Property Case Digest

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1. ALDABA v CA A letter showing an intention to donate is not sufficient to prove donation; and most certainly not the form required by law in donations.

desire as to the way the above –mentioned property...”) to inherit all his properties. ISSUES: W/N there was a valid donation from Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville?

FACTS: Two lots owned by Belen Aldaba are being disputed in this case. Petitoners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba, father and daughter, lived with Belen Aldaba for 10 years and took care of her until her death. Belen had presumptive heirs her surviving husband Estanislao Bautista, and her brother Cesar Aldaba (represented as the respondents in this case.) After the death of Belen, the respondents asked the petitioners to leave the premises and upon their refusal, the former instituted an ejectment case. The petitioners argue that Belen really intended to donate the property to them as evidence by the note written by Belen to them which reads, “Huag kayong umalis diyan. Talagang iyan ay para sa inyo. Alam nila na iyan ay sa inyo.” They also argue that the property was for compensation of their services which amounted to P53,000. The respondents contend that the letter no way proves a donation.

RULING: NO. A close reading of the letter reveals that it is not a donation inters vivos or motis causa but a mere declaration of an intention and a desire. The fact that the property was mortgage by Arsenio with the knowledge of the Melquiades shows that ownership has not yet transferred. Also when Arsenio died, payments to the loan for which the property was mortgaged stopped and was not continued by the petitioners. It was even foreclosed but was later on redeemed by one of Arsenio’s brothers, Zoilo, who is also one of the respondents. Petitioners has a rightful claim over the property based on the fact that they are heirs of Arsenio but not because of the alleged affidavit executed in favour of Melquidas. Also it is worth noting that the signed affidavit is a forgery because Arsenio Sevile was illiterate during his lifetime. He could not write his name and only affixed his thumbmak in the REM mentioned earlier.

ISSUE: W/N there was a disposition of property by Belen in favour of the petitioners? RULING: NO For the following reasons: (1) The note was insufficient conveyance, and hence could not be considered as evidence of a donation with onerous caus. The note can be considered, at most, as indicative of the intention to donate. (2) no notarial document was executed by Belen to the petitioners during those 10 years. (3) P53,000 worth of services made by the petitioners no way proves the alleged donation. If at all, the petitioners believed that the gratuitous use of the property was not sufficient to compensate them for their services, they could have presented their claims in the intestate proceedings, which they themselves could have initiated, if none was instituted.

3. HOWARD v. PADILLA Donations must conform with the formalities set by law. FACTS: Marie Howard is the widow of the donor. The donated propert was conjugal in nature. The CA ruled that the donation was inter vivos, not mortis causa. As such it is valid and irrevocable. It is valid, however, only up to the extent of the share of the donor in the property. ISSUE: Is the donation mortis causa or inter vivos?

The SC emphasized that there was no express agreement between the parties and that respondents Jane did not even expect to be compensated.

HELD: The donation is mortis causa which takes effect upon the death of the donor. Therefore, the donation not having conformed with the formalities of the law, the same is void.

2. JUTIC v CA A letter showing an intention to donate is not sufficient to prove donation; and most certainly not the form required by law in donations. (Same as previous case)

4. PUIG v. PENAFLORIDA The reservation by the donor of the right to dispose of the property during her lifetime in the deed does not indicate that title had passed to the donee in her lifetime but that the donor merely reserves power to destroy the donation at any time.

FACTS: The properties of Arsenio Seville, who had no wife or children, here are under dispute which includes 2 parcels of agricultural land. Petitioners herein are heirs of Melquiades Seville who was one of the siblings of the deceased Arsenio Seville. Respondents are other heirs claiming rightful ownership over the properties. The petitioners claim that the 2 parcels of land with improvements thereon was donated to their father in an affidavit executed by Arsenio Seville to Melquindes Seville. It stated that the latter was the only one to who the former intended (note: this is only a manifest intention or desire similar to the previous case- the last part of the document says “That I make this affidavit to amek manifest my intention and

FACTS: Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon died in the City of Iloilo, without forced heirs, leaving certain properties in the City and province of Iloilo. She left a will and was survived by nephews and nieces, children of her predeceased brother, Catalino Ubalde, and sister, Luisa Ubalde, married to Ariston Magbanua. Besides her will, the deceased had executed two notarial deeds of donation. One, entitled DONACION MORTIS CAUSA, was executed on November 24, 1948, in favor of her niece, Estela Magbanua. The deceased executed another deed of 1

