Political Science.docx

DR. RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY LUCKNOW

POLITICAL SCIENCE III FINAL PROJECT ON: REINVENTION OF INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER PM MODI

Submitted for the project undertaken in partial fulfillment of B.A. LL.B. (H) III Sem. 5 year integrated course at RMLNLU, Lucknow

SUBMITTED TO:

SUBMITTED BY:

MR. BRAJESH MISHRA

GARIMA NAGPAL and GARIMA PARAKH

VISITING PROFESSOR

B.A.LL.B. (H) III SEM.

Dr. RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA

R. NO. 56 and 57

 NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

We would like to extend my sincere thanks to Our teacher and mentor Mr. Brajesh Mishra for g iving me this wonderful opportunity to work on this project and for his able guidance and advice, Vice Chancellor, Mr. Gurdeep Singh Sir and Dean (Academics), Professor C.M. Jariwala for their encouragement and Enthusiasm; Our seniors for sharing their valuable tips; And our classmates for their constant support To make the best possible efforts to complete this project.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………1 2. Recent past and present of Indian Foreign Policy……………………………..2 3. Modi for PM: A Hint of Change……………………………………………….2 4. Current Indian Foreign Policy………………………………………… ............4 5. Country wise analysis……………………………………………………… .…6 6. Is it reinvention of India’s Global Image……………………………………..12 7. Conclusion ………………………………………………………………….. .15 8. Bibliography………………………………………………………………….16

2

INTRODUCTION

Idealism has been the basic tenet of India’s foreign policy with non-alignment and noninterference being two important facets. This neutral stance was adopted with a view to protect national interest of a newly independent India. Independent decision making was, however, not  possible in a bi-polar world divided into two power blocks  –   USA and USSR. After the disintegration of the USSR, the power dynamics shifted towards the West, with India losing the superpower veto support of Russia and a significant alteration of its global position. Although a multi-polar world was beneficial, it led to India losing the bargaining power it previously held. An economic boom in the 1990s and the opening up of our economy made India a geostrategically important region for trade, but did not result in formulation of a coherent foreign  policy, coalition governments being the prime cause for this phenomenon. The global economic meltdown resulted in plummeting foreign trade and corruption allegations on the incumbent Congress government led to rise in anti-accumbency sentiments. Narendra Modi took ample advantage of this to win the elections by a huge majority and form a non-coalition government after a very long time. His focus on domestic economic development and elevation of India’s status to that of a superpower has led to India taking an assertive  –   even aggressive –   stance on vital issues. The invitation to all SAARC nations to attend the oath-taking ceremony had tremendous diplomatic implications. The Modi government has also increased engagements with our immediate neighbours highlighting the importance of a peaceful neighbourhood for economic and political development. Improving bilateral ties and frequency of engagements with each of our neighbours is essential to establish a strong and firm position in South East Asia. With regard to the United States, India has adopted a far more assertive stance, which had  become evident from the strong reaction the Devyani Khobragade incident elicited and was also seen recently when Barrack Obama greeted Narendra Modi with ‘Kem Cho’, implying that their relationship was now on an equal platform. Significant changes have taken place, with some still yet to come; however, if the entire history of Indian foreign policy is looked at, all that has been done is reassert the previous policies with certain modifications. The difference between the incumbent government and its predecessors is that the present government makes optimum use of mass media to inform the public of its moves and policies. The lesson from the previous government is well learnt. 1

