Power,Politics and Death

Endorsements “Olusegun Adeniyi has done us a world of service, in many respects far more important than his work as spokesman for President Umaru Yar’Adua. Within these pages, that service fairly screams at you in excruciating detail: our government is so pathetically dysfunctional that, at bottom, institutions of government matter little, only individuals do. “This book does a great job taking us behind the scenes to see, for what they really were, the cast of characters who were put in charge of our affairs. Their petty rivalries, rank cowardice and sheer incompetency are painstakingly revealed. “A journey through this book, which in long stretches reads like a political thriller, delivers the careful reader to a destination where one must confront our true condition with sober senses. It is not a pretty picture. But the message is a necessary one.” –Dele Olojede Winner of the Pulitzer Prize for Journalism, 2005

Power, Politics and Death

Power, Politics and Death

A front-row account of Nigeria under the late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua

Olusegun Adeniyi

Published in Nigeria in 2011 by Kachifo Limited Under its Prestige imprint 253 Herbert Macaulay Way Yaba, Lagos, Nigeria Tel: +234 1 7406741; 0807 736 4217 Email: [email protected] www.kachifo.com Smashwords Edition Copyright © Olusegun Adeniyi 2011 The right of Olusegun Adeniyi to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the copyright laws. A catalogue record for this book is available from the National Library of Nigeria. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, transmitted, or stored in a retrieval system, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from the copyright holder. The print version of this book is also available from Kachifo Limited.

Dedication To my wife, Tosin, and our three lovely children, Toluwani, Ifeoluwa and Oluwakorede (who in America became ‘Kody’).

Contents Endorsements Dedication Preface Foreword Acknowledgements Abbreviations Introduction

Part I The Defining Issues 1 The Rule of Law, and That of Man 2 Corruption and the Ibori Saga 3 The Oily Affairs 4 The Niger Delta Amnesty Deal 5 Banking Reform and Allied Matters 6 Between Mutallab and Boko Haram 7 When Counted Votes Don’t Count 8 Yar’Adua and the World 9 Unfulfilled Dreams

Part II Illness & Death 10 The Early Signals… 11The Journey to Saudi Arabia 12 The Power Struggle 13 Doctrine of Necessity 14 Like a Thief in the Night 15 Beginning of the End 16 The Days of the ‘Cabal’ 17 The End About the Author About Prestige Publishing

Preface “Segun, where are you?” Before I could reply, there was a command: “Come straight to the Residence.” Even though Colonel Mustapha Dennis Onoyiveta, aide de camp (ADC) to President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, and I were friends and often took liberties with each other, the tone with which he spoke on that night of May 5, 2010, was rather unusual. Curiously, I had just left the same Residence (the official home of the president) where I was to keep an appointment with the First Lady, who, as soon as I arrived, was called upstairs. By the time Mustapha’s call came, I was at my apartment to dismiss the PHCN official I had earlier invited to rectify an electrical fault. While I felt a bit irritated by the commanding tone in his voice, I nonetheless heeded the colonel’s instruction and returned back to the Residence. As I entered the Red Carpet (the first living room), a security man said the Chief Security Officer (CSO) to the president had detailed him to ask me to sit down and wait rather than go straight in. This was rather unusual, but then we were going through an unusual period at the villa and in the country. As a reporter during the military era in the ’90s and as a former editor of THISDAY, one of Nigeria’s leading newspapers, I had been an intrepid witness to the never-ending drama of my country in the last two decades. Yet, nothing in my background prepared me for the experience of being the spokesman for a president whom most Nigerians were not sure was still alive, yet sharing the villa with an acting president who was in charge but could not exercise the full power of his office. As I reflected on this bizarre situation and the drama of the preceding weeks, I saw the CSO open the door, peep into where I was sitting and then close the door again. That just added to the suspense, but after about another two minutes, the CSO opened the door again and this time beckoned me to come. The moment I walked into the living room of the president, the CSO and the ADC gripped me, each holding me on either arm. My initial thought was that they wanted to play a prank on me. However, as I attempted to shake myself free, the ADC said, ‘Segun, please, please and please, we are about to tell you something that will shock you, but you have to take it calmly because we are trying to manage the situation. Oga passed away a few minutes ago, and we have immediately alerted the acting president, who will soon be here. Right now, nobody in this house except the First Lady is aware, so please take it like a man.’ I immediately broke down in tears, and I was practically dragged to a seat while the duo continued their movements up and down the stairs. While waiting for the arrival of Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, I thought of Yar’Adua lying dead upstairs as I reflected on what might have been and the events of the previous eleven weeks since his return from Saudi Arabia. It took about an hour before Jonathan arrived with a powerful team, which suggested he had called a meeting before coming. With him were Mr. Dimeji Bankole, the House of Representatives Speaker; Mr. Ike Ekweremadu, deputy Senate president; Alhaji Yayale Ahmed, secretary to the government of the federation; Major General Aliyu Mohammed Gusau, national security adviser; and Chief Mike Oghiadome, the principal secretary.

They all greeted the First Lady, offering their condolences. After a few minutes of accepting their commiseration, she stood up from where she sat and beckoned on Jonathan to escort her upstairs to see the remains of the president. There was a slight hesitation by Jonathan. Then he paused and also asked Bankole to join him as they climbed the staircase. The symbolism of Jonathan going to see the remains of Yar’Adua was not lost on me. For weeks, I had pleaded several times that they should allow him to see the president, but all my pleas fell on deaf ears. Now he was going to see his dead body. As I surveyed my surroundings, I reflected on the Yar’Adua years. At a time when the nation needed a president who could take quick, strong, and decisive action, his health problems ensured he could not be fully focused on his job. He was, however, a delightful person to work with, and those who accused him of parochialism based on the few Katsina friends he kept grossly misunderstood him. For some inexplicable reason, in spite of his elite background, Yar’Adua’s network was very limited until he became president. It was said that as governor for eight years, he hardly ever ventured beyond Katsina (his state), Kaduna and Abuja. Outside Nigeria, the only places he visited were Brazil, China, Germany (for his medicals) and Saudi Arabia on spiritual grounds. In fact, his first visit to the United States came in September 2007 when he attended the United Nations General Assembly. This limited understanding of his environment must have contributed to some of the mistakes he made with regard to critical appointments for which he depended mostly on the judgement of other people. Those appointments contributed significantly to the fiasco of his last days. By the time Jonathan came back downstairs, his countenance had changed. He was evidently shaken (as anybody would be in his situation), but I also realized that power had changed hands. I had been with Jonathan only a few hours earlier to drop my letter of resignation, and throughout our encounter, he cut the figure of a frustrated man. Now, fate had conspired to resolve the logjam, and he was going to be the president. After waiting for another ten minutes, during which there were informal discussions about Yar’Adua’s burial (which had been slated for the next morning) and his own swearing-in ceremony (which some of us suggested should be immediate), Jonathan departed for Akinola Aguda House with his entourage for a meeting on the next line of action. As soon as they left, the ADC declared that when the family left in the morning, there would be no coming back, which meant that they had to take away whatever belonged to them. He brought in some soldiers, and I watched as the personal effects of the president were removed while the team of local and foreign medical personnel that had done everything to sustain his life worked upstairs to dismantle all the medical equipments. I stayed around for about an hour and commiserated with the First Lady before I headed back to my apartment to break the news to my wife. For my family too, it was the end of a chapter. Yar’Adua’s death that night brought a dramatic end to the political saga in the country. It also released me to make public my resignation and the fact that I was going to Harvard University, where I have been for the last one year. While it is difficult to write the entire story of the Yar’Adua administration—or any administration for that matter—in one book, what I have tried to do here is to look at a few of the major national issues that dominated the period he was effectively in office. I also present a diary of events surrounding the health challenges that ultimately cut short his life and presidency.

Olusegun Adeniyi Cambridge, MA United States May 2, 2011

Foreword Olusegun Adeniyi has done us a world of service, in many respects far more important than his work as spokesman for President Umaru Yar’Adua. Within these pages, that service fairly screams at you in excruciating detail: our government is so pathetically dysfunctional that, at bottom, institutions of government matter little, only individuals do. Among the most extraordinary facts you will confront here, dear reader, is that senior cabinet ministers or senior technocrats do not necessarily have any control over their assigned portfolios. The lowliest functionary in the pecking order could, entirely on the basis of his or her closeness to the president or his wife, make decisions with a potentially seismic impact on the country. The president’s military and security aides come across as far more powerful than their normal official duties would seem to imply. The chief of staff may or may not have the president’s ear. The top bureaucrat in our government, the cabinet secretary, may or may not know what’s going. And so it went down the line. This book does a great job taking us behind the scenes to see, for what they really were, the cast of characters who were put in charge of our affairs. Their petty rivalries, rank cowardice and sheer incompetency are painstakingly revealed. None comes across as more odious than Yar’Adua’s attorney general, Michael Aondoakaa, a two-bit lawyer whose godfathers made him our country’s chief law officer. Nothing spoke more eloquently of Yar’Adua’s weakness than that he never got around to firing a man who was unquestionably the worst attorney general Nigeria has ever had, though he had long concluded that the man was unfit for office. Mr. Adeniyi’s loyalty to Mr. Yar’Adua is genuine, and he treats the president with affection and occasional exasperation at the paralysis that characterized his illnessaborted presidency. But he does not shy away from offering a critique of his boss, with restraint and empathy–but a fairly comprehensive critique nonetheless. One could quibble with Mr. Adeniyi’s decision to pull punches while discussing the all-powerful role of the president’s widely unpopular wife, Turai, but it is entirely understandable. Mr. Adeniyi strives to do the right thing while seeking to avoid coming across as disloyal. This central tension is palpable throughout this narrative. A journey through this book, which in long stretches reads like a political thriller, delivers the careful reader to a destination where one must confront our true condition with sober senses. It is not a pretty picture. But the message is a necessary one. Dele Olojede Lagos, October 26, 2011

Acknowledgements The story of how, for more than a month, I turned down the offer to be spokesman to the late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua is already well documented. But looking back, I must thank my brother and boss, Mr Nduka Obaigbena, for seeing what I couldn’t possibly see at the time: the opportunity to play a small role in the affairs of my nation during what turned out to be a most dramatic presidency. But this book would have been difficult—if not impossible—to write without the platform provided by the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University where I spent one year with my family on a Fellows Programme. I therefore owe a debt of gratitude to Center Director, Prof. Beth A. Simmons; Program Director, Dr Kathleen Molony; her assistant, Jason Ri as well as Prof. Jeff Frieden who, as our seminar coordinator, particularly gave time out to offer me advice, even on this book. I also want to thank my fellow Fellows for being such wonderful friends. I want to single out for mention Col. Darvin Anderson (US Airforce); Col. Paul Bricker (US Army); Navy Commander Sean Liedman; as well as Dr. Westina Matthews Shatteen; Ambassador Walter Stechel and Mr Peter Brorsen. They were friends indeed. Thanks of a more personal nature also go to Prof. Jacob Olupona and his wife, Dupe who became for my family a pillar of support. I am also grateful to Pastor Tunde Olorunwunmi and all members of the Chapel of Resurrection, Redeemed Christian Church of God, Cambridge, Massachusetts. I acknowledge my brother and friend, Waziri Adio whose counsel at every stage of writing this book (and throughout my tenure in office) was invaluable. I also thank my ‘editor’ Laurence Ani of THISDAY who went through the initial rough draft and made it more readable and Sunny Hughes who designed the cover of this book. But the insight provided by Senate President David Mark; Mr Dele Olojede, the first African Pulitzer Prize winner in journalism; Mr Sola Oyinlola, Chairman for Africa at Schlumberger; current National Security Adviser, Lt General Andrew Owoye Azazi and former Minister of State, Finance, Mr Remi Babalola, helped to enrich the book and I am most grateful to them. I must especially thank the people who made my Aso Rock Villa experience worthwhile by not only watching over my back but also supporting me even at most difficult periods. There are several of them, but I want to single out former Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Ahmed Yayale; former Head of Service, Mr. Stephen Oronsaye and former Chief of Staff, Major General Abdullahi Mohammed as well as my colleagues in the Akara-in-Council (comprising all principal aides of the president who love eating bean cakes) of which I was chairman: Ghali Umar; Habu Habib, Matt Aikhionbare, David Edevbie, Yusuf Tilde, Mutspha Onoyiveta, Hamza Nadada, Inuwa Baba, Salisu Banye. Then there are my former colleagues, Ima Niboro, Oronto Douglas, Jalal Arabi, Moremi Soyinka-Onijala, Bolaji Adeniyi, Yakubu Musa, Ken Wiwa (junior), Musa Aduwak, Justin Abuah as well as my secretary, Rosemary Ameachina and my Personal Assistant, James Enabu. I must also thank President Goodluck Jonathan, Vice President Namadi Sambo, Governors Adams Oshiomhole (Edo), Chibuike Amaechi (Rivers), Babatunde Fashola

(Lagos), Isa Yuguda (Bauchi), Sule Lamido (Jigawa), Bukola Saraki (Kwara) and Peter Obi (Anambra) as well as Dr Abba Sayid Ruma and Mr. Tanimu Yakubu Kurfi for standing by me at a most difficult period. I also thank Bishop David Abioye (Winners Chapel, Abuja). To Eniola Bello, Kayode Komolafe, Simon Kolawole, Yusuph Olaniyonu, Ijeoma Nwogwugwu and all the good people of THISDAY who shared my frustrations, especially during the ‘cabal’ days, I say a big thank you. My appreciation also to Chief C.O. Adebayo, Alhaji Aliko Dangote, Senator Sanusi Dagash, Chief Ajibola Ogunsola, Pastor Chinedu Ezekwesili, Pastor Niyi Ajibola, Pastor Femi Otegbade, Mr. Mohammed Bello Adoke (SAN), Mrs. Maryam Uwais, Mallam Nasir el-Rufai, Dr. Aliyu Modibbo, Alhaji Adamu Waziri, and Mr. Remi Makanjuola, who have over the years been of tremendous assistance to my family. I am indebted to my friends, Hon Emeka Ihedioha, Ola Awoniyi, Wale Banmore, Sunday Dare, Reuben Abati and Ifeoma Ngozi Malo as well as Elombah Daniel who assisted me in the research for this book. I can also not fail to mention Omoyele Sowore of saharareporters, who made my job very difficult despite our friendship. It is worth noting, however, that throughout my tenure in government I enjoyed the goodwill of my colleagues in the media who were very supportive even in the most difficult days. At that period also, the counsel of several senior people in the profession was invaluable. Messrs. Nduka Irabor, Sam Nda-Is-aiah, Al-Ganzali (real name protected), Segun Babatope, Kabiru Yusuf, Eluem Emeka Izeze, Victor Ifijeh, Soji Omotunde and Gbenga Adefaye stand out. It is pertinent to add, however, that I also had moments of disagreement with some journalists but at all times, I never lost sight of the fact that in a fledging democracy like ours where institutions remain very weak, a fearless and effective watchdog is critical. That remained my guiding philosophy. I also appreciate my siblings, Adeoye, Olaniyi, Agboola and Bosede who have always given me support and unconditional love. Most of all I thank the Lord Jesus Christ who saw me through a most turbulent period in my life and career.

Abbreviations ACF Arewa Consultative Forum ACN Action Congress of Nigeria ADC Aide de camp AFP Associated Free Press AFRICOM United States Africa Command AGF Attorney General of the Federation AIG Assistant Inspector General AIT Africa Independent Television ALGON Association of Local Governments of Nigeria ANPP All Nigerian Peoples Party APGA All Progressive Grand Alliance ASUU Academic Staff Union of Universities AU African Union BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BOT Board of Trustees BPE Bureau of Public Enterprises CAN Christian Association of Nigeria CBN Central Bank of Nigeria CJN Chief Justice of Nigeria CNN Cable News Network CPP Chief Physician to the President CSO Chief Security Officer EEG Eminent Elders Group EFCC Economic and Financial Crimes Commission EU European Union FBI Federal Bureau of Investigations FCT Federal Capital Territory FEC Federal Executive Council FELIS Federal Land Information System FIRS Federal Inland Revenue Service GMD Group Managing Director ICPC Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission IGP Inspector General of Police INEC Independent National Electoral Commission ISO Irrevocable Standing Order JTF Joint Task Force LCDA Local Council Development Area NAN News Agency of Nigeria NBA Nigerian Bar Association NBC National Broadcasting Commission NDDC Niger Delta Development Commission NDPHC Niger Delta Power Holding Company NEC National Economic Council

NEITI Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative NEPZA Nigeria Export Processing Zones Authority NIA National Intelligence Agency NIPP National Independent Power Project NIPSS National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies NJC National Judicial Council NLC Nigerian Labour Congress NNPC Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation NSA National Security Adviser NSCIA Nigeria Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs NTA Nigerian Television Authority NWC National Working Committee OGIC Oil and Gas Implementation Committee OML Oil Mining Lease OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries QC Queen’s Counsel PDP People’s Democratic Party PHCN Power Holding Company of Nigeria PLO Presidential Liaison Officer PMS Petroleum Motor Spirit PPPRA Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency PSC Police Service Commission REC Resident Electoral Commissioner SADC South African Development Community SAN Senior Advocate of Nigeria SGF Secretary to the Government of the Federation SPDC Shell Petroleum Development Company SSS State Security Service TUC Trade Union Congress VP Vice President WABA West African Bar Association

Introduction President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua spent ample time in his first eight weeks in office receiving briefings from agencies and departments of the federal government. One such session with the Nigeria Export Processing Zones Authority (NEPZA) concluded with an anecdote that created some discomfiture for those present. It spoke of an imaginary rowing competition between a Nigerian team and its Malaysian counterpart. According to the story by Mr. Sina Agboluaje, NEPZA managing director, each team featured eight members who had to compete against each other after months of training. The first competition was held, and the Malaysian rowing team defeated the Nigerian rowing team by a margin of 10 kilometres. Following the dismal performance, managers of the Nigerian rowing team contracted some experts to analyze the problem and recommend appropriate solutions. The analysis revealed that whereas the Malaysian rowing team had one captain and seven rowers, the Nigerian rowing team had one rower and seven captains. Ordinarily, the solution should have been obvious, but the managers of the Nigerian rowing team hired a consulting firm to restructure the team. Their recommendation was just as bizarre as the outcome of their finding: the eight-man Nigerian team should comprise four captains, two supervisors, one manager and one rower. Of course, the result at the next competition was predictable: the Malaysian rowing team defeated the Nigerian rowing team, this time by a margin of 20 kilometers! There were some uncomfortable glances across the room, but the president got the message of this anecdote about why things hardly work in Nigeria, because he asked that the slides of the presentation be shown a second time. The message became even more vivid a few weeks later when Eng. Hamman Tukur, chairman of the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission, revealed that the total national wage bill for political office holders at the three tiers of government amounted to N1.3 trillion per annum, a sum more than twice the nation’s capital vote for any given year. That revelation threw up an immediate challenge: Can the president muster sufficient will and the capacity to produce a winning formula for this hypothetical Nigerian rowing team? Even while the election that brought him to power was flawed, a fact to which he himself admitted, Yar’Adua enjoyed early goodwill as a result of his personal disposition and the direction in which he decided to lead his administration. First, he pledged that under his watch, governance would be anchored on the principle of the rule of law. He also said he would be a servant leader. To demonstrate his commitment to these ideals, he publicly declared his assets even when the law didn’t require him to do so. This open display of transparency, the first by any Nigerian leader, did not go unnoticed at a time when the national mood had been fouled by his predecessor’s scuttled attempt to seek a third term in office and by the fiasco of the April 2007 elections. There had also been some controversial decisions taken at the twilight of the Obasanjo administration that had engendered a feeling of despondency within the polity. Some of these decisions included jacking up the pump prices of petroleum products and selling vital national assets, like Kaduna and Port Harcourt refineries. To compound the problem, university lecturers had been on strike.

These were some of the immediate challenges before Yar’Adua in his first weeks in office, and the deft manner with which he tackled them endeared him to many Nigerians, who began to give him the benefit of the doubt, despite the way he came to power. For instance, after what were no doubt difficult negotiations with the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) and Trade Union Congress (TUC), which had served a two-week ultimatum on the day the president assumed office, the president revoked the sale of the federal government’s 51 percent stake in the Port Harcourt and Kaduna refineries to Transcorp. He also reduced the price of petrol from N75 to N70 per litre. Also, following his personal intervention, a compromise was reached with the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), which immediately called off the then on-going nationwide strike that had kept university students at home for weeks before he assumed office. On the political front, the first critical test came exactly two weeks into his administration, when the Supreme Court, in a landmark ruling, restored Mr. Peter Obi1 as governor of Anambra State and ordered Mr. Andy Uba (the elected PDP candidate who had been sworn in as governor based on the April 2007 general elections), to vacate the Government House. This ruling was immediately enforced, a situation that contrasted sharply with what would most probably have happened under his predecessor. Aside from enunciating the cardinal ideas behind his 7-point agenda, which represented the key issues he said his administration would focus on, the president also pledged to place a premium on planning so as not to travel the familiar road of the past, where projects were started and later abandoned. To give effect to this promise, he directed that on-going projects be completed before starting new ones. Coming at a period of restiveness in the Niger Delta, the president’s resolve to dialogue with the militants and fashion a way out of the logjam appealed to many stakeholders in the region, as did the fact that the vice president was an Ijaw man. In one of his first actions in office, the president also inaugurated the Oil and Gas Implementation Committee (OGIC), whose efforts eventually culminated in the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) currently awaiting passage at the National Assembly. Because of his style, it was not long before many Nigerians started paying more attention to Yar’Adua as he began to earn the legitimacy that was deemed not to have been given at the polls. Virtually all the decisions taken early in the life of the administration struck a chord with the public. In keeping with his pledge to reform the electoral process, he inaugurated the Justice Mohammed Uwais Committee with a sweeping mandate that took into account all the issues militating against transparent elections in Nigeria. More plaudits would follow when the president directed that the Lagos state local government funds, which had been seized by his predecessor, be released. Unfortunately, this initial momentum was lost when, with the composition of the Federal Executive Council and the appointment of certain individuals to critical positions, there was recourse to mixed messages on some important issues. For instance, with time, the implementation of the war against corruption became sometimes dysfunctional and at other times very diabolical. To compound the problem, there was the health challenge that would just not go away. All these became the defining issues that would dog the Yar’Adua administration to the very end. Perhaps because of the flaws in the electoral process which brought him to power and the dramatic circumstances surrounding his exit, the narrative of the Yar’Adua years has mostly been very superficial and devoid of any rigour. With the opportunity to experience

first-hand the politics and nuances of those dizzying days, however, I can confirm that President Yar’Adua indeed came to office desiring to redirect the course of the nation, and he had concrete ideas with regard to what the direction should be. Having, however, also observed the minutiae of the health problems, I had questions, even from those early days, as to whether he had the physical capacity for the job, and that ultimately told. That Yar’Adua came to office with impeccable pedigree is beyond any dispute. His father, Mallam Musa Yar’Adua had been a member of the House of Representatives in the First Republic and had also served at different times as minister for establishment, Nigerianization and training and later minister for Lagos affairs. A very influential member of the Tafawa Balewa administration, the elder Yar’Adua held the title of Mutawallin Katsina, which made him a member of the Katsina Emirate Council. His eldest son, Shehu, would later join the army, from where he rose to attain the rank of a major general as well as to become the chief of staff, Supreme Headquarters between 1976 and 1979 in the military government of General Olusegun Obasanjo. It was this connection between Shehu and Obasanjo that would eventually pave the way for his younger brother, Umaru, to be anointed president in 2007. Following the collapse of his Third Term ambition, Obasanjo had encouraged many of the then second-term Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) governors into the race for the party’s presidential nomination. In the case of Dr. Peter Odili of Rivers State, he became a sort of adviser. At the end, apparently mindful of his party’s position on zoning, Obasanjo settled for Yar’Adua by asking Odili, who was a clear favourite to win, to withdraw from the contest. His plan to make Odili running mate to Yar’Adua, however, collapsed in the face of strong opposition from then Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) chairman, Mr. Nuhu Ribadu. In his bid to stop Vice President Atiku Abubakar (who had taken the presidential ticket of another party, the Action Congress) from succeeding him, Obasanjo had unwittingly sown the seeds for the irregularities that would mar the entire process, and with that, Yar’Adua’s eventual victory was very much tainted. For almost two years after the election, he was in court battling the question of the legitimacy of his presidency at a time when his health was also an issue. This court battle and his failing health also provided ample opportunity for some political wheeler-dealers of questionable integrity whose actions would later help in no small measure to negatively affect the public perception of the administration. The enduring lesson of the Yar’Adua years is that there are always potential landmines when a nation elects a leader who has to constantly worry about his health, as Robert Robins and Jerrold Post reveal, with practical examples drawn from several countries, in their book, When Illness Strikes the Leader: The Dilemma of the Captive King.2 When such a leader comes with the additional baggage of a discredited election, then not only will he be distracted, chances are that he will also be vulnerable to all manner of people with vested interests masquerading as do-gooders. That was very evident in Yar’Adua’s case, as he was preoccupied with the issues of both political and personal survival right from his first day in office. This book is divided into two parts, with the first section dealing with a few of the critical issues that dominated the Yar’Adua years in office; the second captures the health challenges that ultimately cut short Yar’Adua’s life and administration while detailing the choices I had to make at that most difficult period in my life and that of the nation.

Endnotes 1 Following a complicated legal battle with attendant political drama, Obi was declared by the Court of Appeal in 2006 as the legally elected governor of Anambra State in the April 2003 elections.The then incumbent, Dr. Chris Ngige of PDP, was ordered to vacate the office of governor. In 2007, following inability to secure the APGA ticket for the April polls, Obi filed a suit in court that his mandate was for four years and should therefore terminate in 2010. At the April 2011 polls in Anambra State, Dr. Andy Uba of PDP was declared winner, but two weeks later, the supreme court ruled that Obi’s tenure should begin to count from the day he took the oath of office in 2006, which in effect meant that his mandate should end by 2010. Uba was therefore ordered to vacate the seat of Anambra governor. 2 Jerrold M. Post is professor of psychiatry, political psychology, and international affairs at George Washington University, while Robert S. Robins is professor of political science and deputy provost at Tulane University.

Part I The Defining Issues

1

The Rule of Law, and That of Man At his inauguration on May 29, 2007, President Yar’Adua stated that the philosophy of his administration would be anchored on the principle of the rule of law. It was a pledge he would reiterate 24 hours later, at his first official duty while receiving the British Government Whip with responsibility for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Baroness Jan Royall. In a remark meant to reassure his guest as well as everyone of his total commitment to the rule of law, Yar’Adua said, “I will assure the Chief Justice of the Federation that I will support any moves for an independent and strong judiciary.” In his first few weeks in office, Yar’Adua’s actions left no one in doubt that the rule of law was, for him, an article of faith as well as his covenant with the Nigerian people. It was also very clear to the people in government, especially in the administration’s early days, that the president indeed subscribed to the time-honoured view that society will flourish when it is governed according to law rather than by the whims of office holders. Of course, there was initial skepticism about its practicability in a country where the flouting of court judgements by the executive appeared to be the norm and not the exception and where the concept of the big man still evoked some romantic notions. In the preceding administration, for instance, the attorney general of the federation was more or less the ‘final arbiter’, interpreting court judgements in the way and manner that suited the government and causing the same to be enforced to the consternation of Nigerians. Yar’Adua’s pledge at every opportunity was therefore implicitly a repudiation of that era and a firm indication that he was not prepared to travel that route. At meetings with officials, he made it a point of duty to always stress that if he ever gave a directive that was considered a contravention of any extant laws, he should be disobeyed. The first major test of this conviction emerged on June 14, 2007, when the Supreme Court restored Mr. Peter Obi as governor of Anambra State and ordered Dr. Andy Uba, who had been sworn in as governor just two weeks earlier to vacate the Government House. In a unanimous decision of the seven justices, the apex court concluded that INEC went ahead to conduct elections into the office of the governor of Anambra State despite the fact that the matter was pending in court. The court therefore held that “there being no dispute that Governor Obi took his oath of office on March 17, 2006, his tenure of office shall expire on March 17, 2010.”1 It is instructive to note that this judgement was not about whether or not Andy Uba was validly elected; it was about whether there should have been any election in Anambra State in the first place. “The office of the Governor of Anambra State was not vacant as at the time of the elections, Andy Uba should immediately vacate the office for Peter Obi to complete his term of office,” the apex court ordered. Citing the provision of Section 180 (2) of the 1999 Constitution, the Supreme Court declared that a governor’s term of office begins to run from the day he takes the oath of office. Section 180 (1) of the 1999 Constitution reads, “Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a person shall hold the office of Governor of a State until – (2) Subject to

the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, the Governor shall vacate his office at the expiration of a period of four years commencing from the date when – in the case of a person first elected as Governor under this constitution – he took the oath of allegiance and oath of office.” Ordinarily, one would expect that the police and all the relevant authorities would simply obey the court order without any prodding. But that was not the case. In Abuja and in Awka, the Anambra State capital, all the officials concerned were still waiting for either the ‘body language’ of the president or perhaps even a clear directive for the ‘status quo to remain’, which was the usual recourse in the past. In Awka particularly, the chief judge had apparently become unavailable as Andy Uba’s legal team plotted how to render the Supreme Court ruling ineffectual. Less than thirty minutes after the ruling, my phone line barely had any moment of inactivity as I received endless calls from journalists eager to know what the position of the president was. The enquiries were not only from the media, there were also calls from officials whose duty it was to enforce the ruling. I knew I had to see the president, but before I went to his office I ensured I had the draft of a press statement where he would order security agencies to enforce the order to swear in Mr. Peter Obi as Anambra State governor. When I got to his office, he was obviously unhappy that his party had lost the state to Obi, an APGA candidate, so he seemed, quite naturally, a bit irritated by my excitement. But he also couldn’t understand why I had to make any statement before there could be compliance with the judgement. I explained the scenario to him, that people were waiting to see what action he would take. While I was with him, the security man brought in a note that some leaders of the PDP were around to see him. He wanted me to leave so he could receive them, but I pleaded with him to read my statement so I could release it immediately. I wanted to avoid a situation where the PDP big wigs would misadvise him into taking a wrong decision. Reluctantly, he read and approved my statement, but not before cancelling the sentence where he congratulated Obi on his victory. He said it would not be fair to Uba. The prompt enforcement of that ruling, which earned the president a huge commendation across the country, would set the tone for more judicial activism. A few weeks later, the president ordered the immediate release of the Lagos State local governments’ funds amounting to 10.8 billion naira (N10,829,527,300.43 precisely), which had been seized by the previous administration, bringing to an end a long-drawn legal and political battle that had pitched the federal government against the Lagos State government. The controversy had started in April 2004 following the creation of 37 local government areas by then governor of Lagos State, Bola Tinubu. Riled by what he considered to be an impudent act, Obasanjo had directed that the funds of local government councils in Lagos be withheld, to be released only on the condition that the governor reverted to the original 20 local government councils in the state. Following this directive, the state had filed a lawsuit against the federal government at the Supreme Court, urging it to determine the propriety and legality of the action. In the somewhat controversial ruling that had followed, the Supreme Court had declared the 37 local council development areas (LCDAs) created by Tinubu ‘inchoate and inoperable’, since the National Assembly had not listed them in the constitution. The apex court, however, had also ruled that the federal government had no right to withhold the funds of the state.

With both the federal government and Lagos state claiming victory in what had become a personality clash between Obasanjo and Tinubu (with the former flexing presidential muscles), a stalemate was imminent. To stave off the stalemate, some prominent Yoruba citizens had intervened through a committee of elders led by Prince Bola Ajibola (SAN)2. That effort had culminated in the LGAs being rechristened Local Council Development Authorities (LCDAs) by Tinubu. This had brought a temporary truce between the duo and encouraged Obasanjo to order the release of a first tranche of N10 billion from the entitlements of the 20 local government councils then estimated at about N21 billion. This rapprochement, however, would not endure, because the balance was withheld when the Lagos State government insisted on conducting elections into the 37 LCDAs. This was the situation at the time Yar’Adua assumed office. Following widespread consultation with legal experts, who held that the decision to withhold the funds contravened the Supreme Court ruling on the matter, the president ordered the accountant general of the federation to release the funds to the Lagos State government. For a man whose ascendancy owed less to his personal effort than to the sleight of hand wrought by his predecessor, Yar’Adua was gradually becoming his own man. But given that one of the most challenging features of the rule of law is that it has no place for the ‘strongman’, there were also early signs that not many Nigerians appreciated the importance of the foundation that Yar’Adua was trying to erect. This much became evident during the controversy that swirled around former Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mrs. Patricia Olubunmi Etteh.3 Guided by the notion that the rule of law also presupposes respect for the independence of each arm of government under the doctrine of separation of powers, the president had stayed out of the election of principal officers in the National Assembly even when he could have picked whomever he wanted for the offices. He would rather not make any input, he said, so it was Obasanjo, in his capacity as the chairman of the PDP Board of Trustees, who worked out the deal that saw to the emergence of David Mark as Senate president and Etteh as House Speaker after his party had zoned the offices. While Mark, an experienced administrator and retired army general, had no problem rallying the Senate, not many in the House felt comfortable with the choice of Etteh, given her limited educational background and exposure. Her political naivety would become very evident when, in constituting the House committees, she didn’t consider it expedient to take care of the interest of the power brokers who brought her to office. These same members, who would later become ‘The Integrity Group’, eventually pulled the rug from under her feet. Amid the crisis in the House, following allegations of corruption against Etteh (on which the media feasted), there were calls on the president to intervene by asking the Speaker to quit. I also met the president on the issue several times, and his position remained the same: he would not intervene. One day, he gave me a lecture I would never forget: “Look, Segun, it is not always right to follow public opinion in matters like this. I have read all the reports from the House; I have been briefed by many of the members, and I have sought opinion from the security agencies, that woman has committed no crime. Those after her want her out for other reasons, and I will not join them in hounding her out. If they have the number, let them go ahead and impeach her.” While the PDP leadership was backing Etteh, the opposition had drawn the support of the media, especially given that the allegation involved corruption. Yet, the David Idoko

Panel, set up to investigate the ‘contract scam’, did not come up with any convincing evidence of corruption against the speaker.4 But keeping Etteh in office was doing serious damage to the image of the government, and I aligned with those who wanted her to go. Personally, I had spoken with her, and I could see that even if she survived that crisis, there were likely to be more because her attitude just did not seem right for managing such a huge crowd of people, many of them with exceedingly large egos. I hosted a few meetings at my residence that comprised ‘dissident’ members, including Hon. Dimeji Bankole, who was then being propped for the office of Speaker. All the meetings were brokered by my friend of over two decades, Hon. Emeka Ihedioha, who would become the Chief Whip in the House after Etteh’s exit. Apparently due to the position the president had taken on the matter, all the members from Katsina in the House threw their weight behind Etteh, and a section of the media latched on to this to ridicule his commitment to transparency. Their charge was indeed unsparing: the president was “giving tacit support to corruption.” In the court of public opinion, Etteh was already guilty as charged. On one of the several rowdy sessions in the course of the battle to have her removed, one of the president’s closest allies, Dr. Aminu Safana (PDP Katsina), chairman of the Committee on Health, collapsed on the floor of the House while bidding to prevent Etteh’s removal. He was rushed to the National Hospital, Abuja, where he was pronounced dead. This tragedy became the game changer, and I recall meeting Dr. Garba Matazu and other prominent House members from Katsina on the need to withdraw their support for Etteh, not because she stole any money, but rather because the crisis would not end until she vacated the seat. Besides, I reasoned, the controversy was hurting the image of the president and the administration. Other people also weighed in, and within days, Etteh and her deputy were forced out. It was only after the crisis had abated that many Nigerians came to appreciate the fact that the president allowed the House to resolve the matter on their own terms. This also reinforced the perception that Yar’Adua was ready to abide by his words to run a transparent administration that would respect the rule of law. Unfortunately, all that would change with the appointment of Mr. Michael Kaase Aondoakaa as attorney general of the federation (AGF) and minister of justice, a man who took a rather bizarre approach to the rule of law, an approach that was clearly at variance with the president’s resolve. Born on June 12, 1962, Aondoakaa graduated from the University of Maiduguri with a law degree in 1985 and was called to bar in 1986. In 1993, he opened his own firm, M. K. Aondoakaa and Company. There were differing tales about his appointment as AGF, but what was not in doubt is that it had to do with the nature of the election that brought Yar’Adua to power, which he had conceded was deeply flawed. Those who had recommended Aondoakaa had apparently known one or two things about his capacity to get things done, especially with regard to election matters. While Yar’Adua openly proclaimed that his administration would be guided by the rule of law, throughout his tenure, there was a gap between the rhetoric of the president and the action of government, especially with regard to decisions emanating from the office of the AGF, who is constitutionally recognized as the chief law officer of the federation. Yet Yar’Adua was too clever a man not to know what his AGF was doing, so the only conclusion I could draw was that he approved some of Aondoakaa’s actions. That was

also the conclusion of most Nigerians. There were other contentious issues also inherited by Yar’Adua that had to be resolved early in the life of the administration. One such issue was the deportation of the Vaswani Brothers, who had sent the president a petition, which he subsequently forwarded to the AGF, the Ministry of Interior, EFCC and Customs for their comments. While the Ministry of Interior insisted that since the deportation was done on the orders of his predecessor it should not be reviewed, EFCC said their investigations against the Vaswanis had not been completed before their deportation was effected. The decision of the federal government to deport them as at the time it did was therefore considered hasty, a position that had been canvassed by Prince Bola Ajibola, former attorney general of the federation and retired judge at the International Criminal Court in Hague. Ajibola had written the president a letter on the issue. In the end, the president kept faith with the rule of law by directing that the deportation be rescinded so that the Vaswanis could be allowed a return to the country to answer to whatever charges were brought against them by the relevant authorities. In a similar vein, the president also resolved the dispute between the federal government and Ibeto Cement Company, which had been shut down by the Obasanjo government on grounds that were considered spurious. But perhaps the most critical issue was the case of the contract awarded for the construction of primary health care centres in the 774 local government areas in the country. It was terminated after a meeting of the National Economic Council (NEC) on December 9, 2007, on the grounds that the contract was unconstitutional and the deduction of money from the accounts of the local governments irregular. This generated innuendoes that the president was taking actions to slight his predecessor. A close look at the background to the cancellation revealed some unsavoury details. A company by the name of Mathan Nigeria Limited had won the contract to the tune of N37 billion for the construction of the primary health care centres in the 774 local government areas of the country. On the strength of an approval by the Federal Executive Council (FEC), money was being deducted from the account of each local government at the end of every month with a commercial bank as intermediary for the contractor and ALGON, the principal promoters of this project. Against the backdrop of allegations by several of the local councils that the project was being forced on them, the president directed the NEC, chaired by the VP, with all the governors as members, to examine the matter. The governors had been opposed to the plan for paying for the health centres, which they saw as an encroachment on fiscal federalism, so it was easy for NEC to terminate the project. Flanked by the governor of Akwa Ibom, Chief Godswill Akpabio, and that of Kebbi, Alhaji Saidu Dakingari, then CBN governor, Professor Chukwuma Soludo, who briefed the media after the meeting, said the awards of the contracts were irregular. The council, as a result, directed that for local government areas where work had not commenced, the money deducted from their accounts and being held at Bank PHB and the Central Bank should be returned to them. “The National Economic Council agreed that the MoU between ALGON and Mathan be terminated and that the outstanding balance in the accounts of Bank PHB and the Central Bank that has been deducted already be returned to the various local governments. Council also directed that there should be reconciliation between the various local governments where the projects have commenced, state governments should liaise with the local governments to ascertain the level of work that

has been done and what should be deducted,” Soludo said. Under what it termed ‘Cooperative Federalism’, the federal government had acted as a guarantor for ALGON (a body not recognized by law) on behalf of the 774 local governments in a contract involving a single company. A flat rate of N48,060,824.13 was then being deducted from the statutory allocation to each of the local governments from the Federation Account in ten equal monthly periods. What was being done was an arrangement called Irrevocable Standing Order (ISO) by which the federal government that manages the federation account on behalf of the three tiers, was making periodic deductions at source to pay directly to the bank account of the contractor. At a meeting earlier convened by the president following representation from the Governors Forum to express their opposition to the deal, there were arguments that under the 1999 Constitution as held by the Supreme Court in its 2004 decision on the suit filed by the Lagos State government against the federal government, no other authority has any power to tamper with allocations due to the states and local governments. Incidentally, some people within the same government which approved the contract also raised issues not only about its legality, but indeed in relation to its feasibility. This much was evident in a report of the Inter-ministerial Committee on the project headed by then minister of finance, Mrs. Nenadi Usman. Although it commended the spirit behind the idea, the committee raised some fundamental questions. For instance, the committee found it ironic that the governors were left out in the entire scheme mid-wifed by ALGON officials and, also, curious that for the 774 projects across the country, the contracts would be coordinated by just one consultant! Surprisingly, opposition to the idea by then FCT minister, Mallam Nasir el-Rufai, was well documented, as he wrote a letter to the Ministry of Finance seeking a refund of the money deducted from the FCT account for the project because, as he said, he was building his own health centres. Even though the grounds for terminating this contract were spelt out, there were Nigerians who felt that since it was for health centres, the president should have allowed it to pass. There were also people who felt that Yar’Adua was just out to discredit his predecessor. This was far from being the case, but one issue that would cause public consternation, especially with the way it was handled, was that of naira re-denomination. The story began during Obasanjo’s last week in office, when he signed into law several bills targeted at institutional reforms. One of them, the CBN Act 2007, was gazetted on June 1, 2007, three days after Yar’Adua assumed office. Following the constitution of the Federal Executive Council in July, Yar’Adua directed the AGF to assess all the Acts of National Assembly, especially the ones yet to be fully operational, and study them critically. While this was going on, Soludo addressed the media on the decision by the CBN board to re-denominate the naira, which he said was in line with the powers granted him by the CBN Act 2007. The night before his media briefing, he had met with the president, but from what I was told, there was not much debate about the issue since it was a decision taken by the CBN Board acting on its powers. The president had said he was not comfortable with the decision but also felt he could not overrule the CBN board. This contrasted with Soludo’s version. He said Yar’Adua expressed no reservation in his meeting with him. It was an opportunity for Soludo to re-emphasize the legality of his action when he briefed the Federal Executive Council on the policy he had earlier

announced. He made it clear that he was merely informing Council members and not seeking any approval since he was acting in line with the powers purportedly granted him and the apex bank board by the CBN Act 2007. The session was nearly ruined by an open disagreement between him and the then national planning minister, Senator Sanusi Daggash, who queried the wisdom of such a policy at a time when the government was still trying to find its bearing. Many ministers also felt that their input should have been sought before CBN’s decision, given that they would all be held accountable if it failed. While the president’s concern was about the implications of the plan on the economy— he would in fact have preferred robust consultations with critical stakeholders before the announcement—he had agreed with Soludo at the meeting on the strength that the CBN Act had granted Soludo and the board autonomy on monetary policy and on the grounds that what he did was legal, even if politically incorrect. At the end of the session, the president mandated the Economic Management Team, led by finance minister, Dr. Shamsudeen Usman, to meet with the CBN governor to discuss areas of concern. The main issue in contention was that under the ‘Strategic Agenda for the Naira’ presented to the media, the CBN would abdicate its monetary responsibility by ceding such authority to states and local governments, while the CBN had also, without consultations, set a commencement date of August 1, 2008, for the re-denomination exercise. Government was also concerned that the CBN apparently had not given due consideration to the huge cost implications of the project, whose economic value was doubtful, at a time when there were more urgent demands on the resources available to the nation. As it would happen, just two days after the FEC meeting, the AGF discovered that the CBN Act 2007 does not in fact grant Soludo the powers he claimed with respect to currency denomination. Section 19 of the act clearly states that the currency notes and coins issued by the central bank shall be “in such denominations of the Naira or fractions thereof as shall be approved by the President on recommendation of the Board; and of such forms and designs and bear such devices as shall be approved by the President on the recommendation of the Board.” The section went further to state that even “the standard weights and composition of coins issued by the Bank and the amount of remedy and variation shall be determined by the President on the recommendation of the Board.” What these provisions mean is that only the president could give approval for naira redenomination if he was satisfied about its desirability or necessity. Given his disposition to the idea, it was predictable that he would stop it. In a statement I issued to explain government position on the exercise, I said that in the prevailing circumstances, “the president is not convinced of the merits of the naira re-denomination plan put forward by the CBN without appropriate regard for the present administration’s insistence on due process and the rule of law.” This action drew significant flak, especially when CBN had gleefully announced that the agenda would bring up the value of the naira to parity with the dollar, which appealed to public sentiment, even though Soludo had also told the FEC that there was no guarantee that the agenda could not end up a failure. But at that point, the real issue for the president was that a strict adherence to the rule of law left no exemptions or leeway for the arbitrary exercise of power by CBN. That position would come under strict scrutiny in the prosecution of the fight against corruption.

Endnotes 1 A unanimous decision given by a seven-man panel of justices presided over by Justice Iyorgher Katsina-Alu held that the tenure of Dr. Peter Obi on the platform of the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) was not yet over. 2 Prince Bola Ajibola was Attorney General of the Federation and Justice Minister under the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida. Before then, he had been president of the Nigerian Bar Association. He was later to become a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (The Hague). 3 Four months after she became speaker, Mrs. Etteh and her deputy, Babangida Nguroje, were accused of authorizing the spending of N628 million for the renovation of their official residences and the purchase of 12 official cars. This led to a crisis, as her accusers insisted that she had to go. About eight weeks after the allegations were made public, Etteh and her deputy resigned from office on October 30, 2007, although they have remained members of the House. 4 Hon. David Idoko, chairman of the committee that probed the allegation, came with the findings that the tender was not advertised, no in-house bill of quantities and drawings were prepared, there was no specific budgetary provision for renovation and furnishing of the Speaker’s and her deputy’s official quarters in the 2007 budget, and that the procedure for the contract award by the Body of Principal Officers on July 12, 2007, “shows major acts of omission and disregard for laid down procedure.”

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Corruption and the Ibori Saga Buoyed by the unprecedented decision to declare his assets in public, Yar’Adua came to office with a reputation of personal integrity. But within only a matter of weeks, that image, which had swirled around him like a halo, would be tainted by the perception that he was leading a government that was protecting the corrupt. Unfortunately, the president did not appear to see what most Nigerians, and indeed several of us within the administration, could see very clearly: that the seeming connivance between his attorney general and justice minister, Mr. Michael Kaase Aondoakaa, and the former Delta State governor, Chief James Ibori, was destroying the reputation of the government and also compromising his own personal integrity. The curtains on this sordid drama did not drop, however, until the very end, so it’s not expected that the image it fostered would be salutary. Both the United States government and the government of the United Kingdom viewed the Yar’Adua administration through negative lens, essentially on account of its apparently indulgent treatment of Ibori. While we may never know how other foreign governments perceived the Yar’Adua administration in relation to its tolerance for corruption, we didn’t really need Wikileaks to ascertain the position of the United States, to which the Ribadu/Ibori saga became a yardstick for measuring the president’s much vaunted commitment to transparency and accountability. The United States’ view was brought home to the president very clearly in August 2008, when the foreign affairs minister, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, recounted for him an encounter between the deputy chief of mission at the Nigerian embassy in Washington, Ambassador B. G. Wakil and the United States’ deputy assistant secretary of state, Mr. Todd Moss. Wakil, who said he was summoned to the US State Department by Moss, had prepared a detailed report of what transpired at the meeting which, according to him, “turned out to be a reading of a riot act from the US to Nigeria, centred on what the US has called an unfair treatment of former EFCC Chairman, Mr Nuhu Ribadu.” According to Wakil, Moss expressed the displeasure of the US government at what he described as an obvious witch hunt targeted against Ribadu. “While the US policy recognizes institutions rather than individuals therein, the pattern of the recent treatment of Ribadu leaves much to be desired and, in spite of the camouflaged technical explanations, smacks of political vendetta against the former chairman,” Moss was quoted to have said. Moss, according to Wakil, claimed that Yar’Adua had, in a previous meeting with President George Bush, given assurances that Ribadu would be restored to his position and that members of his team would also not be affected by any reforms. He said the US was therefore seriously disappointed that not only had Ribadu been demoted, but his working team had been virtually dismantled. This, Moss said, had rendered all the earlier financial and capacity-building investments the US had made in EFCC completely meaningless. Moss told Wakil that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Justice and other specialized agencies of the US government had trained, equipped and

motivated the EFCC, but noted that the action of the Nigerian government had virtually nullified all these US strategies conceived to strengthen the institution. Wakil explained that the session rounded off with a veiled threat from Moss, who instructed him (Wakil) to inform his home government that if Ribadu was arrested, or if there was any evidence of retaliation, vengeance or any form of vindictive action against him from former victims of his anti-corruption activities whilst in office, the US would regard such as “a deliberate attempt to victimize and crucify Ribadu for his successful anti-corruption war while in office” and would react with measures it deemed appropriate. Moss hinted at several options open to the US, some of which were to • review bilateral engagement with Nigeria in other strategic areas of cooperation such as the Niger Delta, poverty eradication and contributions to the success of the seven-point agenda; • consult with European allies on further multilateral action against Nigeria; • resuscitate, in consultation with the Justice Department, the process of denying or revoking visas to certain categories of Nigerian government officials; and • withhold any official engagements with the incumbent Chairman of EFCC, Mrs. Waziri, until her personal sincerity and the competence of the EFCC under her were proved. Wakil recalled that the US had made similar representations to voice displeasure over the government’s decision to send Ribadu to NIPSS, and explained that his attempts to offer clarifications on the issue of Ribadu as a career, non-political appointee and the circumstances governing such deployments in Nigeria were brushed aside by Moss. It was very clear that the US government had drawn its own conclusions about events in Nigeria. Maduekwe’s presentation had disturbed the president, who was equally peeved by the tone of the US intervention on the matter and, quite naturally, believed it was part of the handiwork of Ribadu, given the perception that he was bent on tarnishing the image of his administration. This was the dummy sold consistently by Aondoakaa, who attributed anything negative about the administration both in the local and international media to Ribadu. There were also security reports about Ribadu, whose value, though doubtful, the president considered credible, perhaps on the strength of just one ‘evidence’ found on a computer of a Ribadu acolyte within EFCC that contained several articles obviously meant for publication with such titles as ‘How Turai is ruling Nigeria’, ‘Yar’Adua surrenders Nigeria to his wife’, and so on. Nonetheless, the message from the United States was clear to the president: they perceived his administration as one shielding the corrupt, even though it was all due to the antics of the AGF who, for all practical purposes, had become no more than a personal attorney to the former Delta State governor. Maduekwe knew he had a job on his hands and hence sought appointment with the US Secretary of State, Mrs. Hillary Clinton, to explain the Nigerian position. Even though Maduekwe was himself a Ribadu sympathizer who was unhappy about the travails of the former EFCC chairman, he felt that Nigeria was not being treated fairly by the State Department. This was the basis of his intervention in Washington, and it eventually proved beneficial, because it stalled the attempt to make public a diplomatic démarche on the Nigerian situation. The statement, which would have been very

damaging had it been released, reads: The United States Government [USG] is strongly concerned for the independence and integrity of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in terms of perception and of the institution’s continued credible performance. The United States is concerned that the momentum behind the EFCC’s robust investigation and prosecution of high profile cases involving corruption and fraud issues has been curbed significantly this year. Other than one recent arrest, we have not seen any progress on EFCC prosecutions of over a dozen former governors and senior officials, some of whom seem to retain sizeable Government of Nigeria influence. Consequently, we believe these trends jeopardize not only President Yar’Adua’s Seven-point agenda for reform but also lead to questions regarding the credibility of the Government of Nigeria itself. The most recent massive redeployments of EFCC staff have left a shell of inexperienced replacements at best in most areas, wasting considerable United States Government and international training, threatening the EFCC’s institutional integrity, jeopardizing cooperation efforts. Additionally, with the EFCC leadership having been completely reassigned, it will take considerable time to build new relationships and trust with the new EFCC leadership. Given this situation, the United States is reviewing all of its interactions and assistance with the EFCC. We are therefore extremely reluctant to consider additional requests for resources or training until the EFCC can demonstrate genuine effort or high-profile prosecutions (including prominent ex-governors), extraditions and the establishment of criminal procedures through credible timelines and benchmarks. Similarly, we do not believe high-level meetings between EFCC leadership and USG officials will be constructive until it is clear that the EFCC is moving in a positive direction and taking deliberate actions critical to rebuilding the EFCC’s reputation. The USG and its allies are watching the situation closely, and as appropriate will consider measures to underscore the seriousness with which we view recent events. This might include revoking visas of, or imposing travel bans on, corrupt Nigerian officials, including those from the Niger Delta as legally available.

Despite the temporary truce struck by both governments, the administration’s handling of the Ibori matter would become a sore issue throughout Yar’Adua’s tenure, as it became the yardstick for measuring Nigeria’s commitment to the fight against corruption. At home too, the president was viewed negatively because of his relationship with Ibori, whose activities created the impression that he was above the law. We may never know if there was indeed any deal between the duo, but I suspected that the president must have made some commitment to the former Delta State governor that he would protect him. I recall the day Ibori came to my office to warn me, he said something very instructive: “Look, Segun, there is nowhere in the world where you help somebody to power and his reward for you is that you go to jail. It doesn’t happen anywhere, and it won’t begin with me.” Given that Obasanjo practically made Yar’Adua president of Nigeria—from foisting him on the party to running the campaign almost all by himself—I still cannot put my finger on exactly what role Ibori played in Yar’Adua’s ascension to power, but he must have done something for him to have enjoyed the access he had. Nevertheless, given the albatross that the former Delta State governor had become to the administration’s image, some other leader would have been a little bit ruthless in handling whatever deal might have been struck, even if it meant his friend had to pay some price for his infraction.

