Property 452 Reviewer- Doctrines

ALLAN CARLO SOLLER

SIENNA FLORES 

ARTICLE 415 STANDARD OIL OF NEW YORK VS. JARANILLA Ministerial Duty of the Register of Deeds  There is nothing in the Chattel Mortgage Law or in the Administrative Code conferring upon the register of deeds an authority w/ respect to the qualification of chattel mortgages. His duties to register chattel mortgages are ministerial only.  Jaramillo, the head of the Register of Deeds of Manila refused to annotate on the title of land a chattel mortgage on the ground that it is not a chattel. SC held that the duty of the Register of Deeds with regard to chattel mortgages is ministerial only.

The defendant treated the property (2 storey house) as personal property (even if the land on which it stood is owned by someone else). The chattel mortgage over the same property is therefore valid

MANARANG VS. OFILANDA Real property even if subject to a chattel mortgage  After the mortgage was foreclosed because the plaintiffs were not able to pay, they tendered payment to the sheriff but it was refused on the ground that there is still a balance of 260 pesos representing publication in newspapers.  For purposes of notice to be given for the property’s sale and execution, the house of Maranang, even if subject to a chattel mortgage, is considered as real property.  The fact that the parties entered into a contract regarding the house and treated the said property as personal property in their contract does not bind the sheriff in advertising the property’s sale at public auction as personal property.  Sales on execution affect 3rd persons. The regulations governing sales on execution are for public officials to follow. The form of proceedings for each kind of property is suited to its character, not to the character w/c the parties have given it. This is due to the need for a definite, orderly, well-defined regulation for official and public guidance.

Par. 1: Land, building, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil LEUNG YEE VS. STRONG MACHINERY CO Law not followed because of bad faith  The building was real property, and the mere fact that the parties seem to have dealt w/ it separate and apart from the land on w/c it stood didn’t change its character as real property.  Although Art. 1473 says that the title of ownership that is 1 st recorded shall 1st have preference, this must be understood on the basis of good faith. Leung Yee was not a purchaser in good faith, hence such rule did not apply.  Public records cannot be converted into instruments of fraud and oppression by one who secures and inscription therein in bad faith. The force and effect given by law to an inscription in a public record presupposes the good faith of him who enters such inscription.

Par.2: Trees, plants and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land or form an integral part of an immovable SIBAL VS. VALDEZ Growing crops are movable properties by anticipation  Growing crops are considered immovable property so long as they are attached to the land or form an integral part of an immovable.  However, sugarcanes are movable properties by anticipation. They pass from a state of growing (immovable) to a gathered one (movable).

PRUDENTIAL BANK VS. PANIS Treatment of Parties to the property mortgaged essential Issuance of Sales Patent an intervening cause  The rule in Article 415 paragraph 1 is that the inclusion of building means that a building is by itself an immovable property. A building by itself may be mortgaged apart from the land on w/c it was built.  A valid real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on a land belonging to another.  The second issue shows that the Issuance of Sales Patent by the Secretary of Agriculture prohibiting the owner of the land to encumber the property makes the second mortgage null and void. Claro: The grantee under the Public Land Act is prohibited from encumbering the land.

Par5: Machineries, receptacles, instruments, or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works MINDANAO BUS CO. VS. CITY ASSESSOR Machineries are not essential principal elements  Movable equipments to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must 1 st be essential and principal elements of an industry or works, w/o w/c such industry or works would be unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for w/c it was established.  The tools & equipment in this case (Welder Machines, Boring Machines, Grinder and Hydraulic Press) are not essential and principal elements of the business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidental and used to improve its service. Even w/o such tools, its business may be carried on. The transportation business could be carried on

NAVARRO VS. PINEDA Treatment of the owner of the property is essential  Parties to a contract may, by agreement, treat as personal property that w/c by its nature would be real property.  the deed of chattel mortgage was valid based on the doctrine of estoppel, in that “the parties have so expressly agreed” in the mortgage to consider the house as chattel. However, this is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. But w/ respect to 3rd persons, it is considered as immovable.

PROPERTY DOCTRINES -1-

ALLAN CARLO SOLLER 

SIENNA FLORES

w/o the repair or service shop if its equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop. Par. 5 of Art. 415 also requires that the industry or works be carried on in a building or a piece of land. The equipments in question are destined only to repair or service the transportation business, w/c is not carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land. Hence the equipment may not be deemed as real property.

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Though the machineries were principal and essential elements of an industry or work, the stipulation between the parties is valid and binding upon them so long as it does not prejudice the rights of 3 rd persons. Ergo, the machineries are personal property because they were stipulated in the Lease agreement as a personal property.

Par. 9:. Docks and structures which, though floating are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river lake or coast.

DAVAO SAWMILL CO. VS. CASTILLO Law not followed because the lessee constructed the machineries  Machinery w/c is movable in nature becomes immobilized when placed in a land or a building by the owner of the property. Hence, such result will not be accomplished by the placing of machinery in a plant by a tenant or usufructuary or by any person having only a temporary right.  Even if the machineries tend to directly meet the needs of the said industry, its construction should be done by the owner for it to be considered immovable. Hence, the chattel mortgage over the sawmill is valid and enforceable.