RECENT PAST AND PRESENT OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

India’s position in the foreign policy arena in the last 2-3 decades has evolved due to a variety of internal and external factors of a fundamental and inter-connected nature. Of them, the main ones were brought about by the destruction at the end of the cold war of India’s previous foreign (and  partly economic) policy mainstay, namely the USSR, as well as the beginning of the formation of a new geopolitical game in the mid-90’s, the “center of gravity” of which began to shift from Europe to Asia. The process of the USA becoming a new world superpower has significantly affected this change. At the same time, as socialism was purposely and steadfastly discredited in the 90’s in Russia, a sharp decline in the volume of economic connections with a former key ally couldn’t help but disrupt the “quasi-socialist” status of India’s economy and stimulate the  process of its turning to Western countries.1 The increasing rapport between India and the US has  become a principal component of this drift. The strengthened relations began during Bill Clinton’s visit to New Delhi in 2000, at the end of his 8-year presidency. It is noteworthy that the  process of increasing rapport between India and the US has been flowing by no means 100% smoothly but continuous efforts are being made. For India, the objective nature of this strengthening of ties is shown as well in the fact that it does not depend on the party affiliation of the country’s leadership. Begun during Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s administration, (1998-2004), who represented the “Bharatiya Janata party", it was continued for the next 10 years by the Congress government of Manmohan Singh. However, fear of incurring Chinese displeasure restricted furtherance of Indian relations with USA as well as Japan. In the present scenario, the dynamics are such that overlap is inevitable and no one can be pleased on every single point. Adopting a more pragmatic and practical approach to diplomacy is essential to maintain a peaceful situation for mutual benefit. MODI FOR PM: A HINT OF CHANGE Predictions about him coming into power and his future policies

India’s 16th general election prompted considerable debate about the impact a change of guard in Delhi will have on foreign policy and many predicted a sea of change, especially with Narendra 1

Vladimir Terehov, ‘India’s Foreign Policy under Narendra Modi’ (2014) New Eastern Outlook  accessed 18 October 2014 2

Modi heading the government. According to Sreeram Chaulia, professor and dean at the Jindal School of International Affairs in Sonipat, India, foreign policy under Modi-led government will see greater emphasis on commercial diplomacy, “more assertive actions in response to [Pakistan  backed] cross-border terrorism,” greater attention to  long-term policy planning with a view to formulating grand strategy for scenarios in 2020 and beyond, “a bigger role for the military in shaping India’s national security and formulating doctrines,” and a greater say for the states in the government’s formulation and execution of foreign policy2. A controversial and polarizing figure, Modi has often poured scorn on the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government’s “soft” response to terrorist attacks emanating  from Pakistan and to Chinese incursions into Indian territory. This has contributed to a widely held perception that he will be tough in his response to Pakistan-backed terrorism and would not baulk at the use of force. As recent events prove, this has materialized into a tough stand in case of both Pakistan and China. The recent events offer a direction as to where the Indian foreign policy is heading and Modi’s  plans are in accordance with the hub-and-spoke model. At the core is the growth and development of India. This is the paramount principle of his policy. The second concentric circle, tied closely to the first, is the South Asian neighbourhood. Modi is a believer in the truth, first articulated by former PM IK Gujral, that India's development will be incomplete if its neighbours don't tread the same path. The spokes would be the countries India will engage intensively which would assist the development of his co re principles.3 Manifesto

BJP Manifesto explicitly states that the BJP intends to create a ‘web of alliances to further our interests’4 a clear departure from India’s long cherished notions of non-alignment and strategic autonomy. What exactly lies in the national interest however hasn’t been expounded upon not even in the traditional rhetorical terms. Another statement states that it does not intend to be led  by big power interests and instead shall choose to engage proactively on its own with other

2

Sudha Ramachandran, ‘Indian Foreign Policy under  Narendra Modi’, The Diplomat (6 May 2014) accessed 18 October 2014 3 Indrani Bagchi, ‘With bricks and mortar, Modi puts a foreign policy in place’, TOI  (New Delhi 1 September 2014) accessed 19 October 2014 4 Bhartiya Janta Party Organisation, ‘BJP Election Manifesto 2014’ (BJP 2014) accessed 18 October 2014 3

nations5 however reflects the age old Indian concern with maintaining strategic autonomy. The manifesto also says that states along the territorial borders of India would be given greater say in formation of foreign policy with that country. Such potentially contradictory statements are indicative of the wriggle room Modi has created for his government. Given the lack of foreign  policy commitments in the run up to Modi’s ascension to power such a framing gives him just the sort of flexibility he needs. In an era where the flag follows the trade this may very well have  been the smart thing to do in the run up to elections6. CURRENT INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY Overview of his Policy