After all, the president still had the power of prerogative of mercy which could have been invoked—but only after justice had been served in the court of law. The whole saga began one week after Aondoakaa assumed office as AGF, whereupon he wrote a memo to remind the president of the relevant sections of the constitution and Section 43 of the EFCC Act 2004, which he argued empowered him to regulate the operations of the EFCC. He requested that all agencies involved in criminal prosecution should be made to report and initiate proceedings only with his consent and approval as the attorney general of the federation. He said his request was impelled by the need to ensure better coordination among the country’s law enforcement agencies and avoid situations where multiple criminal prosecutions were undertaken by the EFCC, ICPC and the Code of Conduct Tribunal in respect of the same alleged offences. However, the memo was already in the media even before the president had seen it. The leak was attributed to Ribadu, who had indeed called to intimate me of a telephone call to him by Ibori, who bragged that he would soon humble him (Ribadu). He also claimed that Ibori was working hand-in-glove with the AGF; this was not a charge I could take lightly. When I met the president on the issue, he dismissed the allegations. He said he had read the media report in question and showed me the memo from the AGF, which he had yet to treat. “If your friend (meaning Ribadu) thinks he can intimidate me, he must be joking,” he said, his tone a mix of anger and jest. But I got the message. The president told me that he wanted a professional EFCC that would do its job diligently without pandering to the media or the civil society. He believed Ribadu was too political and that his actions helped ruin the 2007 general elections. He argued that only a court of law could pronounce anybody as corrupt, noting that the EFCC chairman’s actions were antithetical to the rule of law. To buttress his position, he said he had received several petitions from the judiciary of several court orders that were flouted by Ribadu. I had already told him Ribadu and I were very close, so we both knew where we stood on the issue, though he made me understand that he had nothing personal against the EFCC chairman but that he simply deplored his methods. He would later tell me other things that ultimately convinced me that he actually had personal scores to settle with Ribadu. Yet, I could see the point in some of the issues raised with regard to the EFCC’s methods. Even though only a few days in office, the AGF had made no pretensions about the fact that he wanted to curtail the EFCC’s powers to prosecute. But many of his colleagues in the bar thought his position was not tenable and that he was acting above his powers. Since the EFCC had presented this memo as targeted at the commission, it was a battle Aondoakaa could not, conceivably, win. With many lawyers wading into the controversy, the president requested a copy of a Supreme Court ruling said to have addressed the issue. The State House counsel, Jalal Arabi, a brilliant lawyer with unquestionable integrity, had informed the president that whereas the AGF indeed had powers of oversight over EFCC, ICPC and other such bodies, he did not have exclusive powers to initiate prosecution. It was the Supreme Court ruling Jalal cited that the president wanted to see. When the president realized he had indeed taken the wrong decision on the issue, he invited Ribadu; ICPC Chairman, Justice Emmanuel Ayoola; Honourary Adviser on Legal Matters, Dr. Wale Babalakin and Arabi for a meeting, where he rescinded the decision. He also told Ribadu and others that they could initiate criminal proceedings without recourse to the office of the AGF. That was the first reversal of policy in what the media

would later describe as a ‘flip-flop’, but it was the right thing for the president to do. With that, however, Ribadu had only just won the battle; he began a war of attrition against Aondoakaa, who eventually succeeded in hounding him out—with the connivance of other people, of course. Incidentally, at Yar’Adua’s accession to power in May 2007, the British government had concluded that Ibori would stand trial in the United Kingdom. From the representations made to the office of the AGF and the Foreign Ministry, there was no mincing words about the fact that they wanted Ibori extradited to face criminal charges. The complication, however, was that all the alleged infractions for which they wanted to nail Ibori were committed in Nigeria with the evidence obtained from the EFCC. On August 30, 2007, the office of the Director, United Kingdom Fraud Prosecution Service, sent a 31-page letter to the AGF. It was signed by Crown Prosecutor, David M. Williams. In seeking Aondoakaa’s assistance on what was code-named Operation Tureen on James Onanefe Ibori, Christine Ibori-Ibie, Adebimpe Pogoson and Udoamaka Okoronkwo, the prosecutor thanked the office of the AGF for “the response which they provided in response to my earlier request dated 23rd August 2006.” The implication of this was that Aondoakaa’s predecessor, Chief Bayo Ojo, SAN, had been assisting with regard to the investigation, which the prosecutor said was meant not only for criminal proceedings, but to enforce a confiscation order on the numerous properties of Ibori in the United Kingdom and several other countries across the globe. The prosecutor explained that in his earlier investigation of Ibori, code-named Operation Heimdal, he had been given the assets declaration form with the Nigerian Code of Conduct Bureau where the former Delta State governor claimed he had no foreign bank account. Yet, only a few weeks in office in 1999, the prosecutor observed, he had opened two sterling accounts and one dollar account in the United Kingdom. Ibori, according to the prosecutor, had also been actively diverting “funds from his state’s funding allocation and laundered the proceeds through the United Kingdom banking system using other suspects to assist him.” The UK investigator claimed also that sundry transactions running into billions of naira and several millions of British pound sterling involving his special assistant, Adebimpe Pogoson; his sister, Ibori-Ibie; and friend, Okoronkwo were carried out on behalf of Ibori. The prosecutor, in his deposition to the AGF, listed some of the properties already identified in the United Kingdom as belonging to Ibori. They are Flat 23, 20 Abbey Road, London NW8 9BJ; 7 Westover Hill, London, NW3 7VH, and 42 Great Grand Shaftsbury, Dorset SP 7 8FF. Ibori was also named as the beneficial owner of Haleway Properties and Boyd Properties, both in Gibraltar as well as Teleton Quays (BVI). Also listed was Julia Foundation in Panama, a financial investment company that was allegedly used to launder money across the globe. Ibori’s sister, Christine, was also said to own three properties in the UK: 58 Uphill Drive, London NW9 OBX; 76 Woodhill Crescent, Kenton, Harrow, Middlesex HA OLZ; and 139 Kingfisher Way, London NW10. Detailing how Ibori allegedly diverted Delta State’s funds using several fronts (including prominent Nigerians whose names were mentioned) and 32 banks in Nigeria,1 the prosecutor said the former governor also purchased a Mayback 62 car in May 2005 from London, which was then delivered to him in South Africa at a cost of 406,598.84 euro. The vehicle was air-freighted via Frankfurt, Germany, to Johannesburg, South Africa. With an account in Switzerland, Ibori also allegedly made a deposit of $4,700,000 for a

Challenger 300 aircraft believed to cost $20 million. To indicate that they had extensive information at their disposal (all evidently supplied by Ribadu), the investigators even attached several intercepted e-mails between some bankers and Adebimpe Pogoson, Ibori’s assistant. In one dated Wednesday, July 13, 2005, and sent at 10:36 p.m., the banker, a Yoruba lady, wrote that she had discussed the EFCC issue with Ibori and three other persons (confidants of the former governor) whose names she mentioned. These people, she said, had given some tips on dealing with the situation. “At this point, we have concluded that there is no point trying to hide a connection between the companies as these people already have most of the information. Some people seem to be of the impression that we were simply too careless (strange how people shift the blame when the push comes to shove).” The lady banker then listed what she considered “the major problems we have in my opinion from oga [Ibori]/EFCC perspective…,” one of which was that “perhaps we should have restricted ourselves to paying just cash” rather than cheques for “places like Oghara and our other private locations. We don’t know how these people will fare under pressure and I don’t want to complicate things by briefing everyone.” The prosecutor meticulously detailed several overseas accounts and companies said to belong to Ibori, the names of the people allegedly fronting for him and sundry other allegations of how he diverted Delta State money to commit economic crimes, especially in the United Kingdom. With appendices totaling more than 500 pages of evidence, the documents attached were overwhelming in content and volume, and it was easy to see that most of them emanated from the EFCC. At the end of the letter, the prosecutor sought the assistance of the AGF to ensure that Detective Constable Peter Clark and Detective John McDonald of the Metropolitan Police at Wellington House, Buckingham Palace Road SW1, be permitted to liaise with the competent Nigerian authorities with regard to the investigation of Ibori. Aondoakaa neither replied this letter nor acted on it. Not even when there was a followup delegation from the British High Commission in Abuja to remind him of his obligation. His plan would soon unfold; he seemed to have already set in motion the machinery to frustrate the trial in London. It started with an apparently contrived letter dated August 4, 2007, from one Mr. Speechly Bircham, LP, which was aimed at eliciting a response that would aid the defeat of the prosecution’s case. Within 48 hours after the letter was written in London, a reply was already back to the United Kingdom from the office of the AGF. In a carefully worded letter, Aondoakaa admitted that Ibori was indeed investigated in connection with his acts while in office as Delta State governor but that there was no record that he had been charged to court in Nigeria in respect of any offence. Invariably, the AGF exonerated Ibori of complicity in any criminal proceedings in Nigeria. When the letter became public knowledge, the AGF vehemently denied such correspondence ever emanated from his office. The letter was published afterwards in the media, but his explanation was just as intriguing: it was an innocent clarification in response to a request from Ibori’s lawyers, he said. Instructively, in arguing his case, Ibori’s lawyer relied on the AGF letter and on that basis the Southwark Crown Court lifted the restraining order against his assets in October 2007, a verdict that Aondoakaa would celebrate at the time as ‘vindication’ of his position. This made the UK Director of Public Prosecution, Mr. Ken Macdonald, QC, to write

Aondoakaa a strongly worded letter, part of which read: The Crown Prosecution Service has conduct of restraint proceedings against Mr. Ibori ancillary to a criminal investigation being conducted by officers of the Metropolitan Police in London. On 2 August 2007, we obtained a restraint order that prohibits Mr. Ibori from dealing with all his realizable property worldwide so that the property can be utilized to satisfy any confiscation order that may be made at the end of proceedings in the event of conviction. The assets referred to in the restraint order include US$20,075,274 held in escrow by the aircraft manufacturer Bombadier of Canada. On 1 October 2007, on the application of Mr. Ibori, a judge at the Southwark Crown Court in London discharged the restraint order. The main factor behind the judge’s decision was the length of time the investigation has taken and the lack of progress towards a decision whether or not to charge Mr. Ibori. I am disappointed to learn we were not in a position to assure the judge that we had the full cooperation of the Nigerian authorities and indeed to concede that there are practical difficulties about getting unimpeded access to evidence obtained by the EFCC in Nigeria. We have today given notice to the Crown Court of our intention to appeal the decision to discharge the restraint order, and we will be making an application to stay the decision pending determination of the appeal. I understand that on 10 October 2007, the officers of the Metropolitan Police are travelling to Nigeria to continue their enquiries and collect evidence the EFCC has obtained of offences committed by Mr. Ibori in Nigeria. The purpose of writing is to seek your assurances that the requested evidence will be made available for transmission back to the United Kingdom…as you know, my department has also obtained restraint orders against Mr. Ibori’s three co-suspects, and we have proceedings extant and pending against other former governors. The difficulty and lack of progress in obtaining hard evidence from Nigeria is causing major difficulties in relation to the court proceedings in the United Kingdom and putting these other cases in jeopardy. The Crown Prosecution Service is both committed and determined to work closely with the international community and Nigeria to combat corruption, and I look forward to your assurances that we will have Nigeria’s continued cooperation in this matter.

The AGF did not reply this letter, but fortuitously for Ibori, it was at this point that Aondoakaa ‘stumbled’ on the fact that Ribadu had not been confirmed for a second term. Like Mrs. Ifueko Okauru, Chairman of the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), Ribadu had been reappointed for a second term of four years by Obasanjo, but while Okauru’s name was sent to the Senate for confirmation, as required by Section 11 of the FIRS (Establishment) Act 2007, Ribadu’s name was not sent to comply with Section 2 of the EFCC (Establishment) Act 2004. Given that Ribadu, like everyone in his position, needed to be confirmed by the Senate, this was an omission that would be his Achilles’ heel. But first, the inspector general of police, Mr. Mike Okiro, came into the picture by including Ribadu’s name on the list of officers the police was sending for a course at NIPSS in Kuru, Jos. I was in Ilorin on Christmas holiday with my family when Ribadu called to inform me of the directive, which he said he would disregard. As he fumed, I pleaded with him to calm down. I had to cut short my holiday and return to Abuja. I believed that such a move

would have a serious backlash and make my job very difficult. I met the president, and he confirmed that he had the memo but had yet to decide on what he would do, though I could see that he didn’t pay much attention to my advice on the issue, perhaps because he knew that on Ribadu, my intervention could not possibly be impartial. He needed to see Okiro to know why he wanted Ribadu sent to NIPSS, he explained. That, in effect, meant he had not taken a decision on the issue. I took this message back to Ribadu, pleading with him not to say anything publicly on the matter as the chief of staff, Major General Abdullahi Mohammed (rtd.), had also waded in. This dragged on for another week, giving General Mohammed and me some more time to try and ensure that the president did not sanction the idea of NIPSS. But, unknown to us, it was already a done deal. What gave the game away was the January 7, 2008, memo to the president from Okiro, which confirmed that the president had indeed given his approval earlier. Okiro’s memo to the president had begun by saying: “Consequent upon Your Excellency’s approval of my letter dated 24th December, 2007, on the nomination of senior police officers as participants for the Senior Executives Course 30/2008, the affected officers will be warned to hand over to their next in command by 11th January, 2008. This is to enable them [to] prepare adequately for the course which commences on 4th February, 2008.” This directive, according to Okiro, affected the EFCC chairman. He wrote: Since AIG Nuhu Ribadu was appointed from the Nigeria Police by virtue of Part 1 Section 2 (11) of the EFCC Act, and a vacancy now exists as a result of his going on course for a period of one year…, there is the dire need for him to hand over to a successor. In line with the provision of Part 1, Section 4 of the EFCC Act, which stipulates that “where a vacancy occurs in the membership of the Commission it shall be filled by the appointment of a successor to hold office for the remainder of the term for the office of his predecessor so that the successor shall represent the same interest as his predecessor’, I recommend that AIG Nuhu Ribadu hands (sic) over to Assistant Commissioner of Police Ibrahim Lamorde who is the next in command at the Commission meanwhile.

My salvage mission also took me to the IGP to convince him to drop the decision to send Ribadu to NIPSS, but it was a futile effort. Okiro, like many in the top hierarchy of the police, had his grouses against Ribadu, who was said to have been very disrespectful, indeed contemptuous, of him when Mr. Sunday Ehindero (to whom Ribadu was close) was the inspector general of police. Many senior police officers were also unhappy about Ribadu’s ‘irregular promotion’ and the way he seemed to disparage the institution of which he was a member just because he was heading the EFCC. Even those who did not like the disgraced IGP, Mr. Tafa Balogun, felt that the humiliation he was made to suffer at the hands of the EFCC was not good for the image of the police. So, invariably, Ribadu had several powerful foes to contend with, and some of them were baying for blood. I believed also that the president was not altogether ignorant about the unfolding intrigues and that he may have given his tacit approval in the bid to get rid of Ribadu. While I could not put my finger on a particular reason, a conversation I once had with him on the

former EFCC chairman and the recollections of two close associates of his convinced me he was not quite comfortable with the idea of working with Ribadu from the outset. One day during lunch break during an FEC session, I sat with the president, and we began to chat. I will never forget that day, because even ministers who never regarded me began to court my friendship afterwards. Looking back, it is difficult to explain what happened that day; we must have chatted for close to an hour and actually delayed resumption of the FEC meeting for about 15 minutes, still enjoying our conversation, while all the ministers were already back to the council chambers. It took the intervention of other aides, particularly the presidential liaison officer (PLO) and the chief security officer (CSO), who felt irritated that I was taking too much liberty with the president, to put an end to our informal session. In the course of our discussion, the president told me of how he was endorsed by Obasanjo before asking, “Do you know that your friend Nuhu singlehandedly stopped Dr. Peter Odili from being my running mate?” he asked rhetorically. “Such was the power he had over baba (Obasanjo) that whatever he said was law!” I knew a little bit about the event recounted by the president because I was an outsider witness. But he presented it in a way that suggested Ribadu probably had a power of blackmail over Obasanjo. This issue had indeed come up early in the life of the administration, when one of the governors suggested that Ribadu was fast becoming another ‘John Edgar Hoover’, the founding director of the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), believed to have wielded enormous power through amassing secret files on political leaders by using illegal methods. From the way the president talked, it was evident he would heave a big sigh of relief if Ribadu could be removed from EFCC, especially if there was a legal way to do it, before Ribadu could become too powerful to be touched. Not a few people in government felt that way. The president also complained to me about how the EFCC was acting like it was above the law, recalling an incident where their operatives came to Katsina to arrest local government chairmen in what he described as a Gestapo-like operation. The other details, later supplied by close associates, were that once it became obvious that he (Yar’Adua) had been anointed by Obasanjo as successor, an incensed Ribadu, who had been rooting for the then FCT minister, Mr. Nasir el-Rufai, reacted badly. Aside from meeting Obasanjo to express his disappointment, Ribadu badly managed a later session he had with Yar’Adua, to put the account mildly. I have heard different versions of the encounter from several insiders, but the constant factor is that Ribadu dismissed Yar’Adua to his face, saying that he was unqualified for the office of president. It was an insult Yar’Adua apparently never forgot. Nor forgave! So the NIPSS idea was very convenient. Even while Lamorde, EFCC director of operations, was asked to act, a replacement was soon foisted on the commission in a manner that made nonsense of the president’s avowed commitment to the rule of law. But the AGF would rationalize it. Almost as soon as he sent the name of Farida Waziri to the Senate, and without waiting for her clearance, she was announced as acting chairman and made to resume. This irked the Senate members, who ordinarily should have confirmed her appointment. Some feeble protests were made, but the president got away with it. Nonetheless, the EFCC’s tragic saga continued. While still at NIPSS, Ribadu and 139 other senior officers were demoted by the Police Service Commission on August 5, 2008. Ribadu, particularly, was demoted two ranks:

from Assistant Inspector General of Police to Deputy Commissioner of Police. Even though 140 officials were involved in what the Police Service Commission (PSC) described as an exercise meant to restore the integrity of the force, a barrage of condemnations followed the announcement, which was seen as being targeted at Ribadu, as most people echoed the sentiment of the late Chief Gani Fawehinmi2, who described the demotion of the former EFCC chairman as ‘absolutely bizarre’ and a punishment for honesty. The public thought that the presidency was behind the exercise, and even when the president told me he had nothing to do with it, I also had my doubts. What I knew at the time, though, was that several officers within the Villa, including Hamza Nafada, the president’s ADC as Katsina governor, who had become the special assistant on domestic affairs, were also affected in the exercise. I spoke to Comfort Obi, respected journalist and member of the Police Service Commission (PSC), and she explained that reversing the promotion of Ribadu, and 139 other police officers, was the proper thing to do and that it was done to correct the illegalities of the past. She assured me that they were not in anyway guided by any quarters. This was the position canvassed by the PSC chairman, Mr. Parry Osayande, when he appeared before the Senate. A retired deputy inspector general of police, Osayande argued that they acted properly and in accordance with the law. “The truth of the matter is that due process was not followed, a situation where you, a junior officer, would jump over 2,000 superior officers and be promoted above your seniors is dangerous for the system,” he said. The secretary to the Commission, Alhaji Garba Buwai, gave a detailed background of the events leading to the demotion of the 140 officers: “On 16th and 30th October 2006, the former IGP submitted memorandum to the Commission for consideration of: five DCP to CP; seven ACP to DCP; four CSP to SP and one ASP to CSP. The former Commission during its 48th Ordinary Meeting of 16th November 2006, following submission from Appointment and Promotion Committee, deliberated on the Special Promotion and rejected the recommendation.” Buwai alleged that Ehindero, in his capacity as inspector general of police, then subsequently took advantage of the vacuum created by the expiration of the tenure of the preceding members of the PSC to carry out the promotion of the officers ‘through the back door’, a decision that he said contravened provisions of the 1999 Constitution. He added that when Ehindero’s tenure was coming to an end, he also announced the promotion of officers through signals that he sent to their various formations. According to the PSC Secretary, “on 18th December, 2006 after the tenure of the Commission expired, the former IGP sent a signal conveying the President’s [Chief Olusegun Obasanjo’s] approval of the promotion of the officers earlier rejected by the Commission to the rank of Commissioner of Police. The request by the Commission to get a copy of Mr. President’s approval was not submitted to the Commission.” Defending the demotion of Ribadu and others, Osayande, who was accompanied to the Senate by five members of the Commission, said that even if it had been the president who had approved the elevations, it would still have been reversed because the establishing act vested the powers of promotion of police officers on the PSC only. Mr. Ogbonnaya Onovo (then a DIG), who represented the IGP Okiro (whom he would later

succeed), said that the Commission reversed the illegality in order not to destroy the entire police force: “The tenets of democracy are all about transparency and openness in governance. In my over 30 years of service in the police—since I joined the police as a cadet officer (ASP)—promotion has always been a matter of seniority and merit. The moment you join, you know your mates and your seniors. Every officer knows when he is due for promotion and his seniors.” Onovo said arbitrary promotion, as was done in the Ribadu case,3 could only breed indiscipline and bad blood within the system because “once an officer is skipped in promotion, he becomes demoralized. It is a very painful thing to watch your junior become your boss. It must be noted that the role of the PSC is well defined, and the Commission has done the right thing by correcting some of the illegalities carried out in order not to destroy the police force.” Onovo’s position was supported by the Commissioner of Police (Administration), Mr. Felix Ogbaudu, in the course of a deposition before the House of Representatives. Stating that Ribadu was promoted first from the post of Deputy Commissioner to Commissioner of Police and then Assistant Inspector General of Police (AIG) all within one year, Ogbaudu explained that such unprecedented career progression was unhelpful for morale in the police. Ogbaudu particularly wondered why Ribadu, who had joined the Nigeria Police about 10 years after he (Ogbaudu) was enlisted, should now become his boss. This same Ribadu, he argued, had served under him (Ogbaudu) as Chief Superintendent at a time when he (Ogbaudu) had already become a Commissioner of Police. Whereas it could be conceded that the PSC had sufficiently credible grounds for the action they took on the 140 officers, most observers believed there was absence of good faith with regard to the travails of Ribadu—a view that would be given credence on graduation day at NIPSS. Security agents, acting on the orders of the AGF, who was at the graduation without invitation, attempted to drag the former EFCC boss out of the venue of an event where the VP was present as the head of the institution. Once alerted by journalists about what was going on at Kuru, I called a senior NIPSS official, who explained how Aondoakaa was threatening him on Ribadu, using the name of the president. The official told me that the issue of Ribadu had given NIPSS problems, as they were subjected to pressure not to address Ribadu as AIG but DCP. The NIPSS authorities, however, argued that the letter from the police, who had sent Ribadu for the course, addressed him as AIG, and they had not been informed of any change in his official title. However, following pressure from the AGF, the institute had to print another set of brochures that listed Ribadu as a ‘Deputy Commissioner of Police’. All these efforts still did not satisfy Aondoakaa, who argued that Ribadu should not graduate, since his rank fell short of the minimum cadre for a course meant for Commissioners of Police and above. I narrated all these to the president, who later met with the VP under whose purview NIPSS was and a face-saving decision was reached for Ribadu to be given his certificate. But the damage had already been done: a rash of lawsuits to challenge his demotion ensued before Ribadu eventually fled the country for the United States. He also began to collaborate with the British authorities on how to bring Ibori to justice as he filed a personal deposition against the former Delta State governor. The interesting point to note is that being always one step ahead of his foes, Ribadu anticipated every move Ibori and the AGF were making and always reached the media first with his version of events.

Sadly, it was the president who suffered all the collateral damage. Back at home, Aondoakaa also continued to defend Ibori. On September 10, 2009, he addressed the media and said the EFCC had already cleared Ibori over the sale of the state’s shares to V-Mobile4 around 2007, but he was silent on the allegation that the Delta State government offered its 820 million units of shares in Oceanic International Plc to Ascot Offshore Nigeria Limited to secure a N44 billion loan from Intercontinental Bank Plc in 2007. Aondoakaa, who spoke with newsmen in his office in Abuja, deliberately muddled up different issues to achieve a predetermined end. He also attacked Ribadu, whom he alleged was working against Yar’Adua’s administration from abroad by giving false information to the British government about the situation in Nigeria. He added that the revelation about the clearance of Ibori emerged following a request from the British government for more information about the deal. Not more than an hour after this curious press briefing, where the AGF exonerated Ibori, I got a call from a senior official at the presidency who informed me that at the time Aondoakaa was briefing the media, Ibori was actually in his office and must have instigated the statement. When I asked if I could quote him before the president, the official gave his go-ahead. My conversation with the president was rather unpleasant because I didn’t mince words about my feeling and frustrations on the whole sordid drama, especially the influence Ibori had on the AGF, and by implication, on the administration. Later that evening, I got another call that the VP wanted to see me, so I went to meet him at his residence. I was surprised when Jonathan asked me whether I was giving the right advice to the president on the Ibori matter since the image of my boss was involved. He said the matter was bringing the government to ridicule both at home and abroad, especially the way the AGF was handling it. He particularly mentioned the case of the ministers of health who were removed from office for charges that were not as serious as the ones being perpetrated by the AGF. I told the VP all that I had done on the issue but asked why he himself had not intervened. He merely shrugged his shoulders, an indication that he had probably done so and no action was taken or that he considered his intervention unnecessary. I nevertheless pleaded with him to also speak to the president about it. I felt disturbed by my discussion with the VP, especially because many people in government felt the way he did: they could not understand why the AGF was allowed to act as Ibori’s lawyer and defender. I knew I could not go back to the president on the same issue I had discussed with him earlier and on which I was now sounding almost like a broken gramophone, so I decided it was better I write him an informal note, which I then enclosed with the newspaper summary the next morning. Dated September 12, 2009, the note read: I hesitate to send Your Excellency this note, but my conscience will not allow me to stay silent since I made a commitment to serve you in all honesty. Last week, I inaugurated the Information Management Committee comprising the Information Directors/Press Secretaries in all ministries and MDAs as we chart the way forward on managing the public perception for the government. One unfortunate issue that came up from most members was how the office of the Attorney General has become Mr. James Ibori’s public relations outfit. The AGF media intervention on the case in London is now the focus of attention globally

with many people, including our own government officials, worried about how the fate of one man has become the sole responsibility of the Justice Minister. Yesterday evening, the VP invited me to ask whether I have advised you on the implications of the London matter with regards to the negative image it would bring to the administration, home and abroad, and I said he should discuss the matter with you himself. He even cited the case of the two Health Ministers who were removed from office for a matter he considered less embarrassing than this for the government.

While the president never discussed the issue with me, it was also becoming very clear that he might have decided to put some distance between himself and his controversial AGF. There were also hints that Aondoakaa could be moved to another ministry in a minor cabinet reshuffle. What gave credibility to this speculation was that two weeks before the president travelled to Saudi Arabia in November 2009, he asked the labour minister, Mr. Tokunbo Kayode, to deliver his paper at the Judges Conference although Aondoakaa was in the country. It was also evident that Aondoakaa, who felt very agitated that he was bypassed by the president, was also losing his grip over the EFCC, whose chairperson, Mrs. Farida Waziri, denounced him by stating that contrary to what he said, Ibori had not been exonerated and that the letter that the AGF had read to the media had no bearing on the V-Mobile case. The embattled former governor of Delta State would, however, also fight back.5 In a public statement on his travails, Ibori said it was because he didn’t facilitate the elevation of Ribadu to the position of the IGP; he also said that the former EFCC chairman also sought his support in the bid to oust Yar’Adua from power: Nuhu Ribadu must be a serial liar to attempt to deny that he approached me to help unseat the present President. This is one of his numerous on-going attempts to recruit both local and international friends to undermine President Yar’Adua’s administration. The persons he approached, including me, are still alive, and they have given testimonies to security agencies. Ribadu even contacted a high-ranking member of Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) with complaints that a ‘sick Yar’Adua’ should not be allowed to remain in office and also wanted a serving judge and member of the electoral panel to convince the team of INEC officials to concur with his evil plot that the ballot papers were not serially numbered—to damage Yar’Adua’s defence. And he did this with some of his foreign friends who, to date, still wish President Yar’Adua dead.

Ribadu, according to Ibori, “should wait for the persecution by him and his London Metropolitan Police friends of my associates to break open in a full trial. Then I will enclose copious documentary evidence to substantiate every claim I have made. The opportunistic and brazen-faced Ribadu is nothing but a fraudulent ‘anti-corruption Czar’ who operated with instruments of blackmail…he should shut up and stop boasting about having been Nigeria’s anti-corruption Czar. He compromised himself, politicizing his office, and teamed up with politicians to distribute funds to influence National Assembly members in the failed third-term tenure elongation gambit. He was a politician, not anticorruption fighter.” The former EFCC boss is, however, not a man who would allow such allegations to go unchallenged, wondering how he could have sought “the assistance of a convicted felon for the highest police position in the country? If I wanted to be IG, he would be the last

person I would consider to help me.” He added that it was the past of the former Delta State governor that was haunting him and that while Ibori could bribe his way in Nigeria to secure public appointment for people of questionable character who would make it their pre-occupation to shield him from prosecution, his nemesis would ultimately catch up with him in the United Kingdom. With the movement of the Ibori saga from Nigeria to Dubai and now to the United Kingdom, it will be interesting to see the exchange between Ribadu and the former Delta State governor when the duo finally meet in a London court. But the saga very much tainted the image of the Yar’Adua administration, which inherited, but never quite got involved in, high profile international cases of corruption such as the Halliburton scam; the Willbros bribery saga and the Siemens scandal.6 But there is nobody to blame but the late president himself. I cannot forget the experience of December 30, 2007, when I walked into the president’s residence, where I met him at the dining table with a few of his friends. I was carrying the draft of a statement that I wanted him to approve to enable me to douse the outrage generated by the controversy over the attempt to send Ribadu to NIPSS that was still raging. Knowing why I had come, since he was already aware of my concerns, he asked me to sit down and eat. As we ate, he said, “Look, Segun, let me tell you a story. Four days ago, I was sitting on this same table when CNN came with the breaking news of the assassination of the prime minister of Pakistan, Mrs. Benazir Bhutto. Throughout that day, that was the only story they relayed. By the next day, they had started reporting other news, even though the Bhutto story remained the most prominent. By yesterday, the intensity of the reportage of the Bhutto affair had decreased and now if you watch the screen you will see that CNN is gradually moving on to other issues. I am sure that very soon, your friends in the media will forget about this Ribadu matter that is worrying you so much. It doesn’t bother me because I know it will soon blow over.” Unfortunately, the Ribadu saga never really blew over, as it inflicted devastating damage to the reputation of President Yar’Adua, whose personal inclination was against the corrupt. I have read the allegations contained in the US cables published by Wikileaks against certain individuals, including his wife. But despite that, Yar’Adua was a simple man with rather simple needs, and I still believe he was not a man to be involved in crooked deals. A few examples will validate my conviction. I recall the pressure put on him not to declare his assets publicly on the grounds that doing that would compel others to do so against the letter and spirit of the law. Yet, he did. I also knew about his ambivalence towards wealth and his disdain for all forms of materialism. As president, he lived a Spartan lifestyle devoid of any form of personal pleasure, and one got the impression that he knew, or perhaps feared, that he might not live long. That probably accounted for why he was very spiritual. But given that corruption has over the years been Nigeria’s elite vice, passion is easily inflamed when the people are led to believe that a government’s anti-corruption campaign is no more than a ruse. With the way the Ibori matter was handled, it was easy to come to that conclusion, yet here was a president who went public to declare his unwavering support for the removal of the immunity clause from our constitution. With emphasis on laying out regulations and procedures that encourage due process and respect for the institutions that deal with anti-corruption, Yar’Adua’s motivation was to

nudge Nigeria into an era of preventive anti-corruption. “We now have a situation in which people award contracts without caring whether they have enough money to complete the project, and because of this, there are lots of abandoned projects all over the country, in fact some going into billions of dollars. This is the kind of disrespect for established regulations and procedures that feeds corruption,” he said at the World Economic Forum in Davos, while speaking to a group of investors. Yar’Adua, it must be noted, stopped the practice of ‘warehousing money’ at the end of the year, which was the practice before he assumed office. Rather, he insisted that all unspent money at the end of a budget cycle should be returned to the treasury. It was the attempt to flout this directive that led to the ouster of two ministers and 11 senior officials in the Ministry of Health, as well as the arrest of some members of the National Assembly Committee on Health. It was also his insistence on due process that led to the exposure of the fraud at the Rural Electrification Agency, which culminated in the arrest of senior officials and some lawmakers. Cognizant of the fact that the resources in the hands of the federal government far outweigh those of the entire 36 states and the 774 local governments put together, the president believed that it was charitable to begin the fight against corruption at that level, so that by plugging the requisite loopholes at the federal level, it would be easier to lead by example. For him, plugging loopholes meant allowing officials of the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) to be rigorous in their oversight functions, all in the bid to enthrone a regime of transparency and accountability. That accounted for the enormous powers wielded by the director general of the bureau, Engineer Emeka Eze; any project that did not secure his certification was as good as dead. It is on record that Yar’Adua instituted the policy of e-payment, which became effective January 1, 2009, for the settlement of all federal government obligations. There has been some resistance, but with faithful implementation, it will drastically reduce corruption in a nation where politicians’ preferred method of payment for under-the-table deals is cash. With e-payment, banks are now instructed to make direct payments to the accounts of employees, consultants and other service providers so that these payments can be easily tracked. With e-payment, contractors now get their payments directly into their accounts, and banks are under obligation not to open corporate accounts for companies not registered by the Corporate Affairs Commission or companies without a tax identification number. This not only enhances the audit trail, it eliminates cash for online transactions and reduces interactions between officers responsible for payments and the beneficiaries. At the federal level, corruption is now so much easier to track, if the anti-corruption agencies are alive to their responsibilities. Of course, it’s also worth noting that Yar’Adua helped to sanitize the banks by putting the weight of his office behind the Central Bank reform, which saw to the removal and subsequent trial of some chief executives of banks, even when his family had substantial interest in one of the affected banks. Perhaps in years to come, the enduring legacy of Yar’Adua will be in the legislation he superintended in the fight against graft with the bill that he sent to the National Assembly in his last few months in office. On April 8, 2009, he brought an executive memo to the Federal Executive Council (FEC) for the approval of a draft bill for the introduction of a non conviction-based asset forfeiture system in Nigeria, as well as the establishment of a regulatory framework for the control and management of assets both before and after confiscation. This initiative is

aimed at strengthening the capacity of the government to recover assets that are proceeds of corruption and to assist in putting pressure on countries where stolen assets are located to return such assets to the state of origin. It is also the mechanism by which, in the absence of criminal proceedings, the proceeds of criminal activity could be confiscated so as to deprive a person of ill-gotten wealth. Once passed, asset forfeiture would not be thwarted by immunities or inability to extradite a suspect who is beyond reach, while also allowing asset recovery where, in the event of the death or absence of the suspect(s), confiscation and return of property involved would not otherwise be possible. It will also allow for confiscation where an individual has been tried before a criminal court but acquitted, perhaps through a questionable verdict or because the evidence, although probative, fell short of the criminal standard of proof. Yar’Adua envisaged a comprehensive and institutional approach to fighting corruption, but, unfortunately, this was exploited by some unscrupulous officials who had scant regard for the law. However, as the man at whose desk the buck stopped, he must accept responsibility—and Nigerians indeed hold him accountable—for everything that happened on his watch. Endnotes 1 There were 85 banks in Nigeria before the 2004 consolidation policy which ultimately reduced them to 25. 2 Chief Fawehinmi, SAN, Nigeria’s respected human rights crusader and lawyer, was one of the staunchest supporters of Ribadu. Chief Fawehinmi died of cancer in 2009 at age 71. 3 Ribadu was promoted first from the post of Deputy Commissioner to Commissioner of Police and then Assistant Inspector General of Police (AIG) within one year by former President Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. 4 The alleged illegal trading in V-Mobile shares involved three former governors, Chief James Ibori of Delta State, Senator Bola Tinubu of Lagos State and Obong Victor Attah of Akwa Ibom State. 5 At a press conference in Lagos in September 2009, the former governor of Delta State accused Ribadu of acting as a tool to former President Obasanjo because he (Ibori) refused to support the failed third term bid and for championing the move to get the federal government to pay oil producing states 13 per cent derivation fund which he argued dated back to 1999. 6 Siemens and Wilbros were alleged to have bribed some Nigerian officials in order to secure telecommunications and oil service contracts in Nigeria while Halliburton officials confessed that they paid about $180m in bribe to top public officials, also to secure a juicy oil contract; all before Yar’Adua came to power.

3

The Oily Affairs President Yar’Adua’s convictions in relation to the oil and gas industry were not in doubt from his first day in office: a holistic review of the governing structure of the sector was necessary for it to truly serve the interest of the people. Indeed, he made no pretenses about his commitment to that, and he often viewed Brazil’s Petrobas1 as a model to which the nation should aspire. It was for that reason he had taken keen interest in the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), conceived to harness opportunities and address the challenges in the oil and gas sector. The bill’s aim is to ensure that Nigeria derives maximum benefit, directly and indirectly, across oil and gas value chains by opening up horizons for wider participation of stakeholders and entrenching transparency. Not everyone shared the president’s enthusiasm. The current operators in Nigeria especially never hid their opposition to the PIB, because it introduces a number of changes to the existing fiscal system governing oil and gas operation in the country. Some of the key changes include the fact that all companies engaged in upstream petroleum operation would be required to pay Company Income Tax. The bill’s other creation is the Nigerian Hydrocarbon Tax (NHT), which is a simplified version of Petroleum Profit Tax. When implemented, these would provide for a higher government take for deep offshore fields and marginally higher government take for onshore and shallow waters. The PIB also introduces a modern acreage management system with strict relinquishment guidelines that would provide a platform for new investors, both local and foreign, to enlist and contribute to the growth of the industry. Companies currently operating in Nigeria would be required to give back certain acreages from existing oil prospecting licenses and oil mining leases, except with regard to acreages with production activities, or acreages that will be developed in the near future. The intention was to prevent companies from sitting on acreages that would have otherwise been available to new investors. Yet the oil companies, long accustomed to certain ways of doing business in Nigeria, would rather that the status quo remain. It was against this background that a crucial meeting between Shell International and the government was held in the first week of March 2008. It was inconceivable that the company would be comfortable with a law that seeks to subject it to the same system of rents, royalties and taxes as every other company operating in Nigeria. The visiting CEO, Mr. Jeroen van der Veer, outlined the company’s apprehensions about the bill, but the president’s calm reassurance was that Shell’s interest would always be considered in all the actions taken by Nigeria to reform the oil and gas sector, given the long history shared by the company and the country. Nonetheless, he explained that the legal and governance structures that had been designed since the 1970s had become inadequate for the needs of the Nigerian oil and gas industry. The reform commenced under President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2000 with the inauguration of the Oil and Gas Sector Implementation Committee (OGIC) by Atiku Abubakar, who was then vice president, in his capacity as Chairman of the National Council on Privatization (NCP). The committee was chaired by Dr. Rilwanu Lukman, who was special adviser on petroleum at the time. The Bureau of Public Enterprises

(BPE) served as the OGIC secretariat and the then director general, Mr. Nasir el-Rufai nominated most of the members, which included Prof. Yinka Omorogbe, who would later play a crucial role on the issue. In 2007, Yar’Adua brought back Lukman as presidential adviser on petroleum, essentially because of the PIB. Although Obasanjo had conceived OGIC, it was one area in which his successor literarily hit the ground running. It all began on Saturday, August 11, 2007, when the president inaugurated a committee headed by Lukman2, whom he had appointed honorary special adviser, Energy and Strategic Matters and chairman of the OGIC Reform Implementation Committee. His directive to them was brief but quite challenging: review the OGIC report and come up with a workable document within one week. In reconstituting OGIC, Lukman also brought in three original members—Donu Kogbara, Dr. M. M. Ibrahim, and Omorogbe, who headed the sub-committee that drafted the bill. About two weeks later, Lukman made a presentation that addressed four critical areas: required legislation, funding and privatization, gas linkage with power supply, and the role of the three tiers of government. The presentation harped on the need to transform the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) from a huge amorphous cost centre with conflicting roles in policy, regulation, commercial operations into a fullfledged international, integrated commercial oil and gas corporation driven by revenue generation and profit objectives. After extensive deliberation, the president directed that the committee’s report be presented to the Federal Executive Council (FEC), and this was done on Wednesday, August 29, 2007. Endorsed by the council, the report was eventually sent to the National Assembly as ‘The Petroleum Industry Bill’ for their consideration and enactment into law. The president scrupulously explained all these processes to the Shell team before seeking the cooperation of the company, arguing that it could be a win-win situation for both Shell and Nigeria. But this optimism, even from what transpired at the meeting, seemed to be a tall order, given that Shell had its own ideas on how it believes Nigeria’s oil and gas industry should be run. Besides, Shell had found relating with Yar’Adua rather difficult for two reasons: he had expressed his displeasure with the company for its reluctance to make gas available for electricity generation in the country and was also concerned about Shell’s disrespect for constituted authority, as the company had developed the habit of bypassing the NNPC to the presidency, a tendency the president wanted to stop. For this reason, he always referred Shell to NNPC or invited NNPC whenever Shell management attempted to meet him, and the company didn’t like this. The session, however, ended on a convivial note since the president assured the visiting delegation that the reforms were not targeted at any of the multinational oil companies. With the meeting over, one of the company’s officials asked for my e-mail address. He said Shell was holding an Investors Relations Presentation in London on March 17 and that he wanted me to clear what the CEO intended to say about their Nigerian operations. A few days later, Shell indeed sent me the three paragraphs on Nigeria, which I considered a fair representation of what transpired at the meeting, and I gave my goahead. And that was what Jeroen van der Veer read in London.3 This rapprochement was rather short-lived, as the president, two months later, directed the NNPC to take steps to recover outstanding payments of about two billion US dollars due to the federal government from Shell and Exxon Mobil on the Production Sharing

Contracts (PSCs) for the Bonga and Erha oilfields. This directive was based on the recommendations of the committee he had established to verify the claims in a petition that alleged that revenue opportunities had been lost to the nation in the implementation of the PSCs for the two deep-offshore oil fields, which account for about 20 per cent of the country’s total oil production. The following represents a breakdown of this directive: • The total sum of $1.496 billion accruable to NNPC, based on the proper application of the PSC’s capital allowance, should be recovered. This sum was made up of $850 million from Bonga and $646.3 million from Erha. • The sum of $414.6 million accruable to NNPC and to government from Bonga gas sales and as tax revenue from the gas sales be recovered. • All future government gas sales agreements should account for natural gas liquids (NGLs) to ensure that the government derives maximum economic benefit from them and that this position be adopted in the renegotiation of all existing PSC agreements that are due for renegotiation. The gale of reform was not about to abate. President Yar’Adua further directed that the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) should re-examine the company income tax payments due from Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company (SNEPCO) and Esso Exploration and Production Nigeria Limited (EEPNL) on the operation of the two oilfields. To the multinational oil companies, these decisions were akin to a declaration of war, and it was evident they would fight back. But the president’s actions were taken in good faith as a close look at their underlining premise will reveal: critical to these decisions was that Bonga (Oil Mining Lease [OML] 118)—which begun operations in November 2005— and Erha (OML 133)—which commenced operations in March 2006—represent Nigeria’s first major deep offshore developments and both fields are governed by 1993 PSCs. The license for Bonga is operated on behalf of the NNPC by SNEPCO and that for Erha is operated by EEPNL. The determination of crude oil allocation and entitlements from the fields by the contractors (Shell and ExxonMobil) and NNPC had been faced with unresolved issues since production commenced; this was brought to the president’s attention when he assumed office. Contractors and NNPC, according to the brief given him, had held different positions on the treatment of investment tax credit (ITC), cost consolidation, timing of capital allowance and applicable royalty rates. These factors, plus a combination of several other lapses therefore informed the president’s directive that both Bonga and Erha be reviewed. It was this situation that inspired establishing the committee headed by the special adviser on petroleum matters, Dr. Emmanuel Egbogah, with the mandate to ascertain the operations of the fields and determine if there were revenue opportunities that might have been lost by government. Other members were drawn from the Ministry of Finance, National Planning Commission and the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR). The CBN governor, accountant general of the federation, the group managing director of NNPC, and the Federal Inland Revenue Service chairman were also on the committee. The committee was directed to determine the volumes of crude oil and gas that was produced on both fields within a trial marketing period (TMP) of six months and thereafter compare the side agreement clauses (if any) used for marketing the crude oil. It

was also required to ascertain the basis for establishing an escrow account independent of the federation account, and why access to this account was exclusively retained by Shell and ExxonMobil. Finally, the committee was to identify the revenue stream and how the money was being banked and distributed among the partners. Based on the data received and subsequent analysis, the committee’s submission was that a total revenue of $11.342 billion was accruable to federal government and NNPC since the commencement of production from both Bonga and Erha fields. After examining all the figures for royalty and tax as well as the benefit from investment tax credit (ITC) used to offset tax obligation, the committee concluded that there was a gap of $1.911 billion made up of $1.496 billion (capital allowance), $288.5 million for Bonga gas sales to NLNG and $126.2 million as tax revenue on sale of Bonga gas. This represented the recoverable sum from both Shell and ExxonMobil. The president’s directives, however, left the oil companies unsettled and fuelled the suspicion that with such a disposition, the idea behind the PIB could not be in their interest. So, they began to plot strategies that would frustrate the bill. When Mr. Rich Kruger, President of ExxonMobil, led an eight-man delegation to the State House about three months after a similar visit by his Shell counterpart, the president re-echoed his commitment to the oil companies: “I assure you that as we reform the national oil company, we will take into account the mutual interests of the international oil companies and the federal government. The reforms meant to restructure our national economy will be a win-win situation for Nigeria and the oil companies.” President Yar’Adua said Nigeria had enjoyed a long relationship with the companies, adding, “We will ensure mutual consultation, so that we can transform our national oil company without upsetting the relationship we have with our partners.” At both his public and private meetings, the president took a conciliatory path as he pleaded for the support of the oil companies with regard to the reforms of the industry. Yet, as revelations from some secret cables from the United States embassy in Nigeria published by Wikileaks show,4 it is obvious that the oil companies, Shell particularly, were out to ensure that the PIB was not passed and if passed at all, would be a version that would not in anyway advance the interest of the Nigerian stakeholders. In one of the leaked cables written by former US ambassador to Nigeria, Dr. Robin Sanders, Shell’s regional executive vice-president for Africa, Ann Pickard, was quoted to have said the international oil companies (IOC) were quite concerned about the ‘very flawed’ new petroleum sector energy bill. On October 20, 2009, Deputy Chief of Mission, Dundas McCullough wrote: Pickard said the GON [government of Nigeria] wanted the National Assembly to pass the [PIB] by November 17 in order for the GON to be able to announce it at the upcoming CWC Gulf of Guinea Conference in London November 17-19. She said that if the House passes the PIB in the coming weeks, “We need to move quickly” to obtain any necessary changes before it becomes law. Fortunately, she added: “We are working with the House and the House appears to want to work with us.” She continued, saying that if the Senate passed the PIB, “We aren’t worried.” Unfortunately, she explained, “We think the Senate will pass a bad bill,” but it wouldn’t really matter. She added that she would be at the Nigerian House and Senate later that day and would let the embassy know if there were any unexpected developments.

The Ambassador asked if Shell had had engagements with the GON outside the National Assembly, such as with the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Nigeria. Pickard said, “We are meeting with them at all levels.” She noted that an IMF team headed by Charles McPherson was in Abuja to look at the PIB and that Shell would be meeting with them as well. In contrast, she said, “We are worried about the World Bank’s political agenda, and it is not clear what their agenda is.” She said the World Bank was working on how to make the IJVs [International Joint Ventures] ‘bankable’ so that they would be able to go to international and domestic banks for financing.

One fact that must, however, be conceded is that Pickard was consistent in her opposition to the PIB, which she publicly described as “a cumbersome document that lacks insight into the very basics of our industry,” at a public lecture in Abuja in February 2010. This view had then been countered by petroleum minister, Dr. Rilwan Lukman who said, “Let’s wait and see. Very soon we [will] know who is wrong.” Incidentally, renowned energy consultant, Pedro van Meurs, had at the same forum described Shell’s opposition to the fiscal provisions of the PIB as one induced essentially by profit. “There is no truth in the allegation that [the] PIB fiscal system is the harshest in the world or that it will halt investment. I have been advising governments all over the world for over 40 years, and I know that this is a battle whereby the oil company will try to get out of the parliament the highest possible share. So they make loud noise so maybe somebody out there might be listening to them,” argued Meurs, who happens to be Dutch.5 Shell, however, began to feel the heat when the NNPC Group general manager, Public Affairs Division, Dr. Levi Ajuonuma, accused the company of being “at the forefront of a renewed attempt to scuttle the planned passage of the Petroleum Industry Bill, which is currently before the National Assembly.” Egbogah would stir the hornet’s nest when, in a media interview, he made specific allegations about attempts to compromise the lawmakers: “The oil companies are taking the senators to Ghana to feed them, going to Labour people to bribe them and saying that this reform is going to kill you and all that nonsense.” Arguing that the oil companies had been milking Nigeria for 50 years and that they wanted to continue to do so, Egbogah added, “But we know our roles, and we know what to do and how to do it. They are not to educate us on how to do that. We will take our destiny in our hands and Nigerians will begin to see the benefits. It will not happen today, it will take some time, but everyone will realize we are doing this for ourselves.6” Legislators were outraged by this allegation, with some actually accusing the presidency of attempts to blackmail them. There was also a resolution for Egbogah to be invited to substantiate the claim. Even though the special adviser apologized, explaining that he never meant to impugn the integrity of the Senators and that he had used the word ‘lobby’ and not ‘bribe’, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Information and Media, Senator Ayogu Eze (PDP, Enugu North), confirmed that some members were indeed sponsored on a trip to Ghana without the knowledge of the Senate leadership: I need to say clearly that we have found out, unfortunately and regrettably, that there was an attempt by some private sector organizations to lobby members of the National Assembly on the bill that is before the National Assembly. We found out

today that some members of the National Assembly did go to Ghana, and we are also not very happy with the development because Section 21 of our Standing Rules specifies categorically that before you can travel abroad for whatever reason, you must write to the leadership of the Senate, stating the purpose, stating the duration of your stay and stating the address where you are going to stay. The committee or the individuals that are involved never wrote to the leadership, never informed us; so, we are completely in the dark about the people who made the trip, and we are not happy about that, and we have referred the matter, based on the motion brought by a member, to the Committee on Ethics and Public Petition.

Eze assured Nigerians that there would be a public hearing on the matter and that if any senator was found wanting, there would be consequences. Though Eze did not mention the names of senators who made the trip to Ghana, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Petroleum (Upstream), Senator Lee Maeba, who was not part of the trip, gave a blunt summary of events: “When they returned from Ghana, I discussed with distinguished Senator Amange, but I have not received official brief from those who went to Ghana. Senator Amange is even lamenting as to why he went there because there were even issues of estacode not paid to them and a lot of other issues which made them to return a day before they were supposed to return.” The said seminar, attended by eleven senators and representatives of Labour, was sponsored by the Oil Producers Trade Session (OPTS) then chaired by Mr. Basil Omiyi, former country chairman of Shell. If the Senate ever conducted any investigation, the public is yet to be informed of the findings, but the oil companies stepped up their onslaught to frustrate the passage of the PIB, which remains with the lawmakers almost three years after it was submitted. There were other issues that were never quite resolved under Yar’Adua. For instance, the appointments, by the president, of Mohammed Barkindo as NNPC Group managing director and Omorogbe as secretary and legal adviser were at the instance of Lukman and principally because of the reform. But the moment they got to NNPC, Barkindo and Omorogbe could not agree on the content of the PIB, especially after the former was believed to have redrafted the bill in such a manner as to give tremendous power to NNPC while blunting the roles of the new institutions to be created, in clear contravention of the stated objectives of the reforms. This led to a multiplicity of bills, and Omorogbe sent a protest letter to Lukman, while Ajumogobia also raised the issue. Notwithstanding, the scaremongering tactics adopted by the IOCs have obscured from many Nigerians the real benefits of the PIB, which is designed to unleash the capacity of the nation in the oil and gas sector while one of the multiplier effects of its implementation would be employment generation. Again, with the prospect of stopping cash call payments to the IOCs and raising money from international finance markets to fund joint venture projects, the president believed that would also deepen our capital market, where no oil company is as yet being quoted. Passage of the PIB (as originally conceived) would also ensure that with the gas sector that is just being developed, the nation does not commit the same mistake it made with crude oil. But beyond all these was a decision to free resources for the social sector. “Part of the reasons why we are restructuring our oil sector is to free the resources that we pay the oil companies under joint venture agreements for critical areas like power, education and

health,” the president said at a meeting with representatives of the organized private sector in Abuja in November 2007. While the IOCs continued to make overt and coverts moves to subvert the passage of the PIB, they also took keen interest in the surreptitious moves by the Russian and Chinese governments to make a dramatic entry into the Nigerian oil and gas industry: a deliberate bogey Yar’Adua encouraged to get the IOCs to show more sensitivity to Nigeria’s national interest. It was at the margin of the 33rd G8 summit in Germany7 in June 2007 that the then Russian president, Mr. Vladimir Putin, had a brief chat with Yar’Adua. He bluntly told the president that Nigerian officials were denying a level playing field to Gazprom8, which was having difficulties gaining entrance into the nation’s oil and gas industry. Putin told the president he had information that Nigerian government officials, in collaboration with Shell, were deliberately making it impossible for Russian and Chinese IOCs to operate in the country. This was a serious allegation that could not be taken lightly. Upon return from the summit, the president directed Tanimu to monitor and provide him with feedback on NNPC’s proposed partnership with Gazprom until appropriate protocols were signed. He detailed Egbogah with the responsibility of assessing the Chinese interest. The president felt that Nigeria needed the competition between the preexisting IOCs, of which Shell was the primus inter pares, and the Chinese and Russian IOCs then prospecting Nigeria. His reasons were that if the new global players were allowed to participate in fresh bid rounds, especially on long term leases held by Shell that were about to expire, the IOC’s would be compelled to up their bids. While he never contemplated replacing western IOCs with Russian and Chinese competitors, he believed that the new entrants could be used as a bait to extract value and concessions from the reluctant western IOCs on the many fronts on which he thought they could do better for the nation. The story of the Chinese interest in the oil and gas sector began in November 2007 when a Chinese consortium, led by CNOOC Africa Ltd. made a proposal to the president, expressing its desire to acquire a large number of oil and gas assets estimated to contain six billion barrels of oil reserves. With a proposed offer of $50 billion in what they described as ‘alternative funding for infrastructural development in Nigeria’, it was very difficult to resist. To the president, who was intent on bridging Nigeria’s infrastructural gap, this was a huge sum that could help, especially in developing the gas sector, which held huge prospect for the power and the transport sectors. It was, however, not until he returned from his state visit to China in February 2008 that he directed Lukman to explore the idea proposed by the Chinese consortium. Lukman would later constitute a committee to examine the Chinese proposal when he assumed the office of petroleum minister. That committee was chaired by Egbogah. Other members included Dr. Mohammed Ibrahim, from the office of the minister of petroleum; Dr. Tim Okon from the office of the GMD of NNPC; Eng. M. K. Amate, director of Planning and Statistics, office of the permanent secretary, Department of Petroleum Resources; and Mr. A. J. Ibikunle of the Department of Petroleum Resources. Others were Mr. Victor Briggs, National Petroleum Investment Services (NAPIMS), and Mrs. Grace Taiga, legal director, Ministry of Petroleum Resources.

The mandate of the committee, as spelt out by Lukman, included confirming and ascertaining the availability of uncommitted reserves between two to three billion barrels and undertaking negotiations with the Chinese consortium made up of CNOOC Africa Ltd., Sinohydro Corporation and China State Construction Company over possible sale. They were also to determine the appropriate legal and commercial framework for this transaction if it was found to be worthy of consideration. In the first proposal made to government by the Sunrise Consortium chairman, Mr. Lap Yen Young, the company was ready to pay $25 billion for the six billion oil reserves after which it would further invest another $25 billion “in the execution of economically viable infrastructural projects in Nigeria.” Some of the projects identified by the company included the Mambilla and Zungeru hydropower projects; 300,000 barrel-per-day export refinery in Lagos; 100,000 barrelper-day refinery in Calabar and Katsina; construction of an 800,000 metric ton-per-day compound fertilizer in Sokoto; concession and construction of five super highways across the country to include Abuja to Kano, Lagos to Badagry; and coastal highways from Calabar to Lagos and Maiduguri to Kebbi. They also proposed the execution of the Nigerian gas master plan with $3 billion provision for gas gathering as well as the Lagos-Kano rail project. These were enticing propositions to the president. The identified oil fields were OML 67, 68, and 70, for which they offered farm-in fees of $5 per barrel for 3 billion barrels; $2 per barrel for 49 percent interest in OML 11 and 13 and $3 per barrel for 49 percent in OML 71, 72, 74, 77, 79, 83, 85, 86, 88, 90, 91, 95, 116, 118, 127, 133, 140, and 326. At a time when the oil companies were already kicking against the PIB, it was evident they took a lot of interest in the negotiations with the Chinese consortium, especially with regard to the availability of the identified fields, some of which were then under litigation. The first task undertaken by the government was to ascertain the volume of oil and gas in the reserves under consideration. The NNPC data and records revealed that they contained about 11.562 billion barrels of oil and 1.082 billion barrels of condensate, which meant that the offer made by the Chinese consortium would then make it technically an offer of $1.8 per barrel of oil equivalent. Of course, the Chinese negotiators kept dangling the carrot of their “investible funds” in infrastructural projects, which, given the situation in the country, was rather tempting. But with negotiations in the hands of technical people and not politicians, the Chinese did not make any headway in that direction as the Egbogah committee decided on examining the offer using market benchmarks. To the government, the absurdity of this proposition is self-evident: Whereas the consortium calculated the volumes in the oil fields it was bidding for as six billion barrels of reserves, it was obvious that they deliberately left out gas and condensate in their analysis. The major factor cited by the Chinese consortium for their valuation was the element of risk associated with the transaction given the prevailing volatility of the Niger Delta. But the government was of the view that the reward far outweighed the risk. Even while tempted by the offer of developing critical infrastructure—one of the main items in Yar’Adua’s seven-point agenda—the considered wisdom within government was that the Chinese offer was far too low, and from the outset, Lukman was dismissive of their proposal. But the president wanted it explored to its limits. On three different

occasions, the Chinese indeed improved on their offer, but they were nonetheless rejected because the negotiating team was directed that there be no trade-offs on infrastructure and downstream commitments. Four offers later from the Chinese consortium, the answer remained the same: no deal. The government now made a counter offer shaped by the fact that prevailing market conditions around the world indicated that major resource holders were not selling equity barrels. The reasoning was that at a time when the government was working towards Incorporated Joint Ventures under the PIB, the implication of selling equity barrels would be that they could confer the full potential reserves in a block without being constrained by price. This, it was felt, would not be in the interest of Nigeria. After weighing the Chinese offer against the price per barrel being paid by other operators in some OMLs, the government came to the conclusion that, even with all the enticing promises about investible funds, the Chinese proposition was out of the question. Interestingly, while these negotiations were ongoing, it was obvious that the local promoters of the Chinese deal did not want to leave matters in the hands of the professionals. Political lobbyists of different hues were deployed to meet with the president on the need to allow the transaction to work. There was also pressure on Lukman; minister of state for petroleum, Mr. Odein Ajumogobia; and Egbogah. The carrot was always the ‘investible funds for infrastructure’, especially in refineries, since Labour had made the building of local refineries a precondition for supporting the deregulation of the downstream sector of the petroleum industry. There were several other approaches made to the president by politicians and top government officials who spoke of a possible ‘political donation’ running into hundreds of millions of dollars. I could not, however, ascertain whether these emissaries were working at the behest of the consortium or whether they were just political undertakers who were working alone, but there was enormous pressure on the president to take the negotiation away from the technocrats and domicile it in the hands of a team comprising ‘trusted’ politicians and officials, including those known to have the president’s ears. He rebuffed all the entreaties. There is no doubt that the president was interested in working with the Chinese because of the pledged investment in infrastructure, yet he believed that given the technical intricacies of the oil industry, the negotiations were better handled by professionals. He was also not interested in any under-the-table party ‘donation’ that would compromise him and effectively shortchange the nation. Given that Lukman had from the outset been somewhat disinterested, he drove a hard bargain, and with the president refusing to take the negotiation away from his ministry, the Chinese offer looked every inch a doomed venture. By September 2009, the federal government had concluded that it was better to renew the lease agreements with the previous operators who were then requested to make certain payments. With that, it became obvious to the Chinese that they were losing out and, eager to turn the situation around, they decided to give the deal another shot. Unfortunately, by the time they came round to making a fresh offer to the government, the president was already on his sick bed in Saudi Arabia. The last offer from the Chinese was for 30 per cent equity interest in the NNPC-MPN (Mobil Producing Nigeria) Joint Venture, with a bid of $4.85 billion, since MPN had paid $600 million for 30 percent and NNPC was expected to pay $900 million for 40 percent. They also offered a bid for 30

percent equity interest in the NNPC-SPDC Joint Venture, for which they were prepared to pay $US14.715 billion, with SPDC holding 30 percent and NNPC 40 percent. The last was for 30 percent equity interest in the NNPC-CNL (Chevron Nigerial Limited) Joint Venture, for which they offered $2.25 billion, with CNL holding 30 percent and NNPC 40 percent. For the uncommitted OML 139, they offered $125 million. In addition to these proposed cash payments, they also offered to finance 50 per cent of the cash call cost for exploration and production on behalf of NNPC in the joint venture; finance 70 per cent ($8 billion) of the cost of the construction of two new 300,000-barrelper-day refineries in Lagos and Akwa Ibom on behalf of NNPC and finance 70 per cent ($7 billion) of the cost of constructing 4000MW and 1000MW of hydropower in Mambilla and Zungeru. Even if there were merits in these proposals, the Chinese had left it too late since by then the president was in a Saudi Arabia hospital battling for his life. The likely outcome of that offer in the event that the Chinese had made them much earlier can only now be a matter for conjecture. But what was never in doubt was that if the offer was right, the president was ready to do a deal with the Chinese, even though this had political implications. The United States government did not hide its displeasure about the possibility of the involvement of the Chinese in the Nigerian oil industry. Coming after a series of meetings with the Russian gas company, Gazprom, there was a feeling that Nigeria ‘was going the wrong road’. At an international session, a member of the United States Congress had accosted the foreign affairs minister, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, asking in typical American fashion, “Hey, why are you guys tending towards China?” Maduekwe replied rather jocularly, “To make America jealous.” Laughing, the congressman replied, “You bet it is working!” In spite of the foregoing hearty exchange, the fact about all the dealings with China, which never really worked out—either in the oil and gas industry or in the transport sector—remained that the president had not acted with the intent to rile America or, for that matter, to provoke diplomatic jealousy. He was also committed to the passage and subsequent implementation of the PIB notwithstanding the opposition from the IOCs. What was important to President Yar’Adua was not so much how other countries felt about the choices Nigeria was making as it was about whether those choices were in the country’s interest. Endnotes 1 Founded in 1953, Petrobras is regarded as the largest company in South America by revenue and market capitalization with output of more than 2 million barrels of oil equivalent per day. The company also owns oil refineries and oil tankers and is a world leader in development of advanced technology from deep-water and ultra-deep water oil production. 2 Dr Rilwan Lukman held several ministerial positions (Mines and Power, Petroleum) under the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida in the eighties and early nineties before becoming the secretary general of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) from 1 January 1995 to 31 December 2000. After initially serving as honorary adviser on energy, Lukman was eventually appointed minister of petroleum

resources by Yar’Adua. 3 The Shell CEO remark on Nigeria at the Investors Forum in London: “Regarding Nigeria, I’m pleased that after a sustained difficult security period, we are seeing an improvement wherever there is concerted federal and state attention. Of course, the implications for our people and assets are my prime concern. But as a result, we are also regaining some shut-in production. When I met the President 10 days ago, we moved closer to establishing some sustainable funding solutions—and agreed [on] the basic principles and terms which we hope will unlock some of the key projects that have been suspended for the last year. This is also important for restarting suspended projects that harness gas going to flare. The President told me he is committed to ending continuous flaring but recognized that more detailed work has to be done by government with the industry to agree [on] a practical timetable and deadline recognizing current industry realities. I’m delighted that the President has given his personal backing to this approach and re-confirms our commitment to work with government on this important issue.” 4 In November 2010, Wikileaks began publishing 251,287 leaked United States embassy cables, which provide insight into how American diplomats see officials in their host countries and one of such from Nigeria details the activities of Shell in Nigeria’s domestic affairs as captured by American embassy officials. 5 Meurs is a national of The Netherlands, the home country of Shell. 6 Egbogah spoke to a Punch correspondent at an oil and gas conference in Houston, Texas, and the interview was published by the newspaper on November 17, 2009. 7 The 33rd G8 summit to which President Yar’Adua, along with four other African leaders, was invited took place at Kempinski Grand Hotel, Heiligendamm, Germany. 8 Gazprom is the Russian state oil and gas company. It is regarded as the largest extractor of natural gas in the world.

