Preliminary Conference and Pre-trial Digests

Preliminary Conference and Pre-trial Bayas vs Sandiganbayan (2002) FACTS: • Three informations were filed against Petitioners Ernesto T. Matuday and Sixto M. Bayas charging them with malversation through falsification penalized under Article 217, in relation to Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code in their capacities as municipal mayor and municipal treasurer • They pleaded not guilty during arraignment. • Pretrial • October 15, 1999 - cancelled because the counsel for the accused, Atty. Molintas was not prepared • November 5, 1999 - cancelled because of the absence of the counsel due to flu. Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan urged the accused to discuss with their counsel the stipulation of facts drafted by Ombudsman Prosecutor II Evelyn T. Lucero. • December 10, 1999 - parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents, which had been duly signed by the two accused (herein petitioners), Atty. Molintas and Prosecutor Lucero (this was supposedly the day the pre-trial should resume so they could pass upon all other matters) • January 14, 2000 - Atty. Molintas was again absent; rescheduled to Feb 14. • Feb 7, 2000 - Att. Molintas moved to withdraw as counsel for the accused. Granted on Feb 14, 2000, pretrial rescheduled to March 31. • March 31 - new counsel (Atty. Cinco) moved to withdraw joint stipulation of facts specifically when they admitted disbursement of funds. Invoked consti right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. • SB: denied motion to withdraw stipulation of facts • no vitiation of consent through fraud or mistake of a serious character • The fact that the stipulation of facts leaves less or no room for the accused to defend himself is not a ground for setting aside a pre-trial order ISSUE/HOLDING: 1. W/N pretrial stipulations may be unilaterally withdrawn by the accused because allegedly, they are not binding until after the trial court has issued a pretrial order approving them. a. NO. Rules on Criminal Procedure mandate parties to agree on matters of facts, issues and evidence. Such stipulations are greatly favored because they simplify, shorten or settle litigations in a faster and more convenient manner. They save costs, time and resources of the parties and, at the same time, help unclog court dockets. b. Once validly entered into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for good cause. They should be enforced especially when they are not false, unreasonable or against good morals and sound public policy. When made before the court, they are conclusive. And the party who validly made them can be relieved therefrom only upon a showing of collusion, duress, fraud, misrepresentation as to facts, and undue influence; or upon a showing of sufficient cause on such terms as will serve justice in a particular case. Moreover, the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly made lies in the courts sound discretion which, unless exercised with grave abuse, will not be disturbed on appeal. c. Validity of joint stipulation: They wanted to be relieved of it without alleging falsity, fraud, mistake. They did not even dispute the finding of the SB of no vitiation of consent. In fact, they admitted that they freely gave their consent in signing the joint stipulation of facts. a. They blame incompetence of previous counsel; he failed to consider their legal interests. To be a ground for relief against a stipulation, a mistake must be one of fact not, as in this case, a mere lack of full knowledge of fact because of failure to exercise due diligence in ascertaining it. b. Hornbook doctrine applies: parties are bound by the action or the inaction of their counsel. To all intents and purposes, the acts of a lawyer in the defense or the prosecution of a case are the acts of the client. The rule extends even to the mistakes and the simple negligence committed by the counsel.

