Power and Authority

A Political Science Project on Power and Authority

A collective attempt to understand the Fundamental Principles and Dynamics of one of the most important political phenomenon of  the Human Society.

Sachin Satyaraj Soumya Nair Anupama Subramaniam Priyadarshini Srinivas Atreya

Power and Authority

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Introduction

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What is Power?

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The Emergence of Power

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The Division of Power

What is Authority? o

The Emergence of Authority

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Political Authority

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The Democratic Conception of Political Authority

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The Relationship and Distinction between Power and Authority

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Weber's Analysis of Authority

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The Consent Theory of Political Authority

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The Elite Theory

Acknowledgment

 This Project couldn’t have been successfully completed without the support and guidance of our Political Science Professor, Sudeesh Sir and we would like to express our immense gratitude to him for his constant support and motivation that has encouraged us to come up with this project. We are also thankful for our librarian for the support rendered during the course of the research. Lastly, we would like to thank our classmates for their whole hearted support at all times during the course of the Project.

Introduction Of the vari various ous pheno phenome meno non n in nature nature that that exis existt amon among g livi living ng organisms, the most enabling factors which are seen throughout most structured organizations of the countless living beings are the phenomenon of power and authority. Man in particular has evolved from a tree dwelling ……. to a complex and social animal.  The hierarchal mechanisms and the instinctual dominance exhibitions displayed by animals during mating or hunting have been developed into sophisticated and structured institutions by man and which are used to control and influence other men. The disp displa lay y of stren strengt gth h and and sh sho ow of power ower and the the su subs bseq eque uent  nt  classification as an authoritative figure of an individual or a group form the basis of any political institution in the modern society. In fact, close parallels can be seen in the dominating alpha male in a  pack of lions and an d an aggressive human leader leading lea ding his men to battle. However, to understand the concepts of power and authority, a clos close e exami examina natio tion n of the prin princi cipl ples es and and funda fundame menta ntall facto factors rs whic which h form form each each of thes these e conc concep epts ts,, the relati relations onshi hip p betwe between en them and the various theories formulated about them must be made. This study is vital as these phenomenons are embedded deep eep into nto the cells ells of livi living ng bein beings gs.. With With eac each addi additi tion on of  complexity in society, a balance has to be maintained and it has to still progress ahead.  The definitions, the contextual meanings, the factors and the influence it has upon the social institutions of the concepts of  power and authority will be studied in detail and in context with contemporary social and political institutions.

Power  The concept of power can simply be put up as an entity's ability to control the environment around itself, including the behavior of  other entities. Yet the society we live and the multitude of things which we surround surround ourselves ourselves with require require constant constant grooming and maintenance maintenance for we live in an almost almost precarious precarious balance of social and individual see-saws. There is no need to justify the need as to why why we need need to unde unders rsta tand nd the the fund fundam amen enta tall conc concep epts ts and and multifarious dimensions of power.

What is Power?  The concept of power for a better bette r understanding has been divided into three main subtopics the factors and characteristics related to the phenomenon have been given due emphasis. Before that however, a clarification is required that the use of  power need not involve coercion (force or the threat of force). At one extreme, it more closely resembles what everyday EnglishEnglishspeaker akers s call "influence" influence", although some authors make a distinction between power and influence - the means by which power is used  There is a need to understand the various types of power through which it can be held. They include

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Delegated authority (for example in the democratic process) Social class (material wealth can equal power)

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Personal or group charisma

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Ascribed power (acting on perceived or assumed abilities) Expertise (Ability, Skills) Persuasion (direct, indirect, or subliminal)) subliminal Knowledge (granted or withheld, shared or kept secret) Money (financial influence, influence, control of labour, control through ownership,, etc) ownership

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Fame

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Force (violence, violence, military might, coercion). coercion).

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Moral persuasion (including religion) religion)

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Operation of group of group dynamics (such as public relations) relations)

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Social influence of tradition of tradition (compare ascribed power)

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In relationships; domination/submissiveness

 The first subtopic deals with how and why power plays an important role in human organizations.

Power Invariably Fills Any Vacuum in Human Organization  The phenomenon that a power vacuum is always filled by a power holder is constant throughout the history of society. The reasons are not as obvious as the fact. Two of the reasons are as follows:  The need for order at any level of society Peace is a social necessity. Lacking peace, individuals or larger  elements in a situation will fly apart to seek a place in some order  of things where they can live, work, or enjoy themselves without  being despoiled or interrupted. Professor George Catlin stated the  proposition concisely in The Story of the Political Philosophers: "To maintain peace has been the justifying function of coercive gove govern rnme ment nt,, desp despit ite e all all its its tyra tyranni nnies es,, sinc since e the the days days of the the

Pharaoh Phara ohs. s."" The The human human need of peac peace e lead leads s to acce accept ptanc ance e of  such government at any level. Emotion Emot ional al make ma keup of men Instinct for power exists to some degree in every human. Often individuals will encounter others on the same search; then they must either conquer them or secure their adherence, usually by offering hope of a share of power in the structure he proposes to creat create. e. The The proc proces ess s may may be rati rationa onall and stud studie ied. d. This This occu occurs rs when the organizer of a party recruits adherents from among possible possible rivals by promising them positions positions in the government govern ment he hopes to establish. As power is essentially personal, the underlying social reasons can never be divorced from the factor of personality. Drive for power power insti instinc ncti tive ve aggr aggres essi sion on or desi desire re to put put into into effec effectt some some principle of idealism or of order. It may proceed from selfishness and ambi ambiti tion on or from from altruis altruism m or inspir inspirati ation. on. The domin dominant ant motive will reflect itself later as the power holder announces the idea system or philosophy by which his power is justified and accepts the institutions by which power is exercised. When a vacuum occurs at any level of a power structure, the immediate result is to throw power downward to the next lower institutional echelon. When imperial power is destroyed by conques questt or revo revolu luti tion on,, its its comp compon onen entt part parts s go on func functi tion onin ing. g. Compulsion to fill a power vacuum occurs at any level of social orga organi niza zati tion on.. The pheno phenome meno non n is not not limi limite ted d to inter internat natio ional nal affairs, as in the case of the Dominican Republic in 1965, or to breakdown of organization, as in Yugoslavia in the closing days of  World War II and in New York City when the lights went out. It occurs in any form of organization. In each a power holder ceased to exist, leaving a vacuum. In the Domini Dominican can Republ Republic, ic, this this occurre occurred d through through an army army rebell rebellion ion.. Vacuum in the republic created chaos likely to be filled by outside

power. It was in fact filled momentarily by the paramount power of the United States as President Johnson acted, fearing lest a Russian-Cuban combination would fill it instead. In the case of the commercial empire, vacuum was brought about by the disability of its its chie chieff and and the the abs bsen ence ce of sett settle led d succes uccessi sion on.. Had the the situation been allowed to continue, anarchy would have resulted.  The void was filled by agreement between two rapidly organized forc forces es,, one an amb ambitio itious us man domi ominati nating ng a frac fracti tion on of the the orga organi niza zati tion on and and seek seekin ing g to take take over over,, the the othe otherr a grou group p of  dire di rect ctor ors s find findin ing g a natu natura rall lead leader er and and nego negoti tiat atin ing g a work workin ing g arrangement. When When norm normal al proc proces esse ses s of dist distri ribu buti tion on of power power brea break k down down,, someone steps in, gives directions, and takes charge until the poli police ce or other other estab establi lish shed ed autho authori rity ty arriv arrives es to take take over. over. The The individual may do so because he is that kind of person who has an instinct for power or he rises to the situation because he feels an obli obliga gati tion on to the peop people le su suffe fferi ring ng from from dange dangerr and and confu confusi sion on around him. Momentary anarchy induces assumption of power, whether in high politics or local circumstances.  The most habitually orderly and law-abiding population has within w ithin it some elements whose conduct is kept within bounds only by external restraint, by the presence of power. They emerge when power power no long longer er is there. there. They They su subs bsid ide e only only when when it return returns, s, unless they or one fragment of them sets up a tiny power system and takes over. If not immediatel immediately y filled by the power institutions institutions and institutions of the community, some boss gangster, usurper, or vigilante committee will occupy the field. It is the genius of   power to find and fill the vacuum whenever it occurs in human organization.

The Emergence of Power

Power is brought into existence by the coalescence of three elements: men, a philosophy, and a group capable of organization into institutions. Birth may occur with implosive speed. Most of us have seen small organizations come into being less sublimely, whether insignificant, as in the founding of a club or the launching of a political movement. Review of any such experience will show the three elements always present. A few men, including some with an inst instin inct ct for for power ower meet meet in agre agreem emen entt on a comm common on id idea ea.. Purpose becomes evident to attempt its realization. At the behest of the the man man with with the the st stro rong nges estt inst instin inct ct for for powe power, r, the the grou group p organizes. The process frequently occurs on battlefields after a military ary forma rmation has been een shattere tered d and the stron rongest remaining individual remakes an organization out of the survivors.  The government about to be formed had not merely to take over exis existi ting ng tradi traditi tion onal al inst instit ituti utions ons,, but but also also to exten extend d them them and and impr improv ovis ise e new new ones ones in vast vast fiel fields ds of econ econom omic ic orga organi niza zati tion on traditionally considered no function of the federal government. Pres Presid iden entt Roos Rooseve evelt lt achi achieve eved d adde added d organ organiz izat atio ion n and power power structure before the Congress of the "hundred days" recessed.  The substance of that structure remains intact to this day. Swiftly or gradually, a power structure comes into existence as men with an idea system set up new or take over existing institutions. Normally, power is allocated through operation of the existing existing institutions institutions—a —a president president is elected, cabinet ministers ministers apap pointed, key posts in Congress or Parliament are filled. Institutional processes place individuals "in power." They must establish their personal grip and control over the institutions they head. Unti ntil he org organi niz zes his personal nal position, he is impotent. ent. Connecting the power position with the idea structure and with his subordinate officers and perhaps with outside allies is his first task. When the combination is made, a power structure exists and he is able to use it.

