Powers of the President

Powers of the President  1. Executive Power 2. Power of Appointment 3. Power of Removal 4. Power of Control 5. Military Powers 6. Pardoning Power 7. Borrowing Power 8. Diplomatic Power 9. Budgetary Power 10. Informing Power 11. Other Powers

Non-delegability  There is a difference between Appointment and Delegation: Appointment – Appointment – executive in nature; done by virtue of authority of the person appointing; usually done with confirmation; secure in tenure Delegation – Delegation – legislative in nature; done by law; imposition of additional duties on the existing official; temporary/no security in tenure

Power of Control The President has the power of control over executive departments, bureaus and offices; and the power of supervision on local governments. (Mondano vs Silvosa)

Veto Power

The President also has the power to carry out reorganization of the departments under Constitutional and statutory laws, subject to limitations (also belongs to Residual Power). (MEWAP vs Romulo)

The President has the power to veto: power  – veto of entire bill 1) General veto power  –  – veto of specific items in a bill, only for appropriations acts (where sum of  2) Item veto power  – money is involved). (PhilConsa vs Enriquez)

Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency  – Agency  – members of cabinets, bureaus, and departments are merely alter egos of the President, hence they can be countermanded and reprobated by the President. (Villena vs Secretary of Interior)

Power of Appointment

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies  – must exhaust all administrative remedies first before going to court; required to go to admin agency first as it has authority

Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups o f officers whom the President shall appoint: 1) Heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; (must be confirmed by Commission on  Appointments) 2) All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; 3) Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; 4) Officers lower in rank whose appointments the C ongress may by law vest in the President alone. (Sarmiento vs Mison; Concepcion vs Salonga) For item 4: Other appointments vested in him by the Constitution: a. Chairman and commissioners of the Constitutional C ommission b. Regular members of JBC (7) i. IBP Rep ii. Professor of Law iii. Retired SC Justice iv. Rep of Private Sector v. Chief Justice (ex-officio capacity) vi. Sec of Justice vii. Rep of Congress c. Sectoral Reps d. Regional Consultative Commission

Power of Removal

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction  – also known as Doctrine of Prior Resort  – because of the expertise or knowledge of the agency, they are primarily vested with the jurisdiction in finding the technical issues; preferred to go to admin agency first

Executive Impoundment Impoundment refers to the refusal of the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type. Usually carried out by the President to prevent the release of certain budget appropriations. Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least t hree (3) principal sources of the authority of  the President. 1. Authority to impound given to him either expressly or impliedly by Congress 2. The executive power drawn from the President’s role as Commander -in-Chief  3. Faithful Execution Clause The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the President desist from implementing the law if doing so wo uld prejudice public interest. An example given is when through efficient and prudent management of a project, substantial savings are made. In such a case, it is sheer folly to expect the President to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law. (PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506)

Pardoning Power “Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may  grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by   final judgment.

The President’s power to appoint also holds the power to remove from office all his appointees . He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.” (Art. VII, Sec. 19, 1987 Philippine Const itution)

Exercise by the President: Discretionary; may not be controlled by the legislature or reversed by the courts unless there is violation of the Constitution.

7) Cannot be granted without concurrence of majority of members of the Congress (for amnesty).

Cases: 1. Pardon – an act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from punishment which the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. a. Plenary or partial b. Absolute or conditional Conditional pardon — is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. 2. Commutation — reduction or mitigation of penalty 3. Reprieve — postponement of sentence or stay of execution 4. Parole — release from imprisonment, but without full restoration of liberty, as parolee is in custody of the law although not in confinement 5. Amnesty — act of grace, concurred in by the Legislature, usually extended to groups of persons who committed political offenses, which puts into oblivion the offense itself.