FELS ENERGY VS. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS Barges, though moving, are Real property  Pursuant to Par. 9, the power barges are immovable properties by destination. They are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast.  Power barges are categorized as immovable property by destination, being in the nature of machinery and other implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried on in a building or on piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or work.

BERKENKOTTER VS. CU UNIJENG Additional Machinery is an essential and principal element of the industry  The additional machinery is an essential and principal element of the sugary central. The installation of machineries for the purpose of carrying out industrial functions of the sugar central and increasing production constitutes a permanent improvement on the property.

Buboy: WTF! There were 2 confusing provisions invoked by the SC, paragraphs 9 and 5 of Art 415. Par 5 talks about the property which is carried on in a building or on a piece of land. Power barges, are floating! Moreover, barges are not intended to remain at a fixed place because they have to move because they are vessels intended to transfer oil from one point to another. Sienna: WTS! (What the Shit?!) They can’t use Par. 5 as a basis because power barges, by their very nature, remain in the water. One of the requisites for Par. 5 to apply is that the equipment must be carried on in a building or a piece of land. Water is NEITHER a building nor a piece of land!

MAKATI LEASING & FINANCE CORP. VS. WEAREVER TEXTILE MILLS Machineries treated as movable property in a chattel mortgage  Parties to a contract may, by agreement, treat as personal property that w/c by nature would be real property, as long as n interest of 3 rd parties would be prejudiced thereby.  The party is estopped in denying that the drive motor seized is movable for he executed a chattel mortgage. By executing this accessory contract, the Milling Company accepts the validity and enforceability of the chattel mortgage.

Par. 10: Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over immovable property. PRESBITERO VS. FERNANDEZ Rights over sugar quota allocations are immovable properties  Sugar quotas are real property for they are considered “real rights over immovable property”, just like servitudes & easements.  Under the Sugar Limitation Law, the sugar quota allocations are accessories to land, and cannot have independent existence away from a plantation. ARTICLE 416

BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS VS. MERALCO Steel Towers of Meralco are personal property  Vis-à-vis par 1 The poles are removable and attached to a square metal frame by means of bolt, which when unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from place to place.  Vis-à-vis par 3 They are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking the material or causing deterioration upon the object to which they are attached.  Vis-à-vis par 5 They are not machineries, receptacles, instruments and implements, and even if they were, they are not intended for industry or works on the land.

Paragraph 1 UNITED STATES VS. IGNACIO CARLOS Electricity is a movable property  Electricity is considered as a movable property which is capable of appropriation. The true test of the nature of a property is not its corporeality, but its capability of being appropriated.

SERG’S PRODUCTS INC. VS. PCI LEASING & FINANCE Stipulation of the party prevails over the essential character of the property

PROPERTY DOCTRINES -2-

ALLAN CARLO SOLLER

SIENNA FLORES

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The manifestations and effects of electricity may be seen and felt. It is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like other personal property and is capable of appropriation. Paragraph 2 COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS CARIDAD CAPISTRANO Philippine Bills may be considered as merchandise  Money in the country where it is current, is both a measure of value and a medium of exchange, while in other countries it is a commodity bought and sold in the market.  Philippine Bills when taken out of the country are deemed to be taken out of domestic circulation as legal tender, and therefore considered as commodity.

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ARTICLE 417

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BACHRACH MOTOR CO. VS. LACSON LEDESMA Certificate of Stocks are movable properties  A contract of pledge or chattel mortgage, to be binding against 3 rd parties, need not appear in a public instrument, so long as it is delivered to the creditor.  Certificates of stock or of stock dividends, under the Corporation law, are quasi negotiable instruments in the sense that they may be given in pledge or mortgage to secure an obligation. They have some of the attributes and partaking of the character of negotiable instruments, in passing hand to hand. Because of their characteristics of being close to commercial paper, they can be treated as movable property.  Right/title of interest which a person may receive from a Milling Company can be subject to a pledge

The 1987 Constitution bans corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. They are only allowed to hold them through lease. The purpose of the law is to: o Prevent large landholdings w/c tend to create social unrest o Equitably diffuse land ownership o Encourage owner-cultivatorship o Transfer ownership of limited area of alienable land of public domain to a qualified individual o Strengthen the constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable land Absent 2 official acts - a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable. PEA may sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private individuals, since there is no longer a statutory prohibition against such sales and the constitutional ban doesn’t apply to individuals. PEA however, cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private corporations. The legislative authority only benefits individuals. Private corporations remain barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain, including government reclaimed land.

HEIRS OF PROCESO BAUTISTA VS. SPS. BARZA Timber lands  Until timer lands are released as disposable/alienable, neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has the authority to lease/grant/sell/dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases, fishpond leases, etc.  Possession acquired in good faith doesn’t lose its character except from the moment facts exist w/c show that the possessor is not unaware that he possess the thing improperly or wrongfully.