The "Power Form" Power in the simplest terms is the coalescence of three elements namely assertive men, an idea system, and a group capable of  organi organizat zation ion which which generat generates es power, power, be the measure measure small small or great. It thereupon attains reality and assumes form. The Gestalt of power establishes establishes itself in many ways, tangible tangible and intangible. intangible. Preponderantly, it must exist in the minds of men affected by it at the time. Any subject of the Roman Empire in its great days knew that Roman power existed; he sensed what it was, though he might have little knowledge of its boundaries, its institutions, or the men at its head. It had a center in Rome, or perhaps at the habitual place of administration chosen by the emperor. Some notion existed of the Pax Romana, an overriding force that limited or extinguished the independent use of local force. Sense also existed of its institutions. Probably foremost among these were the the Roman oman arm armies ies, but the there were were als also gover overno nors rs,, judge udges, s, questors and tax gatherers. Roman power impact would be heavy or light depending on the level of organization amid complexity of  the local country and the tenacity of its own power structure.

Power Is Invariably Personal  The Power Instinct Bertrand Russell in Power: A New Social Analysis mentioned "Of  the infinite desires of man, the chief are the desires for power and glor glory. y."" He cons consid ider ered ed that that the the fund fundam ament ental al concep conceptt in soci social al science is power. Further, he believed that power was the same whatever tools it used or forms it took. It might express itself  thro throug ugh h weal wealth th,, arma armame ment nt,, civi civill auth author orit ity, y, and and infl influe uenc nce e on opin opinio ion, n, mili milita tary ry comm comman and, d, or top top posi positi tion on in an econ econom omic ic pyram pyramid id.. Like Like energ energy, y, it conti continua nuall lly y pass passes es from from one form form to another; it is useless to isolate it. Power has recently been defined as "the capacity or ability of an individual or a group of individuals to dete determ rmin ine e the the beha behavi vior or of othe otherr indi indivi vidu dual als s or grou group ps in

accordance with his own wishes." Endless methods attempt to accomplish this—naked force, use of faiths, loyalties, and interest, and the probability that a great many people will usually act as anyone having the power position wishes. Power is the capacity to mobilize the resources of a group or a society to attain statist goals. Power is an attribute of man. It does not exist without a holder. Power in the abstract abstract does not exist. exist. It becomes becomes fact only when a man or woman following his inborn instinct takes and uses it. This is why why powe powerr is invar invaria iabl bly y indi indivi vidu dual al.. Limi Limitat tatio ions ns are alwa always ys present—else the world would be worse off than it is, and its condition in all conscience is troublesome enough. Where a power holder holder has no interna internall restrai restraints nts i.e., i.e., any intelle intellectu ctual al or moral moral system stopping him, his power is limited only by the circumstances in which he is placed. Normal individuals have a high content of internal restraint based on the system of ideas and morals in which they were brought up or to which they agree. To foster a situation in which the people within scope of their power act predictably, will follow instructions, will maintain a degree of order. If need be order can in limited measure be produced by force.

Power as a Personal Attribute Power is invariably personal. However attained, it can be exercised only by the decision and act of an individual. Attribution of  power is often made to an institution— the power of a nationstate, of a corporation, of a church, of a bank, of a professional asso associ ciati ation on,, of a newsp newspap aper er,, of a poli politi tica call party party.. Or powe powerr is attributed to an unorganized group—to a "class" of some kind, uppe upperr or lower lower,, to the "prol "proleta etaria riat, t,"" to the the "inte "intell llec ectua tuals ls," ," the the "press," the "masses," the "people," the "Blacks." Sociologists discover "elites," and speculate on their power. By taking various blocs of statistics, they discover a relatively small

group group who has higher higher positi positions ons,, greate greaterr educati education, on, or greater greater wealth. These are then entitled a "class" or an "elite group." To them, power is ascribed. No collective category, no class, no group of any kind in and of  itself wields power or can use it. Another factor must be present: that of organization. The collective group must put itself together, must develop formal or informal structure, and must establish stated or unstated rules by and through which power to decide and act is assigned to someone and, as a rule, distributed through a hierarchy of subordinates. Without this organization, whatever its common interest or background, no collective group can or ever does act. History and contemporary contemporary politics politics are littered littered with illust illustrati rations ons of unorgani unorganized zed groups groups,, whose whose member members s have had much in common, ignored or ridden over roughshod or sometimes destroyed by individuals having power derived from groups that did have organization. organization. Lacking it, there is no effective effective exercise of  power, quite simply because there is no individual or hierarchy of  individuals who can exercise it. In feudal times, noble birth or military capacity, and sometimes both both,, were were requ requir ired ed.. From From the the grou group p of men men poss posses essi sing ng the the needed qualification qualifications, s, power holders holders are usually usually drawn, or made, or make themselves. It may have been the tenth century when Karl Marx wrote rote Das Das Kapital tha that weal ealth was an ess essenti ntial qualification for power holding. But it is one thing to say that and quite another to suggest that a group or class having certain attributes tributes exercised power. More often than not, though their members bers have have para parall llel el or simi simila larr atti attitu tude des s or inte intere rest sts, s, they they are are fier fierce cely ly comp compet etit itiv ive, e, figh fightt amon among g each each othe other, r, are are unab unable le to organize and unwilling to designate power holders. Rulers may predominately be drawn from classes. Classes do not rule. Power holders may be drawn from elites. Elites do not exercise power. Elites and classes may have influence. This is an entirely different affai affair. r. The senti sentime ments nts or opin opinio ions ns of a parti particu cula larr categ category ory of 

people may and often do affect the decisions and actions of the men who have power. Their conceptions, their value judgments, their desires, their emotions about the world in which they would like to live may be and often are extremely persuasive. But they can be blocked by a simple decision of the power holder not to act along these lines—to do nothing, or to do something different.  The group, whatever it is, if seriously offended, may be stimulated to organize and oppose—to become a power structure. Consequently, views that may represent its body of sentiment are taken into account. But this is far removed from power to decide and cause others to concur.

The Effects of Power on Personality  The personal quality of power introduces an element baffling scientific analysis. The power process itself follows definite laws. But since power is made effective through individuals, the personality of the power holder is always a factor—and the content of  personality is a vast unknown. Power holding is itself an emotional experience. The greater the powe power, r, grea greate terr the the impa impact ct made made.. One One of the the firs firstt impa impact cts s is realization that the obligation of power takes precedence over other obligations formerly held nearest and dearest. The effect of  power on its holder is unpredictable. Men who have ascended to power gradually, or have been vaccinated by previous experience, are in a safer position than those suddenly thrust into it. Power forcefully introduces itself into personal development.  Yet the rules of power are ar e the same in all cases, as is the fact that it affects the personality and that its impact on the power holder can rarely be foretold. A man in power can cause events to happen—at short range. He comm commonl only y does does so to exec execute ute a long longerer-ra rang nge e plan plan,, aimi aiming ng to bring about a series of events leading to a result he has in mind. Short-range events do occur as directed. The long-range result

may be entirely different. This led Tolstoy to the conclusion that whil while e hist histor oric ical al forc forces es do not not contr control ol imme immedi diate ate event events, s, they they implacably dictate results quite apart from the power holder's will. Intelligent power holders learn this almost at once. Failure to do so would, and frequently does, lead them to live in a world of  illusion, in which realities ultimately impose themselves, often in a manner quite contrary to the conception of the power holder. I remember President Franklin Roosevelt's stubborn desire not to allow his country to be involved in World War II if he could help it. My journal quotes his explanation of his aversion. Once involved, he said, we start on a course "whose end results none of us can fore forese see. e."" One One imp impact act of power ower hold holdiing on the the hold holder er is hi his s discovery that the power act, the direction of an event, causes surprisingly unpredictable consequences.