- Person released under an amnesty proclamation stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. Par. 3, Art. 89, Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, the penalty and all its effects are thus extinguished (People v. Patriarca, G.R. No. 135457, September 29, 2000) - To avail of an amnesty proclamation, one must admit his guilt of the offense covered by the proclamation (Vera vs. People, 7 SCRA 152) - Conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief  Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. By the pardonee’s consent to the terms stipulated in the contract, the pardonee has placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the conditions of the pardon. - Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." It is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond  judicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered. (In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S. Sumulong, G.R. No. 122338, December 29, 1995) - In Llamas vs. Orbos, pardon is available also to one found guilty of administrative offense. Section 19 of Article VII did not distinguish between a criminal and administrative offense. - Effect of grant of pardon : In the case of Monsanto vs. Factoran (170 SCRA 190 (1989), the accused was convicted of malversation thru falsification of official documents. She was granted absolute pardon. She demanded for reinstatement and back salaries. The SC held that pardon may

Limitations on the exercise of the pardoning p ower: 1) Cannot be granted in cases o f impeachment; 2) Cannot be granted in violations of election laws without favorable recommendations of the COMELEC; 3) Can be granted only after co nviction by final judgment (except amnesty); 4) Cannot be granted in cases o f legislative contempt or civil contempt; 5) Cannot absolve convict of civil liability; 6) Cannot restore public offices forfeited;

mean forgiveness but not forgetfulness. What was remitted is the penalty and not t he fact of  one’s guilt. In the eyes of law, she was still a convict. Exceptions: 1. Unless the grant expressly so provides for her reinstatement and payment of back salaries. 2. If the grant of pardon was based on the fact of the innocence of the one charged of the crime. - Section 19, Article VII is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. This provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after the finality. In truth, an accused that has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these right s can be claimed in the appropriate

courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in the state of insanity. (See Article 79 of the Revised Penal Code) Article 81 of the Revised Penal code, as amended, which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out without prejudice to the exercise by t he President of his executive clemency powers at all times. For instance, the President cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a sentence to a day certain in the a bsence of a precise date to reckon with. T he exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might even work to the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitution, and t he applicable statute as when the date of execution set by the President would be earlier than that designated by court. (Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96, 1999)

Power to Call Congress to Special Sessions

be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled  corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other  matters as may be provided by law.” (Art. VII, Sec 20, 1987 Constitution) Limitations: 1. There must be prior concurrence of the Monetary Board 2. It is subject to such other limitations

Q: The President of the Philippines authorized the Secretary of Public Works and Highways to negotiate and sign a loan agreement with the German Government for the construction of a dam. The Senate, by a resolution, asked that the agreement be submitted to it for ratification. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs advised the Secretary of Public Works and Highways not to comply  with the request of the Senate. Is the President bound to submit the agreement to the Senate for  ratification? (Bar Question 1994, No. 13)

“The President may call a special session at any time.” (Art. VI, Sec. 15, 1987 Constitution) Power to call special session is vested in th e President, not in the Senate President or the Speaker of the House. Instances when the Congress may meet in a special session even without a call from the president: 1. Within 24 hours following the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus the Congress, if not in session, may convene without need of a call to: a. Receive President’s report on the proclamation or suspension b. Revoke such proclamation or suspension c. Extend such proclamation or suspension upon the initiative of the President "Within 48 hours after the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within 24 hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of  all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined  by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it." (Art. VII, Sec 18, 1987 Constitution)

2. In impeachment cases; 3. For the purpose of canvassing t he elections of the President or Vice-President; 4. To enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President after the vacancy in such offices occurs. "The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of  the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call  and within seven days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a VicePresident to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. "(Art. VII, Sec. 10, 1987 Constitution)

Borrowing Power “The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be  provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within 30 days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans to

A: No, the President is not bound to submit the agreement to the Senate for ratification. Under Section 20, Article VII of the Co nstitution, only the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board is required for the President to contract foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Q: What are the restrictions prescribed by the Constitution on the power of the President to contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines? Explain. (Bar  Question 1999, No. 1) A: Under Section 20, Article VII of t he Constitution, the power of the President to contract or guarantee loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines is subject to the prior concurrence of  the Monetary Board and subject to such limitations as may be prescribed by law.