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donation, also entitled "ESCRITURA DE DONACION MORTIS CAUSA" in favor of the same donee, Estela Magbanua Peñaflorida, conveying to her three parcels of land

took Aurora’s her place in the litigation. Sadly, the CA reaffirmed the RTC decision. ISSUE: w/n the Donation took the nature of one Intervivos

Defendants-appellants Estela Magbanua Peñaflorida, et al., insist that the reservation by the donor of the right to dispose of the property during her lifetime in the deed of December 28, 1949 indicates that title had passed to the donee in her lifetime, otherwise, it is argued, the reservation would be superfluous.

HELD: No. The donation is mortis causa. The court found circumstances signifying that Aurora never intended the donation to take effect within her lifetime. First, she expressed that the donation take effect 10 years after her death. Second, she inserted a prohibition on the sale of the property during the 10 year period. Third, she continued to possess the property as well as the fruits and authorized such enjoyment in the deed of donation. Fourth, she retained the certificate of title and subsequently alienated it in favor of the Sicads. All these are indisputable acts of ownership.

ISSUE: Is the donation mortis causa or inter vivos? HELD: The Court in its decision took to account not only the foregoing circumstance but also the fact that the deceased expressly and consistently declared her conveyance to be one of donation mortis causa, and further forbade the registration of the deed until after her death.

The court then concluded that the real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its language and the intention of the parties as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its execution.

The power, as reserved in the deed, was a power to destroy the donation at any time, and that it meant that the transfer is not binding on the grantor until her death made it impossible to channel the property elsewhere.

The deed subject of litigation is one mortis causa because it stipulated “that all rents, proceeds, fruits, of the donated properties shall remain for the exclusive benefit and disposal of the donor, during her lifetime; and that, without the knowledge and consent of the donor, the donated properties could not be disposed of in any way, whether by sale, mortgage, barter, or in any other way possible.”

5. SICAD V. CA The real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its language and the intention of the parties as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its execution.

A donation which pretends to be one inter vivos but withholds form the donee that right to dispose of the donated property during the donor’s lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa “ the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive.”

FACTS: Capiz, Dec 1979: Granny Aurora Montinola, out of the charitable goodness of her heart, drew up a Deed in favor of her darling grandkids Catalino, Judy and Jesus- all of them Valderramas. The deed bore the title “Deed of Donation Intervivos.”

Because of Aurora’s actions, nothing was transferred by the deed of donation in question to her grandchildren. They did not get possession of the property donated. They did not acquire the right to the fruits thereof, or any other right of dominion over the property. More importantly, they did not acquire the right to dispose of the property – this would accrue to them only after ten years from Aurora’s death. Moreover, they never saw what the certificate of title looked like.

Thereafter, Aurora’s able secretary presented the Deed to the Registrar for the purpose of canceling the original title and obtaining a transfer certificate of title in favor of the three donees. A twist of events followed. The duplicate title never reached the donees; Aurora retained the document and maintained possession of the property for ten years after the transfer.

These circumstances ultimately lead to the conclusion that the donation in question was a donation mortis causa, envisioning a transfer of ownership only after the donor knocks on Heaven’s door.

The tipping point arrived when Aurora then alienated the land to spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad. Simultaneously with alienation, Aurora issued a Deed of Revocation of Donation. She asserted that the donation took the nature of mortis causa and was therefore revocable anytime. She further averred that the same failed to follow the formality of wills, and therefore was nullity.

6. DAVID V SISON When the donor maintains the essential rights of ownership over the property during his lifetime, the donation is mortis causa.

Aurora’s grandchildren found their grandma’s reversal vexing. They insisted that the Deed was one intervivos and therefore irrevocable. The RTC adjudicated and found for the grandchildren.

FACTS: Manila, 1943: The Administrator of deceased Ms. David was ordered by the court to pay the lawyer of deceased the amount of P18,000 for legal services rendered. The lawyer, on the other hand, wanted about P81,000. (chaching!!!) which was equivalent to 5% of the inventoried estate. Administrator thought that too high and said he’d be happy to pay P3,000.