4

The Niger Delta Amnesty Deal Resolving the Niger Delta problem was a cardinal part of President Yar’Adua’s sevenpoint agenda. It was a challenge that the president had devoted considerable time contemplating, so it wasn’t long before he came up with what, essentially, were his convictions about turning the grim situation around. There were, for instance, two issues peculiar to the region that he felt could only be tackled together: the challenge of development following decades of neglect and the burgeoning rate of criminality characterized by the spate of kidnappings and violence. The trend had an even greater significance when viewed against the background that most of the federal government contractors mobilized to sites in the region had abandoned their projects, and the cost of initiating new ones (which also stood the risk of being abandoned) was thrice what the original cost would have been. Under that atmosphere, going forward required meaningful dialogue with all the stakeholders. The president had promised to hold a Niger Delta summit within his first 100 days in office; the intention was to use the session to achieve two goals: to emphasize his and the federal government’s commitment to a new path that would address both the developmental and environmental challenges, and also to secure the firm commitment of other stakeholders in the Niger Delta. As a prelude to the summit, the president set up two committees. The first one, which he personally headed, engaged the governors from the region to examine the 15-year Niger Delta Development Master Plan as developed by Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), with the aim of working out details of the implementation plan and timelines. The task of the second committee, headed by the VP, was to collate all previous attempts and reports; engage all the stakeholders, including the militants and elders in the region; work out the modalities for the conference and establish the parameters for the discourse. To kickstart the process, the VP visited the creeks, held meetings with militant leaders and other stakeholders while the president met with the Niger Delta governors to share with them his thoughts on the way forward. As he had envisioned, the region could be transformed through a faithful implementation of the Niger Delta Development Master Plan if all the stakeholders agreed to collaborate through the adoption of a three-pronged approach: Acceptance by the oil-producing states to use their 13 per cent derivation fund for capital projects only; additional injection of development funds by the federal government for critical infrastructure and full implementation of the NDDC Act in relation, but not limited, to funding. The president made it clear from the outset that he preferred a new outlook that downplayed constitutional issues in favour of well thought-out processes in which the idea of a summit was one part of the entire inventory. He was convinced that the peaceful resolution of the Niger Delta crisis could only be a process and not an event and that it should transcend the familiar route of endless debate on ‘resource control’. To him, it was better that concrete steps were taken towards the development of the region. The meeting was attended by all the governors and the NDDC managing director, Mr. Timi Alaibe, who took participants through a PowerPoint presentation of the NDDC master plan, which they all accepted as a realistic platform capable of transforming the

region if there was faithful implementation. Violence in the region, however, continued unabated, and a few days after the meeting, the president was informed of the arrest in Angola of Mr. Henry Okah, believed to be the leader of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). At the time of his arrest, Okah was already on the security agencies’ wanted list following his alleged involvement in massive theft of arms and ammunitions from the Nigerian Army, whose officers were eager to apprehend him. Okah had been implicated by the report of the Board of Inquiry convened by then chief of army staff, the late Lt. Gen Luka Yusuf, to investigate the huge theft of arms at 1 Base Ordnance Depot, in Kaduna (1 BODK). The report had detailed how arms and ammunitions belonging to the Nigerian Army were sold to some Niger Delta militants, with the name of Henry Okah and that of his brother, Charles, featuring prominently. The investigation was itself spawned by allegations that an arms syndicate, which involved some officers of the Nigerian Army, soldiers and civilian collaborators, had been breaking into the arms sheds in 1 BODK, the Ordnance Sub Depot (OSD) in Jaji and the Ordnance Field Park (OFP) in Calabar to steal weapons. With several officers arrested, the investigating team discovered that the syndicate actually began operations in 1999 with the delivery of nine rifles of different makes to Henry Okah’s younger brother, Sunny Bowei Okah. The supplier was the son of a retired major whose last unit before retirement was 1 BODK, where he was quartermaster. This retired major was the conduit for the initial set of weapons sold to people who were stoking the Niger Delta crisis. In the report presented to Yar’Adua, the army said the extent of the theft was so staggering and the crime so well organized that the investigating team could hardly determine the exact amount of arms removed due to deliberate false accounting and destruction of stock cards by the perpetrators. But the army chief noted that the arms and ammunition removed included GPMGs, Sterling SMG, Bren LNG, AK 47 rifles, Uzis, FNs, 3G, Cetme, M12 She Berettas, grenades, rocket launchers, and several fragmentation jackets. Instructively, he said all the new UMGs, as well as the used but serviceable GPMGs, RPG 7 and AK 47 rifles were stolen. Three former governors of Niger Delta states were named as those who provided money to the militants and Mr. Henry Okah for the purchase of the weapons in 2002. “The procurement of the weapons was linked to the mentioned governors’ preparation for the 2003 re-election campaign,” the army report said. The major, earlier identified as kingpin of the shady deals, confessed to starting the business in 2000 with Bowei Okah, who paid an amount considered “significantly out of proportion with the value of the empty magazine” he was supplied, apparently to lure the major in. That ploy worked remarkably. After that, the major started delivering arms, at first using the boot of his car, to Okah. As he became emboldened and more prosperous, the major started transporting the stolen arms in a Toyota Dyna half truck. By 2004, he had graduated to using Gully–Suckers (sewage trucks), which had the capacity to carry about 1,200 weapons, to cart away the arms. The major and his accomplices also introduced a seedy system that entailed daubing the body of the truck with human waste to ward off security men who might want to examine it out of curiosity or suspicion. With Okah as the sole customer, the report concluded that “some of the soldiers involved in the theft of weapons actually escorted the stolen arms in uniform to their destination in Niger Delta.”

The investigation also revealed that all the arms that were exchanged for billions of naira during the 2005 cash-for-arms deal with the Niger Delta militants in one particular state in the region were stolen from the Nigerian Army. “Henry Okah was the main source of the over 2000 G3 rifles, 600 AK 47s and about 40 GPMGs and 2 rocket launchers that were returned to the River State government for this exercise. In fact, Sonnie Bowei Okah admitted that he moved 1,800 G3 rifles from the OSD for this exchange….The presidency, the SSS and the military have been seriously infiltrated by the militants of Niger Delta. This is a fact gathered from Sunny Bowei Okah and other civilian suspects....” With this report, the security agencies mounted pressure on Yar’Adua to move for the extradition of Okah to Nigeria so he could face charges, especially since his military accomplices were already being court-martialled with Brigadier Gen. Bala Usara presiding over the prosecution for which some men and officers of the army would later bag life sentences.1 But because Nigeria had no extradition treaty with Angola, this became a problem. On November 18, 2007, an opportunity was presented in the course of a bilateral meeting between Yar’Adua and President José Eduardo dos Santos of Angola at the margin of the 3rd OPEC Conference in Saudi Arabia. Quite naturally, the issue of Okah came up, and the Angolan president listed a litany of allegations against those he described as ‘criminals operating from the Nigerian Delta creeks’, whom he said were infiltrating his country and carrying out arms deals. He mentioned Henry Okah as the leader of this group. When Yar’Adua informed Santos that Nigeria also needed Okah to come home to face charges, he made a commitment that the two countries could collaborate through their respective offices of the attorney general and justice minister. Okah’s name echoed again at the margin of the African Union Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, two months later in January 2008, when the president of Equatorial Guinea, Mr. Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, also recounted how Niger Delta militants had become a menace to his country. He narrated a story of two incidents where they had stormed Malabo in speed boats, and the only name he could mention in connection with these incidents was that of Henry Okah. Apparently afraid that the incursion of Niger Delta militants could spell doom for his dictatorship2, Mbasogo, whose family controls the nation’s petrodollars, said he had been making overtures to the Angolan authorities to have Okah brought to his country to face criminal prosecution. At that point, Yar’Adua knew he had to intensify efforts on the Okah matter with the national security adviser (NSA), Major General Sarki Mouktah (rtd.), directed to represent the federal government in the negotiations with the Angolan authorities. Following a series of meetings in Luanda by the NSA and his team, Okah was repatriated to Nigeria on February 10, 2008, and handed over to the military for safe custody. After a few weeks in detention, a 62-count charge of treason, terrorism, kidnapping, illegal importation of arms and ammunition, illegal trafficking in arms and ammunition, illegal possession and storage of prohibited goods, management of unlawful society, incitement of soldiers to commit traitorous acts, and so on were proffered against Okah. He was charged before a federal high court sitting in Jos, Plateau State. The first drama in the trial, however, began when his lawyer, human rights attorney, Mr. Femi Falana, requested Justice Stephen Ada to take his hands off the Okah case on the

strength of the controversial ruling by the court of appeal in Kaduna, which quashed the corruption trial of Chief James Ibori, former governor of Delta State before a federal high court in Kaduna. That decision had set a template for a series of controversial actions at the centre of which was the AGF. The kernel of the matter was that the court of appeal had ruled that since there were no elements of crime committed by Ibori in Kaduna, the federal high court located in the city did not have the jurisdiction to try him and thus asked the chief judge of the federal high court to reassign Ibori’s case to the Benin division. It was after this judgement that a special court was created in Asaba, the Delta State capital, with a predictable outcome. But this played into the hands of Falana, who applied to the chief judge of the federal high court to advise the judge in Okah’s case to return his file for proper reassignment to where Okah allegedly committed the numerous crimes listed against him by the federal government. The location, according to Falana, should be Yenegoa division of Bayelsa State. Although Falana’s plea was not granted, it nonetheless caused the trial judge to excuse himself. Citing the need to avoid ‘bias’ in the trial, Justice Ada explained that the Court of Appeal’s contention in Ibori’s case, which the federal government did not appeal, meant that since Okah did not commit any of the 62 charges brought against him within the Jos division, he could not be tried there either. In recusing himself from the case, Justice Ada further stated that public perception would ridicule the integrity of the court since the attorney general of the federation, Michael Aondoakaa, was already accused of manipulating the jurisdiction of the court in earlier pleadings by Okah’s lawyers. The case was reassigned to Justice Liman following the withdrawal of Justice Adah. After extensive consultations with senior lawyers, the attorney general decided to withdraw 59 of the 62-count charge. The offences of conspiracy, treason and treasonable felony, which the government felt could be prosecuted in any part of Nigeria, were to be pursued to conclusion. While welcoming the withdrawal of most of the charges, Falana raised another objection on the ground that the case was statute barred. While relying on section 243 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Falana argued that since the treason charge was not filed within three years, his client could not be tried under the circumstances. This effectively stalled Okah’s trial, and after some weeks, there were claims by MEND that he had been killed in detention. This led to an escalation of violence in the Niger Delta, despite assurances from the government that Okah was “alive and in safe custody.” Notwithstanding, efforts were nonetheless being made towards the convocation of the Niger Delta Summit. The VP was coordinating this, and Professor Ibrahim Gambari had already been nominated as chairman of the steering committee of the Niger Delta Stakeholders’ Summit. This choice did not go down well with several people in the Niger Delta and the civil society. There were recollections that Gambari was Nigeria’s permanent representative to the United Nations when Ken Saro-Wiwa was hanged and that he had rationalized the action of the then military government. With the media and civil society opposed to Gambari’s involvement, the summit had already run into a storm even before it commenced. Apart from this, there were some simmering internal problems. There was a mild drama on the day the VP presented his report. Gambari was in the country to deliver a message

from the UN secretary general to the president, and the VP asked Gambari to join the meeting. The PowerPoint presentation was done by an aide to the VP, Sullivan Akachukwu, but as he delved into the problem in the Niger Delta and made government commitments with regard to constitutional issues, the president shouted, “Are you a member of MEND? This is a MEND report. You must be a member of MEND.” Obviously flustered, Akachukwu explained his home state was Anambra and not the Niger Delta. To this, the president screamed again, “Then you must be working for MEND.” The president’s anger was rather uncharacteristic. He was deeply upset with Akachukwu, and I had to intervene on his behalf. “I know Akachukwu very well, Sir. He is not from Niger Delta, but he is well respected by most of the stakeholders in the region and understands the issues.” Akachukwu would later thank me for my intervention, but the NSA took off from where the president left it in attacking the report. To compound the situation, in bringing an expert opinion into the discussion, Gambari said the presentation could only be one of the working documents that would be examined along with others. He dissected the reports with a conclusion that was evidently not too favourable to the VP, who later shifted his position on the choice of Gambari for the job. With Labour also lending its voice against the choice of Gambari, and the personality of the summit’s chair threatening to overshadow the real issues, I suggested to Mr. Tunji Lardner3 that it was better for Gambari to throw in the towel, because I didn’t see how he could continue in the face of relentless opposition from several quarters, most of which were central to the resolution of the crisis in the region. When I discussed this with the president on July 6, 2008, in Hokkaido, Japan, where we were attending the Summit of the Group of Eight Industrialized Nations (G-8), he rebuffed my suggestion that he should consider replacing Gambari with someone else. His argument was that a leader should not always wither in the face of dissent, especially when convinced of the rightness of his action. He said that I was aware that at his meeting with Ban Ki-moon in Davos earlier that year, he had requested for Gambari’s secondment along with some UN staff members. The Niger Delta crisis, according to the president, was not, as being appropriated, ‘a Niger Delta issue’. It was rather a national challenge with serious national security implications. From his tone, he saw the issue of Gambari as a personal challenge, so I didn’t argue further. There was, however, no doubt about his commitment to resolving the issue, since he used every international forum to campaign for support both in dealing with the developmental challenge and also in rooting out the criminal aspect. At the G-8 summit, he held separate talks with the Japanese prime minister, Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, and the president of the World Bank, Mr. Robert B. Zoellick on the need for the international community to take urgent action to clamp down on the illicit trade in stolen crude oil which, he argued, ought to be treated globally in the same manner as stolen diamonds. “I appeal to you and through you to all other G-8 leaders to support my new proposal, which I will also discuss with the UN secretary general at my meeting with him, that stolen crude should be treated like stolen diamonds because they both generate blood money. Like what is now known as ‘blood diamonds’, stolen crude also aids corruption and violence and can provoke war,” the president told the Japanese prime minister. The president had been dealing with the international aspect of the Niger Delta crisis,

especially with regard to the activities of some Ukrainian criminal cartels. Even though Ukraine does not manufacture small arms, it is internationally reputed for illicit deals in such weapons, essentially because of the way the country managed the huge stockpiles of arms inherited from the former Soviet Union. By the time Yar’Adua came to office, there was evidence that the Niger Delta region had become one of the prime destinations for the Ukrainian criminal networks. For instance, sometime early in 2008, there was a security report to the president that a ship carrying arms meant for the Niger Delta had been spotted around some ports in Spain. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was alerted, and the Spanish embassy in Nigeria was brought into the picture. The ship was eventually intercepted by the Spanish authorities, so it never reached its Niger Delta destination, but that would not be the first or last such expedition. On our return from Japan, we found that the outrage that had trailed the appointment of Gambari still lingered. The VP had also withdrawn his support at that point because, as he told me when I met with him on the issue, under the prevailing circumstances, it would be difficult for Gambari to midwife the Niger Delta summit. I personally had to intervene by sending a mail to nudge Gambari to turn down the offer, especially when I saw that the president had taken the issue personally. What riled the president was the ethnic slant being given the choice of Gambari when the compelling argument for the choice had been that the summit needed a professional who had experience in such matters. It was amid this acrimonious situation that Gambari wrote the president to notify him of his intention to turn down the offer. Once that dust settled, the VP came up with the Niger Delta Technical Committee, which was eventually chaired by Mr. Ledum Mitee. Although he did not voice his opinion publicly, the president was deeply hurt about the way Gambari was forced out of the Niger Delta summit on ethnic grounds. He also believed the idea of the Niger Delta Summit had been defeated with the composition of a technical committee comprising only people from the region. His idea of a Niger Delta Summit was a pan-Nigerian one in which the neglect of the region would be discussed by representatives drawn from all over the country and across a wide spectrum of stakeholders so that the decisions taken could enjoy national acceptance. To him, it was simply not about Niger Delta indigenes holding discussions amongst themselves, which was what the Niger Delta Technical Committee had become. Another issue that the president found unacceptable was that the appointing authority of a committee set up by the government could ask members to pick their own chairman. For these reasons, Yar’Adua was very ambivalent from the outset about the technical committee, which was inaugurated by the VP on September 8, 2008, with the following terms of reference: • to collate, review and distil the various reports, suggestions and recommendations on the Niger Delta from the Willinks Commission Report (1958) to the present and give a summary of the recommendations necessary for government action; • to appraise the summary recommendations and present a detailed short-, medium-, and long-term suggestion for the challenges in the Niger Delta; and • to make and present to government any other recommendations that will help the federal government achieve sustainable development, peace, human and environmental security in the Niger Delta.

At the end of their sessions, the committee recommended, among other things, the immediate increase of the allocation accruing from oil and gas revenues to the Niger Delta to 25 per cent (i.e., an additional 12 per cent) within a framework in which the additional funds are dedicated largely to new infrastructure and sustainable development of the region. They also recommended that within six months steps should be taken that will support a disarming process for those involved in militancy with a view to an eventual negotiated release of Henry Okah. The federal government was also urged to create credible conditions for amnesty by setting up a Demobilisation, Disarmament and Rehabilitation Commission with a negotiated undertaking by militant groups to stop all kidnappings, hostage taking and attacks on oil installations. Even while the president may not have agreed with the principle behind the committee, he saw merits in some of its proposals. In fact, the only areas he queried were those that required legislations or constitutional amendments. But he believed that if a successful amnesty deal could be struck that would culminate in the militants laying down their arms and paving the way for an enduring peace in the Niger Delta, then the constitutional areas may be open for discussion at a later date. It was at this point that the idea of amnesty for Niger Delta militants began to crystalize. The initial preparations were done by the NSA who co-opted the service chiefs into the committee as they worked out the plans and logistics towards the entire process. Since the NSA thought that the criminal dimension to the Niger Delta crisis would make the amnesty unworkable, he also fashioned out a Plan B in the event that the amnesty failed. He made it very clear from the outset that Henry Okah’s case had an unquestionable criminal motive with serious implications for national security and should therefore not be part of the amnesty deal. Adopting a similar position, the armed forces also believed that Tompolo, whom the JTF had declared wanted, also had to account for 13 of their officers and men. These were the initial misgivings that the president had to resolve, because it was very clear that if Okah and Tompolo were excluded, then the amnesty would be dead on arrival. But I also understood the dilemma. With the information at his disposal concerning the charges against the duo, the president needed to have some confidencebuilding sessions with the service chiefs who eventually budged on the issue of amnesty for Tompolo. What made the situation even more complicated with regard to Henry Okah was that the president himself had made a commitment to the presidents of Angola and Equatorial Guinea that he was bringing Okah home for trial. But for the amnesty process not to be derailed, a compromise had to be reached: Okah would benefit. But then there was no guarantee that Okah would buy the idea. Since the case against him had already been adjourned for ruling, the government reviewed the matter and decided to withdraw the charge, provided he would agree to assist in restoring peace to the Niger Delta. His lawyer, Falana, was contacted, and he agreed to persuade Okah to cooperate with the government once there was a serious commitment to address the issues that led to his agitation. At his request, the federal government provided a plane that took him to Jos to consult with his client, who agreed to the deal. It was at this stage that the criminal cases against Okah and all other militants were amnestied and subsequently dismissed. Since the amnesty was more a political than a military process, some of us (presidential aides) felt it was better for the president to take the chairmanship away from the NSA, a northerner, in order to prevent a repeat of a scenario similar to the Gambari controversy.

Besides, we argued, it was better to have a southerner as the public face of the amnesty. The president found the advice convincing, so he appointed Godwin Abbe, who had just been moved to the Ministry of Defence from the Ministry of Interior. A retired major general and indigene of Niger Delta (Edo State) who had also been military governor of old Rivers State (now Rivers and Bayelsa), Abbe came to the job with an impeccable pedigree. He was to work with the chief of defence staff, Air Marshall Paul Dike, a fine officer who also had the advantage of coming from the Niger Delta. Both Abbe and Dike worked night and day to prepare all the papers and map out the logistics for the amnesty process and the necessary rehabilitation efforts. By the end of May, they were ready. In fact, the initial plan was for the president to proclaim the amnesty on May 29, 2009, to coincide with the second year anniversary of his government. A few days before May 29, however, the president said he needed the support of the Council of State, which comprises the president, VP and past heads of government, governors and former chief justices. The session was held on June 25, and it lasted for over two hours. It was attended by Obasanjo, Gen. Yakubu Gowon, Alhaji Shehu Shagari and Chief Ernest Shonekan. General Ibrahim Babangida, who was then in the United States, nursing his late wife, Maryam, could not attend. General Abdulsalami Abubakar was also absent because he was on diplomatic assignment to Niger Republic at the instance of the president. General Muhammadu Buhari stayed away without any excuse. Thirty-two governors and three deputy governors (from Ekiti, Rivers and Cross River states) attended the meeting, where Obasanjo said that the amnesty offer was one of several gambles in the bid to resolve the Niger Delta crisis. He recalled all the efforts he had made to proffer solutions, which didn’t work at the end of the day, warning that it was better to hope for the best and prepare for the worst, an advice the president took very seriously. Other leaders offered suggestions and advice, but at the end, they all endorsed the amnesty deal. Briefing State House correspondents after the meeting, Governors Timipre Sylva (Bayelsa) Ikedi Ohakim (Imo) and Ali Modu Sherriff (Borno) disclosed that the approval followed exhaustive deliberation and commendation for Yar’Adua in adopting the approach. Sylva particularly noted that the amnesty was for those whose angst was premised on issues, adding that genuine militants had expressed willingness to accept the amnesty. After the window on the grace period is shut, he warned, the government would consider any other violent agitator a criminal. Replying to a question on the attack on a Shell facility that had occurred the previous day, the governor said he was not aware, but added, “We are talking about two different groups here. We are talking about people who probably have genuine issues and some criminals, and the essence of the amnesty is actually to distinguish between the criminal elements and those who have genuine issues. Those who are going to take advantage of the amnesty are only those who have issues and who, of course, merit to be granted amnesty, so that at the end of the time stipulated for the amnesty, every other person becomes a criminal.” Two hours after the Council of State meeting, the president proclaimed amnesty for repentant militants in the Niger Delta who unconditionally surrendered their equipment, arms and ammunition and also renounced militancy . This, he declared, would extend to all persons, including those being prosecuted for offences associated with militant

activities. Citing Section 175 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the president, who said the militants and their leaders had until October 4, 2009, to renounce militancy, declared, “I hereby grant amnesty and unconditional pardon to all persons who have directly or indirectly participated in the commission of offences associated with militant activities in the Niger Delta.” But the pardon, he added, would take effect only upon the surrender and handing over of all equipment, weapons, arms and ammunition and execution of the “renunciation of militancy forms specified in the schedule hereto, by the affected persons at the nearest collection centre established for the purpose of government in each of the Niger Delta states.” The proclamation elicited cautious optimism at the early stage, as General Abbe made it very clear that government would not pay anybody who surrendered arms. This came against the backdrop of campaigns that some militant leaders were willing to embrace the deal if they were paid for the arms surrendered. The president had resolved that the only “payment” that would be made to any militant who surrendered was that he or she would not be prosecuted for whatever crimes he might have committed in the course of the ‘struggle’. The seeming indifference was shattered, however, when 65 ex-militants surrendered over 10,204 rounds of ammunitions, over 50 AK 47 rifles, and four other rifles. On hand to receive them were Azubuko Udah, assistant inspector general of police (AIG) zone 6; Timiebi Koripamo-Agari, media coordinator of the Presidential Amnesty Implementation Committee; and Bala Hassan, Rivers State commissioner of police. The first group, led by Solomon Ndigbera, alias Osama Bin Laden, arrived at the Government Girls Secondary School, Ogoloma in Okrika in a police Unimock truck, while the second group, led by Wisdom Okorosa, erstwhile second in command to Asari Dokubo, leader of the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), arrived in two coaster buses, all carrying arms. But as the momentum gathered, the six Niger Delta governors took a step that nearly derailed the amnesty programme. After a meeting in Asaba, Delta State, on July 23, under the aegis of the South-South Governors’ Forum, they addressed the media, opposing the reported movement of the proposed University of Petroleum from Effurun, Delta State, to Kaduna State. They also accused the minister of petroleum resources, Dr. Rilwanu Lukman (who incidentally hails from Kaduna State) as having a sentiment that ran contrary to the interest of the Niger Delta people. Claiming that the federal government did not have any concrete post-amnesty plan on the ground, the governors threatened to withdraw from the process. This was a political bombshell, which suited those opposed to the amnesty idea, and the president felt very disturbed, but following my extensive discussions with four of the governors, during which I was able to glean four grievances that inspired their action, I reported my findings to the president. The principal secretary, Edevbie, advised on the need to schedule a meeting with them immediately, but the president was not disposed to the idea, arguing that the governors had done their worst. We didn’t relent; we kept pushing. An outline of the governors’ grievance includes the reported movement of the proposed University of Petroleum in Effurum in Delta State to Kaduna; lack of a concrete post-amnesty plan; the anti-Niger

Delta posture of Lukman; and the alleged withdrawal of the original Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) by the NNPC and substitution with a new one that removed five percent royalty to host community and 25 percent to the states. Lukman’s statement was indeed provocative, but the fact of the matter was that the Federal Executive Council never took any decision for the relocation of the Petroleum University from Effurum in Delta State to Kaduna. No such thing happened. The memo taken on May 25, 2009, was for the award of contracts for the National College of Petroleum Studies, Kaduna, which was established in 1995 by the NNPC “for the training of higher level technical and senior management personnel who are transiting to general management level within the corporation.” The memo stated further, “The Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF), as an agency of government created for capacity building in the Oil and Gas industry, was mandated through [a] letter of 2nd January, 2002, to take over and establish a National College of Petroleum Studies in Kaduna, which will serve the entire Oil and Gas industry and when established will be at par with similar institutions in the world. Following the mandate given to PTDF, the Fund commissioned a Joint Technical Committee with NNPC, which assessed the present situation of the College and made recommendations for the way forward.” This decision actually predated Yar’Adua’s government. A programme of action approved by Obasanjo on April 15, 2002, was for the upgrade of the Petroleum Training Institute (PTI), Effurum; reactivation of the College of Petroleum Studies, Kaduna; establishment of offshore Technology Development Centres; upgrade of the curricula and facilities in universities and polytechnics relevant to the PTDF mandate; capacity building and skill acquisition programmes; and the endowment of petroleum technology related chairs in selected universities. What some experts in the industry were canvassing was that the mandate of the PTI in Effurun should remain because the interest of Niger Delta people would be better served that way. Their position was that the objective of PTI is defeated as long as technicians in the oil industry were still being brought from countries like the Philippines, given that the institute was established to train low and middle level officials in the industry. From my interactions with the governors, it was very clear that what irked them most was the way and manner Lukman had spoken to the media. Although I had read a few extracts of what was reported, I went on to request for the tape, which one of my staff then transcribed. After reading it, I knew the president had to speak with the minister, because he was indeed provocative. I also printed the full transcript of the minister’s comments. Incidentally, I had been compelled to discuss the issue of Lukman’s choice of words with the president several times in the past. In fact, the minister of state for petroleum, Mr. Odein Ajumogobia, once complained to me that Lukman always referred to Niger Delta people as ‘those rascals’ even in his presence. This I had reported to the president, who said he would caution the minister. I am not sure he did. Lukman said in the interview under reference that Yar’Adua had since reversed the decision taken by Obasanjo to upgrade the PTI Effurum to a university status, arguing that it was unnecessary. This in itself was a complete misrepresentation of Yar’Adua’s position, and was only worsened by the manner in which Lukman spoke. He said, “Look, look, don’t give us that. Everybody wants to obtain a university upgrade, it does not happen that way. The people who run the economy of a country are not necessarily

people with degrees from universities. This is why we give emphasis to the PTI to train the people that we need. The oil industries are suffering because we don’t have the right manpower, and here you are talking about converting an institute which has been set up precisely to train people that we need into a university that will train people that we don’t need. I studied at the Federal College of Science and Technology in London. It is the biggest training ground for mining and petroleum engineers, yet there is not a drop of oil in London. So the question of the location of the institution is not necessarily a coincidence with where oil resources are….” Pragmatism prevailed eventually; the president met with the governors in what started as a stormy affair. He almost walked out before he was persuaded to stay. He expressed anger that chief executives of states would issue a sensitive statement based on incorrect information, especially when they had the access to clarify from him the correct position. The meeting, however, ended on a convivial note as the governors resolved to fully back the amnesty process. But the ugly side of the internal politics in Niger Delta continued to play out in ways that were affecting the amnesty deals, and I was to become a victim. Earlier, on April 9, 2009, Yar’Adua, on the recommendation of the vice president, dissolved the Board of the NDDC, and as a result, the managing director, Mr. Timi Alaibe, lost his job. But because Alaibe was a prominent person within the Niger Delta equation, the president appointed him an honorary special adviser with a mandate to act as his representative on the amnesty issue. While this was a strategic move designed to help in the coordination of the amnesty process, it was not well received by the governor of Bayelsa, who apparently saw Alaibe as a potential future gubernatorial opponent, who should not be given any visible role.4 When the governor therefore came to my office on August 6, 2009, to inform me that he would be leading some 32 repentant militant leaders, including the leader of the Bayelsa faction of MEND, Ebikabowei Victor Ben (popularly known as Boyloaf) to the presidential villa the next day, I was not enthusiastic. As he sought my cooperation to make it a big media event, I told him I was not aware of the event, because the president had not told me about it. (I was, of course, aware, but the information I got was an unsettling one, and I had decided to meet the president later that night to discuss the issue with him.) When the governor saw that I appeared hostile towards him, he sought the intervention of Edevbie, who called to find out what my misgivings were. What the governor didn’t know was that I had information that Boyloaf was coming to the villa not only to embrace the amnesty deal, but also to use the occasion to discredit Alaibe, who would be described as the person funding militancy in the Niger Delta. I had no illusion that the accusation was for any altruistic cause other than the fact of the political rivalry between Sylva and Alaibe. I believed that such an open declaration would not help the amnesty process, but as it would happen, I couldn’t see the president that night. It turned out to be fortuitous. Early the next morning, I was roused by a call from Alaibe, who said The Sun newspaper had published an interview with Boyloaf where he alleged that he (Alaibe) was the one funding militancy. I immediately went online, downloaded the story, wrote a memo to the president and rushed to the villa to give one of the stewards to dispatch to his room, so he would read before coming down. Within one hour, the president summoned a meeting of the VP, the NSA, General Abbe, myself and Alaibe.

By that time, the governor, Boyloaf and other militant leaders had arrived at the Banquet Hall in preparation for the ceremony scheduled for 10 a.m. At the meeting, the president presented copies of the newspaper report that I had earlier given him and said that in view of the implications of allowing such divisive tendencies to be made manifest at the early stage of the process, he could no longer receive the militants. He instructed Abbe to meet with the governor and militants to inform them that he would meet with them after the disarmament exercise. Abbe asked me to accompany him to see the group, and I made a mistake of acceding to the request. Before we got to the Banquet Hall, someone had alerted the governor that the president had changed his mind about receiving the militants and that I was the brain behind the decision. The moment the governor sighted me, he charged at me. It took the intervention of the NSA and the DG of SSS to separate the two of us. There was pandemonium, and with Sylva arguing that if the militants went back, he would not be held responsible for the consequences, the NSA, the defence minister, and the DG of SSS had to go back to the president. Again, the president sent for the VP, and the governor was invited for another round of meeting. This time, I was excluded. It was at the second meeting that an agreement was reached that the group would be received by the president. The governor was, however, told to warn them against making any allegations against Alaibe. President Yar’Adua received the militants after a three-hour delay, and noted during the event that it was disheartening to see that such young, energetic, intelligent Nigerians were spending their lives in the creeks, noting that it was high time they were rehabilitated to live normal lives and have the same opportunity as other people in the country. He said he proclaimed amnesty to create an environment for peace and security in the Niger Delta states barring which development would not be possible. “We have reached a situation, as you know, where even contractors are afraid to take contracts and execute works in the Niger Delta states. Throughout the world, peace, stability and security are necessary conditions for development and prosperity, but we need this peace a lot in the Niger Delta states,” he said. In his response, Boyloaf remarked that they would take the president’s words as a bond but added that if the promises were not kept, the consequences would be catastrophic for the nation. “You are all aware of how we got to where we are today in the Niger Delta. Our people are hungry and dying, our infrastructure [is] in a deplorable state, our communities have no water and light, while oil spillage and gas flaring have become the order of the day. Yet, this is the same region that produces over 90 per cent of our national income; how then do we fold our arms and see the future of our generations yet unborn crumble before our eyes?” Following the visit by Boyloaf and his group, other militant leaders decided to surrender their arms to embrace the amnesty. The first major breakthrough came on August 13, 2009, when Soboma George, leader of the Iceland Group , accepted amnesty and surrendered his arms at the Rivers State office of the Department of State Security Service (SSS), Port Harcourt. With about 400 of his men, the weapons surrendered included several AK 47s, G3s, LARs, K2s, Pump Actions, MGs, and assorted bullets. Following on his example, other leaders, along with their fighters, came on board and embraced the amnesty, turning in their arms. One fact became evident through the arms surrender: all the militant camps were

regimented in nature, as they were actually run like military garrisons. The ‘soldiers’ were also paid monthly salaries ranging from N20,000 to N80,000 each. Instructively, the leaders of all the groups had the title of either ‘commander’ or ‘general’, with their subordinates given lower military ranks depending on their importance to the organization. The Seashore Freedom Fighters, however, had two ‘generals’, with John Seibakumo as leader and Nabena Young as the ‘defence minister’. The Gawei group operating from Obotobo in Delta State equally embraced the amnesty along with the ‘men and officers’ of the ’12 Fighting Battalions’. Ditto Tamunegiyeiofori Proby, aka Egbele and Ferdinand Amaibi, aka Busta Rhyme . The group hitherto led by the late Daddy Ken (who had died in police detention) operating from Odi in Bayelsa also decided to surrender, even though they sought the intervention of the amnesty committee to secure the release of some of their men then still in detention. The leader of the group called ‘Ugbeberi Islanders’ in the Bayelsa creeks, was initially reluctant to embrace the amnesty, claiming 40 of his men were wounded by JTF. But after meeting with Alaibe and assurances of safety were given, he agreed to the deal. The list of militant bigwigs who disarmed and embraced the amnesty programme was further swelled by Kile Selky Torughedi, aka Young Shall Grow . A prominent figure within MEND, Torughedi has a benevolent streak: he ran a sort of NGO, whose projects comprised a primary school where no tuition was paid, scholarship for indigent students and concessional grants to women. With top guns like him leading his men to embrace the amnesty, next came Tompolo and then Ateke Tom, and finally, Farah Dagogo, as the MEND operational commanders surrendered one after the other. Alaibe’s intervention was critical to the success of the amnesty programme because he knew most of the militant leaders, and they respected him. But notwithstanding the initial enthusiasm of the militants, doubts persisted about the actual intention and sincerity of the government. Ateke Tom was particularly uncomfortable that the amnesty notwithstanding, the governor of Rivers State, Mr. Rotimi Amaechi, had placed a prize on his head, so he needed the assurance of the president that he would be safe if he turned in his weapons. At a meeting between the duo and the president, Amaechi recounted all the atrocities he said Ateke Tom had committed in Rivers State. The governor, however, concluded that if he (Ateke Tom) could assure the president that he would not go back to his old ways, there would be no problem. The meeting ended on a good note, and Ateke Tom, who came with his lawyer felt he could accept the amnesty deal. Amaechi’s tough stance had, however, contributed to the success of the amnesty, because he opposed the idea from the beginning on grounds that the issue was more of criminality than agitation, because, according to him, the real struggle for ‘resource control’ had been hijacked. For that reason, he aligned with the JTF to go after those who had made an industry of kidnapping for ransom. Again, as he argued, it was illegal to grant amnesty without conviction and pardon can only be granted to those who have legally been tried and found guilty. This led to a series of meetings at the end of which the solicitor general of the federation came up with the position that amnesty could indeed be granted without conviction citing the case of the late American President Richard Nixon, who was pardoned by his successor, President Gerald Ford, without standing trial over the Watergate scandal that had led to his ouster from office. Since the president had decided he would personally handle the amnesty issue, he held

several private meetings with leaders of the various camps in which he assured them that anytime they wanted to see him, all they had to do was call his ADC, and within 24 hours he would schedule an appointment. He was true to his word, because at short notices, he had audiences with Tompolo and others, and this helped as confidence-building measures. When there was contention on the shape and size of the rehabilitation and reintegration efforts that the government was providing and the militants wanted to be certain that they would become truly and gainfully engaged once they left the creeks, the president called an enlarged meeting of government and leaders of the militants. The roll call included the coordinator of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG); the group managing director of NNPC; executive secretary of the PTDF; director general of the National Directorate of Employment (NDE); director general of the Bureau for Public Procurement; and the minister of finance. They became a standing committee with a mandate to provide the necessary logistics for the resolution of the crisis. While there were fears among the militant leaders that the actual struggle to draw national and global attention to the plight of the deprived oil-bearing communities could be undermined once they turned in their weapons, the president was convinced that a lasting solution could be found. His optimism was buoyed by the fact that the GMD of NNPC gave him daily reports of oil sales, which pointed to the fact that with the amnesty, oil earnings had substantially increased. So, even from an economic point of view, as the president argued, it made sense to resolve the crisis. With this situation, the president continued his informal meetings with selected leaders of militant groups in Aso Rock to assure them that he was both committed to the amnesty process and to the development of Niger Delta once there was peace. To assuage the anxiety of the militant leaders about the JTF, the military was directed to free several militants and their supporters who were in their custody. On this score, Alaibe aided the release of the detained militants arrested in connection with the killing of JTF troops on March 13, 2009, at Gbaramatu, the ancestral home of Mr. Government Ekpemupolo, popularly known as Tompolo, where he also domiciled his dreaded Camp Five. In the operation by the militants, some foreigners were also kidnapped and several vessels destroyed. Initially, the JTF had argued that the arrest of the men and their confessional statements aided the recovery of the military’s lost weapons concealed in certain locations, as well as the burial site of the soldiers killed. Nonetheless, the JTF commander indicated that he was authorizing the release of the militants in compliance with the president’s amnesty declaration. The JTF also released four men who were arrested and detained in connection with the armed attack on Agip Flow Station in Tibidaba on December 25, 2008. The JTF commander informed the committee that during the arrest of these militants, several arms and ammunitions were recovered from them. These include GPMGs, AK 47 rifles, locally made single barrel guns, AK 47 empty magazines and 7.62mm (Special). Again, the JTF commander emphasized that he accepted to release them only in full compliance with the dictates of the amnesty offer. The main challenge, however, remained the reintegration and rehabilitation efforts; there was apprehension that nothing had been done substantially to convince the militants that the government was capable of truly rehabilitating thousands of youths who were willing to give up militancy and return to normal life.

There was also the concern raised by Henry Okah that amnesty should not be seen as an abdication of the Niger Delta cause. Following his release, Okah had travelled to South Africa, but he returned for a meeting with the president on October 20, 2009. He was brought in by THISDAY chairman, Mr. Nduka Obaigbena, who brokered the session. After speaking passionately about what he considered the injustice of the Nigerian state against the Niger Delta region, Okah said he was ready to accept the amnesty on the condition that the president was willing to address the issues. He also said that as a first condition, the president needed to meet with the MEND ‘Aaron Team’ of negotiators at his earliest convenience. After the meeting with the president, Okah, Obaigbena, and I went to the house of the ADC where we now held another session. I personally assured Okah that whatever message he wanted to pass across to the president could be sent through me, and we exchanged contacts. With that, we became friends to an extent that anytime he was in Abuja, I would host him to dinner, and when I also went to South Africa for the World Cup in June 2010 (a few weeks after I left office), he hosted me to a reception in his house. The peace brought about by the amnesty was, however, still fragile because fundamental issues remained unresolved. In his first meeting with the militant leaders as a group on October 9, 2009, Yar’Adua decided to put his cards on the table as to the direction he was headed. Amid calls for the government to increase the allocation to Niger Delta, the president came prepared to argue that the people who needed empowerment were oil producing communities. Before the session, he had directed the minister of state for finance, Mr. Remi Babalola, to prepare for him a comparative analysis of revenue allocations from the federation account to the geo-political zones of the country for the period between June 1999 and December 2008. Babalola’s report had stated that following the 2002 Supreme Court decision on the onshore/ offshore dichotomy in the country, resource allocation to the Niger Delta had taken a sharp rise. Before this ruling, allocation to the region was put at 26.82 per cent, but with the ruling, that proportion had risen to 38 per cent of the total allocations received by all the states in the federation. For instance, in 2008, the allocation to Akwa Ibom state alone was N204.5 billion, which was more than the allocations of N176.2 billion to the five states in the South East5 and more than the N198.4 billion allocated to the six states in the North East6 while the six states in the North Central zone7 of the country also got N197.2 billion for the same year under review. With a tabulation of what each state of the federation received on a yearly basis from 1999 to 2008, it was evident that much resources had gone to the Niger Delta in the last one decade. What the president meant to achieve with the statistics (and he was successful) was to prove that giving more money to the states under a new revenue sharing formula would not offer a practical solution. What he proposed was to fashion out measures that would take care of the oil-producing communities without necessarily resorting to the long process of amending the constitution. His proposal was to give communities that are either hosts of or affected by oil and gas activities a stake in the ownership of the petroleum assets through payments of dividends

similar to landowner royalty. The idea was to establish a trust fund for these communities that host vital assets in the oil and gas industry, such as wells, flowlines, pipelines, flowstations, gas plants and processing facilities, terminals, and tank farms. Fund managers were expected to be appointed to advise and manage these trust funds on behalf of the communities, but the funds are distinct from the 13 per cent derivation currently being paid to oil-producing states and from the Niger Delta development levy. This position, however, contrasted with that of the governors, who were canvassing for increasing the percentage for the derivation fund accruable to the Niger Delta states. The president did not subscribe to their idea. His argument was that the 13 per cent derivation fund was actually meant for the development of the oil communities and should not be for overhead and part of normal allocations as states were treating the money. In reeling out the statistics of the trillions of naira that had been allocated to Niger Delta since 1999 to the militant leaders, the president succeeded in arousing their awareness that so much had been committed to the region without a commensurate result in the welfare of the people. But there were still many contending issues yet unresolved. On Saturday, November 14, 2009, Okah was at the villa with his ‘Aaron Team’ comprising Farah Dagogo; Admiral Okhai Akhigbe (rtd.); General Luke Aprezi (rtd.); Mr. Amagbe Kentebe; and Nobel laureate, Professor Wole Soyinka, who said he was attending merely as an observer. The meeting dwelt on the same old issues, but again, the president gave his assurances about his commitment towards resolving the Niger Delta problem. Two days later, on November 16, he called a meeting where Egbogah came for his presentation of the idea of equity matrix for the Niger Delta. Convinced that enduring peace in the Niger Delta remained crucial to any efforts towards the development of Nigeria’s oil and gas sector, the president believed that whatever the cost of the postamnesty process, the end would ultimately justify the means. For that reason, he put everything on the line for it to succeed. His plan was that before his scheduled two-day visit to Rivers State on November 28 and 29, 2009 the details of a concrete agenda for Niger Delta would have been finalized for him to announce. He was also to hold a Town Hall Forum with stakeholders from Niger Delta. As it turned out, by November 23, his health had deteriorated to the point that he had to be flown to Saudi Arabia. The rest, as they say, is now history. Endnotes 1 An army major and five other ranks were sentenced to life imprisonment in August 2008 for stealing and selling arms to MEND by a military tribunal. Among those sentenced were Major Suleiman Alabi Akubo, Sergeant Matthias Peter, Lance Corporal Alexander Davou, Lance Corporal Moses Nwaigwe, Lance Corporal Nnamdi Anene and Private Caleb Bawa. 2 Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo deposed Francisco Macías in August 1979 in a bloody military coup d’état and subsequently executed his predecessor by firing squad after a trial. Even though he declared that his government would make a fresh start from Macías’ brutal and repressive regime, his 32-year dictatorship has been equally brutal. 3 Respected Nigerian journalist Mr. Tunji Lardner happens to be a friend of Prof. Gambari and was therefore serving as link man and also provided critical input into the amnesty agenda.

4 Alaibe had since 1999 been seeking the Bayelsa gubernatorial ticket of PDP, and in 2007, he was seen as a formidable contender against then incumbent governor Goodluck Jonathan, for whom he was persuaded to withdraw at the last minute. When Jonathan was eventually picked as the running mate to presidential candidate Umaru Yar’Adua, Alaibe had been technically disqualified from the race, but he had always wanted to be Bayelsa governor. This much Silva knew and would therefore not want to concede any space to his opponent. 5 The South East states are Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo. 6 The six North East states are Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe. 7 North Central states are Kwara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kogi, and Nasarawa.

5

Banking Reform and Allied Matters The impact of the global financial crisis grew in intensity as 2008 drew to a close, and that was a cause of anxiety for most governments. It was in this context that former governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Professor Chukwuma Soludo, appeared before the Federal Executive Council (FEC) in early February 2009 to brief members on the implications of the global meltdown for the Nigerian economy. His presentation dwelt on the causes of the crisis; the impact on national economies; global and country responses; and threats, opportunities and the road ahead for the nation. With regard to its impact on the Nigerian economy, Soludo said the crisis had led to the collapse of commodity prices, especially oil. He said further that it had caused revenue to shrink, adding that declining capital inflows into the economy, deaccumulation of foreign reserves and pressure on the exchange rate were also apparent fallouts of the crisis. Some other negative features he identified as arising from the crisis included limited foreign trade finances for banks (some, according to him, faced the dire possibility of credit lines drying up), capital meltdown and divestment by foreign banks. To tackle these challenges, Soludo listed a number of measures already taken by CBN and afterwards gave a highlight of his forecast and prospects, one of which was that the “growth rate of GDP between 7-9 percent is still possible despite the economic crisis.” He concluded by stating in categorical terms that “Nigeria won’t experience economic recession.” To lend credence to this claim, Soludo quoted Merrill Lynch as ranking Nigeria “among ten least vulnerable economies in the world.” Although Soludo highlighted several threats, which included pressure on foreign reserves and exchange rates, fiscal burden and the threat of abandoned projects, possibility of reduced confidence in the business environment, political pressure to spend the ‘excess crude’, he nonetheless did not see any prospect for gloom. Rather, he saw opportunities for the nation. His optimism was built on the conviction that while Nigeria was not insulated from the global economic crisis, it was better prepared for it than in 1982 when the crash of crude oil price pushed the nation to near bankruptcy. Some of the reasons he gave included the role of Nigerian banks, which he argued accounts for over 90 percent of the financial system’s assets, apart from dominating the stock market, which he dubbed “the engine of the economy for the near term, which must be guarded.” Are the banks under threat? Soludo asked rhetorically, and in response replied, “Not significantly!” He said with about N2.7 trillion as at September 2008, their cumulative exposure to capital market was below N900 billion. “Even if you wipe off all of them, capital adequacy ratio is still higher than most countries.” While Soludo conceded that the rate of profitability could reduce, he argued that the interbank market was active, just as banking lending activities were still high and the aggregate credit to private sector growing ‘too high’, according to the World Bank. Not everyone in the Federal Executive Council shared Soludo’s optimism. Many members indeed raised doubts about the CBN report on Nigerian banks, but he asked for evidence to the contrary. Despite the skepticism, the CBN governor gave a good account of himself and left FEC members with no doubt that as far as the banks were concerned, his prognosis was unassailable. It was then just about three months to the expiration of

his first term as governor, with expectations that it would be renewed for another term of four years. The threat to his aspiration at that period, however, emanated mainly from the state governors, most of whom remained unconvinced that the banks were as sound as the CBN governor presented. There were also many within the organized private sector whose perception was somewhat scornful: to them, Soludo was either not aware of the situation in the banks or he was deliberately putting a sheen on their malaise. Incidentally, the president unwittingly provided a platform for the expression of these misgivings. In January 2009, Yar’Adua inaugurated a presidential steering committee, which he personally chaired, with a mandate to assess the impact of the global economic crisis on Nigeria with particular reference to the nation’s annual budget, financial and commodity markets. The goal was for the committee to recommend appropriate macro-economic policy responses to stimulate the economy and identify more practical measures aimed at bolstering the confidence of investors and increasing production in the real sector. The committee was also to examine other related issues such as unemployment, poverty alleviation, food availability, and how to ensure a sustainable debt position. The committee was also supposed to make recommendations on any other issues or actions that may be required. Members of the Presidential Steering Committee included four governors: Babatunde Fashola of Lagos State, Isa Yuguda of Bauchi State, Adams Oshiomhole of Edo State and Bukola Saraki of Kwara State, as well as the ministers of finance, national planning, and petroleum. Its members also included the chief economic adviser to the president, Mr. Tanimu Yakubu Kurfi; the president of the National Economic Summit Group, Mazi Sam Ohuabunwa; Mr. Bismark Rewane, an economist; Mr. Tony Elumelu, representing the Bankers’ Committee; Alhaji Aliko Dangote, representing Nigerian industrialists; and CBN governor, Soludo. Quite naturally, I attended all the sessions, which held at the villa. In the early days of the committee, the state of banks was an issue that dominated discussion, and I recall that both Yuguda and Saraki often accused Soludo of prevaricating with regard to the true state of the banks. Being former bankers, the two governors obviously had some insider knowledge about what was going on within the financial sector, but Soludo always countered by asking them to give him proof, which they never did. From the interactions, however, it was obvious the duo knew a lot, because even with innuendoes and conjectures, they were able to convey the impression that there were problems within some specific banks. Usman, who, until his appointment, first as finance minister and later as national planning minister, was one of Soludo’s deputies at CBN, also held cynical views of the state of the banks. The exchanges between Usman and Soludo were usually very interesting as the latter was wont to say, “As if you were not with us until recently.” What was obvious from the interactions within the committee was that almost half of the members would not endorse a renewal of Soludo’s tenure as CBN governor if they had anything to do with it. And these were people with access to the president. But evidently, Soludo also had a strong fan base. Nearly all the people close to the president—from aides to family members and his personal friends—were rooting for the renewal of his mandate and each for different reasons. I know that Edevbie, himself an economist, had written a brilliant memo to argue for the retention of Soludo on grounds

that the economy was too fragile to absorb any market upheaval that could arise as a result of bringing in a new CBN governor at that point in time. Friends of the president like Alhaji Dahiru Mangal, were also die-hard backers of Soludo. Somehow, the handlers of the CBN governor must have also reached the First Lady, who by then was also rooting for Soludo. But with Yuguda, son-in-law to the president, opposed to Soludo’s aspiration, I knew such support could not possibly endure. Meanwhile, I did not pretend about the fact that I was also backing Soludo. I had my reasons: I felt that his regime of consolidation helped significantly to institutionalize banking in Nigeria and that due to the exigency of market stability, there was need for continuity. Right from my days at THISDAY, I never pretended about my support for Soludo’s efforts at CBN. Besides, I also believed that the Igbo people were not well represented in the top echelons of government due, essentially, to the PDP zoning arrangement, which offered the region the position of party chairman! I have a lot of Igbo friends and often heard their complaints, which I could identify with: in comparison with other ethnic nationalities, there was no equitable representation for persons of Igbo origin in the Yar’Adua government. That would explain my critical intervention in the appointment of Mr. Ogbonaya Onovo as inspector general of police and Dr. Bernard-Shaw Nwadialo as acting customs boss in 2009.1 Beyond the emotional satisfaction and sense of belonging it may confer, equity in appointments and opportunities in a plural society such as ours has always been a necessity for national cohesion and development. It is even enshrined in the constitution under the provision of federal character. I therefore believed that even if only by virtue of being an Igbo man, Soludo deserved to be retained. And when I saw moves to suggest that he might not, I confronted the president in a manner that could have cost me my job if he were not so broadminded. It was May 28, 2009, and the position of CBN governor was still vacant after all the lobbies. So, I waited to see the president the moment we got to the office. I asked: “Sir, I can see that you don’t want to extend Soludo’s tenure because the media is awash with stories that you are resolved to give the position to a northerner….” I could see that the president was angered by my remark. But there was no bitter retort; rather, he told me to sit down. He waited a while before saying, “Segun, I am very disappointed in you. By now I thought you would have known me enough not to think like that of me. Contrary to what you think, this CBN appointment has become the most difficult decision for me to make. Let me tell you my dilemma: Everyday, people come here to tell me that the picture of the banks that Soludo has been painting for me is not the correct one. While I also have my fears about the banks, nobody has been able to give me any concrete evidence to prove Soludo wrong. Now the challenge is, if I approve for him a second term and it turns out these fears are correct, how do you think I would feel? On the other hand, it will also be unfair to deny him second term on the basis of speculations that may turn out not to be true. That is why I am yet to make up my mind as to what to do.” The president explained to me that a situation where journalists were openly speculating about the health of our banking industry, where depositors and creditors were doubtful of the safety of their savings, and where the public was becoming distrustful of CBN figures on the banks could not be in the interest of our banking industry. I spent considerable time with the president that morning after I had apologized for my

comments, which he said he appreciated. I asked him about Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, whose name had been widely speculated in the media, and he told me that the then First Bank of Nigeria (FBN) managing director was indeed under consideration along with a few other people, but added that he had yet to make up his mind about whether or not to renew Soludo’s mandate. Surprisingly, as I got up to depart, the president asked me, “This Sanusi guy, I have met him but never heard of him before, do you know him?” I confirmed that I knew Sanusi by reputation and that if at the end he settled for him, it was a choice that would be assessed on merit because Sanusi was well respected by the media and civil society for his public interventions. I left him feeling that he must have made up his mind on Sanusi, but by the next day, when Soludo’s term expired, there was still no new CBN governor. It was not until the morning of June 1 that the letter nominating Sanusi as CBN governor was sent to Senate president, Senator David Mark. In the letter, the president also requested the Senate to confirm the renewal, for a second term, of the appointment of Mr. Babatunde Lemo as deputy governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria. As it would turn out, the president was particularly impressed with Sanusi’s performance in the Senate in the course of his screening, which was relayed live on television. The moment I entered his office, he said, “I watched some of the exchanges between Sanusi and the senators, and I was impressed. I think the guy is brilliant, but I have also been told about his integrity. I hope I made the right choice.” Sensing that he was indirectly seeking some sort of validation for his action, I assured him Sanusi was a good choice. Despite not having renewed Soludo’s mandate, the president still met with him and also wrote him a nice letter of commendation. However, as Sanusi resumed at CBN, his first mandate from the president was to examine the state of the banks, to ensure that all was well and that the fears being expressed in certain quarters were unfounded. As it turned out, the fears indeed were not unfounded. As a former bank CEO with vast experience in risk management, Sanusi knew what to look for in the banks. After studying internal memos, various reports and correspondences, and also interviewing regulators, bankers, business persons, government officials and other stakeholders, he became convinced that some of the banks were, figuratively speaking, on life support. Sanusi’s review of activities in the Expanded Discount Window (EDW) particularly revealed some unsavoury details: some banks were almost permanently locked in as borrowers and were most often unable to repay their obligations. When CBN decided to temporarily shut the EDW to these banks, they, in desperation, turned to banks like UBA, which had excess liquidity, but such funds were lent at very high premium rates. Four banks were in this dire strait. A fifth one was also a frequent borrower on the EDW. While these banks were not the only beneficiaries of the EDW, the persistence and frequency of their demand, by Sanusi’s reckoning, could only be a manifestation of a deeper malaise, which CBN identified as a probable source of financial instability. In unraveling what exactly was going on in some of these banks, Sanusi gave clues to the CBN examiners with regard to the areas to look for and the questions for which they should seek answers. By the time their assignment was concluded, the preliminary report was just a validation of what he had always suspected: five of the ten banks whose books were examined were in serious trouble. Following these revelations, Sanusi prepared a report with clear options as to what

needed to be done, but he remained mindful of the political terrain within which he was operating. When he briefed the president on his findings, he said there were only two options open to him: either to send the report to the NDIC or bail out the distressed banks and deal with those who put them in that state. He, however, said he preferred the second option but without the support of the president, there was no way he could carry it through. While Yar’Adua immediately gave his approval for Sanusi to go after the bankers, the CBN governor warned of the likely consequences: “Mr. President, these are powerful people, and some of them are your friends. If we start this process, we cannot stop, and they will put pressure on you.” To this Yar’Adua replied, “Sanusi, I give you my word, I will not interfere in your work.” The report on the activities of five of the ten banks that were first examined was damning: several abuses had been committed in the name of banking, with depositors’ funds taken to speculate in the stock market and manipulate share prices while loans were given out without any expectation that they would be repaid. With scant regard for corporate governance, some bank executives had even set up Special Purpose Vehicles to lend money to themselves and cronies for stock price manipulation and to sustain their flashy lifestyles. The level of malfeasance was so much that the borderline between depositors money and their personal wealth seemed non-existent to some promoters of the banks. One bank executive took money from the till to purchase private jets, which were then registered in the name of a son, another banker used depositors’ funds to purchase 80 percent of the bank’s IPO, paying N25 per share when the shares were trading at N11 on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, and these shares later collapsed to under N3. The CEO of yet another bank controlled over 35 percent of the bank through a crooked deal in which customer deposits were being borrowed. The pertinent question therefore was, how could all this have escaped Soludo? Among the documents Sanusi met at CBN, copies of which he handed to the president, were an internal report as far back as December 2007 warning Soludo that banks were trading in their own shares and sitting on bubble capital with risks to the financial system; a letter written to Soludo by the NDIC managing director, Mr. Ganiyu Ogunleye, in 2008 after a meeting between NDIC and the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), which proposed that a technical team be sent by CBN to examine the books of the banks and assess possible threats with regard to capital market exposures and a letter from the finance minister, Shamsudeen Usman in 2008 following up on the NDIC letter. Sanusi said he met no record at CBN to suggest that any concrete action was taken. Having secured the approval of the president, Sanusi decided to wield the big stick by sacking the CEOs of five banks: Erastus Akingbola (Intercontinental Bank); Okey Nwosu (Finbank); Sebastian Adigwe (Afribank); Mrs. Cecelia Ibru (Oceanic Bank); and Bartholomew Ebong (Union Bank). But there was a problem: the president was scheduled to travel to Saudi Arabia on August 14, 2009; this was a trip I had announced ahead of time. The CBN action was planned in such a way that it would catch the affected CEOs unawares, so there would be no chance to procure a court injunction to scuttle it. Given that the president would be away in Saudi Arabia when the policy would be announced, there was a need for a statement that would indicate that he backed the idea. This explains why I know so much about what transpired between the president and

the CBN governor on banking reform; essentially because, for strategic reasons, I was brought into the picture very early. After my meeting with the CBN governor a week before the action was taken, I reported back to the president, who gave me approval to work closely with Sanusi and give whatever support was needed in his name. So, before the president left for Saudi Arabia, I had his authority to intervene in his name while he was out of the country. It was the highest demonstration of trust in me by the president, which I will forever cherish. The night before the president left for Saudi Arabia, Sanusi met him with the request that he would need the support of the police, the EFCC and the SSS to effect the decision. In his presence, the president called the DG of SSS, the Police IG and the EFCC chairperson. Without going into specifics, he said the CBN governor was going to carry out a difficult national assignment, and he wanted them to do whatever he (Sanusi) asked of them. With that directive, Sanusi effectively began to wield powers far beyond any CBN governor in history. For example, through the SSS, he was able to stop most of the affected bankers from fleeing the country. On my part, four days after the president left for Saudi Arabia, I addressed the media with a statement that he fully endorsed the measures announced by the CBN governor to sanitize Nigeria’s banking sector and prevent fresh bank failures with their attendant negative effects on the national economy. I added that along with stricter supervision and regulation by CBN, the administration would continue to do whatever was necessary to guarantee the safety of deposits in Nigerian banks and entrench best corporate practices and better credit administration processes in the management of domestic banks. To further assure the public that the measures were taken with his support, I said the president had directed all law enforcement agencies “to give their fullest support to efforts by the new management teams of the five banks, which have received bail-out funds from the CBN to recover the huge loans, the non-servicing of which placed the banks at risk of distress.” As expected, a major intervention like this would not go without attempts by vested interests to fight back through scaremongering, blackmail and even sabotage as the affected bankers began their plot. The first signal came from the office of the AGF, without whose consent CBN could not file charges against them: Aondoakaa chose to side with the affected bankers. Confronted with this challenge, Sanusi, on August 17, 2009, sent a text message to the ADC in Saudi Arabia, but he also copied me. Meant to intimate the president about what was going on, the text message read, “Good afternoon ADC, I don’t know how to handle this information to the president, but it’s important for him to know. In everything we have done, we have acted legally, but I have reliable information that last night, James Ibori and our AGF Aondoakaa met secretly with Cecilia Ibru, and the AGF is assisting them on securing an injunction to stop me. Ibori owes Intercontinental Bank more than 40 billion naira, and when he accosted me, I told him I am publishing his company’s name. Many people have called to say Ibori is angry with me, but I told them to ask him to just settle his obligations. We are ready for the AGF, but if we are prosecuting these people, I will need the AGF fiat to have my lawyers do it. I am determined to bring whoever is involved in this massive fraud to book, however highly placed such a person is. But this is just for the president to know how badly things have gone.”