The Fallacy of "Class Power" Denial of the existence of class or elite power cuts into an immense body of political dogma which has dominated affairs at least since the Communist Manifesto of 1848. It requires revision of some nascent theo heories ries of modern ern sociology ogy. It is not a proposition to be advanced lightly, or to be ignored. Classes are real but ill-defined. In any society, there are groups, large and small, whose members have a high common factor of common experience. The factor of common experience is sufficiently great that on the basis of that experience they can communicate with each other. The group can develop a sense of identity. It can distinguish itself from the population around it.  The factor of common experience is higher as the group is smaller and and as it is base based d on a reco recog gni niza zabl ble e comm ommon inter nteres estt. The members of the group must realize that their interest is common and they must be willing to accept, maintain, and defend that common interest. Analysts point to a clear common interest in maintaining and defending their property or position. Assume that the the comm common on fact factor or of expe experi rien ence ce and and comm common on inte intere rest st are are

pres resent, nt, and also that hat each member of the the group know nows consciously consciously or vaguely that his interests are the same as those of  the other members of the group. With that, psychologically he does feel himself a member of an aristocracy, or of an educated class, or of a minority group, or of a working class, as the case may be. At that point, the needed elements are present. Given a common medium of communication, a "class" exists. No group, no class, comes into recognizable existence automaticall cally. y. Elem Element ents s in comm common on are are like likely ly to bring bring about about comm common on experience. Common experience does bring about the possibility of wide communication. From that communication may develop a body of common feeling. From this there can emerge a psychological acceptance of the desirability of defending the common interest—this is, "class consciousness." Ever Every y grou group p is not not a "cla "class ss". ". The The theo theory ry of "cla "class ss"" is alwa always ys arbitrary in making divisions; quite frequently the divisions are artificial. Assumption that any individual is in one class as distinct from another has little behind it. He may be in several classes at once—as a college graduate may be an impecunious white-collar cler clerk. k. Whet Whethe herr he cons consid ider ers s hims himsel elff a memb member er of the the lowe lowerr middle class defending lower-middle-class interests or considers himself one of the educated elite, of which he is also a member, depends on what he himself thinks. Classes, however delimited or defined, are important in this study not because classes have power, but because they are potential fields of organization. By sheer organization, power can perhaps be lodged in or obtained by sp spec ecif ific ic indi indivi vidu dual als. s. Potenti Potential ally ly,, power power can can be devel develop oped ed,, though there is no certainty that this will occur.  The fact of class does, to be sure, exert influence. Power can be developed or expanded only on the basis of a system of ideas. When endeavor is made to bring an organization out of a class, the system of ideas must be one that appeals to its members.  Their common experience, their common interest, will dispose

them to accept this system of ideas in place of that. Aspirants for power have this in mind. The idea system they profess will not be acceptable if it threatens the common interest of the group in question, though even that is not wholly certain.

The End of Power  The power of any man invariably ends in time. Death D eath may end it, as where a man holds hereditary office during his life or when he dies ies in offi offic ce. The The Unit United ed State tates s is accu accust stom omed ed to fede federa rall Supreme Court justices and judges to whom life tenure is granted to guar guarant antee ee thei theirr judi judici cial al inde indepe pend ndenc ence. e. Even Even in su such ch offic office, e, custom, convenience, and legal institutions often cause and assist retirem retirement— ent—that that is, encourag encourage e volunta voluntary ry renunci renunciati ation on of power power before death as strength ebbs. Death aside, men leave power in one of three ways: they voluntarily resign or abdicate it, their term of office expires, or they are expe expell lled ed by mean means s not conte contemp mpla lated ted in the inst instit ituti utiona onall structure—by revolution, usurpation, or foreign conquest. Intentional renunciation of power commonly occurs in one or two situations. It may be contemplated by the institution conferring power. Practically all governmental institutions face the possibility that a man may leave office and they provide for the choice of a successor. In lesser institutions such provision may not exist. exist. One of the established American institutions is the family. A separation agreement or divorce decree may place authorit rity and responsibility of the children in the hands of the husband or the wife. wife. Leav Leavin ing g power power volunt voluntar aril ily, y, espe especi cial ally ly where where there there is no ready ready mean means s of prov provid idin ing g a su succ cces esso sorr may may prod produc uce e a chao chaoti tic c condit condition ion.. Conseq Consequent uently, ly, resigna resignatio tion n or renunci renunciati ation on is itself itself a dangerous act. Volu Volunta ntary ry aban abando donm nment ent of power power creat creating ing chao chaos s is prop properl erly y considered a major offense. Achievement of power by whatever means sets up a relationship between the power holder and those

affe affec cted. ted. That hat rel relati ations onshi hip p cann cannot ot be ig igno nore red d, hum humanl anly or politically. In 1967, there was wide demand that, having assumed wide wide meas measure ure of power power in Vi Vietn etnam am,, the the Unit United ed Stat States es sh shoul ould d forthwith and unconditionally withdraw. One result would have been to surrender the South Vietnamese to the uncontrolled and far from tender mercies of the Viet Cong and the North Vietn Vi etnam ames ese e gove governm rnment ent of Hanoi Hanoi.. This This incl includ uded ed consi conside dera rabl ble e probability, judging by past tactics, that many thousands would promptly be killed or exiled. Neighboring states whose policy had been based in part on the existence of nearby American power might well have suffered. Power holders are expected to defend their power and to defend the institutions that vested power in them. They are allowed to retire if the institution vesting power in them requires it. When expelled by operation of their institutions, they may, having lost the political political battle, retire and more or less gracefully gracefully accept their successors. This happens when a British cabinet is defeated in Parl Parlia iam ment. ent. It resi resign gns s, rec recomm ommend endin ing g to the the mona onarch rch that that another government be formed, or that Parliament be dissolved and the country proceed to a general election. An institutional expulsion from power has occurred—but institutional provision is made for succession, and quiet retirement is no act of political wrongdoing.  The case is quite different when a power holder is attacked, by a revolution, rebellion, or foreign force. Then he must defend to the limit of his capacity. He may be defeated, but he must not leave. His His attac attacke kers rs may, may, and ordi ordinar naril ily y do, do, have have a su succ cces esso sorr power power holder in view who will take power if they win. In winning, they have damaged the institution by which power was vested—and the new power holder necessarily necessarily has less capacity capacity to govern. govern. He is, in the modern phrase, "illegitimate." When a power holder is illegitimately expelled, two offenses take plac pl ace. e. One One is the the inab inabil ilit ity y of the the powe powerr hold holder er to defe defend nd his his

posi positi tion on.. The The othe otherr is the the crim crime e invo involv lved ed when when an oppo oppone nent nt endeavors to seek power outside the accepted institutions. He may be more moral than the legitimate power holder. His attack may be wholly justified by the defaults, omissions, or abuses.

The "Post-Power Syndrome" Except in rare cases, power leaves men before their lives are over over.. Men are are chos chosen en for for offi office ce;; thei theirr term term expir expires es.. They They are are heads of universities or other institutions; the day arrives when they must give way to younger successors. They are executive offi office cers rs of great great corp corpor orati ations ons;; the time time come comes s for for reti retirem rement ent,, compulsory or dictated by circumstances. They may be heads of  families; their children grow up and assume independence. In all cases, cases, the moment of voluntary voluntary or involuntary involuntary separation occurs. Consequence to the personality of the power holder is emotional and immediate.

Power Is Invariably Based on a Sys System of Ideas or  Philosophy   A Precondition of Lasting Power   Two ingredients of power are inseparable. One is an idea system, a philosophy. The other is an institutional structure transmitting the will of the power holder. Without an idea system, institutions cannot be constructed and certainly cannot endure. Without institutions, power cannot be generated, used, or expanded. Of great interest is the philosophy developed over more than half  a century on which Communist Communist power was successfully successfully organized in 1917. One of its primary appeals unquestionably was negative: the doctrine of the class war. Fear, hatred of, and revenge upon group roups s supp upposed osed to be or to have have been been oppr oppres ess sors ors was was an operative part of it. Greater drawing power lies in its conception that under Communism all property and economic operations are to be administered for the benefit of the "people"—proletariat,

workers, and peasants. Small institutions as well as large require an idea system and o power wer holder head eading any of thes hese institutions could hold it together without such a core of ideas.

Limits Imposed by the Philosophy  The constituting philosophy of a power system necessarily limits the exercise of power by the head of the organization based on it. Acti Ac tion on know known n to be cont contra rary ry to it at once once weak weaken ens s and and may may destroy the organization on which the power is based and by which it is transmitted. A measure of opportunism in applying the philosophy may get by—if the power holder is strong enough. e nough.  Tension in some measure always exists between the power holder headi heading ng the inst instit ituti ution on and and the men men loya loyall to the idea idea sy syst stem em holding his institution together. Invariably, situations arise where the opportune thing to do does not correspond with the idea system. Invariably, the men in power consider that the interests of  the organization as a power apparatus—and, incidentally, their own positions—must be the overriding consideration. Given the choice between conforming to the philosophy at sacrifice to the effe effec ctive tivene nes ss of their heir appa appara ratu tus s or thei theirr own pres presti tig ge and and strengthening their machine and their position, pressure is strong to do the latter.  Thus the philosophy underlying power institutions is ultimately determinative. A power holder must conform to its general lines, making only limited sacrifices to expediency, else his institutions become useless to him, they break down or he becomes their prisoner and is eventually displaced. To change the philosophy itself it requires intellectual as well as organizational leadership.

The Separation and Division of Power Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu claimed that without foll follow owin ing g a prin princi cipl ple e of conta contain inin ing g and and bala balanc ncing ing legislative, legislative, executive and  judiciary power owers s, ther there e is no free freed dom and and no

protection against abuse of power. Separation of power must be in su such ch grad grade, e, that that any any of the the bran branch ches es can can oper operat ate e with withou outt exce excess ssiv ive e limi limita tati tion ons s from from the the othe others rs;; but but inte interd rdep epen ende denc ncy y between them must also be in such grade, that one single branch cannot rule out the other's decisions. This is the separation of  powers principle. A similar concept, termed "division of power", also consists of  differentiated legislative, executive, and judicial powers. However, while separation of powers prohibits one branch from interfering with with another, another, divis division ion of power power permits permits such such interfer interference ence.. For exam exampl ple, e, in Indonesia Indonesia,, the the Pres Presid iden entt (who (who wiel wields ds exec execut utiv ive e power) can introduce a new bill, but the People's Consultative Assembly (holding legislative power) chooses to either legalize or reject the bill.