ARTICLE 419 ARTICLE 420 CRUZ VS. CRUZ VDA. DE NAEG  The applicants for the registration of title or for the confirmation of imperfect title must prove that: o The land is alienable public land o Their open, continuous, exclusive & notorious possession & occupation must be either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945  An applicant for registration under Sec. 48 of the Public Land Act must secure a certification from the Government that the lands w/c he claims to have possessed as owner for more than 30 years are alienable and disposable. It is the burden of the applicant to prove its positive averments.  A person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear & convincing evidence; he should not rely on the weakness of the evidence of the oppositors.

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY VS. CITY OF ILOILO Ports  A port is a place where the ships may anchor or tie up for the purpose of shelter, repair, loading or discharge or cargo & other such activities connected w/ water-borne commerce and including all land and water areas and structures, equipment, and facilities related to these functions.  The warehouse in the case at bar may not be held as part of the port, considering its separable nature as an improvement upon the port. The warehouse is subject to taxation because exemption of public property doesn’t extend to improvements made thereon.  Moreover, the enumeration under Art. 420 specifically states “ports constructed by the State.” The fact that the port was constructed by the State must 1st be established by sufficient evidence. However, no proof was adduced to establish that the port was constructed by the State.

CHAVEZ VS. PEA Alienable lands of the public domain

PHILIPPINE FISHERIES DEVT AUTHORITY VS. CA Public property not subject to execution/foreclosure sale

PROPERTY DOCTRINES -3-

ALLAN CARLO SOLLER 

SIENNA FLORES

Since the Iloilo Fishing Port Complex is a property of public dominion, it cannot be sold at public auction to satisfy the tax delinquency. The IFPC was constructed by the State for public use and/or service, hence it cannot be subject to execution or foreclosure sale. The reclaimed land on w/c the IFPC was built cannot be the object of a private/public sale w/o congressional authorization. This means that the City has to satisfy the tax delinquency through other means other than the sale at public auction of the IFPC.

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REPUBLIC VS. LAT VDA. DE CASTILLO shores  Lakeshore lands or lands adjacent to the lake must be differentiated from foreshore land or that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides.  Accretions on the bank of a lake belong to the owners of the estate to w/c they have been added, while accretion on a sea bank still belongs to the public domain, and is not available for private ownership until formally declared by the government to be no longer needed for public use.  The shores are properties of public domain intended for public use, and therefore not remittable. Portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters and beaches cannot be registered. Their inclusion in a certificate of title doesn’t convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title upon the registrant.

ownership, it follows that banks w/c form part of them are also of public ownership. A river is a compound concept consisting of 3 elements: the running waters, the bed and the banks. All these constitute the river. Since a river is but one compound concept, it should have only 1 nature – it should be either totally public or completely private. And since rivers are of public ownership, it is implicit that all 3 component elements be of the same nature also. The City of Manila cannot be accused of unjustly profiting at Hilario’s expense. They were not responsible for the shifting of the River. It was due to natural causes for w/c not one can be blamed. The government, through Hilario, may have been enriched by chance, but not unjustly.

VDA. DE VILLONGCO VS. MORENO Navigable river  RA 2056 states that any dam, dike or any other work that encroaches into any public navigable river, stream, coastal waters and any other public navigable waters or waterways, or that they are constructed in areas declared as communal fishing grounds, shall be removed w/in 30 days.  In order to be exempted, the following requisites must be present: o The constructions/works were constructed in good faith before the areas were declare communal fishing grounds o The constructions/works would not impede the free passage of any navigable river or stream o The constructions/works wouldn’t cause inundations of agricultural areas  In the case at bar, the 2nd requisite is missing. The area included a portion of the Manila Bay area or coastal area, & is evidently navigable at high tide for vessels of deeper draft. Hence, it is part of the waterways – waterways w/c are especially used by fishermen & fishpond owners to bring in their catch to market. It is public property and not susceptible of appropriation by any private individual, not only because it belongs to the state, but also because it is a waterway.

MANECLANG VS. IAC Creek  The Compromise Agreement between the parties is null and void. The stipulations contained therein partake of the nature of an adjudication of ownership in favor of Maneclang of the fishpond, w/c was found as a creek forming a tributary of the Agno River.  A creek is an arm extending from a river & participating in the ebb & flow of the sea. It is property belonging to the public domain w/c is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. As public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens system in the name of any individual.

MUNICIPALITY OF CAVITE VS. ROJAS Lease on a plaza is void there is reimbursement  The residential house of Rojas was constructed on a part of Plaza, a land of public domain. The lease to her over the land was void and the SC ordered reimbursement to the lease fees collected.  In leasing the said plaza to Rojas, the municipality exceeded its authority in the exercise of its executing a contract over a thing w/c it could not dispose, nor is it empowered to do. The contract is null and void, and the thing leased cannot be the object of a contract.

SANTOS VS. MORENO Streams/Canals  No private person has a right to usurp possession of watercourse, branch of a river, or lake of public domain and use, unless it shall have been proved that he constructed the same w/in property of his exclusive ownership.  Canals constructed by the State and devoted to public use are of public ownership. Conversely, canals constructed by private persons w/in private lands and devoted exclusively for private use must be of private ownership. The streams involved were artificially made & devoted to the exclusive use of the hacienda owner.