Aurora took the case to the CA but, alas, kicked the bucket during proceedings. The Spouses Sicad who were in possession of the property 2

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Both parties based their claims on the central issue of the donation by Ms. David. If the donation was mortis causa, then the donation should be inventoried with the estate and therefore the lawyer can get his lofty demand. Should the donation have been intervivos, then the donation wouldn’t be inventoried and therefore the In a donation mortis causa, the right of administrator can pay the lower sum contended.

included in the inventory of the estate and should follow the same proceedings as if they were not donated at all. The court then awarded the lawyer P10,000 instead of the P81,000 he craved.

disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive.

7. MAGLASANG V. HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, 383 SCRA 6

The lower court analyzed a few paragraphs of the deed (in tagalog) and concluded that the deed partook of the nature mortis causa.

FACTS: On February 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot." Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 1995, bestowing upon: (a) petitioner Estela C. Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land;(b) Nicolas Cabatingan, a portion of a parcel of land; and (c) Merly S. Cabatingan, a portion of land.These deeds of donation contain similar provisions, to wit:

"Na and naturang "donor," Margarita David y Puato, alang-alang sa malaki niyang pagtiñgin, pagliñgap at pagmamahal sa mga nabanguit na "donees" Narcisa de la Fuente at Priscila de la Fuente, sa pamamagitan nang kasulatang ito, malayang ibinigay at ipinagkakaloob sa mga naturang Narcisa de la Fuente at Priscila de la Fuente, at sa kanilang mga tagapagmana, "albacea" at "Administradores", sa habang panahon, ang kanyang mga titulo, interes at participacion sa mag sumusunod na ari-arian na pawang malines sa lahat nang mga pananagutan: (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 209, 210.)

"That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, x x x the DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described property, together with the buildings and all improvements existing thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect; x x x"3 (Emphasis Ours)

Datapwa't ang lahat nang mga tubo at pakinabangan nang nagbibigay o "donor" na si Margarita David y Puato hanggang siya ay hindi binabawian nang buhay nang maykapal; at ang mga pinagbibigyan na si Narcisa de la Fuente at Priscila de la Fuente ay hindi maaaring maipagbili, maisangal, a maipagpalit o sa ano pa man paraan, kung walang kaalaman at pahintulot nang naturang Margarita David y Puato.

On May 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died.

ISSUE: w/n the Deed of Donation is Mortis Causa

Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations, respondents (Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan) filed an action for Annulment And/Or Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Donations and Accounting, seeking the annulment of said four (4) deeds of donation executed. Heirs allege, inter alia, that petitioners, fraudulently caused the donations and that the documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa.

HELD: Yes. The deed of donation makes it clear that all rents, proceeds, fruits, of the donated properties shall remain for the exclusive benefit and disposal of the donor, Margartia David, during her lifetime and that, without the knowledge consent of the donor, the donated properties could not be disposed of in any way, whether by sale, mortgage, barter, or in any other way possible, thus making the donees just as paper owners of the properties.

RTC ruled that the donation was mortis causa thus void for not following the requisite forms.

The court then concluded that the donation in question is a donation mortis causa, because the combined effect of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of donation and of the above-quoted clauses thereof could not have taken effect before the death of Margarita David. According to the terms of the deed, the most essential elements of ownership — the right to dispose of the donated properties and the right to enjoy the products, profits, possession — remained with Margarita David during her lifetime, and would accrue to the donees only after Margarita David's death.

ISSUE: W/N the donation was mortis causa? HELD: Mortis Causa. In a donation mortis causa, "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive." In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;

While the donation in question is a donation mortis causa, the court declined to rule that the donated properties should be

(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by 3

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the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; And

several parcels of land made by Domingo Bonsato in favor of Juan and Felipe Bonsato. The donations were embodied in two Notarial deeds which the Josefa Utea and the heirs allege were obtained thru fraudulent inducement.

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime.

In the Notarial deeds, the donor reserved for himself a portion of the fruits of the properties and expressed “that after the death of the donor, the aforesaid donation shall become effective.” CFI ruled that the donation was inter vivos therefor valid. CA ruled it was mortis causa therefor invalid for not following the required formalities. ISSUE: W/N the donation was inter vivos? HELD: Inter Vivos. If the donation conveys the ownership and only reserves for himself during his lifetime the owner’s share of the fruits or proceeds, and the deed expressly declares the act to be “irrevocable,” it is not a donation mortis causa, but a conveyance inter vivos.