I spoke to the ADC a few minutes after he had brought the SMS to the attention of the president, whom he said expressed anger at the AGF over his alleged action. The president directed the ADC to get in touch immediately with the solicitor general of the federation to help CBN with the necessary assistance if the AGF was unwilling to facilitate the prosecution. When this eventually got to the attention of Aondoakaa, he knew he had bitten off more than he could chew and quickly retraced his steps. The president also spoke on the phone with Sanusi to assure him of his full support and said that if he needed any assistance, he could always reach him through the ADC. Within a period of four weeks, a whopping sum of N110.8 billion had been recovered. The AGF was, however, not acting alone; the forces that Sanusi was fighting, a nebulous group called ‘Corporate Nigeria’, had been involved in the campaign that had brought Yar’Adua to power. Though the former director general of the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), Dr. Ndi Okereke-Onyuike, served as the arrowhead of the group, most of the funds used for the election had been contributed by bankers. Since this group included the prime financiers of the election that had brought Yar’Adua to power, it was understandable that the bankers whose hands were caught in the cookie jar would seek protection in their hour of need. By the time the president came back from Saudi Arabia, report on the second batch, comprising 15 banks, was ready. And Bank PHB, where the president’s family has considerable interest, was among those to be affected. Mr. Francis Atuche, the CEO, happened to be very close to some associates of the president, but that was not the card they would use in selling their anti-CBN reform agenda; the argument would be that Yar’Adua could not preside over the liquidation of the bank in which his family had considerable interest! What these do-gooders did not reckon with, however, was that the president had some inside knowledge about some of the issues within Bank PHB and could not have been shocked by CBN’s findings. An incident a few weeks earlier validates this position: on the way back to the residence from the office, the ADC had hinted to the president that Atuche wanted to see him. In a changed mood, the president asked the ADC, “Is he your friend? If he is your friend, you better warn him. Murtala (Yar’Adua2) has told me of how the guy is messing up the bank, giving out unsecured loans left, right, and center. In fact, let him come, I want to see him.” Sanusi took action on the remaining five banks that fell short of the required minimum capital: Bank PHB, Equitorial Trust Bank, Unity Bank, Spring Bank, and Wema Bank. But shortly after the president returned from Saudi Arabia, Sanusi met and intimated him that he had no faith in Aondoakaa and that if the AGF handled the prosecution, the cases could be compromised. He therefore asked the president to direct the AGF to give the lawyers whom CBN would be appointing the fiat to prosecute on behalf of the EFCC. The president gave the directive, which Aondoakaa had no choice but to obey, and with that, Sanusi brought in Konyin Ajayi, Kola Awodein and A. B. Mahmoud to prosecute the affected bankers. In retrospect, I understand the enormous pressure the president endured on the bank issue, and this pressure came from several quarters, especially given that promoters of some of the affected banks contributed huge funds to the campaign that had brought him to power—which in itself was an abuse of their role. But the president believed the CBN

governor had a responsibility to protect the interest of depositors in the affected banks and therefore gave Sanusi all the support he needed. Incidentally, Sanusi was in fact one of the last public officials to see Yar’Adua in his last week in office before he left for Saudi Arabia on November 23, 2009, and the CBN governor recounted the conversation to me after the meeting as I escorted him to his car. He said that when he had shown the president the list of the assets owned by one particular bank CEO, the president had said, “Are these not the same people attacking you in the media that you have an agenda? Why don’t you publish the list of their assets for the world to see? You owe it to yourself and the country for people to see what these people were doing with depositors’ funds.” Sanusi heeded the advice and caused to be published in newspapers the list of the assets owned by some of the bankers. Looking back, I have no doubt that the special examination conducted by CBN assisted in unveiling the problems in some of the banks, and Sanusi’s action to save and strengthen the affected banks was proactive and helped in averting what could have been a major systemic crisis. The president understood this and gave his unwavering support. Until he left for Saudi Arabia in November 2009, his commitment to the CBN reform was never in doubt. But following the political upheaval created by his sickness and prolonged absence from the country, some of the bankers saw an opportunity to align with the new power brokers in the bid to stage a comeback based on the cold calculations that if they backed Jonathan, he would reverse the bank reform agenda. I was therefore not surprised that a particular banker, who had evidently struck some rapport with Chief Edwin Clark, soon became a frequent visitor to Akinola Aguda House. Aside from channeling money to some ‘civil society’ people fighting the ‘cabal’, this person also helped to fund the media campaign that denigrated the person of Yar’Adua in his last days. At the end, to President Jonathan’s credit, that did not prevent the banker from getting a jail term and forfeiting to government numerous assets running into billions of naira. Endnotes 1 Following the exit of Ehindero as inspector general of police, he had handed over to Onovo as the next most senior police officer before Mike Okiro was subsequently appointed as the substantive inspector general of police. When Okiro was leaving, he bypassed Onovo to nominate an officer from the north as a successor. The police affairs minister, Dr. Ibrahim Lame, in a memo to the president to justify why it was the turn of the north to hold the office, also nominated another northern officer different from the one Okiro was promoting for the office. Shortly before the president made the decision, I met him to explain the implication of bypassing Onovo for a second time when his competence and character were not in question. I said he would be the first officer from the South East to assume the office, and if he was denied, nobody would believe it was not because of where he came from. While I didn’t argue with him when he said Okiro was Igbo, I nonetheless explained that Okiro hails from Rivers State! He then asked me to get him Onovo’s CV, which the ADC already had with him. That was how he approved Onovo for the IG post. In the case of Customs, the AGF had positioned a Tiv woman for the job, but she was not the most senior; Nwadialo was. Following an approach made to me by my friend Hon. Emeka Ihedioha, I sent a mail to the finance

minister, Dr. Muhtar, on the implication of by-passing an Igbo man who would also be the first from his region for the position. I argued further that since he had eight months to retirement, there was no point denying him the opportunity to reach the pinnacle of his career. My intervention led to his memo to the president to nominate Nwadialo. 2 Murtala Yar’Adua, son of the late Major General Yar’Adua, who was then a director at Habib Bank representing the family’s interest. He was later to be appointed minister in 2010 by then acting president Goodluck Jonathan shortly before his uncle (President Yar’Adua) died.

6

Between Mutallab and Boko Haram I was spending Christmas in Ilorin, Kwara State, with my family on December 25, 2009, when I received a call that would shatter that celebratory mood. The caller said I should tune in to CNN, which had breaking news on Nigeria. I promptly did and glimpsed a rather chilling report: A young Nigerian man had attempted to blow up a United States Delta airlines flight en route to Detroit from Amsterdam. As I tried to make sense of this tragic incident, I got another phone call, this time from the CSO in Saudi Arabia. It was through him that I knew that the Nigerian involved was Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, son of Alhaji Umar Mutallab, who retired as chairman of First Bank of Nigeria in December 2009 after serving on the board for thirteen years. Well respected in the Nigerian corporate world, Mutallab had also served in the Federal Executive Council between 1975 and 1978 first as minister for economic development and reconstruction and later as minister of cooperatives and supply. It was the son of this prominent Nigerian whom I know personally and for whom I have tremendous respect that was allegedly involved in terrorism. Having apparently been fully briefed, the CSO apprised me of some of the details as we reviewed the implications of the tragic incident at a time when the president was out of the country. We both agreed it was necessary for the VP to be kept up to date on the incident and that the Nigerian authorities had to be seen to be on top of the situation. After speaking with the CSO, I placed a call to the VP, who had been informed of the development. I explained how exigent it was to have seamless information management at that point and also informed him that I would be returning to Abuja the next day. After speaking with him, I called the information and communication minister, Professor Dora Akunyili, who was in Enugu, to intimate her of the details I had and the need for us to work closely so we could manage the fall-out. I barely slept that night as I exchanged calls and text messages with both the ADC and the CSO in Saudi Arabia. I had no doubt in my mind that the Mutallab saga was going to change all the calculations surrounding the absence of the president. The ADC had informed me that he was in touch with the American ambassador in Nigeria, Dr. Robin Sanders, whom he said had hinted that it was important for the president to be available to speak with President Barack Obama at very short notice. Although the impression I got in my interactions with Saudi Arabia was that the president was ready to talk with the US president if the call was made, I would later learn this was practically impossible at the period. While the president was still very much conscious, the ailment had badly impaired his speech and made him hardly audible. You could not possibly put someone in such a state on the phone to speak with the most powerful man in the world. His handlers in Saudi Arabia recognized this fact. I was also worried about my secretary, Rosemary Amaechina. She was travelling to the United States and had mentioned Delta Airlines, but I never imagined she would be on the same flight. It turned out she had been on the same flight and had actually sat three rows away from Abdulmutallab and had watched the whole ugly drama as it played out. What a fright the incident must have given her! Back at home, we were beginning to feel its bitter aftermath. The United States

government had decided to impose stricter measures for US-bound Nigerian passengers. In what was no more than a knee-jerk reaction, the Homeland Security administration immediately included Nigeria as a ‘country of interest’ in the war against terrorism, while some members of Congress were pushing for Nigeria to be included in a list of ‘terrorlinked’ nations. It was a development that could not be allowed to stand, especially given that within 24 hours, preliminary investigation had established that though a Nigerian, Farouk had actually spent less than 30 minutes in the country before the botched attempt. He flew into the country on December 24 from Ghana aboard Virgin Nigeria. His passport was scanned for entry at the immigration point at exactly 20.08pm and was again scanned for departure to Amsterdam at 20.35pm. It also emerged that some people within the Nigerian security agencies, as well as officials of the American embassy, had been alerted to the fact that Farouk could be a potential threat to the US. The VP convened a meeting of the security agencies on December 26 for full briefing on the incident and the approach Nigeria should adopt. It was resolved that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should proceed with a diplomatic démarche that it was more productive for the American authorities to collaborate with a willing Nigerian government to combat terrorism. Farouk’s father was also invited to meet with the VP, but somehow the meeting never held though he had sessions with the National Security Adviser and other top government functionaries. He would later be invited by the US Congress. It did not take long for the authorities to piece together Farouk’s story; he was the last of Mutallab’s 16 children by two wives: Aisha and Jidda. Aisha, the second wife, who hails from Funtua, Katsina State, like her husband, is mother to Farouk, who was born in 1986. Farouk’s story reveals a remarkable tapestry. After his primary school, he spent most of his formative years outside Nigeria; he had his secondary education at the British International School in Lome, Togo, an elite school that reputedly admits students from about 40 countries. Upon completion of his secondary education, Farouk enrolled at the University College, London, in 2005, where he graduated with a degree in mechanical engineering in 2008. Although Farouk hardly stayed in Nigeria and would visit only for holidays, family members and neighbours on the Ahman Pategi Street in the posh Unguwar Sarki area of the northern city of Kaduna described him as an easy-going fellow who was passionate about his faith. After graduation from University College, London, his father sent him to a university in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, where he was to complete a postgraduate degree in business administration in January 2009. Farouk indicated his interest in pursuing a summer course in Arabic in Yemen in July 2009, and his father consented, given his son’s flair for Arabic and since Farouk had undertaken such a course in Yemen before. While his father was happy about his son’s zeal and interest in matters pertaining to faith, he became worried when he refused to return from Yemen, not even when his elder brother wedded and everybody in the family was expecting him to come home. This prompted the father to call all the prominent clerics whom he knew the young Farouk had respect for, so that they could plead with him to come back home. One of those scholars whom Farouk’s father believed could speak with him was Dr. Ahmad Abubakar Gumi, whose late illustrious father, Sheikh Abubakar Mahmoud Gumi, founded the Izala movement in Nigeria. Then pursuing a doctoral degree in Saudi Arabia,

Gumi is a respected Islamic scholar whose views the elder Mutallab believed his son could not discountenance. What he did not know at the time, however, was that Farouk had been so indoctrinated by Al-Qaeda in the Peninsula that he already had his opinion of what jihad entailed and what his own expectations as a believer were. But the fact that Farouk knew Gumi would create its own problems following the aborted blow-up because, at the instance of the American authorities, the scholar was arrested in Saudi Arabia on February 24, 2010. Sheikh Yusuf Sambo Rigachukun, a prominent Islamic cleric, had to write to the Saudi authorities, pointing out that Gumi had lived in Saudi Arabia for almost two decades and had never run afoul of the law. Similarly, Governor Patrick Yakowa of Kaduna State and the Emir of Zazzau asked President Jonathan to intervene on Gumi’s detention. The Jamaatul Nasril Islam (JNI) and the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA) also waded in. With the pressure on the federal government, and following representation from Alhaji Mutallab, who knew the circumstances that led to his son’s meeting with Gumi, Vice President Namadi Sambo had to visit Saudi Arabia on the issue. It was his intervention with the Saudi authorities that eventually led to Gumi’s release. Although he tried to ensure his son received appropriate guidance with regard to the essence of Islam, Alhaji Mutallab sensed something sinister when, in August 2009, Farouk called to inform him that he was no longer interested in pursuing his postgraduate degree, and that he would be staying in Yemen to pursue another course that he would not disclose. The father became more distraught when Farouk sent a text message a few days later, informing him that he was severing all contacts with the family and that he would discard his mobile phone’s SIM card after that message so that attempts to reach him would be futile. It was after this message that the father decided to inform his friend and former national security adviser, Lt. General Aliyu Mohammed Gusau1, about his experience with his son. First, Gusau alerted one of his protégés in the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and subsequently advised Mutallab to formally report at the United States embassy in Nigeria. The father did, expressing his fears that Farouk was being radicalized and sought help for him to be located. Nothing, apparently, was done until Farouk re-appeared on the flight from Amsterdam, which he nearly blew up, putting Nigeria on the American radar. Apparently, Nigeria’s listing as a ‘country of interest’ by US Homeland Security was informed by some unrelated events. The decision was seemingly aided by the fact that Farouk’s case was coming after a series of incidents involving a group called Boko Haram, whose activities had been well documented by the American authorities. The history of the sect can easily be traced to 2002 with Muhammad Yusuf, a native of Jakusko in Yobe State, as its spiritual leader and founder. His rise from relative obscurity to prominence in the Salafi Islamic religious circle (Wahabites) derived from the fact that he was a close disciple of the late Sheikh Jaafar Adam. So prominent was Yusuf within the sect that at a time he was regarded as heir to the pulpit at Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri, where Jaafar Adam used to conduct annual tafsir in the month of Ramadan. With time, however, Yusuf began to introduce some unorthodox beliefs—including aversion to western education and a call for jihad to oust the secular status quo—within the Salafi circle. He also began what was considered a rigorous proselytizing campaign to

capture impressionable minds, especially among the youth who frequented the mosque. Eventually, he had to part ways with his spiritual leader, Jaafar Adam and was sent packing from the Ndimi mosque by the mosque committee. He moved to Daggash mosque, where he continued the same teaching. His daring and scathing verbal attacks on the government portrayed Yusuf as a fiery and intrepid cleric and this obviously endeared him to the common people, who began to see him as a champion of the downtrodden. Members of the political elite in Maiduguri were, however, taking note, and Yusuf was considered no more than a nuisance. It was therefore no surprise that the Daggash mosque committee also expelled him within a short time. That was when his father-inlaw, Baba Fugu, gave Yusuf a piece of land at the Railway quarters, where he built a mosque and an adjoining house he dubbed ‘markas’, from where he continued his preaching, drawing followers from the city and beyond. His initial followership was largely from among secondary school students and primary school pupils who abandoned their studies on the ground that western education (‘boko’) was a sin (‘haram’), hence the name Boko Haram. As he got more followers, his power and influence also grew. Ultimately, Yusuf and the late Adam became archenemies, spewing verbal attacks on each other’s views and interpretations of Islamic tenets. Adam was vociferous in exposing what he described as the folly of Yusuf’s views on western education and the ‘jihad’ whose advocate he [Yusuf] had become. He also warned against the indoctrination of impressionable minds. These opposing views quite naturally degenerated into violence. Twice Yusuf’s disciples reportedly made failed attempts on Adam’s life in Maiduguri. Yusuf would later be paid in his own coin when some of his lieutenants also became more radical, claiming he had become too soft in his approach and thus splitting from his camp to form a splinter group they named Taliban. In September 2004, the group launched an armed uprising from a village called Kanamma in Yobe State on the border with Niger Republic; they had renamed the village Afghanistan. They attacked police stations, and troops had to be sent in to restore order after several people had been killed. The soldiers engaged the group in a two-day battle in which many sect members were killed, some were captured and others went underground. This attack caused the group to keep a low profile for a year, but by then the activities of Yusuf had attracted the attention of security agencies, which on several occasions arrested and charged him to court. But his lawyers always managed to secure freedom for him. A few months later, the splinter group re-emerged and launched attacks on some police stations in Bama and Gwoza in Borno State, where they killed policemen, including an assistant police commissioner, carted away guns and ammunition before running into the Mandara mountains on the border with Cameroon. The army was sent in, accompanied by helicopters. They engaged the sect members in a mountainous battle, and in the process, scores of the attackers were killed while the rest crossed the border into Cameroon. The Nigerian government alerted the Cameroonian authorities, whose gendarmes succeeded in arresting five of the militants and handed them over to Nigeria. Following that encounter, Yusuf felt he had lost committed members of his group, who were gradually becoming hostile towards him for what they perceived as his weakness and moderate views. In mid 2005, he made overtures for reconciliation to the splinter

group, and there was some reintegration. After this, Yusuf rose from a poor preacher to a wealthy cleric living in opulence and driving SUVs around the city, where he was hailed as a hero for his criticism of the government and his call for sharia law. His preaching—recorded on CDs—which he daily doled out, were hot cake in the city and beyond, selling in thousands. In April 2007, on the eve of the general elections in the country, some unidentified men stormed Jaafar Adam’s mosque in Dorayi, a suburb of Kano city, at dawn and fatally shot him and three other worshipers while he was leading the morning prayers. The attack was later followed with an invasion of a mobile police detachment in Panshekara neighbourhood, during which 13 policemen were killed. Soldiers were drafted to the area, and the gunmen eventually crossed the Challawa River, behind the abandoned water works they camped in, and fled. A few days earlier, the gunmen had launched a pre-dawn attack at the Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC) office and killed two officers on night duty. The incident was thought to be a robbery attack until the night of July 26, 2009, when Yusuf’s men struck again, invading and attacking several police posts and public buildings in parts of Bauchi, Borno, Kano and Yobe states. At this point, the president decided that the Boko Haram menace had to be confronted frontally. Coming on the eve of his departure for a twice-postponed state visit to Brazil, there were suggestions that the president should shelve the trip on account of the lives of policemen that were lost. But he argued that it would be improper to do so given that the trip had been postponed twice, and besides, he noted, the security agencies were in control of the situation. Before we departed for the airport, he met with the NSA and security chiefs as well as the service chiefs to whom he gave this directive: deploy troops to the area and fish out all the leaders and members of the extremist sects involved in the attacks. The president further directed that security be beefed up in all neighbouring states and security personnel placed on full alert to ensure that the attacks did not spread elsewhere. He also used informal channels to reach out to emirs and prominent Islamic leaders in the north to rally support against Boko Haram. I had told State House correspondents to proceed to the airport ahead of our convoy as I had secured the commitment of the president to field questions before our departure. At the session, the president expressed his heartfelt sympathies with the families of the gallant police men who lost their lives while defending their posts from the senseless attacks, as well as other innocent victims who may have been caught in the unjustifiable mayhem. He also reaffirmed his determination to deal decisively with all those whose misguided beliefs and actions promoted violence and contempt for the rights of others and undermined national peace, stability, and security. Indeed, the soldiers deployed to tackle the Boko Haram sect fulfilled the president’s mandate when they captured its leader, Yusuf, alive with what was no more than a minor injury on his arm. In the euphoria of the moment, the army commander of the operation, Col. Ben Ahanoto, allowed his men to take snapshots of Yusuf with their mobile phone cameras, before they handed him over to the police. The story turned awry, however, when a few hours later journalists were shown the bullet-ridden body of Yusuf, who was said to have died in a shoot-out with the police. Meanwhile, Ahanoto had spoken to reporters on record that he had personally captured Yusuf and handed him over to the chief of police in Maiduguri. He said Yusuf had a wound on his arm, which had already been treated. The police, however, insisted that

Yusuf had been fatally wounded. There were reports that the attack on the police station by Boko Haram members was a response to an earlier attack on the sect members in the course of a funeral procession. They were said to have been accosted by the joint police/army task force called Operation Flush for not wearing helmets while riding motorcycles. In the altercations that followed, tempers had flared, with policemen allegedly killing about 17 of the sect members. This was said to have been the genesis of the crisis, but there were also allegations that the subsequent order for the killing of Yusuf and Alhaji Buji Foi (a former commissioner for religious affairs in Borno State) after they had been captured alive was given by certain political leaders in Borno State. There may not have been any credibility to the allegations, but Boko Haram members believed it and were out for revenge. The suspicion of extra-judicial killings, however, spurred a reaction from the police commissioner of Borno State, Christopher Dega, who said Yusuf “was in a hideout, and the forces went there, and there was an exchange of fire. In the course of that confrontation, he sustained his own injury. He was picked up, and he later couldn’t make it.” This was different from the first police version, in which Yusuf was said to have been fatally wounded while trying to escape from custody. This version had indeed been corroborated by Usman Ciroma, the spokesman to the Borno State governor, who told the Associated Press: “I saw his body at police headquarters. I believe he was shot while he was trying to escape.” Yusuf’s financier, Buji Foi, who had been arrested and driven to the police headquarters in Maiduguri also died under curious circumstances. Unfortunately, there are video recordings of Foi’s execution still circulating on cell phones. I was shown one by a police officer! The same fate befell his father-in-law, Alhaji Baba Fugu, who also reported at the police station but never came out alive. Human Rights Watch said that the reports of Yusuf’s killing were extremely worrying. “The Nigerian authorities must act immediately to investigate and hold to account all those responsible for this unlawful killing and any others associated with the recent violence in northern Nigeria,” said Corinne Dufka, the group’s senior West Africa researcher. In a statement issued in Geneva, High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay also expressed her concerns. She called on the Nigerian government to investigate Yusuf’s killing and bring offenders to justice. When the BBC published the photograph that showed that Yusuf was alive when captured by the army, I knew we could no longer keep quiet and that the point had to be made that extra-judicial execution had no place under the rule of law. As, I however, waited to see the president, who was in a meeting with the VP, I made the mistake of openly voicing my concern about what I considered extra-judicial execution. This did not go down well with the governor of Gombe, Alhaji Danjuma Goje, who was also waiting to see the president. “Segun, I sometimes wonder on whose side you really are. This is someone who killed several policemen and innocent people, and all that concerns you is what some human rights noisemakers would say,” he charged. We had a hot exchange on the matter and since he saw the president ahead of me, I was not surprised when my principal bluntly refused to discuss the matter. It was a difficult period, because while I worried about the image of the government, I could also understand the anger of the police, whose men were brutally killed. Photographs of the

murdered officers were so gruesome that it was not difficult to comprehend the raw emotion that could have led some people into taking the law into their own hands. Some of these photographs were handed to the president. While I appreciated his feelings, I also believed jungle justice, no matter the provocation, cannot be justified by agents of the state. To compound the situation, someone posted a video stream on YouTube of Yusuf’s interrogation by the police after he was captured and shortly before he died. While I dodged all the enquiries about the matter, I was determined that the president would not remain silent on the issue, and an opportunity came when President Boni Yayi of Benin Republic visited. At the instance of the president, I had started a regime of joint briefing between him and any visiting leader. As the president escorted his guest to the rostrum, I put in his hand a piece of paper. In it I wrote that I had been reliably informed that the question the correspondents were interested in was on the Boko Haram killing and that he should be prepared to respond should it be asked. Predictably, it was the first question, and the president responded that it would be investigated, together with all the events that led to it. “Yesterday I directed the NSA to carry out a post-mortem with the security agencies as a first step, so that we can have a full report of what happened during the crisis, including how the leader of Boko Haram was killed as well as the circumstances under which he was killed. “Now it is after we get this report that we will determine what actions to take, whether we need to carry out further investigations into the entire matter, because it is really a very serious issue. I have been emphasizing since this administration came into power on our stance on the rule of law, and everybody in this country and all the officials are clearly aware of the stance and indeed my personal commitment and firm belief that it is the rule of law that will anchor good governance and progress in this country. “When issues like this happen, we do not rush into taking precipitate actions. We try to investigate to make sure that we get the facts as they happened. So, this is the action that I took when I came back from Brazil. Yesterday I met with all the security agencies, and we decided on this course of action.” The president sounded very convincing. Yet I knew there was no investigation with regard to how Yusuf had died, and it was unlikely there would be any. The investigation he had ordered was the usual one on Boko Haram, because, with regard to Yusuf, the disposition of the security agencies was that two wrongs had become a right. Since Yusuf and his men had murdered several policemen in cold blood, they believed that justice was served with his death, regardless of how it was carried out. Indeed, as a proof that there was not going to be any investigation, the army commander who handed Yusuf over to the police was recommended for dismissal. His offence: allowing the photograph of Yusuf to be taken after capture! It took the intervention of an aide to the president for the career of Ben Ahanoto not to be abruptly terminated. The aide argued that dismissing an officer who was carrying out a lawful order would be grossly unfair, especially when it came to light that even the interrogation of Yusuf (before he met his death) was also on the internet. What was never in doubt was the president’s resolve that the spectre of Boko Haram had to be completely rooted out. Against the background of a growing population of idle youths, especially in the northern part of the country, the president was of the firm conviction that preachers of incendiary messages, like Yusuf, were a danger to society. But the circumstances of the Boko Haram leader’s death remain till today a permanent

sore to the image of Yar’Adua’s administration, which had made respect for the rule of law its cardinal objective. A Borno State high court would later find the police guilty of unlawfully executing Yusuf’s in-law, Baba Fugu, and awarded N100 million in damages to his family. Babakura Fugu, 40, a schoolteacher and eldest son of the deceased, had sued the president, Governor Ali Sheriff, and the inspector general of police for his father’s alleged execution while he was in police custody. Justice Mohammed Mustapha, in his judgement, also granted the prayer that Baba Fugu’s corpse be exhumed from ‘wherever it is’ and given to his family for proper burial, and that the respondents should publicly apologize to the family. The family had told the court that Baba Fugu’s corpse had been buried along with other corpses in a mass burial despite their appeal for its release. I am not aware that the government ever complied with this ruling, given at a time when the president was battling for life and Jonathan was already acting president. Endnotes 1 Lieutenant General Aliyu Mohammed Gusau is a retired army officer who held the position of NSA from 1999 to 2006 during the Obasanjo presidency. He had also been appointed chief of army staff by General Babangida shortly before he left office in August 1993 but was removed by General Abacha shortly after. He would later be appointed the national security adviser by then Acting President Goodluck Jonathan during the crisis occasioned by President Yar’Adua’s long medical sojourn in Saudi Arabia.

7

When Counted Votes Don’t Count At his inauguration on May 29, 2007, President Yar’Adua took the rather unusual step of conceding that the elections that had brought him to office ‘had shortcomings’. As a result, he pledged to reform the nation’s electoral process. Exactly three months later, he took that promise beyond rhetoric as he established a 22-member electoral reform committee to examine and identify lapses and inadequacies that have stifled the yearning for free and fair elections in Nigeria. The mandate of the committee, headed by former chief justice of the federation, Justice Muhammed Uwais, included a review of Nigeria’s history with general elections and identification of factors that militate against their credibility.1 On January 16, 2008, five months after inaugurating the committee, the president held a consultative meeting on electoral process in Nigeria with all the state governors, the leadership of political parties that won elections in one or more states in the 2007 elections, the leadership of the National Assembly, and the heads of various security agencies. He opened the discussion by acknowledging that the history of elections in Nigeria had been that of controversies, adding that the responsibility for all the failures lay mostly with the political actors. “No matter the legislations, no matter the efforts we put at electoral reforms, unless we the political leaders change our attitude towards election, we will continue to have problems.” After his brief remarks, all the journalists were excused because, as he said, he wanted a frank and open discussion. Even when that had been done, he looked in my direction rather apprehensively, as if he considered me to be one of the reporters he had only moments ago excused. The import of that became glaring when he began to speak again. “Now that journalists have left and all of us are politicians, we should be able to speak the truth,” he began. “If we will be honest with ourselves, we all know how we rig elections in this country. We compromise the security agencies, we pay the electoral officials and party agents while on the eve of the election we merely distribute logistics all designed to buy the votes….” For about twenty minutes, the president spoke candidly about the methods usually adopted to manipulate elections, stopping occasionally to ask rhetorically whether his observations were false. Nobody controverted him, and so he concluded by telling the participants that collectively, they could lay a new foundation for democracy in the country if the political elite had the will. That candid declaration by the president achieved its aim as it emboldened others to speak frankly. It was a most enlightening session that revealed quite clearly that the average Nigerian politician would rather not leave matters in the hands of the electorate on polling day. The meeting, which commenced at 11 a.m., eventually ended at 5:30 p.m. with the constitution of four committees under the coordination of the VP. One of the committees’ tasks was to examine the role of security agencies in the course of elections and why murder and arson perpetrated on polling day were usually treated as ‘electoral violence’, with nobody ever successfully prosecuted for such heinous crimes. The session also agreed on the composition of bi-partisan committees whose recommendations were expected to shape the agenda for the next meeting, which, as it

would turn out, never held. In fact, that would be the first and last of such meetings. The Uwais Committee, however, continued its work, and after sitting for one year, during which they received hundreds of memoranda and conducted several public hearings across the country, came up with extensive—and rather radical—recommendations in their report, which was made public. Some of the recommendations included • establishing a new, truly independent, non-partisan and impartial INEC composed mainly of representatives of professional groups who are nominated through the National Judicial Council; • abolishing the state independent electoral commissions and resident electoral commissions so that INEC handles all elections in the country; • establishing a political parties registration and regulatory commission to, among other things, register political parties, monitor their organization and operations, and arrange for the annual auditing of their accounts; • establishing an electoral offences commission to investigate electoral offences and prosecute offenders; • establishing a constituency delimitation commission to handle the creation and periodic review of electoral constituencies; and • stipulating the time limit for disposing of election petitions, that is, four months for election tribunals to deliver judgement and two months for the conclusion of all appeals. The committee also recommended the use of electronic voting machines for future elections; stipulation of additional conditions to be met by any political association seeking registration as a political party; and the introduction of independent candidature in all elections. Equally recommended was the injection of a dose of proportional representation into the current ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system, in order to promote greater inclusiveness and minimize both pre- and post-election tension; holding all elections on a fixed date, at least six months before the expiration of the term of incumbents, to allow adequate time for election petitions and appeals to be concluded before swearing anyone in; and staggering elections such that National and State Assembly elections hold two years after presidential and governorship elections. On January 16, 2009, the president appointed a committee to produce a draft white paper on the report for the Federal Executive Council (FEC), which eventually held three consecutive sessions spanning several hours, during which it agreed that the funding of INEC would be a first-line charge on the consolidated revenue fund of the federation. The goal was to ensure that its financial and administrative independence was guaranteed. The FEC also accepted the recommendation that politicians convicted of violence during elections, in addition to any other punishment, should be barred from holding public office for 10 years. Indeed, all the other recommendations by the committee were accepted except the following: • Injecting a dose of proportional representation into the current ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system, in order to promote greater inclusiveness and minimize both pre- and post-election tension. • Holding all elections on a fixed date, at least six months before the expiration of the term of incumbents, to allow adequate time for election petitions and appeals to be

concluded before swearing anyone in. • Staggering of elections such that National and State Assembly elections hold two years after presidential and gubernatorial elections. • Shifting the burden of proof from the petitioners to INEC to show that disputed elections were indeed free and fair and complied with the provisions of the Electoral Act 2006. (This last recommendation was against the cardinal principles of law, which provides that whoever asserts must prove.) The most contentious, however, was the recommendation that INEC members should be nominated by members of the NJC. This had been a thorny issue within the white paper drafting committee, and Mr. Hakeem Baba-Ahmed, a permanent secretary in the SGF office and a former INEC secretary, had argued with the AGF over this provision, which he considered cardinal to the Uwais report. Given his experience and exposure, Baba-Ahmed’s view could not be taken lightly, but Aondoakaa would argue on the point of law that in the presidential system of government, the power to appoint or nominate could not be taken away from the president. He would adopt a similar premise when he intervened at a heated FEC session during which some members had taken the issues personally, as if it was the integrity of Yar’Adua that was being questioned. So, the discussion became, unfortunately, an emotional one. Justice Uwais, who was invited to the FEC session argued forcefully that if that aspect of the report was removed, Nigerians would not believe the government was serious about electoral reform. He said that almost all the memoranda that the committee received canvassed the position that the choice of electoral officials should be made by the NJC and that it had been the main issue at the public hearings they had held. From the tone of the discussion, I could immediately discern that Justice Uwais would feel let down if the clause was removed, so shortly before the last FEC session on the report, I tried an intervention. As members were seated in the council chambers, I asked Uwais whether he was disposed to the idea of a meeting with the president before the session began. I suggested that it would be helpful if he could personally express his misgivings and offer some advice. When he said he wouldn’t mind, I rushed to the residence and met the president at the study examining some papers as he sipped his tea, preparatory to leaving for the FEC session. I pleaded with him to tarry a while to have a private audience with Uwais, and when he agreed, I went back to the council chambers and brought Uwais to meet the president. The duo met for about 15 minutes, but it didn’t appear as if it achieved any meaningful result. With the handling of the Uwais report by the FEC, the public felt betrayed, with the consensus being that there would be no free and fair election in Nigeria until the appointment of the INEC chairman was insulated from the president. For him to therefore retain the power to nominate the chairman and INEC members conveyed to critics the impression that he was not serious about electoral reform, especially at a time when Prof. Maurice Iwu was being singularly held responsible for the problems associated with the 2007 general elections in the country. This in itself was a simplistic reading of events. While it is agreed that the 2007 elections were deeply flawed, it is necessary to put it in context. The problem with the elections began when, following his failed third-term bid, Obasanjo decided to scuttle Vice President Atiku Abubakar’s ambition to succeed him by setting up an extra-constitutional body to examine allegations of corruption against

aspirants seeking public office at both the federal and state level, based on EFCC reports. It was on the basis of Atiku’s indictment alongside others by this committee that an ‘EFCC advisory’ was forwarded to INEC to ban certain office seekers, including the former VP. While many of these candidates were eventually excluded from the election (a development that would later set the stage for further confusion in the polity), Atiku sought legal redress, and the Supreme Court quashed the ban on him on the eve of the presidential election. With ballot papers already printed without his name, another set was ordered, with all the attendant logistical problems that INEC could not handle. So from the outset, the 2007 elections were doomed to fail. Nothing captures what happened at the polls better than the report of the European Union (EU) Election Observation Mission, led by Max van den Berg: “The elections were marred by very poor organization; lack of essential transparency; widespread and procedural irregularities; substantial evidence of fraud; widespread voter disenfranchisement; lack of equal conditions for political parties and candidates; and numerous incidents of violence.” In several respects, the laws guiding the elections were flagrantly violated, and the preceding conduct of the PDP primaries at all levels further exacerbated the problems. In several states, names of nominated candidates were substituted with either those they defeated or candidates of rival parties, who were then co-opted to fly the PDP banner even against their own rule, which stipulated a minimum period of membership for any contender. That set the stage for the electoral fraud perpetrated all over the nation and the subsequent judicial interventions that in themselves politicized the courts. While Yar’Adua, then outgoing two-term governor of Katsina State, played no substantial role in the elections that brought him to office as president, he was a beneficiary of the flawed process and therefore inherited the challenges associated with it. But in retaining the power to appoint INEC officials rather than handing such responsibilities to the National Judicial Commission as prescribed by the Uwais Committee, the president created disaffection between the public and himself. The matter did not, however, end there. On the day he presented the FEC’s conclusions on the Uwais Report to the Council of State, the president said all the recommendations were up for debate. Unfortunately, the Council of State did not even show as much enthusiasm as the FEC, because, notwithstanding the pleas of Governor Adams Oshiomhole, its members rejected outright the inclusion of nominees from Labour, media, civil society, youth and women into the INEC Board. They also rejected the abolition of the state independent electoral commissions, which would have empowered INEC to conduct all elections in the country, including the local government polls. In contrast, FEC debates were indeed interesting and exhaustive. For instance, the recommendation of the Uwais committee was that elections should hold six months before inauguration in order that all petitions could logically be unravelled before swearing in. The FEC reasoned that to conduct elections six months before swearing in implies that for six months there would be two authorities in one state or local government or even at the federal level. Such, members argued, was a recipe for anarchy. A counter proposal to impose a time-limit of three months for the conclusion of all petitions was also suggested. But this was considered impracticable. Uwais had attended both the FEC as well as the Council of State meeting to guide discussion. Justice Belgore, also a former chief justice of the federation, was also present at the Council of State

meeting. The president asked Uwais what he thought was the reason electoral matters could not be settled within three months since they were all concluded within that period during the Second Republic. The response was that what obtained during the Second Republic was a military aberration that could hardly apply in a democracy. From the exchanges, there was no guarantee that even the six months being proposed would suffice. This pessimism then inspired new thinking: if justice would be enthroned by allowing the aggrieved to seek redress without the constraints of time, then so be it. The contentious issue, however, remained the appointment of the INEC board. Aside from the doctrine of separation of powers on which the FEC based its decision, it was the considered view of the Council of State that the judiciary should be insulated from politics. The argument was that since the reasons adduced for the electoral fiasco in most states across the federation were attributed to INEC, whose officials were in most cases reprimanded by the tribunals, then the impartiality of the judiciary would not be guaranteed if it was involved in the appointment of INEC officials. Citing the examples of Edo, Ondo, and a few other states where results were upturned, with the tribunal expressing strong opinions about the conduct of INEC officials, it was noted that had the judiciary been involved in the appointment of the officials, it’s inconceivable that they would have humiliated the same people they helped to appoint. Governor Segun Mimiko of Ondo State, who secured victory at the tribunal said the judiciary would have been defensive of INEC the same way INEC had been defensive of its elections, inclusive of the most defective ones, if they were part of the electoral process. At the end, the media and civil society believed the nation had been shortchanged, particularly, with the president retaining the power to nominate the members of the INEC board to the Senate. What made the public to be further suspicious of Yar’Adua’s intention on electoral reform was the fact that the election that brought him to office was tainted, yet he managed to secure a controversial legal victory at the Presidential Election Tribunal. On February 26, 2008, the tribunal, headed by Justice James Ogebe, gave what many saw as a political judgement when it declared that the opposition had “established substantially the non-compliance with the electoral act” in the conduct of the election, yet still ruled that the petitioner “failed to establish the substantiality (effect) of the non-compliance on the results.” It was even more curious that Justice Ogebe (who had been nominated to the Supreme Court) would be absent, with the ruling delivered by Justice John Afolabi Fabiyi. Not surprisingly, there were allegations that the verdict was procured, and there were people around the president who actually gave the impression that they fixed it. Weeks before the ruling, I had intimated the president that the AGF was spreading word around about the case and creating the impression that he was going to ensure the president won. I assured the president that he needed to warn Aondoakaa on the matter, while adding that even if the election was cancelled, the president would still win. Many of the principal staff of the president were also worried about Aondoakaa’s antics and openly expressed their displeasure. Several times during that period, Aondoakaa and Ibori fondly told those who cared to listen within the villa that “right now we have two judges for and three against.” Sometimes, it was “one for and four against” and some other time, it was “all the judges are against us.” I always marvelled at how they could possibly know all that, and I wondered about what

they would have been telling the president. I had no doubt in my mind that all these were to put fear into Yar’Adua and probably make themselves more relevant in the scheme of things as they were. Did they procure the judgement? I have had cause to seek clarifications from the president’s lawyer, Chief Wole Olanipekun (SAN), a respected and very honourable man, who said he never had dealings with any judge, and if the AGF was actually saying all that, he was talking nonsense. Incidentally, Aondoakaa and Ibori continued this numbers game when the case climaxed at the apex court. I recall that a particular justice (now retired) got to hear about it, and he booked an appointment with the president. He said he had heard that Aondoakaa had boasted to some people that he (AGF) fixed the judgement and he needed to ask the president to bring him (Aondoakaa) for a meeting where he would have to confirm whom he gave money to. I am not sure the meeting ever took place. With the foregoing controversy as a backdrop, the April 2008 gubernatorial re-run elections in Ekiti State, where the PDP and AC had equal members in the House of Assembly, was bound to be seen as a real test of the government’s political will and ability to reform Nigeria’s electoral system. The tribunal ruling had left the AC leading by about 10,000 votes after results from five local governments had been cancelled. This gap led to the belief in the media and civil society that the only way the outcome could be in favour of the temporarily ousted PDP Governor Olusegun Oni was if the polls were manipulated. As he did in every other state where there were re-run gubernatorial elections, the president was in Ekiti to flag off the PDP campaign for Oni. But in the process, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Hon. Dimeji Bankole, broke into a song that seemed to suggest the federal government would deploy troops to prosecute the election. “We will use soldiers (for this election), the other time we used MOPOL (mobile policemen), we will use soldiers,” Bankole sang to a thunderous applause from the PDP supporters at the party’s rally in Igede-Ekiti. Once the Speaker’s allusion to troop deployment had been made, I knew there would be a media backlash, and not surprisingly, it was the headline news throughout that day and the next. Incidentally, other speakers at the campaign also made veiled threats about the deployment of troops. Launching an attack against former Lagos State governor, Asiwaju Bola Tinubu (believed to be the backer of Dr. Kayode Fayemi, AC candidate for the Ekiti re-run polls), Osun State governor, Olagunsoye Oyinlola, said the PDP would deploy every resource available to it for the Ekiti election to ensure that Oni emerged victorious. “We will use the resources at our disposal to ensure that he overcomes. Whatever support he needs, we will give to him. We shall be victorious. We will win the election by all means possible.” It was not unexpected that the AC would dwell on the faux pas in Bankole’s song about deploying troops. The director of communications for the Kayode Fayemi campaign organization, Mr. Yemi Adaramodu, set the tone for this: “We wish to remind the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Dimeji Bankole, that Ekiti people have never been known to succumb to the threat of armed soldiers. The ruling clique tried their luck in the act of intimidation with soldiers and police in the past and got their fingers burnt. It is still the same people that inhabit the space called Ekiti today and they are more than ready to defend their votes.”

The party also advised the president to refrain from deploying troops, which, in their reckoning, was for the ulterior motive of rigging the election for his party. When we got back to Abuja, I was convinced the presidency had to wade in. I outlined the implications of bringing the military into partisan politics to the president, and he assured me that troops would not be deployed. He had already met with the inspector general of police, Mr. Mike Okiro, and directed him to increase the strength of the police in Ekiti State with additional squads from five neighbouring states, he told me. Since the election was going to be held only in a fraction of Ekiti state, he had been assured that the police could offer adequate security. I therefore told the media that troops would not be deployed in the conduct of Ekiti elections but that security would be adequate to take care of any eventuality. This, of course, outraged many people within the PDP and the government, as well as some security chiefs sympathetic to the ruling party, who had already labeled me ‘a closet AC member’. The same charge was leveled against Remi Babalola after openly expressing his concerns about the management of the Ekiti election crisis. The truth of the matter was that I was neither an AC sympathizer nor opposed to the reelection of Governor Oni; what I considered paramount was the danger inherent in unwittingly dragging the military into the conduct of elections in just a section of one state. I knew the president was opposed to deployment of troops, yet I had been reliably informed that there was already a plot to send soldiers to Ekiti on the eve of the election. Their role, ostensibly, was to keep the peace. I realized too that this was being done without the knowledge of the president. When this illegal order was eventually carried out, I rushed to the ADC, in the presence of whom the president had directed that soldiers were not to be seen on the streets of Ekiti on the day of election. He had to speak with the chief of army staff, who was then abroad and had also not been kept abreast of the situation. Counter orders were then immediately issued, and the troops were withdrawn immediately. But the AC had already issued a statement that essentially highlighted the party’s disappointment on the reported presence of troops in Ekiti State, which it noted was inconsistent with the earlier assurance by the president that he would not deploy soldiers to the state. It added that such a development had called to question the credibility and integrity of the president. Knowing that the president had not ordered any deployment of troops, this was not something I could take lightly. I made another statement that troops had not been—and would not be—deployed for the Ekiti elections. Curiously, the director of army public relations, Brigadier General Chris Olukolade, had told the media that the army headquarters was aware of the presence of soldiers in Ekiti State. “Their going there should not be politicized. It is not about elections. Their being there is purely for security reasons.” While some within government queried my motives, the basis for my intervention was basically due to the fact that I knew the instruction did not emanate from the president, who, as commander in chief, was the only person who could authorize the deployment of troops. I also knew those behind the entire plot, and I suspected that their plot was not motivated by altruism. Owing to the malicious campaign being launched against me internally, I had to seek an audience with Governor Oni to reassure him that I was not covertly working against him,

and that I was only doing my job. We met in Abuja, and he expressed appreciation that I would explain my role, as he had been told tales about me. Oni, no doubt, is a very decent man, but the forces involved in the Ekiti elections really did not care much about him. All the cold calculations were based on PDP ‘stopping Tinubu in the southwest’ and not about the governor securing back his mandate. While I had no problem with PDP attempting to win the southwest, I could not possibly stand aloof if the tactics being adopted would call to question the integrity of the president. Following the stalemate that dogged the election, these same people would put the whole blame on me, with the argument that the election was mismanaged because of my announcement that troops would not be deployed. Without deference to my position as spokesman for the president, they directed me to report to SSS headquarters for interrogation on my role in the Ekiti saga. When I received the letter, the first emotion I felt was rage. I called the CSO to intimate him about the letter and the fact that I was going to ignore it, warning that if any attempt was made to arrest me, I would resign, but not quietly. He came to my office to withdraw the letter, which he said I should ignore, while pleading with me not to inform the president. On later reflection, I decided I would honour the SSS invitation, but at a time of my choice. I went on a Saturday and spent about two hours with the panel investigating the fall-out of the Ekiti election. Of course, I was not surprised that the question the investigators wanted me to answer was who gave me authority to announce that soldiers would not be deployed. My response was quite simple: they could go and find out from the president! I happen to know most of my interrogators, some since my days as a journalist. Air Vice Marshall Moses Akinola Akinsanmi, who left the villa a few months before as commander of the presidential fleet, was also on the panel, so the session itself was very friendly, and I used the opportunity to extract information about the Ekiti debacle and what they considered the problem. I realized that my role became crucial because there had been allegations that Tinubu had imported some Niger Delta militants and a lot of arms into Ekiti State and that only soldiers could enforce peace in the election. Even while I was not aware of this at the time, I still felt that politicizing the deployment of troops could bring incalculable damage to the image of a president who had promised electoral reform. Besides, I could not have envisaged that the police would find it difficult to monitor elections in just a few wards within five local governments in a small state! The election itself had featured a major drama, which began when the resident electoral commissioner (REC), Mrs. Ayoka Adebayo, disappeared midway into collating the results, and afterwards a letter of resignation purportedly written by her appeared in the media. She was believed to have rejected some of the results from Ido Osi Local Government Area, the home base of Governor Segun Oni, and was allegedly inclined to cancelling the election in tense Oye-Ekiti because of violence. In an attempt to rationalize the unfolding event, the INEC chairman, Prof. Maurice Iwu, said he had been informed “that as a result of the pressure of the exercise, the REC broke down and took ill, the commission had no choice but to postpone the remaining election.” With this situation, it was not lost on critical observers that a government that pledged electoral reform in the country was finding it difficult to conduct transparent elections in a fraction of a small state. That displeased the president. But all the briefs he was getting

on the botched polls dwelt on the activities of Tinubu, who was labeled the brain behind the whole controversy. Media reports were, however, different; but it didn’t seem to matter, as the perception within government was that Tinubu had the media also on his side. With the situation, I advised the president that the wise thing to do would be to reject Mrs. Adebayo’s resignation and that she be allowed to conclude the process. Since the insinuation was that there was pressure on her to declare a false result, what was needed, I reasoned, was for the security agencies to embolden her to do the right thing. The president agreed to this idea. In the course of the impasse, the president summoned a security meeting, and Iwu was invited to brief them. Before this meeting commenced, I had prepared for the worst, because I knew that some people would still press the charge that I was to blame for the fiasco. So, when the ADC rushed to my office, I was surprised when he said: “Oga [the president] said he wants another copy of the letter from that your Harvard friend you enclosed for him this morning.” This gave me some comfort that whatever would be said against me at the meeting would not count after all. Early that morning, I had received a mail from my friend, Waziri Adio, who was then a Mason Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, and had found his advice very instructive. I printed the mail and put it in the newspaper reports for the president with a note that he should read it. This was the letter he was asking me to reprint for him, which I did. Waziri had written: Dear Sege, I have to apologise for bothering you on this, but after wrestling with this Ekiti State saga for a few days, I decided I should share my concerns with you, even if you can’t do anything about them. I know the situation in Ekiti is complicated. Even from afar, I can see that neither party is completely innocent and that the struggle is beyond the interest of Ekiti people. I can see the struggle for/against dominance in Yorubaland; I can see dress-rehearsals for 2011; I can see clash of big and fragile egos. For all these reasons and more, Ekiti State has become a battle-ground and may well become a tipping point for something quite ominous, if we allow the situation to degenerate. But I also see opportunities written all over this: to show that the talk of electoral reform is sincere; to demonstrate that votes will count in future elections; to underscore that [the] rule of law is not a mere convenient rhetoric. More than at any other time, this is the time to show real leadership. Let the votes be counted and the winner duly declared. Who will listen to you when you talk about electoral reforms and decent elections when we needlessly bungle election in just one state? This is not a time for dilly-dallying. It is the time for clear, forthright and open instructions. If PDP is losing (I say if), this is the time to be strategic in conceding a battle to win the war. If this is the case, let the president instruct INEC to do the right thing, and call Oni to concede and compensate him. If PDP is not losing, then let this whole process be clear and transparent. It is a tough call. But that is what leadership is all about. If well handled, I see a huge opportunity for this administration and Mr. President, as the attendant goodwill can then be spinned positively.

How the president used the letter at the meeting I have no idea, but the conclusion at the end was that Mrs. Adebayo should be persuaded to conclude the election.

Eventually she did by announcing Oni as the winner, but the whole process had been sullied already, with the image of the government bearing an embarrassing taint. The result itself did not endure for long, as Fayemi ultimately won at the court of appeal, but by then, the president had left the scene. Endnotes 1 An outline of the president’s directive shows that the committee had this mandate: to make general and specific recommendations that would ensure 1) a truly independent electoral commission imbued with administrative and financial autonomy; 2) an electoral process that would enable the conduct of elections to meet acceptable international standards; 3) legal processes that would ensure that election disputes are concluded before inauguration of newly elected officials; and 4) mechanisms to reduce post-election tensions.