SANCHEZ VS. MUNICIPALITY OF ASINGAN, PANGASINAN Cross-reference to Rojas is untenable.  The property involved in the case of Rojas was devoted to public use, and therefore outside the commerce of man, while the property in the case at bar is patrimonial in character.

HILARIO VS. CITY OF MANILA River  All riverbanks are of public ownership – including those formed when a river leaves its old bed and opens a new course through a private estate. The riverbank is part of the riverbed. Since all beds of rivers are of public

PROPERTY DOCTRINES -4-

ALLAN CARLO SOLLER 

SIENNA FLORES

The lease being valid, the reimbursement prayed for cannot be allowed. In fact, the lessees benefited from the lease by constructing temporary stores and buildings.

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CITY OF MANILA VS GARCIA Lease contracts to Squatters do not cure the illegality of taking of the land  The defendants entered the parcel of land without the knowledge and consent of the owner. The contract of lease given cannot grant them the right to claim the disputed land as their own.  The mayor of the City of Manila cannot legalize forcible entry into public property by the simple expedient of giving permits or executing leases.

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purchase, if it was not intended as patrimonial, his purchase does not transfer the ownership of the property to him. When there has been bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, sowed, or planted on another’s land, but also on the part of the owner of the latter, the rights of both shall be the same as if they had acted in good faith. Roa constructed the building in bad faith for he had knowledge of the fact that his grantor was not the owner thereof. There was bad faith on the part of the Municipality since it allowed Roa to construct the building w/o any opposition on its part and to so occupy it for 8 years. The rights of the parties must, therefore, be determined as if they had both acted in good faith.

CEBU OXYGEN AND ACETYLENE VS BERCILLES Abandoned Roads changed the nature of the property from public to patrimonial.  Abandoned roads are of patrimonial character for it is no longer intended for public use or for public service. The City Council of Cebu has the power wand authority to pass resolutions declaring the land as patrimonial property. Claro: The question of whether or not property of public domain is no longer needed for public service and therefore shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State is a question of fact.

GOVT VS. CABANGIS Wearing away of land  General Rule: When the lots began to wear away & when it was completely submerged, they became a part of the public domain.  Exception: If government removed silt & the shore moved, the owner wouldn’t lose title over the property because it wasn’t due to the natural ebb and flow of the tide.  Cabangis could have protected their land by building a retaining wall when the waters of the sea began to wear it away. Their failure to do so constituted abandonment.  Accdg. to the Law of Waters “Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by provinces, pueblos, or private persons, w/ proper permission, shall become the property of the party constructing such works.” Claro: the natural wearing away of the land is called “natural expropriation” and is not subject to indemnity

ARTICLE 424 VIUDA DE TANTOCO VS. MUNICIPALITY OF ILOILO Properties devoted to public service are not subject to attachment  Property, real or personal, held by municipal corporations, in trust for the benefit of their inhabitants, and used for public purposes, is not subject to levy and sale under execution.  Property for public use of the State is not w/in the commerce of man, and consequently is inalienable and not subject to prescription.  There is no right to attach auto-trucks, police patrol automobiles, and police stations for they are devoted to public service.

PALANCA VS LA COMUNIDAD DE FILIPINAS Res Judicata does not apply to the government  The parcel of lands separated by rivers and esteros, for commercial navigation and fishing, are considered lands of public domain.

ARTICLE 425

BUREAU OF FORESTRY VS CA Convincing proof is not needed for Bureau of Forestry to declare a land as agricultural  The classification/reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now the prerogative of the Executive Dept. & not of the courts. It is not the court w/c determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of Government through the Office of the President

ALBA VIUDA DE RAZ VS COURT OF APPEALS  Lachica cannot acquire the land through prescription via the Civil Code. Lachica applied for Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title. This presumes that the land sought to be registered is part of the public domain. Being land of public domain, it cannot be acquire by prescription for no public land an be acquired by private persons w/o any grant, express or implied, from the government.  Prescription does not run against the State.  Even assuming that prescription can apply, Lachica cannot be considered in good faith because he encroached upon the property of others. Being in bad faith, 30 years are needed to obtain title over the land.  There are 2 classifications of land: alienable/disposable & inalienable/nondisposable o Alienable/Disposable  Agricultural

ARTICLE 422 MUNICIPALITY OF OAS VS ROA Intended as Storage of Gov. Property; Statements made that pueblo owns the lot  The general rule is that a public property may only be sold to a private individual when it becomes patrimonial. Even if ROA acquired the lot by

PROPERTY DOCTRINES -5-

ALLAN CARLO SOLLER

SIENNA FLORES

Residential, commercial, industrial Educational, charitable Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public purposes o Inalienable/Non-Disposable  Timber lands  Mineral lands Claro: When the trial court applied prescription, it used the Civil Coe, but that applies only to private property, not property of the public domain. REPLEVIN (RULE 60)

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SV’s right over the land is premised on the certificate of title registered in its name after it had purchased it. As the registered owner, it had the right of possess of said land illegally occupied by another. Claro: A certificate of title is a strong evidence of ownership. Possession is an attribute of ownership.

