R O M A N I A N REVIEW OF POLITICA L S C I E N C E S A N D I NTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
VOL. IV
No. 1
2007
CONTENTS ROMANIAN POLITICS JOSEF KARL, Das Demokratische Forum der Deutschen (DFDR) als Vertretung der deutschen Minderheit im postkommunistischen Rumänien 1989–2004 .... THE EUROPE OF NATIONS CRISTI PANTELIMON, Ortega y Gasset and the Idea of Nation ......................... CÃLIN COTOI, The Imagining of National Spaces in Interwar Romania. The Emergence of Geopolitics ..........................................................................
3 59 75
THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT ANA BAZAC, Kant et Rawls: remarques sur l’évolution des théories idéales concernant les relations internationales ............................................................ GABRIELA TÃNÃSESCU, Freedom as Projection of Reason in Spinoza .......... HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN, “Nature” and “Reason” in the Leviathan .... WILLIAM J. CONNELL, Machiavelli on Growth as an End ...............................
97 112 120 127
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS YVES PLASSERAUD, The Minorities of Estonia and Their Status .................... LUCIAN JORA, Historical Knowledge of Europe and the European Dimension...
141 153
IN FOCUS VIORELLA MANOLACHE, A Form of Re-activating the Political Freedom — Mass-media (Theoretical Aspects of a Postmodern Simulacrum) ...............
159
BOOK REVIEWS...................................................................................................
185
THE AUTHORS ....................................................................................................
204
ISPRI’s ACADEMIC LIFE ....................................................................................
THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS................................................................................
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., IV, 1, p. 1–206, Bucharest, 2006.
169 201
TOME IV
R E V I E W RO U MA INE DE SCIENC ES P O LI TI Q U ES ET RELATION S I N T ERNATIONAL ES No 1
2007
SOMMAIRE POLITIQUE ROUMAINE
JOSEF KARL, Das Demokratische Forum der Deutschen (DFDR) als Vertretung der deutschen Minderheit im postkommunistischen Rumanien 1989–2004....... L’EUROPE DES NATIONS
CRISTI PANTELIMON, Ortega y Gasset et l’idée de nation................................ CÃLIN COTOI, Imaginer les espaces nationaux à l’époque de l’entre-deux-guerres en Roumanie. L’émergence de la Géopolitique ............................................... HISTOIRE DE LA PENSÉE POLITIQUE
3 59 75
ANA BAZAC, Kant et Rawles: remarques sur l’evolution des theories ideals concernant les relations internationals............................................................... HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN, “Nature” et “Raison” dans le Léviathan ..... GABRIELA TÃNÃSESCU, La liberté en tant que projection de la raison chez Spinoza .............................................................................................................. WILLIAM J. CONNELL, Machiavel — de la croissance en tant que fin ............
120 127
YVES PLASSERAUD, Les minorités de l’Estonie et leur statut ......................... LUCIAN JORA, Connaissance historique de l’Europe .........................................
141 153
RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES
IN FOCUS
97 112
VIORELLA MANOLACHE, Une manière de re-activer la liberté politique — les mass media (Aspects théoriques du Simulacre Postmoderne) ...............
159
COMPTES RENDUS .............................................................................................
185
VIE ACADÉMIQUE ..............................................................................................
REVUE DES REVUES ..........................................................................................
AUTEURS...............................................................................................................
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., IV, 1, p. 1–206, Bucharest, 2006.
169 201 204
ROMANIAN POLITICS
DAS DEMOKRATISCHE FORUM DER DEUTSCHEN (DFDR) ALS VERTRETUNG DER DEUTSCHEN MINDERHEIT IM POSTKOMMUNISTISCHEN RUMÄNIEN 1989–2004 JOSEF KARL
Abstract. The study explores the Romanian political scene after 1989. It investigates the role of the Democratic Front of the German People in Romania (F.D.G.R./DFDR) and the inter-party relations within the democratic Romania. The historical approach is complemented by political interpretations.
1. Übersicht über Abkürzungen rumänischer Parteien und Organisationen1
Abkürzung ADJV DA (Wahlbündnis der PNL und PD 2004) CDR
F.D.G.R./DFDR FDSN (seit 1993 PDSR)
FSN (seit 1993 PD) IPP PD
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Rumänisch Asociaþia Tineretului German din România
Deutsch Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Deutschen Jugendverbände
Convenþia Democraticã din România
Christdemokratische Konvention (Wahlen 1996)
Alianþa Dreptate ºi Adevãr
Forumul Democrat al Germanilor din România
Frontul Democrat al Salvãrii Naþionale Frontul Salvãrii Naþionale Institutul pentru Politici Publice Partidul Democrat
Allianz “DA” (Gerechtigkeit und Wahrheit)
Demokratisches Forum der Deutschen in Rumänien Demokratische Front zur Nationalen Rettung Front zur Nationalen Rettung
Institut für öffentliche Politik Demokratische Partei
1 [Weiterführende Informationen in: Lewis, Political Parties in Post-Communist Eastern Europe].
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., IV, 1, p. 3–58, Bucharest, 2007.
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Abkürzung PDSR (seit 2002 PSD)
Rumänisch Partidul Democraþiei Sociale din România
PNL
Partidul Naþional Liberal
PR
Partida Romilor
PNÞCD
Partidul Naþional Þãrãnesc Creºtin Democrat
PRM
Partidul România Mare
PSD
Partidul Social Democrat
P.U.N.R.
Partidul Unitãþii Naþiunii Române
PUR
Partidul Umanist din România
UDMR
Uniunea Democratã Maghiarã din România
2
Deutsch Partei der Sozialen Demokratie (von) Rumänien(s)
Nationalliberale Partei
Christdemokratische Nationale Bauernpartei Partei der Roma
Großrumänien-Partei
Sozialdemokratische Partei Partei der Rumänischen Nationalen Einheit Humanistische Partei Rumäniens (sozial-liberal)
Demokratische Ungarische Union Rumäniens (“Ungarnverband”)
2. Übersicht über Orts- und Gebietsbezeichnungen2 Deutsch Siebenbürgen Agnetheln Bistritz Großlasseln Heltau Hermannstadt Kleinschelken Kronstadt Mediasch Neumarkt Regen/Sächsisch Reen Schäßburg Schil Vierdörfer/Zernendorf Zeiden
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Rumänisch Transilvania Agnita Bistriþa Laslea Cisnãdie Sibiu ªeica Micã Braºov Mediaº Târgu Mureº Reghin (-ul Sãsesc) Sighiºoara Jiu Sãcele/Cernatu Codlea
Ungarisch Erdély Szentágota Beszterce Szászszentlászlo Nagydisznód Nagyszeben Kisselyk Brassó Medgyes Marosvásárhely Szászrégen Segesvár Zsil Négyfalu/Csernátfalu Feketehalom
2 [Ein umfassender Index für siebenbürgische Orts- und Gebietsbezeichnungen findet sich in Mittelstraß, Ortsnamenbuch und für die Orts- und Gebietsnamen im Banat und in Sathmar kann bei Ács et. alt., Erdély autótérképe nachgeschlagen werden].
DFDR IM POSTKOMMUNISTISCHEN RUMÄNIEN
3
Deutsch
Sathmar Bildegg Capleni Darotz Erdeed Fienen Großkarol Josefhausen Kalmandi Kleinmaitingen Petrifeld Schamagosch Schönthal Stanislau Terebescht Terem Thurterebesch Trestenburg
Banat Anina-Steierdorf Billed Busiasch Groß-Pereg Pankota Perjamosch Temeschwar/Temeschburg Tschanad Wolfsberg Berweni/Berweli
Rumänisch
Satu Mare Beltiug Cãpleni Craidorolt Ardud Foieni Carei Iojib Cãmin Moftinul Mic Petreºti Ciumeºti Urziceni Sanislãu Terebeºti Tiream Turulung Tãsnad Banatul Anina Biled Buziaº Peregul Mare Pâncota Periam Timiºoara Cenad Gãrâna Berveni
5
Ungarisch
Szatmárnémeti Krasnabéltek Kaplony Királydaróc Erdõd Mezöfény Nagykároly Józsefháza Kálmánd Kismajtény Mezöpetri Csomaköz Csanálos Szaniszló Krasznaterebes Mezöterem Túrterebes Tasnád Bánság Stájerlakanina Billéd Buziás Németpereg Pankota Perjámos Temesvár Nagycsanád Szörénvordas Börvely
A. Einleitung: Hinführung zum Thema und Eingrenzung der Fragestellung
Vorliegende Arbeit soll die Geschichte der einzigen gemeinsamen Organisation der gesamten deutschen Minderheit in Rumänien nach 1989 analysieren. Unter dem Namen Demokratisches Forum der Deutschen in Rumänien (DFDR)/Forumul Democrat al Germanilor din România (F.D.G.R.) versucht sie seit 1989, das kulturelle und politische Leben der nach dem Massenexodus von 1990–91 noch in Rumänien verbliebenen Deutschen zu organisieren. Die Hauptthese der vorliegenden Arbeit ist, dass die Unverträglichkeit der expliziten Absicht des DFDR, eine Minderheitenorganisation für alle Deutschen und keine Partei zu sein und seines impliziten Willens, eine aktive politische Kraft zu sein, das DFDR de Facto mehr und mehr zu einer Art politischen Partei werden ließ. Dieser Konflikt war die größte Herausforderung des DFDR während seiner Existenz. Meine Annahme ist daher, dass es der permanente Diskurs des DFDR (aufgrund des Mangels einer gemeinsamen deutschen
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4
Identität, eines gemeinsamen Dialekts oder einer gemeinsamen Geschichte in Rumänien) “einen Verband in Vielfalt und innerer Einheit” zu schaffen und “in Loyalität zum rumänischen Staat” zu stehen, dem DFDR erlaubte, beide Ziele trotz ihrer scheinbaren Unverträglichkeit miteinander zu kombinieren. Es deutet doch einiges darauf hin, dass das DFDR dadurch an die sächsische Tradition des Strebens in Richtung eines Modus Vivendi mit den jeweils Herrschenden anknüpft, die in der Vorkriegspolitik von Rudolf Brandsch und insbesondere von Hans Otto Roth eine große Rolle spielten.3 Auf der rumänischen Seite hingegen finden sich die spezifisch rumänische Form eines vom Staat monopolisierten Nationalismus und die Absicht des rumänischen Staates, die deutsche Minderheit als ein Werkzeug zu verwenden, um Rumäniens schwache Leistungen bei den Reformen mit Blick auf die EU-Integration zu kompensieren. Beide Aspekte spielen meines Erachtens nach eine entscheidende Rolle in der Gesamtstrategie des DFDR. Diese Arbeit wird erläutern, warum sich das DFDR, das unter diesen Aspekten auf den ersten Blick wie eine Organisation mit Chamäleonqualitäten erscheinen könnte, nicht allzu stark wandeln musste, um sich den sehr schnell ändernden Gesamtbedingungen anzupassen, wie man eigentlich annehmen könnte. Die Forschungstätigkeit für diese Studie wurde in erster Linie in induktivem Rahmen durchgeführt. Zunächst einmal kann sich diese Arbeit nicht sehr stark auf eine bestehende Historiographie stützen, da sich diese hauptsächlich aus dreierlei Gründen nicht sehr intensiv um das gewählte Thema bemüht hat.4 Erstens, weil das Thema per se nicht durch ein breiteres Publikum entdeckt worden ist, zweitens weil die Landsmannschaften in Deutschland als Vertretung der Ausgewanderten den wissenschaftlichen Diskurs nach 1945 maßgeblich mitprägten und sich erst ganz allmählich mit einer weiteren Existenz von Deutschen in Rumänien nach 1989 abzufinden bereit waren und drittens, da die Archivmaterialien im DFDR nur unter Bedingungen zugänglich sind, die viel Zeit in Anspruch nehmen. Überdies wurde hoch relevantes Archivmaterial umsortiert, als die Zentrale des DFDR Mitte der 1990er Jahre renoviert wurde. Dies führte dazu, dass sich einige Akten bis zum heutigen Tage in Umzugskisten befinden, was einige Geduld und häufiges Nachfragen beim Auffinden wichtiger Dokumente erforderlich machte. Darauf aufbauend, wird die allgemeine Arbeitsweise teilweise Entwicklungen auf nationaler Ebene beschreiben und sich dabei vornehmlich auf Sekundärquellen
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3 [Bereits seit den 70er Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts war es sächsische Politik gewesen, dass sächsische Abgeordnete sich den regierenden ungarischen Liberalen anschlossen und auf Konzessionen “von innerhalb” des regierenden Lagers hinarbeiteten, um exklusiv-sächsische Privilegien zu behaupten und zu erweitern. Im doch recht engen Rahmen dieser Arbeit soll jedoch diese historische Komponente nicht vertieft werden, es soll an dieser Stelle vielmehr mit Blick auf eine eventuell weiterführende Arbeit Erwähnung finden]. 4 [Diese Arbeit kann sich für den Zeitraum 1989–2004 lediglich auf kurze Aufsätze oder recht kurz gehaltene Werke wie Azzola, Jüdische und andere Geschichten stützen, weshalb man von einem “aktuellen Forschungsstand” im eigentlichen Sinne nicht sprechen kann. In der historischen Perspektive kann sich der Bearbeiter auf Standardwerke über die Zeit von 1870 bis 1933 beziehen, wie Göllner, (Hg.), Die Siebenbürger Sachsen in den Jahren 1848–1918; Roth, Politische Strukturen und Strömungen bei den Siebenbürger Sachsen 1919-1933; Teutsch, Die Siebenbürger Sachsen in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart].
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und auf Primärquellen aus rumänischen und deutschen Institutionen stützen. Diese Entwicklungen werden mit denen innerhalb des DFDR in Verbindung gesetzt und die Studie untersucht insbesondere die Wirkungen externer Vorgänge auf das DFDR, so wie diese sich aufgrund der vorliegenden Primärquellen, wie Manuskripten, Korrespondenzen und anderer Aufzeichnungen aus dem Archiv der Zentrale des DFDR in Hermannstadt, darstellen. Als analytische Hilfen werden hierzu teilweise politikwissenschaftliche Theorien der Demokratisierung und des Nationalismus herangezogen werden.
Im Detail besteht der Hauptteil dieser Arbeit aus drei Kapiteln, die Faktoren behandeln, welche die Arbeit des DFDR während der vergangenen 15 Jahre nachdrücklich beeinflussten. Da in diesem Zusammenhang die unterschiedlichen sprachlichen und kulturellen Merkmale der im DFDR geeinten Deutschen Rumäniens für ein wirkliches Verstehen der inneren Entwicklung des DFDR unerlässlich sind, werden diese im ersten Kapitel behandelt, das sich darauf konzentriert, die Ursprünge und die ethnisch-kulturelle Zusammensetzung der deutschen Minderheit in Rumänien näher zu betrachten. An dieser Stelle werden auch die rechtliche, politische, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Entwicklung, die zur heutigen Situation der deutschen Minderheit in Rumänien führte, aufgearbeitet. Im zweiten Kapitel wird sich die Arbeit den politischen Entwicklungen auf der rumänischen Bühne zwischen 1989 und 2004 zuwenden und diese kritisch analysieren. Insbesondere das Themenfelder Minderheitenschutz und Demokratisierung werden in diesem Zusammenhang thematisiert werden, da sie einen wichtigen Hintergrund zu allen Aktivitäten des DFDR bilden und somit entscheidenden Einfluss auf Misserfolg oder Erfolg seiner Politik haben. Dies bildet zugleich die Grundlage für den dritten und gleichzeitig zentralen Teil der Arbeit, in dem die politischen Aktivitäten des DFDR in den größeren rumänischen Rahmen eingeordnet werden sollen. Dieses Kapitel befasst sich schließlich mit den internen und externen Entwicklungen, die das DFDR von seiner Gründung am Abend der so genannten “Revolution” im Dezember 1989 bis zum Jahr 2004 genommen hat. Insbesondere wird hier auch auf seine internationalen Aktivitäten und seine nationalen und internationalen Partner eingegangen werden. Da der selbst gewählte Auftrag des DFDR, alle “Rumänen deutscher Nationalität” zu vertreten, integraler Bestandteil des vom rumänischen Staat propagierten Zieles, sich auf dem Weg zu einer EU-Mitgliedschaft “modern und europäisch” zu zeigen, geworden ist, wird auch diese “europäische Dimension” mit in die Analyse einfließen. Hier werden in besonderem Maße Originaldokumente aus dem Archiv des DFDR in Hermannstadt Verwendung finden. Im daran anschließenden Schlussteil werden die aufgeworfenen Überlegungen schließlich in eine gedankliche Synthese gebracht und es wird ein kurzer Ausblick auf die Zukunftsaussichten und — optionen des DFDR erfolgen. Die sich vornehmlich auf Archivmaterialien und Sekundärliteratur stützende Studie wird überdies mithilfe der modernen Technik der “mündlichen
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Geschichte” anhand von Gesprächen mit wesentlichen Zeitzeugen und politischen Akteuren ergänzt werden, ohne jedoch allzu sehr auf diesen zu basieren. Eine Anzahl von persönlichen Erfahrungen von Zeitzeugen soll vielmehr als Ergänzung mit in die Studie eingeschlossen werden, um sie noch authentischer zu gestalten. B. Hauptteil
1.1. Historische Einführung
Gemäß E. A. Freeman ist “Geschichte vergangene Politik und Politik ist gegenwärtige Geschichte”5. Nimmt man dies zur Richtschnur, so bedarf jede Analyse der Situation der deutschen Minderheit in Rumänien nach 1989 auch einer detaillierten Erläuterung der historischen und demographischen Entwicklung der Deutschen im heutigen Rumänien. Dies ist sehr wichtig, da die Geschichte der Deutschen in Rumänien relativ unbekannt ist, insbesondere in Deutschland. “Deutsche aus Deutschland tendieren oft dazu, ihre Landsleute in Rumänien für eine mehr oder weniger homogene kulturelle Einheit irgendwo im Osten zu halten”6, so fasst Professor Paul Philippi, Ehrenvorsitzender des DFDR, diese Tatsache zusammen. Die deutschsprachige Gruppe in Rumänien ist ganz im Gegenteil dazu äußerst heterogen. Sie besteht aus mehreren unterschiedlichen kulturellen Gemeinschaften mit nur einigen gemeinsamen Merkmalen. Da die unterschiedlichen Gruppen der Deutschen in Rumänien zum ersten Mal überhaupt nach der Gründung des modernen Rumänien im Jahr 1918 miteinander verbunden wurden, ist das Wenige, was ihnen gemeinsam ist, ihre Sprache und einige kulturelle Ähnlichkeiten. Doch sogar diese Muttersprache ist weit davon entfernt, als homogen gelten zu können. “Während der Zwischenkriegszeit hielten sich die verschiedenen deutschen Gruppen in Rumänien lediglich für Einwohner ihrer Regionen. Es gab kein explizites Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl mit einer gemeinsamen deutschen Identität.”7 Dies zeigt sich auch am Mangel einer zentral organisierten deutschen Partei zwischen 1918 und 1944. Obwohl es den zwischen 1921 und 1931 von Rudolf Brandsch geführten “Verband der Deutschen in Rumänien” gab, entwickelte sich dieser nie so recht zu einer wirklichen Partei im modernen Sinn des Wortes. Er war lediglich ein loser Verband der unterschiedlichen Organisationen der Schwaben, Buchenlanddeutschen, Bessarabiendeutschen, der Siebenbürger Sachsen (Deutsch-Sächsischer Volksrat) und er wurde darüber hinaus nahezu vollständig durch die Siebenbürger Sachsen dominiert. Hatten die Deutschen im Anschluss an diese Epoche sogar eine Art Vertretung unter kommunistischer
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5 Freeman, E. A. (1823–92), Regius Professor of History in Oxford 1884 bis 1892, Methods of Historical Study (1886), S. 44. 6 Gespräch mit Professor Dr. Dres. h.c. Paul Philippi, Hermannstadt, 29. September 2003. 7 Völkl, Rumänien, S. 237.
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Herrschaft, so “kann der so genannte “Rat der Werktätigen deutscher Nationalität” nicht als wirklich repräsentativ für alle Deutschen in Rumänien angesehen werden.”8 Daher war die Gründung des “Demokratischen Forums der Deutschen in Rumänien” (DFDR) der erste explizite Versuch, einen einheitlichen Verband in Rumänien zu gründen, der alle Deutschen vertreten sollte. Vor dem Hintergrund von 850 Jahren deutscher Geschichte auf dem Gebiet des heutigen Rumäniens ist dieses Ereignis daher wirklich von historischer Bedeutung. Nichtsdestotrotz können auch heute noch zentrifugale Tendenzen unter den Deutschen des Banats bemerkt werden, die Anfang der 1990er Jahre zwei separate Vertretungen bevorzugten, eine für alle Schwaben des Banats, des Kreischgebiets9 und in Satu Mare-Sathmar10, zusammen mit den “Berglanddeutschen” des Banater Berglandes im heutigen Kreis Caraº-Severin rund um Reschitz, und eine für “den Rest”. Um diesen Bewegungen entgegenzuwirken, wurde das DFDR in einer föderalen Struktur organisiert. Seine Zentrale in Hermannstadt stützt sich auf fünf regionale Bezirke (“Regionalforen”). Einer wurde in Temeschwar für das Banat (Judeþe Timiº, Arad, Caraº-Severin und Mehedinþi), einer in Satu MareSathmar für Nordwestrumänien (Judeþe Bihor, Sãlaj, Satu Mare und Maramureº), einer in Bukarest für das “Altreich” (“Regat”, bestehend aus der Walachei, der Dobrudscha und der Moldau), einer für das Buchenland (Bukowina, bestehend aus den Judeþen Suceava und Botoºani11) in SuceavaSuczawa und einer für Siebenbürgen (Judeþe Hunedoara, Klausenburg, BistritzNãsãud, Alba, Hermannstadt, Kronstadt, Mureº, Covasna und Harghita) in Hermannstadt eingerichtet. Die Vorsitzenden der regionalen Foren sind zugleich auch stellvertretende Vorsitzende des DFDR.12 Das DFDR hat derzeit insgesamt circa 56.000 Mitglieder und besteht aus einem “Landesforum” (Landesverband mit Sitz in Hermannstadt), fünf “Regionalforen”, fünf “Kreisforen” (eine Art Kreisverband, deckungsgleich mit den Judeþen in Bihor, Salaj, Satu Mare, Maramureº und Hermannstadt13), 23
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8 Gespräch mit Professor Dr. Dres. h.c. Paul Philippi, Hermannstadt, 29. September 2003. 9 [Das so genannte “Kreischgebiet” umfasst den Nordteil des heutigen Judeþ Arad und die Judeþe Bihor und Sãlaj]. 10 [Die deutschen Ortsnamen werden in dieser Studie nur dann verwendet, wenn sie offiziell vom rumänischen Staat neben den rumänischen Namen verwendet werden, d.h. wenn sie auf Ortstafeln in Übereinstimmung mit rumänischen Gesetzen erscheinen, oder wenn sie in der offiziellen Korrespondenz zwischen dem DFDR und der rumänischen Regierung verwendet werden. Der geläufigere Name wird zuerst genannt. Die sehr oft verwendeten Ortsnamen Bistriþa, Bucureºti, Braºov, Cluj-Napoca, Mediaº, Reºiþa, Hermannstadt, Sighiºoara und Timiºoara werden in der gesamten Studie nur mit ihren deutschen Namen als Bistritz, Bukarest, Kronstadt, Klausenburg, Mediasch, Reschitz, Sibiu, Schäßburg und Temeschwar bezeichnet]. 11 [Das historische Buchenland beinhaltete das Gebiet des heutigen Judeþ Botoºani nicht, es wurde dem Regionalforum Buchenland lediglich beigefügt, um es etwas größer und dadurch leistungsfähiger zu machen]. 12 [Gegenwärtig sind dies in Siebenbürgen Dr. Paul-Jürgen Porr aus Klausenburg, in Nordsiebenbürgen/ Sathmar Johann Schwartz aus Satu Mare, im Buchenland Antonia-Maria Gheorghiu aus Suceava, im Banat Dr. Karl Singer aus Temeschwar und im “Altreich” Dr. Klaus Fabritius aus Bukarest]. 13 [Laut Auskunft durch Dr. Paul-Jürgen Porr, den Vorsitzenden des Regionalforums Siebenbürgen, ist die Gründung von Kreisforen auch in anderen Kreisen Siebenbürgens im Laufe der Jahre 2005/2006 geplant, um “für die nächsten Kommunalwahlen im Jahr 2008 überall ähnlich gut wie in Hermannstadt aufgestellt zu sein”. (Rede im Zuge der Vertreterversammlung des Siebenbürgenforums am 12. März 2005 in Klausenburg)].
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“Zentrumsforen”14 (Foren, die mehrere “Ortsforen” umfassen), 5 “Lokalforen” (Foren mit Mitgliedern aus mehreren Orten der weiteren Umgebung)15, 116 “Ortsforen” (analog eines “Ortsverbandes” in Deutschland), einem landesweiten Jugendverband (“Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Jugendorganisationen in Rumänien”, ADJ), fünf regionalen Jugendverbänden16, 141 landwirtschaftlichen Verbänden (“Landwirtschaftsvereine”) und sieben Stiftungen17. In § 1 seiner Satzung erklärt sich das DFDR nicht zur Partei, sondern zu einer kulturellen Vereinigung im Sinne der ganzen deutschen Minderheit in Rumänien (nicht im Sinne des lateinischen Wortes Pars, also eines Teils). Auf diese Art ist es seinen Mitgliedern möglich, in politische Parteien Rumäniens einzutreten. Dennoch ist es den Mitgliedern des DFDR verboten, eine führende Position sowohl im DFDR als auch in einer Partei innezuhaben. Diese Regelungen verbessern die allgemeine Position des DFDR maßgeblich, da sie erlauben, so die Förderung der Interessen der deutschen Minderheit indirekt auch mit Hilfe großer politischer Parteien voranzutreiben. Das DFDR ist über seine “Schulkommission” inhaltlich-organisatorisch auch an 200 Kindergärten und an circa 140 Schulen mit Deutsch als Hauptsprache beteiligt und hat eine enge Verbindung zu 14 Studiengängen an rumänischen Universitäten in deutscher Sprache (einschließlich fünf Lehrstühlen für Germanistik). Erst kürzlich wurde in Hermannstadt darüber hinaus die private Deutsch-Rumänische Universität (Universitatea Românã-Germanã, UniRoGer) gegründet, mit der das DFDR zum Teil zusammenarbeitet. Das DFDR besitzt auch sieben Stiftungen, ist an sechs wöchentlichen und einer Tageszeitung beteiligt und kooperiert mit zwei deutschsprachigen Theatern, fünf regionalen deutschsprachigen Rundfunkstationen, einem regionalen deutschsprachigen Fernsehsender, einem landesweiten deutschsprachigen Radioprogramm und einem landesweiten deutschsprachigen Fernsehprogramm. 1.2. “Einheit in Vielfalt”? Die Folgen der historischen Heterogenität für das DFDR heute
Die unterschiedlichen deutschen Gruppen zeigen eindringlich, dass es keine homogene deutsche Minderheit in Rumänien gibt. Außer den Deutschen des
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14 [Gegenwärtig sind dies im “Altreich” Bacãu, Bukarest, Constanþa, Craiova, Galaþi und Iaºi-Jassy und in Siebenbürgen Bistritz, Brad-Criºcior, Broos-Orãºtie, Deva-Diemrich, Hermannstadt, HunedoaraEisenmarkt, Kalan-Cãlan, Klausenburg, Kronstadt, Mediasch, Sebeº-Mühlbach, Târgu Mureº-Neumarkt, Petroºani-Petroschen, Reghin-Sächsisch Regen, Schäßburg, Lupeni-Schiltal und Sfîntu Gheorghe-Sankt Georgen]. 15 [Dies ist nur im Buchenland der Fall, da speziell dort die Deutschen sehr verstreut und ländlich leben. Es sind dies: Vatra Dornei-Dorna-Watra, Gura Humorului-Gurahumora, Câmpulung MoldovenescKimpolung, Siret-Sereth und Suceava-Suczawa]. 16 [“Deutsches Forum der Banater Jugend” in Temeschwar, “Deutscher Jugendverein Siebenbürgen” in Fãgãraº-Fogarasch, “Arbeitskreis Banat-JA” in Arad, “Deutsche Jugendorganisation ’Gemeinsam’” in Satu Mare und “Jugendforum Buchenland” in Suceava]. 17 [“Verein für internationale Kooperation TRANSCARPATICA”, Bukarest; “Banater Verein für internationale Kooperation ‘Banatia’”, Temeschwar; “Stefan Jäger Stiftung”, Temeschwar; “Adam-MüllerGuttenbrunn-Stiftung”, Temeschwar; “ACI Bukowina Stiftung”, Suceava; “Sathmarer und Nordsiebenbürgische Stiftung für internationale Kooperation”, Satu Mare; “Stiftung ‘Saxonia’”, Kronstadt].
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Regats und der Dobrudscha kamen alle Gruppen erst nach 1918 zu Rumänien.18 Die Bessarabiendeutschen hatten unter russischer Herrschaft gelebt, während die Buchenlanddeutschen in einem Teil Österreichs (Zisleithanien) lebten und die Schwaben des Banat, des Kreischgebietes und aus Sathmar, die Zipser, die Berglanddeutschen und die Sachsen Siebenbürgens Teil Ungarns (Transleithanien) waren. Es dauerte bis in die 1930er Jahre, bis der Ausdruck “Rumäniendeutsche” überhaupt in Gebrauch kam. Dennoch hat es bis 1945 keine gemeinsame deutsche Identität gegeben. Im Jahr 1940 übernahm die von Andreas Schmidt geführte Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) der Deutschen Volksgruppe in Rumänien die Kontrolle über die übrigen Deutschen Rumäniens (nachdem Bessarabien und die Nordbukowina von den Sowjets annektiert worden waren, Nordsiebenbürgen zu Ungarn gekommen war und die Dobrudschadeutschen im Wesentlichen in den “Warthegau” umgesiedelt worden waren). Dennoch vermochte nicht einmal die nationalsozialistische Ideologie die tiefe Spaltung zwischen den Siebenbürger Sachsen und den Banater Schwaben durch Zwang zu überwinden. Vor diesem Hintergrund muss man den Versuch, diese internen deutschen Probleme durch die Gründung einer gemeinsamen Organisation nach 1989 beizulegen, als einen historisch bedeutsamen Schritt betrachten. Natürlich trug auch die Auswanderung von mehr als 50 Prozent der Deutschen seit 1989 dazu bei, da unter den Deutschen die Furcht vor einem nachhaltigen Identitätsverlust allgegenwärtig war. Als man jedoch das DFDR in den stürmischen Tagen des Dezember 1989 gründete, konnten die Gründer das volle Ausmaß des bevorstehenden Exodus noch nicht voraussehen. Daher bleibt das DFDR der erste explizite organisatorische Rahmen, um “Einheit in Vielfalt”19 zu schaffen, wie Professor Paul Philippi die Anreize der Gründer zusammenfasst. Dennoch ist dieser Anspruch immer noch kein wirklich leicht zu erfüllender. In den Parlamentswahlen des Jahres 2000 zum Beispiel gewann das DFDR einen Sitz in der Camera Deputaþilor20, der zweiten Kammer des Parlaments.21 Sie gewann auch einen Sitz im Senat, der ersten Kammer, über ein indirektes Bündnis22 mit der nationalliberalen Partei (Partidul Naþional Liberal, PNL)23. Außerdem stellte es zwischen 2000 und 2004 mehrere Bürgermeister (am bedeutendsten Klaus Werner Johannis, seit 2002 Landesvorsitzender des DFDR, Oberbürgermeister von Hermannstadt seit 2000), Mitglieder von Lokalräten (sechs Sitze im Stadtrat von Hermannstadt und vier im Kreisrat von
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18 [Insgesamt lebten 745.000 Deutsche in den zu Rumänien hinzugekommenen Gebieten. in: Völkl, Rumänien, S. 235]. 19 Gespräch mit Prof. Dr. Dres. h.c. Paul Philippi, Hermannstadt, 29. September 2003. 20 [Abgeordnetenkammer]. 21 [Das war Eberhard-Wolfgang Wittstock im Judeþ Hermannstadt]. 22 [Möglich durch §§ 1, 5 und 11 der DFDR-Satzung vom 1. Februar 1991, da Doppelmitgliedschaften im DFDR und in Parteien möglich sind]. 23 [Dabei handelte es sich um den Architekten Dr. Hermann Fabini als Senator des Judeþ Hermannstadt. Er ist sowohl Mitglied des DFDR, als auch der PNL].
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Hermannstadt)24 und einen “Subsecretar de Stat”25 für “Interethnische Beziehungen” (Ovidiu Ganã) in der rumänischen Regierung.26 Dieses Ergebnis hat die deutsche Minderheit zusammen mit der wichtigen Tatsache gestärkt, dass die Auswanderung der Deutschen nach Österreich und nach Deutschland im Jahr 2000 zu einem Stillstand kam.27 Die rumänischen Parlamentswahlen vom 26. November 2000 trugen auch zu diesem Erfolg bei, als das DFDR mit 40.981 Stimmen (1990: 38.768, 1992: 34.685, 1996: 23.888) auf Platz 19 von insgesamt 69 politischen Formationen und Parteien kam, die in den Wahlen des Jahres 200028 antraten. Wieder einmal wurde der Kreis Hermannstadt bei diesen Wahlen zur Hochburg des DFDR (19.821 Stimmen für das DFDR). Demgegenüber beklagten die Banater Schwaben wieder einmal die totale sächsische Vorherrschaft innerhalb des DFDR. Außer Ovidiu Ganã aus Temeschwar, wurden alle anderen wichtigen Posten des DFDR von Sachsen besetzt. Die Sachsen mussten sich aber nach 2000 forumsintern sowohl ihren alten Rivalen aus dem Banat (Schwaben und Berglanddeutschen) wie auch den stärker werdenden Schwaben aus Sathmar und aus dem Kreischgebiet stellen. Wie man daher deutlich sehen kann, haben die zuvor beschriebenen historischen und kulturellen Unterschiede auch heute noch eine sehr große Wirkung auf gegenwärtige politische Entwicklungen und auch Personalentscheidungen innerhalb des DFDR.29 Geschichte wird für die Politik entscheidend, und diese zwei Bereiche können nicht gesondert voneinander betrachtet werden, wenn man sich mit der deutschen Minderheit in Rumänien bei ihrem Versuch beschäftigt, “politische Einheit in historischer Vielfalt”30 zu schaffen. Unter diesem Blickwinkel wird in der Tat “Geschichte zu vergangener Politik und Politik zu gegenwärtiger Geschichte”31, wie bereits zu anfangs erwähnt. Das folgende Kapitel baut auf diesen bisherigen Ergebnissen auf und wird die Rolle der nationalen rumänischen Geschichte und des Nationalismus während der postkommunistischen politischen Entwicklungen in Rumänien näher analysieren, insbesondere, da diese für eine Minderheitenorganisation wie das DFDR von großer Bedeutung sind. 2. Das postkommunistische Rumänien 1989–2004 2.1. Der historische Hintergrund
Rumänien ist mit seinen 238.391 Quadratkilometern und seinen 21,7 Millionen Einwohnern32 nach Polen der größte der so genannten “postkommunistischen” Staaten Mittel- und Südosteuropas. Die Rumänen selbst sehen ihren Staat als
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24 Forums-Nachrichten, Wahlbilanz des Forums, Hermannstadt (28. Juni 2000), S. 23. 25 [Unterstaatssekretär]. 26 Gespräch mit Dipl. Ing. Hansmartin Borger, Hermannstadt, 24. März 2003. 27 Gespräch mit Professor Dr. Dres. h.c. Paul Philippi, Hermannstadt, 1. April 2003. 28 Forums-Nachrichten, Wahlbilanz des Forums, Hermannstadt (28. Juni 2000), S. 23. 29 Gespräch mit Kulturreferent Dr. Florian Rudolph, Bukarest, 5. April 2005. 30 Gespräch mit Prof. Dr. Dres. h.c. Paul Philippi, Hermannstadt, 29. September 2003. 31 Freeman, E. A. (1823–92), Methods of Historical Study (1886), S. 44. 32 Archiv-Akte A3, 21. September 2002.
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ihren Nationalstaat, aber de facto ist Rumänien ein Land mit vielen Nationalitäten. Es gibt ungefähr 1,4 Millionen Ungarn, wohl zwischen 60.000 und 70.000 Deutsche33 zwischen einer und zwei Millionen Roma und kleinere Minderheiten von Ukrainern, Polen, Russen und Lipowenern (slawischstämmige Bewohner des Donaudeltas), Serben, Bulgaren, Kroaten, Slowaken, Tschechen, Mazedoniern, Ruthenen, Türken, Tartaren, Griechen, Albanern, Armeniern, Juden und Italienern. Insgesamt werden 19 Minderheiten vom rumänischen Staat offiziell erkannt.34 Es wird sogar geschätzt, dass die Minderheit der Sinti und Roma zwischen “2 und 3,5 Millionen Menschen, also bis zu 10 Prozent der Bevölkerung stellt”35. Der moderne rumänische Staat in seinen jetzigen Grenzen ist ein Produkt des Ersten Weltkriegs. Vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg bestand Rumänien nur aus den zwei “historischen rumänischen Fürstentümern, der Walachei und der Moldau”36 (dem so genannten “Regat” (von Regatul vechi, dem alten Königreich, oder Königreich von Rumänien), das im Ersten Weltkrieg seit 1916 auf der Seite der Alliierten kämpfte. Nach der Niederlage Österreich-Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg wurde Ungarn (in der Donaumonarchie firmierend als “Transleithanien”) im “Diktatfrieden”37 von Trianon38 gezwungen, das Banat, Siebenbürgen, Sathmar (Satu Mare), die Marmarosch (Maramureº) und das Kreischgebiet (Criºana) an das Königreich Rumänien abzutreten, dem alten “Regat”.39 Der Reichsteil Österreich (“Cisleithanien”) verlor das Buchenland (Bukowina) an Rumänien. Auf diese Weise wurde Rumänien ein ethnisch höchst heterogenes Land, da diese neu gewonnenen Territorien zum Teil überwiegend von Ungarn, Deutschen, Ukrainern und Juden bevölkert waren. Zwar war Rumänien auch schon vorher durch seine jüdische Minderheit ethnisch heterogen gewesen, aber man sträubte sich sehr, dies zuzugeben.40 Von 1965 bis 1989 wurde Rumänien “im Geist des Neo-Stalinismus und des nationalen Kommunismus”41 von Nicolae Ceauºescu42 beherrscht. Ceauºescu setzte die nationalen Minderheiten wie Ungarn und Deutsche unter starken Druck und “beherrschte das Land mit seinen Freunden und Verwandten wie ein Sultan”43. Im Großen und Ganzen “passte Ceauºescu den Marxismus- Leninismus mehr an den Nationalismus an, als umgekehrt.”44
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33 [Die Volkszählung von 2002 geht von 60.088 Deutschen aus]. 34 Ibid. 35 Agh, Emerging Democracies, S. 257. 36 Kolarz, Mituri ?i realit??i în Europa de Est, S. 145 ff. 37 [“Ungarn verlor dadurch 1919 zwei Drittel seines Territoriums” (Kinder, S. 903), sogar junge ungarische Männer wurden “Trianon” getauft, um an diese ungarische Katastrophe zu erinnern. (Gespräch mit Egon Erwin Lajos Bunzmann, Regensburg, 6. Januar 2002)]. 38 Kinder, Atlas zur Weltgeschichte, S. 415. 39 Leuºtean, România, Ungaria ºi Tratatul de la Trianon 1918–1920. 40 Gespräch mit Dorel Dorian, Bukarest, 7. April 2005. 41 Agh, Emerging Democracies, S. 258. 42 [“Nicolae Ceauºescu, geboren 1918, hingerichtet 1989. Ceauºescu beherrschte Rumänien von 1965– 1989 auf diktatorische Art und Weise und wurde im Dezember 1989 gewaltsam gestürzt. Dies wurde von der rumänischen Armee gezielt unterstützt. Er wurde in einem Geheimprozess von einem Militärtribunal zum Tode verurteilt. Das Todesurteil wurde sofort vollstreckt.” (Anger, S. 133)]. 43 Gespräch mit Prof. Dr. Dres. h.c. Paul Philippi, Hermannstadt, 4. April 2003. 44 Schöpflin, “Rumanian Nationalism”, S. 104.
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Auf der Grundlage dieses historischen Hintergrundes von Rumänien und seines Erbes der totalitären Vergangenheit wird es offensichtlich, dass Rumänien vor 1989 mit einer ganz besonderen Form der Herrschaftsform — unterschiedlich von den Ländern des östlichen Mitteleuropa, zu “kämpfen” hatte: Sultanismus. Jede Art persönlicher Initiative in diesem “dynastischen Sozialismus”45 wurde sofort bestraft, und sogar Schreibmaschinen mussten bei der Polizei (jedes Jahr von neuem!) angemeldet werden46. Darauf aufbauend, verkündete Ceauºescu noch im November 1989, auf dem 14. PCR-Parteitag, gerade einstimmig als Parteichef wiedergewählt, “während im restlichen Osteuropa der Kommunismus bereits zusammengebrochen war, für Rumänien die ‘Verwirklichung des goldenen Traums der Menschheit, des Kommunismus.’”47 Während im restlichen Ostblock die Reformen und Umwälzungen ihren Anfang nahmen, stellte sich Ceauºescu an die Spitze eines Anti-Reform-Blockes, der die Bewahrung der bestehenden Verhältnisse zum Ziel hatte. Als es im Dezember 1989 in Temeschwar zu Unruhen gekommen war, machte Ceauºescu noch einen Staatsbesuch im Iran. Dies zeigt, wie sicher er sich in seiner Position fühlte. Nach seiner Rückkehr versuchte er mehrmals die aufgebrachten Massen durch Ansprachen zu beruhigen. Selbst in seiner letzten Ansprache am 21. Dezember 1989 betonte er die Einheit, Unabhängigkeit und Souveränität Rumäniens und erhielt dafür Beifall vom versammelten Volk.48 Sogar in ihrer schlimmsten Stunde konnten die Rumänen vom Nationalismus begeistert und mobilisiert werden. Als Ceauºescus weitere Appelle an sein Volk jedoch erfolglos waren, floh er mit seiner Frau Elena und die Demonstrationen griffen auf das ganze Land über. Ceauºescu wurde auf seiner Flucht gefangen genommen, durch ein Militärgericht zum Tode verurteilt und am 25. Dezember 1989 hingerichtet. Warum aber war das rumänische Regime unter Ceauºescu das einzige im ehemaligen Ostblock, das aktiv den Nationalismus in so beträchtlichem Ausmaß ausnutzen konnte? Eine genauere historische Analyse des rumänischen Nationalismus hilft bei der Beantwortung dieser Frage. Diese historische Analyse zeigt, dass für Rumänien die Unterjochung der Bauernschaft vor der nationalen Vereinigung der altrumänischen Fürstentümer (Moldau und Walachei) das Aufkommen jeder Art eines vom Volk getragenen Nationalismus (Popular Nationalism) verhinderte, den zum Beispiel Serbien und Bulgarien49 entwickelten. Der Mangel eines bedeutenden Bürgertums schloss eine Entwicklung analog der in den tschechischen Landen (Bourgeois Nationalism) aus und das mangelnde Interesse des
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45 Linz und Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, S. 350. 46 Gespräch mit Rudolf Rösler, Regensburg, 6. Januar 2002. 47 Oschlies, Ceauºescus Schatten schwindet — politische Geschichte Rumäniens 1988–1998, S. 47. 48 Vgl. www.ceausescu.com/ceausescu_media/ultima.html: Rede von Nicolae Ceauºescu am 21.12.1989: “(...) Sã demonstram cu toate puterea pentru unitatea în apãrarea independenþii integritãþii ºi suveranitãþii României (...)”. 49 Roucek, Balkan Politics, S. 43.
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rumänischen Adels an der Regierung des Landes und sein schneller Untergang nach der Vereinigung, war für die Entwicklung einer Art aristokratischen Nationalismus nach ungarischem Vorbild (Aristocratic Nationalism) abträglich.50 Diese Faktoren sorgten dafür, dass nur in Rumänien der Nationalismus an die Bürokratie gebunden war und auf diese Art vom Staat monopolisiert werden konnte, um den Zwecken der herrschenden Kreise zu dienen. Ein derartiger Nationalismus ist wenig geeignet dazu, im Sinne einer Mobilisierung der Gesellschaft zugunsten demokratischer Ziele zu wirken, sondern er wird vielmehr den Herrschenden dazu dienen, “in Krisensituationen (...) an Emotionen (...) und schöne Träume von einer glorreichen Vergangenheit und einer guten Zukunft (...)”51 zu appellieren. Dennoch wäre es völlig falsch, den Nationalismus für die Fehlentwicklungen in Gänze verantwortlich machen zu wollen. Eine aktive Zivilgesellschaft “(...) wird nicht ganz ohne Nationalismus auskommen”52 und Staaten wie Belarus zeigen, dass eine postkommunistische Systemumwandlung mit nur schwachem Nationalismus53 noch weniger Erfolg hat, als im Falle Rumäniens mit einem vom Staat monopolisierten Nationalismus. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird die Besonderheit Rumäniens den übrigen kommunistischen Ländern gegenüber deutlich. Da der Kommunismus den Nationalismus in der gesamten Region Mittel — und Osteuropas nicht “einfror”, sahen sich die Regierungen anderer kommunistischer Staaten außer Stande, ihn zu ihrem eigenen Vorteil so zu monopolisieren, während Ceauºescu dies in Rumänien geschickt tat. Ganz im Gegenteil dazu mussten sich die anderen Staaten dem Nationalismus vielmehr als ernstem Problem stellen. In Ungarn sah sich die Regierung mit einer nationalen Revolution konfrontiert. In der Tschechoslowakei bewirkte der Nationalismus “von der Basis her” Versuche zu einer Reform der Regierung und Titos Projekt in Jugoslawien blieb nur dank der Transformation der nationalen Frage vom Vorkriegskonflikt der entgegen gesetzten nationalen Ideologien in einen Konflikt über die Struktur und Zusammensetzung der jugoslawischen Föderation erhalten. Tito schaffte dies durch formale Änderungen in den 1960ern und 1970ern: Partei — und Staatspräsidentschaft rotierten, der Nationalitäten-Proporz in Partei — und Staatsorganen auf Republik — und Provinzebene wurde eingeführt und die Amtsdauer wurde begrenzt.54 Nur in Rumänien nahm die Regierung selbst die Führung der nationalen Bewegung wirksam ein und unterdrückte ethnische Minderheiten innerhalb der Staatsgrenzen und beantwortete die sowjetische Vorherrschaft und Bevormundung durch eigene nationalistische Töne.