8

Yar’Adua and the World From the point he was making, I had no doubt the story being recounted by the permanent secretary for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Joe Keshi, was directed at me. But the president could not resist laughing about what transpired at the February 2009 pre-summit meeting of African Union Foreign Ministers in the Libyan town of Sirte, the birthplace of Libyan president, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. According to Keshi, the council of ministers had just adopted a document on the incremental approach towards transforming the AU into a continental authority when Gaddafi sauntered into the meeting with a sheet of paper, which he gave to the presiding official. He was insistent that the proposals contained therein be adopted as the official position. This brazen and unprecedented intervention proved somewhat effective, as some ministers easily acquiesced. Others, however, disagreed, thus causing a stalemate before the Libyan leader eventually walked out in a huff. The next day, when word got to Gaddafi that the agenda adopted by the ministers was not the one he had dictated, he returned to the meeting venue and this time insisted that his document be read by the Libyan foreign minister, saying that was the only document to be presented at the July AU Summit, where he would preside as chairman. To the consternation of those present, the Libyan official began to read Gaddafi’s document. The message in Keshi’s story was actually a sub-text. He was baffled that a Nigerian journalist who witnessed the drama was more interested in asking him (Keshi) whether it was true that Nigeria had yet to pay all her dues to the AU! In Keshi’s story, the president could glimpse the excesses of Gaddafi that he had lived with for two years. In terms of foreign affairs, the Yar’Adua years were defined by largely unflattering tales. It was a period when Nigeria’s seat in the international arena was mostly empty due to the illness of the president, which compelled him to travel less. But it was also an era characterized by the mistrust nursed by the United States over Nigeria’s apparently fledgling friendship with China and refusal to sanction the AFRICOM deal. Within the region and the sub-region also, there were events that defined the period, but none more interesting than the antics of Gaddafi and the constant plot by the trio of Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and Yar’Adua to checkmate him. Yar’Adua’s predecessor, Obasanjo, had a towering image on the international arena, where he was very much respected. It was an image that had been cultivated over three decades and which had its roots in 1979, when he handed over power as a military leader, and was burnished further from the period he was a member of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group that negotiated with the apartheid regime in South Africa through to the time he was deemed a favourite to become the secretary general of the UN. His was therefore no doubt a big shoe to fill by Yar’Adua, whose induction into African affairs came at the July 2007 AU Summit in Ghana, five weeks after he assumed office. That special summit coincided with Ghana’s 50th year anniversary and had a single-item agenda, Grand Debate on Union Government, a tribute to the country’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, who played a leading role in the formation of the 31-nation Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Fifty years later in Ghana, Alpha Oumar Konare, the AU Chairman, evoked the memory

of Nkrumah as he declared, “The battle for the United States of Africa is the only one worth fighting for [in] our generation, the only one that can provide the answers to the thousand-and-one problems faced by the populations of Africa.” But Konare was not speaking for the continent, he was simply re-echoing the wish of one man: the Libyan leader, Gaddafi. Donning his usual sunglasses, a safari suit with silhouettes of Africa emblazoned on it, and accompanied by his usual retinue of female bodyguards, the ‘Brother Leader’, as colleagues usually addressed him, arrived in Accra with the sole agenda of proclaiming into existence the United States of Africa, probably with himself as life president! As desirable as the dream was, Yar’Adua and others could see nothing on ground to make that a reality, and so they voiced their concerns. As far as they were concerned, a more productive approach for the continent would be to begin to put in place those building blocks that would ultimately lead to the realization of the dream. Zenawi put this rather succinctly in his contribution when he said there were two groups: those who believe you could build a house from the roof and those, like himself, Presidents Yar’Adua and Mbeki “who believe it’s wiser to build a house from the foundation.” Accustomed to having his way, the Libyan leader views any challenge as anathema, and, as at all other meetings he attended, in Ghana, he often ensured that every other leader was seated before he made his noisy entry with several aides and cameramen. Then he would choose when to speak, and whenever he did, he determined for how long. He never abided by the rules. Besides, he would not stay in a hotel, preferring rather to camp in a large tent. He also always drove into AU summits in a convoy of no less than 50 new vehicles, which he usually left behind in the country while crowds are usually mobilized for him ahead. These idiosyncrasies were taken to a ridiculous height In Accra. A day before the summit began, Gaddafi had gone to the University of Ghana, where he roused the students that “for Africa, the matter is to be or not to be,” while inciting them against African leaders who were opposed to the idea. “My vision is to wake up the African leaders to unify our continent,” he said, describing himself as a ‘soldier for Africa’. But at the end, he went home disappointed. In Ghana, he played court to some African leaders, who were evidently on his payroll. He also sought audience with Yar’Adua, and, typically, he would rather the Nigerian president come to meet him in his tent. He was ignored. The president never minced words that he could not reconcile himself to someone who treated fellow Africans in his country shabbily yet wanted to lead the continent. As Libya currently unravels, it’s now easy to understand why Gaddafi would call for a break-up of Nigeria under Yar’Adua’s watch since his tactic is, and has always been, to bribe those African leaders he can and destabilize those he cannot. Yar’Adua belonged to the latter group. Within the continent, by forming an alliance with Zenawi and Mbeki, the president and others were able to checkmate their ‘Brother Leader’, who remained a constant irritant nonetheless. Outside the continent, the first critical challenge Yar’Adua encountered in the area of diplomacy was in handling the issue of AFRICOM, which essentially defined the relationship with the United States. The details emerged on November 19, 2007, at the Council of State meeting, when the president informed members of moves by the United States Department of Defense to relocate the military command for Africa (AFRICOM)

from its temporary base in Stuttgart, Germany, to the continent. He said most African leaders were opposed to the idea, and so was Nigeria. It was really not an issue for debate—it was merely a matter of information, and he was commended for bringing it to the notice of the council. However, in briefing the media after the session, the Kwara State governor, Dr. Bukola Saraki, announced that Nigeria would not approve the plan to domicile AFRICOM within the shores of the continent. The US was, to put it mildly, not pleased, because AFRICOM was high on the agenda of the issues for which President Bush had invited President Yar’Adua to the White House, an official visit that was just about three weeks away. Instructively, less than a week before the US trip, there was the AU/EU summit between the AU leaders and their European Union counterparts in Lisbon, Portugal. At the margin of the summit that ran between December 8 and 9, 2007, Yar’Adua raised the issue of AFRICOM in his bilateral sessions with President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and John Kuffuor of Ghana, who was then the AU chairman. While the leaders reiterated their resolve to oppose the move to domicile AFRICOM on the shores of the continent, they were pragmatic enough to realize that they still needed the logistics, funding and training that the Americans could provide for the establishment of the AU Standby Force. During the session with President Bush at the White House, the issue came up again and the president rather cleverly repeated a position consistent with his earlier agreement with other African leaders: the continent was ready to partner with the US on AFRICOM as long as American troops would not be stationed within the continent. “We shall partner with AFRICOM to assist not only Nigeria, but also the African continent to actualize its peace and security initiative, which is an initiative to help standby forces of brigade-size in each of the regional economic groupings within the African continent,” he said in the course of the joint media briefing. The public was outraged, as that statement was interpreted to mean that the president had reversed himself on the issue. A controversy had been born, so we had to do damage control. The Hausa service of the Voice of America (VOA) already had a scheduled interview. In the VOA session, Yar’Adua stressed that he never gave the approval for the establishment of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in the country. President Yar’Adua explained that the assistance he sought was with regard to logistics and training, stressing that at no time did he endorse the use of Africa as a base for AFRICOM. “What we discussed with (President George) Bush is that if they have something to do for Africa that has to do with peace and security, they should contribute. I told him that we African countries have our own plan to establish a joint military command in every sub-region (as we) have in economic groupings. “(America) should assist us, the African countries, with military weapons and the training of our soldiers. Since they already have the AFRICOM, it is only through it they should assist us in whatever way they can, especially in relation to peace. I asked him that they should help those of us African countries in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea to establish a joint military command to protect the territory. They should assist us to establish the military command and help us with weapons and gadgets to monitor the happenings in the area. “Therefore, it is a kind of cooperation, not for them to come and establish the command. This was what I also said back in Nigeria. I hope it is understood. Those who reported the matter in the media or [are] making insinuations did not actually understand what we said; they did not even wait to understand the kernel of the discussion at the White

House.” President Yar’Adua later held meetings with the secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, and the assistant secretary of state for Africa, Jendayi Frazer, as a gesture of reassurance that Nigeria remains committed to her relationship with the US. However, by openly repudiating the idea of AFRICOM, Nigeria’s relationship with the US on Yar’Adua’s watch had started on a very bad note. It was a relationship that would remain at a lessthan-inspiring note throughout his tenure. On the contrary, the relationship between Nigeria and China was rather cordial, even when there was really no substance to it. With Nigeria’s huge population, which offered them a market and the oil and gas potential, China embarked on a deliberate strategy to make a friend of the country, and Nigeria reciprocated, even if only symbolically. This fact obviously caught the attention of the United States, and the state visit by the president to China in February 2008, which showed clearly the importance in which China held Nigeria, merely confirmed the budding Sino-Nigerian relationship. In his meeting with President Hu, Yar’Adua spelt out the country’s request from China in the form of massive investments to develop untapped but vast gas reserves. “We know China can play a vital role here,” he told his host. “I am also sure you are looking at what role Nigeria can play in providing energy security for the People’s Republic of China. We both have strategic interest in the gas. Nigeria needs domestic gas for power and China needs LNG for your industries. I hope Chinese companies can get involved in the on-going discussions.” The president said that the kind of strategic partnership in power and energy as well as in transport infrastructure that Nigeria was seeking was one that could easily benefit China. “My officials and some of our businessmen and bankers in my delegation have had useful discussions with Chinese investors and [the] Chinese investment bank, SinoSure, and I will plead that Mr. President put in some words for our country. The direction we want to go is private-public partnership in which Chinese investors would partner with their Nigerian counterparts to invest in these strategic areas and recoup their investments within a certain period. In Nigeria, we are already putting in place the necessary regulatory framework for this arrangement.” On China’s domestic politics, the president assured that “Nigeria is committed to [the] one-China policy. China is a very good friend of Nigeria and of Africa, and I look forward to Mr. President bringing his influence to bear in helping to resolve some of the problems we have in the continent, especially in Darfur.” The Chinese president proposed the formation of a Nigeria-China Joint Commission on trade and investment, the details of which he said could be worked out through diplomatic channels. He also directed his minister of commerce to follow up on the discussion with Chinese investors and investment banks. With regard to Darfur, President Hu said China was ready to partner with the African Union, United Nations and the Sudanese government to help bring a permanent solution to the crisis. Fielding questions from about 300 members of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), Yar’Adua said no investor in Nigeria, whether foreign or local, would be given preferential treatment over another. “You asked whether your company would be granted preferential treatment in Nigeria and my response to that is simple. I believe what you really mean is whether we do give certain concessions to investors, and the answer is yes. The concessions we give are on [a] sectoral basis,

especially for pioneer businesses. But we will not grant waivers or concessions to any investor on [a] preferential basis.” There was no doubt that the president believed it was in the strategic interest of Nigeria to have a very cordial relationship with China, a conviction buoyed by the realization that the country had a lot to offer Nigeria in terms of investment in critical infrastructure. There were several attempts along this direction, but at the end, most of the deals fell through. The relationship with China suffered a minor strain in 2008. The Anyiam Osigwe family had invited the Dalai Lama as guest speaker for the annual lecture that they hold in honour of their late patriarch, and the Chinese authorities did not want him to be received in Nigeria. When representations to the foreign affairs minister, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, failed, the Chinese foreign minister wrote him a letter. Maduekwe’s response was that while Nigeria remained a friend of China, such friendship does not preclude our country from having a relationship with other interests. Ultimately, the matter reached the president, and he sided with Maduekwe on the issue. And with that, the Dalai Lama was received in Nigeria, to the displeasure of China. As chairman of ECOWAS, the president had to deal with issues of democracy and good governance within the sub-region, and he did all within his power to decisively intervene in Niger Republic, where President Mamadou Tandja, having amended the constitution, was trying to seek a third term after two terms in office. He sent emissaries to Tandja, noting that whatever disturbed the peace and stability of that neighbouring country would also affect Nigeria. He appointed Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar as ECOWAS facilitator; this choice was also endorsed by the African Union. Even though Tandja remained recalcitrant, at the end he was toppled. The president indeed demonstrated his administration’s commitment to democracy with the hard-line posture taken following the 2008 elections in Zimbabwe that ended in controversy. At the AU 11th ordinary assembly held in Egypt on July 1, 2008, foreign affairs minister, Ojo Maduekwe, said Nigeria’s position was that “no African country should be allowed to use the fig leaf of sovereignty to cover its nakedness on good governance and human rights issues, including electoral integrity.” Having reviewed the findings of SADC on the Zimbabwe presidential run-off elections held on June 27, 2008, which reported politically motivated violence, intimidation and displacement on the part of the Robert Mugabe regime, Nigeria was “of the view that the prevailing environment impinged on the credibility of the electoral process, so the election did not represent the will of the people of Zimbabwe.” According to Maduekwe, Nigeria would not consider the outcome of the election, adjudged to have been manipulated by incumbent Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, “as a basis for moving forward.” Maduekwe also sounded a note of caution on what he described as the ‘Kenyan contraption’, after a similar situation in Kenya in which the incumbent refused to yield to the wishes of the people as expressed with their votes. Mugabe, quite naturally, felt angered by Nigeria’s remark and openly challenged Maduekwe that he could not be speaking for Yar’Adua. But the minister’s position was endorsed by the president. While his health did not allow him to travel as much as he would have liked, if there is anything that defined Yar’Adua’s vision of the continent, it was what he said at the informal chat with African ambassadors in the course of his visit to Brazil. The president

had been received at the airport by all the African ambassadors in the country, a gesture for which he felt deeply touched. It was therefore fitting that he would host them to a session before we left for home again. In the course of the interaction, he expressed his gratitude for what he described as a show of solidarity and African brotherhood. Speaking extempore, the president gave an inspiring speech, excerpted below: I have no doubt in my mind that our continent is fully and ably represented in Brazil, which is a regional leader in South America. I believe each one of you represents not only your country but also the entire African continent. For that reason, all of you must be current with events on the entire African continent with respect to the interest of not only your country but of all countries in Africa. I can see that this is evident in the very tradition you have established of meeting with any African head of state who comes here so that you can discuss with him and listen to him to give you briefs on the issues concerning the African continent. As all of you must be aware, we face similar challenges in Africa, as a result of comparable historical experiences, which we have gone through in the last century. You are aware several of our countries had to struggle and fight against foreign domination in the past, yet half a century after independence, most of us are still be-devilled by problems concerning peace, security and stability on our continent. The African peer review mechanism is one of the things we have evolved as a continent to ensure peace, stability and security. With that, is the insistence now on constitutional democracy and abhorrence of changes in government that are unconstitutional and violent in nature. I think this is a major challenge on our continent today, and in Nigeria we have been making efforts to put in place a stable political system anchored on free, fair and acceptable elections. On the African continent over the last half a century, we have had political instability and rapid change of governments through unconstitutional means, and this has affected the efforts towards sustainable development. We must ensure political stability so that we can plan and implement policies and have continuity. In Nigeria, for instance, since our independence in 1960, the year 2007 was the first time we ever had a civilian to civilian political transition and a peaceful change of power from a civil administration to another civil administration. So far, we have enjoyed a decade of consistent stable civilian government from 1999 to 2009. Until now, that is something we [had] never achieved in the country since our independence. This is why my administration has embarked on [the] reform of our electoral process, so that we can have acceptable elections that will form the basis for building trust in the system we are operating. We are also making this effort at the subregional level. In Guinea Bissau where elections just held, the run-off election went well and a winner is already being declared. But because of the challenges in the country, where vital institutions have broken down, I am calling a donor roundtable on Guinea Bissau in Abuja when I get back, to ensure that we are able to get funds to assist the government to carry out institutional and security reforms as well as the economic investment that is required for the government to stabilize and for the regime to solve the problems of security and economic challenges. And in the Republic of Guinea Conakry, we have been talking with the administration of Captain Kamara, and we have insisted that elections be held by the end of this year. At the stakeholders’ conference of ECOWAS, Africa Union and EU on Guinea Conakry, we are prepared to carry out a credible election for the military to hand over power by the end of this year. Once that is done, we will do the same thing with regard to building institutions by calling another donor roundtable to enable them [to] consolidate the gains of this stable political system in the country.

We are also talking to President Laurent Gbagbo of Cote d’Ivoire to hold a credible election by the end of this year. If we are able to achieve this, we would have achieved our goal of ensuring political stability and putting a stable democratic system not only in Nigeria but throughout the West African sub-region. But we are also having an emerging issue in Niger Republic, where the president will finish his second term, which is the constitutional limit, by December this year. But efforts are being made to extend his stay, in the first instance by three years, to 2012 and then subsequently on a sit-tight basis. I have sent a delegation from ECOWAS to talk to President Tandja to have a rethink. We have also sent a joint delegation of ECOWAS, African Union, EU, and UN, but there seems to be no positive response. As soon as I get back to Abuja, I will invite President Tandja to come to Abuja because we need political stability, peace and security for us to pay attention to issues of development, education, human development and the other many challenges facing us. These efforts are also being replicated at the African Union level to ensure that within this decade we achieve total political stability in Africa so that the entire continent can focus its attention on developmental issues. During our last two summits, we placed much emphasis on integrating African economies, taking cognizance of the fact that the economic ties between individual African nations with their old colonial masters are much stronger than the ties between ourselves, even in terms of movement of people. You find, for example, in Nigeria that you can’t fly to Niger Republic, which is our neighbour; you have to go through Europe before you can get to Niger, and in a lot of African countries this is the case. So we need continent-wide infrastructure that will integrate our people, and we need structures that will ensure free movement of our people within the continent, structures that will ensure that we have a common market and we move towards assisting one another economically. On this we have decided to work together with our partners in the developed world. We appreciate all their efforts, they may help with aids and grants, but clearly, only we in Africa can solve our problems for ourselves. Our salvation is in our hands. For our economy to develop, we must put in place critical infrastructure, like power and energy as well as transport, that will ensure mass movement of goods and people. We need railways, waterways and good interconnected road networks. In Nigeria we are aware of all these challenges, and that is one of the reasons we introduced Vision 20-2020, and we have identified seven critical areas of infrastructure which we call the seven-point agenda that will enable the nation [to] accomplish this objective. While we work on these plans, we are also conscious of our responsibilities to our other African countries. For instance, in our national gas master plan, we have also included the West African gas pipeline, which is now being constructed from Nigeria to Benin, Togo and Ghana, and we have plans to extend it up to as far as Senegal. And we have just signed an agreement, and we are signing other agreements and launching, by next year, the Trans Sahara gas pipeline project, which will essentially go through Niger, Algeria and Europe, and in that way, it can branch to other African countries, which will be required to provide one of the sources [for] solving our energy problem. Nigeria, we have realized, is more a gas nation than an oil nation, but for several years, this potential has been untapped. But now we are investing in gas, where we have a reserve of about 183 trillion cubic feet. That is the direction we are going, but as we go into the gas area, we want to avoid all the mistakes we made with regard to our crude oil exploitation, and that is why we are reforming the entire sector. That will benefit not only our country, but the entire continent when we finish with our plans because we want a network of gas pipelines not only to the developed world but also to several African countries.

Even though it was an informal session, and the president had no prepared text,

the foregoing response to the issues raised by the African ambassadors encapsulated his thoughts on what he envisioned for Nigeria and the continent of Africa. But a major battle he had to confront was his health, a battle that he ultimately lost.

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Unfulfilled Dreams One of the issues Yar’Adua was very passionate about was land reform, which had been designed to overhaul the over three-decade-long Land Use Act, which asserts that land belongs to the government. Very early in his administration, the president had engaged Akin Mabogunje, a professor of Geography and the foremost Nigerian expert on urbanization. It is instructive to digress here to state that Mabogunje was one of a few people for whom the president had tremendous respect. He would later give the reason without any prompting: “You know why I like that old man (Mabogunje): he is one of a few people who have never sought a personal favour from me. Every time he comes here, all he discusses with me are issues concerning the country, and if I don’t send for him, he won’t make an appointment to see me.” The president had charged the Mabogunje committee with the responsibility of providing technical assistance to states and local governments to ensure that land cadastral boundaries and title holdings are demarcated in such a way that a community, hamlet, village or town would be recognizable. The committee was also to make recommendations for the establishment of a national depository for land title holding and records in all states of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory, as well as make recommendations for the establishment of a mechanism for land valuation in all parts of the country. Land reform, when successfully implemented the way it was envisioned by Yar’Adua, will have a positive and direct impact on economic growth, food security and poverty reduction in Nigeria. The bill, when passed, will liberalize land administration and remove the legal encumbrances that restrict the transformation of land into capital assets that can be used to advance agricultural production and mortgages. To fast-track the process, the Federal Land Information System (FELIS) was established in 2008 with a linked network to the field headquarters of the Ministry of Works and Housing. Already, the FELIS database can be accessed from any part of the world, and this will make tracking of land transactions at the federal level easier. Unfortunately, even with all these efforts, precious time was lost, to the extent that by the time the bill would get to the National Assembly, the president’s health had so deteriorated that there could be no follow up. Ironically, this was an issue on which he had invested a lot of time and energy. Perhaps the most painful aspect of the cost of the president’s health can, however, be glimpsed in the government’s deregulation attempt. The federal government had, in February 2009, endorsed the full deregulation of the downstream sector of the petroleum industry following the recommendations presented by the Presidential Steering Committee on the global economic crisis, which submitted that what the nation had been subsidizing to the tune of an estimated N1.63 trillion were inefficiencies, fraud and racketeering in the whole production chain. To muster an unassailable national consensus in support of this new policy philosophy, President Yar’Adua had asked the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) and the Trade Union Congress (TUC) to send in one nominee each for membership of this committee, which

he chaired. Their inclusion was to facilitate a mutually beneficial exchange of views among government, Labour and the private sector operators on the issue. After several meetings, a sub-committee, headed by Governor Isa Yuguda of Bauchi State, was constituted to agree on the final details with Labour with regard to the deregulation of the downstream sector of the petroleum industry. I was appointed as the representative of the president on the subcommittee. Incidentally, it was Edo State governor, Comrade Adams Oshiomhole, whom the president actually nominated to chair the sub-committee, but he declined on the point of principle as a former Labour leader who had led nationwide strikes on the issue of deregulation. He nonetheless promised to assist, and he did. Against the background that successive administrations had made futile efforts to remove the rent element associated with the downstream sector of the petroleum industry, we felt that the best approach was to put out all the facts in the negotiations with Labour, which involved the finance minister, director of budget, group managing director of NNPC, executive secretary of PPPRA and heads of other related agencies of government. While the negotiations were difficult, given that Labour had an ideological opposition to any regime of market deregulation, it was very clear that not only was the arithmetic in favour of what the president intended to do, what subsisted was a regime of fraud that was unsustainable. It was also clear that the existing refineries would never work, and no new one would be built until all the distortions and racketeering associated with the market had been removed. The conclusion from all our sessions with Labour was that they were willing to reach a compromise if they could see clear plans for improving the lot of the workers from the savings that would be made and with a timeline and programme of activities leading to the building of new refineries that would stop the import of PMS. They were also ready to work with the government on a number of palliative measures. Given the huge market that we have within our country, and also considering the fact that our supply outlets feed the sub-region through smuggling, investors were interested in building refineries in Nigeria if the conditions were right. When Labour saw the compelling arguments, negotiations moved to stage two, in which the president had to personally engage their leaders as a confidence-building measure. He held meetings with Comrade Abdulwaheed Umar, Peter Esele, and Comrade John Odah to secure their buy-in. Even though they still felt uncomfortable with the idea of deregulation and were suspicious of government’s intention, their stance was not as uncompromising as it used to be in the past: they moved from a posture of no deregulation to that of conditional support. With this, it was decided that we could take the gamble, as Ajumogobia continued to dialogue with Labour. Deregulation was supposed to commence on November 1, 2009, before it was shifted to begin after the FIFA Under-17 World Cup tournament being hosted by Nigeria scheduled to end on November 16. Unfortunately, by then, the president was spending what would turn out to be effectively his last week in office, as he left Nigeria on November 23 for Saudi Arabia. Today, the nation continues to lose hundreds of billions of naira annually on ‘subsidy’, money that largely swells the purse of high-profile rent seekers in the downstream sector of the oil industry and their collaborators in government. Food security, one of the cardinal principles in his seven-point agenda, was another area

where President Yar’Adua came with lofty ideas but achieved mixed results. His desire was to intervene in such a manner as to fully harness the agricultural potentials of the country not only for food sufficiency but also for job creation. With that in mind, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources under Dr. Abba Sayid Ruma launched key interventions in certain critical areas, aimed at enhancing farmers’ access to quality and affordable agricultural inputs. The new approach, driven by a value-chain perspective advocated comprehensive and concentrated attention to every component of the agriculture in certain areas: I. N200bn commercial agriculture credit scheme: This concessionary credit scheme was designed to solve one of the major problems of commercial farming in Nigeria: lack of credit facilities. Five banks were designated by the CBN to disburse to large-scale farmers who meet the requirements; state governments were to disburse to small-scale farmers. II. 20 silos and warehousing complexes: The silos were designed to serve multiple purposes, including storage, cleaning/standardization, market outlet, and transport corridor to the market. 20 of such are being built in the various grain centres in the country. Combined, the silos were also to add 1,025,000 metric tonnes of storage capacity to the present 300, 000 metric tonnes in the country. III. One-stop agro-input centres: These were designed to serve as one-stop shops where farmers could purchase high-grade agricultural inputs such as seedlings, fertilizers, animal feeds, agro-chemicals, and tractors. Each centre was to have the capacity to store up to 2,000 metric tonnes of input. IV. Integrated livestock estates: These estates were to provide integrated infrastructure for the development of the livestock sub-sector and its relevant value chain. The livestock estates will include grazing areas, covered and open pens, dairy processing plants, abattoirs, leather treatment centres and modern meat supermarkets. These will be built in eight states in the country, and are expected to commence operations by 2010. V. Integrated fish estates: These fish estates are designed to provide integrated infrastructure for the development of the fishery sub-sector and its relevant value chain. The fishery estates will include ponds, hatcheries, processing plants, training centres, feed mills, laboratories, cold stores and marketing centres. The estates will be built in eight states in the country. VI. Commodity out-growers development and extension service centres: These centres were to incentivize the growth of large-scale agric business as well as create a new generation of farmers in Nigeria. They were to be built around the dormant riverbasin assets and will include farmers’ markets, processing and storage facilities, water for irrigation and power generation, and facilities for housing and training up to 2,000 extension workers. VII. Export handling, preservation and conditioning centres: These centres were designed to reduce post-harvest losses and ensure that agricultural products from Nigeria can compete well in the international market. Facilities in these centres will include washing, drying and storage chambers, sorting, grading and packaging facilities, storage crate handling and cargo facilities and temperature and humidity control facilities. The foregoing were some of the designs for the agricultural sector, but I couldn’t ascertain the level of implementation with regard to these policies.

The power sector is another area where Yar’Adua could not deliver. He had promised to declare emergency in the sector within the first 100 days, but he never did. The story began in his third week in office, when Mr. Joseph Majoku, retained as special adviser on power from the preceding administration, gave a presentation on the true state of the sector, especially with regard to how far behind Nigeria was. In his narrative, he said power generation capacity in Iran and Nigeria had both been at the same level in 1970, but as at 2007, Iran, with a population of 70 million, had achieved a power generation capacity of 42,000 megawatts. South Africa presented another example. Whereas South Africa distributed an average of 800 watts per person, in 2007, it was 30 watts per person in Nigeria. According to Makoju, it would take 104,000 megawatts of electricity for Nigeria to match South Africa in per capita terms, and it would require about $90 billion to do so. His comparison of Nigeria with smaller African countries was even more damning: “On a per capita basis, Senegal, Zambia, Ghana, Kenya, Gabon, Algeria, Libya, Mozambique and Cameroon (and several less endowed nations) were generating more electricity than Nigeria!” This was the dire situation Yar’Adua met when he assumed office in 2007. It must be noted, however, that given the grim situation he himself inherited in 1999, Obasanjo should indeed be commended for unilaterally using the excess crude sales account (which belonged to the three tiers of government) to pay for the investment in the power sector. But such an act was difficult for Yar’Adua to follow, having publicly announced a commitment to the rule of law. With the governors threatening court action, and given the Supreme Court ruling on Lagos State vs Federal Government on the withheld local government funds, the president was advised that unilaterally taking money from the excess crude account was not sustainable and would backfire. What Yar’Adua therefore decided to do, and ultimately did, was to get the states to secure the approval of their respective houses of assembly while also seeking the approval of the National Assembly for a special dispensation on power. The process, akin to a constitutional amendment, was eventually completed after he had secured the buy-in of the governors. With the legal instrument for the sustainable funding of the power projects, a steering committee was set up with then Vice President Goodluck Jonathan as chairman. Other members included six governors to represent their respective colleagues in the geopolitical zones. The attorney general and minister of justice, secretary to the government of the federation, the ministers of power, the minister of finance, the chief economic adviser to the president, BPE and NDPHC were also members of the committee. This committee determined the amount needed to complete the projects, which it placed before the National Economic Council for the FGN and the states to jointly approve as the money was to come from the states’ and local governments’ share of the excess crude sales account. The fact that not much attention was paid to gas at the initial conception of the NIPP perhaps accounted for a situation in which not all the available turbines could be operational, either because the pipelines conveying the gas were too small to deliver what was needed to power the plants, or the gas available was less than what was actually needed. There were also cases where the available gas was too wet, thus necessitating frequent shut downs as was (and may still be) the case with the Egbin Power Plant.

With the benefit of hindsight, perhaps the investment to increase the availability and quality of gas ought to have preceded the NIPP contracts. At the end, Yar’Adua failed to achieve any set targets on power. Notwithstanding, there were a couple of things the president did for which he will be remembered. One important legacy of the Yar’Adua administration is the dredging of the lower River Niger, 43 years after the idea was first conceived. When completed, this project, which covers 572 kilometres, will ensure all-year round navigation of the River Niger, providing a more attractive, cheaper and safer means for hauling goods. It will also engender linkages and promote commerce and trade between communities and peoples of the eight adjoining states, awakening the full potential of the hitherto comatose inland shipping maritime sub-sector. Thanks to the vision of Yar’Adua, the cotton, garment and textiles (CTG) scheme is also becoming an evolving success story. In January 2011, Nigeria’s biggest textile conglomerate, UNT Plc. re-opened to business after a decade of closure. In one fell swoop, about 2,000 staff members were reportedly recalled out of its sacked work force. I recall all the meetings the president held on the issue before the sum of N100 billion was raised by the Debt Management Office through a bond issue. The CTG scheme was designed as a major poverty alleviation strategy. The resuscitation of cotton farming and textile production will ultimately put about a million cotton farmers back to work in the cotton-producing belt of the country, whose means of livelihood disappeared with the closure of textile and ginning industries largely in Kaduna, Lagos and Aba. Convinced of the need to properly channel resources in the education sector, the president also changed the mandate of the Education Trust Fund (ETF) to target tertiary education rather than what obtained in the past, where the money was deployed to all strata of education in a manner that made it ineffectual. It is also to Yar’Adua’s credit that he introduced the tenure system for permanent secretaries and directors in the civil service to arrest succession crises, create vacancies, reinvigorate the system, boost the morale of qualified and deserving officers as well as unlock the potential of creative and hardworking ones. While he pursued all these ideas, his fragile health became a serious distraction. From the outset of the administration, critical meetings were routinely cancelled, most often at the last minute, because the president was not in the right frame of health to attend. Several Federal Executive Council (FEC) sessions were also held with his chair vacant. Indeed, with time, the vacant chair of the president within the Aso Council chambers became a metaphor for the administration. It was therefore fitting that following the National Assembly resolution that elevated Vice President Goodluck Jonathan to the position of acting president on February 8, 2010, that vacant chair would symbolize the beginning of the power struggle that ended only with Yar’Adua’s death on May 5, 2010. But the tragic saga actually began in April 2008.

Part II

Illness & Death “I am a normal human being who can fall sick, who can recover, who can die.” –Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, Financial Times (interview), May 20, 2008

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The Early Signals… Although hardly ever ready on schedule, it was no less alarming when, as of late March, the 2008 Appropriation Bill had yet to be signed into law. The reason for the delay this time arose from a disagreement between the president and the National Assembly over the powers of the legislature in relation to the budgeting process. There was therefore understandable anxiety within the polity, especially as it emerged that President Yar’Adua was somewhat reluctant to sign the budget over what he saw as the extreme meddlesomeness of the lawmakers. The president’s resolve was further strengthened by a meeting held on April 3, 2008, at the villa, which reviewed and subsequently endorsed his decision to challenge the powers of the National Assembly at the Supreme Court. In attendance at the meeting were attorney general of the federation and justice minister, Mr. Michael Aondoakaa; minister of finance, Dr. Shamsudeen Usman; national planning minister, Senator Sanusi Dagash; chief economic adviser, Mr. Tanimu Yakubu Kurfi; director general of the Bureau of Public Procurement, Eng. Emeka Ezeh; national security adviser, Major General Sarki Muktah; director general, Budget Office, Dr. Bright Okogu and the State House permanent secretary, Mr. Steve Oronsaye. The main contention was that a review of the 2008 Appropriation Act as passed by the National Assembly revealed that the legislators had virtually rewritten the budget not only by jacking up their own figures but also by introducing several clauses in contravention of the principle of separation of powers. There were, of course, other areas of disagreement, and the meeting created an opportunity for the major issues to be outlined. In summary, the legislators unilaterally initiated projects for which they provided money without any input from the executive, which ordinarily should design, cost, execute and supervise such projects. The president was indeed curious as to how the costs were determined, given the sheer scale of projects added. In the Budget Office’s reckoning, the figures were anything but reliable. To the president, the legislators’ actions made a mockery of the entire budgetary process and were clearly antithetical to the principle of transparency and accountability. The meeting over, he asked the AGF to outline the issues for which he would seek judicial interpretation at the Supreme Court, which seemed to be the logical step since all the dialogue sessions held with the Assembly leadership had failed to yield any positive result. To that end, the Justice Ministry came up with the following issues for determination by the Supreme Court: Whether the National Assembly, in the exercise of its constitutional power to approve the yearly budget estimates submitted to it by the executive, can • unilaterally increase the revenue benchmark beyond what was provided in the budget estimates presented to it by the president; • unilaterally write into the budget heads of expenditure and appropriate money on those heads of expenditure that were not provided for by the budget estimates submitted by the president; • unilaterally insert into the budget projects not included by the executive and proceed to appropriate money beyond the estimates submitted by the president;

• under the presidential system of government, whittle down the powers of the executive president by compelling officers of the executive branch to report directly to them on matters such as provided under the appropriation bill. Before the suit could, however, be filed at the Supreme Court, there was a further appeal to dialogue, after the finance minister’s counsel that the president should seek another session with the Assembly leadership. Usman, who had frequent interactions with the lawmakers, knew they would perceive the court option as a declaration of war and would fight back. So, the option taken at the earlier meeting, that of going to court, was not one with which he was comfortable. At his instance, another meeting between the president and the leadership of the National Assembly was scheduled on the night of April 3, 2008. With no apparent resolution at the meeting, the president hinted that the crisis was better resolved by the Supreme Court. The legislators thought it was a bluff; but once they realized he was serious, there were subtle threats that the Supreme Court option would not work. Their position was simple but no less grim: if they were served any notice to that effect, their lawyers would require ample time for response. And since it was already April, they said, chances were that there might not be a budget for the year. Members of the House in the delegation were particularly hostile. They argued that since the powers of the president to authorize spending was ordinarily lost by the end of June (barely two months from the meeting date), a constitutional crisis was inevitable if he pursued the Supreme Court option. In the end, it was pragmatism that prevailed. There was a compromise that the president should sign the bill as passed, after which the act would be sent back for amendment. It was on this basis that I briefed the media to the effect that the president would sign the 2008 Appropriation Bill. I, however, stated very clearly that Yar’Adua’s formal assent to the bill as passed was with the firm understanding that all contentious sections would be reviewed subsequently, in line with the agreement reached at a meeting with the National Assembly leadership. The grounds on which the president had previously withheld his assent remained valid, I explained, but added that he would continue to work for a proper understanding of the lawful roles of the executive and legislative arms of the government in preparation, passage and implementation of the budget. “While he will continue to give due regard to the prerogatives granted the National Assembly by the 1999 Constitution, President Yar’Adua insists that the provisions of the constitution, including those guiding the appropriation and expenditure of public funds, must be properly applied at all times in the interest of good governance and the national well-being,” I said. Everything was therefore set for the signing of the budget on April 12, 2008, but early that morning, I got a call from the CSO that I had to come to the villa. On arrival at the residence, I saw the president exiting his study, and I almost did not recognize him. His entire face had swollen to the extent that he could barely see. The problem, from what the doctor told me, began the previous week, when the president started taking some malaria drugs that had been prescribed for him. A few days after it was noticed that there was scarcely any improvement, another medication was recommended. But while it brought the needed relief from the malaria, it unleashed an allergic reaction that manifested in the form of a swollen face. The chief of staff, General Mohammed, who had been with the president from the night before also recounted how dramatic the development had been. He said that before the

president had taken the prescribed drug, he had actually hinted that he was allergic to it, but the doctors had said it was not the same drug. But not more than a few minutes after taking the medication, his face began to swell up. By Sunday night, the situation had deteriorated, necessitating a visit to the National Hospital, where the chief medical director, Dr. Olusegun Ajuwon, and a team of experts were waiting. Notwithstanding their efforts, the president was evidently in very bad shape on April 12, 2008. The budget signing was fixed for 10:00 a.m., and some correspondents had started arriving in the villa. Meanwhile, efforts were being made to secure German visas for the security men and a few aides, including myself. For me, there was a big dilemma: how would the president sign the budget without being exposed to the public in the state he was in? I asked the chief of staff whether the budget could be assented to without any ceremony, but he said the convention required that there be witnesses, in which case the National Assembly’s principal officers had to be present. This information would be instructive in December 2009 when the supplementary budget had to be signed at a Saudi hospital with no witnesses. Back in April 2008, it was a big challenge. After a meeting comprising the CSO, the ADC, the chief of staff and me, we agreed that the budget would be signed at the dining table at the residence but with no media presence. We also decided that only the Senate president, the House of Representatives Speaker and the special adviser on National Assembly, Mrs. Florence Ita-Giwa, would be present. I felt uncomfortable with the decision to black out the media, but chose not to argue my case at that point because I knew it was inconceivable that I could win such a debate. It was a matter I knew I had to take up privately with the chief of staff. By 10:00 a.m., many government officials from the Budget Office, Finance Ministry and National Planning Commission had arrived in the Council chambers and were all waiting for the president. They had to be quietly dispersed with the explanation that the ceremony would no longer hold at the venue and at that time. With me walking back and forth between my office and the residence, the CSO so casually dressed and the ADC in mufti, it wasn’t long before everybody in the villa sensed that something was amiss. While the reporters pressed for information about when the budget would be signed, all I could do was plead for their patience while reassuring them that the ceremony would hold that day. They had by then received information that the president was ill, but putting off the signing till later in the day was based on the doctor’s advice that the swelling would reduce. That was actually the case. At about 2:00 p.m., the president’s face had experienced a bit of improvement. Emboldened, we felt the Senate president and the speaker could be invited to the residence. At that point, I told the chief of staff that there was no way the president could sign the Appropriation Bill into law without a photograph of the event. I insisted that I would bring in the official photographer and the NTA camera man, but explained that the shots would be taken from a sideways angle that would not reveal the president’s face. It was a challenge selling the CSO on that point. But he would later acquiesce, so I brought in the NTA cameraman, Mohammed Adamu, and the photographer, Kola Osiyemi. Before the president came out of the study to the dining table where the ceremony was to hold, we had scrupulously rehearsed where the camera would be positioned and how the shots would be taken, and were thus convinced we could successfully pull it off. With the arrival of Senator Ita-Giwa, Senate president David

Mark, and the House of Representatives deputy Speaker, Bayero Nafada, as witnesses, the budget was eventually signed at 4:00 p.m. Before proceeding to the airport, I scrutinized all the shots and selected the one I considered the best for publication in the newspapers and that was what I sent out. I also watched the NTA clips to ensure there were no embarrassing takes. At the airport, the NTA cameraman took his shots from a distance so that he captured the president as he ascended the steps and waved before entering the aircraft. Meanwhile, when I announced earlier in the day that the budget had been signed, I also stated that “the president will leave for Wiesbaden, Germany, later today (Monday) to see his private physicians for a medical review of an indisposition believed to be due to an allergic reaction.” When we eventually got to Germany that night, the condition of the president had improved remarkably, and his face was actually coming back to normal. So we simply drove straight to the hotel, and it was only the next morning that he checked into the hospital. Four days later, I went to see him at the hospital, accompanied by the ADC. He was sitting alone on a chair and looked very tired. He was happy nonetheless to see us and asked questions about events back home, but after about 30 minutes we left him and headed back to the hotel. The next day, Friday, he was discharged, and he came back to the hotel. The media back home was already awash with speculations about the state of his health. So, the expectation that we would soon be going home gave me some sense of relief. But I was soon to be disappointed. The disappointment came later that evening when I inquired about our return date and Dr. Banye appeared uncertain. The medical process had yet to be concluded, as the president would be returning to the hospital two days later to prepare for further tests, he told me. On Sunday, the president left the hotel again, this time for a hospital in Frankfurt for another test before he returned to the Wiesbaden hospital. It was there he went through what was described as a ‘minor surgery’ the next day. My dilemma grew worse. Given that by Saturday I had told Nigerians through an interview I granted the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) that the president would be returning home, I was now under intense pressure since I could no longer confirm with certainty the date of his return to Nigeria. A few aides of the First Lady informed me she had issues with my interview, especially the fact that I had set a date for the president’s return, but our paths never quite crossed. Even though we were on the same floor in the hotel, I never ventured into her room since she did not ask for me. To make up for the absence of the president, however, I seized every opportunity for him to appear to dispel any untoward rumour. First, I learnt that Chief Gani Fawehinmi, who had been diagnosed with cancer at a UK hospital, was about to clock 70. I quickly called Kayode Komolafe, my former colleague at THISDAY, to give me Gani’s London number. I also discussed with the CSO and ADC what I planned to do in order to preempt any opposition: I wanted the president to call Gani and congratulate him on his birthday. I eventually succeeded in getting him to make the call and that played well in the media back home—but only for a few days. Relief came when, after almost two weeks, the president was discharged from the hospital. A date was thus set for his return. But the politicians turned his arrival into a carnival with several governors and top public officials converging at the airport to receive him. Back at the villa, it was very evident that a lot of things would change, and it

did not take long for that to unfold. There were speculations then that aside from his kidney problems, the president had been diagnosed with lung cancer. It was mere speculation, which nobody could confirm, but it was evident that the health report had not been positive. Whatever might have been the information from the German hospital, it was also very clear that some warnings had been given on the president’s work schedules. The First Lady accused Inuwa Baba, a long time associate of the family, of always bringing people to see the president at odd hours. She read the riot act to other aides, spelling out rules that would reduce the number of people seeing the president after office hours and the time after which nobody should be allowed to come to the residence. The first thing I noticed when we returned was that the president, who was usually down at his study as early as 8:30 a.m. now began to surface there between 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., sometimes even as late as noon. Although he now seldom got to the office early, he tried to make up for it by closing late. There were days when we would still be in the office at 10:00 p.m. Unfortunately, it was at that most vulnerable period in his life and presidency that some people close to him would connive to get rid of the chief of staff, General Abdullahi Mohammed, who had not only been a shield to the president, but someone who had the capacity to really help him. A tested administrator with incredible energy, Mohammed was in his office as early as 7:00 a.m. and would not leave until after midnight. With his experience as a retired major general, the founding director general of the National Security Organisation (NSO) who had later broken into State Security Service and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), and as a former military governor, Mohammed’s experience and exposure were invaluable. He had also served as national security adviser and was for eight years the chief of staff to Obasanjo’s government. He helped to stabilize the Yar’Adua government at the initial stage while also shielding the president from what was initially becoming an overbearing influence on the part of Obasanjo. One story that the president himself recounted was how he (Mohammed) had saved him from committing political suicide just to please his predecessor on the day the PDP had held their convention to pick the national chairman. Because the governors had rejected the aspiration of the former Ebonyi State governor, Dr. Sam Egwu, on account of the fact that Obasanjo had proclaimed him publicly as his anointed, there was pressure on Yar’Adua to endorse Chief Anyim Pius Anyim, but he refused. He believed Egwu was the best man for the job, and didn’t think he should be jettisoned on account of Obasanjo’s open endorsement. At the last meeting he held with representatives of the governors, his message was clear: Please don’t back Anyim. The former Senate president had fallen out publicly with Obasanjo, and his election as PDP chairman would have sent a wrong signal about the relationship between the president and his predecessor. Because of this, the night before the convention, the governors met and decided that they would instead back Chief Vincent Ogbulafor as opposed to Anyim, who was initially favoured by many of them. On the day of the convention, the emir of Katsina died, and Yar’Adua decided he would witness the burial, so the plan was for us to spend about an hour at Eagles Square and then sneak out to Katsina. Just as we were about to leave the villa for the convention venue, Obasanjo drove in. He went into the study with Yar’Adua to plead that the convention be postponed till evening, even though people were already gathered at

Eagles Square. Since the governors had rejected Egwu and he opposed the idea of Ogbulafor, Obasanjo came up with his idea of a compromise. He wanted the president to endorse the foreign affairs minister, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, for the party chairmanship. The president wondered how that could possibly be done since Maduekwe had not collected the nomination form to be chairman. Obasanjo said it was possible. At the point when the president was about to buckle under the pressure, Mohammed burst in: “Mr. President, you have to start going to Eagle Square now. You cannot continue to keep the people waiting—” An apparently angry Obasanjo shouted, “Please, please, please….” But this only stiffened Mohammed, who laughed before telling the president, “Don’t let this old man mislead you, its time you left the villa.” That was how the conversation ended, but the president himself would later tell me that but for Mohammed, he would have succumbed to Obasanjo’s idea, even though he had thought that it would not work. It was this same Mohammed against whom some conspired to oust from the villa. While there were those close to the president who felt that General Mohammed was ‘an Obasanjo man’, his main foe was Chief James Ibori, the former Delta State governor, who saw the chief of staff as the godfather of the EFCC chairman, Nuhu Ribadu, with whom he was fighting a battle. Ibori made no pretensions about the fact that I was also becoming an obstacle because I was perceived as Mohammed’s ally, which wasn’t entirely wrong. After a public spat between us at the villa where he openly accused me of running a smear campaign against him, I went to his house to ascertain what his misgivings about me were. He told me without mincing words that he wanted the chief of staff removed because he (Mohammed) no longer had any business being at the villa. His next comment was just as brusque and cold: “Look Segun, you know you were not supposed to get this job, but the president insisted it was you he wanted, but now that you are here, you think you can play politics. Let me warn you, I have been playing the villa game since the Abacha days, so don’t mess with me. Be careful,” he warned. By defending the man in the media, I was risking my own job too. Ibori was not alone in the plot to oust Mohammed. I knew that the Kwara State governor, Dr. Bukola Saraki, also felt this way. Whereas Saraki’s stand could be excused as the seldom palatable fall-out of local politics (since, like him, Mohammed is also from Ilorin), Ibori’s belligerence on the matter was puzzling. Yet Ibori carried out his plot surreptitiously and with cold efficiency. As that went on, it was easy for me to see that the bond of trust between the president and the chief of staff had been broken. There were rumours that the office would be scrapped, with all kinds of inferences as to how the villa would be run. Ordinarily, I should have been happy, because I was told by those courting my support that we would have a new structure that would free me from all unnecessary bureaucracy and make me subject to no one in the villa except the president and VP. I didn’t believe it at the time, but that was exactly what eventually happened. But even if I had believed it, I knew for sure that any arrangement that would lead to Mohammed’s exit from the villa would be catastrophic for the country and the president himself. My conviction would turn out to be prescient, and I had reasons to believe the president later regretted his action, but by then it was far

too late. Shortly before the Federal Executive Council meeting adjourned for break on August 20, 2008, the president informed members that he would be travelling to Saudi Arabia later that day to perform the lesser hajj (umrah). He said he would leave the council chambers by lunch break (1:30 p.m.) and that when it reconvened by 2:30, the VP would be presiding. I had been informed days earlier about the trip, including the fact that the president would return on Sunday, August 24 because we were scheduled to travel to Brazil on Tuesday, August 26 on a state visit. I was not on the Saudi trip—the first time I would be left out of a foreign trip—but I considered going to the country more a religious voyage than an official one, so it really didn’t bother me. The days preceding the trip saw some changes in the armed forces. Then, both the chief of defence staff, General Andrew Azazi and the chief of naval staff, Admiral Ganiyu Adekeye, were already due for retirement. By their service record, they ought to have left by December 2007. While there was a lobby to have their tenure extended, the situation was not helped by the fact that the top echelon of the army was already divided between loyalists of Azazi and those of then army chief, Lt. General Luka Yusuf. To compound the situation, the name of the erstwhile chief of army staff, Lt. General Agwai, who was then heading the UN military mission in Darfur, was also being added to the mix. Yusuf was said to have the tacit backing of Agwai. As the president prepared for the trip to Saudi Arabia for umrah, there was pressure on him to make the changes within the armed forces before leaving on Wednesday, August 20. Later in the afternoon, he invited the service chiefs to a meeting at his residence, during which he told them he would be making some changes. Having thanked them for their services, he directed that they go and hold a meeting with the minister of defence, Ahmed Yayale. Owing to a controversial act of the National Assembly that stipulated that appointment of service chiefs be cleared, the president had instructed Yayale to meet with the Senate president and the House of Representatives Speaker before I could make the announcement. Ordinarily, I should accompany the president to the airport, but I had to wait to coordinate with Yayale, who was to notify me the moment he got the green light from both the Speaker and the Senate president. By 5:00 p.m., I made the announcement that the president had approved the appointment of Air Marshall Paul Dike as chief of defence staff, to take over from Azazi, who was retiring from service. I added that he had also approved the appointment of Major General A. B. Dambazzau as chief of army staff in place of Luka Yusuf. Other changes approved by the president in the command structure of the armed forces that I announced included the appointment of Rear Admiral Isaiah Iko Ibrahim as chief of naval staff to succeed Adekeye, who retired from active service. After listing all the appointments, I concluded by saying that the president “left Abuja this evening to perform the lesser hajj in Saudi Arabia.” The changes in the armed forces deflected public attention from the fact that the president had travelled out of the country. But that only bought us some days as saharareporters soon reported that the president had gone to Saudi Arabia for medicals and not for umrah. Initially, my response was one of contempt for the story, but when on Saturday I confirmed that the president would not be returning by the weekend, even though the

advance party to Brazil had been told to proceed, I began to suspect that there was more to the trip than we were being told. With the international media latching on to the story that the president was in Saudi Arabia for medicals, there were calls for full disclosure on the president’s health status. The Saudi Arabia trip was not without its own drama because it was done in such a manner that the president’s chief physician (CPP), Dr. Banye, was curiously left out, without the knowledge of even the president, who was evidently angry when at the airport he asked, “Where is Salisu?” only to be told that his chief physician was not on the trip. He immediately directed that arrangements be made for Banye to join him in Saudi Arabia the next day. The change of hospital from Germany to Saudi Arabia (without the prior knowledge of the CPP) was done on the belief that the American security agents had penetrated the hospital and had gained access to the president’s health profile. Going to Saudi Arabia was therefore a move to protect such information, but from what I would later learn, it was an exercise in futility. Back at home, at the next FEC meeting on August 27, 2008, the absence of the president had become a serious issue, as nobody knew the true situation about his condition. When asked by cabinet members whether he had been in touch with the president, the VP answered in the negative. Since leaving the country, he explained, the president had not spoken with him. The VP further added that on the occasions when he made efforts to speak with the president, he only succeeded in speaking with either the ADC or the CSO. The FEC meeting over, the minister of information, Mr. John Odey, and his foreign affairs counterpart, Maduekwe, were detailed to brief the media. The Brazil trip was in the news, especially since correspondents were aware that the advance team had travelled ahead. Maduekwe, a smart politician with an uncanny ability to wriggle out of trouble, confirmed to the media that the president had postponed the Brazil trip “because of developments that needed our immediate attention.” He would not elaborate on what those developments were before he added that the postponement of the Brazil trip was not unusual. “The trip was just readjusted, not cancelled. There is nothing unusual about it. It was deferred. It happens like that several times. Governance is dynamic. You cannot be a prisoner to any particular programme. Brazil is very important, and we intend to keep that. Our respect for them remains very strong, and our inability to go on this trip does not in any way affect our respect for them, and they are looking forward to when the president will make the trip,” he said. On his part, Odey decided to stick to the fact of the matter as he understood it: “To the best of my knowledge, the president is still performing the lesser hajj. I can’t say when he will return because umrah is a personal prayer affair.” During this period, I refused to speak with the media, although I continued to mount pressure on the CSO and ADC with the aim of having Yar’Adua speak with the VP. We were exchanging dozens of text messages every day. From my own sources in Saudi Arabia, it was very clear that only the CSO and the First Lady had access to the president, while the other aides—including the ADC, SCOP, and Hamza—could not see him. September 2, 2008, however, brought some refreshing news. Almost two weeks after leaving the country, the president finally spoke with the VP, the Senate president and the Speaker. I was notified immediately after the calls were made, and I decided it was better to make a statement the next day, to use those conversations to explain the reason why

the president was staying longer than had been anticipated in Saudi Arabia. I made a draft, which I sent via e-mail to the ADC for the president’s approval. This was the draft: In view of the continuing anxiety across the nation caused by President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua’s longer than expected stay in Saudi Arabia, the presidency wishes to assure all Nigerians that the president will return home this week and continue to work diligently for the attainment of the goals of his administration. President Yar’Adua left Nigeria for Saudi Arabia on Wednesday August 20, 2008, to perform [the] lesser Hajj, but upon arrival in the Holy Land, he had to undergo some routine medical checks. It was expected that the recommended tests and procedures would be completed quickly to enable the president [to] return for his scheduled trip to Brazil last week Tuesday. But the medicals regrettably took longer than anticipated, and for that reason, the trip to Brazil was rescheduled. The tests and procedures have now been successfully completed. President Yar’Adua yesterday spoke with Vice President Goodluck Jonathan, Senate President David Mark, House of Representatives Speaker, Hon. Dimeji Bankole, some ministers and state governors to confirm his well-being and imminent return to Abuja. The presidency greatly appreciates the sincere concern of Nigerians for the good health and well-being of President Yar’Adua. It also wishes to stress that there was no deliberate attempt to misinform the nation as to the true purpose of the president’s trip or his state of health.

Even though the mail was sent through the ADC, it was from the CSO that I received a text message a few hours later. He said that the president didn’t want me to make any statement without express clearance from him. Since I had a splendid relationship with virtually all the security men around the president, I knew everything that was going on in Saudi Arabia, and it was in this messy situation that he returned to the country 17 days after he had left. While I fretted over the media backlash that would follow, I got hints that he was going to sack the secretary to the government of the federation, Ambassador Babagana Kingibe, the next day. When it happened as predicted, it was such big news that it jolted the nation and helped people to forget, at least for a while the ‘small matter’ of the president spending 17 days outside the country without any explanation! I felt, nevertheless, that there was a need to put a definite closure on the matter with a statement that would explain the reason it took him that long in Saudi Arabia. I approached the president about the issue. Not only did he disagree, I noticed that his countenance changed. He never wanted to discuss anything related to his health. Somehow, we were able to ride the tide until a week later on September 16 when AFP, quoting an alert from the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN), claimed President Yar’Adua may resign due to ill health. Incidentally, the AFP State House correspondent, Ola Awoniyi, a longtime friend, had called my attention to an alert from NAN, which I had dismissed. I was just receiving the forwarded mail when Mrs. Remi Oyo, the agency’s managing director, called. It turned out that someone had hacked into NAN’s computers and sent out a badly written e-mail that read, “President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua may resign after cabinate (sic) reshuffle on health ground.” My landines and mobile phones began to buzz endlessly, and each time I had to explain that there was no truth to the claim, because the president was in the office. Then I was informed that Channels Television was broadcasting the story, quoting AFP, which in

turn quoted the alert from NAN, which had disclaimed the story. While I sat in my office warding off enquiries, some politicians and top officials had gone to the president advising him to shut down the television station. By the time I went to brief him of my efforts and how sorry Mr. John Momoh was, I saw that his mood had been fouled up already. As I made to leave his office, I saw the news bar on AIT that security men had invaded Channels, arrested some people and closed down the station. “Oh my God, this is unhelpful!” I exclaimed, but as I looked back at the president, I could see visible anger written all over his face. I knew it was not a moment to say anything as it dawned on me that just when I thought one problem had been overcome, I was now being drawn into another—a bigger one. The controversy over the closure of Channels lasted one week, during which I hardly slept. I pleaded; I cajoled and sought the help of emissaries. At the end, the intervention of Yayale, who had just become the SGF, helped, especially at the last meeting called at my instance by the president. He read to the president some text messages sent by his friends in the Diaspora about the implications of closing down a media house. That helped considerably, but I also must commend the then DG of SSS, Mr. Afakriya Gadzama. He saw the point John Odey and I were making, and conceded. With the reopening of Channels TV, there was relief for me, but not for long. First, despite all my appeals, the case against Mr. Sam Nda-Isaiah, the publisher of Leadership newspaper and some of his editors over a publication that Yar’Adua was sick, was not withdrawn, thus drawing negative reactions. The situation virtually graduated from frying pan to fire a week later when the principal secretary to the president, David Edevbie, led 70 political aides of both President Yar’Adua and Vice President Goodluck Jonathan to take an oath of secrecy. The oath, administered by Justice Hussaini Yusuf of the High Court of Justice, Abuja, was held at the Banquet Hall of the Presidential Villa, Abuja. While this was part of some futile civil service rituals, critics described it as a ploy to curb information flow about the health of the president. The situation was not helped by the fact that even the spokesman for the president openly swore to an oath of secrecy! The oath of secrecy was a funny affair. I recall we were having a series of leaks of information in the villa. We would finish a meeting and the details discussed would be on the internet in less than 30 minutes. There was an instance when the president conveyed a meeting to discuss the problem between NICON Insurance and the federal government. Not more than ten minutes after the meeting ended, Jimoh Ibrahim called to express his displeasure at the position I took, which he said did not reflect the fact that we were friends. When I asked what he was talking about, he quoted verbatim what I said at the meeting. I reported the incident to the president because we were just about eight in the meeting. Also at this period, media houses were openly publishing confidential memos from ministers, and a staff member in the president’s office was also caught selling documents to a bank executive. Following a conversation he’d had with the permanent secretary of the State House, Edevbie discovered that, apparently, since May 1999, no political appointee had signed the standard undertaking not to disclose confidential information to the public without proper authorization. After he took the matter up with the AGF, it was decided that the

State House permanent secretary should rectify it. On the day of the oath taking, however, the whole event was mismanaged. One, it became a big ceremony. Two, the media had been invited. Three, those of us who had taken the oath of allegiance were not supposed to partake in the oath of secrecy. Interestingly, as the session was about to commence, someone suggested that the media should be excused, but I considered such an idea rather silly, since the reporters were already there. I insisted that the media witness the ceremony, but the fact of the matter is that it was not done because of Yar’Adua’s health and it was not even his idea. The event, however, generated negative reactions as lawyers and clerics condemned the president for the development. The secretary general of the Nigeria Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA), Dr. Abdul-Lateef Adegbite, described the president’s action as a “disgrace to the Muslim community with which he has always wanted to identify. What Nigerians want at this point in history is a leader committed to democracy, rule of law and good governance. We believe this [will] not be realised under a government run like a cult.” I had to wade into the controversy, but all my explanations fell on deaf ears. As far as the public was concerned, Aso Rock had become another secret society, and the only thing that fuelled all the innuendoes was the health of the president, which, I also must admit, had indeed become a state secret, to the handlers at least!