Preliminary Conference and Pre-trial d. Presumption of innocence: However, the Rules were amended in 1985, precisely to enable parties to stipulate facts. The amendment was carried over to the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The acceptability of stipulating facts has long been established in our jurisprudence. There is nothing irregular or unlawful in stipulating facts in criminal cases. The policy encouraging it is consistent with the doctrine of waiver, which recognizes that x x x everyone has a right to waive and agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right and without detriment to the community at large. In this case, there could have been no impairment of petitioners right to be presumed innocent, right to due process or right against self-incrimination because the waiver was voluntary, made with the assistance of counsel and is sanctioned by the Rules on Criminal Procedure. e. Necessity of a pretrial order: Not necessary. Section 2 of Rule 118 a. for a pretrial agreement to be binding on the accused, it must satisfy the following conditions: (1) the agreement or admission must be in writing, and (2) it must be signed by both the accused and their counsel. Such approval is necessary merely to emphasize the supervision by the court over the case and to enable it to control the flow of the proceedings. b. Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally; it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage. If the accused are allowed to plead guilty under appropriate circumstances, by parity of reasoning, they should likewise be allowed to enter into a fair and true pretrial agreement under appropriate circumstances. c. Moreover, SB could not be faulted for not approving the stipulations as the pretrial was rescheduled 6 times. f. Role of Lawyers in pretrial: The Rules on Criminal Procedure provide that if the counsel for the accused and/or the prosecutor do not appear at the pretrial and do not offer an acceptable excuse for their lack of cooperation, the court may impose proper sanctions or penalties. a. attorneys must make a full disclosure of their positions as to what the real issues of the trial would be. They should not be allowed to embarrass or inconvenience the court or injure the opposing litigant by their careless preparation for a case; or by their failure to raise relevant issues at the outset of a trial; or, as in this case, by their unilateral withdrawal of valid stipulations that they signed and that their clients fully assented to. b. They were the ones who validly and voluntarily entered into the joint stipulation. If the Court allows it to be withdrawn, there would be no end to litigations. Lawyers can wiggle in and out of agreements the moment they are disadvantaged. Lawyers should remember, however, that they are not merely representatives of the parties but, first and foremost, officers of the court. As such, one of their duties assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice is more significant than that of acquitting their client, rightly or wrongly. g. GAD: the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly made lies at the sound discretion of the court. Unless exercised with grave abuse, this discretion will not be disturbed on appeal. a. Petitioners in this case failed to prove that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing them to withdraw the stipulations that they had freely and voluntarily entered into. Also, no bad faith or malice was or can be imputed to the antigraft court for failing to immediately act upon the Joint Stipulation. The delay was due, not to its deliberate evasion of its duty, but to the continued absence of petitioners counsel.

Preliminary Conference and Pre-trial People vs. Sitao (2002) FACTS: • Jovito Sitao alias Beto was charged with the crime of rape against his 14-year old daughter • Arraignment: not guilty • Pretrial: stipulated that the private complainant, Jovy Sitao, is the daughter of the accused and was only fourteen years old at the time of the alleged commission of the offense. • Jovy: • According to her, she was born on February 15, 1985, and the accused-appellant is her father. • At the age of three (3), she was taken by her maternal grandparents to live in Wao, Lanao del Sur. They transferred to Cagayan de Oro City in 1998. The following year, Jovy was sent back by her grandmother to her parents in Purok 12, Barangay Tongantongan, Valencia, Bukidnon, to study at the Batangan Elementary School. She enrolled as a grade IV student in the said school. • Defense: • He admitted that Jovy is his daughter, and that at the time of his testimony, Jovy was fifteen (15) years old. He denied staying in the same house with Jovy after she was taken by her grandparents to live with them in Wao, Lanao del Sur. He last saw her in 1998, before she was brought by her grandparents to live in Cagayan de Oro City. Later, he was informed by his brother-in-law that Jovy was working there as a household helper. He denied that Jovy enrolled as a grade IV student at the Batangan Elementary School. • TC: found Sitao guilty of rape. Death penalty • Automatic review ISSUE/HOLDING: 1. W/N the prosecution failed to prove the private complainant’s real age, thus the TC erred in imposing death penalty? YES a. Art. 266-B, as amended by RA 8353 provides for death penalty if the crime of rape was committed against a minor by an ascendant, etc. a. In prosecution of criminal cases, especially those involving the extreme penalty of death, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which an accused is charged must be established. Qualifying circumstances must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself, otherwise, there can be no conviction of the crime in its qualified form. b. As a qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the victims minority and her relationship to the accused-appellant must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof of age of the victim cannot consist merely of her testimony. a. Jurisprudence: there must be independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial of the accused. Admitted by

complainant even if corroborated by father IS NOT SUFFICIENT. b. Neither can a stipulation of the parties with respect to the victims age be considered sufficient proof of minority. Circumstances that qualify a crime and increases its penalty to death cannot be the subject of stipulation. An accused cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or his own admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the seriousness of the penalty of death. c. Hence, for failure of the prosecution to prove the circumstance which would qualify the crime of rape, the penalty of death imposed upon the accusedappellant by the trial court must be reduced to reclusion perpetua.