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50 Prof. Dr. Richard Crampton, Universität Oxford, Tutorium South Eastern European History, Wintersemester 2003/2004. 51 Macków, Am Rande Europas? Nation, Zivilgesellschaft und außenpolitische Integration in Belarus, Litauen, Polen Russland und der Ukraine, S. 210. 52 Ibid. 53 Vgl. Ibid., S. 182 ff. 54 Pavlowitch, Tito: Yugoslavia”s Great Dictator: A Reassessment, S. 67-79.
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Wie zuvor argumentiert, war der Nationalismus alleine in Rumänien schon zu Beginn an bürokratische Eliten gebunden. Weil diese Eliten notwendig waren, den rumänischen Staat zu gründen, wurde der Nationalismus schnell de facto zur offiziellen Regierungspolitik. Der Irredenta-Charakter des rumänischen Nationalismus, den er durch die große Zahl der im damals ungarischen Siebenbürgen lebenden Rumänen annahm, stellte sicher, dass er auch weiterhin an den Staat gebunden blieb. Der Nationalismus wurde in anderen Staaten Mittel — und Osteuropas anfangs von einem bedeutsamen Bestandteil der Zivilgesellschaft als Argument für politische Ziele genutzt und jede staatliche Anwendung dieser Rhetorik musste von der Zivilgesellschaft zuerst als gerechtfertigt legitimiert werden. Dies vollzog sich durch die verschiedenen Akteure der Zivilgesellschaft in ihren unterschiedlichen subjektiven Meinungen und Überzeugungen darüber, wer der geeignete Anführer der nationalen Bewegung sei. Der Kommunismus verstieß gegen diese mittel — und osteuropäische Spielart des Nationalismus, da er keine Zivilgesellschaft zuließ. Wo die regierenden Kommunisten sich daher nicht mit Recht an die Spitze der nationalen Bewegungen zu stellen vermochten, taten sie ihr Bestes, um den Nationalismus ganz einzudämmen. In Rumänien stand Ceauºescu als Erbe der Führung auch automatisch an der Spitze der nationalen Bewegung, da der rumänische Nationalismus nie an eine Zivilgesellschaft gebunden war, sondern einzig und allein an den Staat. Sowjetische Vorherrschaft über Rumänien kollidierte daher direkt mit seiner eigenen Position und gefährdete sie potentiell, wenn er nicht die an ihn “vererbte” Führung der nationalen Bewegung übernommen hätte. Aber vor dem Hintergrund seiner eigenen Unzulänglichkeit und der seiner Partei, verschlechterte die von Ceauºescu erstrebte “nationale Autarkie” Rumäniens die Lebensbedingungen der rumänischen Nation. In dieser Situation geschah dann das Unvermeidliche: Der Nationalismus steigerte sich als Mittel der Herrschaft immer mehr, um das Unhaltbare weiter zu verteidigen, wenn auch ohne Erfolg. Wenn man daher die Änderungen der politischen Strukturen nach dem Sturz Ceauºescus im Jahr 1989 verstehen will und wenn man nachvollziehen möchte, warum sich diese nur langsam entwickelt haben, muss man sich vor diesem Hintergrund und in der Retrospektive noch zusätzlich klar machen, wie drückend und totalitär die Diktatur Ceauºescus, zusätzlich zu den nationalistischen Exzessen, wirklich war. Ceauºescu war die allerhöchste Autorität auf jedem öffentlich relevanten politischen, ökonomischen und kulturellen Feld.55 Dieser Fakt degradierte die Bevölkerung auf den Rang einer lediglich applaudierenden Masse.56 Je länger dieser Zustand vorherrschte, desto klarer zeigte sich allerdings auch, dass sogar Ceauºescu selbst das Opfer seines eigenen Personenkults wurde und dass schließlich auch sein persönlicher Größenwahn aufgrund dessen weiter voranschritt.57
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55 Gespräch mit Dipl. Ing. Hansmartin Borger, Hermannstadt, 24. März 2003. 56 Gespräch mit Horia C. Matei, Bukarest, 10. März 2005. 57 Gespräch mit StD a. D. Wilhelm Fritsch, Regensburg, 12. Juli 2002.
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Ana Blandiana58, eine charismatische rumänische Schriftstellerin, die in ihrer Geschichte “Kopie eines Alptraums” eine der beeindruckendsten Beschreibungen über das Lebensgefühl in Ceauºescus Rumänien wiedergibt, wurde zu einer Art geheimen moralischen Autorität vor 1989. Sie schreibt über einen gewissen “psychologischen Bestandteil”, welcher im ganzen öffentlichen Leben Rumäniens beobachtet werden muss, und welcher dem Benehmen des Volkes etwas Irrationales verlieh; ein Benehmen, das passend in George Orwells “1984” beschrieben wird, und das darauf zielt, das kleinste “Fehlverhalten” gegen das System zu verbergen. In Verbindung dazu erklärte Ana Blandiana im Bezug auf den Zusammenstoß zwischen ethnischen Ungarn und Rumänen in Târgu Mureº (Neumarkt) in einem Fernsehinterview des deutschen Fernsehens: “... diese Schlammschlachten, die man in Rumänien dann und wann vorfindet, sind das Ergebnis der allgemeinen Demütigung während Ceauºescus Diktatur. Ein westeuropäischer Beobachter kann sich keine Vorstellung von ihren Wirkungen auf die Psyche und Mentalität der Leute machen. Nichts davon ist natürlich, alles ist künstlich. Alles wurde initiiert, um die verschiedensten Ziele zu erreichen.”59 Dieser Mangel einer Tradition persönlicher Initiative ist eine besondere Ursache des langsamen politischen Fortschritts und für die zunehmende ethnische Unruhe. Der hohe Grad der Personalisierung der Macht bis 1989 führte zur Situation, dass es keine institutionelle Autonomie oder keinen institutionellen Pluralismus in Rumänien gab, und die Anzahl an unabhängigen Initiativen auf ein Minimum reduziert wurde. Dies war das entscheidende Defizit in der rumänischen Gesellschaft bezüglich einer Reform-orientierten und durch Initiativen angetriebenen Bewegung auf eine moderne und demokratische Gesellschaft zu, die durch zuverlässige Institutionen stabilisiert wird. In einem solchen modernen institutionellen System gilt: “Need is accepted as a normal part of social life and institutions reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life”60. Diese Institutionen fördern auch Prinzipien, wie von T.H. Marshall in seiner ziemlich aufschlussreichen Klassifizierung von Bürgerrechten angegeben wird, die er in drei Hauptkategorien einteilte: “civil, political and social”61. Wie mehrere akademische Studien über die politische Transition in Mittel — und Osteuropa gezeigt haben, ergaben sich die meisten Probleme während des politischen und ökonomischen Wechsels besonders aufgrund der fehlenden Entwicklung einer Zivilgesellschaft62, d.h., von unabhängigen Interessengruppen, einer freien Presse und öffentlichen Initiativen, die helfen hätten können,
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58 [Ana Blandiana wurde am 25. Mai 1942 in Temeschwar, Banat, Rumänien, geboren. Sie studierte Philologie in Klausenburg, Rumänien. Ihr Band mit Gedichten wurde 1964 (Persoana întâi La Plural, d.h. Erste Person Plural) herausgegeben. Sie hat Gedichte, Prosa und Essays geschrieben, und sie ist die Vorsitzende des rumänischen Pen-Clubs und Mitglied der europäischen Akademie für Lyrik]. 59 Südwest 3: Schauplatz der Geschichte: Siebenbürgen, Sonntag, 6. August 1995, 16.55 Uhr. 60 North, Institutions, S. 3. 61 Marshall, Class, Citizenship, and Social Development. 62 Wydra, Democracy in Eastern Europe as a Civilising Process.
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Korruption durch Protest zu bekämpfen oder zu verhindern.63 Wie William Beveridge feststellte, “hängt der Erfolg einer guten Gesellschaft nicht vom Staat, sondern von den Bürgern ab”64. Deshalb kann die Rolle der staatsbürgerlichen Rechte und Pflichten als eine der treibenden Kräfte innerhalb der Entwicklung des modernen Staats betrachtet werden. Eine Vorverurteilung der rumänischen Bürger als “schlechte Bürger” im Sinne von Beveridge wäre aber äußerst voreilig und nicht im Sinne einer wissenschaftlichen Analyse, sondern eher im Stile von “Gelegenheitsanalytikern von Osteuropa wie Klaus von Beyme”65. Vielmehr muss die Geschichte als prägendes Element gesehen werden, das die Bürger zu dem machte, was sie sind. Die sich ändernde Bedeutung der Staatsbürgerschaft (“Citizenship”) bereitet aber den Weg, auf dem der demokratische Staat und die sich liberalisierende Wirtschaft folgen können. Solange die Zivilgesellschaft in Rumänien ziemlich schwach sein wird, solange wird auch die Entwicklung in Richtung eines modernen, demokratischen und wirtschaftlich liberalisierten und funktionierenden Staates im Sinne einer Transformation sehr schleppend voranschreiten. Im Falle Rumäniens verlief die Entwicklung einer Zivilgesellschaft und einer modernen Staatsbürgerschaft noch nicht wirklich viel versprechend. Wie von Ernest Gellner beschrieben, würde eine wirklich aktive Zivilgesellschaft es erfordern, dass weder die nicht-politischen Institutionen, noch Personen von politischen Institutionen oder dem Staat unterdrückt oder unter Druck gesetzt werden.66 In der wohl interessantesten und prägnantesten Formulierung der Zivilgesellschaft, die Victor Pérez-Díaz in eine enge Definition, begrenzt auf eine gesellschaftliche Vereinigung von Institutionen ohne Staat, fasst, besteht diese aus gesellschaftlich-politischen Institutionen, gesellschaftlichen Institutionen und der Öffentlichkeit.67 In diesem System ist es die Aufgabe des Staates, Recht und Ordnung sicherzustellen und die Kooperation und Konkurrenz zwischen den verschiedenen Institutionen zu beaufsichtigen. Die Fakten im heutigen Rumänien sehen allerdings anders aus, und die oben genannten Bedingungen sind nur teilweise erfüllt in der politischen Realität. Die Tatsache, dass die erfahrensten Politiker der heutigen politischen Elite direkt aus Ceauºescus System der Vergangenheit kommen, verbindet das Problem der schwachen rumänischen Zivilgesellschaft mit dem noch viel schlimmeren der politischen Eliten.68 Auf diese Art sind Institutionen nicht in der Lage gewesen, sich stark zu konstituieren und Rumäniens Institutionalismus kann ziemlich gut als “schwacher, oder verzerrter Institutionalismus”69 beschrieben werden, der sich als ein Erbe des Sultanismus und der “revoluþia furatã”, der “gestohlenen Revolution” von 1989, entwickelt hat.
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63 Wallace und Haerpfer, Democratisation, Economic Development and Corruption. 64 Beveridge, Voluntary Action, S. 320. 65 Professor Jerzy Macków, Universität Regensburg, Vorlesung Nation und Gesellschaft in Mittel- und Osteuropa, Wintersemester 2002/2003. 66 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. 67 Pérez-Díaz, The Return of Civil Society. The Emergence of Democratic Spain, S. 54 ff. 68 Henkel, “Ostalgie und Heldentod: Was von den Revolutionen übrigbleibt”, in: HZ, Nr. 1827 (16. Mai 2003), S. 3. 69 Wallace und Haerpfer, Democratisation, Economic Development and Corruption, S. 14.
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Nicht nur der Kommunismus per se, sondern auch die Politik an sich im Sinne eines Forums für öffentliche Angelegenheiten, mit dessen Hilfe konkrete Anliegen der Bevölkerung behandelt werden können, hatte seine Glaubwürdigkeit durch Ceauºescus Diktatur nahezu völlig verloren. Wie verbreitet diese a-politische Einstellung im heutigen Rumänien noch ist, wird sehr anschaulich durch das Beispiel der Machtübernahme der neuen Führung im Jahr 1989 gezeigt: Ion Iliescu, einer der früheren Chefideologen im Zentralkomitee der rumänischen Kommunistischen Partei, schaffte es schon während des Sturzes Ceauºescus, sich als der “Retter der Nation” zu stilisieren, und die große Mehrheit des Volkes erklärte als Grund für ihre Unterstützung Iliescus: “...Iliescu hat uns Brot gegeben, er hat uns Elektrizität gegeben ...”70. 2.2. Demokratisierung in Rumänien 1989–2004 2.2.1. 1989 — eine Revolution?
Die demokratische Entwicklung in Mittel- und Südosteuropa nach 1989 kam nicht wie Phönix aus der Asche. Dem Aufstieg der Demokratie liegt ein langer sozialer Entwicklungsprozess zugrunde, “interwoven with the collapse of communism whose origins were long before 1989”71. Dieser Hintergrund wurde deshalb für den Erfolg der späteren Entwicklung entscheidend. “Democracy remains the possible outcome of a civilising process that is constantly threatened by de-civilising turns.”72 Aber genau an dieser Stelle unterscheidet sich der Fall Rumäniens und seines Transformationsprozesses von dem anderer Länder, wie Ungarn, Polen oder der ehemaligen Tschechoslowakei. Diese mitteleuropäischen Länder betrachteten sich nicht als Europäer “zweiter Klasse”, da durch ihre eigenen Beiträge der politische Wechselprozess des ganzen ehemaligen Ostblocks ins Rollen geraten war. Dieses sehr weit verbreitete Gefühl der Polen, Tschechen, Slowaken und Ungarn spiegelt sich in einer der Reden des früheren ungarischen Premierminister Józef Antall. “We are not the back-yard of Europe ... I hope ... that they will at least pay more attention to our region ... and to the fact that the nations of this area, from the Poles to the Hungarians and others, have viewed the Western World with unrequited love for centuries. This unrequited love must end because we stuck to our posts, we fought our own fights without firing one shot and we won the Third World War for them.”73 Der rumänische Fall hingegen war anders. Ironischerweise kollabierte der rumänische Staatssozialismus erst nach “dem Zusammenbruch des Staatssozialismus in der ganzen Region”74. Genau dieser Punkt ist für die anschließende Entwicklung des rumänischen Falles entscheidend. Ein gutes
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70 Gespräch mit Professor Dr. Dres. h.c. Paul Philippi, Hermannstadt, 1. April 2003. 71 Wydra, Democracy in Eastern Europe as a Civilising Process, S. 288. 72 Ibid., S. 303. 73 Ibid., S. 298. Passim: East European Reporter, V (II) (March–April 1992), S. 67. 74 Agh, Emerging Democracies, S. 262.
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Beispiel, um eine Vorstellung zu bekommen, wie anders die rumänische Entwicklung war, ist die Tatsache, dass es im Juni 1989 nur zwei unabhängige Bewegungen in Rumänien gab, während es in Ungarn schon 21 waren.75 Überdies erhielt Nicolae Ceauºescu im November 1989 auf dem 14. Parteitag der kommunistischen Partei Rumäniens noch 67 Standing Ovations für seine Reden, während in den anderen Ländern die Systemtransformation bereits im Gange war, oder gerade eingeleitet wurde.76 Deshalb unterschied sich der anschließende Wechsel des politischen Systems auch ganz entscheidend von dem der anderen sozialistischen Staaten. Rumänien “profitierte nicht von einem frühen Anfang des Transitions-Prozesses”77 und es konnte sich nicht auf einen, schon unter dem Mantel des formal noch herrschenden Staatssozialismus begonnenen gesellschaftlichen Transformationsprozess stützen. Aufgrund dieser historisch belasteten Ausgangsposition war der Demokratisierungsprozess in Rumänien weitaus schwieriger als in den so genannten “Visegradstaaten” und die nationale Geschichte konnte so zu einem bestimmenden Faktor der Herrschaftslegitimation im Postkommunismus werden. Ist es daher überhaupt möglich, im Falle Rumäniens von ReDemokratisierung zu sprechen? Zuallererst muss festgestellt werden, dass Rumänien die demokratische Erfahrung fehlte. Daher war eine “pacted transition”78 zwischen Hardlinern und Softlinern des Regimes und Gemäßigten und Radikalen in der Opposition aufgrund der seltsamen Kombination von nationalistischem Sultanismus und Totalitarismus79 unter Ceauºescu in Rumänien nicht möglich. Diese Vorbedingungen machten es unmöglich, dass Rumänien überhaupt einen “Pfad in Richtung einer echten Demokratisierung”80, wie theoretisch von Alfred Stepan beschrieben, erleben konnte. In Rumänien spielten vielmehr Gewalttätigkeit und internationaler Einfluss81 eine große Rolle beim Systemwechsel. In diesem innenpolitischen Umfeld ohne funktionierende Zivilgesellschaft, de facto ohne unabhängige Organisationen, erfüllt von Gewalt und materiellen Nöten, war es ein Leichtes für die etablierten Machteliten, an nationale Gefühle als “Ventil” der angestauten “Wut” zu appellieren und dadurch ausgesprochen antikommunistische Kräfte unter Verweis auf deren angeblich “antinationale Einstellung” von den Schaltstellen der Macht fern und sich selbst in diesen zu halten.82 Eben diese ausgesprochen antikoFmunistischen Kräfte wären allerdings an den Stellen der Macht notwendig
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75 Linz und Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, S. 352. 76 Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, S. 399. 77 Baleanu, Romania — Resources for the Region, S. 210. 78 Linz und Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, S. 356. 79 Schöpflin, “Rumanian Nationalism”, S. 95. 80 Stepan, Paths toward Redemocratization, S. 64. 81 Vgl. Brandstätter, Schachmatt — Strategie einer Revolution, ARTE Fernsehen (Mittwoch, 25. Februar 2004, 20.45 Uhr). [In dieser Dokumentation wird ein ganz neues Licht auf die Ereignisse in Rumänien im Herbst 1989 geworfen. Der Tenor der Sendung ist, dass Ceauºescu in Kooperation von KGB, CIA und französischem Geheimdienst gestürzt wurde, da er und sein Regime nicht mehr in die Wendezeit passten, aber nicht von alleine zusammenbrechen wollten. Ceauºescu war zum einzigen noch verbliebenen Hindernis des Zusammenwachsens Europas geworden und musste daher gestürzt werden, so die Dokumentation]. 82 Gespräch mit Edward Hicks, Oxford, 24. Juni 2002.
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gewesen, damit die Chance erhalten blieb, eine echte Demokratisierung durchzuführen.83 Dennoch fand eine bestimmte Art Systemwechsel auch in Rumänien statt. Dies soll jetzt analysiert werden. Für die Analyse der Demokratisierung muss man allerdings festhalten, dass Rumänien und die “rumänische Demokratie anders ist als die aller anderen Staaten Mittel- und Südosteuropas”84, weshalb es auch immer noch an seinen historischen Lasten in sehr hohem Maße leidet. Die Krise des rumänischen Staatssozialismus begann auch aufgrund der zuvor beschriebenen Eigenheiten Rumäniens. Der Startschuss fiel, als die Securitate den ungarischen Priester Lászlo Tökés in Temeschwar, der Hauptstadt des am ethnisch gemischtesten Teils Rumäniens, dem Banat, festnehmen wollte. Man könnte deshalb dieses Detail auch als Indiz dafür werten, wie der heterogene ethnische Charakter des Landes die demokratische Initiative unterstützte und somit die ethnischen Minderheiten als “vaterlandslose Gesellen” in das Visier der “Herrschafts-Erhaltungs-Waffe” Geschichte manövrierte.85 Es ist sogar ziemlich wahrscheinlich, dass die Entwicklung nach 1989 eher das Produkt solcher struktureller Besonderheiten war, als das der demokratischen Erfahrungen der rumänischen Bevölkerung. Agh, der Ungar ist, nimmt sogar den Standpunkt ein, dass es überhaupt keine rumänische Revolution im Jahr 1989 gab.86 Die Parteigranden entfernten Ceauºescu mehr oder weniger von der Macht. Dieses Schicksal teilte er mit Todor Schiwkow in Bulgarien und mit Erich Honecker in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, obwohl Ceauºescus Los bei weitem das blutigste war. Aghs Theorie unterstützend, wurde die erste Stufe (die “Zerstörung”, die “Krise” oder einfach der “Zerfall”) von drei entscheidenden Faktoren initiiert. Erstens, dem Massenaufstand, zweitens der Armeerebellion und drittens dem “Palace Coup”.87 Der tatsächliche Kern einer demokratischen Revolution jedoch, die eine nachhaltige Demokratisierung Schritt für Schritt erzwingt, fehlte im rumänischen Umsturz von 1989 eindeutig. Im absoluten Gegensatz zu einer “wirklichen” Revolution wurde diese Änderung durch etablierte Parteigrößen “unterstützt” und initiiert, um ihre eigenen Positionen behalten und sichern zu können.88 Um dies zu kaschieren, brauchte man einen “dramatischen” Abgang Ceauºescus á la Exekution, um sich selbst dann anschließend als “Retter des Vaterlandes” stilisieren zu können. Ein gutes Beispiel in diesem Zusammenhang ist Ceauºescus Nachfolger, Ion Iliescu89, der zur alten rumänischen kommunistischen Nomenklatur gehörte, die
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Macków, “Der Wandel des kommunistischen Totalitarismus und die postkommunistische Systemtransformation”. 84 Linz und Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, S. 365. 85 Gespräch mit Helmut Kahr, Hermannstadt, 18. Juli 2002. 86 Agh, Emerging Democracies, S. 262. 87 Câmpeanu, Ceauºescu anii num?r?torii inverse, S. 294 ff. 88 Crampton, The Balkans since the Second World War, S. 134 ff. 89 [“Ion Iliescu war rumänischer Präsident von 1990 bis 1996, als er die Präsidentschaftswahlen an seinen Nachfolger und Vorgänger Emil Constantinescu verlor. Da Constantinescu 2000 auf ein neuerliche Kandidatur verzichtete, wurde Iliescu wieder Präsident ...” (In: von Baratta (2002), S. 904). In seinem veröffentlichten Lebenslauf wird er ganz im Gegenteil dazu wie folgt charakterisiert: “Er wurde schon [vor 1989] für einen Politiker gehalten, dem man zutraute, den Kampf gegen Totalitarismus, für Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und Demokratie führen zu können.”].
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Rumänien bis 1989 unter Ceauºescus Führung ruinierte. Iliescus “Front der Nationalen Rettung” (NSF, FSN auf Rumänisch) ergriff die Macht und behielt sie bis 1996. Iliescus so genannter “Palace Coup”90, der der “vorgetäuschten Revolution”91 oder der “gestohlenen Revolution”92 folgte, war wegen der desorganisierten Masse, die politisch unerfahren und untätig in der Konfrontation mit Rumäniens “politischen Mandarinen” war, erfolgreich. Der eigentliche Coup selbst war die Tatsache, dass die NSF in der Lage war, sich erfolgreich als de facto monopolistische Vereinigung aller Anti-Ceauºescu-Kräfte darzustellen. Durch sein geschicktes Anknüpfen an die nationalistischen Parolen Ceauºescus gelang es ihm überdies, sich als “nationaler Retter” zu profilieren. Iliescu nutzte so geschickt das Fehlen einer funktionierenden Zivilgesellschaft und er torpedierte ihr — für ihn herrschaftsbedrohliches — Entstehen überdies durch das gezielte Schüren von Nationalismen und Geschichtsmythen.93 Dieses Kunststück gelang während der entscheidenden Wochen gegen Ende des Jahres 1989.94 Dank dieses erfolgreichen “Tricks” konnte die alte Elite die Macht behalten. Eben dies war in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik oder in Bulgarien nicht erfolgreich. Das Rückgrat von Iliescus System waren die Bergarbeiter, die er im Jahr 1990–91 zu fünf Anlässen in die Hauptstadt rief, um rebellische Studenten und widerspenstige Intellektuelle zusammenschlagen zu lassen. Zusammenzufassend kann man sagen, dass Rumäniens Entwicklung während der ersten Stufe der Demokratisierung nicht zu einem “wirklich” demokratischen System, sondern zu einer “Fassadendemokratie” führte, die im Folgenden beschrieben wird. 2.2.2. Die Transition zur “Fassaden-Demokratie” — Erster Versuch (1992–1996)
Das Jahr 1990 war für die Zukunft Rumäniens entscheidend, weil einige Vorbedingungen zugunsten oder gegen eine nachhaltige weitere demokratische Entwicklung gelegt wurden. Die NSF “gewann” geradezu leicht aufgrund der organisatorischen Defizite der anderen, frisch gegründeten Parteien die Wahlen im Mai 1990.95 Sie vereinigte mehr als 60 Prozent der gültigen Stimmen auf sich. Die zweite erfolgreiche Organisation war der Verband der ungarischen Minderheit, DAHR-RMDSZ, oder UDMR96 auf Rumänisch, der ungefähr denselben Prozentsatz wie den Anteil der ungarischen Bevölkerung an der Gesamtbevölkerung Rumäniens (7,5 Prozent) gewann. Auch dies unterstreicht die tiefe ethnische Spaltung Rumäniens. Zusätzlich dazu gewann Iliescu im Mai
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90 Agh, Emerging Democracies, S. 263. 91 Macków, Parlamentarische Demokratie und Autoritarismus, S. 54 ff. 92 Linz und Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, S. 358. 93 Sislin, “Revolution Betrayed? Romania and the National Salvation Front”. 94 Câmpeanu, Ceauºescu, anii num?r?torii inverse, S. 293 ff. 95 Agh, Emerging Democracies, S. 265. 96 [In dieser Arbeit kommt nur die rumänische Bezeichnung zur Anwendung].
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1990 auch die Präsidentschaftswahlen.97 Deshalb wurde die zweite Stufe der demokratischen Entwicklung, die Einführung von demokratischen Institutionen, nur oberflächlich verwirklicht. Die NSF war in der Lage, das Land nahezu ungefährdet und unkontrolliert zu beherrschen. Aufgrund der ausgeprägten regionalen Disparitäten Rumäniens unterstützte die öffentliche Meinung in Rumänien Iliescu und sein NSF-Regime in unterschiedlichem Maße. In den westlichen Landesteilen, wie in Siebenbürgen und im Banat, wo viele Angehörige ethnischer Minderheiten leben, war die Unterstützung für Iliescus Regime schwächer als in den rumänischen “Kernregionen” der Walachei und der Moldau. Bis 1991 wurde diese Fassadendemokratie von zwei Männern, Ion Iliescu und seinem Kollegen aus früheren — und jetzt verdrängten — Zeiten, Petre Roman, symbolisiert. Iliescu war Präsident, während Roman Premierminister war. Jedoch hatten beide verschiedene “Visionen”, wie Rumänien sich entwickeln sollte. Roman war ein überzeugter(-er) Europäer und Modernisierer, während Iliescu nationalistisch und traditionsgebunden war. Im September 1991 kam es schließlich zum ultimativen Konflikt zwischen beiden, der sich am Privatisierungsgesetz Romans und seiner Reformpolitik an sich entzündete. Die “Bergarbeiter aus dem Schiltal, dieselbe Gruppe, deren Brutalität Roman und Iliescu im Jahr zuvor gerettet hatte, kehrten nach Bukarest zurück und Iliescu nutzte diese Gelegenheit und die Schlagkraft “seiner” Bergarbeiter, um Roman loszuwerden.”98 In der Dezemberverfassung von 1991 wurde ein Präsidentenamt in Anlehnung an das in Frankreich eingeführt, das den Präsidenten dazu ermächtigt, den Premierminister zu ernennen und den Vorsitz bei Kabinettsbesprechungen innezuhaben. Der Staat wurde weiter zentralisiert. Jetzt wurden sogar Gemeinden und ihre direkt gewählten Bürgermeister von der Zentralregierung abhängig, da diese einen Präfekten an der Spitze jedes Bezirkes (“Judeþ”, d.h. “Gerichtsbezirk”)99 ernannte, dem sie untergeordnet wurden. Hierzu bemerkte der East European Constitutional Review: “...Overall 133 mayors have been dismissed by government-appointed prefects ... Of the 62 mayors who appealed to the Court of Justice only four received redress. Despite the reaction of the parliamentary opposition, international organisations and the electorate, the executive seems determined to carry on its program of purging mayors.”100 In den Septemberwahlen von 1992 gewann die frühere NSF, die sich jetzt DNSF (Demokratische Nationale Rettungsfront) nannte, zwar die relative Mehrheit, aber jetzt musste sie mit der neuen Oppositionspartei Petre Romans, der “neuen” NSF, konkurrieren, die etwa 10 Prozent der Stimmen gewann.101 Da diese Wahlen dem Premierminister Nicolae Vãcãroiu keine absolute Mehrheit im Parlament bescherten, musste die DNSF Kooperationen suchen, die
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97 Völkl, Rumänien vom 19. Jhdt. bis in die Gegenwart, S. 217–8. 98 Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, S. 450. 99 Baleanu, Romania — Resources for the Region, S. 210. 100 Linz und Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, S. 364. Passim: Constitution Watch: Romania, In: East European Constitutional Review 4, Nr. 2 (1995), S. 22. 101 Agh, Emerging Democracies, S. 269.
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am leichtesten mit nationalistischen (PRM und PUNR) und neo-kommunistischen Gruppen (PSM) möglich waren.102 Um durch diese Herrschaftsbasis besonders im Ausland keinen schlechten Eindruck zu erwecken, änderte die DNSF im Juli 1993 ihren Namen wiederum, dieses Mal von DNSF zu PDSR (Partei der Sozialen Demokratie in Rumänien).103 Aber diese kosmetische Veränderung hatte weder die Art der Herrschaft, noch die herrschende Klasse an sich verändert. Diese Fassadendemokratie reichte bis zu den nächsten Präsidentschaftswahlen im Jahr 1996, die von Emil Constantinescu gewonnen wurden. Im Jahr 1996 wurde die dritte Stufe der Demokratisierung, die Konsolidierungsphase schließlich begonnen. Die Fassadendemokratie wurde — zumindest an der Oberfläche — von einer echten Demokratie abgelöst. Unter der Oberfläche änderte sich allerdings so gut wie nichts. 2.2.3. Demokratisierung — Zweiter (1996–2000) und Dritter Versuch (2000–2004)
Linz und Stepan zufolge kombiniert die dritte Phase der Demokratisierung alte und neue Teile einer politischen Ordnung in einem neuen, homogenisierten System. Die Wahlen von 1996 markierten einen Meilenstein in der rumänischen Geschichte, obwohl einige Probleme, besonders im ökonomischen Bereich, blieben.104 Die Taten der neuen Regierung waren “von historischem Wert für die demokratische Entwicklung Rumäniens”. Minderheitenrechte wurden anerkannt, Verträge mit Ungarn und der Ukraine wurden geschlossen und es begannen Gespräche mit der EU und der NATO. Sogar die Minderheit der Ungarn in Rumänien, vertreten durch den UDMR, trat in die Regierung ein und schickte zwei Minister nach Bukarest. Jedoch hatte Rumänien immer noch eine sehr schwache Zivilgesellschaft, die für eine wirklich stabile Demokratie notwendig gewesen wäre105. Ein zweiter Aspekt, der ziemlich aufschlussreich über die politischen Realitäten in Rumänien ist, war die Tatsache, dass ein frustrierter Constantinescu nach nur einer Amtszeit auf eine erneute Kandidatur verzichtete. Er musste sich den undemokratischen Realitäten und der Last der sultanistischen Vergangenheit stellen, die ihn scheitern ließen. Deshalb waren besonders die Präsidentschaftswahlen des Jahres 2000 ein Schritt rückwärts in der demokratischen Entwicklung Rumäniens, weil Iliescu nach Constantinescus Verzicht wieder zum rumänischen Präsidenten gewählt wurde. Ein zweiter interessanter Faktor bei den Wahlen des Jahres 2000 ist die Tatsache, dass Vadim Tudor, der Führer der Großrumänien Partei (PRM), einer klar antisemitischen und nationalistischen Partei, auf den zweiten Platz, direkt hinter Iliescu, kam. Dieses Ergebnis verrät die unangenehmste Wahrheit über die rumänische Demokratie: Sie ist weder stabil noch widerstandsfähig gegenüber extremistischen politischen Kräften, sowohl von links als auch von rechts.
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Gespräch mit dem Professor Dr. Petre Þurlea, Bukarest, 29. März 2005 und vgl. auch Þurlea, Din Culisele Parlamentului României. 103 Crampton, Eastern Europe In The Twentieth Century, S. 451. 104 Gespräch mit Egon Erwin Lajos Bunzmann, Regensburg, 20. Dezember 2001. 105 Linz und Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, S. 364.
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In der Terminologie Attila Aghs kann zusammengefasst werden, dass Rumänien weit von wahrer demokratischer Konsolidierung entfernt ist. Zwar hat sich die Demokratie entwickelt und Erfolge sind erreicht worden, aber es ist noch ein langer Weg zu einer stabilen Demokratie und einer Integration Rumäniens in Europa. Die Wiederwahl Iliescus verbesserte die demokratische Struktur nicht. Ganz im Gegenteil dazu marginalisierte die regierende PSD die anderen Parteien geradezu und ein Ende ihrer Dominanz war bis Anfang des Jahres 2004 kaum abzusehen.106 Auch Parteineugründungen wie die im Mai 2003 durch den ehemaligen Präsidenten Emil Constantinescu begründete christdemokratische Sammelbewegung “Acþiunea Popularã” (Volksaktion) konnten wenig an dieser Situation ändern.107 Erst die Lokalwahlen vom 6. Juni 2004, die ein Erstarken der Oppositionsallianz DA aus PNL und PD mit sich brachten, änderten die Lage grundlegend.108 Die PSD war auch in der Wahrnehmung der Bürger verwundbar geworden.109 2.2.4. Der Regierungswechsel im Dezember 2004: Neue Hoffnung für Rumänien, oder Rückkehr der Geschichte?
Wie nicht anders zu erwarten war, trugen Präsident Iliescu und Premier Nãstase als Angehörige der alten Nomenklatur während ihrer gemeinsamen Regierungszeit zwischen 2000 und 2004 nicht dazu bei, eine echte demokratische Konsolidierung zu verwirklichen. Ganz im Gegenteil dazu waren sie beide damit beschäftigt, die Macht der PSD dauerhaft zu verankern und keine ernst zu nehmende politisch-demokratische Konkurrenz hochkommen zu lassen. Am deutlichsten wurden diese Versuche durch das gezielte Unter-Drucksetzen von Oppositionspolitikern, zur PSD zu wechseln. Die regierende PSD verwendete alle ihr zu Gebote stehenden Patronagemöglichkeiten — und in einem derart zentralistischen Staat wie Rumänien bieten sich der Regierung jede Menge davon —, um ihren Einfluss über die zentral von der Regierung eingesetzten Präfekten dazu geltend zu machen, “Kommunalpolitiker zu ihren Gunsten umzudrehen”. Dieses Phänomen, in Rumänien als “politischer Tourismus” bezeichnet, stärkte die Position der regierenden Partei noch mehr. Eine Studie des Instituts für Öffentliche Politik (IPP), die die Parteiangehörigkeit von Bürgermeistern in Rumänien im Jahr 2000 mit der im Jahr 2003 verglich, zeigte eine massive Wanderung von Bürgermeistern von anderen Parteien zur PSD. Nach den
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106 Lucaciu, “Autoritatea Electoralã Permanentã subordonatã PSD?”, in: România Liberã, Nr. 670 (15.–21. Mai 2003), S. 3. 107 Curierul de Vest, “Fostul preºedinte al României ºi-a lansat noul partid”, Nr. 22 (28. Mai 2003), S. 2. 108 ADZ, “PSD erzielte die meisten Mandate, PNL und PD die meisten Stimmen”, Nr. 2906 (23. Juni 2004), S. 1. 109 [Es sollte bereits an dieser Stelle nicht unerwähnt bleiben, dass sogar das Deutsche Forum als politisch recht schwache Vertretung der kleinen deutschen Minderheit in Rumänien, einen überwältigenden Sieg gegen die seit 2000 völlig dominierende PSD davontragen konnte. So besiegte der Bürgermeisterkandidat des DFDR für Hermannstadt, Klaus Johannis, den Kandidaten der PSD schon im ersten Wahlgang mit knapp 90 Prozent zu 6 Prozent für die PSD und auch im Stadtrat der 160.000-Einwohner Stadt standen 16 gewählten Stadträten des Forums von insgesamt 23 Stadträten lediglich 3 der PSD gegenüber]. Aus: ADZ, “Totales Vertrauensvotum”, Nr. 2896 (9. Juni 2004), S. 8.
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Kommunalwahlen des Jahres 2000 waren 1.050 von insgesamt 2.957 Bürgermeistern (35,5 Prozent) Mitglieder der damaligen PDSR. Nur drei Jahre später stellte die PSD 1.947 Bürgermeister (65,4 Prozent, was einem Plus von 29,9 Prozent entspricht), 897 mehr als im Jahr 2000. Außer der PSD gewannen nur der UDMR (+1,5 Prozent) und die sozial-liberale PUR (+1,0 Prozent), eine Art “Anhängsel” der PSD110, geringfügig.111 Diese Vorgänge zeigen überdeutlich, dass Linz und Stepans dritte Phase, die “Konsolidierungsphase”, in der die Relikte des alten politischen Systems mit den frisch eingeführten Teilen des neuen politischen Systems kombiniert und in einem homogenen System miteinander verbunden werden sollen, noch bei weitem nicht erreicht ist. Die vorher beschriebenen Ereignisse zeigen zwar, dass die alte Nomenklatur im neuen System angekommen ist, dies aber beständig nach ihren Bedürfnissen auszuhöhlen versucht. Diese Erkenntnis wurde durch die Wahlen vom 28. November 2004 und die Präsidentschaftswahlen noch eindrucksvoller bestätigt. Während schließlich der Kandidat der Opposition, der Bukarester Bürgermeister Traian Bãsescu (PD), in der Stichwahl der Präsidentschaftswahlen mit 51,23 Prozent gegen Premierminister Adrian Nãstase (PSD) (48,77 Prozent) siegte, blieben die Mehrheitsverhältnisse in beiden Kammern des Parlamentes recht unübersichtlich. Beide in den Wahlkampfbündnisse, die Allianz DA (PNL und PD) und die Union aus PSD und PUR lagen nahezu gleich auf mit insgesamt 161 zu 189 Sitzen. Noch am 7. Dezember 2004, nur fünf Tage vor der entscheidenden Stichwahl um das Präsidentenamt, hatte sich das Zünglein an der Waage, der UDMR mit seinen insgesamt 32 Sitzen auf eine Unterstützung Nãstases und eine Regierungsbildung mit der PSD und der PUR festgelegt. Am 21. Dezember 2004 sah die Sache schon ganz anders aus und der UDMR entschied sich nach der Niederlage Nãstases nun für eine Zusammenarbeit mit der DA.112 Sogar die PUR schwenkte nun um und schloss mit der DA ein Koalitionsabkommen, wie auch die Fraktion der 18 kleinen nationalen Minderheiten, seit jeher Manövriermasse der jeweiligen Regierungen.113 Der Weg war frei für Cãlin Popescu Tãriceanu (PNL), Bãsescus Wunschkandidat als Premierminister, und er wurde schließlich am 28.12.2004 mit 265 zu 200 Stimmen durch das Parlament gewählt, 20 Stimmen mehr als die Koalition im Parlament Sitze hat.114 Was war geschehen? Das starke Präsidentenamt, das unerwartet in die Hände der Opposition gefallen war und das die alte Nomenklatur in der Verfassung
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110 [Die PUR ist eine Art “Privatpartei” des Medienmoguls Dan Voiculescu. Sie konnte nur ins Parlament gelangen, da sie auf den Listen der PSD mitkandidiert hatte. Die PSD war das Bündnis mit der PUR eingegangen, um für sich eine loyale Berichterstattung in dem großen TV-Privatsender Antena 1 und in der Zeitung Jurnalul Na?ional zu sichern]. HZ, Opposition rebelliert”, Nr. 1906 (3. Dezember 2004), S. 1–2. 111 ADZ, “Wie demokratisch ist die Sozialdemokratische Partei?”, Nr. 2832 (10. März 2004), S. 3. 112 ADZ, “Eine Regierung um die Liberalen und Demokraten zeichnet sich ab”, Nr. 3034 (21. Dezember 2004), S. 1. 113 ADZ, “Minderheiten-Fraktion unterstützt die Bildung einer Regierung PNL-PD”, Nr. 3036 (23. Dezember 2004), S. 1. 114 ADZ, “Vereidigung der neuen Regierung und Investitur durch das Parlament”, Nr. 3040 (30. Dezember 2004), S. 1.
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verankert hatte, um zur Not autoritär handeln zu können falls der Transformationsprozess nicht nach Wunsch verlaufen sollte, wurde nun zum Verhängnis der PSD, da der neue Präsident Bãsescu sich weigerte, die PSD trotz ihres Status als stärkste politische Kraft mit der Regierungsbildung zu betrauen. Sagte Bãsescu noch scherzhaft in einer Wahlkampf-Talkshow zu seinem Konkurrenten Nãstase, “was für ein Fluch muss auf dem rumänischen Volk liegen, dass es zwischen zwei ehemaligen Kommunisten zu wählen hat”115, so zeigt der Ablauf der Regierungsbildung doch eindeutig, wie gut die ehemalige Nomenklatur im neuen Rumänien angekommen ist. Was “der amerikanische Soziologe David Stark bereits 1992 als den Weg vom Plan zum Clan beschrieben hatte und was Katherine Verdery 1996 auf den griffigen Terminus “entrepratchik” brachte — eine Zusammenziehung aus Entrepreneur, Unternehmer und Apparatschik — scheint auch in Bukarest denkwürdige Realität geworden zu sein.”116 Die weitestgehende politische und auch moralische Austauschbarkeit der Parteien zeigt sich insbesondere bei der Mehrheitsbeschaffung für die neue Regierung, die sogar soweit führte, dass sich ein so genannter “Gewerkschafterblock” von der ultranationalistischen PRM abspaltete, um die DA zu unterstützen.117 Die Art und Weise der Kungelei um die Macht, fern jeder inhaltlichen Auseinandersetzung zeigt nicht nur den Mangel und die Instabilität der Parteienlandschaft in Rumänien, sie weist überdies auch beträchtliche Parallelen zum Rumänien der Zwischenkriegszeit auf, in der neben exklusivem Nationalismus auch Nepotismus, Korruption und politische Instabilität ganz oben auf der Tagesordnung standen.118 Die Tatsache, dass der scheidende Präsident Iliescu kurz vor seinem Ausscheiden aus dem Amt beinahe schon täglich noch Begnadigungen und Ordensverleihungen vornahm und nicht einmal davor zurückschreckte, die höchste rumänische Auszeichnung, den “Stern von Rumänien”, an den Antisemiten Vadim Tudor zu verleihen und zugleich den berüchtigten ehemaligen Anführer der in Iliescus Namen marodierenden Bergarbeiter, Miron Cozma, zu begnadigen, zeigt, dass Iliescu bis zur buchstäblich letzten Minute, die er im Amt war, versuchte, die Macht der PSD auch über den Machtverlust hinaus zu sichern. So hoffte er, der neuen Regierung möglichst viele Stolpersteine in den Weg legen zu können, bzw. potenzielle Verbündete in der bevorstehenden Opposition, wie Tudor, langfristig an sich zu binden.119 Genau so hatte er es auch nach seinem ersten Ausscheiden aus dem Präsidentenamt 1996 gehandhabt, was ganz entscheidend zum Scheitern der nachfolgenden bürgerlichen Regierung beigetragen hatte. Der angerichtete Schaden, wie, dass der Nobelpreisträger Elie Wiesel seinen “Stern von Rumänien”
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115 Wagner, “Die neue Regierung”, in: Banater Zeitung, Nr. 581 (12. Januar 2005), S. 1. 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid. 118 Roth, Politische Strukturen und Strömungen bei den Siebenbürger Sachsen 1919–1933. 119 ADZ, “Scheidender Präsident Iliescu hat berüchtigten Bergarbeiterführer Miron Cozma begnadigt”, Nr. 3033 (18. Dezember 2004), S. 1.