11

The Journey to Saudi Arabia On Monday January 19, 2009, the CSO and I were having a routine conversation when he informed me that the president would be taking his annual vacation the following week. He offered no hint of how long the vacation would last. He was also vague concerning the vacation spot. The more I probed, the more he hedged. I anticipated trouble. For the next two days, I had to depend on my established sources among the security men and protocol officials, in an attempt to ascertain if there was any development about the president’s health that required emergency response, and whether there were plans to travel out of the country. The feedback was reassuring: there was no preparation for any foreign trip. But I still felt uncomfortable. I reasoned that there must be something behind the sudden idea of a vacation in January, and I needed to know what exactly was going on. After the FEC meeting two days later, I walked the president back to his residence and sought an audience with him. Discussing his health was the most troubling issue for me, but on January 21, 2009, I needed a clarification. I told him I had been informed that he would be starting a twoweek leave beginning from the following Monday, adding that the media would be very inquisitive about the details of how the leave would be spent and where. I told him that already there were speculations in the media that he might be travelling outside the country for a medical check-up. I glimpsed a change in the president’s countenance as I spoke, but the change was not indicative of anger; it was a mood that spoke of sadness, the sort that could come with the helpless realization that all my concerns were based on an issue over which he had no control. Discussing his health usually made him look vulnerable, but on this particular occasion, he explained that he was not travelling abroad but simply needed to take some time to rest. I found that somewhat comforting, but as I made to leave, he called me back and asked for my thoughts about the necessity of formally writing the National Assembly. I said it would bolster his image as it would reaffirm his commitment to the rule of law. He promised he would do that and asked that I inform the CSO to get him the attorney general. I left the president, feeling very relieved and thinking I could spin the positives out of the leave if he could formally notify the National Assembly of his intention to go on vacation as he promised to do. I felt even more elated four days later at the banquet hall of the State House. In the course of the reception for the president’s daughter, Nafisat, who had earlier in the day gotten married to Governor Isa Yuguda of Bauchi State, the president beckoned to me, since I was sitting at the next table. He asked, “What is the weather like at Obudu Cattle Ranch now?” I told him I had no idea but could find out. He nodded before he added: “If you can confirm that the weather is not so cold, let us go there; after all, you have since been pushing for me to go to Obudu. But tell the CSO and the ADC and also inform the governor about it.” Bustling with excitement, I informed the CSO and the ADC, and afterwards left the reception in order to call the Cross River State governor, Mr. Liyel Imoke. When I couldn’t reach him, I got his predecessor, Mr. Donald Duke, and told him that the

president was planning to spend some time at Obudu. I called Duke because he conceived the idea of the presidential resort, which Yar’Adua declared open in October 2007, and I knew the time and energy that had been sunk into making Obudu Cattle Ranch what it had become. Having spent time at the ranch with my family during the Christmas of 2005, I was certain the president would enjoy the place. While Duke confirmed the weather was okay—this being the crucial factor—he also said, however, that I needed to clear with the governor about the availability and readiness of the presidential resort. I reported back to the president, who said we could go ahead and make all the preparations for the trip. Optimism was still in the air by the next day. I was also aware of moves to write a letter of notification to both the Senate president and the House of Representatives’ Speaker in compliance with provisions of the 1999 Constitution. This became apparent during discussions on how the language should be couched. But at that period, it was also common to hear sniggering remarks that suggested there were people opposed to the idea. Comments like these were common: “Did Obasanjo ever write the National Assembly that he was going on leave?”; “Did Baba ever formally hand over to Atiku?”; “Is the president not president of Nigeria wherever he is?” Notwithstanding all this side talk, there was nothing to suggest that the president would not send a formal letter of notification to the National Assembly, because the SGF office was already abreast of the matter. As it would turn out, those who did not want the president to send the notification eventually prevailed, even when he had already appended his signature to the letter titled ‘Notification of Leave’. The two-paragraph letter separately addressed to both the Senate president and the House of Representative Speaker and dated January 26, 2009, reads, “I hereby write to formally apprise you of the fact that I shall be proceeding on a two-week leave with effect from today, 26th January, 2009. “During the period of my leave, all matters requiring my attention will be attended to by His Excellency, the Vice President, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan.” For reasons that were both curious and irrational, I was told that some officials argued that it was ‘politically dangerous’ for the president to send such a notification to the National Assembly. Of course, this same issue would come up later in the year when the president went on what turned out to be his last trip to Saudi Arabia, from which he never recovered. With the benefit of hindsight, I can see that if the president had sent that letter in January 2009, his action would have been applauded and when it was necessary again to leave the country in November 23 for Saudi Arabia, he probably would have had no hesitation to do so. The nation would have been spared the controversy that dogged the last six months of his presidency if he had not succumbed to the pressure. The handlers of the president were clearly wary of Section 145 of the 1999 Constitution, which reads, “Whenever the president transmits to the President of Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives a written declaration that he is proceeding on vacation or that he is otherwise unable to discharge the functions of his office, until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such functions shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.” The attorney general’s position, as he would later explain to me, was premised on the conviction that the operative word in Section 145 of the constitution was ‘whenever’, which implies the president was not compelled to transmit such a letter to the National

Assembly. In arguing that it was discretionary, the AGF said even in the American system, from where the presidential system of government was copied, transfer of power only happened four times in their history and that for medical reasons at times when the president was to undergo surgery. In effect, all the ‘special advisers’ the president consulted before finally deciding whether or not to send the notification to the National Assembly would have used his health issue to highlight the implications of the course of action he planned to take. By the morning of January 16, 2009, when I planned to brief the media that the president would be going on a two-week vacation, my main concern was how to navigate this tricky issue. Even though the president had not notified me that he had changed his mind about the letter, I could not pretend I was unaware of the anxieties and resulting intrigues over the issue. I was almost certain it was bound to come up in the course of my media briefing. After reading my brief, one-paragraph statement on the vacation, I decided to take a few questions. Quite naturally, the first was whether the vacation had to do with the health of the president, which I quickly dismissed. I explained that every president needs time away from the pressure of office to relax, rejuvenate and possibly reflect and unwind, adding that the presidential resort at Obudu Cattle Ranch was built as a presidential getaway like Camp David in the United States. So, to that extent, the idea of going on leave had nothing to do with the health of the president, I said. Predictably, there was a question about whether the president would hand over to his deputy. My reply to that question was vague, as I alluded to what happened in the course of the Federal Executive Council the previous week. I recounted the debate at the FEC concerning some of the principal ministers whose ministries virtually grind to a halt when they travel out, because the minister of state cannot act. I reaffirmed what the president had said: that whenever he was absent from office, the vice president should deal with any official matters that arose. “So, if Mr. President is on vacation, it goes without saying that the vice president will take charge. That is just the normal thing, not hand-over per se. The president is still in charge, there is no big deal about it,” I said. To buttress this position, I added that the VP would represent the president at the African Union summit scheduled for that week in Libya, where Muammar Ghaddafi would take the chair. Then came the tricky question as to whether the president had written to notify the National Assembly about his vacation. I said I was not aware, but added that the AGF would be in the best position to clarify the situation on that. After making my point, I refused to take any follow-up questions on the matter, even while the reporters pressed for more information. Not surprisingly, the lawmakers picked up the issue the next day when Senator Thomson Sekibo, while raising a point of order, drew the attention of his colleagues to media reports (quoting me) that the president was taking a vacation. Senator Sekibo, who sought to ascertain from Mark whether the president had transmitted to him a letter of which he was yet to inform the Senate said, “I bring it up because we must adhere strictly to provisions of the constitution. Mr. President has a right to go on leave, no one argues about that, but we must follow the constitution, so that we will know where the president is. Between August and September last year there was the rumour also on the pages of newspapers that Mr. President was not in Aso Rock. I therefore want to know from the Senate president whether you have received a notice that the president [will] be proceeding on leave, since you have not communicated such to us.”

Mark replied that the president had not forwarded to him any such letter. “That’s why I have not read any letter. But in the event that he does so, the vice president will be the acting president,” he explained. Senate leader, Teslim Folarin’s contribution came as a mild rebuke of Sekibo, whom he said was relying on newspaper reports: “If he has not written to us, it is not mandatory; it simply means the man has not gone on leave.” Intent on protecting the president from what was becoming an embarrassing exchange, Mark eventually ruled Sekibo out of order and closed further debate on the issue. The House adopted a similar position, namely, that if the president was indeed on vacation, he would have transmitted to them a letter. While several lawyers and civil society activists waded in, all the debate turned out to be merely academic, because the president did not eventually travel out of Abuja. That, nevertheless, stirred some controversy. Saharareporters, the news website owned by former University of Lagos students’ union president, Omoyele Sowore, had become popular, especially among Nigerians in the Diaspora. Within the Villa, it had become a constant irritant because it was evident there were moles within who were feeding the website information on the status of the health of the president. Initially, perhaps because I had admitted knowing Sowore at a time when the website was erroneously being linked with Sahara Energy of Tonye Cole, Tope Sonubi, et al., some people considered me the prime suspect. But when the website began to publish information I could not possibly have, then the realization dawned that the sources must be closer than they imagined. I recall that one of the saddest days for the president was when the website published photographs of his son wielding guns and holding wads of N1,000 bills. Investigations later revealed that the photographs had been taken by a rogue security official close to the family who had given the boy his official gun and handed him the naira notes. In a rather emotional tone, the president held the photographs I had printed for him and kept repeating, “How can they do this to a small boy? How can politics degenerate to this level—an innocent child?” As he handed the photographs back to me, asking that I bring them back to him at the residence later in the day, he said, almost in tears: “They can do anything to me, but why give a gun to a small boy just to make a point?” For a man who was already weak, it was no surprise when I learnt the next day that the president would not be coming to the office because he had fallen ill. All his appointments were cancelled, and it would take another six days before I would set my eyes on him again. From that period, efforts were made to locate saharareporters’ sources within the villa security network, but it proved futile. Back in January 2009, following my announcement that the president was going to Obudu Cattle Ranch, the website came out with a story that the entire vacation idea was a ruse and that the president was being managed by some spiritualists imported into the country and domiciled within Aso Rock. There were graphic descriptions of the movement of the president to precise locations within the villa under the cover of darkness. Most of the reports were dead accurate. While I see no point dignifying some of the desperate measures that people sometimes take, especially when confronted with serious health challenges, my main concern at that point was how to rationalize the fact that the president, who told the world he would go on vacation outside Abuja, was now holed up inside the State House. As it happened, on the first day of the leave, the governor of Yobe State, Senator Mamman Ali, died in the

United States. The president said he would attend the burial as arrangements were made to bring the remains of the deceased governor back to Nigeria. The burial took place in Fika on Thursday morning, and we were there, having left the villa for the airport before 6:00 a.m. (This was another curious feature about the president and, looking back, it may have been as a result of his own mortality which, apparently, he was more conscious of than most, perhaps because of his health challenges. While he would ordinarily not come down early for any event, if it was a funeral, no matter the time it was fixed for, he would be prompt. The moment the news of the death of a close relation or a prominent personality from the north was broken to him, the next thing would be to ask that arrangements be made for him to attend the burial.) Attending Mamman Ali’s burial was particularly instructive. As we drove into the town, we were confronted by big banners, billboards and posters of the deceased governor all loudly pronouncing him the right choice for the 2011 gubernatorial elections! This was January 2009, less than two years into his first term in office. When we got back to the villa, the president asked whether we had noticed the banners, shaking his head before he went into a philosophical exhortation on the vanity of human wishes. Back from the burial, the vacation continued. With saharareporters supplying the fodder, a section of the media would not relent on the fact that the man who had said he was going to Obudu Cattle Ranch and Lagos did not even leave the villa, and I had to keep inventing excuses. First, it was because the VP had to attend the African Union (AU) meeting in Libya and, later, the excuse was that Obudu was not ready. Governor Imoke didn’t like this bit because he had actually cut short a foreign trip to be back home to receive the president. He called me to register his protest. After spending two weeks without travelling out of Abuja, the president resumed work. But by then, his work schedule had reduced considerably to such an extent that he was spending no more than an average of three to four hours in the office daily. By then also, he was no longer walking to the office; he had to be driven, even when the distance was less than a hundred metres. There were also days when he would not come down from his room. To make up for this, on days when his health seemed to have improved, he would stay for several hours and would not leave until all the files were cleared. There was, however, no doubt that his health was having an adverse impact on the business of governance. In a nation where so much power was concentrated in the hands of the president, where even routine decisions sometimes require the sanction of the big man, things were gradually coming to a halt in Aso Rock. Meetings were routinely cancelled and crucial decisions could not be taken because ministers and heads of agencies could not secure the approval of the president. Notwithstanding his health challenges, however, whenever the president attended the FEC meeting, he ensured that he stayed till the end, however long it took. Yet, it didn’t require medical training to see that he was merely struggling, as his body could no longer withstand the stress he was putting himself through. All these would not go without repercussions: on July 20, 2009, what would have been an international embarrassment was averted in Togo. It all started at the 15th summit of the Non-Aligned Movement meeting in Sharm ElSheikh, Egypt, between July 15 and 16, 2009. The first day, the president missed the session with the host, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and was also late for the opening ceremony. Even so, he did not stay till the end of the ceremony: he left the

moment he had presented his own address. There were also bilateral meetings scheduled for him at the margin of the summit with the leaders of Australia, Colombia, Turkey, Vietnam, Serbia, Sri Lanka and Bosnia Herzegovina. All of them were cancelled when it became clear that he was not strong enough to be exposed to these sessions. While all this was understandable, I became worried when I learnt that the twicepostponed two-day visit to Bayelsa State had again been cancelled and that he would also not attend the ECOWAS summit billed for Togo the same week. At a time when the president had proclaimed amnesty for Niger Delta militants, there was no doubt in my mind that it would strike a wrong chord if he refused to go to Bayelsa. Fortunately, the ADC saw things my way, and he deployed Alhaji Inuwa Baba to speak with the First Lady to persuade her husband to appreciate why going to Bayelsa was very important. One of the reasons Inuwa Baba was invaluable to us in the team was that not only did he have access to the First Family, he could be very blunt if he wanted to be. In trying to secure the support of the First Lady on the issue, he said, “If your husband doesn’t go to Bayelsa, then many Nigerians will say he is a coward, because it would be interpreted to mean he is staying away because he is afraid of the militants.” The First Lady agreed with this summation and within one hour after the trip had been cancelled, it was rescheduled. There was now, however, a little caveat: we would be returning the same day rather than spending the night in the state, which had been the initial plan. We also agreed that not more than two projects would be commissioned, after which the president would address the people at a public arena before proceeding to the presidential lodge. The Bayelsa trip was successful, but it no doubt took a toll on the president, whose health, even at the best of times, was very fragile. By then, he had also decided that he would attend the ECOWAS summit the next day in Togo because President Faure Eyadema had pleaded with him to attend. Twenty-four hours later, we were in the small West African country. As was common at such events within the sub-region, the president alighted from the aircraft to a tumultuous crowd that had been stationed at the airport to welcome the visiting African leaders. That also meant he had to inspect a guard of honour! Nobody anticipated any trouble, until the president took about 20 steps and could not move again. Since the drummers and dancers were carrying on excitedly, there was not much attention focused on him at that point. He whispered to the ADC, who had by then moved close to him, that he may fall if he took as much as another step. Moving quickly, Mustapha draped the lapel of the president’s babariga over his uniform, so that no one would see his right hand, which he had used to support the president while pulling him forward with his shoulder and right leg. Many in the ecstatic crowd watched the awkward and slow movement of the president. The ADC succeeded in dragging him forward until he could make a detour to enter the nearest room at the arrival hall. It was a public place, but all the officials were immediately cleared by a visibly worried Togolese president, who helped the ADC to sit president Yar’Adua on a chair provided for him. Because we were the last delegation to arrive at the airport, which was quite a distance from the town where the ECOWAS session was to hold, immediately the president’s aircraft touched down and cameras captured his arrival, all the journalists were directed to leave for the venue so that they would not be caught in the presidential convoy. That

became the saving grace: Beyond the official photographers and cameramen who came with the Togolese president, there was no newsman around the airport from the private media to observe the unfortunate drama. We stayed at the airport for a further thirty minutes while the doctor observed the president. When we eventually arrived at the venue, rather than go for the meeting, the president moved straight to the room that had already been prepared for him. As people milled around, there were whispers that the Nigerian president had nearly collapsed at the airport, with varying accounts as to what had happened. Given the incident, and sensing that it might not be wise to hold a session in public in the state the Nigerian president was, the ECOWAS leaders decided to have an informal closed-door session with no other officials present. It was only after the session had ended that someone came to where we were all gathered to read the communiqué. Till today, it remains a mystery to me how the ADC successfully moved the president away from the tarmac, a fairly long distance. His only response when I asked him later that day was a terse, “I am a military officer.” Nevertheless, with that remarkable feat, his stock rose, since the president knew he (ADC) had saved him from what would have been an international embarrassment. Until then, Col. Mustapha Dennis Onoyiveta had been viewed with suspicion based on the little fact that he is an Urhobo man from Delta state and not a northerner as some people preferred. Yet he had gotten the job purely on merit after a competitive interview conducted by Major General Mohammed from a shortlist sent by the Defence Headquarters. That itself became an issue, as there were whispering campaigns that former President Obasanjo deliberately planted Mustapha on Yar’Adua. After Togo, Mustapha’s loyalty was never questioned again. The experience of that day sounded a further note of alarm that the president needed to attend to his health. At this time, I too had earned his trust. So when the idea was being mooted for him to travel out of the country, I was in the picture quite early. He personally told me of the need for him to see his doctors in Saudi Arabia, and I suggested that the best way to handle the issue was to give an advance notice. Most Nigerians would understand and even appreciate the gesture if that was done, I told him. He agreed. So five days before he was scheduled to leave the country on Friday, August 14, 2009, I informed Nigerians that the president would be travelling for a scheduled medical checkup. In the statement I put out on Monday, August 10, 2009, I added that he was expected to be away for one week. As predicted, this statement was well received by most Nigerians, who began to pray for him the day he travelled. He spent exactly one week on this trip. He looked a bit rejuvenated and relaxed upon return, but within a matter of days, all that had vanished. The sad but candid verdict was that there was no major improvement in his health condition. He was by now going to the office about three times a week and only between 1:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. By this period also, government was practically on autopilot. I was therefore not surprised to learn that, for the second year in a row, the president would not be attending the United Nations General Assembly late in September 2009. But I was shocked when I learnt that the president was instead going to Saudi Arabia to attend the opening ceremony of a university at the invitation of the Saudi monarch. Coming just about three weeks after he returned from the same country, I knew nobody would believe this was not a decoy to go on yet another medical expedition. Although highly controversial, this trip took him exactly six days. But in the weeks that followed

his return, his health deteriorated to such an extent that I suggested he take a vacation. I did so through a memo, which he approved and thanked me for. When he, however, suggested going to Obudu Cattle Ranch, I was not enthusiastic, given the previous experience. To show that he was serious, an advance team of security men were sent to recce the ranch with preparations for us to go there during the Eid al-Fitr period, which would fall within the third week of November. The plan was for him to take a vacation after presenting the 2010 Appropriation Bill to the National Assembly. This was initially scheduled for the end of October. It would, however, drag on till November. Unfortunately, by the time the budget was ready, there were more dramatic developments. It began early in the morning of Monday, November 15, when the CSO called that it was very important for me to join him and the ADC to discuss a crucial issue that had to do with the presentation of the 2010 Appropriation Bill before the National Assembly. I couldn’t understand what the fuss about the budget was that would necessitate such an emergency intervention, but I prayed it had nothing to do with the health of the president. Just two weeks earlier, the president had written to Senate President David Mark in his capacity as the National Assembly chairman, on his desire to address a joint session of the National Assembly on Thursday November 19. The request to present the appropriation bill to a joint session of the National Assembly (which had become a tradition for sitting presidents) was based on Section 81 (1) of the constitution, which states that “the President shall cause to be prepared and laid before each House of the National Assembly, at any time, in each financial year, estimates of the revenue and expenditure of the federation of the next following financial year.” But as we sat in the ADC’s office that Monday morning, the CSO said, mostly for my benefit—since he and the ADC were working together—that we needed to explore the ways we would manage the president’s mission to the National Assembly. By this period, perhaps due to the level of confidence he saw I enjoyed with the president, the CSO was no longer concealing issues pertaining to the health of the president from me, especially in relation to areas where my advice might be useful. He went straight to the point: the president did not have enough strength to walk from the National Assembly main entrance to the chambers of the House of Representatives where the session would hold. The duo had come up with a solution: rather than enter the National Assembly through the main entrance, our convoy would drive into the complex through the back entrance from the Akinola Aguda end of the villa. This would necessitate leaving the villa earlier than expected so that on arrival, the president would walk what was a short distance into an office where he would be received by some officials of the National Assembly. He is expected to rest for sometime there and afterwards walk some distance to another holding room where he would relax for yet another few minutes. From there the president would then walk the remaining distance into the chambers. This was not altogether a bad idea. But I was not comfortable, as I feared that something could still go wrong. If the president was not strong enough to walk what was ordinarily a short distance, how can we be assured that he could stand for some considerable length of time to read the speech? The next day, there was some freak of fortune on the floor of the National Assembly. It all started when the Senate President, Mr. David Mark, said the budget would be presented at the Senate. This, of course, was rejected by the House of Representatives with the Speaker, Dimeji Bankole, countering that the House had always

hosted the president. Although some conspiracy theorists would later claim that the disagreement was stoked by Aso Rock, I know for a fact that we did not engineer it, though we took full advantage of the situation. Bankole’s stand was buttressed on the day by the House’s Media and Public Affairs Committee chairman, Eseme Eyiboh, who said, “Traditionally, it has always been in the House of Representatives, and that tradition is usually informed by the convenience of space and logistics. The 360 members in the House, 109 Senators, President Yar’Adua and his entourage, governors, chieftains of political parties, captains of industry, and members of diplomatic corps are coming. So when I am talking about the convenience of logistics and space, it’s the tradition that the House provides that space to accommodate that audience. The Senate has the capacity to accommodate less than 150.” The Senate countered this argument through their own spokesman, Senator Ayogu Eze, who maintained that the Senate chamber was large enough to accommodate all lawmakers and that Mark had consulted all stakeholders before taking the decision: “It is the prerogative of the chairman of the National Assembly to decide the venue of the joint session. This year, he has decided that the joint session will take place in the Red Chamber, and all the relevant authorities have been duly notified, including the leadership of the House and the National Assembly leadership —including the clerk of the National Assembly and the management.” This squabble in the National Assembly presented a perfect excuse for us at the villa; I quickly spread the word that the president was ready for the budget presentation but could not possibly go to the National Assembly until the issue of the venue was resolved. The common view was that the stalemate would buy us more time for the president to fully recover. But by Saturday, November 21, 2009, the equation changed when the CSO called for another emergency meeting, and this time, he included the principal secretary, Edevbie. Within one hour, four of us had assembled in his office, and without any preamble, he said the president was ill and needed to travel out of the country. This information was rather depressing for me. Given that the budget had yet to be presented, another trip to Saudi Arabia would be a major problem to manage, so I asked, “Can’t the president wait till Tuesday, present the budget and then travel that day?” The CSO’s response was that barring the challenge of getting a visa from the Saudi authorities, they would have travelled immediately. On the appropriation bill, he said a decision had been taken already that the president would just send it to the National Assembly through the special adviser on National Assembly matters. Since he was quoting the constitution to buttress his point that this course of action was perfectly in order, even though he was not a lawyer, I concluded that the AGF must be privy to the issue of budget presentation. Our meeting ended with an agreement that it was very important for the president to invite the VP and seek his cooperation before he would travel out of the country, because we anticipated that it would be difficult to manage without his cooperation. On Monday morning, with arrangements for the trip at the concluding stage, I issued the following statement based on what the president had personally scrawled for me: “President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua left Abuja today for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. While there, the President will call on his personal physicians in Jeddah for follow-up medical checks. The President forwarded copies of the 2010 National Appropriation Bill

to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives before leaving the country. He wishes the Muslim Ummah and all Nigerians happy Eid-el-Kabir celebrations.” As expected, there was public outcry not just about another trip to Saudi Arabia, the third within a space of two months, but also on the unprecedented decision to send the appropriation bill to the National Assembly through the special adviser. By then also, there were speculations that the president was actually evacuated on a stretcher to the airport in an ambulance. It was a story that got ample mention on the international media, and the president himself was said to have monitored the news throughout the trip that spoke of his visit to “an undisclosed hospital” in Saudi Arabia for an equally “undisclosed ailment” on Aljazeera. He didn’t feel comfortable with the reportage. Four days after they left Nigeria, I got a call from the ADC, who said the president wanted me to speak with the president’s chief physician so we could issue a press release on the diagnosis of his ailment. A few minutes later, Dr. Banye sent me a text message from which I crafted a statement duly sent back to Saudi Arabia. After it was approved, I called for a briefing. Shortly before I addressed the media, the CSO called me and said the president wanted me to personally take the statement to the VP before addressing the media. I called the VP on the phone to intimate him of my planned press briefing and the content. I also told him that the instruction from the president was that I should see him personally, but if he didn’t mind, I could read the statement to him straightaway. He said I should go ahead. Once I was done, he said he felt relieved by the development, mentioning that he could no longer pick his calls because he didn’t know what to tell people about the health of the president. Having cleared with the VP, I went to brief the media. I started by reading to them the statement by Dr. Salisu Banye, dated November 26, 2009: At about 3pm on Friday, November 20th, after he returned from the Abuja Central Mosque where he performed the Juma’at prayers, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua complained of left-sided severe chest pain. Preliminary medical examinations suggested ACUTE PERICARDITIS (an inflammatory condition of the coverings of the heart). It was then decided that he should undertake confirmatory checks at the King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Centre in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where he had his last medical check-up in August 2008. The medical review and tests undertaken at the hospital have confirmed the initial diagnosis that the president is indeed suffering from ACUTE PERICARDITIS. He is now receiving treatment for the ailment and is responding remarkably well.

The reaction to this disclosure was swift. Fifty-five prominent Nigerians comprising Chief Olu Falae, Colonel Abubakar Umar and some opposition politicians like Dr. Usman Bugaje said Yar’Adua’s health challenge had unwittingly created a dangerous situation to the effect that no one was in charge of the affairs of state, contrary to the letter and spirit of the constitution. They argued that it was very clear to every discerning observer that the president’s physical condition had a negative impact on his ability to discharge the functions of the highest office in our land: “Within the last few months, he has been unable to attend to crucial affairs of the state at home and abroad and

whenever he has found time to do so, his judgment appears impaired by his ill-health.” After citing several examples to buttress their point, they recommended that he resign from office immediately. In the event that he failed to heed that advice, they called on the Federal Executive Council to pass a resolution pursuant to Section 144 (1) of the Constitution to the effect that the president appeared incapable of discharging the functions of his office. Section 144 empowered the FEC to begin the process that would declare the president permanently incapacitated. More people were to join in making that call, saying that it was time the president resigned to attend to his health. It was at that point that the Nigerian Governors’ Forum met in Abuja, following which they dismissed the calls for Yar’Adua to resign. In the absence of any evidence of incapacitation on the part of the president, according to the Governors’ Forum, it was rash and diversionary to call for his resignation. “On the basis of the foregoing, therefore, the Nigeria Governors’ Forum hereby restates our firm commitment to the peace, progress and stability of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. We wish Mr. President, Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, GCFR, quick recovery as he continues to lead our country,” the Forum concluded. The intervention of the governors, however, hardly brought any respite; by the second week of December, the president’s absence had fuelled intense agitation within the polity with several pending issues that required his attention. Aside from the signing of the supplementary budget, the NDDC Act had also not been signed and the tenure of the Chief Justice of the Federation was about to run out. Throughout this period, I was in constant touch with Saudi Arabia through phone calls and text messages, and they kept giving assurances that the president “will soon return” despite the fact that there was no specific date as to when that would be. By the third week of December, there was still no sign that the president would return, so I pleaded with the CSO to allow Edevbie and I to travel to Saudi Arabia so we could give them a holistic picture of the situation back home and take rational decisions on the way forward. All my entreaties yielded no result. I met with the AGF and asked him why he could not advice that the president should send a letter to save everybody the trouble. I warned that with the way things were going, it was better for the president to send a notification to the National Assembly. I also said that in the event that the VP became acting president without a transfer of power from the president, there would be consequences. At one point, the then outgoing chief justice of the federation, Justice Idris Kutigi, also waded in. His advice —which had been relayed to Saudi Arabia—was that the president needed to write a letter. On December 21, 2009, I was in the office when a security man brought an envelope, which he said had just arrived from Saudi Arabia. The moment I read the contents, I became deeply sceptical. It was a letter from the AGF to the VP where he practically said therein that it was unnecessary for the president to send any notification to the National Assembly because the law already granted the VP enough powers to act. He hinged his argument on a Supreme Court interpretation in Attorney General vs. Abubakar (2002) 10NWLR (PT1004), which stated that “the 1999 Constitution vests executive powers only on the president. However, the president is required to exercise such executive powers conferred on him either directly or through the vice president and minister of the government….” By virtue of this ruling, according to Aondoakaa, the VP could sign budget, swear in the chief justice of the federation, and perform any other function of the

president. Despite not being a lawyer, I found all the arguments proffered by the AGF quite spurious. So, I called the CSO and asked him whether the VP found the content agreeable. While he was obviously not expecting this sort of inquisition, I told him I could not possibly leak such a letter unless I cleared with the man himself. I called the VP to say I would be coming to see him. After dispensing with pleasantries, I asked whether he had received a letter from the attorney general directing him to act as president. He retorted, “Why would the AGF write me a letter?” I said I had just been given a copy of a letter written to him, producing same as I spoke. He dismissed the letter out of hand, repeating the question, “Why would he write me a letter?” He appeared very angry, but I nonetheless pleaded with him to read the letter. Reluctantly, he accepted the letter from me, and as he went through, I could see that he had actually read the letter before. When he got to the part on Supreme Court interpretation, he read aloud the phrase “the president is required to exercise such executive powers conferred on him either directly or through the vice president and minister of the government…,” he looked up and said, “That can mean anybody, even you. This is a very stupid letter, which says nothing.” For the next five minutes, the VP expressed his anger over what was going on, especially the attempt by the handlers of the president to circumvent the law. He specifically had harsh words for the AGF, whom he said was working the courts in the bid to ensure that the right thing was not done. At that point, I had to explain that I also didn’t know what was going on in Saudi Arabia. I left the VP feeling more depressed about the political situation, and I recounted my meeting with him to the CSO. I also told him to caution the AGF that if the letter leaked, there would be trouble, because the VP had made it clear he was disinclined to swearing in the chief justice and would also not sign the appropriation bill except if there was a notification to the National Assembly by the president, which would then make him officially the acting president. Not long after I dropped the phone, the AGF called me, asking for a meeting. He also suggested that I contact the finance minister, because the critical issue we had to tackle was how to get the budget signed and the chief justice of the federation sworn in. We eventually fixed the meeting for 7:00 p.m. at the Ministry of Finance. There were four of us: the AGF, the finance minister, and Ruma. I narrated what had happened earlier in the day and my fear about the danger of the memo leaking. The AGF said he had taken care of that, assuring that nobody would know about the ill-fated memo. I now asked him why it was difficult for the president to send a letter to the National Assembly, considering he had offered such advice only a few days earlier. His position had clearly changed. He said it would be politically suicidal for the president to write the National Assembly because that would mean ceding powers completely. The constitution does not recognize a sitting president and an acting president, he said, adding that once someone else began to act as president, it meant the substantive president was no longer there. I considered his argument self-serving, because I could see it lacked conviction. Deep down, he knew the correct thing for the president to do was to write the letter, and the excuses he was now offering were merely to justify his change of position. After about two hours, during which we could not conclude on the budget, it was resolved that

emissaries be sent to the VP to plead with him to sign. It was also decided that the leadership of the National Assembly be persuaded to accept this option. From the tone of discussion, there was not going to be any letter from the president. That seemed to be a closed option. Yet I knew the longer the president stayed in Saudi Arabia, the less tenable it would be to sustain such a decision. The entreaties to the VP yielded no positive result; he maintained that he had it on good authority that if he signed the budget, he would be impeached by the National Assembly. But with regard to the new chief justice of the federation, the AGF said he had stumbled on the fact that the president did not necessarily have to perform the swearing in, that under the oath’s act (not the constitution) even the outgoing CJN could swear in his successor. This was new, but under the situation we were in, any straw was worth holding on to. So on December 28, 2009, with many governors present, and for the first time in the nation’s history, the outgoing chief justice of Nigeria (CJN), Idris Kutigi, swore in his designated successor, Justice Aloysius Katsina-Alu. This created an uproar, but as in all legal issues, there were also those who said it was legal. The divided opinion just suited us. Describing the swearing in and mode of appointment of Justice Katsina-Alu as “illegal,” Mr. Femi Falana, president of the West African Bar Association (WABA), said they were a recipe for a constitutional crisis: “Between 11:00 a.m. and 12 midnight today, Nigeria has two chief justices, contrary to the letter and spirit of the constitution and the Supreme Court Act.” Falana argued that even though President Yar’Adua had sent Justice Katsina-Alu’s name to the Senate for confirmation as required by Section 231 of the constitution, after which the lawmakers screened and declared him ‘appointable’, the process remained incomplete. “When did the Senate inform the president that his lordship was okay for the appointment? When was his lordship appointed after the Senate screening?” he queried. “The swearing in convened by the National Judicial Council (NJC) is illegal, as its power does not go beyond the nomination of judges for appointment. For sure, these serial illegalities will not go unchallenged,” he said. Justice Kutigi, who also swore in the court of appeal president, Justice Isa Ayo Salami, said his action was backed by the Oaths Act: “For the first time in the history of this country, a sitting Chief Justice has sworn in the incoming. It is happening not because of the fault of anybody, because the law has always been there that Mr. President or the Chief Justice can swear in the incoming. Now the occasion has arisen, and we are to perform the function. This has generated a lot of issue even from those who should know. If you look at the Oaths Act, you will see that the President and the Chief Justice can swear in the incoming. The law is clear. If you look at the constitution, the constitution also makes it clear. There is nothing new; the law is there.” The legal controversy that raged on did not, however, dampen the relief we felt that we had, at least, successfully managed one of the two issues for which the absence of the president had all but created a constitutional problem. But the budget problem still lingered, and for the National Assembly, it was the most critical. Although all earlier entreaties to allow Edevbie to come to Saudi Arabia had failed, just before Christmas, he received a telephone call requesting him to bring the 2009 Supplementary Appropriation Bill to enable the president to sign it into law. We were relieved because we were getting close to the end of the 30-day deadline for presidential assent as required by the

constitution, or the bill would be deemed to have been vetoed. Chairman of the Governors’ Forum and Kwara State Governor, Dr. Saraki, a close ally of the president, was instrumental in getting Saudi Arabia to invite Edevbie to come with the appropriation bill. Saraki had visited Saudi Arabia in the third week of December but could not see the president. He met the First Lady, however, to whom he presented three requests: One, that the president invite Edevbie to bring the supplementary budget so he could sign before it would lapse; two, that the president should call and speak with the VP; and three, that the president should forward a letter to the National Assembly so that Jonathan could serve as acting president. While the First Lady promised to help push the first two propositions, on the issue of a letter to the National Assembly, she said she would not dabble into that. On 24 December, Edevbie visited the VP at Aguda House to inform him of his proposed trip and to retrieve the bills, which were in the possession of his principal secretary, Mike Oghiadome. Two days later, he left for Saudi Arabia aboard one of the smaller jets from the presidential fleet. On arrival in Jeddah, he was received by the ADC and officials of the Nigerian embassy, after which they drove to the hotel where the presidential entourage was residing. Apparently, it was one of the Saudi king’s guest houses reserved for visiting heads of state. When Edevbie later arrived at the King Faisal Hospital, he met with the CPP and CSO, who informed him that the president was asleep and that when he awakes later, he would see him. He was then shown around the hospital floor and private wing where the president was briefly resident, and through the glass, he could see the president on his hospital bed. He gave both the CPP and the CSO an update of events in Nigeria and returned to the hotel. The following day, he went back to the King Faisal Hospital and was informed that though the president was awake, he was very weak. He was also told that the medical personnel were reluctant to allow any visitors into his room because he had caught an infection from previous visitors. Subsequently, Edevbie left the documents for the president’s signature at his convenience and returned to the hotel. The following day, he was back at the King Faisal hospital and received the bills duly signed and dated on the three pages as required. There have been questions as to who actually signed the budget, but I confirmed from the security agents around him that the president actually did after a laborious medical process. But it doesn’t also require an expert to see how much he must have struggled to sign the three copies. Even though Edevbie’s desire was to wait until he could meet with the president personally, in view of the urgency of the situation, he had to come back immediately. He arrived in Nigeria on 29 December, 2009. The following day, he went to see the VP in his office. But while that may have resolved the problem with the budget, Nigerians were increasingly getting frustrated with a president who had for weeks been hospitalized in a foreign land.

12

The Power Struggle Things seemed to be looking up for the president, having both successfully navigated the dilemma about whether the swearing in of the chief justice of Nigeria was a statutory necessity and also signing the appropriation bill. But the temporary relief that these accomplishments brought for the president was shattered by the December 25, 2009, attempt by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to blow up a US Delta airline en route to Detroit from Amsterdam. The incident drew condemnation from around the world, with the US government imposing stricter security measures for US-bound passengers. It also earned Nigeria an ignoble slide on the world stage, as it was branded a ‘country of interest’ by the American authorities. The grim reality was that our country got blacklisted along with Iran, Algeria, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia. Given that the president had been out of circulation for more than one month, the global searchlight, which the sanction caused to be beamed on Nigeria, only helped worsen things. This, quite predictably, heightened the political crisis back home at the beginning of 2010. But as it would emerge, some people were also surreptitiously contriving their own solution. On the morning of January 13, 2010, I got a call from an upbeat AGF asking whether I had heard about the court pronouncement that the VP could in fact act for the president without any letter. He exuded enthusiasm and spoke of being vindicated. Not long after his phone call, I received several calls from Saudi Arabia and congratulatory text messages from a few supporters of the president back home. It didn’t take long for me to realize what was going on. A federal high court in Abuja presided over by Chief Judge Dan Abutu had declared that with the VP already acting for President Yar’Adua, there was no vacuum whatsoever in the discharge of the functions of the president’s office. In the suit, which received express treatment from Justice Abutu, the court was asked to determine whether the VP, under the provisions of sections 5 (1) and 148 (1) of the Nigerian constitution, could exercise the executive powers vested in the president in the absence of the president and whether the VP could lawfully discharge any or all of the functions of the president in the absence of the president in the interest of peace, order and good governance of the federation pending when the president would resume and take over. The plaintiff wanted the court to declare that given the combined provisions of those two sections, the VP could indeed exercise the executive powers vested in the president and could also lawfully discharge all his functions pending when he would resume and take over. It didn’t require any investigation to ascertain the brains behind this whole judicial maneuvering. In the supporting affidavit to the originating summons, the plaintiff confirmed that the president had not transmitted any written declaration to the Senate president and the speaker of the House of Representatives and that the Federal Republic of Nigeria did not at that period have a head of government. He also stated that if the declarations sought were not granted, the country would plunge into social and economic gloom and

constitutional crisis as there would be no functioning government. Having earlier submitted a counter affidavit that there was no statutory requirement for the president to transmit a written declaration to the National Assembly whenever he was traveling out of the country, the AGF was present in court as Justice Abutu ruled that the VP had been lawfully discharging the functions of the president’s office on the strength of the delegation by the president of his duties to him in his capacity as vice president. It was this ‘judgement’ that supporters of the president, including many governors, were celebrating and quoting. Instructively, many of the governors had always taken the position that invariably denied there was any vacuum. But in spite of the euphoria in some quarters, the ruling hardly calmed the simmering discontent in the country. At the presidential villa, the ruling was derided as a mere contrivance of the AGF to cause further confusion in the polity. The VP had a particularly deep insight about this ruling. It was simply a rehash of the letter the AGF had written to him earlier, so it was not surprising that he chose to act on that insight. At a meeting with his aides, it was decided that he should not accept anything short of a letter to the National Assembly by the president. But once, when it became obvious that such a letter was not forthcoming, he was advised to sit and watch events unfold. At that period, Jonathan had a strong ally in Yayale who was monitoring events in Saudi Arabia and whose contacts were feeding him information about the actual state of the president. Early in December, the SGF and VP had agreed that the former should go to Saudi Arabia to see the president. When the First Lady was contacted, she initially expressed delight about the idea. But shortly after, the SGF got a call from the CSO, saying the president did not approve the visit. There was an argument between the duo, with the SGF insisting that he would not take orders from the CSO and that he would come. He indeed got his visa and made all the arrangements, but before he could travel, the VP called to plead with him to shelve the idea. He said the CSO had called for him to intervene. The SGF and the CSO both hail from Bauchi, so there is an element of local politics in their relationship, which was never cordial, but even though that trip was aborted, the SGF still monitored events in Saudi Arabia on a daily basis. As the dilemma persisted, my frustration too spiraled. Fortunately, I found a window of escape in the African Cup of Nations Football tournament in Angola due to kick off on January 10. As a member of the Presidential Task Force on 2010 World Cup in South Africa, that earned me the status of official delegate to the Angola tournament. A few hours after my arrival in the southwestern African country, my nightmare resurfaced: I saw a deluge of text messages on my cell phone, most of them asking whether it was true that the president had died. The rumour, from what I would later gather, followed the publication by NEXT newspaper that Yar’Adua had suffered severe brain damage and could no longer recognize anyone, including his wife. While there were factual inaccuracies in the publication, it nonetheless provoked action in Saudi Arabia, because for the first time, they saw the sense of urgency back home and how fast the president was losing legitimacy. I had a rather lengthy discussion with the CSO in Saudi Arabia, and he confirmed that Jamilah Tangaza, editor of BBC Hausa Service, had already contacted them about the possibility of an interview with the president, if indeed he was alive.

I was quite familiar with Jamilah; as a matter of fact, I feel somewhat obligated to her. She had on one occasion flown into Abuja from London for a scheduled interview with the president, and I stayed with her as we waited for the session. It turned out to be one of those days when the president worked till very late in the office. When he closed at about 9:30 p.m., he pleaded that the interview be rescheduled for the next day. Since Jamilah had to leave for London the next morning, the interview had to be cancelled, and I felt really bad, as she left the villa disappointed. So, it was gratifying to learn that she would be having an interview with the president, particularly as I was convinced that her reputation as a thoroughbred professional well respected for her integrity would help defuse the adverse public opinion. If only she could have the interview. The alternative contemplated then was for me to take a few reporters from Nigeria to Saudi Arabia for the interview, even though it was easy to perceive some reluctance. But having now gained some useful insight, I’m certain that even if we had traveled to Saudi Arabia, it would have been no more than an organized waste of time. Eventually the BBC interview was done after the station had ensured their correspondent in Saudi Arabia visited the president in the hospital to ascertain he was indeed the one with whom they were speaking. Before the interview was aired, however, I had spoken to the media back home to debunk the rumour that the president was dead. I also decided I had to go back to Nigeria and the Rivers State governor, Mr. Rotimi Amaechi, arranged an aircraft for me. The BBC interview was aired, but rather than allay public scepticism, it merely reinforced the perception that the president was indeed infirm. It was a view held both by those who believed the interview was genuine and those who argued it was contrived. Any discerning listener could easily notice how the president laboured and strained himself in an interview that lasted less than 90 seconds. And what did he say? “At the moment, I am undergoing treatment, and I am getting better from the treatment. I hope that very soon, there will be tremendous progress, which will allow me to get back home. As soon as my doctors discharge me, I will return to Nigeria to resume my duties.” The speculations in Abuja that the interview was a fraud and that the president was in a coma and could not have granted any interview only raised the stakes further at the PDP board of trustees (BOT) meeting held in Abuja on January 14, 2010. Chaired by Obasanjo and attended by Jonathan, it was certainly bound to be interesting. Although the issue of the president’s health was not on the agenda, it was not because the members would rather not dwell on the touchy issue; it was because the intention was for it to be raised under AOB (any other business). With all the items discussed, former minister of agriculture, Alhaji Adamu Waziri, was acknowledged to speak. Waziri was said to have begun by stating how disappointed he was that at a time when the nation was ‘burning’, when there was a vacuum in leadership, the board of trustees was discussing what he described as irrelevant matters. The most important issue in the country, he told the gathering, was the health of the president and the need for him to transmit a letter to the National Assembly so that the VP could formally become the acting president. Failure to do this, he warned, could lead the country into serious constitutional crisis. After Waziri spoke, the floor was yielded to Chief Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu, who argued that issues pertaining to the health of the president had been dealt with by the institution empowered to deal with it: the Federal Executive Council. He said there was no vacuum,

since the VP was in charge of the country in the absence of his boss, a position that he said had been affirmed by the federal high court in Abuja. As far as he was concerned, the health of the president ought not to be an issue for discussion at the meeting, Former Speaker of the House of Representatives, Hon. Aminu Bello Masari’s comment was brusque and scathing: The president was holding the nation to ransom, and a constitutional crisis was being unwittingly created by his failure to hand over to the vice president. But the submission of former Senate president Anyim Pius Anyim was conciliatory. He argued that there was a need for proper guidance in the discussion, noting that contributors must be able to distinguish between the health of the president and the health of the nation. On the health of the president, he argued that it should be recognized that as a human being, the president could fall sick, in which case he had the right to seek medical attention wherever he chose. On the health of the nation, he said that the normal thing was for the president to brief members, and since he was not around, it was incumbent on the VP to brief the board and state the challenges he was facing. According to Anyim, since the VP, who was at the meeting, had not complained to anybody that there was a vacuum or that he was not in charge, nobody should put words into his (Jonathan’s) mouth. There were several other comments before Chief Barnabas Gemade urged Obasanjo to intervene and end what he described as “an unnecessary debate.” He said the meeting had gone on for too long and that the polity was being overheated by professional agitators who ought to have been ignored. Obasanjo was said to have interjected at this point that before he’d left home in the morning, he’d prayed for God to grant him the patience to listen to everybody, and for that reason, he would allow all the BOT members to air their views before ruling on the matter. He was true to his word: he recognized everybody who signified an intention to speak, after which he rounded off by saying that the situation in the country was both unusual and not right. He said he had held the topmost position in Nigeria as well as having been the second-in-command, so he could sympathize with Jonathan. “The fact is that never in the history of Nigeria have we had this kind of tension that we have today when there is a vacuum in leadership. There is no commander in chief and the vice president has no power. Some people cannot see the danger, so let me make it very clear by asking: what if there is a military coup?” Waving a copy of the 1999 Constitution, which he had brought along to the meeting, Obasanjo dismissed Abutu’s court judgement as he made references to different sections of the constitution to highlight the distinctions. At the end, he announced the constitution of a committee to be headed by former PDP national chairman, Dr. Ahmadu Ali, whose task was to issue a press statement wherein the BOT would call on the president to transmit a letter to the National Assembly for the VP to act. “Whenever the president comes back, he can then take over his seat,” he added. While Mrs. Josephine Anenih immediately endorsed this position, Dr. Haliru Bello was said to have counseled against it on the grounds that it would contradict the position earlier adopted by the PDP National Working Committee. Besides, Bello explained that it was unusual for the BOT, ordinarily an advisory organ of the party, to issue press statements. Most of the members agreed with him that the wise step would be to refrain

from issuing any statement. On a jocular note, Anyim said, “Since Baba said President Yar’Adua should transmit a letter to the National Assembly in compliance with Section 145, what I expected you to say, sir, is that you will go to Saudi Arabia, collect the letter from your successor, and when you come back, we will hail you for resolving the problem....” Obasanjo’s response was terse: “What if I don’t come back?” The meeting ended on that note, but the former president was clearly unhappy that a public pronouncement had been shunned by the BOT on the issue. He would, however, have his opportunity a few days later, with a rather devastating effect. At an event organized by Daily Trust newspaper where Obasanjo was a special guest alongside South Africa’s Mrs. Winnie Mandela, the former president spoke on sundry issues, and at the close of the session fielded questions, not surprisingly, on the Yar’Adua problem. In reply to a question suggesting he may have deliberately imposed an invalid president on the nation, Obasanjo gave what may well have been a well-rehearsed retort: “You have raised a vital question, and you will get an answer. When in 2006, the issue of succession came up, I was convinced that a southerner succeeding me would not augur well for Nigeria. You may agree with that, you may not agree. Now, I was looking for somebody who would succeed me who has three important qualities: One, he has enough intellectual capacity to run the affairs of this nation; two, he has sufficient personal integrity to run the affairs of this country; three, he is sufficiently broadminded enough, politically, religiously, socially, whatever, to manage the affairs of the country. These three were important and very primary to me. “Then to ‘Umoru’ Yar’Adua, the current president. I know he had a kidney problem and was under dialysis. Sometime earlier, he had gone abroad for almost six months when he was governor of Katsina. When the idea came for him to contest, I asked him, and he gave me a medical report. The medical report shows that he [had] turned off dialysis. I asked experts who then told me that if you are on dialysis and you are no longer on dialysis, it means you have had a successful kidney transplant and that you can live for as long as you may wish to live. “Now, that was the situation before we went campaigning, and you remember at one stage of the campaigns, it was intense, he was run down. The chairman of our party, Ahmadu, also had a similar challenge. Ali didn’t go abroad for medical check-up, but he (Yar’Adua) went abroad for medical check-up, and the rumour was that he was dead. And I phoned him and put the phone on speaker and said: ‘Umoru, are you dead?’ and you heard his voice live and clear, and he came back and continued the campaign. That was the true situation. “To the best of my knowledge, Yar’Adua wasn’t on dialysis after that. When the issue of dialysis came, he was well into the first year, which must mean one thing: that the kidney transplant is failing. If that is the case, that is an emergency situation for which you cannot put the blame on me. So for people to say, I, Olusegun Obasanjo, deliberately picked somebody who is an invalid, I think is the height of insult. How can I, who [have] given so much to this country, both in peace and in war time, give the running of this country to somebody who will run it down? If you fear God you will not make that statement. “If you say there is a constitutional crisis or no constitutional crisis, I will not comment on that. What I needed to say on that I have said as the chairman of my party’s board of

trustees last week. But the one I need to say is the fact that nobody picked Yar’Adua so that he will not perform. If I did that, God will punish me. Yes, I love this country so much that there is no way I could do that. “If you take an appointment, a job, elected, appointed, whatever it is, and then your health starts to fail, and you realize you will not be able to deliver to satisfy yourself and the people you are supposed to serve, then there is a path of honour you are supposed to take. There is a path of honour and morality, and if you don’t know that, then you don’t know anything.” Obasanjo’s remark was, quite naturally, the headliner for all news outlets, as many people picked up from there with intense pressure, calling on the president to transmit a letter to the National Assembly. A few days later, another ethnic crisis broke out in Jos during which several people were killed. The tragedy also served as a reminder to Nigerians about the fact that their leader was nowhere to be seen even in the face of increasing pressure by different groups that he should cede power to the VP. On the strength of these, I had extensive discussions with both the ADC and the CSO, pleading with them to prevail on the president to transmit the letter to the National Assembly. I told them that some of the individuals canvassing a contrary view were actually saying an altogether different thing back home. I said Nigeria was regressing to a situation almost similar to the ‘Third Term’ days. “If we don’t manage the current situation well, power will slip away from the president within a matter of weeks,” I told them. The days went by, and they soon rolled into weeks. Yet, the issue of the president’s return from Saudi Arabia remained a matter of conjecture. At this point, handlers of the VP had advised him to begin to assert himself, and the first evidence of this came when the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) director general, Mallam Usman Muhammed Magawata, called to inform me that he had been getting intense heat from Aso Rock. He said the fact that the national broadcast by the VP on the Jos crisis was not preceded by the national anthem was already generating problems for him. I recall that he had called to seek my opinion on this before the broadcast was aired by NTA, and my response was for him to use his professional judgement. I did not, honestly, think the national anthem should be played for the broadcast by the VP, and I said so. But as I also told him at the time, it was his call. The VP, however, took exception to this, and the next day, he directed the minister of state for information and communication, Aliyu Ikra Bilbis, to issue the NTA director general a query to explain the reason why the station did not air the national anthem before his broadcast on Thursday, January 21, 2010. “This anomaly, which breached the usual protocol that ought to have been accorded the very high office of the Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, calls for urgent explanation. You should therefore explain within the next twenty four hours why disciplinary action should not be taken against you,” Bilbis wrote in his query to the director general. Magawata’s response was quite apologetic. He explained that leaving out the anthem was neither deliberate nor intended to belittle the person or office of the number two citizen. When he was informed via a text message that a statement would be coming from the VP, he said, “Considering the current mood of the nation, the management discussed, rubbed minds and consulted sister agencies before finally deciding that in order to avoid a breach of protocol, NTA should not broadcast with [the] National Anthem. However, if

this has offended His Excellency, the Vice President, I sincerely apologise.” Without doubt, the power struggle had begun, and the battleground had shifted to the Federal Executive Council. At the FEC session on January 27, 2010, the SGF excused all the secretariat/support staff from the council chambers. The only persons that were allowed to stay behind were ministers as well as the principal aides to the president, and the VP. With the chambers cleared, the VP asked the SGF to brief council members on what had transpired at the Senate, to which he had been invited. Six days before—Thursday, January 21—the SGF had appeared before the Senate, following their resolution, to give a briefing on the health condition of the president. But the session was a closed-door affair, even though snippets were published in the newspapers. Now, his task was to brief the FEC on what had actually transpired between him and the senators. In his presentation before the FEC, the SGF said he spent about two hours with the senators, who posed to him about 30 questions, “most of them repetitive of the earlier ones.” He summarized the questions into six: The first was on the actual status of the president’s health, into which he was asked to offer some insight. He said he told the Senate that even though he had no evidence to show them, he believed the president was recovering. Making allusion to the BBC interview where the president spoke about his recovery and the fact that he would soon be home, he said he told the senators he had no reason not to believe the president was recovering from his ailment. The second question was why he had not gone to Saudi Arabia to visit the president, given his status as the SGF. Yayale said he responded that he was aware of many people within the Senate chambers who were friends and relatives of the president. Since these people had also not gone to visit the president, his going or not going to Saudi Arabia should therefore not be an issue. He said he reminded the senators of the experiences of the House of Representatives delegation that went to Saudi Arabia. The third question posed was why the president seemed reluctant to comply with Section 145 of the constitution, which required him to transmit a letter to the National Assembly to empower the VP to act whenever he was not around. He said he argued that the president once wrote a similar letter, signed it, but that the special adviser on National Assembly, Senator Abba Aji, failed to deliver it. He said he told the senators that he knew this to be a fact because he actually helped to draft the letter. He said he argued further that the president would not fail to make such formal notification whenever he considered it expedient to do so. The follow-up question to that from the Senate was if the president could sign the budget even when he was away, why did he not transmit the requisite letter from his hospital bed in Saudi Arabia? The SGF said he responded by telling them that while the budget was time bound, the letter was not. He said another senator sought to know why FEC members had yet to invoke Section 144 of the constitution, which empowered them to begin the process that would declare the president permanently incapacitated, given the fact of his long absence from the country. He said he responded by asking the senator who posed the question what his own preoccupation would be if the person who appointed him as minister fell ill: would it be to seek the downfall of his principal or to continue to pray for his recovery? The last question, according to the SGF, was in relation to when the president would return. He said he told them that he had no clue. Yayale said he could discern some

ethnic and sectional undertones in the contributions of the senators but that they all treated him with respect and praised his candour. With the briefing over, the VP then urged the AGF to speak on the implications of the order by the federal high court in Abuja, which a few days earlier gave the FEC 14 days to prove medically that President Yar’Adua was fit to perform his duties. This was another Justice Abutu ruling, and it compelled the FEC to ascertain whether by the fact that the president had been away on a medical treatment since November 23, 2009, he (Yar’ Adua) should not be declared incapable of performing his presidential duties. “The FEC should resolve whether the president is capable of performing his presidential functions or not and pass a resolution to that effect,” the judge had ordered. The AGF had brought up this matter as an item under any other business (AOB). He described it as a potentially dangerous issue, which had to be handled carefully, warning that FEC members acting in their individual capacity could run foul of contempt. While the AGF sounded altruistic in leading discussions on the need for the council to take a position one way or another so as to comply with the court ruling, all he wanted was a situation where the FEC would simply make its position clear on the issue of invoking Section 143, considering that at that point, the consensus was that to declare Yar’Adua incapacitated would be very dangerous. Aside from the political and ethnic undertones in the debate that ensued, the health minister, Prof. Babatunde Osotimehin, a renowned medical practitioner, had also argued that even from a medical point of view, what the constitution required the FEC to do was impracticable. He said no medical doctor could pronounce anybody permanently incapacitated, especially someone that had not been physically examined. The background to the debate started with a suit against the AGF and the FEC over the indefinite absence of the president. It was filed by former House of Representatives minority leader, Mr. Farouk Aliyu and the chairman of the Jigawa State chapter of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), Mr. Sani Gabbas. The plaintiffs, through their counsel, Mr. Bamidele Aturu, asked the court to determine whether the resolution of the FEC at its meeting of December 2, 2009, to the effect that Yar’Adua was capable of discharging his functions as president of Nigeria, was constitutional. Aturu contended that the seat of the president had been vacant since November 23, 2009, when the nation ceased to have a leader. He urged the court to compel Vice President Goodluck Jonathan to start carrying out the functions of the president, adding that “it is unlawful, pursuant to the Public Service Rules, for Yar’Adua to be absent from the office without going through due process.” Aturu further prayed the court to rule that the president’s failure to write the Senate president and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, before going on medical vacation on November 23, was “illegal and unconstitutional, as it violates Section 145 of the constitution.” Even though the AGF, who appeared in person, had argued that the suit was premature and lacked locus standi, he felt he could exploit the ruling therefrom, which merely compelled members to take one position or another on whether or not the president should be declared incapacitated. After his preamble, the VP said he would want the lawyers in the chambers to speak first in order to lend perspectives to the debate. After the lawyers had had their say, the VP said he wanted the views of former governors in the council so they could speak with the benefit of experience, especially with regard to their

relationship with their deputies. The FCT minister, Aliero, a two-term governor of Kebbi; commerce minister, Achike Udenwa, his former colleague from Imo State; and the education minister, Dr. Sam Egwu (also a former two-term governor of Ebonyi state) spoke with passion on the need for constitutionalism and trust. They also praised the VP for the way he had been handling the issue of the president’s long absence from the country. They, however, were emphatic on one point: they were not in favour of invoking Section 143. Amidst laughter, Egwu recounted a personal experience that had occurred when he once travelled for his medicals at a time when his deputy was also outside the state. He said he had written a letter to the Speaker of the state House of Assembly to act for him. “Hardly did the guy even allow me to leave the state capital before he moved into my office, sat on my chair and started barking orders. The only thing the fellow did not take over was my wife!” In the end, the AGF got what he wanted because the FEC officially decided to stand by their earlier resolution not to invoke Section 144 of the constitution, thus securing another reprieve for the president. That same day, however, the Senate, after two days of closed sessions, resolved that the president should formally notify it of his medical vacation. How that would be done was not stated, neither was there any threat of sanction should their resolution be disobeyed. Although only a few people took the resolution seriously, it yet added to the pressure that was increasingly being felt in Saudi Arabia. That resolution, a compromise in itself, did not come easily since the Senate had by then broken into three factions: the pro-Yar’Adua group, the pro-Jonathan group, and a third group, which was also anti-Yar’Adua but not necessarily pro-Jonathan. The proYar’Adua group had succeeded in scuttling the prayer to send a delegation to Saudi Arabia to visit Yar’Adua as well as the motion to invite the CPP, Dr. Salisu Banye, to come home to brief the Senate on Yar’Adua’s condition. Senate President Mark had deftly ensured that the motion to visit Yar’Adua did not sail through. He had also staved off attempts by some senators citing constitutional points of order to raise Sections 143 (on impeachment for the gross misconduct of being away from his duty post for more than 42 days) and 144 (on incapacitation). But the Senate president was only just biding his time. Section 143 (1) reads: The President or Vice-President may be removed from office in accordance with the provisions of this section. (2) Whenever a notice of any allegation in writing signed by not less than one-third of the members of the National Assembly (a) is presented to the President of the Senate; (b) stating that the holder of the office of President or Vice-President is guilty of gross misconduct in the performance of the functions of his office, detailed particulars of which shall be specified, the President of the Senate shall within seven days of the receipt of the notice cause a copy thereof to be served on the holder of the office and on each member of the National Assembly, and shall also cause any statement made in reply to all the allegations by the holder of the office to be served on each member of the National Assembly.