Instead of a presumptuous enunciation of a Modi doctrine in foreign policy, the Prime Minister is allowing his actions, including diplomatic successes and breaks, to define his approach. From the  big bear hug with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe that symbolized the dawn of an IndiaJapan alliance to his scrapping of scheduled foreign secretary level talks with Pakistan after its high commissioner defiantly met Kashmiri secessionists, Modi has managed to put his stamp on foreign policy faster than any predecessor, other than Jawaharlal Nehru7. India’s new government’s foreign policy will be carried out in conjunction with “the 6 top  priorities”, published by the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the end of May of this year  – 8 “1. India's ties with the US have become lackluster. MEA needs to infuse life into it by making it more transactional and business-like. The civil nuclear liability law needs to be amended to open India to nuclear energy industry, fix the retroactive taxes to revive business sentiment in the US and

explain

India's

stand

on

IPR

in

pharmaceuticals.

2. India's big challenge is China —   its rise and aggression causes anxiety. These anxieties will reduce if China is seen to be developing a stake in India. The way to do it is to push Chinese 5

Bhartiya Janta Party Organisation, ‘BJP Election Manifesto 2014’ (BJP 2014) accessed 18 October 2014 6 Himanil Raina, ‘India’s Foreign Policy under Modi 2’ (2014) International Policy Digest accessed 18 October 2014 7  Brahma Chellaney ‘Narendra Modi’s Imprint on Foreign Policy’ Live Mint (2 September 2014)  accessed 18 October 2014 8 Vladimir Terehov, ‘India’s Foreign Policy under Narendra Modi’ (2014) New Eastern Outlook  accessed 18 October 2014 4

investment in India and develop a genuine economic partnership with it. MEA has to help the security

establishment

overcome

its

fear

about

China.

3. India's Look East policy has petered out into a "Glance East" Policy. India's economic and strategic moorings are in Asia, therefore MEA will have to look at advancing Indian interests in Asia, including countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore as well as Australia  —   countries that

are

also

anxious

about

China's

territorial

moves.

4. Modi has made a terrific start by inviting all neighbours for his swearing-in. It's a gesture to indicate that he wants better ties with them. India's arrogance as Big Brother in south Asia has  brought these ties to a low from which they can only grow. Pakistan has been told upfront that terror and trade can't coexist. Nawaz Sharif needs to make it apparent that he is trying to contain the

terror

operatives

in

Pakistan.

5. SAARC countries look up to India. This needs to be exploited by MEA with a genuine appreciation of the requirements of our neighbours as well as their political sensitivities. As a regional bloc, South Asia is the least integrated in the world. Injecting faith and trust by opening up

trade

and

business

would

change

the

situation.

6. Build trade missions in key embassies to facilitate Indian economic interests. A good way to approach this would be to absorb the international trade division of Commerce ministry into MEA.”9  Narendra Modi favours an assertive (if necessary even aggressive) stance towards diplomacy which was evident in his maiden speech at the sixty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly on 27 September 2014. He called for reform and expansion of  United Nations Security Council including India's long standing demand of a permanent membership. He had also argued why UN should serve as G-All for global governance instead of several parallel sub-groupings like G7, G20 etc. In the wake of  ISIS threat in West Asia and similar in other parts of the globe he urged for immediate implementation of 'Comprehensive on International Terrorism' by the UN and offered India's pro-active role in it citing India as a victim of terrorism for 9