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nach der Verleihung an Tudor unter Protest zurückgeschickt hat, gehen Iliescu nicht nahe120, da es ihm — ganz in kommunistischer Tradition — nicht um den Staat und Werte, sondern nur um seine Partei und seine eigene Macht geht. Es bedarf größten Optimismus, vor diesem Hintergrund eine bessere Zukunft und eine wirkliche Konsolidierung der Demokratie in Rumänien zu erkennen. Es bleibt abzuwarten, ob die neue Regierung trotz der Hypothek ihrer eigenen Schwäche und Inkorporation der PSD-treuen PUR wirkliche Reformen wird anpacken können. Es besteht eine gewisse Wahrscheinlichkeit dafür, dass sie sich wie ihre zwischen 1996 und 2000 regierende Vorgängerin im Gestrüpp der von der PSD hinterlassenen Seilschaften verheddern und zu Fall kommen könnte. Eine echte demokratische Konsolidierung ist vor diesem Hintergrund jedenfalls sehr schwer. Es scheint doch möglich, dass Rumänien sich “zurück in die Geschichte” entwickeln könnte, wenn es nicht gelingt, die Demokratie dauerhaft mit gleichen und verbindlichen Spielregeln für alle politischen Kräfte zu konsolidieren. Diese Sorge wird auch von der EU-Kommission geteilt, die eine ungewöhnliche Sonderklausel für Rumänien zur Anwendung gebracht hat, nach der, analog zum Beitrittsverfahren der Türkei, die “Notbremse” gezogen werden kann, falls der Reformprozess nicht weiter vorankommt.121 Die Wettbewerbskommissarin der EU, Neelie Kroes, fasst die fehlenden Reformen in Rumänien so zusammen: “Rumänien bereitet mir Kopfschmerzen.”122 Sorgen sollten sich vor diesem Hintergrund auch die 18 kleinen Minderheiten machen, die bei einer derartigen politischen Praxis mit großer Skepsis in die Zukunft blicken müssen. Man sollte überdies nicht vergessen, dass trotz nicht unerheblicher Stimmverluste im Vergleich zu den vorhergehenden Wahlen von 2000 die Großrumänienpartei (Partidul România Mare, PRM) Vadim Tudors immer noch als drittstärkste politische Kraft im Parlament ist. Sie wird umso gefährlicher, seit sie geschickt das seit 2000 bestehende Fehlen einer wirklich starken bürgerlichen Partei für sich auszunutzen versucht und sich vom Radikalismus der 1990er Jahre zumindest in der Öffentlichkeit verabschiedet hat.123 In diese Richtung muss man auch die Umbenennung der Partei in “Partidul Popular România Mare” (PPRM) (Großrumänische Volkspartei) und Vadim Tudors Rückritt als Vorsitzender der PPRM und seinen Rückzug auf den extra für ihn geschaffenen Posten des “Preºedinte de Onoare” (Ehrenpräsident) werten. Die PPRM versucht, sich gezielt als bürgerliche Alternative darzustellen und wird dadurch für die etablierten Parteien erst recht gefährlich, da sie die PD und die PNL, im Verbund mit der PSD von links, in der Mitte zu erdrücken droht. Es scheint sich die absonderliche indirekte Koalition zwischen der PSD und der PPRM aus den Jahren 1996 bis 2000 fortzusetzen, mit der beide erfolgreich den bürgerlichen Regierungsblock zerschlagen hatten.
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120 ADZ, “Iliescu kriegt weitere Orden zurückgeschickt”, Nr. 3034 (21. Dezember 2004), S. 1. 121 ADZ, “Sonderklausel für Rumänien ist viel strenger als bei Bulgarien”, Nr. 3028 (11. Dezember 2004), S. 1. 122 Ibid. 123 Gespräch mit Lilla Balázs, Bukarest, 7. April 2005.
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29
Nun scheinen beide Parteien wieder zusammenzuarbeiten und auf die Vernichtung des nationalliberal-demokratischen Regierungslagers hinzuwirken, um sich selbst als Erben der PD und PNL in Stellung zu bringen. Dabei würde die PD als ehemals von der FSN/DFSN, alias PDSR, alias PSD “abtrünnige” Vereinigung langfristig von der PSD “aufgesaugt” werden und die PNL als nationalliberale Partei wohl von der PPRM, sollte diese sich wirklich dauerhaft als bürgerlich-konservative Kraft etablieren können. In einem Gespräch mit dem Berater Vadim Tudors und der PPRM im rumänischen Parlament, dem Professor für Geschichte an der Universität Ploieºti, Professor Dr. Petre Þurlea, wurde diese Taktik eindrucksvoll bestätigt, als Herr Professor Þurlea ausführte, dass “die PPRM intensiv nach europäischen christlich-konservativen Parteien als zukünftigen Partnern Ausschau halte.”124 Für das DFDR und für Rumänien insgesamt verheißt dies nichts Gutes. Zwar bewegt sich Rumänien mit großen Schritten in die EU und der Beitritt zum 1.1.2007 ist seit April 2005 eine ausgemachte Sache125, aber dennoch bleiben zahlreiche Punkte, die den objektiven Betrachter und Analysten nachdenklich stimmen. Immer noch befinden sich die Minderheiten im rechtlich de facto luftleeren Raum, da ein Minderheitenschutzgesetz zwar durch die Verfassungsreform vom Oktober 2003 verpflichtend gefordert wird, aber immer noch nicht verabschiedet ist, obwohl es seit 1993 diskutiert wird. Zwar ist die Situation des Minderheitenschutzes in Rumänien “insgesamt in der Theorie gut”126, aber es sind trotzdem mitunter minderheitenfeindliche und antisemitische Tendenzen in der Presse und im öffentlichen Leben zu beobachten.127 Auch die Einschätzung des Abgeordneten des DFDR in der Abgeordnetenkammer, Professor Ovidiu Ganþ, dass “niemand den Bestand der jetzigen Minderheitenregelungen über den Tag hinaus garantieren könne”128 stimmt nicht gerade zuversichtlich. Dazu kommt noch die von der Bundesregierung in Aussicht gestellte “Überprüfung der finanziellen Hilfen durch Deutschland nach dem EU-Beitritt Rumäniens”129, was einer drastischen Kürzung entsprechen und ebenfalls beträchtliche existenzielle Probleme für das DFDR aufwerfen dürfte und bereits jetzt Umplanungen notwendig macht.130 Positiv stimmen auf der anderen Seite wiederum die Beteiligung der Minderheitenvertreter an der Regierung und die Ernennung von aufgeklärten, weltoffenen und besonnenen Politikern wie dem ehemaligen Außenminister (1996–1999) Professor Dr. Andrei Pleºu zum Berater von Präsident Bãsescu, die Einbeziehung des Oberbürgermeisters von Hermannstadt in die bilateralen Beziehungen zu Deutschland, die stetig verbesserten Beziehungen zu Ungarn und die Beteiligung des UDMR an der Regierung. Nichtsdestotrotz gibt es noch zahlreiche Herausforderung für die Minderheitenverbände und das DFDR, die im abschließenden Teil dieser Arbeit analysiert werden sollen.
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124 Gespräch mit Professor Dr. Petre Þurlea, Bukarest, 29. März 2005. 125 [Bei schwerwiegenden Verstößen könnte er um ein Jahr bis zum 1.1.2008 verschoben werden]. 126 Gespräch mit Andrei Oi?teanu, Bukarest, 4. März 2005. 127 Ibid. 128 Gespräch mit Professor Ovidiu Ganã, Bukarest, 28. März 2005. 129 Gespräch mit Kulturreferent Dr. Florian Rudolph, Bukarest, 5. April 2005. 130 Planungskonferenz des Regionalforums Siebenbürgen in Klausenburg am 12. März 2005.
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Das Demokratische Forum der Deutschen (DFDR) als Vertretung der deutschen Minderheit im postkommunistischen Rumänien 1989–2004 3. Die Entwicklung des DFDR seit 1989
3.1. Einführung
Aus offensichtlichen Gründen verringerte der Massenexodus der Deutschen während der 1980er und der frühen 1990er Jahre die deutsche kulturelle Präsenz in ganz Osteuropa und insbesondere in Rumänien. Dennoch hat sogar die kleine, heute noch in Rumänien verbliebene deutsche Gemeinschaft auch nach 1989 noch eine spürbare Wirkung auf das kulturelle und politische Leben Rumäniens und der gesamten Region. Im akademischen Bereich wurde sogar ethnischen Minderheiten und Gemeinschaften, die noch viel kleiner als die noch in Rumänien lebenden 60.000–80.000 Deutschen sind131, gezielt Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet, da jede ethnische Gemeinschaft, so klein sie auch sein mag, immer eine gewisse kulturelle Ausstrahlung besitzt, die ihre kleineren oder auch größeren Effekte nach außen zeitigen kann.132 Da die deutsche Minderheit in Rumänien die drittgrößte Minderheitengruppe in einem Land von knapp 22 Millionen Einwohnern und 19 anerkannten ethnischen Minderheiten bildet, kann sie selbst vor dem Hintergrund ihrer drastisch reduzierten Zahl nicht als eine “Phantomminderheit” betrachtet werden. Würde man sie nicht beachten, so würde man einen wichtigen Bestandteil rumänischer Minderheitenpolitik vernachlässigen. Diese Tatbestände gilt es zu berücksichtigen, zumal diese Studie die erste wissenschaftliche Langzeitstudie der politischen Aktivitäten des DFDR nach 1989 ist.133 Die vorhandenen akademischen Arbeiten über die Deutschen in Rumänien beziehen sich vor allem auf die Zeit vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg oder noch davor, oder auf die kommunistische Periode. Zwar erwähnen einige Autoren den Exodus der Deutschen aus der Region vor und nach 1989, sie unterlassen es aber
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131 [Daten von: Abgeordneter Wolfgang Wittstock, Brief an das Deutsche Bundesministerium des Inneren (BMI), 20. Juli 1999, in: DFDR-Archivakten B6, Juli 1999]. 132 [So zum Beispiel bei Rossitza Guentcheva, State, Nation and language: the Bulgarian community in the region Banat from the 1860s until the 1990s, Doktorarbeit. Nr. 24624 (Universität Cambridge) 29. Mai 2001. Die bulgarische Minderheit im Banat zählte bei der Volkszählung aus dem Jahre 2002 nur 8.092 Angehörige. Daten von: Rumänische Regierung, Populaþia dupã etnie — la recensãmântul din anul 2002, März 2003, S. 5–6, in: DFDR-Archivakten A5, März 2003]. 133 [Einer der wichtigsten Gründe, warum diese Art von Studie selten ist — besonders in Deutschland — ist die Tatsache, dass es äußerst schwierig ist, eine derartige Arbeit zu verteidigen. Dr. Gerhard Seewann fasst es mit folgenden Worten zusammen: “Das Risiko, als rechtslastig diskreditiert zu werden, war sehr hoch und das ist der Grund, warum solche Themen von Nachkriegshistorikern in Deutschland absolut gefürchtet wurden”. Daher ist es umso ermutigender, festzustellen, dass nach einer langen Zeit der akademischen Abstinenz deutsche Minderheiten in Osteuropa wieder zum Gegenstand wissenschaftlicher Studien von über jeden Zweifel erhabenen Autoren werden (z.B. Roth, Gündisch und andere). Aus: Seewann, “Kommunismus und Minderheiten”, in: HZ, Nr. 1835 (11. Juli 2003), S. 5].
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zum größten Teil, auch die Gegenwartsgeschichte nach 1989 abzudecken. Wenn diese jüngste Vergangenheit bearbeitet wird, dann geschieht dies meist nur in einem kurzen Beitrag in einer Zeitschrift134, oder auf ein paar zusammenfassenden Seiten am Ende einer langen Beschreibung der bis zu 850-jährigen Geschichte der Deutschen auf dem Gebiet des heutigen Rumänien.135 Deshalb fehlt im wissenschaftlichen Diskurs zur Analyse der Vor- und Zwischenkriegsära der Siebenbürger Sachsen, wie sie von Göllner, Roth und Teutsch vorgelegt wurde, immer noch das akademische Äquivalent für die postkommunistische Geschichte der Deutschen in Rumänien.136 Diesen Umstand vor Augen, wird es relevant, sich auf die Wirkungen der kulturellen und politischen Aktivitäten der Deutschen Rumäniens zwischen 1989 und 2004 zu konzentrieren. Die Rolle des DFDR während der postkommunistischen Systemtransformation wird im Folgenden unter Berücksichtigung der verschiedenen rumänischen Regierungen und auf das zweite Kapitel aufbauend, beleuchtet werden. Wie haben diese zum Teil frappierend großen politischen Diskontinuitäten in der jüngeren politischen Geschichte Rumäniens die Ziele des DFDR beeinflusst? Musste das DFDR seine Ziele den sich ständig wandelnden Umständen stets anpassen, oder konnte es seine Ziele “in innerer Einheit und in Loyalität zum rumänischen Staat” verwirklichen, ohne sich allzu sehr verändern zu müssen? Während bei der Beantwortung dieser Fragen der Fokus der Analyse auf der staatlich-rumänischen Seite vor allem auf den Prozessen der Demokratisierung liegt, werden auf der Seite des DFDR vor allem die Situation innerhalb des DFDR, seine Hierarchie und seine internen Entscheidungsfindungsprozesse unter die Lupe genommen werden. 3.2. Der Rückgang der deutschen Bevölkerung in Rumänien
Es ist geschätzt worden, dass im Jahr 1948 343.913 Deutsche in Rumänien lebten. Bis zur Volkszählung im Jahr 1956 war die Zahl auf 384.708 gewachsen. Diese Zahl änderte sich nicht entscheidend, bis die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ab dem Jahr 1978 begann, jene “auszukaufen”, die sie als deutsche Staatsangehörige anerkannte.137 Ceauºescu bemerkte dazu zynisch, dass “die Deutschen und die Juden sein bestes Kapital seien”138, es waren nämlich nicht nur Deutsche, die der rumänische Staat bereitwillig verkaufte, sondern auch Juden. Für die nächsten Jahre wurde eine Quote von bis zu fünfzehntausend Deutschen pro Jahr
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134 Zum Beispiel: Gabanyi, “Bleiben, Gehen, Wiederkehren?”. 135 Zum Beispiel: Gündisch, Wahrung der Eigenständigkeit trotz wechselnder Staats-Zugehörigkeit. Eine 850-jährige Geschichte im Überblick; Hochstrasser, Die siebenbürgisch-sächsische Gesellschaft in ihrem strukturellen Wandel. 136 Göllner, (Hg.), Die Siebenbürger Sachsen in den Jahren 1848–1918; Roth, Politische Strukturen und Strömungen bei den Siebenbürger Sachsen 1919–1933; Teutsch, Die Siebenbürger Sachsen in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. 137 Daten aus: Illyes, Nationale Minderheiten in Rumänien- Siebenbürgen im Wandel, S. 39–60 und Totok, “Rumänisierung”, S. 128 ff. 138 Hoffstadt und Zippel, Reiseland Rumänien, S. 76.
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festgelegt. Das Ergebnis dieser Politik war bis 1989, dass über 160.000 Deutsche Rumänien verließen. Die absolute Abnahme der deutschen Bevölkerungszahl durch Auswanderung seit der Volkszählung von 1956 überstieg diese Zahl noch, wobei eine genaue Zahl hierfür nicht bekannt ist. Die publizierten Daten für den Zeitraum zwischen 1956 und 1987 sprechen von ungefähr 300.000 ausgewanderten Juden und Deutschen und deuten so die Größenordnung an.139 Nach dem Fall des Kommunismus setzte sich diese Tendenz weiter fort. In der letzten kommunistischen Volkszählung von 1977 wurden 359.109 Deutsche in Rumänien gezählt.140 Bis 1989 hatte die Zahl auf etwa 200.000 abgenommen, von denen 111.150 Ende 1990 offiziell als “Aussiedler” registriert wurden.141 Schon im Jahr 1989/90 hatten 132.400 Deutsche während der ersten acht Monate nach dem Umsturz im Dezember 1989 Rumänien in Richtung Deutschland und Österreich für immer verlassen.142 Bis 1992 war die deutsche Bevölkerung in Rumänien um zwei Drittel gesunken und im Jahr 2002 betrug sie gerade noch rund 0.3–0.4 Prozent der knapp 22 Millionen Einwohner des Landes, was ungefähr 60.000–80.000 Menschen entspricht.143 Was ein ständiger, aber langsamer Rückgang der deutschen Bevölkerung vor Dezember 1989 war, entwickelte sich schlagartig zu einem reißenden Auswanderungsstrom nach dem Sturz Ceauºescus. Fünf Gründe lassen sich für diesen Massenexodus der Deutschen identifizieren. Erstes fanden es viele Deutsche aufgrund ihrer bitteren Erfahrungen der Vergangenheit sehr schwierig, in Rumänien zu bleiben, da sie nicht glaubten, dass die Ereignisse von 1989 eine bessere Zukunft bringen würden. Zweitens bewirkten die politischen Änderungen von 1989 auch einen Massenexodus der Deutschen aus beinahe allen früheren kommunistischen Staaten Osteuropas. Deutschland, das auf dieses Ausmaß der Auswanderung nicht vorbereitet war, versuchte, das Problem durch Gesetze “zu lösen”, um die Einwanderung aus dem Osten “zu regulieren”.144 Aus Furcht, dass das Tor nach Deutschland durch eben diese Gesetze vielleicht für immer verschlossen werden könnte145, bemühten sich viele Deutsche aus Osteuropa sogar noch entschiedener, auszuwandern. Drittens wurde keine der Hoffnungen und Erwartungen der Deutschen Rumäniens in den Monaten unmittelbar nach der Revolution erfüllt. Die Inflation war immens und die Verbraucherpreise stiegen unerbittlich. Obwohl die Knappheit an Waren in den Läden aus propagandistischen Gründen behoben worden war, verhinderte nun die Inflation eine höhere Kaufkraft.
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139 Illyes, Nationale Minderheiten in Rumänien- Siebenbürgen im Wandel, S. 39–60. 140 Seewann, “Die Ethnostruktur der Länder Südosteuropas aufgrund der letzten Volkszählungen”, S. 78–
141 Schreiber, “Demographische Entwicklungen bei den Rumäniendeutschen”, S. 204. 142 Gabanyi, “Bleiben, gehen, wiederkehren?”, S. 493. 143 Paduraru, German Novels, 11. Februar 2004. 144 [Insgesamt wanderten 1.291.112 Deutsche aus der UdSSR, Polen, der Tschechischen Republik, der Slowakei, Ungarn, Rumänien und dem zerfallenden Jugoslawien zwischen 1990 und 1994 nach Deutschland ein]. Daten von: Bundesverwaltungsamt, Statistik. 145 Vgl. Reichrath, “Wem gilt die Empfehlung 1201?”.
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Viertens wurden diese ökonomischen Probleme durch einen wichtigen psychologischen Faktor noch verschlimmert: Die Unsicherheit, eine Minderheit in einem Staat wie Rumänien zu sein. Die blutigsten Ereignisse der “Revolution” von 1989 fanden zwischen Pro-Ceauºescu Kräften und der Armee in Temeschwar, Hermannstadt und Kronstadt statt, Städten mit einem relativ hohen Anteil an deutschen Einwohnern.146 Dieses Gefühl der Unsicherheit wurde weiter intensiviert durch die rumänisch-ungarischen Zusammenstöße in Târgu Mureº im März 1990 und dem Wandalismus der von Präsident Iliescu nach Bukarest gerufenen Bergarbeiter aus dem Schiltal im Januar und Juni 1990 und im September 1991. Schließlich fügte die rasch steigende Zahl von Morden, Plünderungen und Brandstiftungen, begleitet von Einbrüchen, die vor allem gegen die angeblich reicheren Deutschen aus Siebenbürgen und dem Banat gerichtet waren, einen weiteren “Push-Faktor” hinzu, der die deutsche Minderheit in ihrer Mehrheit dazu bewegte, Rumänien endgültig den Rücken zu kehren.147 3.3. Die Gründung des DFDR im Jahr 1989
Im Kontext dieses Rückgangs der deutschen Bevölkerung wurde am 28. Dezember 1989 das DFDR in Hermannstadt gegründet. Seine Gründer wollten, dass das DFDR eine Organisation sein sollte, die die Deutschen in Rumänien vertritt, die aber auch allen ethnischen Deutschen und auch Nicht-Deutschen, die die Ziele des DFDR teilten, zugänglich sein sollte. Das DFDR sollte sich als eine Art a-politische kulturelle Organisation und nicht als eine politische Partei formieren.148 Der wichtigste Grund, warum das DFDR gerade im Dezember des Jahres 1989 gegründet wurde, war die Absicht der Deutschen, die Revolution als eine Art Gelegenheit zu nutzen, den unter dem Ceauºescu-Kommunismus schon beinahe zur Gewohnheit gewordenen rumänischen Nationalismus zu überwinden. Als er im Jahr 1965 die Macht übernahm, hatte Ceauºescu die schon von Gheorghiu-Dej übernommene nationalistische Politik noch intensiviert und, als sich die allgemeinen Bedingungen in Rumänien verschlechterten, wurde der Nationalismus in der Folgezeit in immer stärkerem Maß herangezogen, um das Regime zu legitimieren und zu stabilisieren. Als die allgemeinen Lebensbedingungen nach 1989 nicht besser wurden, fürchteten die Minderheiten, dass sich dieser Trend fortsetzen und sogar vielleicht noch verstärkt werden könnte.149 Diese nationalistischen Tendenzen waren einer der ausschlaggebenden Faktoren, die zur Entwicklung von nationalen Minderheitsorganisationen in
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146 [Sogar Professor Dr. Hans Klein, Dekan der Theologischen Fakultät an der Lucian Blaga Universität Hermannstadt, wurde verwundet]. 147 Vgl. Gabanyi, “Bleiben, gehen, wiederkehren?”. 148 [Das ist aufgrund von §§ 1, 5 und 11 der Satzung des DFDR vom 1. Februar 1991 möglich. In: DFDRArchivakten A3, Februar 1991]. 149 z.B. Gilberg, Nationalism and Communism in Romania: The Rise and Fall of Ceauºescu”s Personal Dictatorship; Shafir, Romania: Politics, Economics and Society; Political Stagnation and Simulated Change.
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Rumänien führte. Wie schon in Kapitel 2 dieser Arbeit gezeigt wurde, ist das Phänomen des Nationalismus in Rumänien historisch so zu erklären, dass die Unterjochung der Bauernschaft vor der Einigung der Fürstentümer das Aufkommen einer Art von “Volks-” Nationalismus verhinderte, die Serbien und Bulgarien150 erfuhren. Der Mangel eines bedeutsamen Bürgertums schloss einen “bourgeoisen” Nationalismus analog zum tschechischen Fall aus und der Mangel an Interesse des Adels an der Regierung Rumäniens und sein schnelles Verschwinden nach der Vereinigung des Landes war für die Entwicklung einer Art ungarischen “aristokratischen” Nationalismus abträglich.151 Diese Faktoren sorgten dafür, dass allein in Rumänien der Nationalismus an die Bürokratie gebunden war und auf diese Art vom Staat monopolisiert werden konnte, um dem Zweck zu dienen, das Land zu beherrschen.152 Jedoch ist es wichtig, in diesem Zusammenhang zu bemerken, dass Rumänien das einzige Land in Südosteuropa war, das seine deutschen Staatsbürger nach 1945 nicht vertrieb oder auswies. 3.4. Die Anfangsjahre des DFDR zwischen 1989 und 1996
In den Anfangsjahren wurden viele der Entscheidungen des DFDR hierarchisch von oben nach unten getroffen, da seine Mitglieder entweder damit beschäftigt waren, das Land zu verlassen, oder in ihren Gedanken dabei waren, sich dem anzupassen, was die demokratische Realität des Postkommunismus in Rumänien war. Unter diesen Umständen setzte die Führung des DFDR unter ihrem Gründungsvorsitzenden Dr. Thomas Nägler, einem Historiker aus Hermannstadt, und ihrem Abgeordneten, Ingmar Brandsch aus Mediasch, den Schwerpunkt auf das Schaffen einer organisatorischen Einheit, die für alle Deutschen Rumäniens innerhalb der Beschränkungen des rumänischen Gesetzes sprechen konnte.153 Einer der ersten Schritte war hierbei, die Kommunikation und Kooperation zwischen den verschiedenen deutschen Gruppen Rumäniens zu verbessern und einen wirksamen, föderal organisierten Apparat zu schaffen, der in der Lage war, die heterogene Struktur der Deutschen in Rumänien widerzuspiegeln. Diese Politik war dazu bestimmt, die Erwartungen und den Sicherheitsbedarf der noch verbliebenen Deutschen zu erfüllen und ihnen zu einer unsicheren Zeit
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150 Roucek, Balkan Politics, S. 43. 151 Vgl. Jelavich, History of the Balkans; Berend und Ránki, Economic Development; Molnar, A Concise History of Hungary. 152 Vgl. z.B. Fisher-Galati, “Autocracy, Orthodoxy and Nationalism” in the Twentieth Century: The Romanian Case”. 153 Tontsch, “Der Minderheitenschutz in Rumänien”, S. 160. [Gemäß der rumänischen Gesetzgebung sind die Organisationen der nationalen Minderheiten keine Parteien, sondern Organisationen im Sinne von Vereinen. Das hat als Konsequenz stärkere Kontrollen durch den Staat zur Folge. Die gleiche Taktik wurde durch Reichskanzler Bismarck in Deutschland angewandt, als er alle politischen Organisationen in den Rang von eingetragenen Vereinen (e.V.) einordnen ließ. Wenn es jedoch zu Kommunalwahlen kommt, werden die Minderheitenorganisationen dennoch de facto wie Parteien behandelt. in: Artikel 4, Kapitel 2 des Gesetzes Nr. 68 vom 15. Juli 1992 bezüglich der Wahlen zur Abgeordnetenkammer (Camera Deputaþilor), in: Ibid., S. 195– 6].
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eine “kulturelle und politische Heimat” zu bieten; sie wurde aber auch darauf ausgerichtet, die Erwartung des rumänischen Staates zu erfüllen, der mit einem einzigen Partner in allen Angelegenheiten der deutschen Minderheit verhandeln wollte. Die doch relativ gespannte Situation für die Minderheiten direkt nach der Revolution von 1989 machte, gemeinsam mit den Zusammenstössen zwischen ethnischen Ungarn und Rumänen in Târgu Mureº und dem Exodus von mehr als 50 Prozent der Deutschen Rumäniens, die erste Präsidentschaft Ion Iliescus (1989–1992) zu einer sehr problematischen Periode für das DFDR. Seine Organisationsstruktur musste noch ausgebaut und vertieft werden und nur Teile der deutschen Gemeinschaft, wie zum Beispiel die Siebenbürger Sachsen, erkannten das Forum als ihre rechtmäßige Interessenvertretung an. Die Schwaben aus dem Banat waren wenig geneigt dazu, diese “sächsische Organisation” voll und ganz anzuerkennen; die Sathmarer Schwaben waren gerade noch dabei, sich als Deutsche zu “re-definieren” und die Buchenlanddeutschen und die Deutschen aus dem Regat waren politisch zutiefst inaktiv. Deshalb waren während der ersten drei Jahre die Aktivitäten des DFDR größtenteils auf Siebenbürgen beschränkt und hier hauptsächlich auf Hermannstadt. Diese Tatsache war auch für den Mangel einer richtigen Machtbasis des DFDR und seine dementsprechend schwache Stellung gegenüber der rumänischen Regierung verantwortlich. Während andere Minderheitengruppen wie die Ungarn154, die Roma155 und die Ukrainer Büros in Bukarest eröffneten, taten die Deutschen dies nicht.156 Dies geschah aus verschiedenen Gründen, wie zum Beispiel den historischen Siedlungsgebieten der Deutschen, aber auch aufgrund der sächsischen Dominanz innerhalb des DFDR. Daher legte das DFDR seine Organisationszentrale nach Hermannstadt. Diese Entscheidung machte jedoch die Kommunikation mit führenden Kreisen in Bukarest und mit den anderen Minderheitenorganisationen noch schwieriger. In einem derart zentralistischen Staat wie Rumänien, der nur über ein recht unzulängliches Verkehrs- und Infrastruktursystem verfügt, verschlechterte dies die Gesamtsituation zusätzlich.157 Unter diesen Bedingungen überrascht es nicht, dass das DFDR während der Zeit zwischen 1989–92 nicht viel ausrichten konnte, um seine Interessen
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154 [Der Ungarnverband UDMR wurde am 25. Dezember 1989 gegründet. Vgl.: Kendi, Minderheitenschutz in Rumänien]. 155 Vgl.: Barany, “Minorities in Romania”, S. 28–30; Erich, “Roma in den ehemaligen Staaten Ost — und Südosteuropas”, S. 35 ff. 156 [Erst seit dem Jahr 2004 gibt es aufgrund der bisher gemachten Erfahrungen im zentralistisch geführten Rumänien konkrete Pläne (auch im Haushaltsplan des DFDR), für das DFDR in Bukarest ein Haus zu kaufen und ein Verbindungsbüro zu eröffnen]. 157 [Nach Auskunft durch Chefredakteur Emmerich Reichrath muss die Allgemeine Deutsche Zeitung (ADZ) ihren Sitz in Bukarest nehmen, da sie nur so ihre Tageszeitung im ganzen Land und ins Ausland vertreiben kann. Alle großen Presseagenturen sind überdies in Bukarest ansässig. Die dadurch geschaffene Unflexibilität wird noch dadurch verstärkt, dass man durch das alte, noch aus der Ceauºescu-Zeit stammende Einwohner-Meldegesetz, das es auch heute noch indirekt sehr schwer macht, innerhalb Rumäniens von einem Ort zum anderen umzuziehen, soweit man kein Grund- oder Wohneigentum vorweisen kann, immer in seinem Geburtsort meldepflichtig ist. So gibt es wohl mehrere hunderttausende von Fällen, in denen (vor allem)
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erfolgreich zu verfolgen. Ein nachhaltiges Auftreten als Interessengruppe der Deutschen war damit nahezu unmöglich. Diese an sich schon wenig positive Situation wurde noch zusätzlich durch den Mangel eines direkten “Drahtes” nach Deutschland und Österreich verschlechtert. Außerdem trugen die klar minderheitenfeindlichen Tendenzen in der rumänischen Politik, die während der ersten drei Jahren der postkommunistischen Ära in Rumänien allgegenwärtig waren, zur zunehmenden Entfremdung zwischen dem DFDR und der rumänischen Regierung bei. Die rumänische Politik wurde während dieser Zeit sehr stark durch die rumänischen Erfahrungen mit der ungarischen Minderheit158 und auch durch die Vorgänge im Nachbarland Jugoslawien beeinflusst. Daher war man in Bukarest bezüglich jeglichen Anzeichens von Autonomie, ganz zu schweigen von wachsender Unabhängigkeit einer Gruppe oder einer Region, äußerst sensibel. Das Hauptziel Bukarests war es deshalb, solche Tendenzen so rasch und vollständig wie möglich einzudämmen. Vor diesem Hintergrund war es vor allem “Loyalität” gegenüber Rumänien, was als Haltung einer ethnischen Minderheit von rumänischer Seite her am besten geschätzt wurde. Im Gegensatz zu den Ungarn, die ihre natürlichen Interessen als eine sehr große ethnische Minderheit zu verwirklichen suchten und zum Beispiel eine Änderung der rumänischen Verfassung herbeiführen wollten, um die Definition Rumäniens als “homogenen Nationalstaat” zu ändern, oder einen Volksentscheid über eine territoriale Autonomie in den Szekler-Gebieten der Kreise Covasna und Harghita159 abhalten wollten, stellte das mit internen Problemen beschäftigte DFDR keine “Bedrohung” dar. Ihre durchaus verschiedenen Ziele entfremdeten die Deutschen vielmehr von den Ungarn, die ihrerseits die deutsche Haltung gegenüber Bukarest als “Kollaboration” und als “Preisgabe gemeinsamer Interessen” betrachteten. Diese Spannungen mit den Ungarn, zusammen mit der rumänischen Politik gegenüber den Ungarn, die ihre Wurzeln in der antiungarischen Politik Ceauºescus vor 1989 hatte, und die sich nach der “Revolution” von 1989 nicht sehr änderte, erschwerte es dem DFDR noch zusätzlich, als demokratische Organisation einer ethnischen Minderheit während dieser Jahre Fuß fassen zu
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(continuation) Bukarester in alle Landesteile fahren müssen, nur um ihre Steuererklärungen, ihre Gewerbeanmeldungen oder auch alle anderen persönlichen Amtsgänge erledigen zu können, da sie sich, wenn sie nur zur Miete wohnen, nicht an ihren eigentlichen Wohnort ummelden können. Durch die äußerst geringen Einkommen und die horrenden Immobilienpreise ist es allerdings für “Otto Normalverbraucher” de facto unmöglich, auf legale Weise Wohneigentum zu erwerben, da die Preise in Ballungszentren annähernd den deutschen Preisen entsprechen, das durchschnittliche Monats-Bruttoeinkommen aber nur bei circa 300–400 Euro liegt. Überdies bekommt man ohne ausreichende Sicherheiten (in der Regel Immobilien) auch keine Bankkredite, um Eigentum erwerben zu können. In kommunistischen Zeiten wollte man durch diese heute noch gültige Regelung Vorsorge dafür treffen, dass die Niederlassung der Bevölkerung staatlich gelenkt werden kann, um unter anderem gezielt die Wohngebiete der nationalen Minderheiten “rumänisieren” zu können. Heute sorgt diese Regelung dafür, dass einer kleinen und wohlhabenden, und zum großen Teil aus der alten kommunistischen Nomenklatur hervorgegangenen, sozialen Schicht ein maßgeblicher Flexibilitätsvorsprung auf wirtschaftlichem Gebiet erhalten bleibt. Dieser Unterschied kann in Rumänien äußerst entscheidend wirken, da man für entsprechend gleich lange Fahrtstrecken mit der mindestens doppelten Fahrtzeit rechnen muss, die man in Deutschland dafür einplanen müsste]. 158 Vgl. Þurlea, Din culisele Parlamentului României und Idem, U.D.M.R. ºi Societatea Româneascã. 159 Archiv der Gegenwart, 8. Dezember 1991, 36286.
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können. Ceauºescu war zwar von der Macht entfernt worden und hingerichtet worden, sein System hatte allerdings in wesentlichen Teilen überlebt.160 In den Wahlen vom September 1992 wurde dies noch verstärkt, da die frühere FSN, die sich jetzt “Demokratische Front zur Nationalen Rettung” (FDSN) nannte, die absolute Mehrheit im Parlament verfehlte und Premierminister Nicolae Vãcãroiu von der FDSN eine Art Kooperation mit anderen Parlamentsfraktionen und -Gruppen suchen musste, die er am leichtesten mit nationalistischen und neokommunistischen Gruppen fand.161 Diese teilweise nationalistische Regierung war verständlicherweise nicht sehr vorteilhaft für das DFDR. Darüber hinaus stand das DFDR auch vor einem internen Wechsel, da Professor Dr. Paul Philippi162, Professor für protestantische Theologie an der Lucian Blaga Universität Hermannstadt zum neuen Landesvorsitzenden des DFDR gewählt wurde, da sein Vorgänger Dr. Thomas Nägler aufgrund von ernsten Gesundheitsproblemen nicht mehr als Vorsitzender zur Verfügung stand. Professor Philippis Hauptziele für sein neues Amt waren zum einen, die Einigkeit unter den Deutschen Rumäniens zu verbessern, zum anderen, die Beziehung des DFDR zum rumänischen Staat auf eine bessere Grundlage zu stellen, das Verhältnis zu den Ungarn und anderen Minderheiten zu entspannen und die Anerkennung des DFDR als Verhandlungspartner in Deutschland und Österreich zu erreichen. Als Erfolge während seiner Amtszeit konnte das DFDR verbuchen, dass die interne Organisationsstruktur des DFDR gefestigt wurde und die Spannungen zwischen den Schwaben und den Sachsen verringert werden konnten. Außerdem wurde die Gesamtsituation des DFDR auch durch die relativ herzliche Beziehung zwischen Deutschland und Rumänien verbessert. Der deutschrumänische Vertrag vom 21. April 1992 enthielt relativ großzügige Bedingungen für Deutschland, um die Situation der deutschen Minderheit in Rumänien aktiv verbessern zu können. Obwohl das DFDR im Vertrag nicht expressis verbis erwähnt wird, beziehen sich doch Artikel 15 und 16 indirekt auf das DFDR, da sie das Recht der deutschen Minderheit garantieren, sich ohne ungebührliche Staatsinterventionen zu organisieren. Artikel 16 gibt Deutschland sogar das Recht, die deutsche Minderheit mit allen für notwendig erachteten materiellen und monetären Mitteln zu unterstützen, um ihre Zukunft in Rumänien zu sichern. Ein weiterer wichtiger Faktor, der die Position des DFDR verbesserte, war die Tatsache, dass es sein Mandat im rumänischen Parlament aus eigener Kraft durch den Erhalt der notwendigen Anzahl an Stimmen in den Wahlen von 1992
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160 [Am 6. Dezember 1992 brachte Iliescus FSN sogar einen Antrag/Erklärung in das rumänische Parlament ein, die den Ungarnverband UDMR als “extrem gefährliche Organisation” bezeichnete]. Aus: Archiv der Gegenwart, 6. Dezember 1992, 37399. 161 [Um einen negativen Beigeschmack in der Öffentlichkeit zu vermeiden, besonders im Ausland, änderte die FDSN ihren Namen im Juli 1993 in PDSR (Sozialdemokratische Partei Rumäniens)]. 162 [Von 1969 bis 1983 Professor für Protestantische Theologie an der Universität Heidelberg, 1976 Gastprofessur an der Universität Cambridge, 1983–1996 Professor für Praktische Theologie an der Lucian Blaga Universität Hermannstadt].
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sichern konnte und sich nicht auf die Garantie des rumänischen Staates, dass jede Minderheitengruppe ein Mandat unabhängig von den von ihr erreichten Stimmen zugesichert bekommt (so genanntes “geschenktes Mandat”), verlassen musste.163 Interessanterweise wurden diese Erfolge insbesondere aufgrund der konsequenten Unterstützung der nationalen Einheit Rumäniens durch das DFDR erreicht. Der Wahlspruch des DFDR, dass die nationale Einheit und die Förderung von Minderheitenrechten zwei Seiten derselben Medaille seien, erwies sich als erfolgreich. Im Falle des Wahlkreises von Hermannstadt profitierte das DFDR auch von der unverwechselbaren Identität und Selbstwahrnehmung der Siebenbürger Rumänen, die weitaus mehr Sympathien für einen Deutschen “aus Ihren Reihen” zu empfinden scheinen, als für einen Rumänen aus dem Regat, der noch dazu als Kandidat der regierenden FDSN antrat. In Hermannstadt wurde das Ziel des DFDR, eine Minderheit und die Mehrheit zu repräsentieren, von den Rumänen als Gelegenheit betrachtet, dass die Stadt vom angeblich besonderen Status, den das DFDR im Parlament genießt, mitprofitieren könne.164 Diese Unterstützung durch die überwiegend rumänischen Wähler in Hermannstadt war äußerst bedeutend für die wachsende politische Rolle des DFDR. Die Gründer des DFDR konnten im Jahr 1989 das volle Ausmaß des schleppenden demokratischen Fortschritts bis ins Jahr 1996 in einer Zeit, von der sie glaubten, dass sie den raschen Wechsel zu echter Demokratie bringen würde und eine Zukunft ohne Nationalismus, nicht vorhersehen. Als kleine Minderheitsorganisation mit nur einem Abgeordneten im rumänischen Parlament konnte das DFDR seine Interessen folglich nur durch Bündnisse mit größeren politischen Parteien schützen und verfolgen. Daher gab sein Ziel, als Stimme der deutschen Bevölkerung in Rumänien wirken zu können und überdies deren vitalen Interessen wahrzunehmen, dem DFDR eine recht beträchtliche politische Dimension und ließ es in der Tat mehr und mehr zu einer “normalen” politischen Partei werden. In diesem Sinne war die Hauptherausforderung des DFDR seit seiner Gründung die eigentliche Unverträglichkeit zwischen seiner expliziten Absicht, eine a-politische kulturelle Organisation zu sein, wie in Abschnitt 3.3. erläutert wurde, und sein implizites Ziel, ein aktiver Faktor im politischen Leben zu sein, die es in der Tat mehr und mehr wie eine politische Partei handeln ließ. Meine Behauptung ist daher, dass es der permanente Diskurs des DFDR, als “eine Organisation in innerer Einheit und Loyalität gegenüber dem rumänischen Staat” wirken zu wollen, ihm erlaubte, eben genau beide Ziele trotz ihrer scheinbaren Unverträglichkeit miteinander kombiniert zu verfolgen. Ich würde behaupten, dass das DFDR dadurch bewusst oder unbewusst an die historische sächsische Tradition, einen Modus Vivendi mit den Regierenden in Bukarest zu suchen, anknüpfte. Man könnte sagen, dass das DFDR — wohl
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163 Archiv-Akte A8, September 1992. 164 Archiv-Akte A8, Oktober 1992.
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unbewusst — mit dieser Politik eine Art Synthese zwischen den Konzepten von Rudolf Brandsch und andererseits den Ideen von Hans Otto Roth verwirklichte165, da die Kurzfristigkeiten und Unwägbarkeiten der rumänischen Politik für das DFDR eben diese “Überlebensstrategie” notwendig machten. 3.5. Das Wachstum des DFDR zwischen 1996 und 2000
Der Wechsel von Präsidentschaft und Regierung im Jahre 1996 von der postkommunistischen FDSN/PDSR hin zum konservativen Oppositionsbündnis CDR, das vom UDMR unterstützt wurde, brachte auch für das DFDR wesentliche Veränderungen. Vor dem Hintergrund seiner besseren organisatorischen Aufstellung scheint es jedoch mehr als überraschend, dass die Parlamentswahlen des Jahres 1996 für das DFDR selbst trotzdem nicht sehr positiv waren. Alles in allem verlor das DFDR mehr als 10.000 Stimmen im Vergleich zu den Wahlen des Jahres 1992. Der Wahlkreis von Hermannstadt konnte nicht wieder gewonnen werden. Stattdessen gewann der Banater Schwabe Horst Werner Brück mehr Stimmen in Temeschwar als Wolfgang Wittstock in Hermannstadt erzielte. Brück gewann zwar den Wahlkreis von Temeschwar nicht direkt, aber er nutzte die fünf Prozent-Klausel, die vom rumänischen Gesetzgeber für die Minderheiten geschaffen wurde und die lediglich erforderlich macht, mindestens fünf Prozent der sonst für ein Mandat erforderlichen Stimmen in einem Wahlkreis zu erzielen.166 Die DFDR-Zentrale unter dem Landesvorsitzenden Professor Philippi verwandelte diese herbe sächsische Niederlage nach außen in eine Geste, die zeigen sollte, dass die Sachsen bereit waren, ihren Einfluss im DFDR mit den anderen deutschen Gruppen, und insbesondere mit den Schwaben, zu teilen. Die meisten Mitglieder hinterfragten diese Erklärung nicht weiter und begnügten sich damit.167 Andererseits waren die Wahlen indirekt auch ein beträchtlicher Erfolg für das DFDR. Die minderheitenfreundlichere CDR gewann die Wahlen und Professor Emil Constantinescu, der Rektor der Universität Bukarest, wurde zum rumänischen Präsidenten gewählt. Die CDR integrierte den Ungarnverband UDMR in die neu gebildete Regierung, und es wurde ein Ministerium für nationale Minderheiten eingeführt, das von einem Mitglied des UDMR, György
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165 [Die beiden Konzepte stehen für eine engere Kooperation mit der rumänischen Regierung (Roth) oder eine unabhängigere Haltung durch eine verstärkte Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Minderheitsgruppen (Brandsch)]. Aus: Wien, Kirchenleitung über dem Abgrund; Baier, “Rudolf Brandsch und Hans Otto Roth”, S. 76-9; Völkl, Rumänien, S. 238. 166 Archiv-Akte A8, November and Dezember 1996. [Diese Regelung schreibt weiterhin vor, dass derjenige Kandidat einer Minderheitenorganisation als gewählt gilt, der die meisten Stimmen seiner Organisation in einem Wahlkreis auf sich vereinen kann. Dies bedeutet im Einzelnen, dass es in fast jeder Minderheitenorganisation eine Art internen Wettbewerb gibt, wer die beste Startposition für das einzige, jeder Minderheit garantierte, Mandat bekommt. Im Falle es DFDR ist dies in der Regel der interne Streit, wer im Judeþ Hermannstadt kandidieren kann, da dies im Normalfall weitaus mehr Stimmen garantiert, als das Judeþ Timiº. Auch dieser Konflikt verschärft die Spannungen zwischen Schwaben und Sachsen noch zusätzlich]. 167 [Schon Ende 1997 zog sich Brück aus dem Parlament zurück, um den Posten des Wirtschaftsattachés in der rumänischen Botschaft in Bonn zu übernehmen. Dadurch zog Herr Wittstock im Februar 1998 abermals in das Parlament ein].
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Tokay, geführt wurde.168 Jetzt zahlten sich die Versuche, die Beziehung zwischen den Ungarn und den Deutschen seit 1992 inhaltlich und menschlich zu verbessern, aus. Aufgrund der gut funktionierenden Zusammenarbeit zwischen den beiden inderheitenorganisationen wurde der Bukarester Dr. Klaus Fabritius169 zu Tokays Staatssekretär ernannt. Die nächsten vier Jahre brachten größere Fortschritte für das DFDR. Die allgemeine Einstellung den Minderheiten gegenüber wurde wesentlich freundlicher und positiver. Rumänien schloss bilaterale Verträge bezüglich noch ungelöster Grenzfragen mit Ungarn und der Ukraine ab und die Spannungen zwischen Ungarn und Rumänen verringerten sich auch dadurch, dass der UDMR aktiv an der Regierung beteiligt war. Vor allem das Jahr 1999 brachte einige sehr positive Ergebnisse für das DFDR. Neue Gesetze regelten und vereinfachten den Prozess der Rückgabe von verstaatlichtem Eigentum der Deutschen. Jetzt konnte das DFDR auch endlich in seine frisch renovierte Parteizentrale in Hermannstadt einziehen, deren Gebäude vor 1944 dem ehemaligen österreichisch-ungarischen Offiziersklub gehört hatte.170 Dennoch wurde auch in den Jahren 1996 bis 2000 das vom DFDR und den anderen Minderheiten bereits im Jahr 1993 in das Parlament gebrachte Minderheitenschutzgesetz weiterhin zurückgestellt und nicht verabschiedet.171 Dies war teils der Fehler der Minderheitenorganisationen selbst, insbesondere der Ungarn, deren abweichende Forderungen nach Territorial —, und Gruppenautonomie die Position der Minderheitsorganisationen spaltete und es so den Rumänen recht leicht machte, den Gesetzesentwurf insgesamt zu vereiteln. Überdies wurde das ganze diplomatische Geschick gebraucht, um das DFDR im Einklang mit den Erwartungen der rumänischen Regierung und der der Ungarn zu halten, die das Ministerium für nationale Minderheiten führten, in denen das DFDR direkter Partner war. Deshalb mussten die zwei Grundprinzipien des DFDR, innere Einheit und Loyalität dem rumänischen Staat gegenüber, um ein drittes ergänzt werden, nämlich einen Modus Vivendi mit dem UDMR zu erreichen, ohne die ersten zwei wichtigen Konstanten der Überlebensstrategie des DFDR zu gefährden. Denn obwohl das DFDR viele seiner Ziele erfüllen konnte, war es innerlich immer noch fast vollständig vom rumänischen Staat und dem UDMR abhängig. Das politisch stürmische Jahr 1998, das drei rumänische und zwei deutsche Regierungen sah, änderte überdies auch noch die interne Situation des DFDR grundlegend. Professor Philippi stand für seinen Posten als Landesvorsitzende nach seinem 75. Geburtstag im November 1998 nicht mehr zur Verfügung. Es war fast schon eine Art Selbstverständlichkeit, dass Eberhard-Wolfgang Wittstock als Abgeordneter des DFDR Professor Philippi als neuer
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168 Monitorul Oficial al României, Teil I, Nr. 17/1997, 31. Januar 1997. 169 [Der Bukarester Biologe Dr. Fabritius ist seit 1992 Vorsitzender des Regionalforums “Altreich” (Regat)]. 170 Archiv-Akte A6, Juni 1999. 171 [Der ursprüngliche Entwurf stammt vom 7. Dezember 1993. Nichtsdestotrotz unterschrieb Rumänien am 1. Januar 1995 das Rahmenabkommen zum Schutz nationaler Minderheiten]. Aus: Archiv-Akte A5, März 1995.