For a donation mortis causa to be valid it must conform with the following requisites: ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The solemnities required for a donation inter vivos are those prescribed by Art. 749 of the Civil Code. But only half of the property conveyed shall be valid since the property is conjugal and only Domingo made the conveyance without any consent

Whether it is a donation mortis causa or inter vivos can be inferred upon the execution of the deed as to what the donor intended it to be. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written , and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

from Andrea. Note: Many portions of the case are in Spanish.

9. ALEJANDRO V. GERALDEZ FACTS: Sps. Gavino Diaz and Severa Mendoza executed a Deed of Donation in favor of their children, Olimpia, Angel and Andrea Diaz. In the deed of donation, the Sps. Donated 8 lots, with reservations on certain lots, to their children and daughters-inlaw and with conditions that they are not allowed to alienate the same to 3rd persons while the couple are still alive and that they shall continue to administer the same until their death. The donees manifested their acceptance in the same deed of donation. When Gavino died, Severa executed a deed of donation in favor of Angel and Andrea, giving the siblings each a ½ portion of Lot 2377-A. When Severa died, Andrea sued Angel to have the lots 2377-A and 2502 partitioned. Teodorico Alejandro, the surviving spouse of Olimpia, moved to intervene claiming 1/3 portion of Lot 2502.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the If the donation conveys the ownership and only reserves for himself during his lifetime the owner’s share of the fruits or proceeds, and the deed expressly declares the act to be “irrevocable,” it is not a donation mortis causa, but a conveyance inter vivos. will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (n)

The CFI ruled that the donation was a donation mortis causa because the ownership of the properties donated did not pass to the donees during the donor’s lifetime but was transmitted to the donees only “upon the death of the donors”. It, however, sustained the partition of Lot 2502 since it was an extrajudicial partition. Both parties appealed to the SC, Andrea contending that it is a donation inter vivos while Alejandro contending it to be mortis causa.

8. BONSATO V. CA|UTEA, 95 Phil 481 FACTS: Josefa Utea and other heirs of deceased Domingo Bonsato and Andrea Nacario filed a complaint to annul the donations of

ISSUE: W/N the donation is a donation inter vivos or mortis causa 4

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RULING: Donation inter vivos The donation is a donation inter vivos because it took effect during the lifetime of the donors as provided in Art. 729. It was stipulated in the deed that out of love and affection by the donors to the donees, the latter are donating wholeheartedly and unconditionally free from any kind of lien and debt. Likewise, it was accepted by the donees which is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa are never accepted during the donor’s lifetime.

ISSUES (1) W/N the probate has jurisdiction to exclude properties donated to Ursula (2) W/N the donation executed in favor of Ursula was a donation inter vivos RULING (1) YES It was stressed in the order of the probate court that it was without prejudice to the final determination in a separate action. It is well-settled that although a probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties, it can determine whether or not the properties should be included in the inventory to be administered. Such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action.

The reservation clause which provides that the donees cannot sell the lots to 3 rd persons while the couple is still alive implies that the ownership already passed. Although there was a stipulation where the couple reserved to themselves the administration, ownership and rights over the properties mentioned, this should not be construed as to mean that ownership will pass only after their death. This refers to the beneficial ownership and not the naked title and what the donors reserved to themselves by means of that clause was the management of the donated lots and the fruits thereof.

(2) YES Although the donation was entitled “donations mortis causa” it has been held that dispositions in a deed of donation do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation. It is the body of the document which should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor.

10. REYES V. MOSQUEDA

For a donation to be a donation mortis causa, the following characteristics should be present: 1. It conveys no title before the death of the transferor or the transferor retains ownership over the property 2. Before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will 3. The transfer is void should the transferor survive the transferee

The nature of the disposition made is the determinative factor which makes the donation “ inter vivos” or “ mortis causa” and not the title given to a deed of donation. FACTS Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and was survived by his sister Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters, herein petitioners Ruperto Reyes et. al. The heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M in the CFI for the administration of Pascual’s estate. Ursula then filed a motion to exclude some properties included alleging that these were

The following are not present in the case. The transfer of ownership was immediate and independent of the death of the donor. The provision stating that the donor has reserved

A sale can still be valid (even if seller was not the owner at the time of the sale) if ownership of the subject matter reverts back to the donor of a donation that is subject to a resolutory condition not being fulfilled.

donated to her in a donation mortis causa in 1966. This was granted by the CFI without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. An appeal was made to the SC. The SC then issued a TRO enjoining the CFI from enforcing the order.

sufficient properties for himself to maintain him for life confirms the intention of the donor to give naked ownership immediately after execution of the deed of donation.