‘6 Top Priorities of Ministry of External Affairs’ The Times of India (New Delhi, 26 May 2014) 5. 5

decades. Ridiculing the possibility of any multilateral intervention, a demand Sharif has made in his address at the UNGA on 26 September, on Kashmir related mater he stated that his government is ready for 'bilateral talk' to Pakistan provided Pakistan should cultivate suitable environment for talks by giving up terrorism policy against India. Difference

The fact that he represents a government with a majority in the Lok Sabha, capable of taking difficult decisions, has given Modi an edge over his predecessors of the last three decades. Modi’s energy and vigour also stands in contrast to the dysfunction and lack of energy in the UPA government in its second term 10 . Moreover, for the first time a nationalist approach to foreign policy has been taken with economic development being the prime focus. We can see clarity in planning as well as execution of his diplomatic plans, which was next to non-existent in the past governments and maybe this clarity of thought and the aura of a different and strong leader at the helm is attracting countries to develop better bi-lateral ties with India. Further, he has understood the importance of engaging all major powers without any inhibition. Unlike the UPA government, which held back on ties with the US and Japan by citing the dangers of  provoking China, Modi has been bold in affirming that India would pursue its relations with all the major powers, each on its own merit. This has significantly improved India’s leverage with the US, China, Japan, Russia and Europe. The question is no longer about India being “nonaligned” between the major powers but about how Delhi can shape the regional and global  balance of power to serve its own interests. COUNTRYWISE ANALYSIS SAARC and ASEAN

Even before becoming the Prime Minister Narendra Modi hinted that his foreign policy will actively focus on improving ties with India's immediate neighbours which is being termed as “ Neighbourhood First” policy in the media, and he started well by inviting all heads of state/heads

of

government

of

South

Asian

Association

for

Regional

Cooperation

(SAARC) nations and Mauritius to attend his government’s swearing-in ceremony and on the

10

Himanil Raina, ‘India’s Foreign Policy under Modi 2’ (2014) International Policy Digest accessed 18 October 2014 6

second day in office held bilateral talks with all of them individually which was dubbed as a "mini SAARC summit" by the media. 11   Foreign minister Sushma Swaraj has highlighted the importance not only of India’s ‘Look East’ policy of materializing it into ‘Engage East’ or ‘Act East’. 12 Later during a launch event at ISRO he had asked Indian scientists to develop a dedicated SAARC satellite to share the fruits of the technology like tele-medicine, e-learning etc. with the people across South Asia to complement the currently operating Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme program in the region. In fact, in its election manifesto the  party had stated, “BJP believes that political stability, progress and peace in the region are essential for South Asia's growth and development. In our neighborhood we will pursue friendly relations. However, where required we will not hesitate from taking strong stand and steps. We will work towards strengthening Regional forums like SAARC.”13 Modi’s visits to Bhutan and  Nepal were ample evidence of the government’s enthusiasm to engage with SAARC. In Nepal, Modi spoke sincerely about improving economic linkages and also about granting whatever assistance the country needed. In Bhutan, too, Modi spoke about the similarities between the two countries while effectively highlighting the point that Bhutan had made a peaceful transition to democracy. Other important aspects of his foreign policy are –  inter-city initiatives, building historical linkages with other parts of the world with the SAARC countries. The reason behind the SAARC focus is evident from the policy tilt of the Modi government –  economic growth and development. Instability in the neighborhood can hinder the achievement of this goal, not least because it will require a diversion of time, energy and resources.14 Moreover, even if India finds a way to grow despite its neighborhood, it might find it harder to play a greater role outside the region if the disparity increases.