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Landesvorsitzender folgen sollte. Da Wittstocks politische Position jedoch eng mit der der PDSR verbunden war, entfremdete dies die regierende CDR und besonders den UDMR, der ihn bereits im Jahr 1996 als Kandidat für den Staatssekretärsposten im Ministerium für nationale Minderheiten zurückgewiesen hatte, was zur Ernennung von Dr. Fabritius geführt hatte. Diese delikate Situation wurde dadurch etwas abgemildert, dass Professor Philippi in den neu geschaffenen Posten des “Ehrenvorsitzenden” berufen wurde und so weiterhin politisch aktiv blieb. Dieses Vorgehen schützte sowohl Wittstock als auch das DFDR vor politischem Schaden und es vermochte die wegen Wittstocks politischer Position vorhandenen Bedenken auf Seiten der CDR und des UDMR zu zerstreuen.172 Diese Ereignisse zeigen allerdings recht eindringlich, wie weit das DFDR immer noch davon entfernt war, eine in ihren Entscheidungen wirklich souveräne politische Kraft zu sein, wenngleich es dennoch trotz der sich laufend ändernden politischen Rahmenbedingungen keine fundamentalen Wandlungen hinnehmen musste, sondern es vielmehr bei recht kosmetischen Korrekturen belassen konnte. 3.6. Die Transformation des DFDR in eine politische Partei seit 2000
Das Ergebnis der Präsidentschafts — und Parlamentswahlen des Jahres 2000 überraschte Beobachter mit etwas Erfahrung in rumänischer Politik nicht allzu sehr. Eine desillusionierte Bevölkerung wandte sich zurück an angeblich “bessere und leichtere” Lösungen und alte Formeln, die von der postkommunistischen PDSR und ihrem Frontmann Iliescu zuhauf angeboten wurden und durch die er demzufolge auch die Präsidentschaftswahlen gewann. Noch erschreckender war jedoch, dass Vadim Tudor, der Führer der antisemitischen und extrem nationalistischen PRM bei den Präsidentschafts — und Parlamentswahlen als Zweiter ins Ziel kam; Tudor zwang Iliescu sogar in eine zweite Runde der Präsidentschaftswahlen.173 Aus der Warte des DFDR allerdings war das am wenigsten erwartete Ergebnis der Wahlen die Verdoppelung seiner eigenen Stimmen. Das DFDR kam auf den 19. Platz von insgesamt 69 politischen Formationen, die bei diesen Wahlen angetreten waren. Wittstock gewann überdies den Wahlkreis Hermannstadt und darüber hinaus ging das Hermannstädter Senatsmandat an das DFDR-Mitglied Dr. Hermann Fabini, der als Kandidat auf der Liste der PNL angetreten war. Zusätzlich dazu konnte das DFDR in den Kommunalwahlen des Jahres 2000 die Wahl von fünf Bürgermeistern aus seinen Reihen verbuchen, am bedeutendsten die von Klaus Johannis zum Oberbürgermeister von Hermannstadt, zusammen mit vier Mitgliedern im Kreisrat von Satu Mare und zehn Mitgliedern in Lokalräten, sechs davon im Stadtrat und vier im Kreisrat von Hermannstadt.
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172 [Wittstock war zwischen 1977 und 1989 Mitglied der Kommunistischen Partei Rumäniens. Er bekleidete allerdings kein führendes Amt]. Aus: MP Wittstock, Brief an die Deutsche Botschaft Bukarest, 27. August 1999, in: Archiv-Akte B5, Juli 1999. 173 Crampton, The Balkans since the Second World War, S. 334.
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Der interessanteste Punkt dieser Wahlen war jedoch, dass es bei den Kommunalwahlen keine positive Diskriminierung zugunsten des DFDR gab. Das DFDR musste seine Posten vielmehr in direkter Konkurrenz mit den anderen Parteien erringen. Daher ist es noch beeindruckender und überraschender, dass das DFDR es schaffte, die PDSR in Hermannstadt zu besiegen. Für die Stadtratswahlen in Hermannstadt hatte das DFDR allerdings nicht genug Kandidaten aufgestellt, da es keineswegs mit einem Sieg gerechnet hatte. Aus diesem Grunde gingen zwei der Sitze, die dem DFDR im Stadtrat eigentlich zugestanden hätten, verloren, da sie vom DFDR nicht mit eigenen Listenkandidaten besetzt werden konnten. Die Wahlen des Jahres 2000 verschafften dem DFDR demzufolge mehr politischen Einfluss, was zum Teil auch auf die auch für Rumänien in Aussicht stehende EU-Erweiterung zurückzuführen war. Dies führte auf parteipolitischer Ebene zu einem Kooperationsabkommen zwischen dem DFDR und der PSD174 im Jahr 2002. Dieses Protokoll hatte indes etwas widersprüchliche Folgen für das DFDR. Auf der einen Seite garantierte es Johannis” Unterstützung für Rumäniens Anliegen in Berlin und so Deutschlands Unterstützung für Rumäniens EU-Beitritt, während es auch dem DFDR etliche Vorteile zusicherte. Andererseits jedoch scheint es unwahrscheinlich, dass beide Seiten ihre Ziele wirklich erreichen konnten. Das DFDR für seinen Teil hatte sein Schicksal im Wesentlichen an das der regierenden PSD geknüpft und die deutsche Regierung wird mit geringer Wahrscheinlichkeit seine Position bezüglich Rumänien lediglich daran orientieren, dass Johannis Rumäniens EU-Beitritt befürwortet. Vor diesem Hintergrund wurden die Interessen des DFDR während der Jahre 2000 bis 2004 nur dann in die Regierungspolitik miteinbezogen, wenn entweder Deutschland oder Österreich das DFDR direkt unterstützen, oder wenn Rumänien seine Minderheiten in einem ganz bestimmten Punkt dazu brauchte, sich positiv darzustellen, um der EU beizutreten. Die Deutschen haben und hatten hierbei eine spezielle Rolle unter den Minderheiten, da sie die drittgrößte Minderheitengruppe bilden und eine recht einflussreiche Lobby im Westen besitzen.175 Auf dem nationalen rumänischen Parkett waren die Wahlergebnisse zwar beeindruckend, aber dennoch verlor das DFDR seinen Staatssekretär und mit ihm wurde das ganze Ministerium für nationale Minderheiten abgeschafft. Die PSD schuf stattdessen ein Ministerium für “öffentliche Information” und fügte diesem ein “Departement für Interethnische Beziehungen” hinzu, in dem einem Staatssekretär drei Unterstaatssekretäre unterstellt wurden.176 Einer von diesen Unterstaatssekretären wurde dem DFDR, der zweite dem UDMR und der dritte der Partei der Roma (PR) zugestanden. Der Posten des Staatssekretärs wurde mit einem ethnischen Rumänen und PSD-Mann besetzt. Auf Seiten des DFDR
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174 [Die PDSR änderte ihren Namen im Jahr 2002 in PSD]. 175 [Hierzu bemerkte Unterstaatssekretär Dr. Zeno-Karl Pinter: “Deutschland wird immer ein sehr wichtiges Land für Rumänien sein. Daran ändert auch die gegenwärtige Wirtschaftskrise nichts.”]. Gespräch mit Unterstaatssekretär Dr. Zeno-Karl Pinter, Bukarest, 11. April 2005. 176 www.guv.ro, Program de guvernare, Pe perioada 2001–2004, cap. X, Relaþiile Interetnice.
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wurde dieser relativ machtlose Posten, mit dem Temeschwarer Gymnasiallehrer Ovidiu Ganþ besetzt.177 Die Wahlen des Jahres 2000 vertieften auch die Kooperation zwischen dem DFDR und dem UDMR. Beide Organisationen beschlossen, gemeinsame Kandidatenlisten in Regionen aufzustellen, in denen die Ungarn nicht sehr stark vertreten waren.178 Im Bereich der nationalen Politik komplizierte sich die Situation des DFDR und des UDMR allerdings zusehends, da die neue Regierung unter Premierminister Adrian Nãstase (PSD) ethnischen Minderheiten nicht dieselbe Priorität einräumte, wie dies die vorangegangenen liberal-konservativen Regierungen zu machen bereit waren. Außerdem wurde der Mangel eines Minderheitsschutzgesetzes nun mehr als offensichtlich. Die Minderheitenorganisationen, insbesondere die weniger mächtigen, waren weiterhin fast ausschließlich auf den guten Willen und die Launen der Regierung angewiesen. Der “Rat für die nationalen Minderheiten”, der im Jahr 1993 geschaffen worden war, hatte nur eine beratende Rolle inne und er konnte seine Vorschläge überdies nur einstimmig formulieren.179 Daher konnte die Situation für die Minderheiten insgesamt kaum verbessert werden. Dies war auch der Grund, warum der UDMR den Minderheitenrat bereits im Jahr 1995 als “Feigenblatt der rumänischen Regierung” bezeichnet und verlassen hatte. Die einzige Rolle von Bedeutung, die dieser Institution in der Folgezeit zukam, war die Verteilung der öffentlichen Gelder an die unterschiedlichen Minderheitenorganisationen. Die in diesem Zusammenhang vorherrschende Praxis wird vom ehemaligen Geschäftsführer des DFDR, Diplom Ingenieur Hansmartin Borger, der das DFDR zwischen 1994 und 2004 für zehn Jahre im Minderheitenrat vertreten hat, wie folgt beschrieben: “Die Vorgänge im Minderheitenrat erinnern einen eher an ein Feilschen um Fördergelder, als an ernstzunehmende inhaltliche politische Diskussionen.”180 Für das DFDR waren die wichtigsten Folgen der Wahlen von 2000 ein massiver Zuwachs an Verantwortung auf kommunaler Ebene und wachsende öffentliche Unterstützung, aber auch eine ebenso gewachsene Notwendigkeit, seine Loyalität gegenüber Bukarest und gegenüber der PSD ostentativ zu betonen.181 Die herrschende PSD bot alle ihr zu Verfügung stehenden Mittel und zentral aus Bukarest gesteuerte Machtmittel auf, Kommunalpolitiker über die aus Bukarest eingesetzten Präfekten “zu ihren Gunsten umzudrehen”. Dies stärkte die Position der regierenden PSD noch mehr. Dies bedeutete, dass Johannis im Hermannstädter Stadtrat mit der PSD einen Modus Vivendi finden musste, der ihm die zum Regieren notwendige Mehrheit sicherte, da er von der Bevölkerung an seinen Taten beurteilt wurde, für die er
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177 DFDR, Deutsches Jahrbuch für Rumänien 2003, S. 26–31. 178 Archiv-Akte A8, Mai 2000. 179 Monitorul Oficial al României, Teil I, Nr. 156, 9. Juli 1993. 180 Gespräch mit Dipl. Ing. Hansmartin Borger, Hermannstadt, 22. September 2003. 181 [Viele nannten Hermannstadt nach den für das DFDR überraschend siegreichen Kommunalwahlen des Jahres 2000 bereits “Johannisburg”]. Aus: Ohnweiler, “Die Stadt am Zibin auf dem Weg zu einem “Johannisburg”, S. 39.
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wiederum die Unterstützung seines Rates brauchte. Diese Unterstützung konnte er allerdings nur erhalten, wenn er ein Abkommen mit der PSD schloss. Die Römer hatten ein Sprichwort für solche Situationen: beneficium accipere est libertatem vendere: Wer eine Wohltat annimmt, der verkauft seine Freiheit. Trotz dieser relativ großen Abhängigkeit von der PSD konnte das DFDR auf nationaler Ebene bei den Lokalwahlen des Jahres 2004 die Erfolge des Jahres 2000 noch erheblich ausbauen. So trug das DFDR insbesondere in Hermannstadt einen überwältigenden Sieg gegen die seit 2000 auf Landesebene völlig dominierende PSD davon. Der Bürgermeisterkandidat des DFDR für Hermannstadt, Klaus Johannis, besiegte den Kandidaten der PSD schon im ersten Wahlgang mit knapp 90 Prozent zu mageren 6 Prozent für die PSD und auch im Stadtrat der 160.000-Einwohner Stadt am Zibin standen 16 gewählten Stadträten des Forums von insgesamt 23 Stadträten lediglich 3 der PSD gegenüber. Im 33-köpfigen Rat des Judeþ von Hermannstadt war es nur wenig besser für die PSD, da dort 11 gewählten Vertretern des Forums lediglich 8 der PSD gegenübersitzen und auch in den anderen Siedlungsgebieten der Deutschen in Rumänien konnte das DFDR des Öfteren im direkten Vergleich mit der PSD punkten.182 Dieses Ergebnis macht sich umso eindrucksvoller aus, wenn man bedenkt, dass die Deutschen im Jude? Hermannstadt nur rund 4 Prozent der Bevölkerung und auf Landesebene nur knapp 0,4 Prozent ausmachen. Das Resultat aber zeigt auch, dass die rumänischen Wähler nach einer glaubhaften lokalen politischen Alternative zur für ihre korrupten Machenschaften bekannten PSD suchten und sie im DFDR gefunden zu haben glaubten.183 Bei den Parlamentswahlen im Winter 2004 konnten die insbesondere durch diese Lokalwahlerfolge genährten Hoffnungen des DFDR, die es in die erstmalige Aufstellung einer landesweiten Kandidatenliste (“Einheitsliste”) gesetzt hatte, indes bei weitem nicht erfüllt werden. Das Ergebnis fiel sogar etwas schlechter aus, als das des Jahres 2000. Dies war allerdings das Ergebnis forumsinterner Probleme, die insbesondere auf die in Kapitel 1 beschriebenen Unterschiede zwischen Sachsen und Schwaben zurückgehen. Herr Ganþ, bisher Subsecretar de Stat, hatte bereits im Jahr 2000 versucht, mehr Stimmen im Judeþ Timiº zu sammeln, als der Kandidat von Hermannstadt, Eberhard-Wolfgang Wittstock und wollte es seinem Vorgänger, Horst-Werner Brück, der dies bei den Wahlen des Jahres 1996 geschafft hatte, gleichtun. Nach einer forumsinternen Regelung und gemäß der rumänischen Gesetzgebung wäre dann ihm als dem mit den meisten Stimmen gewählten Deutschen das dem DFDR zustehende Mandat übertragen worden. Da Herr Ganþ aber, wie so viele DFDR Kandidaten vor ihm, im Banat scheiterte und er das Gleiche bei unverändertem Wahlmodus auch mit nahezu
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182 [Auf Landesebene gewann das DFDR 76.843 Stimmen bei Kreisratswahlen (Judeþe), was elf Kreisräten und 0,85% der Stimmen entspricht, 77.573 Stimmen bei Lokalratswahlen (Stadt-, Markt- und Gemeinderäte), was 96 Mandaten und 0,84% der Stimmen insgesamt entspricht, und insgesamt 93.901 Stimmen im ersten Wahlgang der Bürgermeisterwahlen (0,93%) und 22.815 Stimmen im zweiten Wahlgang (0,22%), was fünf gewählten Bürgermeistern im ersten und vier Gewählten im zweiten Wahlgang entsprach]. 183 ADZ, “Totales Vertrauensvotum”, Nr. 2896 (9. Juni 2004), S. 8.
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100-prozentiger Sicherheit bei den Wahlen 2004 erwarten konnte und musste, setzte er alles daran, eine einheitliche DFDR-Kandidatenliste mit ihm an der Spitze durchzusetzen, da er so sichergehen konnte, in das Parlament einzuziehen, was er dann auch tat. Als Schwabe wäre er in Hermannstadt wohl nicht so einfach aufgestellt worden und seine eigenen Landsleute im Banat sind politisch viel zu desinteressiert und zu wenig organisiert, als dass er sich auf sie wirklich hätte verlassen können. Im Banat ist man weit mehr in Form von Trachtenumzügen und anderen kulturellen Aktivitäten aktiv und an politischen Weichenstellungen und Aktivitäten aller Art des DFDR hat man dort nur relativ geringes Interesse. Man sieht das DFDR im Banat viel mehr als kulturelle Vereinigung denn als Partei der Deutschen. Objektiv von außen betrachtet ist es jedoch genau diese weit reichende politische Inaktivität, die zu einer Art Minderwertigkeitskomplex der Schwaben den Sachsen gegenüber führt. Doch anstatt etwas im Banat zu verändern und das Forum aus der “Trachtenvereinsecke” zu lotsen und in eine schlagkräftige politische Organisation zu verwandeln, begnügt man sich mit den beschriebenen Kulturveranstaltungen und man hat bisher wenig in Richtung der Entwicklung einer gut konzipierten politischen Tagesarbeit auf den Weg gebracht. Vielmehr bemüht man historische Vergleiche mit den Sachsen, um zu erklären, warum die Lage der Schwaben aufgrund ihres weniger ausgeprägten Nationalbewusstseins, ihrer ländlichen Struktur und ihres weit verstreuten Siedlungsgebietes schwieriger sei als die der Sachsen und es daher auch politisch schwerer sei, im Banat Fuß zu fassen.184 Dies mag in der Tat in vielerlei Hinsicht zutreffen, es ist aber ohne geeignete Gegenmaßnahmen in der politischen Praxis relativ unbedeutend, warum es sich so verhält. Um einiges wichtiger wäre es, ein den historischen Gegebenheiten angepasstes Konzept zu entwickeln und zu versuchen, die Gesamtsituation des Banater DFDR zu verbessern, um bei Wahlen größere Erfolge erringen zu können. Stattdessen investiert der Vorsitzende des Regionalforums Banat, Dr. Karl Singer, nahezu alle Energie und Ressourcen des Regionalforums Banat in die Brauchtumspflege, wie Trachten, Blasmusikgruppen und einen alljährlichen Zug durch Temeschwar. Diese Aktivitäten tragen zweifellos zum Erhalt schwäbischer Traditionen bei und in kleinerem Rahmen sind sie mit Sicherheit wünschenswert und notwendig, doch politisch und wirtschaftlich nachhaltig sind sie in der gewählten Form keineswegs und ein politisches Programm ersetzen sie noch viel weniger. Sie kosten vielmehr sehr viel Geld, das stattdessen, wie von den Sachsen vorgemacht, in langfristig rentable Anlageobjekte (Verlage, Immobilien oder ähnliches) oder in eine schlagkräftigere Forumsstruktur investiert werden könnte. Man muss sich daher nicht wundern, dass die Rumänen und Ungarn den Schwaben vor diesem Hintergrund politisch nicht dasselbe zutrauen, wie den Sachsen in Hermannstadt. Wie sonst ist es zu erklären, dass die Sachsen, die Berglanddeutschen und die Sathmarer Schwaben bei den Lokalwahlen seit 1990
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184 Gespräch mit dem Abgeordneten Ovidiu Ganã, Bukarest, 29. März 2005.
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bei zum Teil weitaus kleineren eigenen Zahlen viel bessere Wahlergebnisse als die Banater Schwaben erzielen konnten? Die Kosten des Manövers mit der Einheitsliste waren daher, dass sich das DFDR so kurz nach seinem Triumph bei den Lokalwahlen ohne Not selbst eine Niederlage bei den Nationalwahlen eingebrockt hat, da das Modell der Einheitsliste einen Stimmanteil von mindestens 5 Prozent auf Landesebene erfordert hätte, was einem Wunder gleichgekommen wäre. Wenn überhaupt, so hätte dies wohl nur mit einem Spitzenkandidaten vom Schlage eines Klaus Johannis funktionieren können. Der während der Jahre 2003 und 2004 merklich wachsende Unmut über Wittstock als Abgeordneten des DFDR wurde nun von Ganþ mit der Unterstützung Johannis” geschickt genutzt. Da eine Einheitsliste die einzig Erfolg versprechende Option war, an Wittstock vorbei ins Parlament einzuziehen und sich überdies eine innersächsische Opposition gegen Wittstock gebildet hatte, konnte Ganþ die Einheitsliste durchsetzen und so als Listenführer ins Parlament einziehen. Dies war umso leichter, da auch Johannis mit Wittstocks Amtsführung unzufrieden war. Das restliche DFDR musste folgen, ob es wollte oder nicht. Das Manöver erwies sich als erfolgreich und Wittstock wurde nach über 10 Jahren Arbeit als Abgeordneter (1992–1996, 1997–2004) und Vorsitzender des DFDR (1998–2002) fallengelassen und überdies als Bürgermeisterkandidat des DFDR in Kronstadt und dann als unabhängiger Kandidat für den Senat weitestgehend im Regen stehen gelassen. Nicht einmal das Amt des nun frei werdenden Unterstaatssekretärs für interethnische Beziehungen wurde ihm angeboten, sondern man übertrug es dem bislang politisch recht unerfahrenen Historiker Dr. Zeno-Karl Pinter aus Ferdinandsberg-Oþelu Roºu im Banater Bergland, der in Hermannstadt lehrend und mit einer Siebenbürger Sächsin verheiratet, der Kandidat einer gegen Wittstock gerichteten Gruppe von Sachsen und Landlern um Professor Martin Bottesch und Professor Dr. Hans Klein185 geworden war. Dr. Pinter hatte bei der im September 2004 in Mediasch stattfindenden Abstimmung um Platz 1 auf der Einheitsliste drei Stimmen erhalten, hinter Wittstock (fünf) und Ganã (zwölf).186 Da Wittstock nicht mehr auf der Liste kandidierte, errang Dr. Pinter den zweiten Platz auf der Liste. Als Folge dieser Schachzüge dominieren nun die Banater das DFDR neben Bürgermeister Johannis, der in Hermannstadt “zu recht sagen kann le Forum, c’est moi”187. Dies geschah aber nicht aufgrund politisch vorzeigbarer Leistungen des DFDR im Banat, sondern vielmehr und ausschließlich durch geschickte Manöver im Hintergrund, die Uneinigkeit der Siebenbürger Sachsen und die ausdrückliche Duldung und stillschweigende Billigung des Landesvorsitzenden Johannis. Da Johannis “als Kandidat des Banats”188 zum Landesvorsitzenden
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185 [Vorsitzender des Zentrumsforums Hermannstadt und Dekan der Theologischen Fakultät der Lucian Blaga Universität Hermannstadt]. 186 Gespräch mit dem Abgeordneten Ovidiu Ganã, Bukarest, 29. März 2005. 187 Ibid. 188 Ibid.
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des DFDR gewählt worden war und Wittstock so sein Amt verloren hatte, war dies eine Art Preis, die Johannis für seine Installation als Vorsitzender durch die Banater nun zu bezahlen hatte. Diese Entwicklung kann noch gefährlich für die Zukunft des DFDR werden, da sie einen Präzedenzfall darstellt, der das DFDR weiter in Richtung einer nach gängigen Mustern operierenden politischen Partei manövriert. Zwar war es die seit 1990 verfolgte Taktik des DFDR, sich den jeweils Regierenden so anzupassen, dass es seine eigenen Interessen mit Hilfe und als Teil dieser verwirklichen konnte, doch war dieses Prinzip immer auf das Verhalten gegenüber Dritten begrenzt. Durch die Abläufe im Vorfeld der Parlamentswahlen von 2004 droht nun aber der allgemein verbreitete schlechte, von Opportunismus und häufigen Parteiübertritten geprägte politische Stil der anderen rumänischen Parteien auch im Forum Fuß gefasst zu haben. C. Schluss/Fazit
Zusammenfassend kann man festhalten, dass das DFDR einer ganzen Reihe von praktischen Problemen ausgesetzt war, die es im Wesentlichen inzwischen lösen konnte. Darüber hinaus musste sich das DFDR auch organisatorischen Problemen stellen. Das DFDR musste überdies einen praktischen politischen Standpunkt entwickeln, der die Spannungen zwischen der Ablehnung bestimmter Regierungsansätze und deren Tolerierung und Unterstützung vor dem Hintergrund einer von einer bis zum Jahr 2004 allmächtigen Partei (PSD) dominierten politischen Landschaft zu lösen vermochte. War es bisher immer die Politik des Forums gewesen, seine Ziele durch eine pragmatische Politik der Loyalität der rumänischen Regierung gegenüber, aber in innerer Einheit, zu verfolgen und so den schwierigen Spagat zwischen seinem expliziten Willen, eine a-politische kulturelle Organisation zu sein und seiner impliziten Absicht, auch politisch aktiv zu sein, zu ermöglichen, so änderte sich dies durch die Vorgänge des Jahres 2004 grundlegend. Durch sowohl die personelle als auch die taktische Neuausrichtung wurden die Weichen klar in Richtung auf eine politische Partei mit allen Vor — und Nachteilen gestellt. Mit der starken Abwertung des kulturellen und traditionellen Flügels des DFDR wurde auch das eher beschauliche Innenleben des DFDR zugunsten der in anderen Parteien üblichen Kämpfe geopfert. Dies hat zwar im Augenblick zahlreiche positive Effekte, doch wird es das DFDR langfristig noch mehr in politische Abhängigkeiten gegenüber in Zukunft dominierenden Parteien bringen, da es sich dann nicht mehr nur auf seine Rolle als kulturelle und a-politische Organisation wird berufen können. Man kann also eindrucksvoll sehen, dass auch im Erfolg einige schwerwiegende Probleme liegen, die von ihrer Wirkung nicht weniger problematisch sein können, als Zwangslagen die aus einer Niederlage resultieren. Die zuvor geschilderte politische Realität, der sich das DFDR ausgesetzt sieht, ist symptomatisch für Rumäniens strukturelle Probleme insgesamt. Gute aktive demokratische Institutionen würden solche politische Instabilitäten
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verhindern; sie würden die Vertretung von Minderheiten auch ohne die Notwendigkeit garantieren, die jeweils herrschenden Eliten zufrieden zu stellen.189 Die Beseitigung dieser politischen Unsicherheiten und die Garantie gleicher Rechte für alle Bürger, auch für ethnische Minderheiten, wären eine erste Stufe in Richtung der Schaffung eines positiven Rahmens für die Wirtschaft.190 Demokratisierung, Minderheitenschutz bzw. — Repräsentation und Wirtschaftsreformen sind miteinander verbunden, und ein erfolgreicher wirtschaftlicher Reformprozess braucht auch eine wirklich aktive und funktionierende Demokratie mit solidem Minderheitsschutz ohne Divide et Impera — Politik.191 Insbesondere die EU-Beitrittskriterien schließen eine gut funktionierende und aktive Demokratie mit ein.192 Rumänien “teilt das allgemein weit verbreitete osteuropäische Ziel, in die EU einzutreten”193, aber die in Rumänien umgesetzten Reformmaßnahmen in Richtung auf einen politischen Pluralismus, einen gut funktionierenden Minderheitsschutz und eine echte Marktwirtschaft waren nur äußerst zögerlich und langsam. Die Teilreformen und — Reförmchen gingen des Öfteren publikumswirksam einen Schritt nach vorne, um dann klammheimlich wieder zwei Schritte zurück zu gehen, was letztendlich zwangsläufig in eine Sackgasse führen wird.194 Oft wurde sogar lediglich eine reine Änderung des Titels oder Namens vorgenommen, was insbesondere auf dem Feld des Minderheitsschutzes kaum als ausreichend bezeichnet werden kann. Obwohl Rumänien trotz dieser Defizite den Weg in die EU geschafft hat, werden diese ungelösten Probleme durch den Beitritt in die EU noch problematischer werden, da dann auch der Wettbewerb, dem sich Rumänien stellen werden muss, stark anwachsen wird. Gegenwärtig ist der Rahmen der Gesetzgebung instabil, das politische System hoch fragwürdig und der Boden für Korruption überaus fruchtbar.195 Überdies sind der begonnene Dezentralisierungsprozess und die wirtschaftspolitischen Maßnahmen voll von ganz beträchtlichen Mängeln. Das Niveau der wirklichen und strukturellen Wirtschaftsreformen und die zur Anwendung gekommenen wirtschaftspolitischen Maßnahmen sind noch recht dürftig.196 Die rumänische Zivilgesellschaft ist immer noch recht schwach, die politische Führungsschicht ohne robuste Alternative und die Rechtsstaatlichkeit immer noch weit vom Idealzustand entfernt.197 Eine sich als positiv abhebende Politik ist zuletzt kaum ersichtlich und das Niveau des Minderheitenschutzes ist — so gut es theoretisch auch klingen mag- in der Praxis gering, wenn man es zum Beispiel mit dem in Ungarn vergleicht.
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189 Vgl. Przeworski, Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy. 190 Rose, Evaluating Long and Short-Term Transformation in Central Europe. 191 Vgl. Sachs, Zinnes und Eilat, The Gains from Privatization. 192 Vgl. Smith und Wright (Hg.), Whose Europe? 193 Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, S. 452. 194 Stolojan, Policy Making in Romania, S. 16. 195 Vgl. Wallace und Haerpfer, Democratisation, Economic Development and Corruption. 196 Vgl. Griechische Nationalbank, Overview of the Romanian Economy. 197 Linz und Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, S. 364.
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Daher verwundert es nicht weiter, dass Rumänien “am weitesten von einer stabilen Demokratie entfernt ist”198, wenn man es mit anderen postkommunistischen Ländern der ersten EU-Osterweiterungsrunde vergleicht. Darüber hinaus hat diese rumänische Divide et impera — Politik auch die politische Rolle des DFDR stark beeinflusst. Dadurch, dass die rumänische Führung die deutsche Minderheit als Mittel zum Zweck für ihre eigenen politischen Interessen entdeckte, beschleunigte die PSD das Hineinwachsen des DFDR in seine neue politische Rolle, über die als eigentliche kulturelle Vertretung der deutschen Minderheit hinaus. Die PSD schwächte damit allerdings auch die Einheit unter den Minderheitengruppen insgesamt. Dies bedeutet für das DFDR, dass es, solange es während der Jahre 2000 bis 2004 seine Loyalität zur und seine Unterordnung unter die rumänische Regierung betonte, in seinen Wünschen und Problemen unterstützt wurde.199 Wenn man vor diesem Hintergrund die Gesamtanalyse dieser Arbeit Revue passieren lässt und insbesondere die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen dem DFDR und dem rumänischen Staat betrachtet, so wird ganz offensichtlich, dass das Ziel seiner Gründer, das DFDR zu einer unabhängigen Stimme der deutschen Minderheit in Rumänien gegenüber den deutschen und rumänischen Regierungen zu machen, nur sehr geringfügig erfüllt wurde. Obwohl das DFDR Bukarests exklusiver Partner mit Bezug auf seine Bürger deutscher Nationalität ist, bringt dies de facto nicht sehr viele Vorteile für die Deutschen. Diese ausschlaggebenden Faktoren sollten in Betracht gezogen werden, wenn man die auf den ersten Blick sehr erfreulichen Wahlergebnisse des Jahres 2004 analysiert. Je mächtiger das DFDR nämlich wird, desto mehr wird es seine Loyalität gegenüber der jeweils vorherrschenden Partei und gegenüber dem rumänischen Staat betonen müssen. Andererseits trug die völlige politische Vorherrschaft der PSD bis zum Jahr 2004, ihr Widerwillen zu politischen Reformen, ihr Missbrauch politischer Macht und ihr Benutzen des DFDR auf außenpolitischer Ebene ganz entscheidend dazu bei, dass sich das DFDR als lokale Alternative zur PSD entwickeln konnte. Daher wurde es absolut notwendig für das DFDR, alternative politische Partnerschaften zu entwickeln und es ist absehbar, dass das DFDR seine Loyalität auch in Zukunft dem Staat gegenüber in dem Maße stärker betonen muss, in dem es an politischer Macht gewinnt. Dies führt zum Schluss, dass das DFDR, während es versuchte, ein gewisses Maß an Unabhängigkeit zu sichern, trotzdem in gewisser Weise eine Marionette
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198 Ibid., S. 364. 199 [Den Deutschen wurde eine Art Vorzugsbehandlung zuteil, wie man am Beispiel der zweisprachigen Ortstafeln sehen kann, die den Ungarn oft sogar in Städten mit einem äußerst großen ungarischen Bevölkerungsanteil verwehrt werden. Diese werden den Deutschen großzügig gewährt, selbst wenn sie eine recht kleine Minderheit in den neu benannten Dörfern und Städten darstellen. Gemäß einer Regierungsentscheidung sind die Stadt- und Lokalräte von Städten und Gemeinden mit einem Minderheitenanteil von mehr als 20 Prozent der Gesamtbevölkerung dazu verpflichtet, zweisprachige Ortstafeln aufzustellen, öffentliche Erklärungen (“anunþuri de interes public”) zweisprachig auf Rumänisch und in der entsprechenden Minderheitensprache herauszugeben und zweisprachige Bezeichnungen für öffentliche Institutionen (“unitãþi proprii”) zu verwenden]. Von: Brief des DFDR-Landesforums an seine Regionalforen im Banat, in Siebenbürgen und in Sathmar vom 29. Juli 1997. In: Archiv-Akte A3, Juli 1997.
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im politischen Geschehen blieb. Ganz im Gegenteil zu seiner expliziten Absicht, eine a-politische Organisation der deutschen Minderheit zu sein, hat es implizit über die Jahre hinweg eine starke politische Facette entwickelt. Diese Arbeit hat gezeigt, wie das DFDR diese paradoxe Situation durch seinen permanenten Diskurs, basierend auf Beispielen aus der Zwischenkriegszeit200, “eine Organisation in innerer Einheit und Loyalität gegenüber dem rumänischen Staat” zu schaffen, gelöst hat. LITERATURVERZEICHNIS I. Ungedruckte Quellen 1. Archivmaterialien
DFDR-Akten, katalogisiert und unkatalogisiert aufbewahrt im Landesforum des DFDR in Sibiu-Hermannstadt: System: “A-Akten” (Allgemein) A1: Auslandskorrespondenz A2: Inlandskorrespondenz A3: Forum Intern A4: Korrespondenz mit BMI A5: Minderheitenfragen A6: Enteignungsfragen A7: Minderheitenpublikationen A8: Wahlen A9: Regierung, Ministerien A10: Dt.-Rum. Regierungskommission A11: Schulkommission A12: Allgemeine Kontakte “B-Akten” (Besonderes)201 B1: Persönlich B2: Sitzungen B3: Kultur B4: Kontakte-Forum B5: Kontakte-Inland B6: Kontakte-Ausland B7: Kontakte-Akademisch B8: Sonstiges
2. Gespräche mit
Balázs, Lilla, Târgu Secuiesc, jetzt Bukarest (Rumänien), Wirtschaftswissenschaftlerin, seit 2003 Referentin für Auslandsbeziehungen des Vorsitzenden des Ungarnverbandes UDMR (Bukarest, Rumänien, 7. April 2005). Bein, Daniel, Hamburg (Deutschland), Ethnologe (Gundelsheim am Neckar, Deutschland, 11. November 2003). Borger, Hansmartin, Hermannstadt (Siebenbürgen, Rumänien), Dipl. Ingenieur (Univ.), Geschäftsführer des Demokratischen Forums der Deutschen in Rumänien (DFDR/F.D.G.R.) (Hermannstadt, Rumänien, 17. Juli 2002, 22., 24. und 29. März 2003).
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200 Roth, Politische Strukturen und Strömungen bei den Siebenbürger Sachsen 1919–1933. 201 [Mir wurde vollständiger Zugang zu allen “A-Akten” gewährt und zu allen “B-Akten”, die von vor November 2000 stammten. Die “B-Akten” der Wahlperiode 2000–2004 wurden mir erst nach den Parlamentswahlen im November 2004 offengelegt].
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Bunzmann, Egon Erwin Lajos, Radau?i/Radautz (Bukowina, Rumänien), jetzt Regensburg, Redakteur im Ruhestand (Regensburg, Deutschland, 20. Dezember 2001, 6. Januar 2002). [Egon Erwin Lajos Bunzmann, geboren 1921 in Dunavecse, Ungarn, lebt jetzt in Zeiler bei Regensburg. Von 1922 bis 1940 lebte er in Radautz (Rumänisch: Radauþi), Bukowina, als die Buchenlanddeutschen in das Deutsche Reich umgesiedelt wurden. Bis 1945 diente er in der deutschen Luftwaffe in Italien, Frankreich und Polen. Nach dem Krieg war Herr Bunzmann mehrmals der offizielle Dolmetscher einiger westdeutscher politischer Delegationen, die ihn mit dem damaligen Bundesminister Hermann Höcherl (CSU) zwischen 1966 und 1969 nach Rumänien führten. Der Autor begleitete Herrn Bunzmann im August/September 1998 nach Rumänien.]. Dorian, Dorel, Bukarest (Rumänien), pensionierter Ingenieur, Chefredakteur der Zeitschrift der jüdischen Minderheit in Rumänien “Relitatea Evreiascã”, Vorstandsmitglied des Verbandes der jüdischen Minderheit in Rumänien “Federaþia Comunitãþilor Evreieºti din România” (F.C.E.R.), Abgeordneter der F.C.E.R. in der Abgeordnetenkammer von 1996 bis 2004, (Bukarest, Rumänien, 7. April 2005). Fritsch, Wilhelm, Steierdorf (Banat, Rumänien), pensionierter stellvertretender Rektor des Von-MüllerGymnasiums Regensburg, früherer stellvertretender Bürgermeister von Steierdorf-Anina (1962–1967), (Regensburg, Deutschland, 15. März 2002 und 12. Juli 2002). [Wilhelm Fritsch, geboren im Jahr 1936 in Kronstadt (Rumänisch: Braºov), Siebenbürgen, Rumänien, stellvertretender Rektor im Ruhestand des Von-Müller-Gymnasiums, lebt jetzt in Regensburg, Deutschland. Herr Fritsch flüchtete aus Rumänien über Ungarn im Jahr 1971. Er war der offizielle Vertreter der deutschen Bevölkerung seiner Heimatstadt Steierdorf-Anina (Banat, Rumänien). In dieser Funktion agierte Herr Fritsch als der stellvertretende Bürgermeister von Anina. Der Autor begleitete Herrn Fritsch im Juli 2002 nach Rumänien.] Ganã, Ovidiu, Temeschwar (Banat), ehemals Gymnasiallehrer am deutschsprachigen Nikolaus Lenau Lyzeum in Temeschwar, 2000 bis 2004 Unterstaatssekretär im Departement für Interethnische Beziehungen der rumänischen Regierung für das DFDR, seit Dezember 2004 Mitglied der rumänischen Abgeordnetenkammer als Abgeordneter des DFDR in der “Fraktion der kleinen Minderheiten” und Mitglied des Schul — und Europaausschusses der Abgeordnetenkammer, (Bukarest, Rumänien, 29. März 2005). Hicks, Michael, University of Oxford, MSc (Oxon) in Economic and Social History, Bachelor (Hons) (Oxon) in Neuerer Geschichte und Wirtschaftswissenschaften. Herr Hicks war als Geschäftsmann zwischen 1991 und 1998 in Rumänien tätig (Oxford, Großbritannien, 24. Juni 2002). Kahr, Helmut, Mureck (Südsteiermark, Österreich), Vorsitzender der steirischen Wohltätigkeitsgesellschaft “Hilfe für Rumänien” (Koordinator seit 1973), unterstützt durch die österreichische Bundesregierung bei humanitären Direkthilfen und im rumänischen Teil des Banats (e.g.: Lenauheim) (Temeschburg/ Temesvar/Timiºoara, Reschitz/Reºiþa), Inhaber der Humanitas-Medaille” des Bundeslandes Steiermark (Hermannstadt, Rumänien, 18. Juli 2002). [Der Autor begleitete Herrn Kahr im Juli 2002 nach Rumänien.] Kalmár, Zoltán, Hermannstadt (Siebenbürgen, Rumänien), Ökonom im Ruhestand 1993 Mitbegründer der ungarischen Kulturvereinigung “Polgàri Magyar Müvelödési Egyesúlet”, Vorsitzender seit 1993, Herausgeber des monatlich erscheinenden ungarischen Kulturmagazins Nagyszeben És Vidéke Közéleti Kulturális Lap (d.h.: Kulturzeitung für Hermannstadt und Umgebung) (Hermannstadt, Rumänien, 28. September 2003). Kleppmann, Ulrich, (Amberg in der Oberpfalz), jetzt Skopje, Republik Mazedonien, Wirtschaftswissenschaftler, Major d.R., ehemals Zeitsoldat und stellv. Militärattache in Taschkent, Usbekistan, seit Juli 2004 Leiter der Außenstelle Skopje der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (Skopje, 3. Juni 2005). Matei, Horia C., Hermannstadt (Siebenbürgen, Rumänien), jetzt Bukarest, Historiker und Verleger, Direktor und Eigentümer des Meronia Verlages Bukarest (Bukarest, 10. März 2005). Oiºteanu, Andrei, Bukarest (Rumänien), Ingenieur, Publizist, Mitglied in der Gruppe “Grupul pentru Dialog Social”, Mitglied im Verbandes der jüdischen Minderheit in Rumänien “Federaþia Comunitãþilor Evreiºti din România” (F.C.E.R.) (Bukarest, 4. März 2005). Philippi, Professor Dr. Dres. h.c. Paul, Hermannstadt (Siebenbürgen, Rumänien), vorher Heidelberg, Deutschland, Ordinarius (Evangelische Theologie) der Universitäten von Heidelberg (emeritiert) und der “Lucian Blaga” Universität von Hermannstadt, 1992–1998 Vorsitzender des Demokratischen Forums der Deutschen in Rumänien (DFDR/F.D.G.R.), seit 1998 Ehrenpräsidenten (Hermannstadt, Rumänien, 1. und 4. April 2003). Pinter, Dr. Zeno-Karl, Hermannstadt (Siebenbürgen, Rumänien), vorher Oþelu Roºu, Banater Bergland, Rumänien, Geschichtsdozent an der “Lucian Blaga” Universität Hermannstadt sein 1990, seit 2004 Unterstaatssekretär im Departement für Interethnische Beziehungen der rumänischen Regierung für das DFDR, (Bukarest, Rumänien, 11. April 2005). Porr, Dr. Paul-Jürgen, Klausenburg (Siebenbürgen, Rumänien), Arzt, seit 1994 Vorsitzender des Regionalforums Siebenbürgen des DFDR und stellvertretender Landesvorsitzender des DFDR (Klausenburg, Rumänien, 11. März 2005).
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Reichrath, Emmerich, Temeschwar (Banat, Rumänien), jetzt Bukarest, Chefredakteur der ADZ (Bukarest, Rumänien, 11. März 2005). Rösler, Rudolf, Bistriþa/Bistritz (Siebenbürgen, Rumänien), jetzt Regensburg, Magister Silvarius, pensionierter Forstwirtschaftsdirektor (Regensburg, Deutschland, 6. Januar 2002). [Rudolf Rösler wurde im Jahr 1934 in Sächsisch-Sankt Georgen, Nordsiebenbürgen, Rumänien, geboren. Herr Rösler ist Magister Silvarius, Botaniker und Jagdgelehrter, er studierte Forstwirtschaftswissenschaften an der Universität Kronstadt (Rumänisch: Braºov), Siebenbürgen, Rumänien. Von 1958 bis 1976 arbeitete Herr Rösler in der Staatsforstverwaltung Rumäniens. Im Jahr 1976 wanderte er in die Bundesrepublik Deutschland aus und von 1976 bis zu seinem Ruhestand im Jahr 1999 war er als leitender Forstwirtschaftsdirektor im Forstamt Regensburg tätig. Im Jahr 1987 wurde Herr Rösler zum “Berater des Europäischen Rates bezüglich der Waldverwaltung des östlichen und südöstlichen Europa” berufen. Herr Rösler ist der Autor mehrerer Studien und Forschungsarbeiten auf dem Gebiet der Forstgeschichte Rumäniens.] Rudolph, Dr. Florian, Bukarest (Rumänien), Kulturreferent an der deutschen Botschaft Bukarest seit Sommer 2004 (Bukarest, Rumänien, 5. April 2005). Stendl, Professor Dr. Ioan Ernest (Hans-Ernst), Reschitz (Banater Bergland, Rumänien), jetzt Bukarest, Bildhauer und Maler, Professor an der Bukarester Kunstuniversität (Bukarest, 31. März 2005). Þurlea, Prof. Dr. Petre, Ploieºti (Rumänien), Professor für Neuere Geschichte an der Universität Ploieºti, von 1990 bis 2000 Abgeordneter der FSN (1990–1992), dann parteilos (1992–1993) und der P.U.N.R. (1993– 2000), seit 2001 wissenschaftlicher Berater der Fraktion der PRM in der rumänischen Abgeordnetenkammer (Bukarest, Rumänien, 30. März 2005). Wittstock, Eberhard-Wolfgang, Kronstadt (Siebenbürgen, Rumänien), Vorstandsmitglied des Demokratischen Forums der Deutschen in Rumänien und Mitglied der ersten Kammer (Abgeordnetenhaus) des rumänischen Parlaments (Camera Deputaþilor) von 1992–1996 und zwischen 1997 und 2004, 1992–1997 und 1997–2004 Mitglied der “Fraktion der Nationalen Minderheiten”, 2000-2004 direkt gewählter Abgeordneter des Wahlkreises von Hermannstadt, 1998-2002 Vorsitzender des DFDR, seit März 2005 Aufsichtsratsvorsitzender des ADZ-Verlages (Hermannstadt, Rumänien, 21. März und 3. April 2003). 3. Rede
Nãstase, Adrian, Rumänischer Premierminister, Vorsitzender der zwischen 2000 und 2004 regierenden Sozialdemokratischen Partei (Partidul Social Democrat, PSD), Oxford Union (Oxford, 7. November 2001). 4. Tutorium
Crampton, Richard, Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für Südosteuropäische Geschichte, Dr. phil., South Eastern European History, Tutorium, WS 2003/2004, Universität Oxford (2003/2004). 5. Filme und Fernsehdokumentationen
Südwest 3: Schauplatz der Geschichte: Siebenbürgen, Sonntag, 6. August 1995, 16.55 Uhr. ARTE Fernsehen: Brandstätter, Susanne, Schachmatt — Strategie einer Revolution, Dokumentation, Deutschland/Frankreich/Österreich/Rumänien/Ungarn/USA 2003, ZDF, Erstausstrahlung, 16:9, 60 Min. (Mittwoch, 25. Februar 2004, 20.45 Uhr). 6. Internetquellen
www.ceausescu.com www.factbook.ro/countryreports/ro www.guv.ro www.rferl.org Open Media Research Institute (OMRI): Daily Digest, E-Mailverteiler mit tagesaktuellen Nachrichten (Prag, Tschechische Republik).