JOVEN VS. CA  It is incorrect to say that a question of ownership was involved simply because Joven alleged in her complaint. That she instituted a separate action for annulment of the mortgage is not a valid reason for defeating the summary remedy of ejectment.  The ejectment case did not involve the question of title as this was the subject of the annulment case before the RTC of Lucena City  In case of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, the court may issue as a matter of course a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser even during the redemption period, provided that: o A proper motion has been filed o A bond is approved o No 3rd person is involved  If no redemption is made w/in 12 months after the sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and the possession of property. However, to give effect to his right of possession, the purchaser must invoke the aid of the courts & ask for a writ of possession. He cannot simply take the law into his own hands & enter the property w/o judicial authorization.  In case of non-redemption, the purchaser at a foreclosure sale shall either: o File w/ the Register of Deeds a final deed of sale executed by the person in authority by virtue of the power of attorney embodied in the deed of mortgage, OR o File his sworn statement attesting to the fact of non-redemption

TILLSON VS. CA  Replevin, as a provisional remedy, is an ORDER FOR DELIVERY OF PERSONAL PROPERTY  Replevin is “the return to or recovery by a person of goods or chattels claimed to be wrongfully taken or detained upon the person’s giving security to try the matter in court & return the goods if defeated in the action”  Replevin is a form of action w/c lies to regain the possession the possession of personal chattels w/c have been taken from the plaintiff unlawfully  When the trial court executed a Writ of Replevin in favor of Cooney, the sheriff took possession of the yacht. The case is not removed from the operation of Rule 60 by the fact that after the property was taken from Tillson, it was not turned over to Cooney, but to the Coast Guard, on the instructions of the trial court. It does not alter the reality of Tillson’s loss of possession.  Tillson had substantially complied w/ the requirements of Sec. 6 of Rule 60 o He posted a counterbond double the value of the property (in fact more than double the value) o The counterbond was posted w/in 5 days after the taking of the property

PHARMA INDUSTRIES INC. VS PAJARILLAGA  There are 3 kinds of action ejecting a person from the land: - Accion Interdictal: may be either for forcible entry or detainer, w/c is a summary that seeks the recovery of only physical possession, and is brought w/in 1 year in the MTC - Accion publiciana: intended for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceedings, before the RTC - Accion de reivinidicacion: seeks the recovery of ownership w/c of course included the jus utendi & jus fruendi also brought in the RTC  The present case is one for unlawful detainer because Del Rosario refused to vacate the property upon demand & after her right to possess it had ceased to be lawful.  In unlawful detainer, there is no need to allege prior possession & forcible deprivation. Prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non.  But if prior possession be insisted, Pharma Industries actually had it before the suit was filed. It acquired possession when Del Rosario executed in its favor the Deed of Sale w/ right to repurchase over the land & title was confirmed upon failure of Del Rosario to repurchase the property

MACHINERY ENGINEERING SUPPLY VS. CA  Replevin is brought to recover SPECIFIC PERSONAL PRORPERTY unlawfully taken or detained from the owner, provided such property is capable of identification & delivery  Replevin is not applicable to real property or incorporeal personal property  Machineries of respondent were obviously immovable, hence replevin is not applicable FORCIBLE ENTRY (RULE 70) TOYOTA MOTORS PHILS. VS. CA  A certificate of title cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance w/ law.  The complaint for reformation filed by Toyota warrants a dismissal because it amounted to a collateral attack on Sun Valley’s title.  What SV seeks in its complaint is the recovery of possession de jure & not merely possession de facto. SV’s complaint was one for accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC.

PROPERTY DOCTRINES -6-

ALLAN CARLO SOLLER

SIENNA FLORES

VIDE DEL ROSARIO VS. CA  BP 129 vests municipal courts w/ exclusive jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry & unlawful detainer.  The fact that Dennis’ father filed an action for quieting of title before the RTC does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case  In an ejectment case, the issue is the right to physical possession (possession de facto) independent of any claim of ownership  In cases falling under the Revised Rules of Summary procedure, the adjudication can be done on the basis of affidavits and position papers. The court is no longer allowed to hold a hearing to receive testimonial evidence. The proceeding must be as summary as possible in order not to defeat the need to dispose ejectment cases in as fast a time as possible REYES VS. STA. MARIA  The only issue in forcible entry and detainer cases is the physical possession of real property – possession de facto and not possession de jure. If plaintiff can prove a prior possession in himself, he may recover such possession even fro the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority of time, he has the security that entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.  Petitioner’s action was not merely for recovery of possession de facto. It was clearly one of accion publiciana for recovery of possession de jure, if not one of accion reivindicatoria for declaration of their ownership over the land. Hence it was correctly filed w/ the RTC