11

Krishna Uppulari, ‘Narendra Modi’s swearing in offers a new lease of life to SAARC’  DNA (New Delhi, 25 May 2014) accessed 21 October 2014 12 ‘Sushma tells Indian Envoys to act East and not just look East’ The Times of India (New Delhi 29 September 2014) accessed 21 October 2014 13 Bhartiya Janta Party Organisation, ‘BJP Election Manifesto 2014’ (BJP 2014) accessed 18 October 2014 14 CFR ‘What BJP has to say about foreign policy’ (CFR Blogs: News Asia 7 April 2014) accessed 19 October 2014 7

While SAARC remains an important area of focus, India has also made it clear that ASEAN is an important Indian objective and not merely a means to check Chinese influence. There is need for greater people-to-people contact, a relaxed visa regime, and also a need for improving connectivity within the region. China

Modi and his ministers have already had some direct interaction with their Chinese counterparts and this is likely to increase over the next couple of months. The prime minister sees China, which he had visited when he had been Gujarat chief minister to attract investment and seek markets for his state, as having the potential to be a major economic partner for India. He would also not mind competition between various sources of investment. Modi has broken some new ground in India’s China policy and  has ended Delhi’s past reluctance to welcome Chinese investments into India as well as the defensiveness in its approach to the boundary dispute with Beijing. While extending much personal warmth to the Chinese leadership, Modi and his government have also been uninhibited in their public criticism of China’s “expansionism”. China, on its part, has been vocal about its hopeful view of Modi as a business-minded and focused leader, and Xi Jinping will likely take with him economic sweeteners to try to expand this side of the relationship. 15 Yet, even as economic ties are an opportunity, they have also been the source of strain with bilateral trade having fallen in the last couple of years even as the trade deficit has grown to India’s detriment. Moreover, security concerns remain —over China’s rise and its intentions in general, the border issue, China-Pakistan relations and Chinese activities in India’s neighborhood in particular. The question here is how Modi will react to incursions by China, since India has close economic relations with its neighbour and, in spite of  some roadblocks, these ties have seen significant improvement. United States of America (USA)

The beginning of Indo-US relations with the present government was rather rocky. The US denied Mr. Modi entrance in 2005 based on the accusations of remaining a silent spectator 15

Tanvi Madan, ‘Indian Prime Minister Modi’s Foreign Policy: The First 100 Days’, Brookings (29 August 2014) < http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/08/28-modi-100-days-foreign-policy-madan>  accessed 19 October 2014

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during the Gujarat riots of 2002, which continued until his government came to power with a  phenomenal margin. This resulted in a complete turn-around in the position of the US since it realised that furthering relations with India is imperative. Barrack Obama congratulated Mr. Modi over the phone on his party’s victory and reminded him about the strategic partnership that  binds their countries. He stressed the significance in the modern world of the fact that the US and India are ‘the largest democracies’. The American president expressed hope that, under the leadership of Narendra Modi, India will play an important role in the solving of global problems. Furthermore, Barrack Obama invited Mr. Modi to attend a bilateral summit after the inauguration ceremony in the end of September 2014. As for PM Modi himself, there were two approaches that Modi could have taken toward the United States:

Option A: hold the U.S. at arms’ length to pay it back for its lack of official engagement with him



over

the

last

few

years.

Option B: continue to build on the bilateral relationship, recognizing the reality of the breadth and depth of India-U.S. relations and its potential to help his priorities (including economic growth, meeting energy needs, managing China’s rise). As against the better judgment of some experts from his inner circle, he did not send disapproving signals to Washington about former “discriminatory” measures. Moreover, during his campaign he underscored his “lack of personal ill will towards the USA and intention to build lasting partner relations with Washington based on equality and mutual benefit.” Mr. Modi has taken into consideration the undoubted fact that continuing to develop US relations this way can offer India much-needed room to maneuver in relations with other world leaders, namely China, Russia, the EU and Japan.16 Sushma Swaraj said the catchphrase for her tenure was "fast-track diplomacy" and said it had three faces - proactive, strong and sensitive. "This time a strong government will be talking to Obama. That will be the main difference." She said a tough