Authority What is Authority?  There are some things in nature which exist universally in every living organism that influence every act they perform and every reaction they experience. Structure, for instance is found even in the most fundamental units of nature and is considered to be one of the most important factors in the existence and survival of a living being. Man, Man, thro throug ugh h his his evol evoluti ution on has has remai emained ned the the most most intel intelli lige gent nt living being and he has built complex mechanisms around himself  to help himself exist and progress ahead. The formulation of a mechanism to possess the ability to influence and control other men forms the central pillar of politics and the phenomenon of  power and authority. Authority can thus briefly be defined as the act or the ability to influence someone with power or position. It is important to observe in the context of the definition that the show

of power and authority is a seminal and significant occurrence and every organism with some kind of structured organization shows traits of authority and dominance, The Human being and the modern man in particular has built a whole institution on the concepts of power and authority on which he subsists.  The show of authority has a history which is as deep rooted as man man and and his his soci societ ety y itse itself lf and and this this is obse observ rved ed by the the soci social al thi hink nke er Bertra rtrand nd de Jouv ouvene enel who says in his work  “The  phenomenon called authority is at once more ancient and more fund fundam ament ental al than than the pheno phenome menon non call called ed stat state; e; the natur natural al ascendancy of some men over others is the principle of all human organizations and all human advances”. Authority can be understood as the derived form of power and a position in a sociological institution is acquired as a result of the power a person wields and exercises. Authority is today recognized most readily with political institutions and bodies of  adm admini nis strat tratio ion n and and gover overna nanc nce e. Man Man has has beco becom me heav heavil ily y depende dependent nt on politi political cal or authori authoritati tative ve contr control ol mechani mechanisms sms for order in society and therefore in the study of political science, auth author orit ity y di dire rect ctly ly corr corres espo pond nds s to poli politi tica call auth author orit ity y and and is generally referred in the political context. Many an attempt has been made to understand the meaning, the factors and ultimately the legitimacy of political authority.

Legi Legiti tima mate te Auth Author orit ity, y, de fact facto o Auth Author orit ity y and and Poli Politi tica call Power For For most ost cont contem emp porar orary y theo theori rist sts s to say that that the the st stat ate e has has auth author oriity in the the desc descri ript ptiv ive e sens sense e is to say say that that the the st stat ate e maintains public order and that it issues commands and makes rules rules that that are are gener general ally ly obey obeyed ed by su subj bjec ects ts beca because use many many of  them think of it as having authority in the normative sense. We shou sh ould ld note note here here that that the the atti attitud tudin inal al comp compon onent ent of  de fact facto o authority is not accepted by everyone. For both Thomas Hobbes

and John Austin, political authority in the de facto sense simply amou amount nts s to the the capa capaci city ty of a pers person on or grou group p of pers person ons s to maintain public order and secure the obedience of most people by issuing commands backed by sanctions. Subjects need not think of the authority as a legitimate authority, on this account. Also, the dis Also, distinc tinctio tion n between between de fact facto o and morall morally y legiti legitimat mate e authority is not universally accepted or at least it is not accepted that the distinction makes a difference. Hobbes insists that any entity capable of performing the function of  de facto authority is necessarily justified and deserves the obedience of the de facto subjects (Hobbes 1668). But most have argued that there is an important distinction between de facto authority and legitimate authority. We will explore in what follows the conceptions political and legal philosophers have had of legitimate political authority. De facto authority, on anyone's account, is distinct from political power. The latter is concerned with the state's or any agent's ability to get others to act in ways that they desire even when the subject does not want to do what the agent wants him to do. Political power does not require any kind of pro attitude toward the agent on the part of the subject, nor does it require that the state is actually successful at securing public order. It operates completely in the realm of threats and offers. No doubt for the state to have de facto authority or legitimate authority requires that the state have the power to compel those subjects who do not wish to go along. This is necessary for the state's ability to maintain public order and to assure those who do see it as an authority that it will be able to do what it is supposed to do.

Political Authority: Some Conceptual Distinctions  The rubric under which the normative notion of political authority author ity is normally known is the idea of legitimate political authority. It is important here to note the distinction between theoretical and

prac practi tica call auth author orit ity. y. A theo theore reti tica call auth author orit ity y in some some area area of  intell ellectu ectua al inqui uirry is one that hat is an expert in that area. ea.  Theoretical authorities operate primarily by giving advice to the laym layman an,, whic which h advi advice ce the the laym layman an is free free to take take or not. not. The The  judgments of theoretical theo retical authorities give people reasons for belief  while the judgments of political authorities are normally thought to give people reasons for action. Theoretical authorities do not norm normal ally ly impo impose se duti duties es on othe others rs,, alth althou ough gh they they migh mightt gi give ve advice on what a person's duty is. Most Most theo theori ris sts of poli polittical ical aut authori hority ty view view it as a speci pecies es of  practical authority rather than theoretical authority, though this view is not held by all. Those who hold that political authority is a specie species s of practi practical cal authori authority ty maintai maintain n that politi political cal authori authorities ties issu issue e di dire rect ctiv ives es that that gi give ve peop people le reas reason ons s for for acti action on and and not not reason for belief. The thought is that political authorities impose duties on their subjects and thereby give them reasons for action.  These theorists th eorists argue that it is the function of political authorities to get peop eople to act act in cert certai ain n ways ways so as to solve olve vari variou ous s collective action problems such as a variety of different types of  coor coordi dina nati tion on prob proble lems ms,, assu assura ranc nce e probl roblem ems s and and free free ride riderr problems. There have been some dissenting views on this of late. Some have argued that the account of practical reason required by the the id idea ea that that polit olitic ical al auth author orit ity y is a prac practi tica call auth author orit ity y is inco incoher herent ent and and so they they have have opted opted for for the idea idea that that poli politi tica call authorities, when legitimate, are theoretical authorities regarding the existence and nature of the duties and reasons for action that people have (Hurd 2001). Since this view is unusual this entry will concentrate on conceptions of political authority that treat it as a species of practical authority.  The rest of this section will discuss a number of different analyses of political authority. There are three basic types of conceptual acco accoun untt of legi legiti tima mate te poli politi tica call autho authori rity: ty: legi legiti tima mate te poli politi tica call authority as justified coercion, legitimate political authority as the

capacity to impose duties, and legitimate political authority as the righ rightt to rule. rule. First First,, many many peop people le have have unders understo tood od legi legiti tima mate te poli politi tica call auth author orit ity y as a polit olitic ical al auth author orit ity y that that is just justif ifie ied d in coercing the subjects of its authority. The notion of justification here is a moral one. The thought is that a political authority might have have moral moral just justif ific icati ation on in coerc coercin ing g those those who come come under under its its autho authori rity ty.. This This is a parti particu cula larl rly y thin thin conc concep epti tion on of legi legiti tima mate te authority. For instance, a state can have this kind of authority when it legitimately occupies a territory as a result of a just war. It is morally justified in coercing the inhabitants of the occupied territory.  The moral justification of a group of people in coercing others may be more or less systematic. For instance, a group of people may may be mora morall lly y just justif ifie ied d in enga engagi ging ng in just just a few few acti action ons s of  coercing others. Or a group may be morally justified in engaging in coercion more generally as in the case of a morally justified military occupation.  This notion of authority author ity need not involve duties on the part of the population that is being coerced. Indeed, they may be justified in trying to escape coercion. This could be the case in a military occupation of a country that is justified on the grounds that it is nece necess ssar ary y to st stop op a thir third d coun countr try y from from enga engagi ging ng in mora morall lly y inde indefe fens nsib ible le aggr aggres essi sion on.. This This conc concep epti tion on of moral morally ly just justif ifie ied d coercion therefore involves no conception of a moral community among persons. In this first conception of authority as justified coercion, the authority may not even issue commands let alone make laws. It may simply justifiably issue threats and offers. The difference between legitimate and illegitimate political authority on this this acco account unt is that that the acti action ons s of the ille illegi giti tima mate te poli politi tica call authority are not morally justified while the coercive actions of  the legitimate authority are justified.

A seco second nd conc concep eptu tual al acco account unt of legi legiti tima mate te poli politi tica call autho authori rity ty implies that those over whom authority is exercised have some kind of duty with regard to the authority. Or the authority authority has the capa capaci city ty to impo impose se duti duties es on the the su subj bjec ects ts.. This This duty duty can can be merely a duty not to interfere with the activities of the political authority. Or it can involve the more significant duty to obey the authority. This conception of authority involves the authority and the subjects in a weak kind of moral relationship. relationship. The authority is  justified in issuing the th e commands and attempting to force people to comply with the commands commands while the subjects subjects have some kind of duty not to interfere with these activities or comply with the commands.  The duty of the subjects need not be owed to the authority. It may merely be that the subjects have a duty to obey where that duty is not owed to anyone in particular or where that duty is owed ultimately to people who are not the authority. For instance, if one thinks that one is likely better to respect others' rights by complying with the authority's directives, the action is ultimately owed to those others. Some have stressed the idea that the holding of justified political authority may only involve a duty on the part of others not to interfere with the political authority and they argue that the duty of non-interference is much weaker than a duty to obey. It is not clear how great the difference between these two duties is in practice practice at least as far as citizens citizens are concerned. concerned. For many cases of failing to obey an authority are cases of interference with the authority. An analogy may be helpful here. If one is playing a game of baseball with an umpire and one refuses to comply with the directives of the umpire, one is in effect interfering with the umpire's carrying out of his duties by not complying with the directives of the umpire.