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No demand was necessary for him to vacate the premises as this was specifically provided for in the agreement that lessee Quemel should vacate the leased premises w/o the necessity of further demand upon failure to comply w/ the terms of the agreement.  Unlawful detainer is defined as the act of withholding the possession of land or building from another who is entitled to it after the expiration or termination of the right of the illegal detainer to hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied, when 1 year had not yet elapsed from the time the original possession had become illegal.  The act of withholding possession w/c could be the subject matter of an ejectment suit is that w/c results from any contract. Thus, an unlawful detainer case can sprint not only from a contract of lease, but may also spring from a compromise agreement w/c is also a contract such as in the case at bar. MABALOT VS. MEDELA  The time limitation of 1 year w/in w/c to file an action for forcible entry and detainer is reckoned not from the moment of occupancy by the defendant, but from the time that his possession becomes unlawful.  The possession of Mabalot became unlawful only after Galvez died; such death terminated the lease in his favor. DE GUZMAN VS. CA  The right to file an action for forcible entry case has already prescribed. The complaint dated 1988 alleged tat De Guzman entered the property in 1988.  Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are quieting processes & the 1 year time bar to the suit is in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. The 1 year period is counted from the time the entry by stealth was made by the defendant.  After the lapse of the 1-year period, the remedy of the party dispossessed of a land is to file an accion publiciana

DAYAO VS. SHELL CO. OF THE PHILS.  Shell filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Dayao & a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Dayao argues that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction can only be issued in cases of forcible entry & not unlawful detainer. However:  Under Art. 1673 of the NCC, a lessor may judicially eject a lessee for violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract. Also Art. 1674 allows the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an unlawful detainer case in the appellate court. It was designed to put an end to the present state of the law w/c unjustly allows the lessee to continue in possession during an appeal. Such provisions are applicable because of the existing relationship of lessor-lessee between the parties.

ZOBEL VS. ABREU  Mere failure to pay rents or breach of contract to pay rents does not render the possession of the lessee per se unlawful, nor may the action for his ejectment from the land accrue upon such failure to breach  The right to bring an action of ejectment or unlawful detainer must be counted from the time the defendant has filed to pay the rent after demand therefore.  It is not the failure to pay rents as agreed upon in a contract, but the failure to pay the rents after a demand therefore is made that entitles the lessor to bring an action of unlawful detainer.

MUNOZ. VS CA  There was no mention that Nicolas was in prior possession of the property. it was only stated that the property was “presently tenanted.” He also failed to state the date of entry or possession, hence he failed to state when entry through stealth was made. Such failure is FATAL, as this determines the start of counting of the 1 year period for filing of summary action of forcible entry.  When the complaint fails to state when dispossession started, the proper action would be accion publiciana/accion reivindicacion cognizable by the RTC.

ARTICLE 435 REPUBLIC VS. GINGOYON RULE 67 RA 8974 Commences expropriation proceedings through the filing of a complaint. No need for legislative authorization to exercise eminent domain. Outlines general procedure under w/c Covers expropriation proceedings intended

VILLEGAS VS. CA

PROPERTY DOCTRINES -7-

ALLAN CARLO SOLLER

SIENNA FLORES 

eminent domain may be exercised by the Government service Government is required to make an initial deposit w/ an authorized government depositary.

for national government infrastructure projects. Service Government is required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession. The initial deposit should be Service Immediate payment is based on: equivalent to the assessed value of 1. zonal valuation of the BIR (in the case of the property for taxation purposes. land) 2. value of the improvements or structures under replacement cost method 3. proffered value of the property (no valuation available & in case of utmost urgency) (FROM CALIDA DIGEST)  Replacement cost method: “The amount necessary to replace the improvements/structure, based on the current market prices for materials, equipment, labor, contractor’s profit and overhead, and all other attendant costs associated w/ the acquisition & installation in place of the affected improvements/structures.”

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The commissioners are required to conduct a hearing to determine just compensation, and to provide the parties the following: o Notice of the said hearings & the opportunity to attend them o The opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor during the said hearings o The opportunity for the parties to argue their respective causes during the said hearings When the principal issue in a case is the determination of just compensation, a hearing before the commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. Trial w/ the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right, and the absence of such violated the parties’ right to due process.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILS. VS. HEIRS OF ANGEL T. DOMINGO,  In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of the like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered.  The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA  The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. The courts must find: 1. that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain 2. that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law.  2 conditions are imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila 1. the land must be private 2. the purpose must be public If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law  The necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in their character. The determination of those questions) belongs to the sovereign power; the decision of the legislative department is final and conclusive, and the courts have no power to review it.  when the statute does not designate the property to be taken nor how may be taken, then the necessity of taking particular property is a question for the courts  But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into. Claro: The courts may still step in when the legislature commits GADLEJ.

REPUBLIC VS. PLDT  The Republic may exercise the sovereign power of eminent domain and require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.  No cogent reason appears why the power of eminent domain may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. DE KNETCH VS. BAUTISTA  even though the state has the right to take private property for public use with just compensation, it may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private property should be taken REPUBLIC VS. DE KNETCH  The social impact factor which existed in the earlier case has disappeared. All the residents in the area was relocated and was duly compensated, the EDSA project is almost complete and only De Knecht, with her violent resistance, stands in the way of the project of reducing the bottleneck traffic in EDSA and also to solve the flood control problem in other area. Due to supervening events, the SC found it proper to reverse the earlier decision.