Among the properties donated to Ursula is lot 24 which was also donated in 1969 in a deed of donation inter vivos in favor of Ofelia Parungao who was then a minor at the time of the donation. When she reached the age of majority, she had the donation registered but found out that the certificate of title was missing so she filed a petition for reconstitution of title which was granted and she registered the donation and was issued a new TCT in her name.

11. GESTOPA V CA FACTS Spouses Danlag own six parcels of land. To four parcels of land, they executed a donation mortis causa in favor of respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil, reserving donor's rights to amend, cancel, or revoke the donation and to sell or encumber such properties. Years later, they executed another donation, this time inter vivos, to six parcels of land in favor of respondents, reserving their rights to the fruits of the land during their lifetime and for prohibiting the donee to sell or dispose the properties donated. Subsequently, the spouses sold 2 parcels to herein petitioners, spouses Gestopa, and eventually revoking the donation. Respondent filed a petition to quiet title, stating that she had already become the owner of the parcels of land. Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioners,

Ursula then sold the lot in favor of the Reyes. Benjamin Reyes filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Ofelia’s TCT which prompted Ofelia to file a petition for recovery of possession against Benjamin Reyes. The CFI issued a joint decision for the 2 cases ruling that Ofelia’s TCT was null and void. The IAC affirmed thus an appeal to the SC. 5

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but CA reversed.

their rights to recover the possession and ownership over the property since they immediately filed the action when the municipality passed the resolution, reverting the ownership of land to the donors. However, a sale being a consensual contract, it can be perfected upon meeting of the minds, and completing the three essential elements of a valid contract of sale. Even when Trinidad was not the owner when the sale was perfected, tradition through delivery is only important upon the consummation stage. Such transfer of ownership through actual or constructive delivery only happened when the lands reverted back to petitioners. Art 1434 is applicable, stating that seller's "title passes by operation if law to the buyer," and therefore making the sale valid. The donated lots cannot be considered outside the commerce of man, since nowhere in

ISSUE: Whether the (second) donation was inter vivos or mortis causa RULING It was donation inter vivos. The spouses were aware of the difference between the two donations, and that they needed to execute another deed of donation inter vivos, since it has a different application to a donation mortis causa. Also, the court stated four reasons to the matter: (1) that the spouses donated the parcels of land out of love and affection, a clear indication of a donation inter vivos; (2) the reservation of a lifetime usufruct; (3) reservation of sufficient properties for

The donation, following the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only upon the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee."

maintenance that shows the intention to part with their six lot; and (4) respondent's acceptance, contained in the deed of

the law states that properties owned by municipality would be as such.

An inter vivos donation of real property as distinguished from a donation mortis causa is one executed in a public document and accepted by the donees in the same instrument or a separate one and takes effect during the lifetime of the donors.

donation. Once a deed of donation has been accepted, it cannot be revoked, except for officiousness or ingratitude, which the spouses failed to invoke.

13. LAGAZO V. CA I CABANLIT FACTS: Petitioner filed an action seeking to recover from defendant a parcel of land which the former claims to have acquired from his grandmother by donation. Respondent on the other hand, put up the defense that when the alleged donation was executed, he had already acquired the property by a Deed of Assignment (allegedly executed before the Deed of Donation to Plaintiff) from a transferee (the former agent) of petitioner’s grandmother. Defendant also claims that petitioner failed to accept the donation whether in the same deed of donation or in a separate instrument rendering the donation null and void. Petitioner defends that the donation in any case was onerous as he wsd the one who paid the land’s amortization.

12. QUIJADA V CA FACTS Petitioners are the children of the late Trinidad Quijada. Trinidad and her siblings executed a deed of donation of a two-hectare lot in favor of the Municipality of Talacogon (Agusan del Sur), exclusively for the purpose of constructing the proposed provincial high school. However, possession remained with Trinidad. She subsequently sold the two hectares on two separate occasions to Regalado Mondejar, who sold it to different persons. Eventually, the Municipality, failing to construct the high school, reverted ownership to the donors. Petitioners filed an action for quieting of title and recovery of possession and ownership. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, but CA reversed.

ISSUE: W/N the donation is simple or onerous.

ISSUE: Whether the deed of donation had a suspensive condition or a resolutory condition *Whether the sale was valid

RULING: A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no strings attached), while an onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to or more in value than the thing donated. Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple donation are not applicable.