Diplomatic or Treaty-Making Power “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least  two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate.” (Art. VII, Sec 21, 1987 Philippine Constitution) Applicability. This provision lays down the general rule on treaties or international agreements and applies to any form o f treaty with a wide variety of subject matter. All treaties or international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, cov erage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective. Who has the power to ratify treaties? In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the l egislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. By constitutional fiat and by t he intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief architect of the nation’s foreign policy; his “dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then) conceded.” Wielding vast powers an influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson describes, is “executive altogether."

As regards the power to enter int o treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of  the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to t he President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Co ngress itself is powerless to invade it.

Consequently, the acts or judgment calls of the President involving the VFA-specifically the acts of  ratification and entering into a treaty and those necessary or incidental to the exercise of such principal acts - squarely fall within the sphere of his constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down, much less calibrated by this Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion. It is the Court’s considered view that the President , in ratifying the VFA and in submitting the same to the Senate for concurrence, acted within the confines and limits of the powers vested in him by the Constitution. It is of no moment that the President, in the exercise of his wide latitude of  discretion and in the honest belief that the VFA falls within the ambit of Section 21, Article VII of  the Constitution, referred the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the aforementioned provision. Certainly, no abuse of discretion, much less a grave, patent and whimsical abuse of   judgment, may be imputed to the President in his act of ratifying the VFA and referring the same to the Senate for the purpose of complying with the concurrence requirement embodied in the fundamental law. In doing so, the President merely performed a co nstitutional task and exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the functions o f his office. Even if he erred in submitting the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the provisions of Section 21 of Article VII, instead of  Section 25 of Article XVIII of the Constitution, still, the President may not be faulted or scarred, much less be adjudged guilty of committing an abuse of discretion in some patent, gross, and capricious manner. (BAYAN [Bagong Alyansang Makabayan] v. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000, En Banc [Buena]) What is a treaty? A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention o n the Law of Treaties, is “an international instrument concluded between States in written form and governed by int ernational law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and whatever its particular designation.”

There are many other terms used for a treaty or international agreement, some of which are: act, protocol, agreement, compromis d' arbitrage, concordat, convention, declaration, exchange of  notes, pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi. All writers, from Hugo Grotius onward, have pointed out that the names or titles of international agreements included under the general term treaty have little or no significance. Certain terms are useful, but they furnish little more than mere description. Article 2(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that “the provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use of terms in the present Convention are without prejudice to the use of those terms, or to the meanings which may be given to them in the internal law of the State.” (Bayan vs. Zamora, ibid.) What are executive agreements? Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of  treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments — treaties and conventions.

They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times t hat of more formal documents denominated "agreements" time or "protocols". The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. “Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade -agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they

are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without t he approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trademarks and co pyrights, etcetera. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in co nformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect of the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.” (39 Columbia Law Review, pp. 651, 755.) (Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, G.R. No. L-14279, October 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 351) Distinction between international agreements and executive agreements 1. International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements.

2. Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress. (Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, ibid.) Binding effect of treaties and executive agreements in international law In international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as th e functionaries have remained within their powers. International law continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive agreements: they are equally binding obligations upon nations (Bayan vs. Zamora, ibid.) Q: Does the Philippines recognize the binding effect of executive agreements even without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress?  A: In our jurisdiction, we have recognized th e binding effect of executive agreements even without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress. In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading (ibid.), we had occasion to pronounce: “xxx the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of  subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of  our history we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.” (Bayan vs. Zamora, ibid.)

Budgetary Power “The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every regular  session as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of   financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.” (Art. VII, Sec 22, 1987  Philippine Constitution)

Informing Power “The President shall address the Congres s at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear  before it at any other time.” (Art. VII, Sec 23, 1987 Constitution)