II. Gedruckte Quellen Zeitungen und Magazine
Allgemeine Deutsche Zeitung für Rumänien (ADZ) (Deutsche Tageszeitung für Rumänien) (Bukarest, Rumänien) “Volksaktion fusioniert mit Lupu-Partei”, in: ADZ, Nr. 2640 (7. Juni 2003), S. 1. “Ohne schnelle Reformen kein EU-Beitritt 2007”, in: ADZ, Nr. 2645 (14. Juni 2003), S. 1.
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“Umfrage zum Stand der Korruption”, in: ADZ, Nr. 2655 (28. Juni 2003), S. 1. “Wie demokratisch ist die Sozialdemokratische Partei?”, in: ADZ, Nr. 2832 (10. März 2004), S. 3. “Totales Vertrauensvotum”, in: ADZ, Nr. 2896 (9. Juni 2004), S. 8. “PSD erzielte die meisten Mandate, PNL und PD die meisten Stimmen”, in: ADZ, Nr. 2906 (23. Juni 2004), S. 1. “Teilergebnisse: Kleinere Differenz zwischen den beiden Bündnissen”, in: ADZ, Nr. 3021 (1. Dezember 2004), S. 1–2. “Sonderklausel für Rumänien ist viel strenger als bei Bulgarien”, in: ADZ, Nr. 3028 (11. Dezember 2004), S. 1. “Scheidender Präsident Iliescu hat berüchtigten Bergarbeiterführer Miron Cozma begnadigt”, in: ADZ, Nr. 3033 (18. Dezember 2004), S. 1. “Eine Regierung um die Liberalen und Demokraten zeichnet sich ab”, in: ADZ, Nr. 3034 (21. Dezember 2004), S. 1. “Iliescu kriegt weitere Orden zurückgeschickt”, in: ADZ, Nr. 3034 (21. Dezember 2004), S. 1. “Minderheiten-Fraktion unterstützt die Bildung einer Regierung PNL-PD”, in: ADZ, Nr. 3036 (23. Dezember 2004), S. 1. “Vereidigung der neuen Regierung und Investitur durch das Parlament”, in: ADZ, Nr. 3040 (30. Dezember 2004), S. 1. “Ungarn und Rumänien vereinbarten gemeinsame Kabinettsitzungen”, in: ADZ, Nr. 3053 (19. Januar 2005), S. 1. Banater Zeitung (BZ) (Wochenblatt für Temesch, Arad und das Banater Bergland) (Temeschburg/Temesvar/ Timiºoara, Rumänien) Cãrãmidariu, Dan, “Gemeinsam die Zukunft sichern”, in: BZ, 11. Jg., Nr. 499 (18. Juni 2003), S. 2. Wagner, Richard, “Die neue Regierung”, in: Banater Zeitung, Nr. 581 (12. Januar 2005), S. 1. Curierul de Vest (Rumänische Wochenzeitung, herausgegeben in Deutschland) (Reutlingen, Deutschland) “Fostul preºedinte al României ºi-a lansat noul partid”, in: Curierul de Vest, Nr. 22 (28. Mai 2003), S. 2. Curierul Românesc (Zeitschrift der Rumänischen Kulturvereinigung Fundaþia Culturalã Românã) (Bukarest, Rumänien) Grosu, Aneta, “Românii de dincolo de noi”, in: Curierul Românesc, Nr. 1 (167) (Januar 2001), S. 5. Hermannstädter Zeitung (HZ) (Deutsche Wochenzeitung für den Kreis Hermannstadt) Hermannstadt/Sibiu, Rumänien) Stãnescu, Ruxandra und Weber, Horst, “Alle Ethnien geschrumpft”, in: HZ, Nr. 1786 (12. Juli 2002), S. 1. Henkel, Jürgen, “Ostalgie und Heldentod: Was von den Revolutionen übrigbleibt”, in: HZ, Nr. 1827 (16. Mai 2003), S. 3. Seewann, Gerhard, “Kommunismus und Minderheiten”, in: HZ, Nr. 1835 (11. Juli 2003), S. 5. “Käufliche Richter”, in: HZ, Nr. 1831 (13. Juni 2003), S. 1. Opposition rebelliert”, in: HZ, Nr. 1906 (3. Dezember 2004), S. 1-2. Karpaten Rundschau (KR) (Kronstädter Wochenschrift) (Kronstadt/Bra?ov, Rumänien) Blandiana, Ana, “Übergänge”, (Aus dem Rumänischen ins Deutsche übersetzt von Marianne Siegmund) in: KR, Nr. 22 (2712) (31. Mai 2003), S. 1. Lumea (Magazin für internationale Politik) (Bukarest, Rumänien). “Republica Moldova: Virajul spre Moscova”, in: Lumea, Nr. 3 (95) (2001), S. 10. Provincia (Vierteljährlich erscheinende Akademische Rundschau Siebenbürgens) (Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár/ Klausenburg, Rumänien) Andreescu, Gabriel, “Naþionalismul civic: între ciocan ºi nicovalã”, in: Provincia Nr. 2 (Mai 2000), S. 6. România Liberã (Wöchentlich erscheinende Internationale Ausgabe der Tageszeitung România Liberã) (Bukarest, Rumänien) Lucaciu, Ileana, “Autoritatea Electoralã Permanentã subordonat? PSD?”, in: România Liberã, Nr. 670 (15.–21. Mai 2003), S. 3. România Mare (Wöchentlich erscheinende Parteizeitung der Großrumänien-Partei /Partidul România Mare, PRM) (Bukarest, Rumänien) Roman, Viorel, Prof. Dr., “Românii ºi maghiarii la Limes”, in: România Mare, Nr. 663 (28. März 2003), S. 6-a.
III. Literatur
1. Bücher und Studien
Agh, Attila, Emerging Democracies in East Central Europe and the Balkans, E. Elgar (Cheltenham (UK) und Northampton (USA), 1998).
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T H E E U R O P E O F N AT I O N S
ORTEGA Y GASSET AND THE IDEA OF NATION CRISTI PANTELIMON
Abstract. There are two fundamental aspects to be considered for the understanding of this notion, that is, the essence of a nation: first, the general principle of organizing the nation or the formal principle of its existence (the Idea) and second, the subordinate character of the fate of the individuals in relationship with this Idea. The nation is not positively defined by a series of specific characteristics, it is not about the common language, or about the common past or other conclusive qualities as such, but it is about a Form that determines the individuals composing it to belong to it, entertaining at the same time a conscience of belonging.
One has to argue with the opinion sustained by Arnold Toynbee about the modern nation, especially since this is not a complimenting one: “The spirit of Nationality is a sour ferment of a new wine of democracy, stored within the bottles of Tribalism”1. The Spanish thinker Ortega y Gasset defines the nation in terms of an Idea that functions as a binding for all who are participating into its constitution. This Idea is assimilated with the clear conscience of such an appartenence of all the members of society at the whole that society Forms. Thus, the Idea is preceding the individuals taken separately and, as well, it is remarkable by the aspect of “constraint” (and I am using a Durkheimian term about which I consider that Ortega would have agreed with it) that is exercised over these members: “In a mental order, social reality is composed exclusively from “common places”. Yet, at their turn, a part of such common places are truisms similar to the enforced “opinion” according to which the individual members of society are belonging to it and that this society has a determined shape that we are going to call its ‘Idea’”2. Therefore, there are two fundamental aspects to be considered for the understanding of this notion, that is, the essence of a nation: first, the general principle of organizing the nation or the formal principle of its existence (the Idea) and second, the subordinate character of the fate of the individuals in relationship with this Idea. The nation is not positively defined by a series of specific characteristics, it is not about the common language, or about the common
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1 A Study of History, apud Ortega y Gasset, Europa ºi ideea de naþiune, tanslated in Romanian by Sorin Mãrculescu, Bucharest, Humanitas, 2002, p. 53. 2 Ibidem, p. 53–54, my transl. All the following quotes are my English version, translated from Romanian.
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., IV, 1, p. 59–74, Bucharest, 2007.
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past or other conclusive qualities as such (this kind of qualities can be also met in the case of other Ideas of social organization, at the inferior Ideas, as the tribes are), but it is about a Form that determines the individuals composing it to belong to it, entertaining at the same time a conscience of belonging. We can distinguish here echoes of the German, formal sociology (Ortega is quoting here the sociologist Alfred Vierkandt, a formalist, with who, he is engaged in a disagreement, too!), conducting toward the observation that each Form (or Idea) of social organization has its own underpinning, one that is, of course, limited in time. Nevertheless, the important fact is to establish that, from the point of view of the formal sociology, the very existence of nation as such cannot be disputed. It is a body organized around an Idea, which cannot pretend a pereniality in time. The older forms of social organization were, for instance, the horde or the tribe. They are with anything inferior to the idea of nation, or, the main issue discussed here is not the matter of (with this observation Ortega answers to Toynbee, who, by “tribalism”, obviously, understands something that is to be considered of an inferior range in relationship with the modern world): “The tribe represents a particular idea of society that has got very precise characteristics, and among other, I mention for now just that the group in question emanates, genealogically speaking, from certain ancestors who were common either to the entire mankind, or to its most part. Before existed the Idea of tribe, it existed the idea of horde, such as, afterward, there were many other Ideas of society”3. The Idea of a society “gathers” around its attributes the individual members that are composing it. Thus, it matters less which exactly is the name of a nation (for instance, Romanian, Bulgarian or French) or a tribe (“Manam”, “Zande”, “Bayeke”4), the fact important being that all these social types of organisation are, formally, identical (the nations among themselves and the tribes among themselves, of course) and that their members are belonging to them and, at the same time, they are subordinated to them. This formula for the coagulation of societies under the national idea has, though, its own limits in time. Ortega is convinced that, at least at the European level, there is now the moment that the nations decided to organize them, within a new kind of political community one that has to be “supra” or “ultra-national”. The nation represents from this perspective an anachronism: “At present, this matter retains nothing academically, while it is of a supreme and urgent gravity. Because the European nations have arrived at a moment when they cannot save themselves unless they succeeded to overcome themselves as nations, in other words, if we succeeded to make the nations accept the validity of the opinion according to which the nationality, as the most accomplished form of collective life is an anachronism, that it is emptied of any future fertility and that it is, briefly put, historically impossible”5.
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3 Ibidem, p. 54. 4 In order to make my point, I have randomly chosen these tribal names from Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Experienþa misticã ºi simbolurile la primitivi (The Mystical Experience and the Symbols at the Primitive People), translated in Romanian by Raluca Lupu-Oneþ, Ed. Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 2003. 5 Op. cit., p. 54–55. The Idea after which the nation is the most accomplished form of collective life, was sustained with approximately three decades before Ortega wrote these lines by Dimitrie Gusti, in Romania. Meanwhile, the Second World War took place... and both the attention and the priorities got shifted away.
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Nation, between inertial reality and the project for the future Polis and nation
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When comparing, from a quantitative point of view, the Greek City (the Polis) with the modern nation, Ortega brings into discussion a pretty simple remark, which many other commentators have emphasized: while with the Greeks one of the conditions of existence for a natural order there was the small number of citizens (about a few thousands), hence everybody could gaze at each and everyone, to see everybody else (the City to be easily grasped with a perspective glance, ευσυνοπτος), the modern nation is impossible to grasp at once, in one sight, and at once, or, at the surface, since it is something much more profound, denser, and more latent in its nature. Therefore, the (modern) idea of nation always entertains the hope of a special potentiality, one that is far from being obvious in everyday life. The nation is always a hope, especially because its very gist, and also its entire premises are impossible to behold definitively with one look (and I understand here not only the physical look, but also the mental one). The nation has “hidden richness”, or, at least, this is the suggestion made by our comparison, as Ortega noticed, too. One may speculate on the tendency of the nations to perceive the future as a better one in comparison with the past gaining thus, anyway, a sort of optimism at least equal with that sprung from the guaranteed stability and the tranquillity of the past. This perspective makes me recall Renan’s idea of a daily plebiscite, that is, of an act of will fundamentally grounded in the future, even when it has its roots deeply in the past. The comparison between the Polis and the nation does not end here. While the Polis appears from the very beginning as a mature organisation, tailored for a specific political, military, administrative, or juridical end (thelos), the nation does not become a state unless it goes through a pretty long period of maturing. The nation has, as a consequence, first, a vast past behind and, second, not all the nations become. The Polis, on the other hand, contrary to this opinion is an entity that arrives at a (real or legendary) moment of an endowment (κτισις). “The nation though is that entity we have behind us as support, it is a vis a tergo6 and not just a blatant figure in front of our very mind, as it was the Polis for the citizen. The nationality makes us compatriots before it makes us cocitizens. It does not stay in our will, it does not live out of our will, but, irremediable, it exists by itself — as a natural reality”. This natural entity that is the nation presupposes in Ortega’s opinion a fundamental lack of preoccupation from the part of the individual in what the nation is concerned. Being something well-understood, in other words, taken for granted and not necessarily consciously understood (as was the case with the Greek Polis), existing beyond the individual wills, in a fabulous past and in a future full of potentialities, as I stated above, too7. The nation is something that
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6 In Latin, this means “force from behind”. 7 The nation has, apparently, two facets that are equally deep: a future, that is very difficult to read, yet impressive given its promises and a fabulous past, that seems to be the more important, the more bleary it is.
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normally does not preoccupy consciously the individual. Even more, for this reason, the excessive, tenacious, and conscious for the fate of the nation (namely, nationalism) is a strange and improper phenomenon: “This is the explanation of the fact that, normally, the individual is not preoccupied by his own nation (that is, given the natural character of the nation8). The individual perceives the nation as existing for a very a long time and continuing for a very a long time to exist, by itself, without the particular input or collaboration of the individual. As a consequence, the form of preoccupation for the nation that is the “nationalism”, even in its most inevitable, measured and, one may say, natural appearance, is though something added, an artificial, and not spontaneous, constitutive and primary, as it was the “civism” or the politism for the Greek or Latin individual, that is, a permanent preoccupation and occupation with their City”.9 To further clarify the idea of nation, Ortega resorts to a duality of notions in pairs: on the one hand the City and Ellas for the Greek, on the other hand, the nation and Europe for the German (Ortega’s work is at origin a conference addressed to a German public). For the Greeks, notices Ortega, there are series of similar elements recalling for the analyst the fact of belonging to a nation. Thus, the members of a nation understand each other rather well when they speak, have common gods (although not all of them), and they have the conscience of a vague common origin. This unity is, nevertheless, just an “inertial habit”, something that comes from the past, and not a project for action with a certain and clear orientation towards the future. The oriented action facing the future is the political Form or the political Idea (the one already mentioned), while the inertial past is only the “matter” of this form. The distance between the two is, obviously, the distance between the more or less nebulous and common past (vaguely felt as an element of bounding) among the Greeks from different cities and the obvious political present, that separates the various cities among themselves: “In this sense there is no shred of doubt that the “form” of the Greek person was his citizenship, the quality of being-an- Athenian, of being-a-Spartan, of being-a-Theban, and that meanwhile, the individual’s conscience of belonging to the Hellenic world having an exclusively character of an inertial habit”10. Ortega sustains that the fact of the (inertial) Hellenism had nothing in common with the fact of citizenship (or with
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8 At least, this is the way I see it. 9 Op. cit., p. 64. 10 Ortega y Gasset, Op. cit., p. 73. One encounters a similar opinion on the character of the ancient Hellenism at the French classicist and historian. He said: “The Greeks, not only the ones living in the Balkan Peninsula, but also those within Asia Minor and Sicily, those from Marseille and from the towns on the shore of Pont-Euxin (the Black Sea), considered themselves the same kind, brothers. And they were conscious of their profound unity in what the language was concerned (despite the differences due to certain local dialects). Also, their unity concerned religion and customs, a unity that was setting them apart from the world the called “barbarian”, that is, the totality of the peoples speaking another language than the Greek. The word “Greece”, though, — Hellás — had never got, during Antiquity, a real political meaning; Greece itself was never a unitary state before the Macedonian and Roman domination” (Robert Flacelière, Viaþa de toate zilele în Grecia secolului lui Pericle /Everyday Life in Greece during Pericle’s Century, translated in Romanian by Liliana Lupas, Ed. Humanitas, 2006, p. 5).
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the agile Greek individual, for that matter, as he names the human being of action, or the human seen in action, as well as the human of the projects set in motion, to use an expression proposed by Fichte, who considered the human being reine Agilität — pure agility). So, the fact of the (inertial) Hellenism had nothing to do with the political present and future. How can one understand this? One manner of interpretation would be to emphasize the huge differences between the way Greeks used to live the fact of nation and the way in which we live it, as Europeans. The (enormous) difference between the manner in which the Greek used to live his Hellenic inertial reality and the one in which the modern Europeans live this inertial national reality is given by the fact that, in the modern world, all the inertial forms of life have become integral manners to be a human being, in other words, all these manners have transformed themselves in tradition and what Ortega named vis a tergo in a future reality, in a vis proiectiva, in a life ideal. The nations are thus projects for the future, energetic actualizations of the human being, and meanwhile peoples are just the groups that want to be what they are, namely they want to live in the pure inertia of their past heritage. These are the old “nations” in the medieval meaning of the term. Examples for such nations are the Swabians, the Normans, or the Picardians. Only that, nowadays, as Ortega noticed, no one would wage a war to prove he is a Norman or a Swabian. Something like this would be a returning to the past, it would be as a ghost, incapable to find its own place within the present time frame. Similarly, no one can declare herself today to be an Ardeal person, a Fãgãraº person, or a Banat person, in Romania, without getting herself into ridicule, because such labels are ridiculous as symbols of the present. They are inertial forms of collective life, they are in this sense pre-national, and, as such, they are belonging to the ethnographic museum. Conversely, the nationality is Romanian and it presupposes before anything else a strong desire to be integrally a Romanian in this national particularity11. While we are now born into a nation, the (ancient) City was “made” from the individuals. Such differences are going to be dimmer and dimmer, from a certain point of view. As we have seen in my argumentation, the nation is becoming today more and more something like the ancient City from the perspective where a nation is not just the total amount of some material and inertial elements, but it is also their form and their full actualization from a future perspective. The nation is, as well, made (otherwise it would not be a viable form), and at the same time we are born into it. Therefore, the nation combines both facets of a political organisation: it is inertial, and realized at present, for the future, each individual being obliged to take interest in the accomplishment of the nation. While the Greek is severed by the inertial Hellenic reality (which, essentially, that person ignores), the modern human being who is part of a nation undertakes the past of the nation and capitalizes it in a political future where the (sociological) stage of “people” is overcame.
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11 Dimitrie Gusti also sustains the idea of the integrity for the national human condition.
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The Greek City had nothing to do with the reality of tradition, it was solely a juridical artefact. On the other hand, within the nation, the “energy, the agility of its members are not employed only in matters of external policy, as are the protection of the City, the domination of other Cities, but it enthusiastically lives the complete manner of being a human, that represents the very content of its collective Idea, that is struggling to refine and enrich; briefly, it projects it into the future, as an ideal to be realized, as the very icon of its past, attempting to take it toward perfection12, underlining the fact that the inertia of a past is constantly becoming some sort of aim, and as an icon of exemplarity for the common future”13. The nation cannot be founded on anything else but the human pattern, the one that can fully live the both forms of time, the future and the past, as Ortega noticed. One may speculate and say that the pattern of the ideological man cannot be compatible with that one of the national man. The man without nation is the man without past (in the sense that the ideological man either ignores or is uninterested by that past), but that person could be as well the man without the future (that is, the person that refuses self-accomplishment in the name of a socalled perfection already given, of the forefathers). Both variants are solutions offered by failed ideologues, both resent a wing of this flying organism that is represented by time and, this way, both are going to be unsuccessful in their attempt to confront the times. The question that stays in front of the researcher now, after this comparison of the differences between the Greeks and the Europeans from the perspective of the idea of nation is: what exactly has to go on in the collective soul of the peoples, in order to determine them to become nations and this way, to be searching for their specific exemplarity in each and every case? The answer given by Ortega is the following one: “It is necessary that, at a certain date, early enough, they would have the clear consciousness that life does not consist entirely of what one already is, by tradition, but to perceive themselves as belonging to a much ampler unit, that is not just their very own a tergo, namely: the huge space of an anterior civilization. This represented for the European peoples the Roman West (...) Roman civilization appeared as a an “integral manner to be a human being” already consecrated and sublimated14”, and this, for all the Germanic peoples that came in contact with the old civilization of Rome and which thus felt indebted to show that thy are much more than their “popular” past. While the European peoples have had a clear cut model, the Greeks, going into the Aegean
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12 This way, the “idealization of the past” of which the nationalism is accused can be interpreted to its benefit, as a process of refining and of transformation or of the betterment of the past. What are designated as ideal are not a dark and bleak past, but, quite the opposite, it is the result of a selection process, where the positive elements are gathered in a pattern, in order to give a processed orientation for the future. At the same time, the idealisation of the past does neither mean that the past is neither uncritically situated on a pedestal of stone nor that it becomes a frozen ideal to be idolised. The Ideal has got this inner quality to be self-improving permanently, to self-polish, until it becomes utopia. 13 Op. cit., p. 80. 14 Op. cit., p. 82.
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Sea met there a great variety of mixed civilizations and cultures, and for this reason they were rather “disoriented”. There were intersected all kinds of influences: Babylonian, Hittite, Egyptian, Cretan, Phoenician, etc. Is there a European suprastate? Germany, the country of moderate nationalism...
Ortega was convinced that what we call to European unity (and which tends to become a unique European state) represents in fact an old contribution made by Europe to its internal equilibrium and to the external one (of the world) based on the idea of the equilibrium of power. Such a reality is of a historical nature: “There was an extremely ample and powerful — the European society — which, as society, was constituted on a basic order owed to the efficiency of certain supreme instances: the intellectual and moral creed of Europe. This order that, underneath all its superficial disorders, was acting within the depth of the West, has sent its radiating influence over the rest of the planet for many generations and has introduced in it, more or less, that order that it could provide”15. Unfortunately, this order seem to be vanished by the end of the First World War and with the creation of the Society of Nations, which Ortega was openly criticizing, considering it a an anti-historical institution, an overcame anachronism, whose spirit was already wedged at time it was created16. The idea of the European unity is founded at Ortega y Gasset on the extremely distinct concept of European public opinion that would always exist. Of course, we do not have to understand by this public opinion what journalism guidebooks understand by it, that is a more or less inform mass of receivers that are formed (manipulated) on a information market and that, most certainly, have at their disposal, possibilities to “react” to this information bombardment often orchestrated, with (few) opinions ‘pro’ or ‘con’. Usually, public opinion defined in this manner is divided in black and white, in adepts and opponents, in sustainers and enemies of a specific issue. This is not the way public opinion speaks should be understood in the perspective open by the Spanish, but as a large movement of ideas, one with distinct historical and geopolitical valences, that manifests itself at the level of the entire European continent. The content of this opinion is formed by the sum of the political, morale, economic, military and cultural issues that are essential, because they are concerning the destiny of Europe, understood as a civilization that stands by itself. Public opinion, at its turn, determines the apparition of a public power, hence an organized form of power, of a form of state or of a cvasi-state form of power. Without such a public opinion, we cannot even imagine the public power. The two notions, Ortega assured, are ancient European realities: “Or, it is indisputable that all the peoples from the West have always lived within a frame — Europe — where there was
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15 Ibidem, p. 112. 16 Ibidem, p. 57 and 113. Instead of being an institution with a historical force of anticipation (to forestall unpleasant), the Society of Nations was dead at birth. From here one deduces its incapacity to prevent the disaster of the Second World War.
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always a European. And, along with it there was also, with necessity, a European public power that has incessantly exercised its pressure over each and every people from Europe. In this authentic and rigorous sense, a certain form of European state has always existed and there were no people that did not feel its pressure, sometimes, a terrible one”17. The public power that has acted within the national European state was never exclusively national. Obviously, not even the public opinion that stays behind this power could be strictly and narrowly localized, only at the level of the particular nations. The European states have permanently moved in an ultra-national frame of public opinion and, hence, of public power, in a web of interests and ideas that, of course, overcame the national borders. What is this overcoming of the particular nations if it is not the very European Union, except it is presupposing a equilibrium and not a static and a monolithic profile? “We ought to realize eventually that for many centuries — and considering their conscience from 400 years ago —, all the peoples from Europe live subjected to a public power which by its very own dynamic purity does not allow any other name than the one inspired from the science of mechanics: “the European equilibrium” or the equilibrium of Power. This is the authentic government of Europe that arranges by its flight through history the swarm of peoples, pushing their fortunes and as bellicose as are the bees, freed from the ruins of the ruins of the ancient world. The unity of Europe is not a fantasy, but it is the reality itself, and the fantasy is exactly the opposite: the belief that France, Germany, Italy or Spain is substantial realities and, therefore, they are also complete and independent realities. It is understandable that not everyone perceives with clarity the unity of Europe, because Europe is not a “thing”, but a kind of “equilibrium”. This particular definition for the European Union and, eventually, of the Europe, as equilibrium and not as a thing, thus as a monolithic union, forewarns us that the current project of European unification could be as well unsuccessful. And this because the union now desired (and, with which, one could be, in principle, in agreement — in the sense that one has nothing against the idea of unity) could endanger the very idea of that particular equilibrium, on which Europe relies for centuries. In fact, the issue of the European Union is not the same as the issue of unity (Ortega demonstrates that such a unity has always existed), but it concerns the form of the unity that is accomplished. The union exists, but one could imagine the multitude of the possible formulae for realizing this unity, out of which, of course, very few are also functional, or, could be functional only the ones that have already proven to be functional. Hitler wanted as well a union of a certain kind for Europe, and Stalin succeeded to “unify” half of the European continent, yet, these geopolitical mega structures could not sustain themselves. In consequence, it is important that the new European unity
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17 Op. cit., p. 96. It has to be said that Ortega spoke in these lines about a supranational or ultra-national State, what is not all the same thing as a national State. This European state is rather diffuse, yet present within all the manifestations of the national states, and it is defined, eventually, as I shall argue, through the idea of the European equilibrium.
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is not going to sacrifice the possibility of that diversity that could recreate the old style equilibrium, the only one that ensures a natural and enriched survival for our continent. The new European unity should not suffocate the ability of this continent to equilibrium under the power to level the trans-national bureaucracy. The bureaucracy should, at its turn, submit itself to a superior principle of moral and material equilibrium and not to allow itself to become a kind of end in itself for the functioning of the European institutions. Unfortunately, any bureaucratic mechanism has this deficiency in seeking to sustain itself, even outside an external logic that is justifying its existence. The European bureaucracy should not become the corner stone of the present European construction, because in that moment the equilibrium and the vitality of the continent would be suffocated. In what concerns the case of the German nationalism, Ortega overthrows the preconceived ideas concerning the “ferocious” nationalism of the German romantics, which manifested itself disproportionately, in a European environment that was “purified” of such an atavist manifestation. One has to keep in mind that the most important German thinkers of the Romanticism or pre-Romanticism have often sacrificed their dearest ideal, German nationality, which they ardently desired, for the European equilibrium, for the European “concerto”, without which they realized that Germany itself could not exist. It is the case of Humboldt, and that of other very important German nationalists blamed by some Germans that they did not militate enough for a totally autonomous Germany: “The restraint of Humboldt, Stein18, Gneisenau19, Niebuhr20, their effort to in castrate “German nationality” in the real historic block of Europe did not emanate, as presupposes Meinecke21, from apolitical and universal ideas, or from the cosmopolitan ideas, ideas type 18th century, but from a very realistic sense, both politically and historically (...) Stein and Gneisenau do not hesitate a moment to maim their countries to give in portions of territory to Russia and to England. Given that they understood that nothing could be obtained for their nation unless the European cohabitation was ensured, simultaneously and, in consequence, unless they made possible a society of Europe”22.
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Karl Heinrich Friedrich Stein (1757–1831) was prim-minister of Prussia (1807–1808), personal counsellor of the tsar Alexander I and one of the most important artisans of the anti-napoleonian coalition. 19 Neihart von Gneisenau (1760–1831) was feldmarschall in Prusian army. 20 Barthold Georg Niebuhr (1776–1831) was an important German historian, initiator of the method of the criticism of the historical sources. 21 Friedrich Meinecke (1862–1954) was the author of the book entitled Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat (7th ed., 1928), from which Ortega quotes, in which Meinecke attacks the cosmopolitan “blindness” of some old legendary names of the German nationalism, as the ones in the (above) reproduced quote. 22 The national sacrifices made in the name of a principle of European equilibrium represents the best proof for the force of that equilibrium, for the imperative of necessity that he introduces in the existence of the continent. This is the reason why, even the greatest German nationalists (pay attention, at stake here is not the demagogical and blind nationalism, but the one based on a historical and political intuition) gave in against this imperative. Political realism is nothing else but the implicit recognition of the European equilibrium. These remarks are applicable to other historical moments, too. Nowadays, for instance, the German nationalism is more than “contained” within the idea of the European equilibrium. Germany leads a prudent politics within the continent, politics that enabled it to regain the territories conquered by the Russian communism after the Second World War. At the same time, against the inter-war manner to return in Europe (based on the military idea), today Germany is coming back in as a part in the European concerto using the diplomatic channels and the opportunities brought about by its competitive economy. A politics of equilibrium means, this time, a new alliance and a partnership with Russia, yet with a careful coordination with France.
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Thus, Ortega believed that it is prejudiced to consider that Germany was always the country of the nationalism without nuances, type furor teutonicus. On the contrary, he said, until Wilhelm II, it was the country of the most moderate nationalism, and Bismarck, for instance (although Ortega reproached him to have been the first German statesman to exploited that Teutonic frenzy), appears nevertheless as a Cancelar with a great historical and European responsibility, with a sense of equilibrium and measure extremely developed. Going from the realm of political action to that of ideas, a great thinker as Fichte was, one of the most enthusiastically German nationalists is, nevertheless, an author who does not sacrifice the idea of Humanity at the expense of the German nationalism, although he frenetically believed in the German nation. This type of nationalism is totally different from the narrow-minded nationalism of the present day, that is a nationalism without horizon, and also totally different from the nationalism that was professed by the followers of Fichte from the first half of the 20th century. The nuances of these observations were emphasized by Ortega: “The German people — thought Fichte — must be radically, frenetically, the German people, but the characteristic of this people is to be the ‘people of Humanity’. Let us see what it implies. Fichte felt a “national” patriot to his bones. Yet, his manner to feel national is that one I called “to-be-agility”, that is, to see your own nation projected into the future as the best possible program to be a human being, as such, through Humanism, Universalism or Cosmopolitanism. One must be German because to be German means to be one with Humanity. Contrary to the recent hiper-nationalisms, that intended to make Humanity German”23. The argument supports, for example, the affirmation made later on by Johann Eduard Erdmann (1805–1892): “To be just German is anti-German”24. The frenetic nationalism of Fichte is nothing but an idealization of the German people, which, in his view, had to become the cultural model of humanity. Only that such an idealization has to be understood starting from the notion of “ideal”, functioning as a guiding light, as a supreme aim and dream, not as a mechanism to occult the deficiencies of this people, not to forcibly transform it in an universal model. In order to become a fulfilled nation (that is, universal), the German nation had to become the model nation for the world, namely, to go through a process of purification-idealization. I have already made the distinction between this type of “correct” idealization and the negative idealization of the narrow-minded nationalism of the present. In other words, the path of a nation toward itself goes indisputably through the universal (cosmopolitan) idea of Humanity. Only this idea can serve as a basis for the creative nationalism. Before they succeed in being Germans (and this is the aim), the Germans would have to pass a kind of exam of exemplarity in front of the mankind. On the contrary, the nationalism lacking an universal horizon is content with the present state of the nation and entertains no aspirations but to
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23 Ortega y Gasset, Op. cit., p. 109. 24 Undeutsch sei, bloss deutsch zu sein, in German in original (p. 109–110).
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perpetuate this present state of things. Indeed, Ortega will say at some point that all peoples respond exclusively to the circumstantial forces that determine their emergence and that human being in general does not exist; there is only the national human being. Resuming Burke’s ideas, who said for the first time that loves the prejudices of the English as well, especially because they are prejudices25, Ortega relocates the idea of prejudice in the first ranks of the cultural pantheon of humanity. History is a succession of circumstances and of occasional creations and not an abstract and rational trajectory. As a consequence, the prejudices are the vital forces that are determining the fate of the peoples. “We see today with all clarity and with enough calm that the human being is essentially nothing more than a prejudice, being so, represents all the best. Culture, even in its highest and most exemplary meaning is the art to polish the best way we can this irremediable prejudice that we are”26. The relationship between nationalism and democracy
We have to emphasize a few considerations on the relationship nationalism–democracy. In general, the modern theoreticians of the nation consider that the relationship between democracy and nationalism is pretty tight and that it represents a manifestation of a historical complex and of a cultural characteristic for the modern epoch. When one sees democracy as an extremely ample movement that overflows the European continent after the beginning of the 19th century, this could lead one to see nationalism merely as a “legitimate child” of this major democratic current. Nationalism could not possibly emerge before the democratic ideas about the world, because only such ideas supposedly led to the emergence of the national states — being the opposite of the dynastic states, the states of the divine right. The nation appears historically out of the unofficial and revolutionary struggles that were de-structuring the old world. Of course, this is the argument of someone like J. Evola, for whom nationalism is only a next to the last landmark toward a definitive loss of meaning of this political world engaged on the revolutionary route. In his perspective, the phenomenon was a struggle against the conservative principles on which the World of Tradition made its bedrock27. After nationalism all that remains is the amassed world of the communism and the historical cycle ends in its final degradation. The modern theoreticians as the revolutionary theoreticians find in this relationship between nationalism and democracy (a synchronization, in the sense that they appear about the same time) a proof for the permissive character of democracy. At the same time, they manifest reticence in front of the
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25 Something that the revolutionary ideology of Enlightenment could never admit, obviously, since it considered that had the mission to free all peoples of the medieval darkness of belief and prejudice where they were smudged for hundreds of years. 26 Ortega, Op. cit., p. 108. 27 V. Julius Evola, Revoltã împotriva lumii moderne, translated in Romanian by Cornel Nocolau, Bucharest, Ed. Antet, without year, chapter Nationalism and collectivism, where the modern nationalism is the third stage of the world’s decay, from the universal toward the collective, the last stage being the collectivism itself.
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nationalist phenomenon. Those are democracy lovers, but they are deprived of affection against its “progenies”, and among these, the nationalist phenomenon being perceived as the most pernicious. Evidently, this type of theoretician is an ideologue of democracy. If it was true that democracy sprung nationalisms, then this theoretician, as a democracy supporter, should admit its progenies, too. Yet, the bias of those theoreticians without historical orientation stops artificially at the term “democracy”, which they neither define nor understand (except in an ideological and confuse way, as a “good” governing principle, with power for the masses, granted freedom, and a political class under the strict control of the public opinion. In reality, any political regime needs permanently a re-check and a redefining, in order to allow the forces that animate it at some point in history to be well emphasized. For Evola, democracy has no positive meanings; since it is nothing else than a decline of the political idea from the divine rank to the immanence of the popular world. I have to underline that between these two extreme conceptions — the rejection of democratism, thus, of nationalism by Evola, on the one hand, and the rejection only of nationalism and the embracing of democratism, by the modern theoreticians, on the other hand — there is the perfect place both for Ortega’s ideas and for the relationship nationalismdemocratism. The democratic ideas appear in Europe approximately at the same time with the nationalist ideas from Germany (between the 1790s and the 1870s). Ortega returns to the offending definition of Toynbee on nationalism that was considered by the latter an impure mixture of tribalism and democracy. In reality, national conscience is much older than democracy and has nothing in common with tribalism: “The conscience of Nationality has nothing in particular to do with tribalism and, even more; it is so much older than the invention of democracy. It is not the case, as a consequence, to identify the latter as mother Nationality (...). What did happen at the dawns of democracy, namely in the first years of the 19th century, was that, with democracy, Western peoples started to fell under the toxic spell of the demagogues — being these right or left — and given that the unique strategy of these irresponsible characters is to exacerbate everything so that they could intoxicate the masses, the conscience of Nationality has already had a past of two centuries of quiet and peaceful life, was transformed into a political program. But, political programs are never made out of authentic ideas, but they are tailored only out of isms, and vice versa, until something rises to the level of ism which means only that it ceased to be something authentic, both transforming itself and degrading itself into a ‘program’”28. Therefore, far from being the daughter of democracy (and, far for being tributary to the latter, as an inferior rank phenomenon), the conscience of nationality appears about two centuries earlier than democracy. The well-balanced nationalism degrades during democracy especially due to the species of demagogues, that “intoxicate” the masses and build, an ideology, a political
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28 Op. cit., p. 93.
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program, out of the national principle. As long as it remained as an idea and a natural sentiment, the national idea ensured the peace of Europe. When it got transformed into an ideology, it became one of the obscure forces of history. The first nationalist war was at the same time the first great democratic revolution in history: the French Revolution. Then was also launched the idea of the nation in arms, an idea that had so many important ideological implications and, from the perspective opened for investigating nationalism here, not so many national consequences...Thus, demagogic democracy weakened the national inborn principles, and by the exacerbation of nationalism, to the point where it sustained the Nazi aberration since, as we still notice today, a demagogic “intoxication” needs always something more and stronger. Under such an interpretation, nationalism escapes Evola’s label, of phenomenon caught within the deconstruction of the Traditional Life of Europe. Nationalism can be the matter of an organic and well-balanced idealistic love for the nation. The nations, at their turn, represent the new historical syntheses of the post-Roman world. Nothing could be more natural that a due share of appreciation and love for these historical syntheses. The nationalism emerges before democracy, so the democratic “scarlet letter” cannot touch it. Thus the nation and the nationalism lose the bleak perspective cast upon them by Evola’s interpretation. On the other hand, the birth of democracy brings along the terrifying species of the demagogue. This is precisely the right time for the dissolution of the democratic pattern discussed by Evola. This character is the one who destroys the roots of the European Tradition, exactly in the name of this Tradition (because Europe, as an heir of the Roman Empire is indisputably founded, on the basis of a prefiguration of the national principle — thus, it has its roots, at least partially, embedded into the ethnical idea). The demagogue manipulates the ethnicity and its immemorial persistence. The danger of the dynamic closeness among peoples
In my opinion, there is another idea worth being examined, namely that of the relationship between the distance, in terms of civilization and technology and the moral distance existing among different peoples. From a technical point of view, 20th century is characterized by an explosive progress of the means of communication. Ortega notices rightfully that it was not the 19th century, characterized in its most part by the optimism in front of the material progress, based on the advancement of technology, the epoch of the unprecedented technological transformations, but the 20th century. The world becomes due to technology a kind of “global village”, as McLuhan said, yet, the consequences at a moral level are not by far as comforting as the apologists of the technological progress might have seen it. Peoples are now, technologically, closer one from another, but the moral distance, instead of vanishing, has increased: “Both suddenly and truly, during these last years, each people, by the hour and, actually, by any minute, is receiving such a huge amount of recent news about what is going on with all the others, that created the illusion that any
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people is effectively situated in the middle of all the other peoples, if not, in their proximity. In other words, considering the effects in what concerns the public universal life, the dimensions of the world have suddenly contracted themselves, getting smaller. Peoples found themselves all of the sudden, dynamically, much closer. And all that is taking place exactly when the peoples of Europe have gained, morally, the most distance among them”29. The distance mentioned here by the Spanish author is not necessarily a hostile distancing, but rather, one that is betraying the moral vacuum that is affecting all peoples, given that they are mutually ignoring each other, fundamentally disinterested by one another. Starting from such a moral vacuum it is obviously possible to arrive at hostility as well, as soon as the conditions are right. In fact, hostility may appear out of the blue sky, without any menacing cloud, without any sign of a will to get to know the other or without any trace of interest or of mutual appreciation. The moral vacuum may result anytime in the disaster of an open hostility, as a consequence of the impact of timeless and faceless forces of ignorance. Ortega’s idea that the technological closeness (he calls it “dynamic”) among the peoples led to the increase of the degree of brutal intervention of some people against others. The most striking case is, within the last century that of the most active peoples geopolitically, namely the case of the American and English people. This type of intervention is often extremely subjective and deformed, especially due to the technological conditions that are amplifying a so-called mutually recognition of among peoples. Actually, such technological means are not doing anything else but perceiving (as looking in a deforming mirror) the superficial envisioning of a people within the collective imaginary of another one, and it is misleadingly replacing the specialized knowledge. Peoples that are strong from a military and economic point of view are acting in conformity with such deforming perspectives. Even more, the false opinion resulting from such a superficial perception often becomes an instrument of pressure at the geopolitical level, which was not the case during the past centuries, when the mutual perception, and opinion, of some peoples against others did not come to be reflected by deeds with an international relations nature: “A century ago did not matter that people in the United States afforded an opinion on what happened in Greece and that opinion was the consequence of the fact that they were ill-informed. As long as the American government did not undertake any action, that opinion was inoperative in relationship to the destiny of Greece. The world was then “bigger”, less compact and more elastic. The dynamic distance between a people and another one was so big that, while crossing it, the incongruent opinion would loose its toxicity (...) During the last years, peoples entered into such an extreme dynamic proximity, and the opinion of, for example, some social North-American groups intervenes effectively — directly, as an opinion, not as government — within the Spanish civil war. I am sustaining the same argument about the English opinion”30.
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29 Op. cit., p. 117–118. 30 Ibidem, p. 120–121.
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Such a situation becomes indeed dangerous as the dynamic proximity among the peoples is increasing. Such interventions of the opinions become (and most of the times the opinions are falsifying because the mutual recognition among the peoples is virtually impossible, as Ortega argues, in comparison with the knowledge that peoples have about themselves31) real “intrusions”, violent inferences into the life of other peoples. The result is the hermetical closure of the peoples in front of one another, especially to bar such an “ethnical breaking an entry”: “I sustain therefore that the new structure of the world is transforming into real intrusions the movements of the opinion entertained in a country about what is going on in another one, while they used to be almost harmless once. This would suffice to explain why, when the European nations seemed to get closer in a superior union, they started suddenly to enclose in themselves, to make their existence hermetic against one another, and to transform their borders in protective diving suits”32. Therefore, it is naïve to believe that the dynamic closeness among the peoples leads automatically to the mutual recognition or to a mutual understanding (that would translate itself into a peace). Often, such a degree of recognition that is too elevated may have contrary effects, such as mutual closure, or even hostility and rejection. Many times this is exactly what is going on at the European level. The opening of the West toward the East did not mean an increased closeness and a fraternal embrace among the peoples from the two areas of the continent that were separated till 1989 by the so-called iron Curtain. Frequently, this closeness has generated gestures of moral rejection that were more violent than these produced before the fall of the Berlin Wall. The initial opening was followed by a mutual closing among peoples. The lesson is simple: the harmonious existence of the different forms of ethnicity cannot be imagined outside any form of border or limit. Peoples need a neutral space in order to get to know each other (in the terminology of the personal relationship they need an intimacy, a space of the greeting — which Ortega mentions, too). It is necessary as well that any people is able to create and impose a physical barrier or at least a zone symbolically protected, taken into consideration by all the others. This is not a plea for reinstalling the physical borders, but for making people aware of the necessity of limitation and self-limitation, in what concerns the intrusions of some peoples within the life of the others. Thus, the disappearance of the borders within the European mammoth state is not necessarily an occasion that would bring people together, but one that — strictly from a logical point of view — would just mix
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31 “(...) any attempt to overlook the fact that a people is an intimacy, the same way as a person, yet maybe, in different ways and for other reasons, is going to be sinister — as a consequence, it is a system of secrets that cannot be simply discovered from the exterior (let us recall Berdiaev’s idea, according to which, the nation is a mystery – my observation). The reader should think something neither vague nor mystique. Let us consider any collective function, for instance the language. It is good to know that it is proved to be almost impossible to know intimately a foreign language, no matter how intensely one would have studied it. And wouldn’t it be crazy to think that is an easy task to know the political reality from another country?” (Op. cit., p. 122). 32 Ibidem, p. 123.