NATIONAL POWER CORP. VS. SPOUSES DELA CRUZ,

VISAYAN REFINING VS. PAREDES

PROPERTY DOCTRINES -8-

ALLAN CARLO SOLLER 

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SIENNA FLORES to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot refuse both to pay for the building & to sell the land & compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.  The trial court’s decision fails to determine the value of the buildings & of the lot where they are erected as well as the periods of time w/in w/c the option may be exercised & payment should be made, these particulars having been left for determination apparently after the judgment has become final. This procedure is erroneous, for after the judgment has become final, no additions can be made thereto & nothing can be done therewith except its execution. And execution cannot be had, the sheriff being ignorant as to how, for how much, & w/in what time may the option be exercised, & certainly no authority is vested in him to settle these matters w/c involve exercise of judicial discretion. Thus the appealed judgment has never become final, it having left matters to be settled for its completion in a subsequent proceeding, matters w/c remained unsettled up to the time the petition is filed in the instant case.

The power of eminent domain is inseparable from sovereignty, being essential the existence of the State and inherent in government even in its most primitive forms. No law is ever necessary to confer this right upon sovereignty or upon any Government exercising sovereign or quasi-sovereign powers. The power of eminent domain must be exercised in subjection to all the restraints imposed by constitutional or organic law. The are 2 limitations, namely: 1. no law shall be enacted w/c shall deprive any person of property w/o due process of law 2. private property shall not be taken for public use w/o just compensation The use of land by the Govt for military & aviation purposes is a public use w/in the meaning of the provisions of law authorizing the Govt to acquire real estate for public use by the exercise of the right of eminent domain. A military establishment is essential to the maintenance of an organized society. The existence of a legislative appropriation especially destined to pay for land to be acquired by the Govt through the exercise of the power of eminent domain is not an essential pre-requisite to the institution and maintenance of judicial proceedings for the expropriation of such land. All that can be required of the Government is that it should comply w/ the conditions laid down by law. The preliminary deposit serves the double purpose of: 1. a prepayment upon the value of the property, if finally expropriated 2. as an indemnity against damage in the eventuality that the proceedings should fail of consummation

TAYAG VS. YUSECO  Once a party in conformity w/ the court decision has made his choice, & has duly informed the court of the said choice, & is accordingly ordered to comply w/ the same by buying the building erected on his land & pay the value thereof fixed by the courts, that duty is converted into a money obligation w/c can be enforced by executing regardless of the unwillingness or inability of the party concerned to pay the amount.

MRR VS. VELASQUEZ  The report of the commissioners on the value of the condemned land is not final. The judgment of the court is necessary to give effect to their estimated value. Nor is the report of the commissioners conclusive so that the judgment of the court is a mere detail or formality requisite to the proceedings.  The court may accept the commissioners’ report unreservedly; it may return the report for additional facts; or it may set the report aside & appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the report in part or reject it in part. Any one of these methods of disposing of the report is available to and may be adopted by the court according as they are deemed suited to secure the plaintiff the necessary property and to the defendant just compensation.  The estimated value made by the appraisers is to be given great weight. Such valuation must not be lightly set aside if there is a substantial testimony to support it, unless error is plainly manifest, unless it is apparent that injustice has been done, unless the commissioners have clearly gone astray or adopted erroneous principles, or their award is grossly inadequate.

GRANA AND TORRALBA VS. CA  If it would be impractical for the owners of the land to buy that portion of the building standing on his land, as where the whole building might be rendered useless, the solution would be for the owner of the land to sell to the builder in good faith that part of the land on w/c was constructed a portion of the latter’s building. If the builder is unwilling or unable to buy, then he must vacate the land & pay rentals until he does.  A builder in good faith cannot be compelled to pay rentals. He has the right to retain the land on w/c he has built in good faith until he is reimbursed the expenses incurred by him. BACLAYON VS. CA  Once a judgment becomes final & executory, the only jurisdiction left with the trial court is to order its execution. To require the trial court in a hearing supplementary to execution, to receive private respondents’ evidence to prove that they are builders in good faith will disturb a final executory decision. PLEASANTVILLE VS. CA  Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his & his ignorance of any defect/flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, Pleasantville has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee.  Violation of the Contract on Sale of Installment may not be the basis to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith.

ARTICLE 448 IGNACIO VS. HILARIO  The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building. The owner of the land has the option either to pay for the building or

PROPERTY DOCTRINES -9-

ALLAN CARLO SOLLER

SIENNA FLORES of malice & the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. It lies in an honest belief in the validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim, & absence of intention to overreach another.  Art. 448 of the CC refers to a piece of land whose ownership is claimed by 2 or more parties, 1 of whom has built some works, & not to a case where the owner of the land is the builder who then later loses the ownership of the land by sale or otherwise, for where the true owner himself is the builder of the works on his own land, the issue of good faith/bad faith is entirely irrelevant.