16

Vladimir Terehov, ‘India’s Foreign Policy under Narendra Modi’ (2014) New Eastern Outlook  accessed 18 October 2014 9

message had also been delivered to the US when John Kerry was told that the US cannot treat India as a friend and then snoop on it as well. However, the fact that a minor incident involving Indian diplomat Devyani Khobragade in December 2013 almost brought catastrophic effects to the entire system of bilateral relations, so much time and effort in the making, was an absolute shock to both countries. The major challenge that lies ahead in the India-U.S. relationship will be translating the various opportunities into outcomes. This will likely involve tackling political and bureaucratic obstacles in India. It will also likely involve companies rather than the governments, limiting what officials can achieve on their part. 17 Pakistan

When Modi abruptly called off foreign secretary talks with Pakistan, the government took a lot of flak on what seems like a see-saw Pakistan policy. But there are several indications that India's approach to other South Asian neighbours will not be replicated in Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif's decision to come, despite the strictures against meeting the Hurriyat then did not go down

well

with

the

Pakistan

army,

but

sent

a

positive

signal

to

Modi.

What did not, was the ISI-LeT attack on the Indian consulate in Herat, Afghanistan. Coming a couple of days before his swearing in, the incident showed the dangers that underlay the apparent  bonhomie. For conversations with many familiar with developments, Modi's approach to Pakistan will  primarily be guided by a tough stand on the border and LOC, which has been evident for the past few weeks. The ‘sentinels on the border’  as the MEA calls them, have been ordered to “give  back

more

than

they

get”.

That does not mean Modi will cut off diplomatic contact, though it's very clear Modi's interest in Pakistan as a nation is minimal, unlike his predecessor. If Nawaz Sharif survives his current crisis and makes it to New York for the UN general assembly, Modi and Sharif may well sit down for a chat. India will make trade concessions to Pakistan to sweeten a stalled trade deal, but that's it. Inside Kashmir, Modi has a very different vision  —   the elections in November will be

17

Himanil Raina, ‘India’s Foreign Policy under Modi 2’ (2014) International Policy Digest accessed 18 October 2014 10

the first time Modi-Shah combine will test their policy. A state government, not opposed to the centre, more nationalistic in tone than before, can alter ground situations more than any conversation between India and Pakistan.18 In the words of the Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj, "I do not know why the Pakistan high commissioner invited the separatists for talks and derailed the foreign-secretary level dialogue. Is it wrong to ex pect that Pakistan should not interfere in our internal affairs? It is not." 19 A research paper was commissioned by Melbourne-based think tank Australia India Institute (AII) on 'Indian Foreign Policy Under (Prime Minister) Modi'. The paper highlighted that Prime Minister Modi would build on his past record as the Chief Minister of India's fastest growing state Gujarat and make "India's Look East policy" as his priority. However, for neighbouring countries like Pakistan and China, he may adopt more "muscular" approach, it said. Modi may treat Pakistan differently, considering the fact that he is heavily inclined towards domestic economic development and Pakistan being a ‘rogue’ state is an inhibiting factor . Unlike his immediate predecessors, Modi will bolster India's military strength so that it is a credible deterrent to Pakistani adventurism. He will be less willing to make concessions until and unless there is an end to what he has called cross border terrorism. Under Modi, steps will be taken to improve the inadequate military infrastructure along the Indo-China b order.20 Japan

There was considerable speculation that given Modi’s penchant for ‘development and technology’, Japan would play a key role in furthering these ambitious ventures. Modi’s visits to Japan during his time as Chief Minister established a personal rapport with the Japanese PM Shinzo Abe which has resulted in a marked difference in the Indo-Japan bilateral dynamics.

