Property Case Digest- Possession

POSSESSION: Theory Exceptions Thereto

of

Irrevindicability

and

EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP v. SANTOS G.R. No. 80298, 26 April 1990 FACTS: Jose Cruz ordered 406 books from EDCA through telephone, payable on delivery. Cruz issued a personal check covering the purchase price for the books. Cruz sold 120 books to Santos who, upon verifying the seller’s ownership from the invoice he showed her, paid him the purchase price. Upon investigation, EDCA confirmed that Cruz was an impostor and had no intention of paying the books ordered (the check issued bounced). Thus, with the assistance of police, EDCA forcibly seized the books from Santos and threatened her with prosecution for buying stolen property. Santos sued for the recovery of the books after demand for their return was rejected by EDCA. EDCA argued that pursuant to Article 559 of the Civil Code, it has the right to recover the books since it was unlawfully deprived thereof. ISSUE: Was EDCA unlawfully deprived of the books because the check issued by the impostor in payment therefor was dishonored? RULING: NO. There was no unlawful deprivation of property, which would entitle the petitioner to recover a property from the person possessing it in good faith. Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books, which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books. Nonpayment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another. LASAM V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS G.R. NO. 42859 Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession, however, possession is not gained by mere nominal CLAIM. FACTS: Lasam files a case in Court for the registration of a parcel of land, containing an area of around 24,000,000 hectares. He presents Exhibit L as proof of his possession over the land. Exhibit L is a certified copy of an application. This application states that Lasam’s predecessor in interest, Domingo Narag, has owned the land since time immemorial. However, the property described in Exhibit L is 15,000,000 hectares only and the property sought to be registered is 24,000,000 hectares. Furthermore, the document, mentions a fifth parcel of land which is the same parcel described in another Exhibit K. Apparently, the surveyor of the land delineated the property based on what the possessor at that time pointed out to him; he based his study mostly on hearsay. According to the applicant, before his occupation of the land, only about 2 hectares were

cultivated. But then, they justified this by invoking the doctrine of constructive possession (That a person in possession of the land does not have to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession). Thus, the Director of Lands opposed the registration on the ground that a) it is not supported by any title fit for registration and b) that the land sought to be registered is public land. ISSUE: Is the applicant entitled to registration because of the required possession during the time prescribed by law? Is he entitled to the 24,000,000 hectares of land considering that the area possessed is only 2 hectares? HELD: First, the Court ruled that Exhibit L cannot be a valid application because the identity o the land was not clearly established. Second, although there is proof that Lasam might have possessed a portion of the parcel land, the proof is lacking in certainty as to the portion occupied and the extent thereof. Although the counsel invokes the doctrine of constructive possession, the said application is subject to certain qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that among these qualifications is one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the portion of land actually in possession of the claimant. While, therefore, possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession, possession is not gained by mere nominal CLAIM. The mere planting of a sign or a symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellanlike claim of dominion over an immense tract of territory. An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document evidencing his title thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of his title but the identity of the land therein referred to. The document in such a case is either a basis of his claim for registration or not at all. If, as in this case, he only claims a portion of what is included in his title, he must clearly prove that the property sought to be registered is included in that title. While "possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession", possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an immense tract of territory. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction.

FELIPA CORDERO (Deceased) MAURO OCAMPO, CASIMIRO OCAMPO and ELISEA OCAMPO v. VICTORIA P. CABRAL AND CA G.R. No. L-36789, 25 July 1983 FACTS: Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo, husband of Felipa Cordero and father of the other petitiones, died on May 17, 1958, and left several properties. Petitioners took possession of the properties left by him, among others is a riceland. However, they found out that a portion of the same was possessed by Victoria P. Cabral, Alejandro Berboso and Dalmacio Montaos. Petitioners filed a civil case alleging that Victoria P. Cabral continued claiming to be the owner of the land while her co-defendants continued recognizing her as the owner thereof instead of the plaintiffs despite demands to vacate the property. They also claim that due to respondents' occupancy of the aforementioned portion of land, petitioners failed to realize a yearly harvest of at least ten (10) cavanes of palay at the rate of P10.00 per cavan, from the harvesttime of 1958 up to the present. RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, even though the CA found that the disputed piece of land is registered in the name of the petitioners but because of the supposed oral sale of the same to the predecessors of the defendants mentioned by the petitioners on appeal, it affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing the complaint for the recovery of the land. ISSUES: 1. Are the heirs of the registered owner entitled to the land? 2. May the respondents be held liable for reimbursement of fruits received? RULING: 1. YES. The Court of Appeals found as a fact that the disputed portion of the land is admittedly part of the land originally registered in the name of petitioners’ predecessor in interest. There should be no question that that title had become imprescriptible and the original registrant as well as his successors had the right to vindicate their ownership against anybody else. 2. YES. The respondents, by their own admission, are in possession of the disputed land. There is no evidence that they were possessors in bad faith. However, their good faith ceased when they were served with summons to answer the complaint. As possessors in bad faith from the service of the summons they "shall reimburse the fruits received and those which the legitimate possessor could have received”.