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peoples. But this mixture (amalgam) is dangerous especially for their relationships (let us not forget that some intervention within the businesses of others, based of the wrong opinions, is exactly the greatest danger Ortega indicates for the state of the international relations). We either reinstall this interactive harmony and order in the relationships from the interior of Europe (with the help of the symbolic borders), or we wait for the moment of the total acceptance of all peoples by all the others. Yet, one has to understand that this moment will not come before the profile of all peoples has flatten in an amorphous mass, in a (now) hypothetical European people. Only the disappearance of the different ethic traits may bring about the complete calmness (peace) of the relationships among the peoples that get mixed up all together. On the contrary, as long as the individual lines ridge the ethnic physiognomy, the only way to understand and collaborate with a different ethnicity is to respect a symbolic interval in the case of each and every ethnic group.
THE IMAGINING OF NATIONAL SPACES IN INTERWAR ROMANIA. THE EMERGENCE OF GEOPOLITICS CÃLIN COTOI
Abstract. The author concentrates mainly on the interwar period since he believes that during this period a certain paradigm shift took place, or, in any case, an important mutation in the cultural mechanisms of national identity reproduction. Between the two world wars, the scientific discourses on the topic of the nation-state and national space(s) became more important, providing a complementary, or even, sometimes, alternative, way of spelling the nature of the nation (taken as a “natural” thing) compared to the historiographic ways of interpreting the nation.
Political and cultural contexts
In pre-war Romania, but especially in the interwar period, there was a large and important reworking and re-legitimation of various scholarly disciplines in a new intellectual context of (neo)romanticism and reactionary modernism; a massive scientific, intellectual and cultural redefinition of different disciplinary canons. A number of sub-domains were being constantly formed, criticized, expanded and contracted in the quite prolific intellectual atmosphere of the period. One of these sub-domains — sometimes called, in a German manner, anthropogeography or geopolitics, or, under a French influence, human geography — emerged at the intersection of geography, sociology, ethnography, historiography, etc. Here I will concentrate mainly on the interwar period since I believe that during this period a certain paradigm shift took place, or, in any case, an important mutation in the cultural mechanisms of national identity reproduction. Between the two world wars, the scientific discourses on the topic of the nationstate and national space(s) became more important, providing a complementary, or even, sometimes, alternative, way of spelling the nature of the nation (taken as a “natural” thing) compared to the historiographic waysof interpreting the nation. The 1920’s had tremendous territorial and institutional effects for the Kingdom of Romania. Provinces, formerly part of the Hapsburg dualist empire (Transylvania, Banat and Bukovina) or of the Russian empire (Bessarabia) were incorporated at the end of 1918 into Romania. The task of integrating Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., IV, 1, p. 75–96, Bucharest, 2007.
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demographically, socially, institutionally, economically and culturally very diverse population was huge. Romania was undergoing a fundamental change as it was struggling to integrate, in a very short span of time, the newly annexed provinces in the full fledged mechanism of a nation state. The inner heterogeneity was not only connected to a passage from 8% ethnic minorities to 28% but also to great disparities — in lifestyles, political culture, economic infrastructure, etc. — between ethnic Romanians belonging to different regions. This dramatic change led to the establishment of a new pattern of relations between national and cultural experts, state bureaucrats and political elites. A new generation of intellectuals, bred in the new Romanian academic system, deriving their legitimacy from an expertise in the national culture but also from their mastery in the Western scientific canon, collided with the older, established generation of national and cultural experts. After a short period of expansion of state bureaucracy personnel, due to the enlargement of Romania’s territory, when the state institutional framework became unable to integrate the new intelligentsia, the most important conflict became the one opposing this new generation to the new political and state elites. Now that Greater Romania was a political-institutional reality, these elites were less dependent on ideological legitimacy from the growing intelligentsia, and also, less able to absorb the huge mass of educated youngsters produced by the national educational system1. Because of these tensions, working at the level of the organization of the mechanisms of national culture, the pre-WWI unified national pedagogy collapsed. There were of course different ideological and political-cultural groups before WWI, sometimes fighting violent wars. Nevertheless, a common pedagogical template provided a unifying language; the people, the nation, were constructed inside a “continuity”, “autochthony”, historiographical and ethnological hypothesis. The difference between the people and its “teachers” was never problematized as all the important political-cultural groups were caught in a twin program, enlightening the population and, in the same stroke, fighting for the political unity of all ethnic Romanians. These pre-1918 “directeurs de conscience”, who, quite successfully, transposed an individual pedagogy to the collective, national self, were entering, after WWI, a very different, i.e., competitive, arena. The polemics on who was in possession of the right criteria for defining the “real” and “authentic” national-identity or national space were multiplying and turning very harsh. This was, briefly, the institutional and cultural setting in which, in post-1918 Romania, the (re)invention of national culture was pursued, in a dense network of disputes, alliances, counter-alliances and competitions for national and scientific legitimacy and representativeness. The discourse on national space, on the naturalness of the newly formed state of Great Romania, became soon a strategic point in these competitions, transforming geopolitics in a common (and sometimes implicit), concern of the sciences thematizing the nation and the nation-state.
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1 See also Irina Livezanu (1995).
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The field of interwar anthropo-geography and geopolitics, as it developed in interwar Romania, was not a homogenous one, not even by the criteria valid in this context, since a number of oppositions and contradictions arose right at its core. The debates, at first diffuse, were to become more focused at the beginning of WWII. Was geopolitics a sociologically-based discourse, a geographically centered one or just another type of Völkerpsychologie? How can the regions and the nation be understood in a unique, scientifically based, discourse? These questions were raised time and again but the dispute remained an open one as the disciplinary field of geopolitics was not able to render a clear cut self-definition; there were different and concurrent definitions but a discursive identity was to emerge at the end of the 1920’s. The self identification of Romanian interwar geopolitics, their emergence as something else than a vague concern with the national space implicit in different scientific disciplines, was due to the growing importance of geopolitics in Western scholarly contexts. There were various cultural channels through which German, French but also Italian and, to a lesser degree, English theories were being critically adopted and adapted by the local intelligentsias. In what, using James Clifford’s words, appears as a network of “traveling cultures”, foreign themes, cultural and political concerns were transferred and transformed by Romanian scholars. All the new intellectual experts in national culture were academic travelers deeply enmeshed in the ambiguous dialectic of “roots and routes”2, brokers of different cultures, even if they were to take, at some point, a more or less nationalistic stance in the field of the politics of culture in interwar Romania. In mapping external discursive influences I shall try to avoid a simple “borrowing” model — a potentially essentialist one — and, instead, reveal the strategic way in which “marginal” thinkers were using the ideological and scientific discourse of the more or less “canonized” West to solve local problems and appease local concerns. The peculiarity of thinking “at the margins” is, probably, that it consciously seeks resemblance to the “core”, Western theories, that legitimize the central and east-European scholars as scholars, while trying to use the same theories for purposes not necessarily equivalent to the original ones. The influence of Karl Ritter, Friedrich Ratzel, Karl Lamprecht, Wilhelm Wundt, Rudolf Kjellen, Walther Vogel, Jaques Ancel, Jovan Cvijic, Karl Haushofer, Hans Freyer etc. was mingling with more or less explicit political concerns: the problems of Transylvania, of the lower Danube, of Bassarabia, of the cultural integration of post-1918 Romania, of regionalism and centralism, etc. A new national imaginary was being constantly forged. New mental pictures of a homogenous and unitary Romania were combined with former concerns about the origins of the Romanians, the authenticity of popular culture, the cultural threats posed by modernization, etc. Important scientific texts were being created and re-evaluated in this new context. The emergence of a new image, a new national invention of space is probably the most important product of this interdisciplinary field.
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2 James Clifford (1997).
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The role of polemics
In my opinion, an appropriate approach to the interdisciplinary field of geopolitics, would be to map the debates through which its major themes were specified and different strategic options of further development appeared. These debates will be contextualized and situated by the “representative biographies”3 of those involved. There are probably at least three structural principles through which we can gain a clearer, or, at least, a more ordered perception of these debates. The first is the disciplinary one and consists of mapping the relations amongst the four scientific disciplinary fields that, at a first glance, contributed to the formation of geopolitics: sociology, geography, history and the psychology of the people. The latter disciplinary field, being populated mostly by the older generation, was probably the least important. At the end of the 1920’s, when the disputes about national identity became more sophisticated and the generational gap was turning more important Völkerpsychologie transformed into a marginal discourse4. The historiography had an important role to play, through the ‘new generation’ historian Gheorghe Brãtianu, and his theory about the pedagogical role of geopolitics5 but mostly through Ion Conea6. The latter, the founder of Romanian geographical history, was to be one of the most prominent and sophisticated “geopolitical” scholars of the interwar period. The second structural principle is the so-called generation war that roared quite wildly in Romania of that time. An important member of the ‘new generation’, Emil Cioran, was even trying to stimulate this new generation towards a “St. Bartholomew’s night” that would target the older generation and put an end to the problem once and for all. Even if it was spelled in more moderate terms, the thematisation of a ‘new generation’ was one of the most important instruments for conceptualizing the perceived newness of the interwar national-cultural configuration7. The third one is represented by the political cleavages arising in the middle of the “new generation” that would eventually draw an important part of the Romanian intelligentsia into the quagmire of right extremism8. Even if, for reasons concerning the length and the main focus of this paper, I shall follow, explicitly, only the first of these structural guidelines, I will try to keep an eye, as a background, on the whole cultural and political context. Anton Golopenþia and the new “science of reality”
The representative biography of Anton Golopenþia is an essential part in my attempt to understand the sociological pillar of interwar geopolitics. I understand
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David Murphy (1997). 4 See the critical stance adopted by Dimitrie Gusti (1936) on D. Drãghicescu’s book — Din psihologia poporului român [From the Psichology of the Romanian People] (1907) . 5 Brãtianu (1941). 6 Conea (1937). 7 Eliade (1928). 8 Volovici (1991).
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by “representative biography” — following Jerry Muller — the condensed story of an individual9. My interest lies not primarily in what was unique about him but rather in highlighting those formative contexts and experiences that he shared with others. The study focuses thus on that social and cultural context that he shared with those who followed a similar intellectual and political trajectory, but also on the differences, the turning points and the alternative intellectual, political and cultural trajectories. The analysis will therefore shuttle back and forth between texts and contexts thus trying to illuminate a more abstract and general model, without losing the connection with the concreteness of historical experience. Radical conservatism: the synchronism of Romanian interwar culture
Before discussing the Romanian case, we have to explain the larger European intellectual trend inside which the Romanian one, with all its peculiarities, should be understood. This larger European political and intellectual framework was the conservative revolution. The radical conservative shared many of the concerns of more conventional conservatism, such as the need for institutional authority and continuity with the past, but believed that the processes characteristic of modernity had destroyed the valuable legacy of the past for the present, and that, therefore, a restoration of the virtues of the past demanded radical or revolutionary action.10 The defense against the cultural and political effects of modernity on the body politic was thought to require however a homeopathic absorption of the organizational and technological hallmarks of modernity. These kind of intellectual movements that embraced technological and economic modernization, political activism and state power in the name of a particularistic cultural idea were usually turning towards state power in order to reach their goals. These goals consisted mainly in the reassertion of collective particularity against a twofold threat. The internal threat, as posed by the functioning of free markets, parliamentary democracy, internationalist socialism, liberalism etc. The external threat, usually conceived as the influence of powerful — politically, militarily, economically and culturally — foreign states. The radical conservatism or, in Jeffrey Herf’s words, reactionary modernism11 is questioning the idea that modernity comes as a package deal. There is not just one sole brand of modernity but, also, alternate ways of spelling modernity, some of them not very pleasant from a moral point of view, but still modern. Even if the package-theory was, and still is, widely upheld, having important theoretical and pragmatically insights, it has been attacked from different points of view, starting with Hugo von Hofmannstahl, Thomas Mann and the Weimar conservative revolutionaries to Karl Mannheim and the less extreme analysis of Jeffrey Herf, Fritz Stern, Stefan Breuer and others.
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9 Muller (1987). 10 Muller (1987), 19. 11 Herf (1986).
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Fritz Stern, the analyst of the “politics of cultural despair”, for example, considered that “we must accept the fact that this kind of rebellion against modernity lies latent in Western society and that its confused, fantastic program, its irrational and un-political rhetoric, embodies aspirations just as genuine, though not as generous or tangible, as the aspirations embodied in other or more familiar movements of reform”.12 Geopolitics was, probably, one of the most interesting discourses of reactionary modernism. It represented more than a type of argumentation used by a circle of scholars grouped around Karl Haushofer and Zeitschrift für Geopolitik — it was one of the important political and cultural languages of Weimar’s fragile democratic setting. In Germany the earth took the role of a hero13 in the political-geographical narratives of geopoliticians, decisively shaping national histories, exemplary narratives, the characteristic qualities of ethnic groups, and even individual personalities. The geopolitical discourse emergent in Weimar society can be considered, as David Murphy does, one aspect of modernism. Even though geopolitics often expressed opposition to some essential trends in modern life, having, seemingly a conservative, right wing orientation, the geopoliticians were quite uniformly distributed in the political spectrum: “Geopolitical language, describing the organic nature of the state, the role of geographical settings, and the determining influence of geography on politics, social structure, ethnicity and economic found adherents on the left and right and in the center as well during this period”14. In the case of Romania this kind of scientific and political language was initially not very important as an auto-reflexive disciplinary canon but as a new conceptual vocabulary, diffuse in all the new scientific discourses on the unity of Greater Romania. In the process of the self-thematisation of geopolitics, its proponents accentuated a pragmatic and eclectic trend, and tried to use both the German Geopolitik and the French human geography of Vidal de la Blache. Geopolitics was to become a scholarly affiliation adopted thoroughly and enthusiastically by a larger cultural and academic group only in the context of the political and national crisis triggered, during the war, by the Vienna Treaty and the loss of Transylvania to Hungary. If in Germany the search for new answers to replace obsolete or discredited ideas, which constituted such a large part of the politics of culture in the Weimar Republic, was reflected in the geographical sciences in the form of geopolitics, in Romania the quest for national unity was partially disentangled from its historiographic prewar cradle and became geopolitical through anthropogeography but mostly through sociology15.
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12 Stern (1974), xxii. 13 Murphy (1997). 14 Murphy (1997), 73. 15 This paper is part of a larger analysis on the invention of the national space(s) in scientific discourses in interwar Romania, developed while working in an interdisciplinary team (the We, the People project) in Collegium Budapest and Centre for Advanced studies Sofia. In the part of the analysis published here, the focus is on the German influence on Romanian sociology and the emergence of a kind of geopolitics based on sociology in the works of Anton Golopenþia. Inevitably, the important ‘French connection’ in the constitution of Romanian geopolitics was left aside.
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This new geopolitical tendency in social sciences and human geography looked very much like radical conservatism in politics. A new rhetoric, dynamism, anti-positivism on some levels, trust in science coupled with anti-urban and pro-rural discourses, applicability and realism were seen as definitory for geopolitics16. Anton Golopenþia: a representative biography
Anton Golopenþia was one of the most important members of the Bucharest Sociological School even if he was to become, at some point, institutionally marginal because of his critical stance towards Dimitrie Gusti sociological-monographical project. He was born in 1909 in the village of Prigor, in the western Romanian county of Caraº-Severin, in a family of civil servants. His father was a small clerk at the Romanian National Railway Company, who graduated from the Faculty of Law in 1925, at the age of 60. His mother came from a family of Germanized Czechs17. A. Golopenþia graduated the Faculty of Law in 1930 but decided, after a kind of intellectual crisis, not to become a lawyer but to start studying philosophy. This career and personal shift was consonant with the larger intellectual context of the Romanian new generation, firmly determined, now that the political ideal of national unity had been fulfilled, to fully dedicate themselves to (national) culture. In the same vein, Mircea Eliade, catching a trend of acute febricity between optimism and cultural despair that was present amongst many members of the new generation, demanded, in 1928, in a more apocalyptic vein, one year of cultural creativity as if it will be the last18. Starting in the autumn of 1930, A. Golopenþia was constantly attending D. Gusti’s and his younger assistants’, T. Herseni and H.H. Stahl, lectures and seminaries on Sociology, Ethics and Politics. The visibility and desirability of sociology in the Bucharest University had, at the end of the 1920’s — the beginning of the 1930’s, an ascendant curve. Some of the most promising Romanian scholars of that period, like the above mentioned Stahl and Herseni, but also Mircea Vulcãnescu, Constantin Brãiloiu, Fr. Rainer etc. were all involved in D. Gusti’s sociological projects. H.H. Stahl described Golopenþia in most favorably terms in his book, Memories and Thoughts, by saying: “Golopenþia was a synthesis of more of us: as much a philosopher as Mircea Vulcãnescu, as much a professor and a scholar as Traian Herseni, an astute investigator as myself and a great organizer as Octavian Neamþu”19. In 1932–1933, A. Golopenþia became D. Gusti’s head of cabinet in the Ministry of Education, Cults and Arts. In the meantime he was involved in a few editorial initiatives, participating in the writing and editing of some important
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16 Agnew ( 2002). 17 Sanda Golopenþia (2001). 18 Eliade, (1928). 19 Stahl (1981), 291.
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magazines, like Dreapta (The Right), but also in many unfulfilled editorial projects. A quite significant project was a cultural/ scientific journal called Anteu. Monthly review for presenting and defending the Romanian reality. Although no clear evidence exists, it is likely that the title was chosen under the influence of Hans Freyer celebrated book from 1918 — Antäus — which was a kind of a cultural elite bestseller20. The period he spent in Germany was probably the most fruitful one from an intellectual point of view. Having received a fellowship from the Rockefeller Foundation and then from the Humboldt Foundation, Anton Golopenþia spent three years studying in Berlin, Leipzig and Hamburg. In Berlin he attended the lectures of Nikolai Hartmann, Edward Spranger, Vierkandt, Ludwig Klages, Werner Sombart and Hans Günther. The intellectual atmosphere of the Berlin University was quite a shock for the young neophyte. In a letter to ªtefania Cristescu, his future wife, he wrote: “The lectures are dull, not even the better professors are doing their best, with the maybe exception of Nikolai Hartmann [...] The professors’ obvious weariness, especially Sombart, made me wonder whether I really should wish for myself accomplishments on the field of scholarship”21. In this context, he considered making his PhD thesis with a professor from Bonn in the field of ethnography and folkloristic, rather than in the field of sociology. “Apparently, I’ll be preparing my thesis with a professor from Bonn. We would have there the most renowned philologists of Germany [...]. The interesting for us lies here, with the folklorists and philologists, not with the professors of sociology”22. But the journeys to the “working camps” of the German Youth Movement (Jugendbewegung) from Silezia, Löwenberg, at Boberhaus, the contact with an elite group from Jugendbewegung, were going to change his plans. It is probable that he had a “geopolitical” experience avant la lettre in this Jugendbewegung meetings and conferences taking place in Löwenberg: “Especially the Hungarians represented a great surprise for me. Now, when we, panic stricken, are about to become chauvinists, they and their journals almost openly criticize the insanity of their previous politics; they strive to know their villages, their motto is: “first a regime for ethnic minorities in present day Hungary, then claims for revision”. The Bulgarians made me see how close we are and understand how inevitable the fight for the Cadrilater is. I heard then a young Ukrainian who displayed maps on which Bukovina and parts of Bessarabia were places among the borders of his future country. My image of Romania has enriched substantially: I saw it also through the eyes of our neighbors”23. In 1934, Anton Golopenþia moved to Leipzig, where he became a PhD student of Hans Freyer. In Leipzig, Anton Golopenþia was to enter a “Romanization”
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20 Murphy 1997, Jerry Muller 1987. 21 Golopenþia, (1999), 114. 22 Golopenþia, (1999), 136. 23 Anton Golopenþia, Ceasul misiunilor reale. Scrisori cãtre Petru Comarnescu, ªtefania Cristescu, Dimitrie Gusti, Sabin Manuilã, Iacob Mihãilã, H.H. Stahl ºi Tudor Vianu, 148.
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process from the point of view of his scholarly interests; at the request of Hans Freyer and G. Ipsen, he delivered lectures on Romania and its present problems. He planed to write for Hans Freyer (who intended to publish a “South-East European” collection of studies) an analysis of the influences of The German Historical School on Romanian conservative thinkers and politicians (Mihail Kogãlniceanu, Mihai Eminescu), and of Schopenhauer’s and the neo-Kantians’ on Junimists. Moreover, he wanted to publish, in the same context, “a booklet on Romania as it had not been written ever before”24. The most important influences on his scholarly formation were those of Hans Freyer and Arnold Gehlen; in a foreword to his PhD thesis, Golopenþia confessed that in „Professor Freyer the author found the guidance he needed in the field of social philosophy and social sciences and in professor Gehlen his guidance in philosophy”25. He studied extensively Dilthey, Simmel, social history, dialectology, the neo-Kantians and he probably met Heidegger in Freiburg26. The influence of Freyer, and his prestigious social circle of radical conservative intellectuals — Carl Schmitt, Arnold Gehlen, Martin Heidegger, Ernest Jünger, Ernst Forsthoff and Ernst Rudolf Huber — who were bound by friendship, by membership in common organizations, by readership of the same periodicals and by common intellectual assumptions, was a decisive one. In a 1936 letter, the Romanian sociologist considered that he had attained a new conception on sociology that could ground “Romania’s present situation, the neighboring countries’, our past and the others’, the fundaments of knowledge and the integrant features of social reality, the principles and the history of social sciences”27. Social sciences appear as an arsenal of means capable of diagnosing social realities and the actual circumstances of the home country in order to facilitate its survival among neighboring states and great powers. From the founders of statistics28 and the old administrative sciences and for a better leadership of the state, we have to learn, according to Golopenþia, the meaning of social sciences. Social sciences, as they are understood now, says the Romanian sociologist, represent the outcome of the reflexive mutation of social sciences, mutation determined by Adam Smith, Auguste Comte and their generation who lost in fact the meaning of these sciences. The destiny of the sociology of today consists of, Golopenþia says, combining the abstraction power of “reflexive” sciences with the effective pragmatism of the administrative, “cameralist” ones. The German influence was also an indirect one, as it appeared in one of Golopenþia’s letters from 1935:
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24 Golopenþia, (1999), 156. 25 Golopenþia, (2002) [1936], 8. 26 Golopenþia, (1999), 200. 27 Golopenþia, (1999), 203. 28 A. Golopenþia uses the term ‘statistics’ with two different meanings. The first one is the old, 17th century “science of the state” statistics; the second is the 20th century one, the “quantitative social science branch” statistics. The Romanian sociologist is trying to reconnect the two meanings by dissolving the 19th century liberal-bourgeois approach to social sciences.
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“This country living in tension is, for the stranger, a very good school of love for one’s own country. He has to remember he comes from a different nation, as the German identity is made explicit here every minute. I believe that in that way I will be able to return with a good theoretical background but also more aware of my ethnicity than before. The cult for the Germans that I have nurtured all my studying years in Romania is now gone. I will go later to France to compensate this, with no intention whatsoever of engendering a cult for the French. All I have left is being Romanian and only Romanian”29. Having in mind this tentative context, we will now focus our attention on several of Golopenþia’s texts. Hans Freyer, Anton Golopenþia and “geopolitical” sociology
The way in which A. Golopenþia attempted to “hijack” D. Gusti’s sociology and transform it into geopolitics, is already perceptible in his PhD thesis, The Informing of the State Government and the Traditional Sociology (Die Information der Staatsführung und die überlieferte Soziologie), ended in 1936. His thesis is an attempted critical understanding of Hans Freyer “science of reality”, that was to be latter articulated, in a Romanian context, with D. Gusti’s system of social unities and wills. Starting with his pre-war studies, but especially in his inter-war ones, Hans Freyer, the former student of Georg Simmel, tried to understand the life of the state starting from the form it takes in his moments of highest historical flow: the first founding, the war, the tension generated by a new state radical reform etc. He was reversing the importance of the most central — in his view — concepts in the sciences of the state: domination and planning. According to Freyer: “It is not the ones who are planning that are dominating (as the utopists wrongly believed), but it is the ones that are dominating who are planning”30. Distinguishing sociology as the science of reality from the Geisteswissenschaften, H. Freyer embarked on a critic of German idealism, believed to engender a kind of history that very easily forgets the importance of the human agent. With history going on beyond and behind the human actions, says Freyer, culture risks to become an autonomous realm, which pays little attention to the specific productivity of the human will and the radical irreducibility of the historicity of peoples. The people, as a socio-historical reality, are not kept together just by the activity of an omnivorous Weltgeist. For the German sociologist, the accent should be translated, through the science of reality, on “creative politics”, transformation and “the will able to remodel history”31 that tends to create a post-capitalistic community of the people, of the nation. Freyer set great emphasis on the ability of the individual, but also of the stateinstitutional agents, to put utopias to work in human history. In one of his most
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29 Golopenþia, (1999), lxvii-lxviii . 30 Herrschaft und Plannung, zwei Grundbegriffe der politischen Ethik, 1933, 22 apud Golopenþia (2002) [1936], 13. 31 Golopenþia, (2002) [1936], 12.
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interesting books, The Problem of Utopia, even if Freyer thought change to be intrinsic to human Geist, or maybe precisely because of this32, he stated that the stream of history can be held back and even maintained in a certain form, the heroic one33. The utopias of the past, from Plato through Morus, Campanella, to the most recent ones, all shared, according to Freyer, the same fatal flaw. While their creators were convinced that their utopias were constructed on scientific principles, none of them had discovered a scientific path toward implementing their schemes. They all came to depend, ultimately, on either force or persuasion to bring about the transformation from the flawed present to the utopian future. Scientific in designing their ideal states, the utopians abandoned science just when the problem of implementation arose. Had they remained true to their scientific pretense they would have had to turn to sociology, to conduct an inventory of factors in the present that might lead in the direction of their utopian goals. With this rather strange utopian, uncritical twist, quite central in his sociological thought, Freyer came to believe that the sociology of his days had to continue the tradition of Stein and Riehl34, tradition that consisted mostly of a historical-philosophical explanation of the German Volk development, and the transformation of this intellectual explanation into a political objective. Hans Freyer’s sociology, focusing on the political goals that can be transformed into legitimate reasons for the domination of the political elite in power, and helping it to apply its regime, its political goals, was active mostly in imposing, legitimizing and explaining the dominance of the new political elite. It contributed to the integration of the people in the post-capitalistic community, depicting and explaining the great goals the political elite was pursuing. An extraordinary combination of scientific and pure propagandistic approach that could, in Freyer’s view, re-establish the contemporary sociology affected by a deep seated crisis. Quite distressing, when we think that the political elites Freyer was talking about turned out to be the infamous national-socialists. A. Golopenþia believed that Freyer’s understanding of the role played by sociology in the new environment created in the aftermath of the crisis and demise of liberalism is too “German”, in the sense of being too closely linked to the German politics and institutions and, therefore, not easily translatable for the problems of other states and nations35. The social sciences, born during the liberal 19th century, have to suffer, in A. Golopenþia’s view, great changes to adapt to the heavily administered 20th century. The essential goal of the renewed social sciences was to be the informing of governments on social processes taking place in their own states and in the foreign states with which they have contacts36.
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32 The revolutionary conservatism, of which Hans Freyer is a major representative, is founded on such tensions between change, preservation and recovery of traditional values and institutions (Stern 1974, Dahl 1999, Herf 1987, Muller 1987). 33 Freyer 1936. 34 For the way Riehl uses folklore (Volkskunde) in a political, cameralist way, see Linke (1997) 35 Anton Golopenþia, (2002), [1936], 16. 36 Anton Golopenþia, (2002). [1936] , 7.
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The administrative-informative part of sociology appeared to Golopenþia very important in the redefinition of this science, maybe more important than the realization of popular integration and the grounding of political domination, problems central to Hans Freyer’s work. The Romanian sociologist tried to transform Freyer’s seemingly too particularistic approach into a system and an interpretation able to clarify the position of social sciences in all existing modern states and societies. The image he created was a quite frightful one, but very important for understanding the process of what we can call the geopolitization of sociology. If Hans Freyer was, in this part of his sociology37, an extremely sophisticated sociologist cum propagandist, Golopenþia was opening the way through which he was to become an equally sophisticated sociologist-geopolitician. The end of the liberal epoch was almost at hand with the end of Britain’s world domination. We entered, A. Golopenþia said, a new historic stage where everybody was perpetually threatened by everybody. For the Romanian sociologist, in what was going on then, we should see only a new moment, a very important one though, in a huge historic drama, the drama imposed on world history by the West through the unfolding of a rational, autonomous, antitraditional and active stance38. This rational attitude, which Golopenþia was far from criticizing or counterpoising to some idyllic Gemainschaft — like vision of tradition, was due to result in a great, dialectic transformation of the democratliberal world into an absolutist-mercantilist one. The social and political sciences, which were drifting freely, autonomously, in the liberal times, were, in Golopenþia’s view, coming back in the service of the state and the government, in what seemed to be a new epoch of mercantilistcameralist sciences, like Polizeiwissenschaften and the old Staatswissenschaften. The liberal, “pure theoretical”, formalistic, pluralistic and autonomous stage in the development of social sciences, acting like in a Hegelian ruse of reason, has elaborated finer and more sophisticated instruments that could be used in the service of the state with a much higher efficiency that in former times. In these “new times”, A. Golopenþia believed, states and peoples were like armies, moving in a hostile territory, counting only on their own strength and trying to survive this dangerous epoch. These armies-states “being sovereign, their commanding elite comes from within this army and is legitimated, in front of the troops and the foreigners, by its own domination. The troops are part of the army and are kept together by the commanding elite, instituted in the last analysis by these very troops, and are not under any other authority. A huge propagandistic apparatus is functioning in order to grant an ever renewed recognition of the elite by the troops and to guarantee the precise enacting of all decisions of the elite; the scouts/spies are formed by complex research teams”39.
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37 His philosophy of culture as it appears, for example, in Theorie des objektiven Geistes — eine Einleitung in die Kulturphilosophie (1923), translated in English as Theory of objective mind. An introduction to the philosophy of culture (1998) by Steven Grosby, deserves probably a different interpretation. 38 Golopenþia, (2002), [1936], 22. 39 Golopenþia, (2002), [1936], 24.
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In this world, the obtaining of a strict integration, a maximum of solidarity and loyalty in relation with the state, and exact information were to be the necessary preconditions for the maintaining of the very existence of the nation. In Golopenþia’s view, this new stage in history was necessary, springing from the attitude out of which the modern western civilization developed. The social and political sciences reached a stage of development where a new and more comprehensive integration was required. The liberal sciences, especially the “theoretical” ones, such as political economy and law, but also sociology — as it was transformed into a formal and liberal science —, have distanced themselves from the rationalist-activist position. They have evolved into a kind of crypto-platonic rumination on the signification of their own existence. This “de-activation” of social-political sciences engendered by liberalism is legitimated on a matrix of combined views, creating the liberal Weltanschauung, the ottocento Geist as Freyer would have put it: — reality is determined once and for all and is accessible to human understanding; — knowledge is a total and self-sufficient comportment; — the way to knowledge is contemplation and deduction stemming from contemplation, due to the fact that notions, concepts are representing reality. Such idealistic mistakes cannot be pursued with impunity anymore, says A. Golopenþia, in a dynamic and never fully cognoscible world. In his view, experience was to be the only way to know and understand this world, concepts being historically determined and functioning as simple keys and guidelines. The traditionalist-theological position that prolonged itself into the XXth century into the social sciences through idealist intellectualism was, in fact, a secularized theodicy. Only recently, Golopenþia believed, we have been able to adopt also in the human and political realities that attitude freed from all traditions and autonomous on which the world, as we know it, has been constructed40. Golopenþia distanced himself from Freyer’s partial neo-hegelianism by not believing in the existence of predicable destinies for peoples, for nations. His ontology was an activist-indeterministic one, opposed to what seems to him to be the implicit leftovers of an idealistic ontology in Freyer’s sociology. In the perspective of the future Romanian geopolitician, science was transforming itself, in the new epoch, in an instrument ready to be used in the incessant battle between the states, battle in which nothing was decided in advance. Geography, international relations, ethnic minorities etc. were all forms of reality to be understood and integrated in a constant flux of information and action (transformation or preservation) for the good of the state. The destiny, the choice of a particular elite or even ethnicity were not so important for Golopenþia as was the survival of the state, this being an urgent and pragmatic problem for the Romanian elites of the 1930’s. Science was understood to be a part of the actual confronting of concrete people with the world in which they were living. Being so, science was not
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40 Golopenþia, (2002), [1936].
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supposed to rise above the existing antagonisms amongst individuals and people. For Golopentia, science was a universal tool by its methods and the kind of relation to reality it supposed, but it was always used from a specific political position, being useful for a certain nation whose specialized device for orientation, systematization of experience and administration it was meant to be. Golopenþia explicitly said: “Science is one of the instruments through which irrational entities, like nations, affirm themselves”41. Is this kind of science sociology anymore, or its geopolitical turn is already inevitable? The differences are hard to grasp and the question would probably have made no sense for Golopenþia. Nevertheless, even if he was not using yet the term “geopolitics” I believe A. Golopenþia was on the way of introducing a radical hybridization or transformation of the Romanian sociology into geopolitics-science of the national state. J. Agnew’s definition of geopolitics42, referring mostly to its German impersonation, underlines five essential characteristics: — the accent put on state as a central form of all politics; — the naturalized claim to knowledge combined with the idealist goal of serving one’s own nation state; — the problem solving orientation, in the service of the state; — racism; — Euro-centrism. Excepting racism, A. Golopenþia’s sociology is very close to this schema. A quite big difference between Golopenþia’s science of/for the state and classic German geopolitics, consisted in the absence of explicit geographical statements. The geographical themes per se are not definitory for a kind of geopolitics seen as part of sociology and of the “contribution of social sciences to foreign policy”43. Following Ladis Kristof we can say that: “... the essence of geopolitics is that it is politics and not geography — not even political geography and perhaps not even a subdivision of political science, although of course, a legitimate subject of inquiry by political scientists”44. In the first issue of Geopolitica ºi Geoistoria review, in 1941, Gh. Brãtianu, an important member of the new generation of Romanian historians, wrote that “for Romanians, geopolitics is like Jourdain’s prose; it has always been practiced but has not been called so”. Even if the assertion of the Romanian historian is not, generally speaking, a valid one, it is, we believe, quite appropriate for the characterization of Anton Golopenþia’s work. Golopenþia’s defining stand on geopolitics appeared in 1937, in Însemnare cu privire la definirea preocupãrii ce poartã numele de geopolitic?45 (Notice Towards the Definition of the Approach Called Geopolitics) published in Geopolitica
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41 Golopenþia, (2002), [1936] , p. 56. 42 Agnew, (2002). 43 Anton Golopenþia, Ceasul misiunilor reale. Scrisori cãtre Petru Comarnescu, ªtefania Cristescu, Dimitrie Gusti, Sabin Manuilã, Iacob Mihãilã, H.H. Stahl ºi Tudor Vianu, 527. 44 Kristof, (1994), 222. 45 Golopenþia, (2000), [1939], 533.
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volume, written by A. Golopenþia, Ion Conea and Mircea Popa-Vereº, who is an extended form of the article Însemnare cu privire la definirea preocupãrii geopolitice (Notice Towards the Definition of the Geopolitical Approach) published in Anuarul festiv al Societãþii Studenþilor in geografie „Soveja” (Annals of the Students of Geography Society “Soveja”), X–XI, 1937–1938. Anton Golopenþia began to explore the advantages of an explicit geopolitical language from that moment on. He reached a personal definition of geopolitics and got involved in the meta-discursive level of geopolitical preoccupations. Significantly for the dynamics of these disciplinary re-identifications, this preoccupation with definitions and usages of “geopolitics” emerged after an argument with Ion Conea, assistant of Simion Mehedinþi and main representative of the geographical perspective on geopolitics. For the Romanian sociologist, geopolitics were to represent a new “science of reality” — not in Max Weber’s sense, but in the sense Freyer ascribed to this concept — that would incarnate the new administrative, cameralist tendency in social sciences46. In this way, Golopenþia distanced himself from a part of geopolitics “classical” definitions that had the tendency to associate it especially with political geography. Speaking of the attempts to define the new discipline, Golopenþia believed that they “...did not start from the real proceedings of geopolitics. On the contrary, the focus was on existing definitions and sciences with which they thought it should be tuned with. The outcome was that, instead of expressing the real activities of what is called geopolitics, rising in conscience the meaning and the way of satisfying this spontaneous interest as a response to circumstances specific to our times, they built perfect definitions in the perspective of certain postulates, but with no connection to the reality itself”47. According to Golopenþia, geopolitics had several defining characteristics that helped to insure a more realistic proximity to what those who are called geopoliticians actually do. There are three main meanings that, according to the Romanian sociologist, geopolitics could have in the usual scientific settings: theory and research of the geographical conditions of the state, external political information and political myth. The first meaning partially overlaps the domain of political geography and can be “sometimes regarded as geopolitics”48. The last two meanings would represent, in Golopenþia’s view, the true novelty that the geopolitical trend brought into the XXth century social sciences. As described and positioned by Anton Golopenþia, the fate of geopolitics was to assume a hegemonic position in the disciplinary field of social sciences, by realizing a concentration and coordination of the sciences which refer to certain autonomous aspects of the state and society in a single perspective and by assuming the construction of political myths.
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46 Freyer, 2000[1936]. 47 Golopenþia, (2000), [1939], 534. 48 Golopenþia, (2000), [1939], 537.
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The German geopolitical discourse, especially that of the Haushofer school, is quite rarely used in Golopenþia’s geopolitics, who favors Hans Freyer’s construction of sociology in the service of the state. The reference to the European (German) scientific “canon” is creative through a selective lecture and a transformation of the discourse recognized as “geopolitical” in the European scientific space. This adjustment, translation, can be framed, when successful, in the limits of the recognizable. We have, with Golopenþia but also with the entire interwar Romanian “geopolitics”, an example of the complex and ambiguous relationship wrought between the “center” and the “periphery”, of the adjustment and transformation of western scientific languages in Romanian social sciences and of the perpetual double game between the modification of the discourses and the scientific instruments and the maintaining of the criteria through which they can be accepted and recognized by the “central” western canon. A few polemics
After returning from Germany, Anton Golopenþia reintegrated in D. Gusti’s Bucharest School, and took an active part in defending the School’s point of view either from certain “dissidents” such as Dumitru Cristian Amzãr, or from the critical stances coming from Celestin Bouglé or Helmut Klocke. Anton Golopenþia assumed the role of public defender of the monographic (gustian) sociology perspective on nation and state in the internecine strifes with various “sociological dissidences” or with the interpretation coming from the field of philosophy and ethnology or other attempts of “ethnic ontologies”49. This role does not stop at the internal, national level as Golopenþia gets involved also in answering to some external attacks/interpretations. The book Les convergences des sciences sociales et l’Esprit international, published in Paris in 1938, contains a critique of D. Gusti’s sociology made by one of the most important representatives of the French sociological school50: Celestin Bouglé. D. Gusti’s sociology is, according to Bouglé, nationalist and not general enough on the one hand and too empiric, with not enough contribution to the unification of social sciences, on the other. This national phase of sociology is, in Bouglé’s view, prevalent especially in Central Europe51. As far as the monographic approach was concerned, a central one for the identity of the Sociological School from Bucharest, Bouglé, who saw it as resembling Le Play’s, accused it of a folkoric-nationalizing tendency. “In village monographies, engendered in Romania mostly by Mr. Gusti, a very powerful belief manifests itself...: if village research represents for our Romanian colleagues the true center of sociology, this is surely explained only by the fact that, to them, rural population, preservers of precious customs and practices, are Romania’s major force, both moral and material”52.
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49 Antohi, (2002). 50 We will use the term “French sociology” to refer to the sociology of Durkheim’s school, as it had a hegemonic position amongst the various social sciences in France at the beginning of the XXth century. 51 Bouglé, (1938), 13. 52 Bouglé, (1938), 13.
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Golopenþia’s answer was very prompt. To him, the construction part of a theoretical and methodological instrument “is not ...the only role appropriate for the scientist specialized in the study of social realities”. In his view, the entire theoretical-methodological construction does not have (anymore) an autonomous stake because it is formed “for a reason which transcends science: making easier the leadership of social life”53. The importance of villages, as the most frequented object of study in Bucharest School sociology, did not represent, in Golopenþia’s view, “the true core of sociology”, at least not in the sense of an essential and self-standing interest, as Bouglé believed, but simply the result of “applying a method... in Romania’s special context”54. Villages, said Golopenþia, were significant for Romanian sociology neither because of the ancient customs and practices they preserved, nor because they were in a process of urbanization and westernization, but simply because “they represent the body of the Romanian people, to the unity of which the Romanian sociologists should participate, above all, through their research55. Consequently, the stakes of the Romanian sociology seemed subsumable to a project of a harmonious social change, of sociologically informed social engineering. The role of sociology appeared to be one of slowing down the dissolution of socially important traditions and hastening the receiving of salutary innovations; it “consolidates as much as possible the country traditional spiritual culture and promotes hygiene, modern agricultural techniques...”56. Besides an exaggerated optimism, the way in which A. Golopenþia presented the Bucharest monographic sociology as applied science, in the service of the state and of the administration, tried to exclude from this science any legitimate question referring to values and final stakes. This science, in Golopenþia’s view, was not intrinsically more “nationalistic” than Durkheim’s sociology, whose follower Bouglé considered himself to be. The lack of understanding that Celestin Bouglé showed towards the Bucharest School approach is far from being just conjectural. I do not intend to dwelve here on a systematic comparison between Durkheim’s School and Gusti’s School, even though this approach is worth emphasizing. Anyhow, we find ourselves in front of a more complex comparison. Anton Golopenþia, one of Dimitrie Gusti’s students, defended the Bucharest school with arguments coming from Hans Freyer, in front of one of Emile Durkheim’s most distinguished heirs. The sociology of modernity, as the master from Sorbonne instituted it, may be understood like a communitarian defense of liberalism57 and as a critique of Tönnies’s theories58, as some recent commentators on durkheimian sociology do. Modern society, formed by the organic social division of work and having individualism — a specific product of modern society — as its sole legitimate
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53 Golopenþia, (2002), 86. 54 Golopenþia, (2002), 86. 55 Golopenþia, (2002), 87. 56 Golopenþia, (2002), 87. 57 Cladis, (1992); see also Stedman (2001). 58 Durkheim (1889).
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morality and ideology, is kept together by a moral order related to citizenship, education and professional groups. Nevertheless, the ordering of modern society, unlike the traditional or segmented ones, implies, necessarily, the background of a homogenous and closed space. Organic solidarity, as structure of the society, and corporatism, as a solution for the modern crisis, imply the existence of a national state, of a homogenous social (national) space that provides the background for the drama of anomy and makes possible the complementarities induced by the social division of work. The fact that Durkheim’s sociology emerges after that immense social, cultural, economic, military and communicational process that Eugen Weber dubbed as “the transformation of the peasants into Frenchmen”59 is probably not accidental. This is the sociology of a homogenous national state where traditional regionalisms were completely defeated and where nationalism became “banal”60; the “national” being obscured behind the unfolding of the “social” forces. The founding of the Sorbonne sociology, the fight for education and the imposing of a new type of intellectual, artfully presented by Wolf Lepenies61, are pieces from a necessary “destructive analysis”62 to which the entire European sociology should be probably subjected in order to gain access to the national implicit that often hides beyond very “positivist” formulations. Due to the different phase in the national building process and the different modality in which social sciences intervened in articulating this process, Gusti’s monographic sociology showed a relative indifference to French sociology. The lack of understanding was reciprocal. The attempted monographic accomplishment of a science of the nation through the study of Romanian villages could not appear as realistic to a sociologist for whom a synthetic science of sociology was far from being entirely constituted63. The group of “primitivist” texts, cultures and populations on which French sociology fed64 was completely uninteresting for A. Golopenþia. The distance between Trocadero in Paris and The Village Museum in Bucharest measures accurately the distance between the Durkheim’s school and Gusti’s school. In the case of Celestin Bouglé’s critique, the differences in articulating social sciences with the national project in the French and, respectively, Romanian case, made the lack of understanding inevitable at the level of fundamental vocabulary.
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59 Weber, (1979). 60 Billig, (1995). 61 Lepenies, (1990). 62 Handler, (1985), 41. 63 “Mais pour qu’on en puisse juger, celle-ci est-elle d’ores et déjà intégralment constituée? Nous en sommes loin. Et les sociologues ne sont pas les derniers à le proclamer. Qu’on mesure plutôt l’étendue du programme que lui trace M. Mauss dans son article sur les ‘Divisions et proportions des divisions de la sociologie’ (Année sociologique, nouvelle serie 1924–1925). Elle aurait à coordoner les résultats de recherches sociologiques spéciales — économiques, juridiques, religieuses, etc. — en les raportant toujours à ces touts que sont les groupes. Elle mettrait en lumière ce qui constitue les systèmes sociaux et ce qui est dû à leur influence, elle relèverait la propagation des faits de civilisation par-dessus les frontieres des groupes. Toutes tâches qui supposent d’immenses enquêtes, des responses à des questionnaires méthodiquement établis, des études ‘sociographiques’ de toutes sortes, un travail cyclopéen” (Bouglé, 1938, 93). 64 For the role of primitivism in French ethnology, see Paul-Lévy, (1986), 299–320.