18

Indrani Bagchi, ‘With bricks and mortar, Modi puts a foreign policy in place’, The Times Of India (New Delhi 1 September 2014) accessed 18 September 2014 19 Editorial, ‘Sushma on Pakistan and China’ The Economic Times  (New Delhi 9 September 2014) accessed 18 September 2014 20 ‘Narendra Modi government may have muscular approach towards Pakistan, China: Australian think tank’  DNA  India  (1 September 2014)

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Modi’s government  has stated that India has a “special relationship” with Japan.  The prime minister sees it as a source of investment and technology (especially in the government’s priority area of infrastructure), potentially defense equipment (a US-2 aircraft sales and co-production deal might be in the offing) and defense cooperation, as well as a strategic partner. Modi has also emphasized the (democratic) values-based motivation for the relationship — a factor missing in relations with the neighbor that India and Japan share: China. Finally, Modi’s Japan visit is  being spoken of in terms of the investments Japan has promised as well as some important strategic agreements Modi and Abe signed, with an eye on China. IS IT REINVENTION OF INDIA’S GLOBAL IMAGE

There’s been a fair bit of continuity rather than change in the overall direction of foreign policy,  but we have seen changes, especially in terms of style or approach, which has the potential to affect substance. 1. The intensity of international engagement has increased, with a number of high-level visits to and from India that have taken place or are on the docket. 2. There seems to be an emphasis on getting deliverables from these visits and not just photo ops. 3. We have seen learning from the previous government’s experience. One example: over the last few years, Indian officials have been criticized for not doing enough, with enough speed, for the safety of Indians abroad. Faced with the need to evacuate or rescue Indians stuck or being held hostage in Iraq recently, the new government established a crisis management cell to monitor the situation and coordinate India’s response, set up a round-the-clock helpline to provide information and aid and sent a special envoy to Iraq. There was high-level involvement, including by the prime minister, the foreign minister who met with family members of those affected multiple times, as well as the national sec urity advisor and intelligence bureau chief who traveled to Iraq and Saudi Arabia respectively.21 4. We’ve seen this government acknowledge to some extent the role of states in shaping Indian foreign policy — though this official recognition wasn’t entirely missing previously.

21

‘NSA Doval want on secret mission to Iraq’ The Hindu (New Delhi 20 September 2014) accessed 22 September 2014 12

5. Finally, we’ve seen the government use e-diplomacy to a greater degree as an instrument of engagement, targeting both domestic and foreign audiences. Contrary Opinion

While agreeing that Modi will appear tough with Pakistan, T P Sreenivasan, a former diplomat who spent 37 years with the Indian Foreign Service, argues that “this toughness will not go  beyond a point” as he will realize soon that with “war not an option anymore, a tough approach will go only so far.” In fact, foreign policy under Modi, Sreenivasan says, “will not change in any significant way.” It would be “continuity rather than change, because  former diplomats would be advising Modi, foreign policy not being his forte.” Changes if any will be in nuance and not fundamental in nature22. Indeed, a striking feature of India’s foreign policy is its continuity. Certainly there have been shifts, but as Manjari Chatterjee Miller points out in a recent article in Foreign Affairs, “the  broad shape of Indian foreign policy has remained the same for nearly five decades.” Even when shifts do occur, they are not “sudden,” “has rarely, if ever, been political,” and “has had little to do with the prime minister’s political ideology.”23 It is in emphasis and style rather than substance that the Modi government’s foreign policy will differ from that of the UPA. Modi will be less patient with Pakistan and can be expected to base his relations with all of India’s neighbors (and not just Pakistan and China) on reciprocity. Opportunities and Challenges Ahead

Both limitations and possibilities lie ahead. A key advantage for India right now is that a number of countries see it as an opportunity and this moment as the right time to establish or expand relations with it. The high intensity of the government’s external engagement might be attributable to its recognition of this fact and its de sire to capitalize on the interest in India. 22

Sudha Ramachandran, ‘Indian Foreign Policy Under Narendra Modi’,  The Diplomat (6 May 2014) accessed 18 October 2014 23 Manjari Chatterjee ‘Foreign Policy- A La Modi’ Foreign Affairs accessed 20 September 2014 13