LEDESMA v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 86051, 1 September 1992 FACTS: On September 27, 1977, a person representing himself to be Jojo Consunji, purchased purportedly for his father, a certain Rustico T. Consunji, two brand new motor vehicles(Isuzu Gemini and Holden Premier Vehicle) from Citiwide Motors, Inc. Citiwide Motors delivered the twoabove described motor vehicles to the person who represented himself as Jojo Consunji, allegedly the son of the purported buyer, Rustico T. Consunji, and said person in turn issued a manager’s check of the PCIB for the amount of P101,000.00 as full payment of the value of the two motor vehicles.However, when Citiwid Motors deposited the said check, it was dishonored by the bank

on the ground that it was tampered with, the correct amount of P101.00 having been raised to P101,000.00 per the bank’s notice of dishonor. Citiwide Motors reported to the Philippine Constabulary the criminal act perpetrated by the person who misrepresented himself as Jojo Consunji and in the course of the investigation, Citiwide Motors learned that the real identity of the wrongdoer/impostor is Armando Suarez who has a long line of criminal cases against him for estafa using his similar modus operandi. On October 17, 1977, plaintiffappellant was able to recover the Holden Premier vehicle which was found abandoned somewhere in Quezon City. On the other hand, Citiwide Motors learned that the Isuzu Gemini was transferred by Armando Suarez to third persons and was in the possession of one Jaime Ledesma at the time plaintiffappellant instituted this action for replevin on November 16, 1977. In his defense, Jaime Ledesma claims that he purchased and paid for the subject vehicle in good faith from its registered owner, one Pedro Neyra, as evidenced by the Land Transportation Commission Registration Certificate. After posting the necessary bond in the amount double the value of the subject motor vehicle, plaintiff-appellant was able to recover possession of the 1977 Isuzu Gemini as evidenced by the Sheriff’s Return. ISSUE: Is Citiwide Motors unlawfully deprived of the cars when it sold the same to a person who purported to be authorized by the buyer to get hold of the same on the faith of the manager’s check issued? RULING: YES. A party who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof can recover the same from the present possessor even if the latter acquired it in good faith and has, therefore, title thereto for under the first sentence of Article 559, such manner of acquisition is equivalent to a title. There are three requisites to make possession of movable property equivalent to title, namely: (a) the possession should be in good faith; (b) the owner voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing; and (c) the possession is in the concept of owner. Undoubtedly, one who has lost a movable or who has been unlawfully deprived of it cannot be said to have voluntarily parted with the possession thereof. This is the justification for the exceptions found under the second sentence of Article 559 of the Civil Code. There was a perfected unconditional contract of sale between private respondent and the original vendee. The former voluntarily caused the transfer of the certificate of registration of the vehicle in the name of the first vendee —even if the said vendee was represented by someone who used a fictitious name—and likewise voluntarily delivered the cars and the certificate of registration to the vendee’s alleged representative. Title thereto was forthwith transferred to the vendee. The subsequent dishonor of the check because of the alteration merely amounted to a failure of consideration which does not render the contract of sale void, but merely allows the prejudiced party to sue for specific performance or rescission of the contract, and to prosecute the impostor for estafa under Article 315 of the RPC. Thus, the Court ruled that considering that Ledesma had successfully proven that he acquired the property in good faith from the vendor and for a valuable consideration, he was unlawfully divested of the car in his possession.