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“National”, from A. Golopenþia’s explicit point of view, meant the local application, on a space legitimated by the existence of a national state, of a general theoretical corpus. The problem of a possible incompatibility between the works of sociology and the practices of the nation state is obscured by the creation of an instrumentalist image, through which sociology does not built nation through knowledge by itself — as it partly was the case with the type of Sociologia Militans D. Gusti was trying to develop — but rather helps the state in this process. “National”, from Bouglé’s point of view, means the existence of a particular case, in a context in which the French sociologism, due to Marcel Mauss and his students, attempted a broad comparison of the diverse “particulars” with the future aim of accomplishing a synthetic sociology. The study of one’s own national particularity was not that interesting at the moment when French sociology’s national particular roots were almost obscured in an objective-scientific knowledge corpus which seemed capable of embracing the entire world, or at least the one marked by what was left from the French empire65. Anton Golopenþia’s stand towards Helmut Klocke’s study, an ex-colleague of his, student of H. Freyer’s and G. Ibsen’s and assistant at the Hungarian Institute from Berlin University, (Landvolk und Dorf in madjarischer und rumänischer Sicht, in Deutsches Archiv für Landes — und Volkforschung, an I, 1937, no. 4, p. 990–1023) published in 1937 in Sociologie româneascã (Romanian Sociology), is interesting because Klocke seemed to accuse D. Gusti’s sociology of the same flaw that C. Bouglé underlined; that is its “ethnicism”. However, the German rural sociologist’s position is quite different from that of Durkheim’s disciple. It is not the existence of an abstract and systematic science that forms the criterion according to which the monographic approach of Romanian sociology is judged by, but “the etatic principle”. Hungarian rural sociology, strongly influenced by the sociology of Gusti School, was “ethnicist”. The two rural sociologies, Hungarian and Romanian, were, in Helmut Klocke’s view, interested only in their own kindred, indifferent toward the state that includes fragments of other nations66. This time, the attack was more deeply felt as it used a perspective forged in a very similar conceptual language with the one used by A. Golopenþia. The fact that the romanian sociologist had to defend D. Gusti’s position from an attack stemming from a ‘freyerian’ perspective reveals, in an oblique way, the difference between Golopenþia’s geopolitical-sociology and the monographic-cumulative science of the nation coming from Gusti. The only answer that Golopenþia was able to find to oppose Klocke’s critique sounds foreign to the implicit rationale of gustian monographic sociology: “we began with a series of Romanian regions because they are of great interest for
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65 Stocking jr., (1983). 66 Helmut Klocke, p. 1000 apud Golopenþia, (2002), 89.
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us. But we will continue just like both professor Gusti and some of us said, with the study of villages of foreign infiltration and the other social layers of Romania, for the sake of our dear state”67. Conclusions
In interwar Romania, in the context of a heightened competition amongst scientific discourses trying to capture the cultural and national ‘essence’, specificity, of the newly formed Greater Romania, sociology (in its monographical guise embraced by Dimitrie Gusti) was able to form a self sustaining discourse about the nation. I believe that the importance of sociology in the interwar period is due, at least partially, to the way it addressed the problematic of the national space and the new borders (internal and external). The geopoliticization of sociology was explicitly endorsed by Anton Golopenþia — a student of both Dimitrie Gusti and Hans Freyer — by understressing the technical, stately and administrative aspects of Gusti’s larger nation-building project and taking them to be the true synthetic part and the possible rallying point of the science of the nation which, in a freyerian manner, was to be also a science of the state and for the state. His position developed in parallel to a geopoliticization of anthropogeography and tried, in the end, to create a hegemonic, all-encompassing geopolitics of the nation-state. In the background of this impressive scholarly attempt, there is a blind spot, a certain blurring of the historicity of the nation in connection with the historicity of the scientific discourse analyzing and serving the nation in the same time. When at least one of the roots of the nation can be traced, in what Anton Golopenþia, following Hans Freyer, defined as the ottocento Geist, its disappearance in a post liberal world which became geopolitical — in the peculiar sense of this term attributed by the Romanian sociologist — should lead to a change in the intimate structure of the nation itself. If the nation is seemingly absorbed by the national state, “the radical imaginary” of the nation and nationalism disappears completely in front of its “institutional imaginary”68. However, A. Golopenþia’s position appears to be rather one of ignoring the changes that the emergence of a geopolitical world would imply in the very constitution and reproduction mechanisms of the nation. In his works the nation appeared as having a strong natural-organic setting and as existing behind scientific discourses. Thus, the primordial national community is implicitly constructed as a substrate that sustains and nurtures the scientific discourses; in this process these discourses become tainted with meanings different from the explicit arguments. This un- or under-formulated stances can be seen and deciphered either in the context of polemics, or, even better, in the context of unexpected agreements between different scientific positions, behind which one may guess this diffuse, common ideology, of the organic, primordial character of the nation.
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67 Golopenþia, (2002), 90. 68 Castoriadis, (1987).
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Golopenþia, Anton. Rapsodia epistolara.[The Epistolary Rhapsody] Bucharest: Albatros, 2004. Golopenþia, Sanda (Ed.). Cronologie.[Chronology]. In: Opere complete. Sociologie. [Complete Works. Sociology], Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedicã, 2002. Gusti, Dimitrie. Sociologia militans. Introducere în sociologia politicã. [Sociologia Militans. Introduction to Political Sociology]. Bucharest: Editura Institutului Social Român, 1934. Gusti, Dimitrie. “Temeiurile teoretice ale cercetãrilor monografice”. [Theoretical Grounding of Monographical Research]. Sociologie româneascã, 7–9 (1), 1936. Gusti, Dimitrie. “ªtiinþa naþiunii”. [The Science of the Nation]. Sociologie româneascã, 2–3 (2), 1937. Handler, Richard. On Dialogue and Distructive Analysis. Journal of Anthropological Research 41, 1985, 171–82. Henning, Richard. Geopolitik, Leipzig and Berlin: Teubner, 1931. Herf, Jeffrey. Reactionary Modernism. Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich, London: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Kristof, Ladis. “The State-Idea, the National Idea and the Image of the Fatherland”. Orbis 11, 1967, 238–55. Kristof, Ladis. The image and the vision of fatherland. In: Geography and national identity. Ed. David Hooson. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994. Lepenies, Wolf. Les trois cultures. Entre science et littérature l’avènement de la sociologie, Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, 1990. Linke, Uli. Colonizing the National Imaginary: Folklore, Anthropology, and the Making of the Modern State. In: Cultures of Scholarship. Ed. S.C. Humphreys. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997. Livezeanu, Irina. Cultural Politics in Greater Romania. Regionalism, Nation-Building and Ethnic Struggle, 1918–1930. Ithaca, New York and London: Cornell Universty Press, 1995. Mauss, Marcel. Oeuvres, vol. 1–3, Paris: Les Éditions de Minut, 1974. Mehedinti, Simion. Coordonate etnografice: civilizaþia ºi cultura. [Ethnographical Coordinates: Civilization and Culture]. In: Civilizatie ºi culturã. Concepte, definiþii, rezonanþe. [Civilization and Culture. Concepts, Definitions, Resonances]. Ed. Gheorghiþã Geanã. Bucharest: Editura Trei, 1999 [1930]. Mucchielli, Laurent. De la nature à la culture. Les fondateurs Français des sciences humaines 1870-1940, Thèse de Doctorat, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 1996. Muller, James. The Other God that Failed. Hans Freyer and the Deradicalization of German Conservatism. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987. Murphy, David. The Heroic Earth. Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany 1918–1933, Kent and London: Kent State University Press, 1997. Nisbet, Robert. Conservatism. Dream and Reality. Minneapolis: University of Minesota Press, 1986. Paul-Lévy, Fr. “A la fondation de la sociologie: l'idéologie primitiviste”. L'Homme, vol. 97–98, 1986, pp. 299–320. Pocock, J.G.A. The concept of a language and the métier d’historien: some considerations on practice. In: The language of political theory in Early-Modern Europe. Ed. Anthony Papden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Pocock, J.G.A.. Politics, language and time. Essays on political thought and history, Chicago ºi Londra: University of Chicago Press, 1989. Rostas, Zoltan. Sala luminoasã. Primii monografiºti ai ºcolii gustiene. [The Enlightened Hall. The First Monographists of the Gustian School]. Bucharest: Paideia, 2003. Stahl, H. H. Amintiri ºi gânduri din vechea ºcoalã a „monografiilor sociologice”. [Memories and Thoughts from the Old School of ‘Sociological Monographies’] Bucharest: Minerva, 1981. Stedman Jones, S. Durkheim Reconsidered, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001. Stern, F. The politics of cultural despair. A study in the rise of Germanic ideology, Berkely, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1974. Stocking, George W. Observers Observed. Essays on Ethnographic Fieldwork, History of Anthropology, vol I, Wisconsin: University of Winsconsin Press, 1983. Volovici, Leon. Nationalist Ideology and Antisemitism. The Case of Romanian Intellectuals in the 1930s. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991. Weber, Eugen. Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France 1870–1914, London: Chatto and Windus, 1979. Zub, Alexandru. Istorie ºi istorici în România interbelicã. [History and Historians in Interwar Romania]. Iaºi: Editura Junimea, 1989.
THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT
KANT ET RAWLS: REMARQUES SUR L’ÉVOLUTION DES THÉORIES IDÉALES CONCERNANT LES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES ANA BAZAC
Abstract. The aim of the paper is to counter-pose Kant’s and Rawls’ ideal theories concerning the international relations, just because the latter expressed and insisted on the Kantian origin of his neo-liberal view on the present world history.
Kant a été un grand créateur de la théorie idéale des relations internationales. Ce qui est important c’est de comprendre que ces théories — et leurs créateurs — n’ignoraient pas du tout «la guerre des tous contre tous», mais qu’ils opposaient justement un ensemble de normes par lequel les relations entre les pays devraient et devaient se corriger, sinon se transformer.1 Les théories idéales sont parties du présupposé que l’essence de la politique est le droit par lequel la variété des relations interhumaines, y compris les relations internationales, pourrait se déployer d’une manière raisonnable, manière générée elle-même par la qualité rationnelle de l’homme. En s’appuyant sur la doctrine rationaliste de l’action humaine, les théories «idéalistes» des relations internationales ont ouvert le chemin vers l’éthique des relations internationales qui contrebalance la description réaliste de ce qu’il y a dans la politique internationale avec l’exigence normative de ce qu’il devrait être. Les théories idéales ne sont pas plus volontaristes que celles réalistes: l’explication des relations internationales par l’évolution du droit et de la justice qui les réglementent n’est plus restrictive pour la théorie comme pour la pratique que la mise en vedette de la force et de l’équilibre des forces sur le plan international. Avant la victoire historique des relations modernes, avant l’évolution du capitalisme comme système dominant, le courant des théories idéales sur les relations internationales a eu une certaine visibilité, même si le réalisme de Machiavel avait averti sur les faiblesses de ce courant, en effet sur l’antagonisme entre les suppositions de celui-ci et, d’autre part, les relations internationales de
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1 Paul Janet, Histoire de la philosophie morale et politique dans l’antiquité et les temps modernes, Tome second, Paris, Librairie philosophique de Ladrange, 1860, p. 561, a observé que le grand philosophe allemand des Lumières a traité au plus haut niveau un des problèmes négligés par les publications de ce temps-là: celui de l’accord entre la politique et la morale dans les relations internationales, justement comme opposition «contre la politique extérieure empirique et machiavélique». Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., IV, 1, p. 97–111, Bucharest, 2007.
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la modernité en cours de formation. C’était caractéristique pour la théorie idéale justement la volonté de dépasser l’opposition entre les relations internes qu’on pouvait présumer s’améliorer et ainsi devenir paisibles et la guerre extérieure. Est-ce que celle-ci serait inévitable? Mais toujours les penseurs ont tout d’abord résolu les questions les plus proches et, ainsi, plus pressantes. De cette manière leurs principaux objectifs ont été les reformes internes, le devenir des relations interpersonnelles internes, afin de constituer non seulement une meilleure société, mais aussi un modèle capable à diffuser. De ce point de vue, les théories idéales ont été «réalistes» en proposant une transformation quasiment structurelle «dans un seul pays», en laissant ainsi ouverts les rapports antagoniques entre les pays. C’était «la rareté des biens disponibles» qui «entraînait une âpre compétition entre les hommes, chacun ne pouvant être satisfait qu’aux dépens d’autrui.»2 Ainsi, même la fameuse île Utopie, où la vie interne serait si désirable pour l’auteur de sa description, se basait sur des esclaves qu’on achetait à l’extérieur»3, et sur des relations internationales amicales dans les seules conditions quand «les peuples (qui) viennent lui demander des chefs.»4 Et si on tenait la guerre «en abomination», elle était tout de même faite: la conception utopienne sur la guerre n’annulait ni au nom des principes humanistes ni à celui du droit international — des traités qu’elle ne tenait pas du tout en compte5 — la guerre, non seulement pour défendre les frontières, mais aussi pour repousser une invasion ennemie sur les terres des alliés, ou pour délivrer de la servitude et du joug d’un tyran un peuple opprimé par le despotisme.6 De cette façon l’idéalisme interne de la théorie sociale à l’aube de la modernité a été doublé par le réalisme concernant les mêmes relations internationales: la force était celle qui régnait celles-ci, même si la force était jugée. En effet l’échange et la production ne s’avaient pas développé au niveau de générer la théorie du système capitaliste mondial. Le temps doit toujours s’écouler et les exemples s’agglomérer avant que la théorie puisse monter et saisir les tendances de la réalité.
Presque deux siècles après les utopistes de première génération et en contextes historiques différentes, Kant a continué la théorie de la paix en partant de la perspective de la bonne volonté de chaque pays, ainsi de la perspective des pays vers les rapports internationaux, vers le système de ceux-ci, et non pas de ce système vers les pays. On ne peut pas ignorer le libéralisme commercial de Kant: la nature «se sert de l’intérêt réciproque pour unir les peuples... c’est l’esprit du commerce qui est incompatible avec la guerre»7. Évidemment Kant n’a pas
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2 Maurice Duverger, Janus. Les deux faces de l’Occident, Paris, Fayard, 1972, p. 248. 3 Thomas Morus, L’Utopie (1516), traduit du latin par Victor Stuvenel, Paris, Lumen Animi, 1935, 148. 4 Ibidem, p. 157. 5 Parce que «dans les terres de ce nouveau monde, il est rare que les conventions entre princes soient observées de bonne foi», ibidem. 6 Ibidem, p. 161. 7 Kant, Projet de paix perpétuelle (1795), texte intégral, traduction originale de Pierre-François Burger, Notes explicatives, questionnaires, documents et parcours philosophique établis par Monique Castillo, professeur à l’Université de Poitiers, Paris, Hachette, 1998, p. 50.
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répondu à la question si la paix par le commerce serait bonne pour tous les pays: comment pourrait-il le profit des producteurs d’un pays se réaliser sinon par l’export, détruisant ainsi la production d’autres pays?8 (On peut saisir la tradition de la logique fragmentée de la société: la discussion des problèmes politiques isolée des questions économiques, c’est-à-dire la réserve envers les contradictions des domaines.) Pour cette raison, Kant a doublé le libéralisme par son aspect républicain: la démocratie interne pourrait se transposer sur le plan international, et serait désirable de se réaliser ainsi, justement parce que, le philosophe de Königsberg étant conscient que les nations rivalisaient aussi par l’intermédiaire du commerce, le cadre démocratique des droits humains serait le seul qui contrebalancerait la concurrence internationale. On doit noter ici de nouveau le réalisme de Kant par exemple face aux penseurs contemporains qui ignorent la question de la concurrence économique en la «transposant» sur le plan de la «quête de l’identité». Enfin, la généralisation d’une société civile mondiale ne pourrait pas avoir lieu sans un système des institutions — y compris le droit international — qui développerait la coopération, ainsi la fermeté des principes: le libéralisme institutionnel est la troisième forme de théorie idéale (normative) promue par Kant. En passant, justement parce que le libéralisme (les droits de l’homme et le marché libre) employé dans les relations internationales a plusieurs formes — c’est-à-dire manifestées comme réalisme et comme idéalisme/encadrées dans ces conceptions — on doit être sensible aux supposés fins tout comme on doit le faire envers les supposés moyens. On peut utiliser les arguments libéraux pour légitimer la paix aussi bien comme le règne de la force. En même temps, on peut bien déduire de ces arguments des théories idéales — de ce qu’il faut faire pour implémenter les principes libéraux des droits de l’homme — des théories consolidant l’affirmation du statu quo, de la situation réelle des puissances qui luttent pour une meilleure place dans le concert international. On note maintenant quelques aspects essentiels de la théorie idéale de Kant sur la paix perpétuelle comme «base» de la théorie rawlsienne de la paix par le droit des peuples. Kant a été le représentant remarquable des rêves immémoriaux de la paix9 que les Lumières ont peut-être cru très proche, réalisable en fait. En effet, si les
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8 Un économiste roumain connu entre les deux guerres mondiales, Mikhail Manoïlesco, Théorie du protectionnisme et de l’échange international (1929), dans l’édition roumaine Forþele naþionale productive ºi comerþul internaþional. Teoria protecþionismului ºi a schimbului internaþional (Les forces nationales productives et le commerce international. La théorie du protectionnisme et de l’échange international) Bucureºti, Editura ªtiinþificã ºi Enciclopedicã, 1986, a considéré que le protectionnisme des pays faibles serait acceptable et nécessaire, et accepté par les pays développés qui obtiendraient le profit par leur avance scientifique et technique. L’histoire a férocement contredit Manoïlesco. 9 On note habituellement les configurations plus ou moins théoriques d’Aristophane, de l’Abbé de Saint-Pierre, de J.-J. Rousseau. Voir J. Beck, Peace Plans of Rousseau, Bentham, and Kant, http://rousseaustudies. free.fr/Articlebeck.htm (25-I-2007).
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philosophes, étant les maîtres chanteurs des gens communs, ont étaient marqués par le désir de donner à l’humanité le schéma de la bonne vie, le schéma d’une société meilleure, peu d’entre eux se hasardaient à affronter l’antagonisme visible entre les pays et les difficultés de construire des plans de paix pour le monde entier. De ce premier point de vue, Kant a dépassé la bonne volonté des utopistes comme Morus, Campanella, Andreae justement par son projet de rendre la paix entre les cités qui, chacune à son tour œuvrait pour devenir des «îles» d’harmonie, contrant les autres et en défi de celles-la. Réalisme: la guerre, et non pas la paix, est la condition naturelle de la société. Comment alors pourrait-on établir la paix? Par l’instauration du droit dans les relations internationales, tout d’abord par la consignation par écrit des articles définitifs qui rendent possibles les conditions juridiques pour une paix perpétuelle. Au niveau des relations internationales, comme à celui des relations interpersonnelles, Kant est (en bonne vision libérale) un optimiste modéré: si l’homme n’est pas mauvais de par sa nature — parce que les inclinations générées par les besoins / les conditions matérielles peuvent être apprivoisées / humanisées / canalisées dans la juste direction, la réalisation du devoir humain, par la raison qui est également un donné constitutif — ni les relations internationales ne sont pas destinées à l’infini à la guerre. Mais l’homme n’est pas non plus bon de par sa nature — à cause des inclinations qui répondent aux conditions dures de l’existence. De cette manière, l’homme, y compris dans ses relations internationales par l’intermédiaire des États, a besoin des structures de droit qui lui permettent et canalisent le comportement rationnel, ainsi moral. Le droit est la raison consignée dans les relations sociales, ainsi sa puissance. Il est le seul contrepoids aux rapports de force. Kant soutient avec enthousiasme l’état de droit dans les relations sociales, contre les rapports arbitraires et de force. Les Lumières de la raison constituent ainsi la base gnoséologique de la transition vers l’État démocratique — où chacun/chacune se conçoit citoyen/citoyenne, et l’est, et vers des relations internationales démocratiques et de paix. Le droit civil protège les personnes en tant que citoyens du peuple, tandis que le droit des peuples régit les relations entre les États. Mais, surtout si la puissance du droit se développera et en qualité de théorie normative, c’est le droit cosmopolitique qui doit permettre que les hommes se sentent membres d’un État universel comme citoyens du monde. L’hypothèse de Kant constitue le noyau du caractère idéal de sa théorie: le consensus et la confluence des deux types de droit dépassent le cadre principal des théories libérales du moment, celui de la légitimation de l’intérêt d’État, à son intérieur bien qu’à son extérieur, ainsi de la suprématie de cet intérêt. Théorie idéale: La paix est perpétuelle de son essence (article 1), ce qui veut dire a. qu’elle est différente de l’armistice qui est un arrêt signé des hostilités et qui est provisoire à cause de la logique des confrontations entre forces de puissance différente et b. que la paix doit être établie par les États, étant ainsi une construction rationnelle, une réciproque soumission des volontés aux principes raisonnables du droit.
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La première exigence du droit international serait ainsi que «aucun État libre... ne pourra être acquis par un autre État» (article 2). Reste alors la possibilité de conquérir des États qui ne sont pas indépendants de point de vue des Puissances européennes. Est-ce que cette «exception» serait-elle conforme à la morale d’une paix perpétuelle? Non, évidement, mais la théorie de Kant n’est pas du tout une application de son éthique aux relations internationales: si, au niveau de l’éthique, chaque homme, justement à cause de son caractère rationnel, pouvait devenir moral par la compréhension des principes — et ainsi l’éthique est/reste ouverte parce qu’elle n’a comme fondement que la raison humaine, son effort de vaincre les inclinations et les conditions irrationnelles, sa victoire entrevue par l’intermédiaire de la science des Lumières — l’établissement de la paix perpétuelle part, raisonnablement, du niveau existant de la situation internationale, du moment existant au temps de Kant. Il ne s’agit pas d’un simple eurocentrisme, mais du calcul rationnel que a. la paix pourrait mieux s’établir si les Etats ont encore leur «terrain de chasse» et b. que le reste du monde pourrait «s’intégrer» dans ce contexte international paisible et, petit à petit, dépasser les problèmes et les complexes générés par le statut de pays acquis. Certainement que du point de vue des relations entre les Puissances et «le reste» (disons, en termes contemporains, entre le Nord et le Sud, ou entre les pays développés et les pays sous-développés), la théorie internationale de Kant est fermée et «réaliste»: le droit rationnel soutenant la possible paix perpétuelle pour les États établis devient la porte fermée du «plus petit mal», ou du «mal nécessaire».10 La logique unitaire de l’éthique — qui préconise que chaque homme doit se comporter envers autrui d’après le principe de la réciprocité, ce qui veut dire qu’on doit traiter les gens comme fin, et jamais seulement comme moyens — et de la théorie cosmopolitique a mené Kant à proposer le bouleversant article 3: «les armées permanentes (miles perpetuus) doivent entièrement disparaître avec le temps» parce que la guerre a des conséquences économiques dévastatrices et parce que, en utilisant l’homme pour tuer un autre homme, les droits de l’homme et la valeur de la personne humaine sont d’emblée reniés. De ce point de vue, pas seulement l’armée, mais l’institution de la diplomatie et l’économie même doivent quitter les activités liées à l’agression. Kant ajoute encore 3 articles préliminaires: «on ne doit pas contracter des dettes publiques en vue des affaires extérieures de l’État»11, «aucun État ne doit s’ingérer de force dans la constitution ni dans le gouvernement d’un autre État», «aucun État en guerre avec un autre ne doit s’autoriser des hostilités qui rendent impossible la confiance réciproque quand il sera question de la paix. Tels sont l’emploi des assassins (percussores), d’empoisonneurs (venefici), la violation d’une capitulation, l’incitation à la trahison (perduellio), au sein de l’État ennemi, etc.»12
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10 Voir Ana Bazac, Hegel et l’Afrique. Le thème des relations entre les États de l’Europe occidentale et l’Afrique, présenté in absentia au colloque international Religion, Philosophie et Sociétés Africaines, Bénin, Université d’ Abomey-Calavi, 10–13 janvier 2007. 11 On ne doit pas oublier la remarque de Kant: «cette facilité de faire la guerre, jointe au penchant des gouvernements pour elle...», Kant, Projet de paix perpétuelle, p. 10–13. 12 Kant, Projet de paix perpétuelle, p. 12–15.
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Ainsi tout d’abord le rôle des préceptes raisonnables, résultat de la conscience humaine rationnelle, pour implémenter la paix: la paix est une structure artificielle, culturelle, et pas naturelle; mais les gens humains non plus ne sont des êtres naturels; leur essence consiste dans la raison humaine universelle13, ce qui implique l’universalisabilité des principes rationnelles, le fait que ceux-ci, en se focalisant sur les buts humains (la liberté, les libertés), n’ont de sens qu’universalisables; pour cette raison, la réalisation des principes rationnelles est la condition d’un accord minimum des gens; la puissance de ces principes est évidente pour tous, quels que soient le niveau d’instruction et la capacité d’expression14; les idéaux humains sont si importants parce qu’ils agissent en tant que forces profondes15 de la conscience et de l’action humaine.16 Ainsi, parce que la paix «n’est pas un état de nature... l’état de paix doit donc être institué»17, par des lois strictes.18 Justement parce qu’en réalité les États se comportent l’un envers l’autre comme se comportent les gens déterminés par les inclinations engendrées dans les conditions précaires19 — ce qui veut dire à cause de la méchanceté de l’homme20 —, «il ne peut y avoir selon la raison aucune autre manière de sortir de l’état anomique, qui ne contient que la guerre, que d’abandonner leur liberté sauvage (anomique) exactement comme les particuliers, de se soumettre à des lois publiques coercitives et de former ainsi un État de nations (civitas gentium...) qui embrasserait finalement tous les peuples de la Terre.»21 Kant a vu très bien l’opposition entre «la politique théorique» et «la politique pratique» et le fait que celle-ci regarde de haut la première22, la primauté des intérêts des États23, mais la seule solution d’éradiquer la guerre lui a paru l’institution d’une constitution républicaine (démocratique) pour tous les pays, la réalisation, sur cette base, d’une fédération de peuples,24 ainsi le renforcement
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13 Kant, Projet de paix perpétuelle, p. 53. 14 Kant, Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, translation Thomas Kingsmill Abbot, http://www.gutenberg.org/catalog/world/readfile?fkfiles=10995&, page 13: “I do not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration to discern what I have to do in order that my will may be morally good” (so in order to know people do not need very high level of instruction). 15 Robert Frank, Penser historiquement les relations internationales, 2003, mise en ligne: 2005, AFRI, vol. IV, http://www.afri.ct.org/article.php3?id_article=458 (1-II-2007). Voir aussi John Rawls, Paix et démocratie. Le droit des peuples et la raison publique (The Law of Peoples. With The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 1999), Paris, La Découverte, 2006, p. 155: «Si une Société raisonnablement juste des Peuples dont les membres subordonnent leur pouvoirs à des fins raisonnables n’est pas possible, et si les hommes sont largement amoraux, sinon incurablement cyniques et égocentriques, on est en droit de se demander, avec Kant, si la vie sur terre vaut la peine d’être vécue pour les êtres humains.» 16 Kant, Projet de paix perpétuelle, p. 47. 17 Kant, Projet de paix perpétuelle, p. 19. 18 Ibidem, p. 15–16. 19 Ibidem, p. 44. 20 Ibidem, p. 29: «La méchanceté de la nature humaine que l’on peut voir à nu et sans contrainte dans les relations des peuples entre eux (tandis que dans l’état civil et légal elle se voile beaucoup sous la contrainte du gouvernement).» 21 Ibidem, p. 32. 22 Ibidem, p. 9. 23 Ibidem, p. 13. 24 Ibidem, p. 28.
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du droit soutenu par les États «(du moins en paroles)»25. Kant a considéré que sa position normative n’était pas une simple idée, mais que la pratique même a démontré la consistance de celle-ci et la possibilité de la réaliser: «il s’ensuit que l’idée d’un droit cosmopolitique n’est pas une manière chimérique et exaltée de se représenter le droit, mais un complément nécessaire du code non écrit qui contient le droit public aussi bien que le droit des gens, en vue de la réalisation des droits de l’homme en général et par là en vue de la paix perpétuelle.»26 L’exemple contraire des «États commerçants de notre continent» envers «des peuples et des pays étrangers» qui «furent pour eux des pays qui n’appartenaient à personne parce qu’ils comptaient les habitants pour rien»27, a poussé Kant à questionner la dialectique sociale et à saisir le fait des «conséquences inattendues»: «la nature (nature daedala rerum) dont le cours mécanique fait transparaître la conformité au but: faire naître la concorde du sein même de la discorde parmi les hommes, et cela même contre leur volonté.»28 Ainsi le droit et la bonne organisation ne font que venir à la rencontre du «mécanisme de la nature»29. De ce fait il ne s’agirait pas que les philosophes imposeraient, avec leurs maximes, la paix publique, ou qu’ils imposeraient leur consultation par les dirigeants. De plus, il paraît qu’il serait nécessaire une certaine «division du travail» entre ceux-ci et les promoteurs de la pensée libre: «On ne doit pas s’attendre à ce que les rois deviennent philosophes ou à ce que les philosophes deviennent rois mais on ne doit pas non plus le souhaiter: parce que le pouvoir corrompt inévitablement le libre jugement de la raison. Mais que les rois ou les peuples rois…ne permettent pas que la classe des philosophes disparaisse ou devienne muette, en les laissant au contraire s’exprimer librement, cela est indispensable aux uns et aux autres pour apporter de la lumière dans leurs affaires.»30 Quelle est la liaison entre cette théorie normative et la réalité? Kant a été conscient du fait que le droit lui-même impose des contraintes: «que le commencement de la force, et sous la contrainte de la force on fonde ensuite le droit public.»31 «Il ne peut donc pas y avoir de conflit entre la politique en tant que doctrine du droit devenue agissante et la morale en tant que doctrine, mais restée théorique, du droit (il ne peut donc pas y avoir de conflit entre la pratique et la théorie).»32 De ce point de vue il paraît évident de dévoiler les «maximes sophistiques» des «perfides représentants des puissants de la Terre»: 1. fac et excusa (fait et justifie ce que tu as fait), 2. si fecisti, nega (si tu l’as fait, nie-le), 3. divide et impera (divise pour régner).33 Au fond, ces maximes relèvent du simple problème du savoir-faire (problema technicum).
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25 Ibidem, p. 30. 26 Ibidem, p. 39. 27 Kant, Ibidem, p. 36. 28 Kant, Ibidem, p. 41–51. 29 Kant, Ibidem, p. 48. 30 Kant, Ibidem, p. 54. 31 Kant, Ibidem, p. 57. 32 Kant, Ibidem, p. 56. Voir aussi p. 68: «Objectivement donc (c’est-à-dire en théorie) il n’y a aucun conflit entre la morale et la politique. Subjectivement au contraire...le conflit demeurera toujours...» 33 Kant, Ibidem, p. 59, 64, 62.
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Au contraire, la raison pratique consiste tout d’abord dans le principe formel qui incombe un problème moral (problema morale): «agit de sorte que tu puisses vouloir que ta maxime devienne une lois générale (quel que soit le but de ton action).»34 Seulement cet état «procède de la reconnaissance du devoir.»35 Certainement on doit s’approcher avec prudence de ce but, mais l’essentiel c’est que les États n’attendent pas de l’entente «analogue à un État universel» du «bien-être ou de la félicité», mais «du pur concept du devoir de droit...quelles que soient les conséquences matérielles qui puissent en résulter.»36 En somme, «toute considération au concept du droit, qui seul pourrait fonder à jamais la paix... Le droit de l’homme doit être tenu pour sacré...»37 Et si on doute que cela pourrait avoir lieu en réalité, Kant ajoute l’Appendice II: la publicité des actions relatives au droit d’autrui est la condition des actions politiques justes et, en même temps, le critère du jugement concernant l’accord de la politique avec la morale.
Voyons maintenant quelques aspects de la théorie rawlsienne des droits des peuples pour comparer Kant en tant que précurseur de la théorie idéale des relations internationales et son émule d’après deux siècles. Tout d’abord, on ne doit pas ignorer les présupposées communes à Kant et Rawls du point de vue du paradigme libéral manifesté avant tout à l’intérieur des communautés humaines: «ce qui est spécifique d’une doctrine kantienne, c’est la relation entre le contenu de la justice et une certaine conception de la personne comme libre et égale, comme capable d’agir tout à la fois rationnellement et raisonnablement, par conséquent comme capable de prendre part à la coopération sociale entre des personnes ainsi conçues.»38 Mais même à ce niveau, «la théorie de justice comme équité n’est évidemment pas une théorie kantienne, au sens strict. Elle s’écarte du texte kantien sur de nombreux points. L’adjectif ‘kantien’ n’exprime qu’une analogie, pas une identité.»39 Mais Rawls assume comme siens les principes spécifiques au libéralisme, justement ceux qui donnent «la force réelle» de la théorie kantienne: «l’idée que les principes moraux sont l’objet d’un choix rationnel...dès que nous représentons des principes moraux comme une législation pour un royaume des fins, il est clair que ces principes doivent non seulement être acceptables pour tous, mais ils doivent aussi être publics... cette législation morale doit être l’objet d’un accord dans les conditions caractérisant les hommes comme des êtres rationnels, libres et égaux entre eux.» De même, Rawls assume le constructivisme kantien selon lequel les projets sociaux pour l’amélioration du monde se basent sur les efforts de la raison, justement pour écarter le subjectivisme des désirs et intérêts:
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34 Kant, Ibidem, p. 64. 35 Ibidem, p. 65. 36 Ibidem, p. 67. 37 Ibidem, p. 68, 69. 38 John Rawls, «Le constructivisme kantien dans la théorie morale» (Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 1980) dans le recueil John Rawls, Justice et démocratie, Paris, Seuil, 1993, p. 78. 39 Ibidem, p. 75.
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le libéralisme politique, comme «le moindre des maux», impliquerait ainsi l’artifice de la raison, un caractère «hypothétique» de l’impératif moral.40 Enfin ici, éléments communs aux deux penseurs sont la tradition du contrat social, la priorité du juste, la théorie du bien, la condition de publicité.41 Quelle serait, dans ce contexte, l’articulation rawlsienne de la théorie des relations internationales, «ni traité ni un manuel de droit international...plutôt un ouvrage qui s’intéresse exclusivement à certains sujets liés à la possibilité d’une utopie réaliste»?42 Tentant de «décrire la manière dont une Société mondiale des Peules libéraux et décents serait possible»,43 Rawls a mis dès le commencement le cadre d’une «utopie réaliste»,44 du contrat nécessaire entre les peuples décents pour éliminer les injustices politiques et, ainsi, «les grands fléaux de l’histoire humaine — la guerre injuste et l’oppression, la persécution religieuse et le déni de la liberté de conscience, la famine et la pauvreté, pour ne rien dire du génocide et du meurtre de masse.»45 La condition préliminaire pour la réalisation de ce contrat international est l’organisation de chaque société d’une manière constitutionnelle et démocratique, c’est-à-dire l’élargissement des supposées concernant les individus libres et égaux (situés de façon symétrique dans la position originelle derrière un voile d’ignorance approprié dans le cadre d’un État) au niveau des peuples. De ce fait, les peuples, comme les individus dans un État libéral et décent, se comporteront d’une manière juste et raisonnable, ne se feront pas la guerre et auront à résoudre paisiblement les relations internationales. À la question concernant les sujets de la théorie — pourquoi peuples et pas États — Rawls a répondu qu’il s’agit d’une théorie idéale, construite de la manière d’être à la fois réaliste, «que sa réalisation est possible et probable», et «utopiste et hautement désirable» en tant qu’elle établie «un lien entre les institutions justes et raisonnables et les conditions qui permettent aux citoyens de réaliser leurs intérêts fondamentaux.»46 Le réalisme de la théorie consiste dans le soutien des formes variées d’associations et de fédérations, mais pas d’un État mondial.47 Les hypothèses de la théorie sont: a. la distinction entre les peuples libéraux — qui ont, comme agent de représentation de ses responsabilités concernant un territoire et un environnement, un gouvernement démocratique constitutionnel raisonnablement juste, qui sont des citoyens unis par une culture commune et par une nature morale à la fois raisonnable et rationnelle — et les États hors-la-loi, b. la distinction entre les peuples qui ne
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40 John Rawls, Théorie de la justice (A Theory of Justice, 1971), Paris, Seuil, 1987, p. 288, 289. On doit noter que dès 1975 le texte original anglais a été considérablement remanié en vue des traductions. «Ainsi, les éditions étrangères...sont supérieures à l’édition anglaise...», ‘Préface (de John Rawls) de l’édition française’ de ci-dessus, p. 9. 41 John Rawls, Théorie de la justice..., p. 37, 81, 123, 166. 42 John Rawls, Paix et démocratie, p. 18. 43 Ibidem. 44 Ibidem, p. 19. 45 Ibidem. 46 John Rawls, Paix et démocratie, p. 18. 47 Ibidem, p. 51.
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disposent pas de la souveraineté et les États, et c. «la différence entre les États et les peuples ...de la manière dont sont définis la rationalité, la préoccupation pour le pouvoir et les intérêts fondamentaux d’un État.»48 Les principes du droit des peuples — consistant dans la stipulation de la liberté, de l’indépendance des peuples, de leur égalité et obligation de respecter les droits de l’homme, les traités, de non-intervention et d’engager une guerre seulement pour l’autodéfense, d’aider les autres peuples vivant dans des conditions défavorables «qui les empêchent d’avoir un régime politique et social juste et décent.»49 S’il s’agit des peuples libéraux, ces principes peuvent devenir réalité, et Rawls a considéré que justement son cadre théorique — kantien — et les tendances observées dans l’évolution de la modernité occidentale permettent de provoquer la théorie réaliste des relations internationales: les institutions politiques et sociales se sont transformées en mettant en évidence le fait des mœurs douces de Montesquieu.50 Mettant en évidence que sa théorie se lie aux aspects institutionnels, culturels et moraux des «citoyens unis» dans une démocratie libérale,51 Rawls a circonscrit les limites de sa construction: celle-ci serait un contrat social extérieur au monde économique où il n’opère pas — de plus qu’on est contemporain aux «intérêts d’un pouvoir économique fortement concentré, dissimulé à la connaissance publique et presque complètement dispensé de rendre des comptes.»52 Même s’il a été intéressé de formaliser les conditions d’une «utopie réaliste» — en précisant le caractère «hypothétique et non historique»53 des ses supposées d’origine kantienne — Rawls a tenté de montrer l’adéquation de sa théorie aux situations actuelles. Ainsi il a eu besoin de considérer aussi des «peuples non libéraux décents», dont la structure de base est «une hiérarchie consultative décente»54. Rawls a occulté les raisons profondes qui ont déterminé l’acceptation comme partenaires des pays qui n’avaient pas accompli ces critères et la répudiation des pays qui les en avaient bien réalisés. De même il a exclu les questions concernant les contradictions entre les tentatives d’imposer la hégémonie et le droit international.55 Enfin ici, Rawls a ignoré les contradictions qui opposent les citoyens bien rangés d’un pays qui mène des guerres qui n’entraînent pas l’accord de la majorité des citoyens,56 comme les guerres comme telles. Et en même temps il a essayé de contre-poser à la vision
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48 Ibidem, p. 43. 49 Ibidem, p. 52. 50 Ibidem, p. 62. 51 Ibidem, p. 37. 52 John Rawls, Paix et démocratie, p. 38. Notre observation est également commune à Malcolm Hayward, Rethinking Post-colonial Theory in a Global Context: John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples, http://www.english. iup.edu/mhayward/Recent/Rawls.htm (22-I-2007). 53 John Rawls, Paix et démocratie, p. 24, 23. 54 Ibidem, p. 17. 55 Voir Heiko Fritz, Sibylle Scheipers, Daniela Sicurelli, Hegemony and International Law, http://www.sisp.it/ sisp_convegnoannuale_paperroom_download.asp?id=438 (23-I-2007). 56 Voir Agustin Aguayo’s statement, September 02, 2006, http://agustin-aguayo.blogspot.com/2006/09/ agustin-aguayos-statement.html (20-II-2007).
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pessimiste de Huntington de The Clash of Civilizations une espérance issue du libéralisme utopique de la première génération et qui paraît nécessaire dans le contexte présent.57 Mais Rawls, tout en précisant le cadre de son analyse, a bien voulu démontrer l’étroite connexion entre l’idéalisme des conditions idéales et le réalisme des buts poursuit par les États.58 Les débats publics (the public reason) sont ceux qui mettent face à face les «idéaux, principes et concepts politiques (moraux) pour caractériser une société raisonnable et juste»59 et d’autre part les institutions qui assurent «la stabilité pour les bonnes raisons».60 Ainsi l’idée d’utopie réaliste, pour une grande part institutionnelle, inclut son application de la même manière que dans une «société intérieure libérale ou décente».61 La grande question est si, dans une conception libérale, on pourrait déduire les droits des peuples des droits de l’homme, qui de leur côté sont établis entre des individus,62 d’autant plus que Rawls considère les pays hiérarchiques décents: s’il y a des groupes privilégiés dans ces pays alors comment pourraît-on respecter les droits de l’homme? En vérité, Rawls a rédigé une théorie idéale basée sur l’extension des présupposées libérales concernant l’organisation des sociétés «décentes» au plan international. L’auteur a tenu à mentionner que «l’idée d’une société raisonnablement juste des peuples bien ordonnés n’occupera une place majeure dans une théorie de la politique internationale avant que ces peuples existent et qu’ils aient appris à coordonner les actions de leurs gouvernements...»63 Tout de même l’image est la vieille conviction: «à travers la négociation et le commerce, ils peuvent satisfaire leurs besoins et intérêts économiques».64 Mais dans cette théorie idéale, le principe fondamental de Rawls, celui de la justice comme équité, fonctionne de deux manières: celle établie entre les peuples libéraux et celle concernant les relations de ceux-ci et les peuples non libéraux. Tout va bien au premier niveau; en ce qui concerne le second, le concept avancé est évidemment celui de tolérance. Il ne s’agit pas ici de rectitude (correctness) ou d’équité (fairness), mais d’impartialité65: ce n’est pas la réciprocité et les sentiments impliqués — en incluant ainsi le désir de maximiser les avantages de toutes les parties — mais la conception minimaliste qui suppose que les
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57 Voir Kofi Annan, novembre 2006, Istanbul, «Alliance des civilisations», dans Independance et Développement. Alliance des civilisations, IDRP, Paris, no 79, 2e trimestre 2007. 58 Voir Charles R. Beitz, “Rawls’s Law of Peoples”, Ethics, Vol. 110, No. 4 (Jul. 2000), p. 669: «La perspective est située dans le contexte intellectuel de la pensée moderne anglo-américaine, en aspirant à occuper le milieu entre le scepticisme des sois disants réalistes et l’utopisme inerte de point de vue politique.» 59 John Rawls, Paix et démocratie, p. 27. 60 Ibidem, p. 26. 61 Ibidem, p. 31. 62 Voir Gavriel Rubin, Liberalism and Democracy: A Response to Rawls’ The Law of Peoples, http://ocw. mit.edu/NR/rdon/yres/Political-Science/17-000JPolitical-Philosophy-Global-JusticeSpring2003/B2ED9EDEE7DF-4E19-8719-F26106D564CA/0/rubin_paper.pdf (15-II-2007) qui répond négativement à notre question. 63 John Rawls, Paix et démocratie, p. 33. 64 Ibidem. 65 Voir Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995, qui a montré que, si dans une théorie qui part des principes réalisés au niveau des pays décents («d’un seul pays») les inégalités sont légitimées comme fait, la théorie même de la justice devrait être changée, comme impartialité (théorie minimaliste du moment) et pas comme équité.
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besoins de base doivent être accomplis avant de discuter la question radicale de la redistribution. On peut apercevoir la vieille tentative commune aux libéraux comme aux fabiens. Cette classification des peuples a ouvert la voie du réalisme politique: c’est la théorie non idéale qui trace les moyens de réalisation graduelle de la société mondiale des peuples décents. La théorie est non idéale justement parce qu’elle se focalise sur les distinctions actuelles entre les peuples, leurs niveaux de vie et leurs aspirations et sur la guerre conçue comme thérapeutique inhérente en vue d’arriver à l’idéal désiré, mais il paraît essentiellement comme réponse aux guerres déclarées par les États hors-la-loi.66 La théorie non idéale répond aux «questions de transition»: «comment passer d’un monde qui contient des États hors-la-loi et des sociétés souffrant de conditions défavorables, à un monde dans lequel toutes les sociétés en viennent à accepter et à suivre le Droit des peuples».67 Et bien, comment? Rawls a oscillé entre la critique des guerres qui ont été initiées par les dirigeants et non par les civils ordinaires68 et l’acceptation de la pression faite par «les peuples bien ordonnés» qui toutefois ne serait «par ellemême efficace».69 Rawls a été motivé par l’idée de configurer les conditions idéales de la politique internationale maintenant, quand «la perception préalable de l’importance fondamentale des principes de la guerre juste»70 est plus avancée qu’en temps de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. De mon avis, ce n’est pas la distinction entre raisonnabilité et rationalité, ni la classification des États,71 mais l’accent remis de nouveau sur l’importance de la pensée idéaliste72 des relations internationales. Dans cet esprit, Rawls a insisté sur les principes limitant la conduite de la guerre, l’idéal de l’homme d’État,73
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66 John Rawls, Paix et démocratie, p. 112: «il existe deux genres de théories non idéale. L’un concerne les conditions de non-obéissance, c'est-à-dire les conditions dans lesquelles certains régimes refusent de se conformer à un Droit des Peuples raisonnable: ils estiment qu’une raison suffisante d’entrer en guerre est que la guerre est favorable — ou pourrait l’être — aux intérêts nationaux (non raisonnables) du régime. Je nomme ces régimes États hors-la-loi. L’autre genre de théorie non idéale s’intéresse aux conditions défavorables, c’est-à-dire aux conditions des sociétés dont les circonstances historiques, sociales et économiques rendent la réalisation d’un régime bien ordonné, qu’il soit libéral ou décent, difficile, sinon impossible. J’appelle ces sociétés les sociétés entravées.» 67 John Rawls, Paix et démocratie, p. 112. 68 Ibidem, p. 118. Et la continuation: «le bombardement incendiaire de Tôkiô et des autres villes japonaises au printemps 1945, comme le bombardement atomique d’Hiroshima et de Nagasaki, qui sont d’abord des attaques sur des populations civiles, ont été des torts considérables, comme cela est aujourd’hui largement, mais pas unanimement reconnu.» Aussi: «leur patriotisme est souvent exploité cruellement et cyniquement» (AB, il s’agit des civilsenrolés de force). 69 Ibidem, p. 116. 70 Ibidem, p. 126. 71 Voir Chris Brown, The construction of a ‘realistic utopia’: John Rawls and international political theory (2002), available online at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/00000744/01/Construction_Realistic_ Utopia.pdf (15-I-2007). 72 Chris Brown a mentionné «de la pensée utopique». 73 John Rawls, Paix et démocratie, p. 120: «L’homme d’État est un idéal, au même titre que celui de l’individu honnête et vertueux.»