However, a question that lies ahead is: can the Modi government effectively seize the opportunity that this moment offers? For one, how long the magic of Modi wave will last will depend on India’s performance, especially its economic performance. Thus, in one way a key foreign policy challenge for the Modi government will be an economic one, with foreign officials and investors asking the same question that Indian voters are: can it deliver on the  promise of prosperity? The wooing will continue as long as the answer seems to be yes; if the government is not seen as meeting expectations, the whining about India will start again, with countries exploring other options. A second challenge is that of implementation. The capacity issues that posed a problem for the  previous government remain. Getting things don e will involve not just grappling with limitations in terms of numbers and expertise available and coordination problems, but also balancing policy and political imperatives, and making policy in the glare of the media spotlight. A third challenge will be that of how to calibrate policy toward countries like China and Pakistan where there is an effort to reach out, but also to lay down red lines. This will be especially challenging, given that domestic dynamics in both those countries might adversely affect their approach toward India. Finally, there are the known unknowns: the crises that this government will no doubt have to face. These could involve the safety of Indian citizens or facilities abroad, border tension with China or Pakistan (with the upcoming Jammu and Kashmir assembly elections, security officials are particularly concerned about the latter) or a terrorist attack in India. They could involve a significant deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, a region where India’s leverage is limited. Additionally, it could also involve tension or conflict between India’s partners, leaving the Modi government with some difficult or awkward decisions to make.

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CONCLUSION

One trademark of Modi’s foreign policy is that it is shorn of ideology, with pragmatism being the hallmark. The policy’s overriding objective appears to be to enhance the country’s economic and military security as rapidly as possible. Of course, it is too early to judge the consistency, strength or effectiveness of the Modi diplomacy. But after a long era of ad hoc, reactive, weakkneed diplomacy, the new clarity and vision represent a welcome change for India. India is seeing a novel nationalist foreign policy which primarily focuses on economic development and improving India’s international image. He is ready to take risks and bold decisions for this  purpose and considers emergence of possible conflicts and tension with a nation, for example China, secondary to having good bilateral relations with a superpower like USA or a nation like Japan.  Narendra Modi’s  foreign policy will apparently be based on the well-known Gujju  principle “strictly business.” Those who can offer India that mutually beneficial “business” in international  politics, economics and defense will succeed in developing partnerships with the country under the new Prime Minister. Usually 100 days is an insufficient period of time to come to a conclusion regarding a government’s foreign policy, however, the Modi led government has managed to accomplish so much so that their accomplishments can be contrasted and compared with that in the past decade and it can be reasonably concluded that the present direction of India’s foreign policy will have a more positive impact on our international image as well as international relations.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY ONLINE JOURNALS AND MAGAZINES

1. Vladimir Terehov, ‘India’s Foreign Policy under Narendra Modi’ (2014) New Eastern Outlook

2. Sudha Ramachandran, ‘Indian Foreign Policy under Narendra Modi’, The Diplomat (6 May 2014) 3. Himanil Raina, ‘India’s Foreign Policy under Modi 2’ (2014) International Policy Digest accessed 18 October 2014 4. Brahma Chellaney 2014)

‘Narendra Modi’s Imprint on Foreign Policy’ Live Mint (2 September



NEWSPAPER

1. ‘6 Top Priorities of Ministry of External Affairs’ The Times of India (New Delhi, 26 May 2014) 5. 2. Indrani Bagchi, ‘With bricks and mortar, Modi puts a foreign policy in place’, The Times Of  India (New Delhi 1 September 2014) < http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/With-bricksand-mortar-Modi-puts-a-foreign-policy-in-place/articleshow/41443457.cms> 3. Editorial, ‘Sushma on Pakistan and China’ The Economic Times  (New Delhi 9 September 2014)

4. ‘Sushma tells Indian Envoys to act East and not just look East’ The Times of India (New Delhi 29 September 2014) 5. ‘NSA Doval want on secret mission to Iraq’ The Hindu (New Delhi 20 September 2014)