RULING: When the donation was accepted, the ownership was transferred to the school, only subject to a condition that a school must be constructed over the lot. Since ownership was transferred, and failure to fulfill the condition reverts the ownership back to the donor, it is a resolutory condition.

We rule that the donation was simple, not onerous. Even conceding that petitioner's full payment of the purchase price of the lot might have been a burden to him, such payment was not however imposed by the donor as a condition for the donation. Rather, the deed explicitly stated:

(Not really a discussion in Property) When Trinidad sold the parcels of land to Mondejar, she was not the owner of the land. Petitioners also did not sleep on 6

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For his part, the Petitioner testified that he was the husband That...the DONOR hereby voluntarily and freely gives, by way of Isidra Melad, Domingo's niece, whom he and his wife Juana of Three essential elements of a donation: 1. Reduction in the patrimony of the donor 2. Increase in the patrimony of the donee 3. Intent to do an act of liberality or aniumus donandi It is also required that the donation be made in a public document and that its acceptance be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, which has to be recorded as well.

donation unto said DONEE...the above described real property, together with all the buildings and improvements found therein, free from all lines [sic] and encumbrances and charges whatsoever;

Malupang had taken into their home as their ward as they had no children of their own. He and his wife lived with the couple in their house on the residential lot and helped Domingo with the cultivation of the farm. Domingo Melad signed in a private instrument in which he gave the defendant the farm and in another private instrument in which he also gave him the residential lot, on the understanding that the latter would take care of the grantor and would bury him upon his death. “I, DOMINGO MELAD do hereby declare in this receipt the truth of my giving to Felix Danguilan, my agricultural land...that I hereby declare and bind myself that there is no one to whom I will deliver this land except to him as he will be the one responsible for me in the event that I will die and also for all other things needed and necessary for me...” “I, DOMINGO MELAD, declare the truth that I have delivered my residential lot to Felix Danguilan because he will be the one to take care of SHELTERING me or bury me when I die...”

The payments even seem to have been made pursuant to the power of attorney executed by Catalina Reyes in favor of petitioner, her grandson, authorizing him to execute acts necessary for the fulfillment of her obligations. As a pure or simple donation, the following provisions of the Civil Code are applicable: Art. 734. The donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. Art. 746. Acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and the donee. Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public instrument, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.

Respondent attacked the alleged donations on the ground that that they were donations of real property and as such should have been effected through a public instrument.

The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation and in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor. If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.

ISSUE: W/N the donation was valid RULING: It is our view, considering the language of the two instruments, that Domingo Melad did intend to donate the properties to the petitioner, as the private respondent contends. We do not think, however, that the donee was moved by pure liberality. While truly donations, the conveyances were onerous donations as the properties were given to the petitioner in exchange for his obligation to take care of the donee for the rest of his life and provide for his burial. Hence, it was not covered by the rule in Article 749 of the Civil Code requiring donations of real properties to be effected through a public instrument. The case at bar comes squarely under the doctrine laid down in Manalo v. De Mesa, where the Court held: There can be no doubt that the donation in question was made for a valuable consideration, since the donors made it conditional upon the donees' bearing the expenses that might be occasioned by the death and burial of the donor

The donation, following the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only upon the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee."

14. DANGUILAN V. IAC I MELAD FACTS: Respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner for recovery of a farm lot and a residential lot which she claimed she had purchased from Domingo Melad, the original owner, and were now being unlawfully withheld by the defendant. In his answer, the petitioner denied the allegation and averred that he was the owner of the said lots of which he had been in open, continuous and adverse possession, having acquired them from Domingo Melad in 1941 and 1943 by donation.

In order to determine whether or not an onerous donation is valid and effective it should be sufficient to demonstrate that, as a contract, it embraces the conditions the law requires, although not recorded in a public instrument. 7

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Placida Manalo, a condition and obligation. Therefore, in order to determine whether or not said donation is valid and effective it should be sufficient to demonstrate that, as a contract, it embraces the conditions the law requires and is valid and effective, although not recorded in a public instrument.