While a duty to obey seems to imply a duty not to interfere, there are cases of duties of non interference that are not duties to obey, such as the duties of foreign powers not to interfere in the activities of a legitimate state. Furthermore, the duty to obey is clearly the more contentious issue in the question of authority sinc since e it requ require ires s that that one make make one's one's actio actions ns confo conform rm to the specific directives of the authority. A third conceptual account of authority or set of conceptions of  legitimate authority involves the idea that the authority has a right to rule. Strictly speaking, an authority can have a right to rule without the subjects having a duty to comply. The authority may may have have a “jus “justi tifi fica cati tion on” ” righ rightt to rule rule.. This This mean means s that that the the authority has a permission to issue commands and make rules and coerce others to comply and its possession of this right is  justified on moral grounds. This “justification right” is not much more than the first notion we discussed above. A more robust right to rule includes a duty owed to the authority on the part of the subjects not to interfere with the activities of  the authority. The subjects subjects owe it to the authority not to interfere interfere with it. This is connected with the right of the authority to rule. Finally, an authority can have a right to rule in the sense that it may issue commands and make rules and require subjects to comply with these rules and commands and the subjects have duties, which they owe to the authority, to comply with the rules and commands.  The distinction between a right to rule that is correlated with a duty not to interfere and one that is correlated with a duty to comply comes in handy when we consider the difference between the duties owed to a legitimate political authority by the subjects of that authority and the duties owed to it by other states and persons persons who are not subject to that authority. authority. A state with a right to rule in the strongest sense may be owed obedience by its

subjects but it is usually owed only a duty of non interference by those who are not a part of the state such as other states and persons in other states. It is worthwhile drawing a distinction here between internal legitimacy and external legitimacy. It is not not a us usef eful ul aim aim of phil philos osop ophe hers rs or poli politi tica call thin thinke kers rs to determ determine ine which which one of these these concep conceptual tual account accounts s of politi political cal authority is the right one. Each one of them grasps a kind of  legitimacy of political authority that is worth taking into account and and disti isting ngui uis shi hing ng from rom the the othe others rs.. The The id idea ea of leg legitim itimat ate e authority as justified coercive power is a suitable way of getting at the authority of hostile but justified occupation powers. And the idea of legitimate authority as an authority that has a right to rule over subjects who owe obedience to the authority and that has a right not to be inter terfere fered d wit with by fore foreiigners ners is surel rely an importantly distinct and perhaps ideal type of authority, which is rare rarely ly imp impleme lement nted ed.. The The kind kind of leg legiti itimacy acy that that is merel erely y corr correl elat ated ed with with duti duties es to obey obey or not not to inte interf rfer ere e is a us usef eful ul intermediate category between those two. What is worth noting is that the idea of legitimate authority as a right to rule in the strong sense described above does describe a kind kind of id idea eall of poli politi tica call comm commun unit ity. y. The The id idea ea of legi legiti tima mate te authority as a right to rule to which citizens owe obedience gives each citizen a moral duty to obey, which it owes to the authority. So this form of legitimacy is grounded in a moral relationship betw betwee een n the the part partie ies s that that goes goes beyo beyond nd the the fact fact that that they they are are fellow human beings. The establishment of a robust right to rule depends on the fact that each citizen rightly takes as a reason for obedience that it has a moral duty owed to the authority. Since a legitimate political authority with a right to rule is predicated on the fact that citizens citizens have moral reasons grounded in the right to rule to obey it, the right to rule engages citizens at a deep moral leve level. l. The The exer exerci cise se of poli politi tica call powe powerr is foun founde ded d in a mora morall

relationship between moral persons that recognizes and affirms the moral personality of each citizen. By contrast, a society in which it is merely the merely  the case that coercion coercion is justified is one in which the subjects are permissibly permissibly treated as means to morally defensible purposes. The subjects do not owe anything to the authority or have any duties to obey it. So, in the case of an authority as merely justified coercion, the subjects' reas easons for obedi edience nce are merel rely thei theirr desires to avoid punishment. And that is the level at which the authority deals with them. Such a society does not engage the subjects as moral persons; it merely attempts to administer the activities of persons so as to bring ring abou aboutt in a morall rally y jus usti tifi fied ed way way a desi desira rab ble outc outcom ome. e. At the the extr extrem eme, e, a pris prison oner er of war war camp camp or even even a hosti hostile le but but just justif ifie ied d mili milita tary ry occu occupa pati tion on gives gives the autho authori riti ties es  justification for coercion. The people who are subjected to that treatment often have no duties to obey and they do not regard each other or the authorities as members of a unified political community. They are merely fellow human beings. To the extent that that a poli olitic tical soc society iety is best best when when it invol nvolve ves s the the mutu mutual al recognition and affirmation of the moral status of each person, the kind of society that involves merely justified coercion of some by others is a pale shadow. And the intermediate form of political authority is incomplete in the respect in which the exercise of political power involves the mutual recognition and affirmation of the status of each person. It is the case that subjects have duties but those duties are not essentially connected to anything in the authority. The subjects instead act more in accordance with reasons that are independent of the authority when they obey the authority. So to the extent that a society ruled by an authority that has the right to rule is an ideal of a moral community, the other types of  authority are lesser forms of a morally ideal political community.

Conceptions of the Legitimacy of Political Authority Few theorists after Thomas Hobbes and David Hume have argued that there is a general duty to obey the law or that political authority is generally legitimate (Hobbes 1668; Hume 1965). Most theorists have argued that the legitimacy of political authority is one that holds only when the political authority satisfies certain normatively important conditions. What we will review here are some of the main theories that attempt to explain when a political authority has legitimacy. General theories are theories that identify general properties that virt virtual ually ly any kind kind of poli politi tica call regim regime e can can have have that that give give them them legi legiti tima macy cy.. Spec Specia iall theor theorie ies s are are ones ones that that mark mark off off parti particu cula larr classes of regimes that have legitimacy or that have a particularly high level of legitimacy. There are really four types of general theory of political authority and then there are a variety of special theories of political authority. The four types of general theory of  legitimacy are consent theories, reasonable consensus theories, associative obligation theories and instrumentalist theories. The two two hist histori orica call lly y impo importa rtant nt form forms s of sp spec ecia iall theory theory in the West West have have been been the Divi Divine ne Righ Rightt of King Kings s theor theorie ies s and and demo democr crat atic ic theories. Concerning the incompatibility of moral autonomy and political authority the problem is really only connected with the kinds of  poli politi tica call auth author orit ity y that that impl imply y cont conten entt inde indepe pend nden entt duti duties es to comply with authoritative commands. The basic idea is that it is incompatible for a subject to comply with the commands of an authority merely because it is the command of the authority and for the subject to be acting morally autonomously. Wolff thinks that each person has a duty to act on the basis of his own moral assessment of right and wrong and has the duty to reflect on what is right and wrong in each particular instance of action. Such a person would be violating his duty to act autonomously if he

comp compli lies es with with auth author orit itat ativ ive e comm comman ands ds on grou ground nds s that that are are independent of the content of the commands. So the duty of  auto autono nomy my is inco incomp mpat atib ible le with with the the duty duty of obey obeyiing poli politi tica call authority. This is the challenge of philosophical anarchism (Wolff  1970).  The worry is that authority is never legitimate because the kind of  obed obedie ience nce asso associ ciate ated d with with autho authorit rity y is inco incons nsis isten tentt with with the autonomy of the subject. We can see, however, that this worry applies only to certain accounts of authority, which imply duties to obey on the part of the subjects. The account of authority as  justified coercion is not affected by this argument nor is the account of legitimate authority consisting of a justification right affe affect cted ed by this this worr worry. y. Stil Still, l, most most acco accoun unts ts of the the natu nature re of  authority do imply content independent duties on the part of the subjects. We can see that any content independent duty, whether it is a duty not to interfere with the authority's command command or it is a duty uty to obey obey the the auth author oriity, ty, is call called ed into nto ques questi tion on by this this argument.

Reasonable Consensus Conceptions of Legitimate Political Authority Reasonable Reasonable consensus views of political political authority attempt to find a kind of mean between the extreme individualism of consent theo theory ry and and the the lack ack of res respect pect for for peopl eople' e's s opi opini nion ons s of the the instrumentalist views. John Rawls argues that the liberal principle of politi political cal legiti legitimac macy y require requires s that that coerci coercive ve institu institutio tions ns be so stru structu ctured red that that they they acco accord rd with with the the reas reason onab able le views views of the the members of the society. As long as they do so they have the right to impose duties on their members. The members may not demur on the the basis asis of unre unreas ason onab able le view views s. Furt Furthe herm rmor ore e, it is not not necessary on this view that the persons over whom authority is wielded have voluntarily acted or given any sign of agreement. All that need be the case is that the basic principles that regulate the

coercive institutions be ones that the reasonable members can agree to.  This view seems to be a kind of middle position between consent theory and the instrumentalist views. It does not allow individuals to divest themselves of obligations on spurious or merely selfinte in tere res sted ted bases ases beca becaus use e it sp spec eciifies fies what what is and is not not a reaso reasonab nable le basi basis s for agree agreeme ment nt to the the basi basic c prin princi cipl ples es of the society. At the same time it evinces a respect for the opinions of  the members of society since it requires that the basic principles that regulate the society accord with the reasonable views of the members.  This account of legitimacy is based on an adherence to a principle of reasonab reasonablen leness ess.. The basic basic princi principle ple asserts asserts that reasonab reasonable le pers ersons ons will will propo ropose se fair fair term terms s of coop ooperat eratio ion n with with othe otherr reas reason onab able le pers person ons s only only on cond condit itio ion n that that the the term terms s can can be  justified to those others on the basis of premises that they can reas reason onab ably ly acce accept pt.. Ther There e has has been been much much di disc scus ussi sion on of this this prin princi cipl ple e and and its its underp underpin inni ning ngs s but but this this entry entry will will focus focus on a central worry concerning this idea.

