Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) Training by: Syed Hassan Sultan Date: 17 March 2016

PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS (PHA) TRAINING CONTENT: Module 1: PHA in the context of PSM Module 2: PHA Process Overview Module 3: PHA Planning & Preparation Module 4: PHA Execution-Hazard Identification Module 4a: Hazard & Operability Study (HAZOP) Technique Overview

Module 1: PHA in the context of PSM Running business implies taking risks….

Module 1: PHA in the context of PSM Operational risks cover a large portion of the entire risk portfolio that major corporations are facing on a day-to-day business

-----------Adopting an integrated approach to the Company Risk Portfolio------------

Module 1: PHA in the context of PSM Understanding of risks plays a central role as it drives effective risk management activities Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) is applied to understand risks involved in the design, operation, and modification of processes that handle hazardous

Module 1: PHA in the context of PSM The impact to company’s objectives varies depending on the risks

Module 1: PHA in the context of PSM PHA mainly focus on risks associated with handling of hazardous material with potential for catastrophic consequence

Module 1: PHA in the context of PSM It’s necessary to recognize the final implications to the company

Module 2: PHA Process Overview A “Hazard” is commonly considered as the “potential for…”

Module 2: PHA Process Overview A “Hazard” is commonly considered as the “potential for…”

Module 2: PHA Process Overview Every PHA implementation follows 3 phases

Module 2: PHA Process Overview PHA Execution: Logical Steps Key steps of the PHA execution depend on the defined scope and methodology to be applied. In general terms, three main logic steps can be identified for any PHA

Module 2: PHA Process Overview There is not a uniform consensus across industries and standards on the terminology describing risk management process steps --------------------Example of terminology from different standards-----------------

Module 2: PHA Process Overview A Comprehensive PHA program encompasses a number of components which are interconnected to provide a complete understanding of risks. -----------Key relationship among different PHA components (Not Exhaustive)-------

The Hazard Identification stage is one of the most important steps

Module 3: PHA Planning and Preparation Careful preparation lays the groundwork for a successful study

Module 4: PHA ExecutionHazard Identification Hazard identification is the first step in a systematic process which aims to improve the management of risk

Module 4: PHA ExecutionHazard Identification A number of techniques can be used in the hazard identification ----------Common Hazard Identification Methodologies--------------

Module 4: PHA ExecutionHazard Identification Different techniques apply different logic to help identifying hazards

Module 4: PHA ExecutionHazard Identification Different techniques apply different logic to help identifying hazards

• What if / Checklist review can enter the logic at any point in the cause & effect relationship • FMEA begins with looking at the cause (failed regulator) & works toward defining the consequence (vessel rupture) • HAZOP begins with deviation (high pressure), determines the consequence (vessel rupture), and then identifies potential causes (failed regulator) of the deviation

Module 4: PHA ExecutionHazard Identification Potential Hazards: --------------------------Five Hazard Categories---------------------------

Module 4a: Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) A HAZOP is a group technique used to identify hazards and operability issues arising from process deviations from plant design intent The technique is used to identify  Hazards (ways the system can fail leading to human loss/injury, asset damage or environmental impact  Operability (ways in which the system can fail to perform as required) • The approach is formal and systematic using a structured question and answer procedure to identify deviations from the intent of the design. • The study is performed by a team of people familiar with the system design and operation, working under the guidance of a leader who is experienced in the HAZOP method. • The leader systematically applies a set of specific guideword-parameters combinations to evaluation deviations in terms of causes, consequence, safeguards. • The team evaluates whether existing safeguards are adequate to protect from the identified scenario; if not a recommendation for improvement is raised. • A recorder makes a detailed tabulation of the team discussion.

Module 4a: Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) The team for a HAZOP is selected from the available staff who will need to be free of others duties for the period of the study

Module 4a: Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) Process deviations result from the combination of guidewords to parameters

Module 4a: Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)

HAZOP can also be applied to batch processes, using Ad Hoc guidewords applied to “ACTION” Guidewords No More Of Less Of As well as Part Of Other than Before After Disordered Repetitive

Deviation Action not executed Too much of action Too less of action Additional action executed although not required Action partially executed Incorrect action Action executed too early Action executed too late Action executed in the wrong order / sequence Action executed repetitively

Module 4a: Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) HAZOP Work Flow Select line or vessel

Start here for each process line and vessel

Define node & design intention of node Select parameter & guide word Develop meaningful deviation Identify all possible causes for the deviation Describe consequences if all safeguards fail List safeguards & protection available Evaluate need for risk control recommendation

Repeat for all guide words & parameters

Module 4a: Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) A number of criteria and approaches can be used by the HAZOP Leader to identify /select the nodes. Here are the most frequent adopted: • Process Flow Analysis: the leader follows the main flows from/to the different process equipment and lines • Presence of Loops: the leader can follow process loops when selecting the sequence of the Nodes • Complexity of Equipment: Node coincide with 1 single process equipment, including relevant inlet/outlet lines and relevant instrumentation. • “Line by Line” Approach: assigning a Node to each of the main process line and equipment.

Module 4a: Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) Part of the team discussion should include the layers of protection which already exist and the extent to which they are adequate COMMUN ITY • The team members need a good knowledge of the plant to explain accurately the protections already in place • The extent to which these are considered adequate depends on the size of the risk posed by the hazard • The discussion should refer to the basic process control system as well as any engineering controls or administrative procedures which are in place

EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANT EMERGENCY RESPONSE MITIGATION PREVENTION CONTROL & MONITORING PROCESS

Layers of Protection

Module 4a: Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) Examples of HAZOP Notes-How do you judge the quality?

Module 4a: Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) It’s important to clearly write recommendation so that they can be actionable ---------------- Examples of “Good Quality” of recommendations ------------------

Module 4a: Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) -----------Inadequate Quality of HAZOP-Key Factors-----------• • • • • • •

Inadequate Study Time Inadequate Documentation Inadequate Team Members Incomplete Study Inadequate Team Guidance Inadequate Facilities Inadequate Follow-up

Q/A Session

PLEASE FEEL FREE TO ASK! THANK YOU