TECNOGAS VS. CA  Unless one is versed in the science of surveying, “no one can determine the precise extent or location of his property by merely examining his paper title.”  It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in w/c it was acquired, until the contrary is proved.  Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in case & from the moment facts exist w/c show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. The good faith ceases from the moment the defects in the title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property the true owner.  The supervening awareness of the encroachment by petitioner doesn’t militate against its right to claim the status of a builder in good faith. in fact, the landowner’s exercise of his option can only take place after the builder shall have come to know of the intrusion – in short, when both parties shall have become aware of it. Only then will the occasion for exercising the option arise, for it is only then that both parties will have been aware that a problem exists in regard to their property rights.  The settlement may have recognized the ownership of respondent but such admission cannot be equated w/ bad faith. Petitioner was only trying to avoid litigation, one reason for entering into an amicable settlement.  The obvious benefit to the builder is that, instead of being outrightly ejected from the land, he can compel the landowner to make the choice between the 2 options. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option & compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land.  Petitioner is deemed to have stepped into the shoes of the seller in regard to all rights of ownership over the immovable sold, including the right to compel the private respondent to exercise either of the 2 options.

ARTICLE 457 CUREG VS. IAC  Accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot w/c receives such accretion is covered by Torrens title. As such, it must also be placed under the operation of the Torrens system. VDA. DE NAZARENO VS. CA  Accretion, as a mode of acquiring property, requires the concurrence of these requisites: o the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual & imperceptible o it be the result of action of the waters of the river (or sea) o the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of rivers (or the sea coast) These are called the rules on all alluvion, w/c if present in a case, give to the owners of the land adjoining banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the current of waters.  The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the NCC all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature.  Where land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct & deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man made accretion and, as such, part of public domain.  The dumping of boulders, soil & other filling materials into the creek & river bounding the land, the same would still be part of the public domain.  In any case, Vda. De Nazareno is estopped from denying the public character of the subject land. The mere filing of the Application by the late Nazareno constituted an admission that the land being applied for was public land, having been the subject of the survey plan.

ARTICLES 449-450 DE VERA VS. CA  According to Art 449 & 450, the landowner has 3 alternatives: o appropriate w/c has been built w/o any obligation to pay indemnity o demand the builder to remove what he has built o compel the builder to pay the value of the land  In any event, the landowner is entitled to be indemnified by the builder in bad faith.

HEIRS OF NAVARRO  Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate fronting the river bank; the owner of such estate is called the riparian owner.  Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. The alluvium, by mandate of Art. 457 of the CC, is automatically owned by the riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen

PNB VS. DE JESUS  A builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice bet. appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. However, in order that the builder can invoke the accruing benefit & enjoy his corresponding right to demand that a choice be made by the landowner, he should be able to prove good faith on his part.  Good faith is understood as an intangible & abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition. It encompasses an honest belief the absence

PROPERTY DOCTRINES - 10 -

ALLAN CARLO SOLLER

SIENNA FLORES

but is not automatically registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by 3rd persons.  The disputed land is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined Navarro’s own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Art. 457 of the CC but Art. 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1886.  Laguna de Bay is a lake the accretion on w/c, by mandate of Art. 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, belongs to the owner of the land contiguous thereto.  As part of the public domain, the land is intended for public uses, & so long as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain & is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization granted in by a competent authority.

 The law clearly limits the usufruct constituted in favor of a corporation or association to 50 years. A usufruct is meant only as a lifetime grant. Unlike a natural person, a corporation or association’s lifetime may be extended indefinitely. The usufruct would then be perpetual.

USUFRUCT MORALIDAD VS. PERNES  Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing 1 to enjoy another’s property – it is also defined as the right to enjoy the property of another temporarily, including both the just utendi & jus fruendi, w/ the owner retaining the jus dispodendi or the power to alienate the same.  The term or period of the usufruct originally specified provides only 1 of the bases for the right of a usufructuary to hold & retain possession of the thing given in usufruct. There are other modes or instances whereby the usufruct shall be considered terminated or extinguished.  Usufructuaries do not have the right to reimbursement for the improvements they may have introduced on the property. If the rule were otherwise, the usufructuary might improve the owner out of his own property. HEMEDES VS. CA  The annotation of usufructuary rights in a certificate of title in favor of another does not impose upon the mortgagee the obligation to investigate the validity of its mortgagor’s title.  The owner may validly mortgage the property in favor of a 3 rd person & the usufructuary shall not be obliged to pay the debt of the mortgagor, & should the immovable be attached or sold judicially for the payment of the debt, the owner shall be liable to the usufructuary for whatever the latter may lose by reason thereof. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY VS. CA  A usufruct may be constituted for a specified term & under such conditions as the parties deem convenient subject to the legal provisions on usufruct.  A usufructuary may lease the object held in usufruct. The owner of the property must respect the lease entered into by the usufructuary so long as the usufruct exists.  A usufructuary has the duty to protect the owner’s interests – a usufructuary gives a right to enjoy the property of another w/ the obligation of preserving its form & substance, unless the title constituting it or the law provides otherwise.

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