A Democratic Conception of Legitimate Political Authority  The basic idea behind the democratic conception of legitimate authority is that when there are disagreements among persons abou aboutt how how to st stru ruct ctur ure e thei theirr sh shar ared ed worl world d toge togeth ther er and and it is important important to structure structure that world together, together, the way to choose the shar sh ared ed aspe aspect cts s of soci societ ety y is by mean means s of a deci decisi sion on maki making ng process that is fair to the interests and opinions of each of the

members. When there is disagreement about how to organize the share hared d sys yste tem m of law, law, prop proper erty ty,, pub public lic educ educat atiion and and the the provision of public goods, no one can have his way entirely in this context without someone else not getting her way. Each person thinks that the ideas about justice and the common good with which the others wish to organize their shared world are mistaken in some way. Yet there is a need for collective action. The only way to do this that is reasonably fair to all the members is to make the decision democratically.  The thought is that when an outcome is democratically chosen and some people disagree with the outcome, as some inevitably will, they still have a duty to go along with the decision because othe otherw rwis ise e they they woul would d be trea treati ting ng the the othe others rs unfa unfair irly ly.. If they they refu refuse se to go alon along g and and disru isrupt pt the the dem democra ocrati tic cally ally chos chosen en arra arrang ngem emen ents ts,, they they are are assu assumi ming ng for for them themse selv lves es a righ rightt to determine how things should go that overrides the equal rights of  all the others. They are, in Peter Singer's words, assuming the positions of dictators in relation to the others. For if they turned out to be in the majority, they would demand the compliance of  the others.  The idea of fairness that underpins the democratic process is grounded grounded in different different ways in different theories. The basic idea of  equality is shared by most democratic theorists. Some argue that there is a fundamental duty of equal respect for the opinions of  others that grounds democratic decision making in the context of  perv pervas asiv ive e di disa sagr gree eeme ment nt.. Othe Others rs wish wish to grou ground nd this this duty duty of  respect for the opinions of others in a deeper principle of equal concern for the interests of each member of society. On this kind of view the democratic assembly has a right to rule and to the obedience of its members. This right of the democratic assemb embly is ground unded in the the rig right of each memb ember of the assembly to be accorded equal respect. The duty of equal respect

requires that the collective decision process gives each a vote in a broadly majoritarian process and a robustly equal opportunity to part partic icip ipat ate e in the the deli delibe bera rati tion ons s and and nego negoti tiat atio ions ns lead leadin ing g to decisions. The equal rights of each of the members are in effect pooled in the democratic assembly so that because one owes each person equal respect, and the democratic way of making decisions embodies this equal respect, one owes the democratic assembly respect.  The democratic assembly can be understood as the assembly of  all adult citizens or better as the assembly of all the democratically chosen representatives of citizens. A conception of  a democratic assembly requires, on this view, an account of the appropriate form of democratic representation. In addition, the democratic assembly is only one part of the complete system of  government. It is concerned with legislation only. In addition to this a government requires executive and judicial functions whose legitimacy may depend in part on other factors better grasped by the instrumentalist view.  The duties that are owed the democratic assembly are content independent and preemptive duties. They are content independent duties because each member has the duty, with a class of exceptions we will review in a moment, just because the ass assemb embly has has made ade a decis ecisio ion. n. The The dutie uties s are are preem reemp ptive tive because the citizen must put aside the considerations she initially plan pl anne ned d on acti acting ng on in orde orderr to trea treatt the the rest rest of her her fell fellow ow citizens with proper respect. The idea of equal respect requires, on this account, deference to the decision decision of the majority majority and not acting on one's own judgment when the majority disagrees. So the decision of the majority gives a reason to obey that preempts or replaces the considerations one might act on were there no majority decision.

It is important to note that this conception of authority is what was was desc descri ribe bed d as a sp spec ecia iall conc concep epti tion on abov above. e. The The fact fact that that demo democr crati atic c asse assemb mbli lies es have have autho authori rity ty does does not not impl imply y that that all all other forms of regime never have authority. One might go along with a regime on the basis of the instrumentalist conception of  authority or even the consent approach even if it is not democratic. It is clear nevertheless that democratic assemblies have a special kind of authority.

Limits to Democratic Authority  The question that arises for a democratic theory of authority is when when do the the cons consid ider erat atio ions ns of the the just justic ice e or inju injust stic ice e of the the outcome override the considerations connected with the fairness of the process of decision making?  The claim that a democratic assembly has a right to rule is not inco incomp mpat atib ible le with with the the idea idea that that there there are limi limits ts to that that righ right. t. Indeed, theorists have argued that the very same principle that grounds democratic authority also ground limits to that authority.  The principle of public equality on which the argument for democ emocra rac cy is foun found ded also also groun round ds a set of libe libera rall rig rights hts (freedom of conscience, association, speech and private pursuits).  The reason for this is that democratic assembly that fundame fundamental ntally ly denied denied these these liberal liberal rights rights to indivi individua duals ls would would publicly violate the duty of equal respect to those individuals.  Those who violate the basic liberal rights of others are publicly treati treating ng them them as infer inferio iors rs.. To the the exten extentt that that the demo democr crati atic c assembly's claim of authority is grounded in the public realization of the principle of equal respect, the authority would run out when the the demo democr crat atic ic asse assemb mbly ly make makes s law law that that unde underm rmin ines es equa equall resp espect. Thi his s esta estab blishes hes, at least for one concep ncepti tio on of  democratic authority, a substantive set of limits to that authority.

The Distinction between Power and Authority

While understanding the concepts of power and authority is vital in the smooth running of social and political institutions, there must must also also be an unde unders rsta tand ndin ing g that that they they are are both both semi semina nall lly y different at their cores. While being interdependent on each other at a high higher er leve level, l, these these conc concep epts ts rely rely on comp comple letel tely y diff differe erent nt factors at their organic level. As mentioned earlier, Power is the ability to get things done by others. The principle of power is to punish and reward. Power can exist with or without authority. For instance an armed robber has power but no authority. Authority, Authority, on the other hand is the power to enforce law and take command, and to expect obedience from those without authority. Authority can exist with or without power, for example a teacher has authority over the pupils but no real power. Steven Lukes states that there are three dimensions of  power namely decision, non decision making and manipulating desires. For instance, In parliament when a law is being discussed by MP's and any other form of political group there must be a body ody whic which h has has powe powerr so that that they they can can actu actual ally ly come come to a decision. The significant differences in the most objective form include the nature of the terms and the differing types of each concept. The first of these differences being the nature of the concepts of power and authority as illustrated in the earlier case. Other distinctions include the sources from which each derives the the powe powerr or auth author orit ity, y, and and fina finall lly, y, the the many many type types s of each each concept. A clea clearr dist distin inct ctio ion n can can be deri derived ved from from betw between een the type types s of  power power to be addr addres esse sed d su such ch as soci social al powe power, r, cult cultura urall powe power, r, econ econom omic ic powe power, r, poli politi tica call powe powerr and and lega legall powe powerr whil while e the the different types of authority include customary authority, statutory autho authori rity ty,, comm common on law law autho authori rity ty and and dele delega gated ted autho authorit rity. y. As mentioned earlier, the concepts of power and authority and the need to form a distinction between are formed in the context of  political institutions and political rule.

At the root root of our our ideal ideal-ty -type pes, s, howev however, er, no sepa separat ratio ion n exists exists between society and politics. The Indo-European king, to whom some people trace back the concept of authority, is at once a social and a political leader. But we are dealing with what one migh mightt flip flippa pantl ntly y call call post post-H -Heg egel elia ian n soci societ ety, y, where where a divi divisi sion on between between “p “poli olitic tical al domain domain” ” and “civil “civil society society” ” is consid considered ered a relatively consolidated fact.  There seem exist three ideal types that can be discerned linking political power to social authority: a) the ideal type of a notables system (waxing strong in nineteenth-centur nineteenth-century y society society but not only there); b) what I would call the ‘ecclesial’ or ‘church’ ideal type which I suggest is not so much a fruit of transposing institutional fide fideli lity ty to reli religi giou ous s sy syst stem ems s onto onto a soci socioo-po poli liti tica call plane plane as of  orga organi nizi zing ng the poli politi tica call autho authori rity ty vested vested in an inst instit ituti ution on for salv salvati ation; on; c) the the burea bureauc ucrat ratic ic-d -dis istr trib ibuti ution onal al idea ideall type type where where power power desc descend ends s from from the abil abilit ity y to creat create e equil equilib ibri rium um (or rereequi equili libr briu ium) m) in the the soci social al real realm m by dist distri ribu buti ting ng the the resour resource ces s produced by the political realm.  To begin, the first ideal type is a system in which power stems from from the the abil abilit ity y of the poli politi tica call deci decisi sion on-m -mak akers ers to auge augerr the the posi osition of the subjects ects under them them and and doing so via the the mediation of the “notable”. In this case the subject relating to publ public ic powe powerr lack lacks s the the reso resour urce ces s to be su sure re of bein being g take taken n seriously. That obviously means the public power system is failing to supply distributional justice. I note that this may happen for opposite opposite reasons: public power may lack the organization organization to field the “non-accredited” subject’s requests, or it may have too much bureaucratic organization, designed to guarantee access for all, but actually a self-defeating labyrinth. In either case a priority pathway is needed to obtain a hearing, creating the demand for a “mediator” to activate it. The problem here is that “discretionary power” lies more or less in the hands of political power itself. The mecha mechani nism sm gets gets acti activa vated ted on beha behalf lf of some someone one eithe eitherr when when

prompted by the need to find supporting covers from someone with enou nough social clout to trig rigger it or when hen it serve rves to strengthen the hold on political power over part of society. Both such aims can be secured through the “notable”, thanks to his investiture with “authority” as a “social representative”. He (traditionally he, of course,) is not just the “advocate” of whoever he represe represents nts but an “interp “interprete reter” r” filteri filtering ng certai certain n claims claims and thereby changing the response by political power into “legitimating” where it would otherwise remain a mere ex-officio duty of the public domain. In the the mode modern rn soci societ ety y with with all all its its comp comple lex x funct functio ioni ning ng’s ’s,, it is vita vitall lly y impo import rtan antt to loca locate te the the thin thin line line whic which h sepa separa rate tes s the the phenomenon of power and authority. There exists a need to study and assi assimi mila late te the vario various us fact factors ors and and the infl influen uence ces s exert exerted ed upon and by them and the interdependence and distinction for the better progress of society and its social beings.