The controversy had yet to abate when some 41 politicians led by a former President of the Senate, Senator Anyim Pius Anyim, and his deputy, Senator Ibrahim Mantu, called on Yar’Adua to urgently transmit a letter of his incapacitation to the

National Assembly to salvage the nation’s democracy from danger. Noting the anxiety raised by the absence of the president from the country, the group said what was required in the interim was a letter signed by the president: “You can agree that neither the letter nor the signature can be obtained through protest, threat or even bringing down our democracy. We believe, like many others do, that it is not in the best interest of this nation—or any other nation for that matter—to be without concrete authority at any time, more so in an executive presidential system of government. We also believe that the leaders of this nation and more so our elected representatives have a very serious duty to manage our national challenges to ensure national stability and democracy.” The group observed also that the Yar’Adua situation had exposed the weakness of the 1999 Constitution, hence the need to begin a process of amendment “with a view to preventing future occurrences. In the interim, what is required is a letter under the signature of Mr. President,” Anyim said. Mark’s response was that the National Assembly would be guided by the constitution in whatever action they deemed appropriate to resolve the Yar’Adua logjam. “Yes, there are obvious problems, and we admit that there are problems, and the solution must be found in the constitution itself. What I want to appeal is for Nigerians to understand that in finding the solutions, we are concerned and worried about the unity and stability of the country, we do not want to do anything that will aggravate the current situation. If they exercise patience with us we will definitely find a lasting solution within the constitution itself.” Mark’s admonition was instructive because later that day, leaders from the South-South zone of the country also called on members of the National Assembly to pass a resolution authorizing the swearing in of Jonathan as the acting president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The group noted that their silence over the controversy caused by President Yar’Adua’s failure to hand over to Jonathan since the former left the country November 23, 2009, on medical grounds, must not be taken for granted. In a communiqué laden with ethnic undertones and read by Ijaw leader and former federal information commissioner, Chief Edwin Clark, the body condemned those working against the emergence of Jonathan as acting president, calling them unpatriotic people who were seeking for the division and collapse of the country: “We kept quiet for various reasons; we kept quiet over the period this thing has been happening because we believe it is a national issue, [a] Nigerian issue, but we have decided to speak because so much [has] been said so far, and things are also going out of hand.” The federal legislators were certainly feeling the heat to help avert what had become an impending crisis. On January 29, 2010, former head of state, General Yakubu Gowon, Second Republic president, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, and former head of the interim national government, Chief Ernest Shonekan joined in the call for Yar’Adua to transmit a letter of medical vacation to the National Assembly in line with Section 145 of the constitution to enable Jonathan to act as president. The association, which identified itself as the Eminent Elders Group (EEG), also comprised retired chief justices of Nigeria and several politicians. Other members of the group included Second Republic vice president, Dr. Alex Ekwueme; former chief justices, Mohammed Lawal Uwais, Alfa Belgore, and Idris Kutigi; other prominent citizens like Danjuma, Chief Solomon Lar, Mallam Ahmed Joda, and Mallam Adamu Ciroma. Their statement, signed by Gowon, was presented to the National Assembly by a

delegation led by Shagari. They said that in order to resolve the political crisis, President Yar’Adua had to comply with Section 145 of the constitution. Arguing that it was important for the president to formally issue the necessary communication that would enable the VP to become acting president, the former leaders said Yar’Adua’s long absence from the country on account of his illness had become a matter of concern: “For well over eight weeks now, our president has been ill and out of the country. This illness and long absence from the country is causing serious concern not only to Nigerian citizens but [to] all those who do business with Nigeria and have the well-being of the country at heart,” they argued. Shagari presented the letter with an admonition: All critical stakeholders in the country should heed the group’s advice that it’s expedient to prevent the political crisis brought about by the president’s illness from escalating. The most critical push, however, began inside the FEC meeting on February 3, 2010, when information and communication minister, Professor Dora Akunyili, attempted to read a paper titled ‘State of the Nation’, which essentially sought to highlight the exigency of the president transmitting a letter to the National Assembly to enable the VP to take on the designation of acting president. Earlier, before the FEC session, Akunyili, with whom I have had a long-term cordial relationship, called me outside the chambers and said, “Segun, my conscience can no longer allow me to keep quiet on this issue of the president’s absence from the country. I intend to speak about it today in FEC. What do you think?” I had no idea that she had already a prepared text and so advised her against the idea. She knew the way I also felt and my frustrations, but I pointed out the implications to her, upon which she promised to think about what I had said. Yet, I sensed that her mind was made up. She said the information at her disposal was that the president was on life support in Saudi Arabia and that Nigerians were being told lies about the state of his health. Inside the FEC meeting, it was not until after all the memos had been presented that Akunyili told the VP that she had a paper to distribute but was challenged by a member who noted that such an attempt was in breach of procedure. She could not ‘ambush’ the council, the member argued, and added that if Akunyili had a paper to present either in the form of a memo or note, it ought to have been sent to the council secretariat ahead. Of course, the paper had been circulated anyway, and members were already reading it before it was asked to be withdrawn. The message was already out: the FEC was divided! Akunyili was asked to submit her write-up in a memo form to the council secretariat so that it could be taken by the next FEC session. By the time the FEC session rounded up that day, however, the content was already in the media. Akunyili’s position was that the president’s absence from the country had created a difficult dilemma for the FEC, which it could no longer ignore: “There has been persistent agitation by the public for members of the Federal Executive Council to do something. Nigerians expect us to rise to this challenge on behalf of our President as the leader of this administration. Some eminent citizens have spoken. They include former Heads of State and others who have served our nation in various capacities. The Senate has also taken a position of which we are all aware. The looming crisis in the system is over-boiling. Our hard-earned democracy is being threatened by the day.” Arguing that the polity had become overheated to an intolerable level, Akunyili said

posterity would judge members harshly if they did not positively intervene to resolve this logjam. “He (President Yar’Adua) has been away for about 70 days now, even if he returns tomorrow, is it not better for him to rest and recover before taking over from the Vice President? We need to do what is morally right and constitutional for the President to officially hand over to the Vice President to function as Acting President. If he does not, we can evoke whichever aspect of the constitution that should make the Vice President an Acting President.” Despite the uncertainty in the country, the PDP leadership still proved to be one of the strongest pillars for Yar’Adua. Visiting the VP on the day Akunyili released her note within the FEC chambers, the party’s top hierarchy more or less foreclosed any handing over to Jonathan. In what he described as a solidarity visit meant to encourage the VP on his resilience in discharging his duty in the absence of the president, PDP chairman, Chief Vincent Ogbulafor, quoted for Jonathan Psalm 62:11 of the Holy Bible, which says, “God has spoken once, twice I have heard; power belongs to God.” He said further: “Throughout this period, you have demonstrated patriotism and measure (sic) of loyalty and statesmanship. You have through exemplary selflessness held the government and the country together in spite of the mischief of a few. We wish to place on record our deepest satisfaction with the manner you have steadied the ship of state in the absence of His Excellency, the president and commander in chief of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Alhaji Umaru Yar’Adua. “You have discharged your duties in the absence of Mr. President with distinction. We are proud that you have refused to be distracted by needless debates and controversies originating from some of our opponents. We maintain our earlier assertion that with you effectively [in] the saddle, there is no vacuum in the presidency.” Unknown to Ogbulafor, by saying there was no vacuum in Aso Rock—words that obviously riled the VP and his handlers—the PDP chairman was inadvertently digging his own political grave. But his position was not substantially different from the stance taken by the governors who met in Abuja on February 4, 2010. “The Forum also identified with the judgement of the courts on the same and agrees that the position of Acting President could be either verbal or written and the Vice President has been appropriately acting admirably,” they stated in the communiqué issued at the end of their meeting. This also did not go unnoticed at the villa. But by then Mark had decided the time had come for the Senate to intervene decisively to arrest the national drift. That was how the idea of a National Assembly resolution, which would empower Jonathan to be acting president, began to crystallize. By this time, though, it was obvious that Jonathan had decided that taking a more proactive political stance was the right path to tread. As he raised the stakes, the governors realized that they needed him to ensure the survival of the democratic project. It seemed that at this point a military coup was no longer far-fetched. After a meeting with the VP and another session with the leadership of the National Assembly, it was decided that the two houses should pass a resolution empowering Jonathan to become the acting president. How this was to be done was left to the leadership. Still, at this period, some close allies of Jonathan had told him to begin to wield presidential power, as it was evident that Yar’Adua’s presidency was gradually coming to an end.

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Doctrine of Necessity Gathered in the office of Vice President Goodluck Jonathan on the morning of Friday January 5, 2010, were PDP national chairman, Chief Vincent Ogbulafor; deputy national chairman, Dr. Haliru Bello as well as national secretary, Abubakar Baraje. Also in the room were Senate president, David Mark; his deputy, Ike Ekweremadu; and House of Representatives Speaker, Dimeji Bankole. There were also the Kwara State governor and chairman of the Governors’ Forum, Dr. Bukola Saraki; the AGF, Aondoakaa, and Chief Mike Oghiadome, Jonathan’s principal secretary. The single item on the meeting agenda was the Justice Abutu ruling, which held that the VP could act for the president without any formal transfer of power. Leading the discussion was Aondoakaa, who argued that with the judgement, the political crisis had been resolved because the VP could then begin to act for the president. He was backed by Saraki and Bankole, with Ogbulafor, Bello and Baraje also leaning towards endorsing the position. But there was strong resistance from Mark, who argued that the Abutu judgement offered no practical solution because there was no way Jonathan could forward bills or any official correspondence to the Senate in his capacity as vice president and expect it to be accepted. Bankole, however, said the House would have no problem with receiving such correspondences from Jonathan. That created a stalemate. At that period, Mark had concluded that the only way forward was for Jonathan to have the constitutional power to be acting president. He also believed that the people around the president were not helping matters by using subterfuge to hide the critical nature of his health from important stakeholders. At the time, Mark was used to receiving phony calls from Saudi Arabia by officials who would ask him “to wait for the president” only to be told after a few minutes that they would call back because the president who had ‘initiated’ the call could no longer be reached. Because Mark was aware of what was going on, he sought to know from Aondoakaa and the governors what objection they had to making Jonathan the acting president. Apparently uncomfortable with the question, they all said that they had none and praised the vice president. Yet, what they were proposing was to use Jonathan to avert a constitutional crisis created by the absence of the president without legally investing Jonathan with the power to act in his stead. At the end, the meeting could not reach any useful conclusion because Mark was insistent that the Senate was not going to recognize the Abutu ruling. Apparently sensing that the crisis was getting more complicated, the Senate president spent the weekend making a series of consultations. First, he invited the lawyers among the Senators to a meeting where he mandated them to review Abutu’s judgement and give him advice within 48 hours. He also told them to invite Aondoakaa to brief them before they came up with their conclusion. At his session with the lawyer-senators, the AGF could only convince a few of the members about the need to use the Abutu judgement to resolve the crisis, as the majority of the senators felt that there was no solution in the ruling. They therefore recommended to Mark that he should make it clear to Jonathan and the governors that the Senate would

not accept the Abutu ruling as a solution to the problem. But it was not a unanimous decision; some of them endorsed the position of the AGF on the ruling, but they were a clear minority. On Monday, January 8, Mark received in audience a group of prominent citizens, among them Lt. General T.Y. Danjuma and former chief justice of the federation, Belgore. It was agreed at the meeting that Yar’Adua would never have allowed the kind of crisis the nation was going through if he was in a position to intervene, so the conclusion was that he was oblivious to what was happening in the country. It was also resolved that the National Assembly had to intervene to save the situation. In the course of discussion, Mark had casually asked Belgore, “Your Lordship, the logical thing to do now is to make Jonathan the acting president. How do you think we can navigate this situation legally?” Belgore had said the constitution recognized the Doctrine of Necessity, which he said the Senate could apply. Mark had actually toyed with the idea of the doctrine, but instructively, Justice Abutu’s ruling (which had Aondoakaa’s imprint) had categorically stated that the Doctrine of Necessity would not apply in resolving the crisis. But with Belgore arguing that it was the most plausible solution, Mark decided that it was the way the Senate would go. He called his deputy, Ekweremadu and told him of what had transpired, and after calling a meeting of the principal officers, where the idea was easily bought by all, he asked that the House leadership be kept up to date about the thinking of the Senate. At this point, Mark brought in a small group of professionals to brainstorm on how the doctrine should be applied within the fine details of the law. It was at the meeting that someone suggested that since there was a BBC interview credited to Yar’Adua (though many were skeptical that it was actually him who had spoken), that would suffice in making a strong case in lieu of a letter to the National Assembly. With that plan in place, Mark then had informal sessions with many members of the Senate, and within 24 hours, he had the support of most senators. By then, the House had also decided to take a similar position on the issue. The nation therefore waited in anxiety as the Senate and the House of Representatives held separate closed sessions on Tuesday, February 9, 2010. At the end, both chambers of the legislature resolved that the VP should henceforth discharge the functions of the office of the president, commander in chief of the armed forces of the federation, as acting president. They also resolved that he would “cease to discharge the functions of the Office of the President when the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation, transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives in writing that he has returned from his medical vacation.” That resolution brought a fitting conclusion to the series of meetings between the presidency, the Governors’ Forum, and the National Assembly’s leadership. But it wasn’t without some dramatic prelude, especially among legislators. In the upper chamber, Senator Folarin drew the attention of his colleagues to what he called a political logjam and the need to find a solution: the time had come for the Senate to invoke Section 145 of the 1999 Constitution, he said. Simply put, his motion essentially noted that the president left Nigeria for medical attention in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on November 23, 2009, without transmitting a letter to the National Assembly as stipulated in the constitution. He had hardly rounded off when a counter motion was moved by Senator Garba Lado (PDP, Katsina), who raised a constitutional point of order to oppose the action the Senate

seemed set to adopt. After reading Section 145 of the 1999 Constitution, he argued that the Senate lacked the powers to make Dr. Goodluck Jonathan the acting president. He was swiftly silenced by Mark, who was apparently in no mood for any further subterfuge on the issue. An uneasy calm suddenly enveloped the chamber as all eyes were directed at the Senate president. Without much ceremony, he put forth the question to which members unanimously acquiesced. Mark then proceeded to read a prepared speech on what he called the ‘Doctrine of Necessity’, which the National Assembly was applying to stabilize the polity following the president’s prolonged absence from the country. Mark stated that the Senate’s decision to intervene was guided by patriotism, wisdom and national interest, adding that in their bid for an amicable solution, the Senate had to ascertain the health status of the president by inviting the secretary to the government of the federation (SGF), Alhaji Yayale Ahmed, to brief it. He declared that “the Doctrine of Necessity requires that we do what is necessary when faced with a situation that was not contemplated by the constitution, and that is precisely what we have done today. In doing so, we have as well maintained the sanctity of our constitution as the ultimate law of the land.” Mark said that from an ordinary reading of Section 145 of the constitution, the Senate had come to the conclusion that the president “through his declaration, transmitted worldwide on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), has furnished this parliament with irrefutable proof that he is on medical vacation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and has therefore complied with the provisions of Section 145 of the 1999 Constitution.” Perhaps to prove that the intervention was not done against Yar’Adua, Mark concluded, “For the avoidance of doubt, let me re-emphasize the import of prayer number two (2) of our resolution: The president will automatically resume office as the president and commander in chief once he is well enough and returns to the country and informs us accordingly, pursuant to Section 145.” The resolution had an interesting subtext: Since the compromise position had been reached after several informal discussions and meetings, there was no real debate on the issue before it was passed by the Senate. Taking a cue from the Senate action, the House of Representatives passed a similar motion, thus ending a 78-day wait on the ailing Yar’Adua to transmit a letter that would enable Jonathan to become the acting president. Through that ingenuous action, the National Assembly was able to defuse, albeit temporarily, a potentially tricky situation. With that also, the drama was inevitably moving to another stage the next day—the Federal Executive Council. The weekly FEC session usually commences by 10:00 a.m. While Yar’Adua was never punctual, the reverse was the case whenever Jonathan presided: The session always began right on time. But February 10 was an unusual day; it was the day after the National Assembly resolution that made him acting president was passed. Jonathan kept members waiting for almost one hour with all eyes fixed on the vacant seat of the president. At exactly 10:58 a.m., it was announced that the acting president was coming in. As all members stood up, the protocol official who walked ahead of Jonathan put all his papers on the table of the VP. He stood behind the chair and pulled it backwards, apparently expecting his boss to take what had been his seat up till that day. Jonathan, however, ignored his protocol aide and walked straight to the president’s chair and sat down. After calling for the opening prayers, he was reminded that the national anthem had not been taken, eliciting laughter in an otherwise tense atmosphere.

With the national anthem taken and the pledge recited, the press was excused as the session began. Given the pin-drop silence occasioned by the fact that he had taken the president’s seat, Jonathan said he wanted to make some opening remarks, which he prefaced by saying there would be a full discussion on the issue after all the items had been taken. He said it was with a very deep sense of responsibility that he accepted the challenge of becoming the acting president, given the unfortunate manner in which the absence of the president from the country was being handled. He told the ministers that it was certain that they had all been following events in the country, and that anyone who would argue that the nation was not already moving towards the edge of the precipice was living in denial. It was based on this realization, he explained, that the National Assembly had to apply the Doctrine of Necessity, which vested in him the powers of an acting president. While expressing his sympathy for Yar’Adua, whose failure to transmit a letter to the National Assembly had caused a division within the cabinet, Jonathan added that some people around the president were not helping matters. He particularly took a swipe at some court judgements, which he said seemed to have been contrived to further complicate the political situation in the country. Jonathan informed ministers that several eminent lawyers, most of them senior advocates of Nigeria, whose opinion he sought on the logjam, had told him that Justice Abutu’s judgement was not a solution to the problem at hand. Warning that the crisis was not over, Jonathan said further that the considered opinion of most of these respected lawyers was that even the National Assembly resolution, on whose strength he had become acting president, was alien to the constitution and might collapse when subjected to strict legal scrutiny. “Well, that is what we have now and (it) will suffice until the courts decide otherwise,” he said, adding that public officials should at all times be guided by public good regardless of their personal inclinations. The more Jonathan spoke, the more visible the discomfiture of the AGF (behind whom I always sat in the FEC) became. Several times he raised his hand to be recognized but got no acknowledgement in any of those instances. After concluding his opening remark with the AGF’s hand still raised, Jonathan turned his attention to him and said, “AGF, I believe there will be time for you to say whatever you want to say when we come to debate the issue after we have taken all the memos.” Apparently because members were more interested in the debate that was to follow, virtually all the memos were approved without much waste of time. When the discussion on the state of the nation, however, began, it turned out to be no more than an opportunity for members to pledge their loyalty to Jonathan as acting president. Not only did members preface their contributions with “Your Excellency, Mr. Acting President and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,” almost every contributor praised his uncommon ‘maturity’ and ‘loyalty’. One speaker noted how it was quite evident that the hand of God was always on Jonathan and that his first name (Goodluck) merely typified the scenario playing out in the country. At the end, the FEC’s conclusion on the debate about the state of the nation was that two ministers, a Muslim and a Christian, should offer special prayers for the acting president. It was even a tough choice deciding who those two should be, as it tended to take on some political coloration. One minister, a Christian from the South-South, argued that he could pray better than the person earlier nominated. He was overruled, thus ending the

session. That was, however, just the beginning of the drama. As the FEC was about to rise, with members picking up their files, Jonathan said that he had some announcements to make. He had decided on a minor cabinet reshuffle, he told them. Mr. Michael Aondoakaa (SAN), the attorney general of the federation and minister of justice, had been redeployed to the Ministry of Special Duties, he announced, while Chief Adetokunbo Kayode (SAN), then the minister of labour and productivity, would become the AGF. By the new arrangement, Ambassador Ibrahim Kazaure, who was then minister of special duties, bagged the Ministry of Labour and Productivity portfolio. It is by no means a trite cliché: the silence could have been sliced with a knife as it dawned on members that an era might just be ending while another one was about to begin. All eyes were on Aondoakaa, who had a wry smile on his face but didn’t, in my reckoning, appear really surprised. Indications that Aondoakaa was in trouble had emerged before the commencement of the FEC meeting when he was invited to the Presidential Villa very early that morning. In the story he narrated to me, he said that when he arrived at Jonathan’s office, he could immediately sense danger with the presence of several policemen. The moment he was ushered in, the question Jonathan posed to Aondoakaa was, “What is your opinion about the National Assembly resolution which makes me the acting president?” Even though taken aback by the question, Aondoakaa said he had been wise enough to reply that what the National Assembly had done was the only realistic solution under the circumstances and that it would help resolve the logjam. He said Jonathan had appeared surprised but nonetheless pleased by his response before he then remarked, “But I heard you said it is illegal, was that not what you told AIT last night?” At that point, Aondoakaa said he’d clarified what he’d said in the AIT interview, and Jonathan had felt satisfied with his response. The issue resolved, the acting president now told him that he wanted to make a slight reshuffle of the cabinet and might be moving him to another ministry. To this, Aondoakaa said he had quipped, “You want to move me to FCT?” Aondoakaa said that before he’d left Jonathan, he had pleaded with him to stay action on his redeployment so that he could conclude some issues he was sorting out at the justice ministry, a request to which he said the acting president had agreed. But the music had changed shortly after. While still within the FEC, Aondoakaa got a text message from his personal assistant that about 10 plain clothes security operatives had forcibly gained entry into his office and other offices, presumably in search of documents. With that alert, the AGF went out to make a call to the inspector general of police, Mr. Ogbonnaya Onovo, to ascertain what was going on and why his office had been invaded. The IG gave Aondoakaa a somewhat ridiculous explanation. The policemen were there to protect him from Niger Delta militants, he told the AGF. Aondoakaa could, however, deduce from Onovo’s response that he was carrying out superior orders, which could only have come directly from the acting president. When he returned to the chambers, Aondoakaa walked to Jonathan’s seat and stooped to whisper to him about what was happening at his office. While feigning ignorance on the matter, Jonathan nonetheless promised to intervene during lunch break. The acting president did intervene: the policemen were immediately withdrawn from Aondoakaa’s office. But the message had been passed. At that point, Aondoakaa knew it

was almost a fait accompli, so during the break, he met again with the acting president, and this time said he was ready to be redeployed to any ministry but that he would take a 30-day vacation. He got a deal. Despite the humbling treatment, Aondoakaa, from what I later gathered, was very lucky because the initial decision was for him to be arrested, because he was seen as the author of the political crisis, given his failure to advise the president on the correct course of action to take. His immediate ouster arose from fears that he might have been making efforts to secure by proxy a court injunction that would restrain Jonathan from assuming the position of acting president. The plea, the tale goes, would be that the National Assembly resolution was unconstitutional. Jonathan was well aware that Justice Abutu’s controversial ruling had especially stated that the Doctrine of Necessity, which the National Assembly had invoked, would not apply in resolving the logjam. Implicitly, if someone had gone to court, the National Assembly’s resolution could easily have been nullified. Aondoakaa had drawn suspicion to himself at that particular period when, a few hours after the National Assembly passed the resolution making Jonathan the acting president, he had appeared on a Cable News Network (CNN) programme where he had insisted there was no crisis in the country, despite the fact that Yar’Adua had spent 78 days in a Saudi Arabian hospital. He had added that the government was running smoothly, a claim that was countered by Nobel laureate, Prof. Wole Soyinka, who was also featured on the same programme. Although the interview had been recorded days earlier, it did not help Aondoakaa’s cause, as Jonathan and his aides believed he had to be removed immediately before he could cause further political damage. It was also seen as a popular move that would resonate positively, especially with the media and civil society. With Aondoakaa off the legal scene, things could not possibly remain the same. He had been the last buffer, the man who had justified the absence of the president by saying he could rule even from the hospital in Saudi Arabia. His removal also sent clear signals to the handlers of the president in Saudi Arabia that Jonathan was tightening the political noose. But what really jolted them was the tone of the debate at the FEC session a week later on February 17. In what was evidently an orchestrated move, foreign affairs minister, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, had set the ball rolling when he said the time had come for the FEC to take a firm stand on the critical issue of the absence of the president from the country. He said whenever he attended a diplomatic event and was asked whether he had spoken with the president since he left the country, he always felt embarrassed to say he had not. He said that at the very minimum, there was the need for the FEC to send a delegation to Saudi Arabia to see the president, noting that his absence from the country had become a source of concern to the international community. He concluded that while there was public clamour for the FEC to invoke Section 144 of the Constitution (which he said was indeed within their purview), he was of the opinion that the FEC should not begin with such a drastic decision. The rational point was for the FEC to be seen as responsible, by making efforts to see the president, he concluded. The next speaker opposed this idea on the ground that any attempt to send a delegation to Saudi Arabia would be no more than a futile pursuit. He said all the delegations—either from the National Assembly or from the Governors Forum—that had gone to Saudi Arabia earlier were never allowed to see the president. He went on to outline those failed

attempts. Indeed, it was common knowledge that in the preceding week, five members of the House of Representatives who had gone to Saudi Arabia had returned to Abuja without seeing the president. The team saw only the First Lady. Also, the delegation of governors that had gone to Saudi Arabia at about the same time had come back having failed to meet with Yar’Adua. Similarly, a top-level PDP delegation led by its chairman, Vincent Ogbulafor, and which comprised Dr. Haliru Bello Mohammed, deputy national chairman, and Alhaji Kawu Baraje, deputy national secretary, completed the list of failed trips to Saudi Arabia. Although the FEC was disinclined to visit the president, due largely to the experiences of all the delegations that had gone to Saudi Arabia without seeing him, the unspoken consensus at that point, nonetheless, seemed to be against invoking Section 144 without making efforts to ascertain the true status of the president’s health. In the course of the debate, Jonathan interjected to say that he had himself made efforts to speak with the president several times but never succeeded, and whenever he mooted the idea of sending a delegation, it was always opposed. The next minister, a lawyer, said that they had all become objects of ridicule and time had come for them to be sensitive to the public mood on the issue. Producing a prepared paper, he quoted several legal authorities as well as the constitution, on the import of Section 144 and the need for the FEC to act in defence of public interest. But there were also voices of opposition. A supporter of the president spoke passionately and with much emotion on the indiscretion of invoking Section 144, adding that it would be a recipe for chaos. He advised that in the event of a constitutional crisis, the chief justice of the federation should be enlisted in the process of finding a solution, but cautioned that declaring the president incapacitated and removing him on the grounds of ill health was a callous and dangerous option to contemplate. Another suggested that rather than send a delegation to Saudi Arabia, the Nigerian ambassador in Saudi Arabia should be invited to brief the council on the status of the president’s health. At this point, the minister who had spoken earlier on the danger of invoking Section 144 said he had a point of information for the council. When given the floor, he spoke of how the Nigerian ambassador to Saudi Arabia had called him the previous night to inform him that the president had ascended five floors at the hospital unaided! While some ministers laughed at this information, which was hard to believe, it was corroborated by two other ministers, who said they also had it on good authority that the president had begun to exercise. This drew a sharp interjection from Maduekwe: “That is the kind of thing we are talking about. I speak with the same ambassador all the time, he is supposed to be reporting to me, yet he didn’t give me that sort of crucial information.” But Jonathan would not allow this information—however ludicrous it sounded—to pass as he made what was evidently a sarcastic remark: “I am happy with that information because it perhaps helps us to resolve this matter. If the president is already climbing [the] staircase at the hospital, maybe it is better if we just begin the process of invoking Section 144. By the time the doctors meet the president, and since he is now getting strong from what we now hear, we can then report back to Nigerians that there is no basis for declaring him incapacitated and all these media agitations would stop. I honestly think we would save ourselves all this embarrassment if we can confirm what the minister said and just proceed with invoking Section 144.”

Nobody followed up on this proposition, but after all the members had had their say, the conclusion was that it was necessary to send a delegation to Saudi Arabia. It was then decided that a panel of six should visit the president and report back to the FEC by the next session on February 24. The team comprised health minister, Prof. Babatunde Osotimehin ; foreign affairs minister, Ojo Maduekwe; agriculture minister, Dr. Abba Ruma; attorney general, Tokunbo Kayode; petroleum minister, Odein Ajumogobia and the SGF, Ahmed Yayale. From the tone of discussion, it was very clear the FEC had been divided along sectional lines, with most northern members opposed to invoking Section 144, while those vociferously in support were ministers from the South-South. As a round-up, Jonathan lamented the emotional nature the debate had taken and the way some ministers’ reactions seemed to give the impression that they loved the president more than others. While expressing his opposition to the idea of invoking Section 144, he said the president’s failure to transmit a letter to the National Assembly had made things rather difficult for everyone. He added, instructively, that he knew Yar’Adua as a man who believed in the rule of law. In a tone laden with emotion, Jonathan said it was unfortunate that some people could imagine that he would betray the president if he transmitted the necessary letter to the National Assembly. He recounted his experience as Deputy Governor in Bayelsa State and explained that he considers loyalty to be a significant virtue. But with the delegation convened, it was not too difficult to see that the move towards invoking Section 144 had begun. That message echoed loudly in Saudi Arabia. Barely one hour after the end of the FEC meeting, I got a call from Nigeria’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alhaji Garba Mohammed Aminchi, who said I should expect a copy of the president’s medical report, which was being sent to the acting president through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ambassador also wanted my e-mail address. This was the first time the man would speak with me directly, and, besides, that a medical report would be sent was also a new development, which spoke of untold desperation in Saudi Arabia. The irony was overwhelming. For weeks I had pleaded that the only way the president could earn the sympathy of Nigerians was if he came out plain about the state of his health, and that we could not for long keep the nation in the dark on the issue. I had also pleaded that direct communication be opened between the president and Jonathan. Of course, I had made all these interventions without knowing the true state of the president’s health. Now that the situation was getting out of hand, they had suddenly realized the need to put the acting president into confidence on the state of the president’s health. As promised, I did get an e-mail from the ambassador, who, curiously, addressed me as ‘Chief Olusegun Adeniyi’. I realized I had suddenly become important in the calculation of the people in Saudi Arabia. My initial enthusiasm about the report soon dissolved into anti-climax. I read the medical report, and I could not see any reason to cheer because there was no clear indication as to when the president would be discharged from the hospital. Curiously, like the earlier Aondoakaa letter, the ambassador also wanted me to make the report a media affair. Knowing this would be counter-productive, I kept the report to myself. It turned out to be a wise decision, because I was told only a few hours later that on receiving the report, Jonathan simply dismissed it with these words, “If after several

weeks in the hospital, what they are telling me is that they don’t know when he will be discharged, then the situation must be very serious.” Although I was not aware of Jonathan’s disposition to the report at the time, I nonetheless sent the ambassador a reply on my thoughts about it: Your Excellency, I received a copy of the letter sent to the acting president, and having carefully reviewed the contents and the political situation here, I believe it is better we wait to see what he [Jonathan] would do with it first. Considering that there is no new positive information in the letter that would be useful for the public, it is only relevant for its political purpose (direct communication between the president and acting president), and any attempt to leak it to the public from my end would be very unhelpful. From a professional point of view, it would also be counter-productive. Because what the media would likely feast upon in the letter are ‘episodes of chest infections’ and ‘isolation and intensive therapy’, which would then be magnified as new ailments. The idea behind the letter is good, and perhaps if this sort of thing had been done earlier, we probably would not be in the situation we are in today where the government is more or less divided, with some ministers now moving to invoke section 144 of the constitution with all its dire implications. I will advise Your Excellency to re-establish links with the Foreign Affairs Minister, especially considering what happened in [the] FEC yesterday, when the impression was created that you report more to the Ministers of FCT/Agriculture about the health improvement of the president while leaving the Foreign Minister in the dark. This doesn’t help anybody, especially at this most crucial period.

The next day, it became evident that the idea of the medical report was to stop the FEC delegation from going to Saudi Arabia. But it did not help. When it became clear that the delegation was bent on making the trip, the ambassador sent a telegram to Maduekwe with a long tale of how it was difficult to obtain flight clearance for official aircraft that would convey the delegation, because such normally took a long time. He also said that they needed to process a lot of documents, which would be difficult since the host authorities do not entertain any request submitted after 12 noon on work days, and that it would take five days to receive a response from the Saudi Royal Court in view of other demands on the king. Given the scenario he had painted, Aminchi advised that it was desirable that the delegation “meet the king or any of his ministers so designated to show our appreciation for the hospitality and free medical care being provided to our president now and before. In the circumstance therefore, I wish to advise that the planned departure of the delegation of Sunday 21/2/2010 be put on hold until a definite appointment to see the king is made by the host authorities in order to avoid keeping the delegation here for a long time and its attendant embarrassment.” When Maduekwe got the ambassador’s letter, he informed other members of the FEC committee, and they met with the acting president, where it was concluded that Aminchi’s intervention was a ploy to prevent them from coming to Saudi Arabia. As a result, it was ignored. Using his own contacts, Yayale was able to secure all the necessary approval from the Saudi authorities. On Sunday, February 21, the ambassador sent another desperate dispatch. It was a last ditch effort to stave off the planned visit by the delegation. The letter to Maduekwe explained all the actions taken by the mission through the host authorities towards

securing an appointment for the federal government delegation to deliver the special message to the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz. These efforts, according to the ambassador, had not yielded results. He explained further: It is pertinent to note that on Thursday 18/2/2010, even though not a working day here, the mission sent a Note Verbale to the host ministry of foreign affairs intimating it of the impending visit and requested for the host minister of foreign affairs to receive the delegation. However as more facts were made known to me on Friday 19/2/2010, a fresh Note number 2 was sent to the host ministry of foreign affairs requesting for an audience and the delegation to be received by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. Similarly, yesterday evening, the particulars of the flight conveying the delegation were received, and a request for its clearance to land in Riyadh in the morning of tomorrow 22/2/2010 and come to Jeddah in the evening was faxed to the host ministry of foreign affairs with the original copy delivered this morning Sunday 21/2/2010. Unfortunately up to the time of close of work today, there was no response from the host authorities with regard to the two request (sic) of the mission. I should also mention that the Council of Ministers which is chaired by the King regularly meets every Monday. Perhaps our request for the audience will be considered after the council meeting in which case the earliest we are going to get a response will be late on Tuesday 23/2/2010. While I shall continue to put pressure on my contacts both in the host MFA and the Royal Court, Your Excellency may wish to consider my earlier suggestion that the departure of the delegation scheduled for midnight today be deferred until later when we have confirmed appointment for the delegation to meet with the king. In this regard, therefore, it is the considered view of the Mission that while these efforts are ongoing, the delegation should defer its date of visit until all necessary arrangements are concluded very soon, including airport clearance and befitting protocol reception in both Riyadh and Jeddah. This will put on hold the impending embarrassment this is likely to cause.

It was another futile bid to dissuade the delegation. By the time this letter came, the delegation had firmed up all the arrangements to travel to Saudi Arabia. It was therefore a shock for the ambassador when he was told by the Saudi authorities that the Nigerian delegation was on their way and had been cleared by the monarch to have audience with the foreign minister and later to see the president. On arrival in Saudi Arabia, the delegation was taken to the royal palace in Riyadh with an appointment to see the foreign minister that day by 7:00 p.m., Saudi time. As they were about to enter the foreign minister’s office, the ambassador told the delegation rather excitedly, “Sirs, I just got a text message on my phone now that the president has been discharged from the hospital and is already on his way back to Nigeria.” It was in a dazed state that Yayale and the five ministers were ushered into the presence of their host, the foreign minister. When the ambassador relayed the same news to the Saudi foreign minister, he didn’t appear pleased as he said, “We are not aware of this development.” The SGF, according to what he told me, immediately called Jonathan to intimate him of the development. He also called the emir of Katsina, the sultan of Sokoto and the chief of defence staff to alert them as to what was going on. The only person he wasn’t able to reach was the chief of army staff. Yayale, whose sources had given him details of the

president’s true health status as at the time he was ‘discharged’ from hospital, knew that the endgame in the unfortunate political drama may have just begun.

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Like a Thief in the Night The first indication I got that the president might actually be on his way back to the country came via an SMS after my phone beeped at 6:00 p.m. on Tuesday, November 23, 2009. It was from Omoyele Sowore of saharareporters. He had information that the president had left the hospital and was in fact at the Saudi airport on his way back to Nigeria, he wrote. Although there had been hints from my previous discussions with the CSO and ADC of their possible return within the week, I had been told similar tales on several occasions, to the extent that I had become weary and no longer considered it serious. But I thought it wise to check. Naturally, my first move was to dial the Saudi line of the ADC. It had been switched off. Then I tried his Nigerian mobile numbers (which were roamed), and they were also inaccessible. Next, I tried the CSO also on all his mobile lines but got the same results. Sensing that the story might be true after all, I tried the Saudi numbers of the security details attached to the president, and when I could not reach any of them, I concluded that surely the president was indeed on his way back to Nigeria this time. Given the political situation in Nigeria at the time, the illness of the president, and his continued stay in Saudi Arabia had caught the attention of the cable networks, most of which had detailed their correspondents in Saudi Arabia to monitor the situation. It was therefore no surprise that the moment the president left the hospital, they immediately alerted their correspondents in Nigeria. At the presidential villa, it was also not difficult for State House correspondents to guess that the president was on his way home, especially when troops from the Brigade of Guards began moving towards the airport. Implicitly, all the plans contrived in Saudi Arabia by the handlers of the president to make the movement a secret affair had become futile. Nothing could be more ironic. By the time the chartered air ambulance and the presidential jet arrived at the Abuja international airport a few minutes apart at about 1:45 a.m., the vicinity was swarming with several pressmen, and CNN, with a camera hidden in the surrounding bush, was able to capture the arrival. Like most Nigerians, I also watched the sad episode live on CNN as one of the aircraft was made to stop in the middle of the tarmac while an ambulance was driven to the plane to evacuate the president. Even though the evacuation was so expertly done as to obscure any glimpse of it from the camera, I sensed trouble because what was happening could only mean one thing: the president was brought back home still sick. I knew this would only complicate the political situation, and I feared that my job would even be far more difficult than it already was. I waited for about an hour after the convoy’s arrival at the villa before driving in around 3:30 a.m., whereupon I went straight to the residence of the ADC, who had just come back from the president’s residence. The stress was quite evident on his face, but since he had been gone for such a long period, our discussion dwelt initially on mundane issues before progressing, at my prodding, to the rather touchy terrain of the president’s condition. The ADC and I are very good friends and were always open towards one another, but on

this night he was very edgy and evasive, even defensive. I couldn’t get much off him, so I decided to see the CSO, who appeared to be more agreeable despite his apparent nervousness. In response to my question as to whether the president was strong enough to attend the Federal Executive Council meeting in the morning, he went into a long monologue of how the president had recovered and had become strong, but had been exhausted by the stress of the trip and would need a few more days to rest. The conclusion was that not only would he fail to attend the FEC meeting, he would still need “a few more days to recuperate” before he could begin to see visitors. “Of course, the president [will] see him later today,” was the CSO’s reply to my question about the possibility of the president seeing Jonathan during the day. Despite his assurance, I couldn’t find any conviction in his response. I did a concise review of my understanding of the political situation for the CSO and where I thought the various actors stood, noting also how Nigeria had changed in the absence of the president and the implications of having him around in the villa if he wasn’t fit to resume office. “We have a crisis on our hands and it’s important for all the presidential aides to collaborate on how we will manage the situation,” I explained, and suggested that all the aides met at 9:00 a.m., an hour before the FEC meeting. The aim was to enable us to make an appropriate decision with regard to the way forward. Immediately I left the CSO, I drove straight to Games Village to meet my friend, Waziri Adio, whom I had called earlier to expect me. I could do with some advice because I knew I would be in a very difficult position later that morning. By now it was about 4:30 a.m. Ever so perceptive, Waziri advised me to be calm. He pointed out that if the president was not in a position to attend the council meeting, then I would have to say something. We agreed that whatever will be said had to be something that would appeal to the sentiment of Nigerians. The only thing that would soothe nerves, we both agreed, was for the president to thank all Nigerians, apologize for the problems caused by his ill health and conclude by saying he would spend the remaining months of his administration working towards reforming the electoral process, culminating in the conduct of elections in 2011 in which he would not be a participant. While there were many Nigerians genuinely aggrieved by the manner in which Yar’Adua’s illness was handled, we also did not miss the fact that beneath the bile seen in some reactions lay the politics of the 2011 elections. So we felt that the moment we took Yar’Adua out of that equation, the pressure would ease considerably. It had been a trip worth the trouble. I left Waziri to help with the draft and drove back to the villa. On my way back, I put a call through to the special adviser on national assembly, Senator Abba Aji, who, I knew, also had a big role to play in the emerging scenario. He went straight to the point: “Is it true the president has returned?” he asked. I told him he had. He raised several other questions, but I told him it wasn’t an issue we could conveniently discuss on the phone and added that it was important we both met immediately. “I can come to your house if you could describe the location,” I recall telling him. He was kind enough to volunteer to come to my house. He arrived around 5:30 a.m. This time, I went straight to the point. “So, what do we do now?” I asked him. His response was a further probe of the president’s health; questions about which I had no clue. Our discussion only made the dilemma of the moment more apparent, so I told him I would insist on seeing the president when I got back to the villa. Abba Aji could not reconcile the fact of the president’s homecoming despite not being

fully fit to resume duty with the challenging situation already on ground. He went on to explain all the implications to me: It had a potential to create a political crisis in the nation and also engender serious problems that may be very difficult to manage at the National Assembly. He advised that if the president was not strong enough to resume office, it would be necessary for him to now write the National Assembly a formal letter requesting a vacation. According to Abba Aji, the letter should contain an apology from the president to the lawmakers over his inability to write earlier. “He could attribute that to the fact that he left the nation in a hurry,” he explained. I thought it was well-meaning advice, but was not sure it would be taken with enthusiasm. Despite having scheduled our presidential aides meeting for 9:00 a.m., we didn’t really gather in the CSO’s office until about 10:00 a.m., at which time there was already tension in the air, as the ministers had arrived for the weekly Federal Executive Council session, which normally begins by 10:00 a.m. As they milled around, each called me to ask a question that was understandably similar: “How is oga?” All eyes were on me. It was a disconcerting moment. Only six of us eventually made the meeting at the CSO’s office, since Hamza and the CPP were with the president. The SCOP had not returned to the villa, and somehow, the PLO was also not around. Those gathered that morning to take a crucial decision on the return of the president were therefore me, David Edevbie, Matt Aikhionbare, Inuwa Baba, the ADC and the CSO. I told them that I was under increasing pressure from journalists who wanted to confirm the arrival of the president in addition to his state of health. Whereas it was my responsibility to announce the arrival of the president, I told the gathering, there is equally a sense of propriety that makes my inclusion of a caveat imperative: From a professional standpoint, I couldn’t possibly do that without seeing the president! This generated the first crisis in our meeting. The CSO tried to cajole me with the excuse that the president was asleep and that doctors had advised that he should rise by himself and never be roused from his sleep. There was hardly any headway for fifteen minutes as we argued on this point. That was the position we were in when Tanimu, who was looking for Edevbie, came in and joined us at the meeting. But his presence was not in anyway helpful as his comments gave the impression that I was sounding unreasonable by my insistence that I had to see the president before I could issue a statement on his return. I considered his remark uncharitable, and as we argued, the CSO placated me with these words: “Calm down, Segun, you will see the president later today. But we need to calm the nation down first.” After many pleas from everyone, especially Edevbie, who argued that the tension in the country was already palpable, I informed the group I already had a draft. Calming the nation down as we agreed meant confirming the arrival of the president and affirming that the status quo would remain, in which case Jonathan would continue to be in charge since it was evident Yar’Adua was still unwell. It’s instructive to note that we—barring the ADC and the CSO—were as yet ignorant of how bad the president’s health was. But we all agreed that Jonathan would continue to run the affairs of the country as he was already. The issue of whether he would continue to be called acting president came up, and we all felt that it was absurd to have a president and acting president in the country. With the

return of the president, Jonathan automatically goes back to being VP, we thought. There was not much debate about this at all. It was a position we unanimously agreed on. With the benefit of hindsight, particularly given what I later glimpsed about the medical state in which the president was brought in and given the background information I would later have about the tricky negotiations that had led to the National Assembly resolution, I would have suggested addressing Jonathan as acting president. It’s unlikely there would have been much resistance. The fact, however, remains that I participated fully in the decision to address Jonathan as VP, but it was by no means out of disrespect or mischief. There was silence as I began to read, but Tanimu interjected that the statement was too long and contained unnecessary details. About everyone agreed with him that the statement should be quite brief. So at the end, we decided we should just announce the arrival of the president, thank Nigerians and say that the VP would continue to run the country’s affairs until the president was well enough. So at the end, it was not anybody dictating to me; it was my call. I released the following statement: After being discharged by the team of medical experts overseeing his treatment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua returned to the presidential villa, Abuja, early this morning. President Yar’Adua is grateful to the vice president, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, for competently overseeing the affairs of state in his absence. The president also wishes to thank the president of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the entire membership of the National Assembly, the Governors’ Forum, the judiciary, the armed forces, and other security agencies, former heads of state and other eminent Nigerians for their roles in maintaining order and stability during his absence. Mr. President wishes to reassure all Nigerians that on account of their unceasing prayers and by the special grace of God, his health has greatly improved. However, while Mr. President recuperates the vice president will continue to oversee the affairs of state.

I had barely finished the draft when I got a call from the CSO’s office inviting me to another meeting. Getting to the office, I found the head of service, Mr. Steve Oronsaye, Inuwa and the CSO discussing another sensitive issue that could be summarized in these words: Could the acting president sit on the president’s chair inside the council chambers? The debate arose from an earlier meeting between Oronsaye and Jonathan. Oronsaye said Jonathan asked him about where he would sit if he came to the FEC meeting in view of the arrival of the president. He had actually advised Jonathan to sit on the vice president’s chair, but Jonathan replied that he would rather not come to the FEC meeting. Oronsaye said his advice was based on the fact that the president was back to the villa, although he also did not know in what state. Inuwa and I cautioned that a crisis may ensue if the council meeting failed to hold that day, and stressed the need for Jonathan to be persuaded to attend, in which case he had to sit on the president’s chair. The CSO agreed with me, and together with the ADC, he went to plead with Jonathan to attend the meeting with the assurance that he could sit on the president’s chair. I had by then released my statement with the understanding that Jonathan would preside over the FEC. My thoughts were that if he did attend and sat on the president’s seat, these would be indications he was effectively in charge. Just a few minutes later, however, I

gathered that Jonathan was no longer coming to the FEC meeting owing to the ministerial delegation’s return from Saudi Arabia. Shortly after, Yayale came into the council chambers to announce that ministers should assemble in the office of the acting president. What I didn’t know at the time—but was later told, however—was that a security detail had been assigned to stand behind the president’s chair before 10:00 a.m. to secure it from any ‘intruder’, which in this case would be Jonathan. Also, by addressing Jonathan as VP in my statement, I had unwittingly entered the political fray even though at that point I didn’t understand how big a fuss it would generate. The political drama had begun in the night when the president arrived at the residence where the flag of commander in chief was being flown. At that time, Akinola Aguda House, where Jonathan, as acting president, resided, also carried the flag of commander in chief. But beyond the symbolism was the fact that the Brigade of Guards had deployed troops to the airport with enormous weaponry to receive the president back into the villa without as much as notifying Jonathan. Although the ADC had followed the normal standard operating procedure in calling from Saudi Arabia to seek military reinforcement, the fact that Jonathan was, at least going by the National Assembly resolution, also commander in chief meant that troops should not have been deployed without his consent. By the next morning, there was also the dilemma of him driving into the villa with the insignia of commander in chief on his car. There were fears among his close aides that he could be shot by the soldiers. At this point, Azazi had become his adviser, and he pointed out all the seeming landmines from the military point of view. The situation was even more compounded by a mix of ethnicity and religion, especially given a security report that emanated from Nigeria, a copy of which was intercepted by one of the Western embassies in Nigeria. The report, believed to have been sent shortly before the ministerial delegation took off from Nigeria, was to the effect that the plot against Yar’Adua was meant to install a Christian to supplant a Muslim. Signals from the military were also hazy, with fears that some soldiers could take out both Yar’Adua and Jonathan. These were some of the dynamics playing out that day, but it wasn’t until very much later that I could understand the complex web of intrigue amid which I had found myself. The first call I got was from Ima Niboro, who told me that Jonathan wanted to know if he was no longer acting president. Then came a flurry of phone calls from other aides. By then, I knew I was in trouble. Even though we had anticipated that some people might question the rationale behind addressing Jonathan as acting president, no one imagined it was going to be as serious as it became. (On a personal note, what I felt was important at the time was that Jonathan would continue to run the affairs of the country. But given that he wanted to know what his official status was, I told Ima to issue a statement that would contradict mine by calling Jonathan acting president.)Looking back, if I had felt ‘acting president’ was the appropriate term to use in my statement, I doubt that anybody would have stopped me. That is the reason I found the insinuations that I had taken instructions from the First Lady rather ridiculous, especially when I did not get to meet with her until four days after they had returned from Saudi Arabia. Instructively, there were whispers that day within the villa that Yar’Adua could be playing the ‘Katsina trick’ on everyone. It was such a strong rumour that many people

believed, hence there was not much gravitation towards Jonathan that day. The ‘Katsina trick’ referred to how Yar’Adua had returned to Katsina State after six months in a German hospital. It was said that his then deputy had given him up as dead until Yar’Adua had ‘resurrected’ in the state, causing serious commotion. On February 23, 2010, many within the villa were expecting a similar occurrence. Nobody knew what to believe. Some ministers were even saying he could attend the FEC meeting that day. Depressed and confused, I called my former boss, Nduka Obaigbena, about the challenge I was now facing. He came to Abuja, and after I explained the scenario to him, he sought an appointment for a meeting with Jonathan that night. The reassuring feedback was that by the next morning, Jonathan would call a meeting of all presidential aides, including the CSO and the ADC. At the meeting, he would read the riot act, tell everybody he was in charge, and Ima Niboro and I would jointly address the media, at which time I would reaffirm loyalty to Jonathan as acting president. It was all agreed, and I felt this would resolve the problem. On my way to the office the next morning, I decided to see Obaigbena again, and while we were together, Ima Niboro called and was invited over by Obaigbena. In reviewing the political situation with regard to my statement where Jonathan was addressed as VP, I told him that the issue of acting president was not so serious and that I actually had an ace that exonerates me, assuming there was any opposition from the president’s side. I told Ima that in the medical report the president had sent from Saudi Arabia the previous week, Jonathan was addressed as acting president. I said that was sufficient evidence to show that even Yar’Adua recognized Jonathan as acting president. It was a surprise to me that Ima was not even aware of the report, and when he asked whether I could give it to him, I promised I would. Obaigbena also wanted THISDAY to have it, but I declined. A major feature of my stay at the villa was that I deprived THISDAY of so many stories. Not only did I not give them exclusives, they also downplayed several stories they sourced on their own just to protect me, because I would be the obvious suspect of a leak, even when I might not know anything about it. I eventually got to the office around 10:00 a.m., and at about the same time the ADC and the CSO also came in as we waited for word from the office of the acting president about the meeting, and nothing came. Several times, we called his office and that of his aides, and whenever we made enquiries, we were told the man was busy and that the meeting would hold. When at about 4:00 p.m., he still had not called us, I decided to intervene by granting an interview to the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA). Since the contentious issue was the fact that I had called Jonathan VP, I felt that I could redeem the situation simply by addressing him as acting president. The first question was on the status of Jonathan following the return of Yar’Adua. I ensured my response addressed the issue that agitated the minds of critics: “The acting president and commander in chief, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan continues to run the affairs of the country until the president (Umaru Musa Yar’Adua) is fit to take over. The statement is very clear that the acting president continues to run the affairs of the nation. And that remains the situation as far as I am concerned, and as far as the president is concerned.” The next question was in relation to the fate of Yar’Adua’s aides under the acting presidency of Jonathan, given that he also had his corps of aides. This was my reply: “We run one presidency, and the acting president has already called for a meeting, and I

believe the meeting will hold tomorrow, to brief us on how things will go and how he will run the presidency. Everybody is included, especially those who just returned from Saudi Arabia. So, it’s just one presidency, and we are all under Dr. Jonathan now as the acting president and commander in chief until the president returns to office fully.” After I had successfully navigated this issue, the reporter sought clarification about the statement that the acting president wanted to meet with Turai Yar’Adua, to which I remarked: “If you ask anybody who was at the meeting, he or she will tell you that what you have there in the press is not what actually happened. I was not actually there. I had some work that kept me in the office, and before I got there, the meeting was over. What I gleaned, however, was that the acting president said the president had arrived but that he has yet to see him. He suggested that he would see the First Lady, which was just a matter of courtesy. “So, when you hear that Turai is in charge, Turai takes over, all those things are not correct. It’s very unfair to the First Lady at a time [when] she is nursing her husband. So, there is no such thing, and you don’t expect the acting president, Dr. Jonathan, to report to the First Lady. It is abnormal, and it won’t happen. What the acting president actually said was that he was going to see the First Lady and ask about the husband, that is the president, and probably see him. To me, it is a normal situation, which, I believe, is the natural thing to do.” The last question dwelt on the relationship between the president and the acting president, to which I replied, “Good, very cordial relation. I know for a fact that when the president was in Saudi Arabia, the medical report of the president was sent to the acting president on the instruction of the president. The last one was last Friday. Dr. Salisu, the CPP, sent to the acting president through the ambassador a forwarding letter. I was copied. I have a copy of the medical report on the president’s health. And if you read the letter sent by the president, he addressed Dr. Jonathan as the acting president. I have a copy of the letter. “They have always had a cordial relationship. And I also know for a fact that several times in the council, when the president was presiding, he always said it that any time he was unavailable, no memo should wait for him, that they (ministers) should go to the acting president, who was then the vice president. And also, when there was friction between ministers and ministers of state, he often cited the kind of cordial relationship he had with Dr. Goodluck Jonathan then as his vice president. So, as far as I am concerned, they had a very cordial relationship.” My interview was lavishly aired on all the television channels and print media the next day, and I felt that the subtle rebuttal would at least attract some sympathy and would help defuse tension. It turned out that I was wrong, as it created another problem for me. By the afternoon of Saturday, four days after the president’s return, I got a call from Ima Niboro that the acting president wanted to see me. I drove to Akinola Aguda House and met him and Ima at the lunch table. There was no pretension; he was not in a friendly mood. He said he had received several phone calls concerning the interview I had granted the media, where I claimed that the president had been sending him medical reports from Saudi Arabia. He told me I was aware of the only one he had received, which was in itself very indicting. My statement was misleading and was causing him political problems, he explained and added, “Please Segun, you know I like you a lot, so I don’t want to be forced to disclaim your statement, but I may be forced to.”