executed by Helen were really donations inter vivos. Republic filed with RTC a Petition for Escheat praying that ½ of David’s interest be forfeited in its favor. RTC dismissed. CA affirmed. ISSUE: W/N there was a donation inter vivos HELD: NO. Not all the elements of a donation are present. The transfer of the properties by virtue of a Deed of Quitclaim resulted in the (1) reduction of her patrimony as donor and the (2) consequent increase in the patrimony of David as donee. However, Helen’s (3) intention to perform an act of liberality in favor of David was not sufficiently established. The 2 Quitclaims reveal that Helen intended to convey to her son certain parcels of land and to re-affirm it, she executed a waiver and renunciation of her rights over these properties. It is clear that Helen merely contemplated a waiver of her rights, title, interest over the lands in favor of David, not a donation. She was also aware that donation was not possible. Moreover, the essential element of acceptance in the proper form and registration to make the donation valid is lacking. The SPA executed by David in favor of Atty. Abela was not his acceptance, but an acknowledgment that David owns the property referred to and that he authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same in his name. Further, there was nothing in the SPA to show that he indeed accept the donation. However, the inexistence of a donation does not make the repudiation of Helen in favor David valid. There is NO valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already accepted her share of the inheritance when she, together with David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, dividing and adjudicating between them all the properties. By virtue of that settlement, the properties were registered in their names and for 11 years, they possessed the land in the concept of owner. Thus, the 2 Quitclaims have no legal force and effect. Helen still owns ½ of the property.

The private respondent argues that as there was no equivalence between the value of the lands donated and the services for which they were being exchanged, the two transactions should be considered pure or gratuitous donations of real rights, hence, they should have been effected through a public instrument and not mere private writings. However, no evidence has been adduced to support her contention that the values exchanged were disproportionate or unequal. As to the claim of Respondent that there was a deed of sale, assuming that the sale was valid, there was no trasnfer of ownership because the land was never delivered to Respondent. It is true that the same article declares that the execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, but, in order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had such control over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its material delivery could have been made. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of possession. There is no dispute that it is the petitioner and not the private respondent who is in actual possession of the litigated properties.

15. REPUBLIC v. GUZMAN

An ordinary donee of a land who causes the donation to be recorded in the Mortgage Law Register in bad faith or with notice of the rights of an adverse claimant requires no additional rights against such claimant through the inscription in the registry.

FACTS: David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses Simeon Guzman (naturalized American) and Helen Meyers Guzman (American citizen). In 1968, Simeon died leaving to his heirs, Helen and David, an estate consisting of several parcels of land in Bulacan. In 1970, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, dividing and adjudicating to themselves all of the property, and registered it to the RD a year after. In 1981, Helen executed a Deed of Quitclaim, assigning, transferring and conveying her ½ share of the properties to David. But since it was not registered, she executed another Deed of Quitclaim to confirm the first. In 1994, Atty. Batongbacal wrote the OSG andfurnished it with documents showing that David’s ownership of ½ of the estate was defective. He argued that Art. XII of the Constitution only allows Filipinos to acquire private lands in the country. The only instances when a foreigner may acquire private property are by hereditary succession and if he was formerly a natural-born citizen who lost his Filipino citizenship. Moreover, it contends that the Deeds of Quitclaim

16. CAGAOAN V. CAGAOAN

FACTS: Eugenio and Felix Cagaoan are sons of Gregorio Cagaoan. In 1915, Gregorio executed a deed of gift of 4 parcels of land in Pangasinan in favor of Felix (without delivery of actual possession) and in 1918 in favor of Eugenio (who immediately took possession) over a parcel of land, which is the same as parcel no. 4 in the deed of gift in favor of Felix. 8

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Immediately, Eugenio took possession of the land donated, but failed to have the donation recorded with the RD. However, Felix’s deed was registered in 1919 and took possession of Parcel Nos. 1, 2 and 3 since 1915. He has never had possession of Parcel No. 4. After Eugenio had taken possession, Felix had caused his title to be recorded in the Mortgage Law Register, having full notice of the donation made to Eugenio. Eugenio instituted an action to declare him the owner of the parcel of land donated to him and to set aside the donation in favor of Felix on the ground of fraud. RTC ruled in favor of Felix ordered Eugenio to surrender possession of the land to him. ISSUE: Who owns the parcel of land in dispute? HELD: EUGENIO. It clearly appears the Felix had full notice of the Eugenio’s claim to the land before he had his deed of gift recorded with the RD. Thus, he may not be considered a third person within the meaning of Art. 34 of the Mortgage Law, and his position was in no wise improved by the inscription of his document. Eugenio, having first taken possession in good faith, must therefore be considered to have a better right to the land in question.

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