Weber on Authority Max Weber, Weber, in his sociological work, identified and distinguished thre three e type types s of legi legiti tima mate te domi domina nati tion on (Herrschaft  in Germ German, an, which genera nerallly means ans 'domi ominati natio on' or 'rul ule e'), that hat have some someti time mes s been been rend render ered ed in Engl Englis ish h tran transl slat atio ion n as type types s of  authority, because domination isn't seen as a political concept in the the firs firstt pl plac ace. e. Webe Weberr defi define ned d domi domina nati tion on (aut (autho hori rity ty)) as the the chanc chance e of comm command ands s being being obeye obeyed d by a sp spec ecif ifia iabl ble e grou group p of  peop people le.. Legi Legiti tima mate te auth author orit ity y is that that whic which h is reco recogn gniz ized ed as legitimate and justified by both the ruler and the ruled. Weber divided legitimate authority into three types.  The first type discussed by Weber is Rational-legal authority . It is that form of authority which depends for its legitimacy on formal

rules and established laws of the state, which are usually written down and are often very complex. complex. The power of the rational legal auth author orit ity y is ment mentio ione ned d in the the cons consti titu tuti tion on.. Mode Modern rn soci societ etie ies s depend on legal-rational authority. Government officials are the best example example of this form of authority, authority, which is prevalent all over the world.  The second type of authority is Tradit Traditional ional authori authority  ty , whic which h deriv erives es from from long ong-est -estab abli lis shed hed cus usto tom ms, habi habits ts and soci ocial structures. When power passes from one generation to another, then it is known as traditional authority. The right of hereditary monarchs to rule rule furn furnis ishe hes s an obvi obviou ous s exam exampl ple. e. The The  Tudor dynasty in England and the ruling ruling families of Mewar, in Rajasthan (India) are some examples of traditional authority.  The third form of authority is Charismatic authority . Here, the charisma of the individual or the leader plays an important role. Charismatic authority is that authority which is derived from "the gift gi ft of grac grace" e" or when when the the lead leader er clai claims ms that that his his auth author orit ity y is derived from a "higher power" (e.g. God or natural law or rights) or "inspiration", that is superior to both the validity of traditional and ratio rational nal-l -leg egal al autho authori rity ty and and foll follow owers ers acce accept pt this this and and are are willing to follow this higher or inspired authority, in the place of  the authority that they have hitherto been following. Some of the most ost prom romin inen entt exam examp ples les of chari haris smati matic c auth author orit ity y can can be politicians or leaders, who come from a movie or entertainment background. These people become successful, because they use thei theirr grac grace e and and char charm m to get more ore vote votes s durin uring g elec electi tion ons s. Examples in this regard can be NT Rama Rao, a matinee idol, who went on to become one of the most powerful Chief Ministers of  Andhra Pradesh. Pradesh. History has witnessed several social movements or revolutions revolutions,, against a system of traditional or legal-rational authority, which are usually started by Charismatic authorities. What distinguishes

authority, from coercion coercion,, force and power on the one hand and leadership, persuasion and influence on the other hand, is legitimacy acy. Super uperiiors feel tha that they have a right to issue commands; subordinates perceive an obligation to obey. Social scie sc ienti ntist sts s agree agree that that autho authori rity ty is but but one of seve severa rall resour resource ces s available, to incumbents in formal positions. For example, a Head of State State is depe depend ndent ent upon upon a simi simila larr nesti nesting ng of autho authori rity ty.. His His legitimacy must be acknowledged, not just by citizens, but by those who control other valued resources: his immediate staff, his cabinet, military leaders and in the long run, the administration and political apparatus of the entire society.

The Consent Theory of Political Authority  The consent theory of political authority states only a necessary condition of the legitimacy of political authority. It states that a political authority is legitimate only if it has the consent of those who who are are su subj bjec ectt to its its comm comman ands ds.. Many Many have have argu argued ed that that in addition to consent, a state must be minimally just for it to be legitimate (Locke 1990). A number of arguments have been presented in favor of this view. Locke's argument is that each person has an equal natural right to freedom and that this implies that at the age of maturity no one may be subordinated to anyone else's commands by nature (Locke 1990). Let us call this the natural right argument . Such subordination would violate the equal freedom of the subo su bord rdin inat ated ed pers person on.. To the the exte extent nt that that poli politi tica call auth author orit ity y involv involves es iss issuin uing g comman commands ds and requiri requiring ng others others to follow follow the commands, it seems to involve subordinating one person to the comm comman ands ds of anot anothe herr and and thus thus viol violat ates es the the natu natura rall righ rightt to freedom of the subordinated person.

The Instrumentalist Argument

Critique

of

the

Natural

Right

A natu natura rall obje object ctio ion n to this this line line of reas reason onin ing g is to st stat ate e that that poli politi tica call auth author orit ity y is actu actual ally ly nece necess ssar ary y to prot protec ecti ting ng each each person's equal freedom. Locke himself argued that the state of  nature would be quite threatening to each person's ability to live freely because there are likely to be many disagreements about what rights each person has and so people are likely to trespass on each other's rights. Furthermore he argued that when there is such su ch disa disagr gree eeme ment, nt, we need need an impa imparti rtial al judg judge e to deter determi mine ne when rights have been violated. And against criminals we need a police power to enforce the rights that people have. Locke argues that only by establishing political society with a legislature that makes known and settled laws and establishing a judiciary that resolves remaining controversies between people and having an executive power that enforces the laws can people's rights and freedoms be protected. Once Once we have the above above argument argument in mind, mind, it is hard to see the forc force e of the the natu natura rall righ rightt argu argume ment nt for for no poli politi tica call auth author orit ity y without consent. We might think that the very liberty that is being invoked to support the case for the necessity of consent is better protected by a reasonably just political authority. The instrumentalist can then argue that one protects the liberty of  each and every person better by instituting political authority and by treating its commands as authoritative. And so the instrumentalist could argue that insofar as liberty is a fundam ndame enta ntal value, it wou would be immoral not to support a reaso reasonab nably ly just just poli politi tica call auth authori ority ty and treat treat its its comm command ands s as authoritative.  The natural right theorist might argue ar gue in response that the above argument argument seems to involve involve a kind of utilitarianism utilitarianism of rights. rights. Such a view says that it is justified to violate one person's right in order to protect the rights of others. But, such a theorist theorist might say, the natural rights of persons are side constraints against actions; they are not to be violated even if others' rights are better protected

as a consequence. This entry will not go into the many issues that arise in the discussion of deontology and consequentialism here. We will return to the issue of side constraints constraints after the discussion discussion of the next argument.

The Consent Theory: The Options Argument Some ome have proposed what hat thi his s entr entry y will call the the options argument  against the kind of considerations the instrumentalist adduces. The instrumentalist argues that I have natural duties of   justice to promote just institutions and that these duties are best sati satisf sfie ied d by comp comply lyin ing g with with the autho authori rity ty of a reas reason onab ably ly just just state. But the philosophical anarchist could argue that though I may have a duty of justice, it does not entail that I must obey any particular institution for promoting justice. The idea here is that  just as Amnesty International may not require me to pay dues to it regardless of my membership even though these dues would clearly advance the protection of human rights throughout the worl world d, so the the st stat ate e may not not requ requir ire e me to compl omply y with with its its comm command ands s even even thoug though h su such ch comp compli lian ance ce would would adva advanc nce e the purposes of justice in the world. Let us suppose that the reasons clearly favor my support of Amnesty International. Intuitively, it stil till may not requi equirre me to lend it support ort. Onl nly y if I have have voluntarily joined and voluntarily remain in Amnesty do I have a duty to do what the conditions of membership require. And I am under no obligation to join Amnesty; I may join other orga organi niza zati tion ons s to fulfi fulfill ll whatev whatever er duti duties es of aid aid that that I have. have. So whether I ought to join Amnesty and be subject to membership dues is up to me. The consent theorist theorist seems to think that, in the same same way, way, only only if I volu volunt ntari arily ly trans transac actt to obli obliga gate te myse myself lf to comply with the state's commands can I be said to have a duty to comp comply ly with with the the st stat ate. e. I must must some someho how w enli enlist st myse myself lf in the the project of promoting the good causes that the state promotes.