I quickly interrupted that I would clarify the statement immediately. It was very evident to me at that point that I had unwittingly been caught in the web of a complex power game in which I got further entangled the more I tried to extricate myself. My allusion to the medical report in the interview was seen as a deliberate ploy to make Jonathan look bad. I explained the circumstances under which I had talked about the medical report and told him Ima was a witness. He knew that my intention was to validate the point that even Yar’Adua had acknowledged that Jonathan was acting president. That issue of the medical report, it later emerged, was the weapon that would be used against me in the media by those who claimed to be supporting Jonathan. An instance was a conference with editors in Lagos called by a prominent person in government who railed against my “negative role for the cabal,” claiming that I “had become a tool in the hands of Turai” and that I had conceived the issue of the medical report in order to embarrass Jonathan. I learnt a few days later that the issue of the medical report was being used by opponents of Jonathan, especially from the north, who argued that he never mentioned the fact that he ever received any such report from Saudi Arabia. So, in retrospect, I understand the basis of his anger towards me, even though I made my statement without any malicious intent. First, I felt, like Jonathan, that the medical report was not in any way helpful to Yar’Adua, and hence preferred that it be kept out of public view. Indeed, that was what I told the Nigerian ambassador who had sent it from Saudi Arabia. In not revealing the medical record, Jonathan was doing the president a world of good. Secondly, the medical report came only a week before the president’s arrival. Also, in alluding to it in my interview, I never meant it as an indictment of Jonathan, but rather to reinforce his position as acting president. The decision to bring up the issue of the medical report was not in any way meant to undermine Jonathan’s political fortune, it was to enhance it, but his handlers saw it differently, and I unwittingly became a pawn in what had become a complex power game. While the politicians were sucked in the unfolding intrigues and holding several meetings in Abuja, the main concern and challenge for me then was for the acting president to meet with the president. That was what I kept pushing for. Four days after the president arrived, I finally came across the First Lady on the evening of Saturday, November 26. She looked very pale and emaciated, and I told her so. I asked about the president, and we had a brief chat before I left. We were never really close, and it was almost always uncomfortable whenever we met. Maybe it was my fault. From the outset, I had decided that it was best for me to simply stick to my official assignment and avoid her, but I had told her husband that I would be willing to offer help any time she needed me. Since she never sought my assistance, I also did not bother to court her, which was good for me. But at this point when nobody could see the president, I knew the decision was hers to make, so I offered my advice that it was in the interest of everyone for the president to meet with the acting president. She agreed with me, but she was non-committal as to when such a meeting would take place. I felt awkward each day people asked whether I had seen the president. Convinced it was better to be frank over such a matter, my reply was always in the negative. Yet telling the truth also made me look ridiculous, if not stupid. How could I claim to be spokesman for someone I had not seen, a president on whose behalf I had issued a statement to the world? I had by now become the object of public derision. I had to endure all kinds of

snide remarks and could neither sleep at night nor eat. It was an overwhelming situation. Ten days after the arrival from Saudi Arabia, I had still not seen Yar’Adua. That was the day I decided I could no longer accept the situation. Following a series of failed promises from the CSO and the ADC, I knew it was not a decision they could make, so I went to the home of a confidant of the First Lady with a simple demand. “If your people will kill me today, I am prepared to die, but if I do not see Yar’Adua today, I am going to resign,” I told her. Screaming, I told the friend of the First Lady that there was nothing anybody could hide from me about Yar’Adua, as I had seen the worst of him. Even if he was in a coma or on life support, I needed to see him that day, otherwise they would hear it from the airwaves that I had resigned, I said. Apparently seeing a side of me that she had not seen before, the First Lady’s confidant put a call to the CSO and the ADC and invited them to her house, saying she had a big crisis on her hands. Within ten minutes, the ADC and the CSO had arrived and the trio did all they could to calm me, but I insisted that if I didn’t see the president, there was no way I could remain his spokesman beyond that day. I knew I was making a very difficult request, having been told by one of the security men who went with them to Saudi Arabia on the day they returned that the last time he saw the president was the day they were leaving Nigeria. This meant that throughout their sojourn in Saudi Arabia he never saw the president whose life he was supposed to be protecting. And given the way the return was organized, he also had not seen the president even when they travelled and returned together! But my mind was made up. It was from Hamza that I learnt that my request had been granted about two hours after I arrived home. He called to say that I should be on the alert, that anytime the president was awake, he would call so I could come to see him. That call gave me a surge of relief because while I had resolved to resign, I also realized it would further worsen the political situation, given the ethnic slant that could be given to my action. Besides, I genuinely liked Yar’Adua and enjoyed working with him. So, naturally, I empathized with him and would not want to be seen as having betrayed him. Yet, I considered my position untenable if I could not see him. Rather surprisingly, I would later learn that when the First Lady was told of my request, her response was, “Let him come and see baba. I have been told that people are now abusing the poor boy.” Unfortunately, it was around 2:00 a.m. when Hamza called that first day. I was asleep and so couldn’t make it. But three days later, I went with the ADC to the president’s living room. I was made to take off my shoes and, ordinarily, should have been disinfected in addition to a few other health protocols at that time. I met the president seated with the doctor and Hamza beside him, holding his hands. He was barely recognizable. I was introduced but given the vacant look on his face, I was not so certain he recognized me. He, however, managed to nod his head in acknowledgment of my presence. Yet, even that had taken considerable effort and time. I mumbled a few words of greeting and left without even being excused. I had seen enough to make me cry later. Although I felt a sense of relief that I had seen him, I felt really sad about the condition he was in. While I had hopes that he would recover, I had no illusions that the person I had seen that day would ever be strong enough to resume as president within the time left for his mandate to elapse. That explains why I was quite skeptical when stories suggesting he had fully recovered began to surface. There were tales in the media about

the president being sighted walking in the garden or going to the library. I knew they were lies and told every editor or reporter that contacted me to ignore such tales. Some did, but some still went ahead to publish the lies they were fed.

15

Beginning of the End While it was easy for Yar’Adua to be kept away from all the Nigerian delegations that made attempts to see him in Saudi Arabia, it was inconceivable that a similar ploy could be sustained within the presidential villa without consequences. Yet one week after he returned unexpectedly to the country, still too frail to rule, nobody outside of his immediate family, the CSO and the ADC could see him. Even within the family, there was growing discontent voiced mostly by female siblings, who apparently had their own grouse against the First Lady, whom they felt had shut them out from seeing their brother. The major headline news, however, came when the governors and top echelons of the PDP who came to the villa ostensibly to see the president were turned back. All this did great harm to the president’s image and also stoked the political crisis that his return to the country had engendered. That Jonathan had not been allowed to see him was perplexing for me and a few others who knew the implication of that, but with conflicting reports at that point either disputing or affirming that the duo had met, the situation was still manageable. On March 1, 2010, however, Jonathan decided to put paid to the speculations when Ima Niboro issued a statement to the effect that the acting president had not seen the ailing president since he arrived the country. In what he described as a clarification to some misleading reports in the media “that the acting president, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, met with President Yar’Adua this morning,” Niboro stated for the record that “the acting president has not seen the president since his return from Saudi Arabia last week.” The impact of this statement was devastating, because it further alienated the president even from those sympathetic to his plight, who found it difficult to comprehend a situation where he could be locked away in Aso Rock without seeing anybody, including his deputy. The issue became, understandably, a dominant media and public discourse. But Jonathan by then seemed to have concluded it was no longer an issue, as he began to increasingly assert himself in the polity. On the day he stated he had yet to see Yar’Adua, Jonathan named a presidential advisory committee, comprising prominent names across the country, whose responsibility, he said, would be to provide input on government policy. Headed by Danjuma, there was no clear agenda for this body that was set up, apparently, to send a signal that Jonathan was now fully in charge. The popular sentiment at this point was that the return of the president from Saudi Arabia was not only an act of political desperation, but a move capable of derailing Nigeria’s democratic project. That soon brought the inevitable recognition within, and a ringing endorsement by, the international community that power had changed hands in Nigeria with Jonathan as the new man to deal with. In extending an invitation to Jonathan to visit the White House, President Obama voiced America’s concern at Yar’Adua’s surprise arrival in the country when he was evidently not well enough to govern. The then British prime minister, Mr. Gordon Brown, also wrote Jonathan to offer the support of his government. It was painful to see Yar’Adua, holed up inside Aso Rock, descend gradually into an object of ridicule with all manner of media reports about how he had been kept in a mobile intensive care unit with the First Lady controlling access to him. There were also

reports that it was his corpse that was brought to the villa. All these, of course, were fabrications. But in the absence of any official information about the president, all the tales, however outlandish, were believed. It was wrong-headed not to have allowed Jonathan to see him, but I also could hazard a guess as to the cold calculations behind the move. When the president was brought back into the country, he could not talk. To surmount this challenge, some speech therapists from a North African country were contracted, with pledges from these experts that Yar’Adua would be able to speak in a matter of days after their sessions with him. The desire of the First Lady, from my understanding of the situation, was that by the time her husband would meet with Jonathan, he should be able to, at least, exchange greetings and perhaps utter a few words. She feared that exposing Yar’Adua to Jonathan in the state he was would only lead to one conclusion: that he was permanently incapacitated! Since relinquishing the presidency was not an option for the First Lady (the only person who could possibly make such a decision), Jonathan’s visit, which she actually desired, became a mere wish because of the health condition of the president. There were other people who also nursed the hope that whenever that meeting took place, Yar’Adua would be able to give some ‘instructions’ to Jonathan. They even had the sort of ‘instructions’ they wanted Yar’Adua to give, and top on the list was that he should ask that the secretary to the government of the federation, Alhaji Yayale Ahmed, be sacked. The problem with this cold calculation, however, was that it was based on what nobody had any control over: Yar’Adua’s declining health condition. A story I heard about what had transpired in Saudi Arabia when the House of Representatives delegation visited may also have played in the minds of the president’s handlers. Considering the political situation back home, there had been assurances that the House members would be allowed to visit the president at the hospital. When he was told about the visit, he was said to have asked rather emotionally: “To see me like this?” Yet at that point, his health had not even deteriorated to the condition under which he was brought back to the country. Although at this period (a week into his arrival) I also had not seen the president to ascertain his state of health, I could deduce that things must be pretty bad. I came to that conclusion because despite the fact that the CPP, Dr. Salisu Banye, and I were neighbours and our families had become quite close, I had yet to set my eyes on him since they arrived in the country. Whenever I asked about him from his wife, the response was always the same: he was with the president. Whether during the day or at night, he was on call with his august patient, who also had the full compliments of several medical experts flown in from Saudi Arabia and Germany. The only time Banye came home was either to eat or to freshen up, after which he would go back immediately. In fact, the first time I would see him was the day I finally met the president. That, to me, pointed to how serious the situation must be. Owing to the manner in which his return to the country was handled, Yar’Adua, who initially enjoyed the affection of most Nigerians with empathy for his health challenges, had become a specimen of shame. This for me was most troubling. All manner of medical experts were invited as television guests to diagnose a ‘patient’ they had never seen, with most of them concluding with magisterial authority that if Yar’Adua was not already dead, then he could only be some breaths away from death, because by the nature of the ailment afflicting him, he ought to have died by December or January.

Whatever the state he was in, keeping Yar’Adua from the people, especially when he was in the presidential villa, was doing far more harm than good to him as a person and to the country. Ironically, even the names being touted in the media as either “members of the cabal” or the “kitchen cabinet” were people who had also not seen the president. I kept pressing, pointing out the implications of shutting out everyone, including the acting president. Every day, I was given assurances that Jonathan would meet the president “tomorrow” or “by the weekend” or “within the next three days”; it kept changing. From the interactions, even when they tried to put positive spins on everything, it was evident that the condition of the president was not improving, or was perhaps even degenerating. On the political front, however, the president still had a remarkable support base, especially among the governors and the top hierarchy of his party. Several factors were responsible for this, but as long as he enjoyed this support, it was difficult for Jonathan to move against him. To forestall this move and checkmate the ministers, a week after the president arrived, the PDP governors met in Abuja to take a decision on what they perceived as the danger of invoking Section 144 by the Federal Executive Council. But they also had other issues on their agenda. At a meeting held on the eve of the March 3 FEC meeting, which would be the first since the arrival of the yet-to-be-seen Yar’Adua, members of the PDP Central Working Committee led by national chairman, Chief Vincent Ogbulafor, were also in attendance. First, they discussed the move being made by some ministers to begin a process that would culminate in invoking Section 144 of the constitution, in which case Yar’Adua would be deemed permanently incapacitated, to pave the way for his removal. This was not an option the governors or the party leaders were comfortable with, and the tone was set by a Niger Delta governor who described Yar’Adua as a good president who unfortunately suffered a health challenge, which, he argued, should not be criminalized. The preponderance of opinion at the meeting was that invoking Section 144 of the constitution to remove Yar’Adua from office, as the FEC was being goaded to do, would create problems in the country, as it was akin to a civilian coup. What seemed to have united the governors against Jonathan was the manner in which he appointed the presidential advisory council without consulting them or seeking their input. Almost all the governors said they knew nothing about the process that had led to the choice of nominees from their states. In expressing displeasure, one governor particularly noted that even President Obasanjo never appointed people from the states without consulting with the governors. Another issue that came up before the meeting, but which was not discussed, was that Jonathan’s advisory council had a northern Christian in Danjuma as chairman, with another Christian from the south, Prof. Ben Nwabueze, as deputy. Rather than make an issue out of it at the meeting as some northern governors had intended, it was agreed that someone would quietly point this out to Jonathan. The discussion soon moved to the issue of zoning, and Ogbulafor was asked to brief the governors on what the position of the party was in the event that Yar’Adua was unable to continue in office and as a result could not seek a second term. Before the session with the governors, the NWC members of PDP had held an elaborate meeting at the party’s Wadata House national secretariat in Abuja with the aim of adopting a common position. At the PDP NWC meeting were Prof. Rufai Ahmed Alkali, Hajiya Inna Ciroma, Dr.

Musa Babayo, Dr. Sam Ortom, Chief Uche Secondus, Mr. Olusola Oke, Mr. Tukur Mani, and the late Muyiwa Collins. At the end of their discussion, they had all accompanied Ogbulafor to the meeting with the governors. So, it was evident the position that he canvassed—that zoning would remain an article of faith within the PDP for the 2011 presidential elections—was not his personal opinion. The implication—even if it was not expressly stated—was that it foreclosed the possibility of Jonathan emerging the PDP presidential flag-bearer for the 2011 general elections. But that was all the governors wanted to hear. That was also the highlight of the meeting. The session rounded off with the unanimous decision that the party’s zoning formula would remain for the 2011 elections. But there was no consensus about how this should be handled, though the popular opinion was that it should not be announced after the meeting. A few of the northern governors, however, argued that the party chairman should immediately announce it as part of their decisions. It was thus a reluctant Ogbulafor who had the unenviable task of briefing the media on the outcome, which was essentially to state that the party would retain the zoning formula, with the presidency rotating between the north and the south. Put simply, only a northerner could fly the flag of the party as its presidential candidate for the 2011 election. “We discussed [the] zoning formula with the governors. The south had presidency for eight years. It is fair and just that the north also keep it for eight years,” Ogbulafor said. This was a very weighty decision that was hailed by many prominent politicians from the north but condemned by those from the south, especially by people like Chief Edwin Clark, who had long championed the cause of a Jonathan presidency the moment Yar’Adua fell ill. With that declaration, Ogbulafor was deemed a man that could no longer be trusted. A few days later, he was facing a corruption charge filed by the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC). The case had been filed originally in 2004 and was in relation to N104 million campaign donations. But the prosecution of the matter had been stalled for some inexplicable reasons. This charge of corruption began for Ogbulafor a chain of events that ultimately led to his forced resignation as PDP chairman. Instructively, the moment that was achieved, nothing was ever heard about the corruption charge again! Four days after inaugurating the Presidential Advisory Committee, Jonathan made another strategic move to consolidate his hold on power with the removal of the national security adviser (NSA), Major General Sarki Mukhtar (rtd.), and the appointment of Lt. Gen. Aliyu Mohammed Gusau as his replacement. Although the change of guard occurred in the middle of another violent crisis in Jos that claimed several lives, it was evident within the power calculus in the villa that Gusau was not appointed to resolve the Jos crisis. It was a political move. Gusau had also served in a similar capacity under President Olusegun Obasanjo from 1999 to 2006, so it was a return to very familiar terrain. But the appointment took on far more significance for those who knew what Gusau represented within the complex power game then unfolding in Aso Rock. The next morning, I had an interesting discussion with the CSO, who, I knew, had some authority with regard to decisions concerning the president. I told him that given the unfolding scenario, it would be in the interest of the president if the First Lady was advised that the meeting between Jonathan and her husband had become long overdue. I told him that with the snippets of information at my disposal concerning Gusau’s

appointment as NSA, the political game was going to change so dramatically that the outcome might not be pleasant for the president. He gave some vague commitments that Jonathan would see the president, but the hints I could take away was that the president was still in bad shape, in which case they didn’t want to expose him yet. Apparently, the speech therapists had not been able to perform any miracle. But time was running out for the president, and I knew that with the way events were going, the aces would soon be taken out of his hands. Just a few days later, Gusau made his first move. In picking Gusau, Jonathan based his calculation not merely on Gusau’s security network, experience or exposure. It was a strategic move motivated by Gusau’s connection with the larger Yar’Adua family. Even though Danjuma was said to have been the brains behind the appointment, it was common knowledge that Gusau was an associate of the president’s late elder brother, Major General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua (rtd.). His close relationship to the family can be glimpsed from the fact that he actually signed the president’s hospital form in Germany as next of kin at the early stage of his ailment. So, this implies that Gusau had ample knowledge of the president’s medical history and was also close enough to the family to offer ‘brotherly’ advice at this most crucial period. And that was his first mission. Three days after he assumed office, he visited the First Lady and, after the pleasantries, told her that he would be making some changes including replacing the ADC and the CSO to the president with new officers from both the military and the SSS. To replace Mustapha, Gusau said he would bring in Colonel Abdulazeez Musa Yar’Adua , the younger brother of the president (they both have the same parents) as the new ADC; he also proposed a list of senior SSS officers known to him and the First Lady from which a new CSO could emerge. In presenting this proposition, Gusau made it clear he was acting not in an official capacity but rather in what he considered the best interest of his younger brother. But the First Lady, who knew what the larger implications could be, was not fooled and quickly resisted. She pleaded with Gusau not to expose her husband to unnecessary danger. She said she had never dabbled into governance issues and didn’t know the consideration that informed her husband’s choice of the aides he appointed, hence she was not in a position to grant him, or anybody else for that matter, the permission to change any of them. “My husband appointed them by himself, so what do you expect me to tell him when he gets better: that I changed his ADC and CSO?” The discussion, from what I later gathered, was not very palatable, and it was evident Gusau’s mission was to move Yar’Adua out of the villa, either to Katsina or back to hospital in the bid to resolve the matter by terminating his presidency. Having penetrated the Yar’Adua family and the president’s inner circle, Gusau couldn’t be said to be acting alone. His move had the support of some of the friends and members of the president’s “kitchen cabinet”, some of whom had by then started gravitating towards Jonathan, seeing that the Yar’Adua era was gradually coming to an end. Gusau also had the support of some extended family members who felt sidelined by the First Lady and who did not take kindly to the fact that they were prevented from seeing Yar’Adua both while he was in Saudi Arabia and when he was brought back home. With Gusau’s arrival on the scene, the First Lady knew she could soon be outwitted. She moved quickly and rallied prominent citizens and respected emirs in the north. She relayed what had transpired between them and pleaded for intervention to prevent a

situation that could lead to the forcible ejection of the president from the villa. While her intervention worked, externalizing the meeting only angered Gusau, and the battle lines seemed drawn. His next move was a directive to the chief of army staff that all the soldiers in the entire Brigade of Guards be posted out of the villa with new soldiers brought in from a battalion in Sokoto. With the president’s return handled almost like a military operation, a campaign of calumny had been launched against the chief of army staff, Lt. General Dambazzau. A brilliant military officer and fine gentleman, Dambazzau had been caught in the crossfire of Nigerian politics simply on account of being a northerner like the president. Yet, the reality was that as long as Yar’Adua was alive and had not been removed, he remained, in the eyes of the law, the commander in chief of the armed forces. Jonathan had also been conferred the title of commander in chief by a resolution of the National Assembly. Dambazzau and the entire armed forces were therefore caught in the dilemma of serving two masters, and it was clear that nothing, barring his removal as chief of army staff, would pacify Ijaw leader, Chief Edwin Clark, who had publicly announced himself as Jonathan’s ‘godfather’. The charge against Dambazzau was the deployment of troops by the Brigade of Guards on the night the president arrived in the country, even though the military’s standard operating procedure for such exercise was followed. The simmering uncertainty at the villa was not restricted to the military. Within the civil society, there were a series of protests in Lagos and Abuja. While the drama was on, some ministers, comprising mostly the elderly ones who had held several appointments in the past, met at the ministry of defence to adopt a common position on the state of the nation and what they believed Jonathan should do to resolve the tension. The ministers were led by Niger Delta minister, Chief Uffot Ekaette; others were defence minister, Major General Godwin Abbe; education minister, Dr. Sam Egwu; interior minister, Alhaji Shettima Mongunu; and petroleum minister, Dr. Rilwanu Lukman. After their meeting, they decided to hold a session with Jonathan to impress upon him the fact that the campaign being launched from within the Federal Executive Council would be counter-productive. They adopted a common position that was in sync with that of the governors. Their position formed their discussion points with the acting president, namely: • Jonathan was not running a distinct administration but rather a continuation of the mandate given Yar’Adua and him in 2007. Jonathan should therefore resist the attempt to invoke Section 144, because they felt it would fail, and if it did, the consequences on the polity would be catastrophic. • The campaign against Yar’Adua by some government officials was not right because the president was being criminalized just on account of being sick. • Jonathan should not make seeing Yar’Adua a precondition for continuing to preside over the affairs of the nation or use it as a weapon to have the man removed from power. • The acting president should be wary of some politicians, especially from Niger Delta, who were making inflammatory statements. Chief Edwin Clark was particularly singled out. By the time these elderly ministers met with Jonathan, his mind seemed already made up

that he could no longer wait for Yar’Adua. That conviction was strengthened by what his own informants within the villa must have given him about the condition of the president. To Jonathan, it was time to move ahead. Three days after the meeting, he sacked the entire cabinet. When it was reconstituted, none of these elders made it back to his new cabinet while two ministers who had earlier been relieved of their duties by Yar’Adua were returned to the cabinet. That was how Senator Sanusi Daggash and Adamu Maina Waziri found their way back. The real talking point, however, was the inclusion of Murtala Yar’Adua, nephew of the president, on the list. This move, believed to have been instigated by Obasanjo, led to serious problems within the family. But it was not totally unexpected. It is believed within the Yar’Adua family that there was no love lost between the First Lady and Murtala’s mother, Hajjia Binta. But beyond the feud between these two powerful women, there was also a feeling that the president had not rallied the family the way his late elder brother had done, even though Yar’Adua was the beneficiary of his political legacy. To put the situation mildly, according to family insiders, Murtala and his siblings believed they did not get a fair deal from the president and hence had a strained relationship with him. The ministerial nomination by Jonathan was therefore a political masterstroke aimed at weakening the Yar’Adua camp in what had become a complex but subtle power struggle. Even though some prominent northern citizens tried to put pressure on Murtala to reject the nomination because of its implications for the family, it turned out that his mother’s commitment had been secured before the announcement was made. So it was already a done deal. The manner of the ministerial nominees’ composition also showed that, in some states, Jonathan simply went for people who had an axe to grind with the president, apparently in preparation towards the delicate issue of invoking Section 144. In Bauchi State, for instance, the nominee was a member of the opposition All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) who led the National Interest Group in the Senate, which worked for the actualization of Jonathan’s acting presidency. He would later be given the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) portfolio, considered in Nigeria’s political parlance as one of the ‘juiciest’ ministries because of the size of its budget and the enormity of patronage that the office holder can dispense. In the course of this period, I paid Jonathan a visit, which was ordinarily normal and quite frequent, but this time under different circumstances. I recall the conversation with him revolved around his frustration. I explained my own dilemma to him and the fact that I would not want to be seen as abandoning my boss when he was practically helpless. I also offered a piece of personal advice: “Sir, if I were in your position, I would be wary of the people very close to Yar’Adua but who are now gravitating towards you because if they could do such to him, they will also do it to you.” While he said he understood my predicament, he minced no words about the fact that what we had at the villa was an aberration. He said it was the height of abnormality to have an acting president within the villa with another who called himself president yet would not be seen within the same villa. “Even in a situation where you have an acting president, it is presumed that the president is not around. But here we are in the same villa with a president nobody sees and an acting president who is in charge. This is abnormal.” With this disposition, Jonathan decided to move, but bearing in mind the complexity of the situation, given Nigeria’s ethnic and religious fault lines. His first act was to raise a

27-man team of prominent leaders from Niger Delta, led by Dr. Atuboyedia Obianime, to meet with an Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) team led by Major General IBM Haruna in Kaduna to begin what they described as “a new window of rapprochement”. This came at a period when ethnicity and religion were fast beginning to shape discussions on the issue, particularly with the audience granted some prominent northern Islamic clerics by the president on March 31, 2010. The clerics, whose visit generated a lot of controversy, would be the first set of people to publicly acknowledge setting their eyes on the president since he left the country for Saudi Arabia on November 23, 2009. Incidentally, I played a role in the visit. I recall that the day before the clerics came to the villa, the CSO had sent me a note and sought my advice on four individuals who he said were visiting the president. On the list, the only recognizable name was that of Dr. Datti Ibrahim Ahmed. Of course, I didn’t like the fact that they were all northerners because of the ethnic slant I knew the visit would be given, but I imagined the four persons were political figures. But even if I had known they were clerics, I wouldn’t have opposed the idea, because this was the first time there was a suggestion that anybody from outside could see him. Having campaigned that the president should be made to receive people, I concluded if he saw those with whom he felt comfortable that could be a strategic way to begin to open him up for public interaction. But the problems started when one of the visitors, who turned out to be the chief imam of the Abuja National Mosque, Ustaz Musa Mohammed, told his congregation that Yar’Adua would resume duties soon, as “he has improved remarkably.” In a lavishly publicized statement, the cleric gave a graphic description of the posture of the president while they were with him, including the fact that he was dressed in a jumper and trousers with a cap to match. Besides, the Islamic leader, who confirmed that he had met with the president alongside Dr. Datti Ibrahim Ahmed, president of the Supreme Council of Sharia in Nigeria, and one Sheik Musa Pantami, explained that they sought permission from the president’s family for the audience and not that they were invited to see him. The fact that these visitors were Muslims and northerners was not missed, especially when the acting president was not allowed to see him. According to the chief imam, they met the president sitting down with his wife while his ADC stood behind him. “Although we could not hear what he said, from where we sat, we could see his mouth saying amen together with us when we prayed for him. In fact, contrary to rumours that he was seriously ill, we saw that he had improved tremendously, and we believe he [will] be able to resume work any moment from now.” The only positive aspect of the clerics’ visit was that it helped to debunk the insinuation that Yar’Adua was on life support. But it also helped to exacerbate the political crisis, with the accusations that religion was being introduced by the president’s handlers, especially when Dr. Datti Ahmed gave his own version of events to the media, warning in the process that Yar’Adua’s presidential authority must not be taken away from him: We met the president around 5:00 p.m. late in the afternoon. Contrary to what some people have been saying, the president is not in a situation where he is almost dead; he is only sick. He was sitting down on a dining chair when we came in and met him. He was not being supported by anybody but himself, he was sitting down calmly. He did not look like someone who is almost dead. When we entered, we were not sure of what we were going to meet. So we

entered and stood at a respectable distance and greeted him. He extended his hand to us and we shook it one by one. This is contrary to the view of those who keep saying he doesn’t know where he is. After that, we prayed for his health. He joined us in the prayers, raising his hands the way we raised our own; his lips were moving. When we finished, we told him we only came to greet him. He shook hands with us. We did not wait as such after that. However, we told him that we just wanted to see him to know the truth from the lies that they have been telling us that he is dead, no longer able to recognize anyone, and all the lies that you and I have heard before. Obviously, he has lost some weight, and he is a bit weak, but he was sitting down calmly. He shook our hands on arrival, and when we prayed with him for his quick recovery, he again shook hands with us. I wish to warn that there is need for people to be careful in the utterances being made about incapacitation, taking the presidential authority and giving such to other persons. Some people [have] to reflect before they stage a civilian coup against him. President Yar’Adua has his deputy, who [can] act for him while he is not there. He knows that he is alive and is only unwell at this point in time. However, nobody should take over his position because he is not available. The president still has a good chance of recovery. Nobody should take over his post and create problems for the country. Those who are thinking of doing that are playing with fire. I will suggest that Dr. Jonathan continues (sic) to act as president till Yar’Adua is fit enough to resume. If he does not get well by 2011, elections will take place, and another person will emerge through a democratic process. But if any person attempts to seize that presidential authority now, the consequences will remain with the country for a long time. It will not be a wise decision and not in the interest of even younger generations of Nigerians.

Expectedly, there was national outrage over the visit. To resolve the tension, there was a suggestion that prominent Christian leaders also be invited to pray for him. In Nigeria, religion and politics have always had a good mix. While they couldn’t reach the general overseer of the Redeemed Christian Church of God, Pastor E. A. Adeboye, who was on the shortlist, they got the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) president and Catholic archbishop of Abuja, Most Rev. John Onaiyakan; presiding bishop of Living Faith Church, Bishop David Oyedepo; and Rev. Emmanuel Kure from Kaduna. I was also invited to attend, but I declined, arguing that since I didn’t attend that of the Muslim clerics, there was no reason I should be at the session with the Christian clerics. I also advised that the session should not be made a media event but that if the clerics so chose, they could speak to the media afterwards; I would not report their visit. The clerics came in about 4:30 p.m. on April 5, 2010, and after seeing and praying for the president, they asked the First Lady whether she had any issue she wanted to discuss with them. They said they were not just there to pray but to see if they could offer a solution to what had become a complex problem. They then had a private meeting with her, during which she narrated the story of Yar’Adua’s ill health, their experience in Saudi Arabia, the return, and her fears about the situation within the villa. After dispersing from the villa, the clerics congregated in Abuja the next morning, having been invited by Jonathan, who apparently wanted to hear firsthand the impression of the clerics. At that time, one could count the number of people who had set their eyes on the president—apart from the First Lady, the CSO, the ADC, his doctor, Hamza, and about two personal stewards. Aside from his two friends, Hon. Shehu Inuwa of the House of Representatives and Alhaji Dahiru Mangal, the only other people who had seen him were his mother and his siblings. The Muslim clerics, the Christian clerics and I completed the

list. No other person, not even those considered ‘cabal members’ were allowed to see him. So to invite the Christian clerics, Jonathan must have been curious as to the state the president was in; he must have needed information from people who he was certain would not deceive him. The meeting with Jonathan was, however, very brief, as the clerics explained the circumstances that had led to their invitation. From what they saw of Yar’Adua, the Christian leaders knew that only a miracle could bring him back as president, and this they clearly stated. They therefore pleaded with Jonathan to show compassion and understanding in the way he would deal with a man they believed was in his last days.

16

The Days of the ‘Cabal’ It was sometime early in 2009 when an aide who was closer to the president than I was came to my office to seek a favour. He wanted me to help him intervene to save the job of the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) director general, Mr. Yomi Abolarinwa. He said he had it on good authority that some powerful people in government had conspired to have the man removed because he refused to bend the rule for them on the issuance of radio and television licences. I knew why this aide had come to me: the president had contempt for people who dabble into areas outside their purview. Since my portfolio had to do with communication, the president would respect my view, he must have concluded. While I didn’t know Abolarinwa, I could recollect attending meetings where his name had come up in a negative light, so I was not surprised that he was going to be removed. The charge was always that he was shirking his responsibility as a regulator by allowing certain private radio stations located in the southwest region to be broadcasting politically dangerous material without him applying sanctions. But the travails of the NBC director general, according to this aide, had to do with his decision to stick to principles in the discharge of his official duties. The documents he handed me backed this claim because they contained official correspondences between the DG and the powerful people who wanted him out. My first inclination was to take up the matter with the information and communications minister, Prof. Dora Akunyili, who I was sure would intervene on the side of justice, but when I learnt the president was in the office and had no visitor, I decided to see him immediately as suggested by the intermediary. When I met with the president, I went straight to the point. I said I had been alerted that the DG of NBC had problems, but I also knew the root of it. I presented the matter and the documents before the president, who after going through them shook his head and said, “Segun, I cannot thank you enough for this. You know what you just did for me? You prevented me from taking an unjust decision. I have just approved the man’s sack.” He brought out a copy of a memo and tore it in my presence before now going into an exhortation of the challenges confronting leaders in the face of officials whose vested interests most often override the national interest. During the crisis occasioned by his illness and refusal (or inability) to transmit a letter to the National Assembly as demanded by law, I reflected on my relationship with Yar’Adua and the opportunity he had given me to make some positive contributions. For instance, it was my memo that led to the reduction of the salaries and emoluments of public officials on the executive side. It was also my memo that led to the composition of the Presidential Committee on Global Economic Recession. Based on the advice I got from Dudu Orumen, I also wrote the memo that led to the constitution of the Presidential Committee on the 2010 World Cup in South Africa at a time when our qualification for the tournament was threatened. Given the bastardization of the national honours, I also intervened with a memo that led to its review by the Justice Belgore Committee. The foregoing are just a few of my several interventions approved by Yar’Adua, who also gave me the liberty to discuss freely with him without any inhibition, which speaks

volumes about his kind of person. I recall a particular episode when we were going to Saudi Arabia for the Third OPEC Summit, in November 2007. Before we left for the airport, someone had given me a copy of a publication by a foreign website dedicated to oil and gas reporting. The publication detailed how oil lifting licences were given out by President Yar’Adua in a manner that lacked transparency. In the course of the flight, I scribbled a handwritten note, attached the document to it and went to hand it to him in his cabin. Not long after, he called me back and confirmed that all the information contained in the publication was accurate. At that time, the president was still holding on to the Energy Ministry portfolio. He said that whenever we reached Saudi Arabia, I should meet the minister of state for energy, Mr. Odein Ajumogobia and give him the document to read in my presence and let him know that I was acting on his instruction. He said I should listen to his comments and report back to him. He added that I should do the same to the GMD of NNPC, Eng. Abubakar Yar’Adua (not a relation of the president). When we got to Riyadh, I acted as the president directed. I met the GMD first, and he blamed everything on Ajumogobia and the president. When I later met Ajumogobia, he explained that he was powerless and that the GMD of NNPC had no regard for him since he was reporting directly to the president. He also agreed the report was accurate but that the said allocations were done between the president and the GMD. I reported my ‘findings’ back to the president, who took time to explain his own role as well as the roles of the promoters of some of the ‘briefcase companies’ on the list. They were prominent people in the society, including those who had held senior positions in government in the past. The president also debunked the charges by both Ajumogobia and the GMD by explaining the role each played in the matter. What was not in doubt from the president’s explanation was that the GMD was indeed bypassing Ajumogobia because he had direct access to the president. This to me was not right. With my background in the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI), a governing body to which I had been appointed by President Obasanjo in 2004, I was able to offer candid advice, which the president promised to heed. When we returned, he indeed directed the GMD to be reporting directly to Ajumogobia, but not long after, Lukman took charge of affairs in the ministry and the equation changed. Given the foregoing, it was natural that I would feel for Yar’Adua at his most trying moments, especially during the crisis that followed his last trip to Saudi Arabia. At that critical period, there was no doubt in my mind that the correct thing to do was to send a letter of notification to the National Assembly so that Dr. Goodluck Jonathan could assume the presidency in an acting capacity as specified by the constitution. By not doing that, he did violence to the ideals I knew he stood for and made my continued stay in government difficult to defend. Towards the end of 2009, I began to weigh all my options. By then also, there were people calling on me to resign my appointment as Yar’Adua’s spokesman. I can categorize them into two: the first comprised my friends and well-wishers, who argued that I couldn’t possibly justify being spokesman for a president with whom all Nigerians had lost contact. I agreed with the position of this group but nonetheless felt that it was better for me to wait for the arrival of the president before taking any such decision. I had my reason: At a time when the handlers of the VP were desperate to take power and there was already a mix of ethnic and religious rivalry in the crisis, I didn’t want to be seen as

taking any action that would hurt Yar’Adua politically. At that point, I had nothing to lose by resigning since I had my exit plan already mapped out; besides, such a course of action would have earned me some applause from my colleagues in the media and civil society. But the question I asked myself was, how would Yar’Adua feel whenever he recovered and he heard that I had jumped ship just because he was sick? He definitely didn’t deserve that from me. The option I chose was to go to school, and by January 2010, my exit plan was already secured, and the people close to me were aware. Incidentally, there was a second group that also wanted me to resign from government based on certain political calculations. People in this group were not thinking of my interest or, for that matter, that of the nation. By the beginning of 2010, there were already aspirations for the 2011 general elections, and different politicians were making their projections. Owing to the strategic position I held as spokesman for the president, there were those who felt that a public announcement of my resignation would weaken Yar’Adua’s hold on power, and they wanted to use me to achieve that end. Even when I knew how close some of these people were to Jonathan, they still offered ‘advice’ for me to resign ‘on principle’. I refused to meet their expectation. When going into public service, I was under no illusion that everybody would like my decision or the choices I would make, but at every point in the course of my stewardship, I tried to stay true to the values I espoused as a commentator on public affairs. Did I make mistakes? Yes I did. But my decision at every point was based on the evaluation of the information I had and what I considered to be the best approach in the circumstances I found myself at the time. It is possible that others might react a different way given the same situations, but I made my choices and I take responsibility for them. Quite naturally, Yar’Adua’s illness and the power struggle it unwittingly fuelled led to all manner of speculation, the most ludicrous of which was the myth of a cabal that had hijacked power in Aso Rock and for which I was fronting. While I never placed any premium on the ‘cabal’ theory, a conversation on the day Architect Namadi Sambo was sworn in as VP put the issue in its real perspective. When he was still governor of Kaduna State, Sambo would always visit my office to say hello anytime he came to the villa, and with that we became friends. So when he was nominated to the position of VP, I decided to congratulate him the moment it was confirmed by the National Assembly. I met with him at his new Akinola Aguda official residence, but as I made to leave, Mr. Isaiah Balat asked me to join his car to the villa so I could also witness the swearing in. It was a big vehicle, so there were many people inside. On the way, Balat, himself a former minister in the Obasanjo government, asked, “Segun, this cabal thing, were you really a member?” Before I could respond, former Federal Capital Territory minister, Mallam Nasir el-Rufai, who played a prominent role in the campaign that eventually brought Jonathan to power, interjected, “There was no cabal, we created the myth in the media to neutralize Turai.” The story at that time was that a ‘cabal’ had captured power in Aso Rock and was ruling in the name of a president many assumed was even dead. Yet nothing can be farther from the truth. While I also saw no sense in the way Yar’Adua was brought back into the country, especially when he was still sick, the fact was that his wife never interfered in the affairs of government; it was Jonathan who was running the show as acting president.

What was happening at the time was that there were ministers and other top government officials as well as businessmen and women who were fighting either to retain their power and privileges under Yar’Adua or to secure such under Jonathan. On the side of the president were people like the agriculture minister, Dr. Abba Ruma, his FCT counterpart, Senator Adamu Aliero and Tanimu, as well as Alhaji Dahiru Mangal (businessman and friend of President Yar’Adua). They needed no one to tell them that with Yar’Adua out, they would also be left out in the cold. On the other side were mines and steel minister, Mrs. Deziani Allison Maduekwe and her Niger Delta counterpart, Godsday Orubebe, who were fighting to become the new power brokers in the villa, with strong backing from private-sector people like Femi Otedola. What was interesting about these disparate interests was that there was no coordinated group either on the side of Yar’Adua or on the side of Jonathan, but as ‘cabals’ go, these were some of the real vested interests jostling for power at a time when alliances and counter-alliances were being forged. Even before that confession by el-Rufai, I knew there was no cabal, and aides of President Jonathan would bear witness that it was the joke in Aso Rock, as I always announced my presence at meetings as ‘representative of the cabal’. That was before Sam Worlu changed my designation to ‘head of the intellectual wing of the cabal’. Within the villa, the myth of a ‘cabal’ taking decisions at a time when Jonathan was effectively in charge suited the campaign to quickly resolve the logjam with the legal transfer of power from a president nobody was sure was dead or alive. Yet, outside the villa, Nigerians were simply led to believe a lie! But the more this public perception was reinforced, the more difficult my job became. For instance, in the interview I granted the NTA to retract my earlier one where I addressed Jonathan as VP, I stated, quite correctly, that the First Lady had not hijacked power in Aso Rock. This was based on the claims supposedly made by the minister of information, Professor Dora Akunyili. Following the cancellation of the FEC meeting the day the president was brought in from Saudi Arabia, Akunyili told State House correspondents, “He (Acting President Jonathan) invited us for a meeting in his meeting room at 2:00 p.m., and when we came, he told us that the president has returned. He has been briefed by the aides of the president and that he hopes to see the wife of the president this evening and that when we meet next week, we will be briefed on the outcome of the Saudi Arabia trip by the members of council. And that when he is eventually briefed by our president, he will call us again.” The banner headline in most newspapers the next day, however, was ‘Jonathan to Meet Turai’ with imputations that the First Lady was now running the affairs of the country and that the acting president would be reporting to her. In my interview, I corrected this insinuation by saying, “When you hear that Turai is in charge, Turai takes over, all those things are not correct, there is no such thing, and you don’t expect the acting president, Dr. Jonathan, to report to the First Lady. It is abnormal and it won’t happen. What the acting president actually said was that he was going to see the First Lady and ask about the husband, that is, the president, and probably see him. To me, it is a normal situation, which I believe is the natural thing to do.” It was this clarification from me that was interpreted to mean that I had become the First Lady’s ‘tool’ by taking a stand that put a lie to the general notion that she had taken charge at the villa. Interestingly, it did not even matter to my critics that, apparently

embarrassed by the report, the acting president had himself directed Ima Niboro to clarify the comments attributed to him at the meeting between him and the ministers. Niboro’s statement, issued on the same day as my interview but, of course, without attracting as much attention reads, “This is to clarify the comments made by the acting president, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, when he met with members of the Federal Executive Council yesterday on the return of President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. The Acting President had said that he was briefed by the President’s aides that he (President Yar’Adua) was resting after the journey, but that he (Acting President) intended to meet with the First Lady, Hajjia Turai Yar’Adua, later in the day to say hello to the family. These remarks seem to have been widely misinterpreted in some quarters, hence this clarification.” The problems in the villa escalated despite the clarifications, worsened by the fact that Yar’Adua was still kept away from the public, including even the acting president. But this was something over which I had no control. By this period, however, my days in government were already numbered whether or not Yar’Adua returned to office, though I was determined to keep a dignified silence even when I didn’t agree with what was going on. It was convenient for my critics to ignore the fact that between November 23, 2009, when Yar’Adua travelled to Saudi Arabia and his controversial return, I spoke only five times. The first, to announce on the day he travelled that he was going on medicals; the second, four days later, to say that the diagnosis revealed he had pericarditis (which I had a challenge pronouncing); the third, on January 10, 2010, from Angola (where I had gone to watch the Cup of Nations) to say that the president was not dead; this was a reaction to the rumour fuelled by a story in NEXT ; the fourth, to announce on February 24, 2010, that he was back to the country; and the fifth, 24 hours later, to clarify that Jonathan remained acting president! Indeed, throughout the period the president was in Saudi Arabia, I assisted the office of the vice president because my concerns were always about the nation. I recall that on the day the National Assembly passed the resolution to make Jonathan the acting president, I was the first to rush to his office that he needed to make a strong broadcast that would put the crisis behind the nation. By then, I already had my exit plan clearly mapped out but decided nonetheless that I would not desert Yar’Adua. I recall expressing anger when I saw Niboro and Jonathan’s special adviser on political matters, Dr. Akilu Sani Indabawa, trying to shield the computer from me while drafting the acceptance speech. I concluded that they didn’t want me around and left. Later that day, I called Oghiadome and requested a meeting of all presidential aides in his office. At the meeting the next day, I didn’t mince words. I told them that I could not work under a situation of intrigues and that I was ready to quit government if there was no longer trust. Oghiadome calmed me down and assured me that we would all work together. The meeting was instructive, because after I spoke, the president’s personal secretary, Matt Aikhionbare, who would later be retained by Jonathan also voiced the same concerns as mine. The campaign against me was that I was disrespectful of his person and that I aligned myself with one imaginary cabal that thwarted his bid to take over power. Yet the only ‘evidence’ being cited was that I called Jonathan vice president rather than acting president on the day the president arrived in the country from Saudi Arabia. Looking back, that was a big mistake, which was due to the circumstances of the day.

I recall insisting that I would not make any statement unless I saw the president, and this stalled our meeting for more than fifteen minutes. That explains why I will forever respect David Edevbie. He was not the only one at the meeting who said I was being ‘unreasonable’ for making seeing the president a precondition for issuing the statement, but he came to my house the next day because he said he owed me a personal apology. I felt touched by his gesture. It is so easy to forget now, but there was tension in the country on February 24, 2010, and nobody had any clue as to what was going on except those who had just returned from Saudi Arabia. Within the villa (and by implication the country), nobody was in charge. What we wanted to avert that day was anarchy, which we tried to do by reiterating that Jonathan should continue to run the affairs of the country. In light of the fact that Yar’Adua was brought home invalid, which I didn’t know at the time, I agree it was wrong for me to have addressed Jonathan as VP; I should have addressed him as acting president as I did the next day without any prompting. I accept responsibility for that error of judgement and feel deeply sorry about it. However, given that the arrival of the president coincided with a period when the executive council had been divided along ethnic lines, when there was already a power struggle between the loyalists of the president and those whose sympathy lay largely with Jonathan, the tone and content of my first statement helped significantly to relieve the tension. But as days went into weeks and Yar’Adua was still kept incommunicado to Nigerians and I refused to say anything, it was not unexpected that I would be considered disloyal by people close to the First Lady. The accusation was always that I allowed the opponents of the president to attack him without me hitting back. To this charge were also added innuendoes about my ethnicity, especially by those who never saw wisdom in Yar’Adua picking an ‘outsider’ as his spokesman. Notwithstanding all the darts coming at me from all angles, I kept my silence, which in itself spoke volumes as to what was going on at a period when Nigerians, used to having ‘ghost workers’, were now saddled with a ‘ghost president’!

17

The End Even though I had been reluctant to accept an offer to join the government in 2007, I still concede that I considered it a privilege participating in high level discussions about the governance of my country. I also enjoyed working with the president, who had come to trust my judgement on several issues. Unfortunately, his seemingly endless bout with what was apparently a chronic illness made governance such a daunting challenge and my own role more and more untenable. My frustration with his health challenges actually began long before his last Saudi trip. It started a year earlier when he went on the controversial first trip to Saudi Arabia, supposedly to perform Umrah (lesser hajj), and would not return as scheduled, thus missing the state visit to Brazil. I recall my exchange of mails on September 2, 2008, with my friend, Waziri Adio. Right from my days at THISDAY, I had always respected Waziri’s judgement at critical times, and when I felt I needed to express my feelings of despondency at what was happening around me at that particular period, it was natural that I would turn to him. In my e-mail, I wrote: This, I must confess, is one of the most frustrating moments of my life. I came to government with much enthusiasm, thinking one would be in a position to make some difference. But I am wasting my time here. The president is a good man with whom I enjoy working, and I still have the access. But there are issues now that make effective governance practically impossible. And in that situation, other forces will come in as I see them coming in, to the detriment of the nation. You must notice that I have been quiet at a time [when] the rumour mill is rather strong on the president’s health. The point is that I cannot lie because of what I know. The truth is that in Saudi Arabia, only [the] CSO and the First Lady can access the president, as they have effectively fenced off every other person. It was the bravado of Dr. Bukola Saraki (Kwara State governor) that got the president to speak with the VP and some other people, including Chairman (of THISDAY, Nduka Obaigbena) two days ago. Yet that happened because Saraki has a friend among the Saudi Princes who was able to bulldoze his way through the hospital security to take him in. That is the situation in Saudi Arabia. And to worsen matters, the country is drifting. Most of the ministers don’t know their left from their right even though they also claim, and rightly too, that they don’t know what is going on. I have asked myself several times why I allowed myself to join government. I worry about my country. I am sending you this in confidence, and I have not discussed with anybody and have no intention to: I am looking for an exit strategy by way of either admission to study in the United States or any job that will take me outside the country so I can go with my family. The former Chief of Staff, a very good man, called me shortly before he left and advised that under no circumstance should I be frustrated or provoked into leaving government. I had wanted to quit at one point early in the life of the administration, and he counseled against it. He said if I had to fight physically with some people, I should do it before adding: “Nigeria belongs to all of us.” That statement rings in my ears anytime I feel low, but even at that, a time will come that one may no longer be able to tolerate what is going on….The country is not being told the truth, the

health situation of the president, from what I can gather, is bad. And there is no date as to when he will return to the country from Saudi Arabia. Yet everyone is blaming communication, as if I don’t know what to do. So you can see my frustration.

Waziri’s reply lifted my spirits: I share your pains. But this is the real world of politics and governance. So, I should say welcome. You see, I have read a number of columnists and activists saying full disclosure is necessary and blaming communication. But the easiest thing to do in the world is to venture opinion from the safety of your laptop or press release. In the real world of politics, things are more complicated. When things like this happen, everybody becomes an expert on communication. I think the most important thing to do is to maintain a sense of perspective and walk the fine line with your dignity intact. This does not mean you need to do something rash. If you have the clearance, you could say something like “the president went for lesser Hajj and took ill (like any human being) necessitating his hospitalization. He has received medical attention and will soon return to the country.” If he is not returning soon, you will need to say something at a point, as the media and civil society will not back off, and this has implications, including for security. Exiting is not an option, Nigeria belongs to all of us, not to some people, and it is in our interest to make it work. Think of it as further education about the complexity of our country, about why things do not work, and about how they could. This is not what columnists do. It is the real thing; in the real world. There is a lot to be done; a lot to be learnt. Hang in there my brother. Bear whatever blame with equanimity. It goes with the terrain. This too shall pass.

By the end of 2009, when it became glaring that the health of the president had become an issue that would not go away, all these frustrations would return, and I came to the inescapable conclusion that I had to leave government. But mindful of several factors, including the ethnicity issue, I resolved I would have to do it with tact. I recall that when I was appointed, there were several people from the northern part of the country who felt that Yar’Adua had not made a wise political choice. The argument was that his predecessor, Obasanjo, a Yoruba man, picked three kinsmen of his in succession, and so by the same logic, Yar’Adua ought to have picked a Hausa-Fulani man. There was an open campaign about this, which he ignored. I didn’t want to give those who criticized my appointment an opportunity to say, “We warned him.” He didn’t deserve that from me. Through the help of my friend, the Consul General of the Chinese Embassy in Nigeria, Mr. Guo Kun, I had secured a scholarship for a one-year MPA programme at the Beijing University that would have enabled me to go with my family. My relationship with the Chinese embassy dates back to 2001, when, as the Saturday editor of THISDAY, I was invited from Nigeria as one of several African journalists selected for the first SinoAfrican conference in Beijing. It was a fascinating experience. When Guo arrived at the embassy in 2005, he took special interest in THISDAY, and he struck a personal friendship with me. Through him, the Chinese ambassador, Mr. Xu Jianguo (now back to Beijing) also became a personal friend, and he hosted me and my wife to dinner several times in Abuja. He also frequently visited me in my office. So when I was looking for a way out of government at the end of 2009, it was inevitable that I would approach him to

help, and he did. My plan, therefore, was that whenever the president came back, I would inform him that I had secured admission, which would then mean that I could resign. That way, there would be no question of disloyalty, as the reason for my resignation would be clear. But the circumstances of his arrival back to the country in late February were not such that made such a discussion possible. So, I kept things to myself. But by then I had become an object of ridicule, with people ascribing to me things I never said or did. I took all these in stride as part of the price to pay for accepting to serve in public office. Even though it was a very difficult period for me, I did not want to be seen as abandoning my boss in his hour of trial, especially when I knew the state he was in. I recall having a conference call with THISDAY editors, who told me to resign, until I confirmed to them that I had seen the president. I also explained my exit plan to them, given my Beijing University admission. By a stroke of fortune, on April 14, 2010, a friend sent me an internet link to the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, the largest international research center within Harvard University’s Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Without bothering to examine the admission requirements, I simply applied and sent my résumé to the program director, Dr. Kathleen Molony. Less than an hour later, I got a response from her. She wrote that application for the 2010 session closed two months earlier on February 25 and that participants had been chosen. She however added that given that she found my application quite compelling, she would discuss it with the selection board to see if they could still consider me. That began an exchange of correspondences with Harvard University, and on May 4, 2010, I finally got the offer of admission. I was so excited when I got the mail that I could not help but share it with the reporters who were then in my office. So, quite naturally, the news spread within the villa that I would be leaving for Harvard. This was a day before the president died. The next morning, May 5, the principal secretary to the acting president, Chief Mike Oghiadome sent for me. The moment I entered his office, he said, “I gathered you won an award at Harvard, and you don’t want to tell oga [Jonathan]. Please go and put it into writing for him.” On the way back to my office, I ruminated over what Oghiadome had said and concluded that it was just a clever way of asking me to resign immediately, so I took the hint. In what I titled ‘Letter of Disengagement from Government’ and addressed to the acting president, I expressed my gratitude for the opportunity to have served in the government of my country. When I took my letter to Oghiadome, he expressed shock, and I could see it was genuine. “You are resigning, why?” I explained to him that my Harvard appointment was for one year, and since he said I should commit myself into writing immediately, he implied I should resign. He felt very bad. “No, I thought it was an award like a plaque or something, which the State House normally gazettes. No, you are not going anywhere....” While I felt relieved that he was not hounding me out as I had earlier imagined, I nonetheless said that since I had already written the letter, he should pass it on. He minuted on it before sending it to the secretary of the acting president, who in turn called me to come and take the letter in personally. I had an interesting time with the acting president. He was evidently very happy for me, and I must have spent about thirty minutes with him as we reflected on the state of the

nation and the then prevailing situation in the villa. I had enjoyed a good relationship with Jonathan, who had two pet names for me: ‘media guru’ and ‘Focus Nigeria’. Incidentally, anytime he addressed me by the second appellation, he would add with laughter for the benefit of whoever was around: “Do you know the producer of Gbenga Aruleba’s programme (on AIT)? It’s Segun.” At this period when the nation was in crisis, the burden of leadership had made him lose much of his sense of humour, but we still had a good discussion. I could understand the power game going on and why Jonathan felt less obligated to the president. Aside from the refusal to transmit a letter to the National Assembly, which then necessitated the intervention of the lawmakers, the relationship between the president and his deputy had started on a wrong note. Early in the life of the administration, Jonathan had written a memo to the president seeking for his office to be self-accounting. Specifically, he requested that the office of the vice president be given the same role and responsibility that were enjoyed by Atiku Abubakar before he fell out of favour with President Obasanjo. After a meeting held at the villa between the duo and attended by the principal secretary and chief of staff, the memo was turned down in favour of ‘one presidency’. Even if Jonathan could forget that slight, his aides definitely could not because they were more affected by the decision. So when the opportunity came for their boss to become the main man at the villa, it was no surprise that they led the charge. On the home front, Mrs. Patience Jonathan was also preparing to be the First Lady. As early in the administration as December 2007, a group of women had paid her a visit, and in the course of the discussion, one had asked: “How is oga ?” To this Mrs. Jonathan replied, “My husband is in the office reading newspapers.” Then she added in pidgin English, rather sarcastically: “Abi no be newspaper Turai [Mrs. Yar’Adua] say make im dey read ?” No matter the politics between him and his ailing boss, Jonathan was very gracious to me on May 5, 2010. As I was leaving his office, I met the NSA, Gusau, on the way, and I shared the information about my Harvard offer with him. It was the first time I would meet him since his appointment, and he also congratulated me and fixed an appointment for us to meet. Just as I got downstairs, I also encountered the SGF, who also congratulated me. Given that the news of my Harvard appointment had spread, I concluded I needed to meet the First Lady before she would hear about it from a third party. I called her media assistant, Bakori, and told him to fix an appointment for me to see her. He called back to say she would see me that same day at the residence at 9:00 p.m. I also went to meet the CSO at home. I was a bit uncomfortable about this meeting, as I felt he would think I was deserting them. Even though our working relationship began with mutual suspicions, we had become friends in the intervening period, and I could see what he too was going through. Within the villa, and even among the aides, the CSO was a very unpopular person, and till today, many hold him responsible not only for the crisis in the nation but indeed for the fate that ultimately befell the president. I share a contrary view. Having been a state house correspondent in the past, I knew that no CSO was really ever liked because they tended to be overprotective of the president. In the case of Tilde, the circumstances of his appointment pointed to the fact that it must have been based on some bond of trust between him and the president. Some other officer from Katsina was first appointed as

CSO, but after just 24 hours, the president asked General Mohammed to help him seek out Tilde, who was the SSS Director in Katsina between 1999 and 2003. I observed one thing about his relationship with the president: of all the aides, Tilde was the only one who could openly stand up to the First Lady, yet with Yar’Adua, everybody—including childhood friends—knew that his immediate family, especially his wife, was off-limits for them. That the CSO could consistently cross that line without consequences meant something. I had a feeling he knew everything about the illness of the president, who must have taken him into confidence. I therefore reckoned that it was on that basis that he took it upon himself to protect the man and in the process committed what turned out to be grave errors. So I had sympathy for Tilde even in times when I found his actions rather irrational. I also found him a rather pleasant person outside officialdom, so we became friends. When I gave him my letter of offer from Harvard on May 5, 2010, I got an unexpected reaction. He read it twice and said rather solemnly: “My brother, I am very happy for you, and this can only be divine. I wish I could also get something like this today.” I reacted immediately: “To do what? You mean you will leave oga . You can’t be serious!” He laughed and said he was joking, as he congratulated me again before we moved to other things. What I would later learn was that, shortly before I met with the CSO, he had just left the president, whose heart had stopped beating and had to be resuscitated after pressure was applied to his chest, an indication that the end was nigh. By 9:00 p.m., I was at the Residence for my scheduled appointment with the First Lady, but the moment I arrived, she was called upstairs. That turned out to be the period her husband finally gave up. Immediately it happened, both the CSO and ADC took charge. They went to inform the acting president, who would later come with the Speaker, deputy Senate president, SGF, NSA and his principal secretary. The First Lady took him and the Speaker upstairs to see the remains of her husband. The death that night brought a dramatic end to the saga in the country, yet notwithstanding the bad blood generated by his last weeks in office, there was a national, and indeed global, consensus that Yar’Adua was a decent man who gave his best to his country despite his health challenges. His death also released me, as I could make public my resignation and the fact that I was going to Harvard. On May 6, 2010, I arrived at the villa early as family members were moving their personal effects into vehicles. The solemn moment came when the president’s body was wheeled out into the ambulance that would take his remains to the airport for the beginning of his final journey. I could not help reflecting on what might have been had he not been hampered by ill health. Even at that, I believed he gave the thankless job of building a good society his very best, refusing to let the position of president and the power he wielded deprive him and others of their humanity. Shortly before we left for the airport, one of the aides stared hard at the official portrait of the president that was still hanging by the Red Carpet, removed it, and turning to me, said, “I am very happy that this is the image of the president that Nigerians will always remember when they think of him.” I perfectly understood his sentiment. Given the manner in which the illness ravaged his body, the image in the photograph bore little resemblance to the Yar’Adua that died. What remains sad for me, however, is that this was also true in several other ways.

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About the Author Olusegun Adeniyi, a former editor of THISDAY and currently chairman of its editorial board, was appointed Special Adviser to the President on communications on May 30, 2007, a position he held until May 5, 2010, when his boss, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua died. Author of four books (The Last 100 Days of Abacha, Fortress on Quicksand, Abiola’s Travails, and Politricks), he is a founding member of the National Stakeholder Working Group of Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) and Fellow of the Nigeria Leadership Initiative (NLI). He conducted research on the factors that shape incumbent presidential elections in Africa at Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, where he recently completed a one-year fellow’s programme.

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