Elite theory  The study of concentrations and distributions power and authority a uthority and the dynamics of political institutions has come a long way from from the the earl early y Gree Greek k and and roman oman civi civili liza zati tion ons s to the the larg largel ely y democratic and republic governments of today. There exist many theories concerning the state and relationships of power in the moder odern n soci ociety ety. The The elit elite e theo theory ry is one one su such ch theo theory ry whi which attempt attempts s to explai explain n the power power relati relations onship hips s of indivi individua duals ls and groups in the modern society.  The elite theory’s main argument holds that it is a small minority , consisting of members of the economic elite and policy policy-planning -planning netw etworks rks, that that hold the most power, wer, all thi his s while being independent of a state's democratic elections process. Through positions in corporations or on corporate boards, and influence over over the policy policy-pl -plann anning ing network networks s through through financ financial ial suppor supportt of  found foundati ations ons or posi positi tion ons s with with thi think nk tan tanks ks or policy-dis policy-discussi cussion on groups, members of the "elite" are able to exert significant power over policy decisions of corporations and governments.  The main opposition to this theory is the pluralism theory which sugge uggest sts s tha that dem democra ocracy cy is a uto utopia pian n ide ideal al and the state autonomy theory. theory.  The Elite theory was suggested many centuries ago and there have been severa severall social social scientist scientists s who have have concei conceived ved many many form forms s of the elit elite e theor theory. y. Thes These e theori theories es are appl applic icab able le even even today from the very fact that while the forms of governance governance have underg undergone one chang changes es,, the the esse essenc nce e of power power and autho authori rity ty over over society and as a political instrument have long remained through the ages.

Classical Elite theory

 The aristocratic version of modern elite theory is the Classic Elite  Theory and it is based on two fundamental ideas: 1. Powe Powerr lies lies in posi positi tion on of auth author orit ity y in key key econ econom omic ic and and political institutions 2. The ps psyc ychol holog ogic ical al diff differe erenc nce e that that sets sets Elite Elites s apar apartt is that that they have personal resources, for instance intelligence and skills, and a vested interest in the government; while the rest are incompetent and do not have the capabilities of  gove governi rning ng thems themsel elve ves; s; the elit elite e are resour resource ceful ful and will will strive to make the government to work. For in reality, the elite have the most to lose in a failed government.  There were many important political thinkers who formulated many theories based upon the elitist thought but some of them including Vilfredo Pareto, Robert Michels and Gaetano Mosca are considered to be an authority on the classical version of the elitist theory. While Pareto emph emphas asiz ized ed the ps psyc ycho holo logi gica call and and intel intelle lect ctua uall superiority that the Elites obtained, he believed that the elites were the highest accomplishers in any field and he discussed how there were two types of Elites namely governing elites and nongoverning elites. He also extended on the idea that a whole elite can be replaced by a new one and how one can circulate from being elite to non elite. Mosca emphasized on the sociological and personal characteristics of elites, he said they were an organized minority and how masses are the unorganized majority. The ruling class is composed of the ruling Elite and the sub-Elites. He divided the world into two groups, the ruling class and class that is ruled. Elites, he said had intellectual, moral, and material superiority that is highly esteemed and influential.

On the other hand Michels developed the Iron Law of Oligarchy where social and political organizations are run by few individuals; he said that social organization is key as well as the division of  labo laborr so elit elites es were were the ones ones that that ruled ruled.. He beli believ eved ed that that all all orga organi niza zati tion ons s were were elit elitis istt and and that that elit elites es have have thre three e basi basic c prin princi cipl ples es that that help help in the burea bureauc ucrat ratic ic struc structu ture re of poli politi tica call organization 1. The Need for leaders, leaders, specialized specialized staff and faciliti facilities; es; 2. The Utilization of facilities by leaders within organization;

their

3. The The impo import rtan ance ce of the psy syc chol hologic ogical al attr attrib ibut utes es of the the leaders.

Contemporary Elite theorists Shifting focus to the contemporary scenario, the elite theory has gained more significance in today’s world and there are a several more factors that influence and control the elite theory which is applicable in today’s society. Some of the important elite theorists of today include James Burnham, Floyd Hunter, C. Wright Mills and Robert D. Putnam Mills published his book The Power Elite in 1956 claiming a new persp erspec ecti tive ve on sys yste tem ms of powe powerr in the the Uni nite ted d Stat States es.. He identified a triumvirate of power groups – political, economic and mili militar tary y – whic which h form form a dist distin ingu guis isha habl ble, e, alth althoug ough h not not unifi unified ed,, power wielding body in the American state. He prop propos osed ed that that this this grou group p had had been been gene genera rate ted d thro throug ugh h a proc proces ess s of rati ration onal aliz izat atio ion n at work work in all all adva advanc nced ed indu indust stri rial al societies whereby the mechanisms of power became concentrated funneling overall control into the hands of a limited,

somewhat somewhat corrupt group. This reflected a decline decline in politics politics as an aren arena a for for deba debate te and and rele relega gati tion on to a mere merely ly form formal al leve levell of  discourse.] This This macro macro-s -sca cale le analy analysi sis s soug sought ht to poin pointt out out the the degradation of democracy in "advanced" societies and the fact that that powe powerr gene genera rall lly y lies lies outs outsid ide e the the boun bounda dari ries es of elec electe ted d representatives. A main influence for the study was Franz Leopold Neumann’s book, ook, Behe Behem moth: oth: The Struc tructu ture re and and Prac Practi tice ce of  National Socialism in 1942, a study how Nazism come in position of power in a democratic state as Germany. It had given him the tools to grasp and analyze the entire total structure and as a warning what could happen in a modern capitalistic democracy.  The elite theory analysis of power was also applied on the micro scale in community power studies such as that by Floyd Hunter (1953). Hunter examined in detail the power relationships evident in his "Regional City" looking for the "real" holders of power rather than those in obvious official positions. He posited a structuralfunctional approach which mapped the hierarchies and webs of  interconnection operating within the city – mapping relationships of power between businessme businessmen, n, politicians politicians,, clergy clergy etc. The study was promoted to debunk current concepts of any ‘democracy’ present within urban politics and reaffirm the arguments for a true repres representative entative democ democracy racy.. This type of analysis was also used in later, larger scale, studies such as that carried out by M. Schwartz examining the power structures within the sphere of the corporate elite in the USA. Burnham’s earl early y work work The Manage Manageria riall Revolu Revolution tion soug sought ht to express the movement of all functional power into the hands of  manag manager ers s rather rather than than poli politi tici cian ans s or busi busines nessm smen en – separating ownershi owne rship p and con contro troll. Many Many of thes these e id idea eas s were were adap adapte ted d by paleo-conservatives Samuel T. Francis and Paul Gottfri Gottfried ed in their theories of the managerial state. state.

Putnam saw the develo elopment of techn echniical and exclusive knowledge among administrators and other specialist groups as a mech mechan anis ism m by whic which h powe powerr is st stri ripp pped ed from from the the democratic process and and slip slippe ped d side sideway ways s to the advi adviso sors rs and sp spec ecia iali list sts s influencing the decision making process. process . He has condensed the essence of his theory into the quote, "If the dominant figures of  the past hundr ndred years have been een the the entre ntrep pren reneur eur, the businessman, and the industrial executive, the ‘new men’ are the scienti ntists ts,, the mathem thema aticians ans, the eco economi omists ts,, and the the engineers of the new intellectual technology.”

Conclusion We can conclude the study of power and authority by stating that they are phenomenon phenomenon deeply embedded embedded into the fabric of human existence nce. The dest estruc ructio tion of tha that intel ntelllectua tual and moral consensus consensus which has restrained restrained the struggle struggle for power for almost almost three centuries deprived the balance of power of the vital energy that has made it a living principle of international politics. Battle for for power power start started ed many many mill millen enni nia a back back and civi civili liza zati tions ons have have fall fallen en and and grow grown n thro throug ugh h the the page pages s of hist histor ory. y. In the the post post-industriali industrialized zed world battle between the European European juggernauts juggernauts for terr territ itor oria iall and and polit olitic ical al powe powerr and and sove sovere reig ignt nty y gave gave way way to colonization of the rest of the world. European hegemony and aristocratic imperialism gave way to the bipolar world after the World wars and the cold war ended with the supremacy supremacy of United State tates s and the the break reakup up of the the USSR. SR. Purs ursui uitt of powe powerr and and authority has dictated the winds of growth of man and his society.  There is no need to repeat r epeat the fact that power and authority au thority play one the most influential and important roles in maintaining the balance and progress in society and ultimately in nature. These concepts are powerful beyond the imagination of the human mind and can never be ignored or forgotten and we can only strive to

channel the potential of theses phenomenon into a positive and progressive building force.

Bibliography  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Political Philosophy

 The Founder’s Constitution of University of Chicago Press  The

Massachusetts

Institute

of

Technology: Introduction

to

Political Thought On Max Weber, the Encyclopedia Britannica  The Cambridge Companion to Weber: Cambridge University Press Essays in Economic Sociology, Princeton University Press The Concept of Law, H.L.A.Hart

Articles

Power and Knowledge by Foucalt Social Authority and Political Power by Power  by Paolo Pombeni Hist Histor ory y of Econ Econom omic ic An Anal alys ysis is by  Joseph Joseph Schump Schumpeter eter,, Oxford Oxford University Press On John Austin, Austin, the Province of Jurisprudence Determined by. H. L. A. Hart The Au Autho thori rity ty of the the Stat State e by Green Green Leslie Leslie,, Oxford Oxford Univers University ity Press