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le comportement envers le peuple de l’ennemi,74 l’exemption pour urgence absolue, l’importance de la culture politique. Dans la même partie, Rawls a discuté «le devoir» des peuples bien ordonnés d’aider les sociétés entravées.75 L’existence des institutions justes, ou décentes, la réalisation d’une culture politique centrée sur les droits de l’homme, une gestion correcte sont les buts et, en même temps, les conditions pour une aide motivée et efficace. En confrontant sa théorie avec une critique maximaliste — mais libérale — Rawls a souligné que «dans la société du Droit des Peuples, le devoir d’aide s’applique jusqu’à ce que toutes les sociétés aient établi des institutions de base justes, libérales ou décentes. Le devoir d’épargne réelle comme le devoir d’aide sont définis par un objectif, au-delà duquel ils ne s’appliquent pas. Il garantissent l’essentiel de l’autonomie politique: celle des citoyens libres et égaux dans le cas intérieur, et celle des peuples libéraux et décents libres et égaux dans la Société des Peuples... Le but politique ultime de la société est de devenir parfaitement juste, et stable pour les bonnes raisons. Une fois cette fin atteinte, le Droit des Peuples ne prescrit aucun objectif supplémentaire comme, par exemple, l’augmentation du niveau de vie au-delà de celui qui est nécessaire à soutenir ces institutions.»76 Ainsi Rawls a mentionné le contraste entre sa théorie — celle du Droit des Peuples — et celle cosmopolitique libérale: «la préoccupation suprême d’une vision cosmopolitique est le bien-être des individus, et non la justice des sociétés. D’après cette vision, la question de la nécessité d’une distribution globale additionnelle restera posée même après que chaque société intérieure aura établi des institutions internes justes... Le Droit des Peuples est indifférent entre (AB), une distribution comparative et, d’autre part, l’aide en soi préconisée par Rawls). La position cosmopolitique, au contraire, n’est pas neutre. Elle se préoccupe du bien-être des individus, et donc de la possibilité d’améliorer celui de la personne globalement la plus défavorisée. L’important dans le Droit des Peuples est la justice et la stabilité, pour les bonnes raisons, des sociétés libérales et décentes...»77 Il ne s’agit pas d’ethnocentrisme, mais de la tolérance envisagée par les peuples décents, a tenu Rawls à nous avertir encore une fois. De cette manière, la conclusion du livre comme tel78 serait «la réconciliation avec notre monde social»79. «J’estime que, dans une société des peuples libéraux et décents, le Droit des Peuples serait honoré sinon toujours, du moins la plupart du temps...»80 Cette observation est très importante: on doit respecter les lois internationales,
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74 Ibidem, p. 121: «Le peuple de l’ennemi ne doit pas être mis en esclavage ou en servage après la capitulation, et l’on ne peut, le moment venu, lui refuser ses pleines libertés.» (AB, c’est moi qui souligne.) 75 Ibidem, p. 130. 76 Ibidem, p. 144, 145. 77 Ibidem, p. 145, 146. Voir aussi le symposium World Poverty and Human Rights, dans Ethics & International Affairs, volume 19, number 1, 2005 — Carnegie Council on ethics and international affairs — où les participants se sont rangés de deux parts: de celle communautariste et de celle cosmopolitique. 78 Sans la partie L’idée de raison publique reconsidérée. 79 John Rawls, Paix et démocratie, p. 150. 80 Ibidem, p. 152.
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mais aujourd’hui on se heurte justement à leur ignorance, serait notre première interprétation. Mais Rawls a ajouté que la réconciliation avec le monde consiste dans la disparition des grands fléaux.81 La théorie politique libérale réconcilie justement par son minimalisme du pluralisme raisonnable opposé aux fondamentalismes. Enfin, elle réconcilie parce qu’elle montre qu’un monde de démocraties constitutionnelles raisonnablement justes serait possible: «elle établit que ce monde peut exister quelque part et à une certaine époque, mais pas que son existence est nécessaire, ni qu’elle se réalisera.»82 L’histoire future est ouverte, mais «en montrant comment le monde social peut faire advenir les caractéristiques d’une utopie réaliste, la philosophie politique définit un objectif de long terme à l’entreprise politique...»83
Même si Rawls a été kantien concernant les supposées liées au contrat et à la désirabilité de foedus pacificum,84 le contenu de sa représentation des relations internationales doit être jugé différemment de celle de Kant. Le philosophe allemand exemplaire des Lumières a dessiné le contour des relations internationales idéales sur la base étique de «la Règle d’Or»85, du principe de réciprocité étendu universellement, tandis que Rawls a voulu décrire la paix désirable du point de vue du modèle idéalisé de la démocratie représentative occidentale et, donc, de la perspective qui impose ce modèle, minimaliste, même si les conséquences de cette perspective contraires à la paix ont été expérimentées par Rawls. Si Popper a pu s’illusionner au temps de l’apogée de l’État providence qu’on éradiquerait la pauvreté en Inde (disait-il), c’est-à-dire dans tout le monde par les moyens de l’État libéral, Rawls a écrit son ouvrage après la décennie des guerres en Afrique — résultat des relations «postcoloniales» — et de l’évolution de la situation en Irak après la guerre de 1991. Il y a ainsi des prémices différentes pour observer les théories des deux penseurs. Les présomptions formelles sont communes à Kant et Rawls. Mais le contexte et même la finalité sont différents. Justement pour cette raison on doit souligner non seulement une certaine continuité entre Kant et Rawls — l’idéal de la démocratie est universalisable/peut être universalisé, les conditions d’un accord minimum, le consensus rationnel autour des valeurs — mais aussi la discontinuité entre les deux philosophes. Le destin des deux théories est aussi différent: tandis que la théorie idéale de Kant, même si elle a soutenu le discours démocratique et universaliste des droits de l’homme dans les relations internationales (et la pratique de la Société des Nations et de l’Organisation des Nations Unis), est restée quand même et plutôt
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81 John Rawls, Paix et démocratie, p. 153: «Je nomme ‘utopie réaliste‘ le monde dans lequel ils auraient disparu et où des institutions de base justes (ou au moins décentes) auraient été établi…» 82 John Rawls, Paix et démocratie, p. 154. 83 Ibidem, p. 155. 84 «Nous pouvons suivre la voie tracée par Kant et débuter l’analyse par la conception politique d’une démocratie constitutionnelle raisonnablement juste...», John Rawls, Paix et démocratie, p. 37. 85 Voir Paul Ricoeur, Soi-même comme un autre, Paris, Seuil, 1990, p. 255–264.
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une tendance dans l’ordre international, l’idéal théorisé par Rawls fait partie de ceci. Il y a évidemment une querelle entre les discours et pratiques qui incarnent les deux théories idéales. Mais tous les deux jouent un rôle de facteur intégrateur dans les deux types de discours et pratiques internationales.
Qui fait le Droit des Peuples, les institutions politiques justes? Et qui et comment définit la justice? N’y a-t-il pas une fétichisation des formes démocratiques? Est-ce que les phénomènes critiques concernant ces formes, comme la relation entre ces formes et les rapports économiques, ne devraient pas être inclus dans une théorie politique actuelle? Si les institutions sont celles qui permettent la négociation des conflits entre valeurs incommensurables et également justifiables — le pluralisme axiologique — qu’est-ce qui offre la légitimité aux institutions? Est-ce qu’on ne peut pas saisir la crise du libéralisme institutionnel, avec la crise du libéralisme utopique des valeurs communes, même minimales?
Les théories peuvent être analysées en soi, c’est-à-dire dans le cadre de leurs présupposées, mais aussi en les comparant avec le contexte historique qui les a engendrées et ainsi avec d’autres théories. Sans doute, le libéralisme rawlsien fait partie du courant idéologique principal de toute une époque moderne et post moderne. En même temps, son idéalisme démontre les contradictions internes de ce courant. Même si chaque théorie composante du mainstream peut être interprétée de manières opposées — en mettant en évidence leur consensus ou antagonisme avec les idées politiques dominantes du moment — et même si le conservatisme a aussi son idéalisme, celui du libéralisme rawlsien a la qualité de surprendre l’importance des institutions et de la culture politique et en même temps le caractère insuffisant de ceux-ci dans le cadre des supposées libérales non disputables: c’est la morale qui doit régler et pas (seulement) les raisons politiques particulaires.86 De ce point de vue, la théorie internationale de Rawls peut être aussi jugée comme liaison entre l’idéalisme conservatiste — concentré sur les institutions et bien existant dans la conception kantienne — et l’idéalisme libérale radicale qui tend à transcender le fixisme par l’intermédiaire des modèles moraux idéaux utilisés comme miroirs. On peut même conclure qu’il y a une tendance de convergence entre les deux idéalismes qui constituent «les deux faces du libéralisme».87
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86 Voir aussi P. Allott, Eunomia: New Order for a New World, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001, apud Ion Yaulet, Rules of Law and International Society, dans «Analysis and Metaphysics», no. 1, 2003. 87 Voir John Gray, Les deux faces du libéralisme, 2000.
FREEDOM AS PROJECTION OF REASON IN SPINOZA GABRIELA TÃNÃSESCU
Abstract. The paradoxical concept of the free necessity, central in Spinoza’s theory of freedom, is sketched by Spinozian ontological argument and by the implications of his theory of rational knowledge. The paper focuses on the individuality of Spinoza’s radical rationalist paradigm and on his agument of holist inspiration.
Considered as reconciliationist, both deterministe, in the physical world order, and “liberal”, in that of spiritual and moral-political one, Spinoza`s philosophical reflection inscribes itself into a paradigm of modern thought that identifies freedom with a spiritual conversion which makes possible “the connection of conscience to the universal order”1. This kind of bivalent philosophy seeks to confer dignity to human by seating the reason sub specie aeternitatis, by orienting it toward the divine and eternal, toward the “fulfilled and a temporal essence”. In this perspective, the theory of freedom is grounded by relating it to a certain absolute differences: necessity–freedom, divine–human and reason–affect. In the following considerations, I propose an inquire on this way of conceiving freedom as a projection of reason, circumscribing it to the representative assertion of the modern philosophy in accordance with freedom is an arch-founder value to human, conferring dignity through the quality of being knowledge part of the existence. “Men think themselves free…”
Spinoza intended to ground the concept of freedom through an apparent paradoxical formula: the free necessity, a syntagma which constitutes — by the concepts of God and of intellectual love of God — the centre of the theoretical display of Ethics, in fact the ontological covered of the author’s political philosophy. The middle term of this “reconciliation”, hard to be accepted in the seventeenth century philosophical thought, was the reason. By this solution Spinoza came to illustrate the evolution of the philosophy through the evolution of the reflective self, an evolution signified, in Gusdorf`s assessment, by an ideatical succession which departed from the Cartesian cogito and delayed until
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1 Jean Préposiet, Spinoza et la liberté des hommes, Gallimard, 1967, p. 18.
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., IV, 1, p. 112–119, Bucharest, 2007.
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the transcendental Kantian self. Thus, “the man’s humanity appears ...as measure of his rational capacity... The man’s liberation, as Spinoza conceive it, recreated the reason in God’s image and, through this, signified the man’s liberation from the servitudes of his condition...”2. Moreover, the situating in the space of the universal constituted the motive or the source of the entire rationalist inspiration in matters of theology from the Stoics to Spinoza and Kant. But, in Spinoza, preceded by the deists and the Reformation, “the cipher of the universality become solidary with the cipher of the personality”3, until its annihilation. “The result is always the same: the reason reduces and burns up the revelation. This stake... is achieved continually through the passing from the revealed theology to the natural theology and then to the rational theology, how can be observed in Spinoza’s thought in his Theological-Political Treatise or in Kant’s Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone”4. This focusing on the reason assumes a complete denaturizing of the original sense of the sacred, a transformation of the religion in moral, a separation of the religion from philosophy. Spinoza affirmed, incendiary for his time that only the philosophy has as aim the truth through reason, “our biggest gift and godlike light”. Reason, as the domain of truth and of wisdom, transcends the piety, the religious obedience and the consolation brought by the Scripture. To Spinoza the reliable path to come to a “certain and indisputable revelation”5 of God’s will remained the reason inclined on God namely on the nature or “the substance composed by infinite attributes”. God, close to the terms and the argumentation of the scholastic kind, is the first, the efficient and the immanent cause. In Brunschvicg’s interpretation, in Spinoza only God “exists from the reason of his self-sufficiency, and his possibility (puissance) is nothing else than his essence”6, because only him “really acts and guides all things only from the necessity of his own nature and perfection and finally, that his decrees and volitions are eternal truths, and always involve necessity...”7. But, in contact with the Jewish tradition, especially with Maimonide’s inheritance, and with that of Renaissance’s Neo-Platonism and naturalism, the sense of Spinoza argumentance and his linguistic transposing is radically modified. Thus, “the more we understand singular things, the more we understand God”8. Moreover, Spinoza affirms that “by God’s guidance I understand the fixed and immutable order of nature, or the connection of natural things” and by universal laws of nature “nothing but the eternal decrees of God, which always involve eternal truth and necessity. Therefore, whether we say that all things happen according to the laws of nature, or whether we say that they
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2 George Gusdorf, Mythe et métaphysique, Paris, Flammarion, 1984, p. 209. 3 Ibidem, p. 223. 4 Ibidem, p. 228. 5 Benedict de Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, in The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, translated from the Latin, with an introduction by R.H.M. Elwes, Vol. I, London, George Bell and Son, 1908, chap. XVI, p. 211. 6 Leon Brunschvicg, Spinoza et ses contemporaines, Paris, Felix Alcan, 1932, p. 76. 7 Benedict de Spinoza, op. cit., chap. IV, p. 65. 8 Idem, Ethics in The Ethics and Other Works. A Spinoza Reader, edited and translated by Edwin Curley, Princeton University Press, 1994, fifth part of the Ethics, p. 256.
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are ordered according to the decree and guidance of God, we say the same thing’9. On this ground Spinoza considers that to affirm that all things are done by virtue of the law of nature or that all things are achieved by God’s decision and guidance means the exclusion of any contingency and of any free will. Thus, “things have been produced by God with the highest perfection, since they have followed necessarily from a given most perfect nature”10, from the eternal necessity. In this context only him who is in self and is conceived by self, namely only the God is considered a free cause. Only him exists from the necessity of his nature, only God acts from the laws of his nature alone and, therefore, is constituted as natura naturanta. Otherwise, what Spinoza defines as natura naturata, or the modes understood as states of the substance, does not exists independently but is constrained to exist and to work in a determinate way since it derives from the necessity of God’s nature. Only God exists necessarily and, nevertheless, freely (“because he exists from the necessity of his own nature alone”) and therefore in Spinoza freedom is placed “not in a free decree, but in a free necessity”11 In this way the author seeks to unite in God the “what can not be unified” or to reconcile in God the “irreconcilable”: the freedom and the necessity. The free necessity represents the core of the Spinoza system because every concept of the system is derived from this “axiomatically truth”. In this respect Gabaude’s interpretation is illustrative for the peculiarity of Spinoza’s ontology: “The God’s free necessity is a manner to express the increate existence of the Totality of existence or of the unity, the self-subsistence and self- sufficiency of this Totality”12. The free necessity signifies thus the absence of the determination understood as an external determination, namely an indetermination and, by causa sui, a self-determination. In this way Spinoza does not put in opposition the necessity and the freedom, but the freedom, understood as God’s free necessity, and the constraint. Yet if only in God the necessity is identified strictly with the freedom and if the necessity of the world is comprised in the necessity of divine existence, then the man, as a mode or as a modification of the substance which expresses the God’s nature in a certain and determined way, “is in God’s power, necessarily exists”13. In consequence, Spinoza considers that is a common prejudice the men’s claim to think themselves free14. This opinion is proved to be false because it expresses just the fact that the men are conscious of their actions, but not of the causes by which they are determinate. To Spinoza, the sayings that human actions hang from the men’s will are just sayings which are not correspondent to any idea. The opinion, the thought that the men are free or that they act free, according to “their volitions and their appetite” reflects that “they do not think...
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9 Idem, Theological-Political Treatise, chap. III, p. 46. 10 Idem, Ethics, cit. ed., first part of the Ethics, p. 74. 11Spinoza to Schuller for Tschirnhaus, Letter 58, Objections and Replies. From the correspondence between Spinoza and Tschirnhaus, in The Ethics and Other Works, cit. ed., p. 267. 12 Jean-Marc Gabaude, Liberté et raison, Vol. II from the Philosophie compréhensive de la nécessitation libératrice, Publication de l’Université de Toulouse–Le Mirail, serie A, tome 14, 1972, p. 62. 13 Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, cit. ed., p. 77. 14 See Ibidem, p. 110.
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of the causes by which they are disposed to wanting and willing, because they are ignorant of those causes”15. This ignoring of the causes that determine the human actions and choices expresses in fact the presence of the inadequate ideas and of confusions. As an implication of this argument, Spinoza considers that the actions, equally as the conduct and the mental life of human beings, are determined and that the free will is an illusion. In this way, the will as free will (in the Cartesian sense) and in the imagination that “can make us to consider things as being contingent” is denied. Denying the free will Spinoza denies the freedom that, consonant with the medieval thought, God concedes to man. In the same, time by this denial the authors tries to correlate the human option with the truth understood as a known necessity and, thus, as an assumed necessity. In this perspective the freedom becomes a merit concretized in the effort to know the truth, to obtain the adequate ideas on the necessity. “In the mind there is no absolute or free, will, but the mind is determined to will this or that by a cause which is also determined by another, and this again by another, and so to infinity”16. Moreover Spinoza considers that the decrees of the mind are not free because the nature itself impedes this thing. The man, as the present existence of the mind that includes the present existence of the body, presumes a bivalence that expresses both “the opening” and “the closing” to the freedom, actually, to the free necessity. “The opening” is produced through the quality of mind, understood as will, as intellect and self-conscience, to be able to relate itself to his own aspirations. “The closing” or, let say, “the restriction” supervenes since the man’s reference concomitant to the mind and to the body is made by affects, by “man’s own essence” and serves to his preservation. To remain just submitted to the affects and to the passions means to remain “passive”, “slave” “subjected by the fate”, powerless, namely, to remain “a part of the nature that can not be conceived by self”. In Spinoza this is the condition of the determined and ignorant man, a state issued from the fact that the men do not respect the teaching of the reason. The author opposes to this condition another one in which the human freedom is defined by the co-ordinates of necessity and of reason. According to it, the salvation consists in reason, in knowledge and in understanding, in a mental and spiritual conversion which makes the freedom possible and, together with it, the exceeding itself of the common man’s condition — “the natural common order” —, hence the obtaining the wisdom. Since only the wise man, which is the free man, is capable ever “to posses true peace of mind,...the wise man, in so far he is considered as such, is hardly troubled in spirit, but being, by a certain eternal necessity, conscious of himself, and of God, and of things he never ceased to be, but always possesses true peace of mind”17. The similitude of the Spinoza solution with that of Stoics, in tone and contents is evident. But to the stoic’s ideal Spinoza adds specific accents. What matters to him is not an extension of the determinism also on the mental life, but
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15 Ibidem. 16 Ibidem, second part of the Ethics, p. 146. 17 Ibidem, fifth part of the Ethics, p. 265.
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the assertion with founding value that liberation consists in rational knowledge. Thus, the wise man reaches the peace in his mind, namely the freedom, by reason and by acquiring adequate ideas on Totality whose mode is himself, by surpassing his passivity, “the hope and the fear”, by acquiring the possibility “to order to the fate”. “The power of reason” or “the path to come to freedom”
In order to come to the state of freedom, hence, we have to let ourselves to be guided by reason, in the first row in order to exceed our ignorance, to know and to love God — what equates with “to order to the fate” — and, then, to enter in the condition of morality and to dominate our own affects — what equates with a sort of active and opened mental activity. The reason is the way by which Spinoza defines the freedom and by which he forces “to coincide the prime necessity from an ontological point of view and the prime freedom from an ethical point of view”18. In Spinoza the essence of the reason, as the striving of the mind for a clear and distinct knowledge, has as basis the notions which explain “what is common to all the things”. The knowledge by reason or the knowledge of the second kind is realized through the adequate ideas on the features of the things and is sustained by a maximum positivism of the will (expressed as a force of knowledge). The second kind of knowledge means the knowledge of the causes, “the exercise of the necessity”, the recognition of God’s and nature’s laws indetermination. The rational knowledge rises above the vague or indefinite experience and the knowledge of the first kind, namely the opinion or the imagination generating, in the same manner as the free will, false representations. The causal knowledge, or the order of nature, becomes an instrument of liberation. Speaking strictly and in a crude formula, it could be affirmed that “Spinoza resorted to the same general rationalization as the Stoics did in the resolving the problem of human freedom in a mechanistically determined universe. By understanding that what happens must happen, that all is a result of universal law and destiny — or of God — we are delivered from intellectual bondage. In other words, a knowledge that we are not makes us free”19. It could be added that in Spinoza the knowledge of the law permits their use, so that the freedom results from an understanding of the necessity and an application of the outcomes of this process in the human activity. This solution seems possible since Spinoza conceives the reality as a system functioning harmoniously, mechanical-repeatable, without conflicts of physical, psychical and social nature. The idea of the liberating power corresponding to this known necessity, developed by Hegel in his specific “dialectics” (“the truth of the necessity is the freedom”) and put again in a historical manner by Marx and Engels, is already
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18 Jean-Marc Gabaude, op. cit., p. 215. 19 Harry Elmer Barnes, An Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World. From the Renaissance through the Eighteenth Century, third revised edition, vol. II, New York, Dover Publications, Inc., 1965, p. 729.
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a common place. Undoubtedly, the wear of the expression does not reflect the wear of the idea. The recognition of the causality and its importance to the human manifestations, especially in the contemporary science and philosophy, needs any more the theoretical endeavor which constituted the novelty and the originality of the Spinoza system. It has to be specified that in order to express the articulation of freedom at human level and its connection with the divine or absolute freedom, Spinoza adds the third kind of knowledge, the intuitive knowledge, the knowledge that realizes the comprehension and the promovation of the necessity. Its result is the awareness of the insertion of the necessity at particular level, as natura naturata, in the necessity of natura naturanta. The intuition is situated by Spinoza above the reason and defined as possibility of locate the man in the nature, as possibility of forming an active conscience of the necessity. So that, freedom means to assume the necessity, to be adequate and to resonate with the divine or with the nature, to make inner the exterior and, as such, to recreate the own self. In this context freedom is “not the freedom of option (as in Descartes — a.n.), but of the progressive assimilation of the thought in a substance which understands that she is no more determined to act but by herself”20. As follows, the comprehension becomes actually the promovation of the necessity. The liberation by acquiring the adequate ideas means for the man the acquiring of the quality of cause. Thus, reason becomes co-extensive to the reality. The reason and the intuition determine concomitant a re-education of the wish, a peculiar moderation of the individual not in the sense of outlining the own personality, neither in that of the option for an alternative or the other, but in that of a guided evolution of subjectivity. Certainly in this process of knowledge and of implication is annihilated not only the subjectivity through the free will, but also the individuality. In consequence “the man becomes free through the intellectual progress which liberates him by his individuality... The law of nature appears to him as the law of the own activity, and the freedom is the conformity with the nature”21. In an absolutes expression, that of Windelband, which does not distinguish in Ethics a freedom in psychological sense, “from a metaphysical point of view freedom can signify only the absolute existence of the undetermined divinity, and from an ethical point of view only the ideal of dominating the passions by reason”22. I think that we can accept that Spinoza wanted much more than that. By the knowledge of the third kind the freedom is raised above the conformation of the individual’s activity to the universal order. This signifies the acquiring of the conscience of the absolute existence’s eternity and of the possibility to participate, only fragmentary in it. Since, to liberate himself, the man must situate himself in the nature and become a part of the necessity, of the divine essence.
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20 Paul Hazard, Criza conºtiinþei europene, Bucureºti, Editura Univers, 1973, p. 280. 21 Leon Brunschvicg, Écrits philosophiques, tome premier, L’umanisme de l’Occident. DescartesSpinoza-Kant, PUF, 1951, p. 127. 22 Wilhelm Windelband, A History of Philosophy, vol. II, New York, Harper & Row Publishers, 1958, p. 413.
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As such, Freedom imposes the knowledge of the universal necessity, the consciousness of it, “the possession of all causes of our action”, without free will, so that “we will be the more free so as we will be reduced the force of external determination to the force of the inner determination”23. Delbos emphasizes a maximal type of innering the necessity that is, to Spinoza, the more acute so as the man, as a part of nature and of God, “only know in part”24. Analogically, freedom is partial, partitive, is a part of the absolute or divine freedom, as far as the man’s acts can be adequate always with the necessity or with “the nature of another man”. The freedom understood as an innerving of the necessity through the reason and understanding changes the sense of necessity at human level: from the constraint to the necessity free assumed and, moreover, to the intellectual love of God. To Spinoza, it is not possible to know God indeed without to love him because God or the nature is the supreme Totality from which everyone is a part. Thus, “between the part and the entire exists a relation of homogeneity: the man exists as far as participates to God”25 and participates to God as far as is princeps rationis. Since to Spinoza God’s power, “the universal power of the entire nature that is not anything else than the power of all individuals together”, Amor Dei intellectualis, as understanding and innerving of the natura naturanta necessity, means the transposing in the condition of the universal cause. This transposing constitutes the highest freedom and signifies, in the same time, the love for the others, for the fellow men. In this way freedom appears as ontological virtue, reported to the exteriority, that makes possible a freedom as ethical virtue, a pure inner freedom. Brunschvicg appreciated “that Spinoza’s moral is, absolutely speaking, a moral of the good and of freedom...” destined to justify from ontological and moral perspective the democracy. Spinoza’s social and political theory proposes, on the route of his ontological construction and in the context of a critical approach of the theology and politics, specific for the entire “civilization of the contract” in Burdeau’s expression, democracy as a form of government “the most natural, and the most consonant with individual liberty”26. Only a democratic society in which the institutions assure the private rights, the freedom of faith, of “saying and teaching what one thought”, would fulfill a political and civic concept, constitutive and positive to freedom. Exceptionally for his epoch, Spinoza affirmed that “the ultimate aim of government is...to free every man from fear... that the true aim of government is liberty”27, that the state must assure the freedom of judging and feeling, the rationality of human beings and the possibility to everybody “to employ the reason unshackled”. The democratic society, that transcends the state of nature,
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23 Victor Delbos, Le problème moral dans la philosophie de Spinoza et dans l’histoire du spinozisme, Paris, Felix Alcan, 1893, p. 232. 24 Benedict de Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, cit. ed., chap. XVI, p. 202. 25 Leon Brunschvicg, Spinoza et ses contemporaines, p. 298. 26 Benedict de Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, cit. ed., chap. XVI, p. 207. 27 Ibidem, chap. XX, p. 258–259.
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imposes the state in which the individual has the possibility to achieve in full safety the functions of his spirit and body, so that the finality of political order is the peace and the security of life and its aim is freedom. The freedom acquired by reason represents in the last analyses a validation of the acceptance of the universal nature laws or God laws. The reason proves itself being the middle term not just between the freedom and the necessity, but also between the individual and the society. This freedom, as salvation, can be appreciated as “recognition by spirit of what possesses the entire eternity”28. What individualizes Spinoza’s conception on freedom in the modern philosophy is the supreme effort to understand and to adhere to the necessity, to conferee a sense into a particular and temporary life. He offers a mental, behavioral and existential matrix to the conditions specific to the univocal causality. Freedom, if it exists from the individual point of view, must be reported to the total Thought, to the integral rationalization. Certainly, Spinoza had the intuition of the unity of the individual and of the Totality, of individual as “cosmic spirit” and of the nature or the immanent substance, but his victory remains that of the effort to interiorize the exteriority by annihilation of the transcendence and of the individuality. The freedom manifests itself as an assimilation of the Totality and an implication in exteriority. By a progress in the order of knowledge the individual succeeds a freedom in the limits of the necessity, as such, the freedom in and by necessity, the wise man’s freedom, not the common or political one, is a projection of reason.
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28 Jean Preposiet, op. cit., p. 37.
“NATURE” AND “REASON” IN THE LEVIATHAN HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN
Abstract. The thoughts of man are representations of objects, qualities, or events that are in a continuous movement, factors of incertitude and anxiety. For Hobbes, man is a rational but not reasonable creature of nature and we speak of man’s reason in relation to a universe of the individual, one marked both by passions and reason.
The thoughts of man are representations of objects, qualities, or events that are in a continuous movement, factors of incertitude and anxiety. For Hobbes, man is a rational but not reasonable creature of nature and we speak of man’s reason in relation to a universe of the individual, one marked both by passions and reason. He says: “...the names man and rational, are of equal extent, comprehending mutually one another. But here we must take notice, that by a name is not always understood, as in grammar, only one word; but sometimes by circumlocution many words together.”1 Man is in Hobbes’s works a type of animal and yet the only one able to reason at the same time embracing senses, using imagination to think regulated thoughts. Hobbes tries to offer a new science of politics approaching all the details of his argument in a scientific manner. Hobbes defines reason “amongst the faculties of mind”. Within this specific perspective, he explains: “For REASON, in this sense, is nothing but reckoning (that is, adding and subtracting) of the consequences of general names agreed upon, for the marking and signifying of our thoughts; I say marking them when we reckon by ourselves; and signifying, when we demonstrate, or approve our reckonings to other men.”2 Leviathan is attempting to concision and precision on what concerns physiological detail as to the inner-workings of the mind, but Hobbes’ ideas provide the conceptual background for the major schools of thinking about thinking which follow in the next two centuries — particularly “skepticism” and “associationism”. The text presents itself as a mediating step between Burton and Locke. It expands and sharpens many of Burton’s ideas about categories of thought and, as Locke will later do, bases a total socio-political philosophy upon them.
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1 Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, part I, ch. 4, p. 22. 2 Ibidem, p. 28.
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., IV, 1, p. 120–126, Bucharest, 2007.
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Hobbes’s model is based upon an application of the rules of “mathematics geometry”, “physics”, to the human sciences. Science is defined by Hobbes as “the knowledge of consequences”. Hobbes professed, first of all, a theory of motion. The movement is as important in the natural and physical world, as in men’s attempt towards science, sapience or safety. Following the theories of Galileo (whom he visited in Europe) he believed that, contrary to the opinion of his day, all matter was in motion and would remain in motion unless acted upon by another force or general accident. Based upon this philosophy, Hobbes constructs as well a model of the human psyche in which all train of thoughts is explained by the motion of things in the material world impacting the senses. This impact upon the senses is the event, which creates a subsequent motion in the “sense”, which creates a subsequent motion in the brain, which continues to exert its pressure on the brain until its motion is degraded sufficiently by the interference of other new motions. There are three fundamental premises underlining this model: 1) that everything is material, including the mind, and the soul; 2) that we are brought into the world with the mind a “tabula rasa” and 3) that the senses are responsible for all mental activity. Based upon these primary tenets, Hobbes constructs an elaborate model of categories of thought, which build one upon the following until one reaches the highest levels of abstract thought. Hobbes starts from a descriptive approach to an analytical one, moving from consequence towards consequence to arrive at a philosophical construction. First, there is the “representation”, Representation for Appearance, which is the initial motion, carried by the senses to the brain. Once a representation enters the brain, it follows a train, which is the path of its motion in the brain, as it interacts with other representations on the way. Within such a specific movement, a newer representation will, necessarily obscure to some extent the older representations in the brain; hence, as a representation proceeds along its train, its influence becomes lesser. As Hobbes puts it, the sense supporting the representation “decays”. Any interaction of these trains of varying degrees of intensity and scope, Hobbes terms “imagination”, which is, he claims, “nothing more than decaying sense”. It is, however, “the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion”.3 Hobbes is very explicit in the second chapter of the Leviathan about the fact that Imagination defines the particular state of all the various trains of thoughts that are present in the mind at one time and not the process of decaying, which he names “memory”. Having defined imagination, Hobbes goes on to refine his definition by distinguishing between two distinct types: simple and compound. Simple imagination describes the presence of a particular train of thoughts separate from all others — “as when one imagineth a man, or horse, which he has seen before.”4 In this sense, imagination is the same thing as experience. Compound imagination describes the interaction of separate trains of thoughts,
—————— 3 Ibidem, p. 11. 4 Ibidem, p. 12.
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“as when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a Centaure.”5 Those individual trains of thoughts are subject to two types of development within the brain: regulated and unguided. Interestingly enough, precisely unguided thoughts are those “wherein there is no passionate thought, to govern and direct those that follow, to itself, as the end and scope of some desire, or other passion: In which case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one to another, as in a Dream.”6 Therefore passions seem to be given a regulatory function for thinking and living one human being’s exposure to reality. On the other hand, regulated thoughts, to the contrary, are those that are directed by some “desire, and designe” such as fear. The importance of this fear as well as the reality of this feeling seems self-explanatory with Hobbes. He neglects to convincingly explain, but his position springs from a multitude of sources, mainly from his perspective upon the human nature and from his (mathematical) argument in what concerns human equality. Hobbesian reality is, as a general rule, complex and frightening. At this point in his construction, Hobbes shows his impressive understanding of the connection between thinking and speaking and he makes an important “leap” to the realm of speech.7 Expanding upon an earlier definition of the functioning of the imagination as “mental discourse”, Hobbes argues that the function of speech is to transfer our mental discourse to verbal discourse. From this definition, Hobbes then constructs of model of “understanding”. Understanding, in his view, is “nothing else, but conception caused by speech”, marking not a separate function of cognition, but rather a particular group of trains of thoughts — those initiated by the exposure of the senses to speech. There are uses and abuses of speech. The general use of speech is to help humans express their thinking and it is explained accurately by other four detailed uses: 1) to acquiring experience and the arts; 2) to counseling and teaching one another; 3) to make known to others our wills in order to make possible mutual help of one another and 4) to pleasing and delighting oneself. The duality influences Hobbesian construction entirely. To the four uses of speech he proposes four abuses of speech as follows: 1) the inconstancy of the signification of words; 2) deceiving others through a metaphorical use of the words; 3) using the words to lie to the others and 4) to grieve another by words.8 Passions (appetites) and speech are the most important factors underlining Hobbes’s individualism. They are for the exclusive benefit of the individual who might choose or not to use those passions and speech to relate to the others. Sociability is in what concerns Hobbes’s individuals a question of choice, according
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5 Idem. 6 Ibidem, p. 16. 7 Ibidem, p. 20–27. 8 Unless, explains Hobbes, this is happening in the process of governing, when grieving is not grieving anymore, it is not an abuse of speech anymore, but a necessary act of correcting or amending the others. Thus, when Hobbes is discussing the definition and role of speech in human beings, he arrives at a point of inflexion where human nature, morality and a double, natural and civic necessity of a commonwealth meet.
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to their selfish interests. His methods, i.e., naturalism and mechanicism, do not lead Hobbesian thinking towards a model of a bee-like society or of a mechanism that would remind his readers of a watch. His perspective on individualism is so strong because Hobbes uses also another modern method: political realism. This is the reason why he has such a frightening vision over the individual depicted in strong dark lines to justify his authoritarian political solution. The Leviathan state has to be as strong, rational and coercitive, as impulsive, passionate, selfish are the individuals creating it (the state, the commonwealth), as a their negative almost. The last area of cognition, which Hobbes defines, is that of reason. According to Hobbes, “when a man reasoneth, he does nothing else but conceive a summe total, from addition of parcels; or conceive a remainder, from subtraction of one summe from another: which, if it be done by words, is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other part.”9 Having dealt with what he perceived to be all the categories of cognition, Hobbes goes on to attempt to explain the sources of Appetites for Desires and the Will. His explanation begins with a type of stimulus response, which he calls a Voluntary Motion.10 The Voluntary Motions are the result of the senses affecting the inner organs of man. The Motions of this brand are a type of pre-acknowledged response within the organs to particular stimuli. Different stimuli cause different types of Voluntary Motions, known as Endeavours; and when an Endeavour becomes directed at an external object, it becomes a Desire or an Aversion. The Will, subsequently, is the last appetite or aversion in which mental motion gets converted into physical motion. There are several interesting and important observations and theories, arising as Hobbes explains his model of cognition, attempting to extrapolate a theory of politics from it. Of particular interest is the way in which Hobbes deals with dualism, with the materiality of the human subject. As noted before, Hobbes states specifically that all things, including thoughts, are material. However, his model of cognition still predicates a specific type of division between the individual thinking subject and the rest of the material world; for, according to Hobbes we never actually experience the true materiality of the thing we sense. “The cause of Sense, is the external body, or object, which preseth the organ proper to each sense, ...which pressure, by mediation of the nerves, and other stings, and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure or endeavour to the heart, to deliver it self: which endeavour because outward, seemeth to be some matter without. And this seeming, or fancy, is that which men call sense ... But their appearance to us is fancy, the same waking, that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the eye, makes us fancy a light ... the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another.”11
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9 Ibidem, p. 27. 10 Ibidem, p. 33–42. 11 Ibidem, p. 9–10.
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Here we see the seeds of later Skeptical thought which argued similarly that all experience is really perception and that we have not real knowledge of the material world. In Hobbes, this philosophy becomes particularly interesting because he insists, in the face of this skepticism, in maintaining that all thought is still material. It should also be noted that Hobbes, both inherits and proliferates, some of the standard divisions of mental functioning from his period. Those are categories such as Namely, Fancy, Imagination, including a subsequent two part sub-division — Reason, Understanding and Will, although, his use of these terms is quite different than many other mainstream authors of his times, fact that underlines his modernity. Also of interest, is Hobbes’ treatment of language. Hobbes devotes an entire chapter to language and its right usage, during which he embraces an interesting model of the function of language in political society12 — one in which function of speech is to transfer our mental discourse to verbal discourse, at the same time reasoning and relating in a correct manner to our human fellows. The chapter dedicated to speech shows how important necessity and passions are in men’s lives. Passions and necessities go hand in hand and they trigger human speech at the same time triggering human reason. While it is inconceivable to think without words (and Hobbes reminds us here that with the Greek philosophers logos/λογος meant at the same time speech and reason), the passionate and playful nature of the human beings makes possible the existence of speech without reason. Passion is with Hobbes deeply involved both in any human attempt to reasoning or to speech, as is in any human action. In his book Private Interest, Public Benefit, A.O. Hirschman goes through the whole Western history of modern ideas to build a theory of the passions that are at work in a liberal democracy, but his main pillar is this approach to Hobbes.13 As hectic and multiple and difficult to anticipate in their scope and action human passions are, they are not to be erased or eliminated. Hobbes considers that among their complex nature there is room for the passions for thinking and peace. Those passions are something to build on in terms of developing a lawful (with Hobbes, the only context for a liberal) society. Hirschman construes Hobbes’s approach to support his own perspective, where human passions are useful mainly in the public sphere. While Hirschman’s implicit concept of human nature is far more optimistic than Hobbes’s, he agrees with the latter in what concerns the tremendous importance of the passions not only in individuals’ life, but in constructing and preserving (a safe and lawful, with Hobbes) liberal society. Human passions are in Hirschman’s theory responsible of the enjoyment of the individual who’s completing public tasks. Here is where the two thinkers differ dramatically. Hobbes appreciates only the human passions for peace and only those passions are to trigger the building of a safe but not really
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12 Ibidem, p. 20–27. 13 Hirschman, Albert O. Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.
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liberal society — a Leviathan. Hirschman respects and trusts all human passions in his admiration towards and certitude that with necessity human passions would lead the great majority to get involved with the activities of the public sphere to create public benefit to his satisfaction and for the general benefit at the same time. According to Hirschman, there is a personal satisfaction resulting from creating something of a public benefit and this is not equal to the remains of subtracting the effort from the benefit, but it equals the sum of those two terms of the social equation.14 While at Hobbes there is no other social and political benefit more important than safety, for Hirschman those benefits are many more and they are not arranged in any hierarchy, as the ends of a liberal society are multiple and not all of them predetermined. Also in the spirit of Bernard de Mandeville, Hirschman considers that individuals need to be trusted in what concerns their passions because they turn eventually towards the benefit of the whole society. Hobbes on the contrary, believes that individuals need lawful limits created either by an assembly or by one person only (the Leviathan) to their passionate nature in order to make the life in society possible and bearable. With Hobbes as with Hirschman, the term “interest” carries also a positive connotation. It is a characteristic of almost all the seventeenth-century writers to appreciate the craving for honor, dignity, respect and recognition, seen as a basic preoccupation of man. Specific for Hobbes is the distinction that he made between that craving for honor, respect dignity, etc., and the caring for necessary things. The latter is common for all men, while the first is more likely to be identified in those men who otherwise live at ease and do not fear want. Only those who live at ease are more complicated in their passions and actions, because the others are simpler. Differently from Hirschman though, Hobbes’s man has insatiable desires and ambitions and his passions are erratic and fluctuating, hence dangerous in spite of their multiple good aspects (after all, even the commonwealth is made possible, with Hobbes, by the fact that the passion for peace dominates people). Hirschman embraces a more enlightened way of observing the conducting of public affairs, private as well as public. The passions can assure a good climate both for public affairs and for private affairs, while “the generous causes” do not exclude, in his view, the calm passion of making money, as the latter does not exclude the first. As a conclusion, with Hobbes passion does not exclude reason. In fact human reason is put at work, generally, by the human passion. The fact that the art and the science of politics are complementary with Hobbes is not an accidental parallel to the fact that reason and passion are in a relation of “complementarity”, as opposed to one of mutual exclusion relationship, as shown by Hobbes himself in a table like the following.
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14 Hirschman, Albert O. The Passions and the Interests. Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph, Princeton: Princeton University Press (20th anniversary edition) 1997.
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Science or Philosophy — The knowledge of the consequences
Yet, while Hobbes states clearly that man and reason are of an equal extent, man and passion are not. Here lies a specific difference.
MACHIAVELLI ON GROWTH AS AN END
WILLIAM J. CONNELL
Abstract. In Machiavelli’s view it was a mistake for a republic to subject its neighbors and become a limited territorial state. Far from a prophet of the unitary territorial state, our examination of Machiavelli’s ideas on empire, the treatment of subject tertitories, and the problem of civic discord reveals him as what he in fact claimed to be at the outset of the Discourses: a writer who sought in the history of Rome’s growth a new and “untrodden” path for solving and moving beyond the problems of what today we call his historical “context.”
One of the major, well-recognized aims of Renaissance scholarship in recent decades has been the reconstruction of the historical context of the writings of Niccolo Machiavelli. Calls for a “contextualized” Machiavelli have come, some in reaction against the idealized readings ot the past, and some in an honest effort to resolve the widely disparate interpretations that have been advanced concerning a relatively small and well-of texts. Understanding Machiavelli’s ideas by placing them “in context” been a cherished goal of members of the socalled “Cambridge School” in the history of political thought, but these scholars have by no means been alone in looking to Machiavelli’s intellectual and political environment for answers to what Felix Gilbert used to call “the Machiavelli question.”1 In the absence of a consensus on Machiavelli — and some scholars still see him as a counselor to tyrants, while others view him as the advocate of moderate Aristotelian republicanism — there is something eminently sensible in looking to contemporary ideas and events tor aid in understanding not just the meaning of important phrases and passages, but also the author’s general intent. Indeed, the appeal to context was not really new in Machiavelli scholarship, where it had already developed out of earlier research. It used to be the case that most historians who studied Machiavelli belonged to one of two groups, each of which emphasized a particular Machiavellian “context” in developing its interpretations. Thus, Meinecke, Chabod, and others preferred to study Machiavelli with a view to the international diplomacy of the early sixteenth
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1 See the collection Meaning & Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics.ed. James Tully (Princeton, 1988), esp. p. 29–67 (Skinner), p.194–203 (Nachan Tarcov), p. 218–28 (Charles Taylor), and p. 246–73 (the kernel of Skinner’s response).
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., IV, 1, p. 127–140, Bucharest, 2007.
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century2. These historians emphasized the politics of power, realism in historical and political writing, and the transformation of Europe’s national monarchies into modern states. The texts they privileged were The Prince and the dispatches from France, Germany, and the Papal Court. A second group of scholars instead preferred to interpret Machiavelli in the context of the republican politics of Florence, and its relation with the tradition of classical republican thought. Such scholars as Hans Baron, J.G.A. Pocock, and (more recently) Quentin Skinner and John Najemy tended to see the republicanism of the Discourses on Livy as indicative of Machiavelli’s genuine political beliefs, and they treated The Prince as something of an exception in Machiavelli’s œuvre.3 It was argued by some that apparent differences between what might be called the “internationalist” and the “republican” approaches of Machiavelli stemmed from substantive changes in the Florentine writer’s own political ideas, changes that would have occurred in the period between the completion of The Prince and the completion of the Discourses4. But students of Machiavelli’s style and imagery, and even more importantly, of his anthropology and ethics, have confirmed time and again a fundamental consistency in the outlook of the Florentine secretary’s major works5. As Felix Gilbert demonstrated, however, the two approaches may be susceptible of synthesis, once the historian’s method comprises both the way in which citiens of the Florentine Republic viewed the outside world and the way it percieved them.6
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Friedrich Meinecke, Die Idee der Staatsrason in der neuren Geshichte (Munich and Berlin, 1924); Eugenio Dupre Theseider, Niccolo Machiavelli diplomatico. I, L arte della diplomazia nel Quattrocento (Como, 1945), esp. p. 197–204 on the Venetian relazioni; Federico Chabod, Scritti su Machiavelli (Turin, 1964); Sergio Bertelli, “Machiavelli e la politica estera fiorentina” in Studies on Machiavelli. ed. Myron P. Gilmore (Florence, 1972), p. 31–72. 3 Hans Baron, “Machiavelli: The Republican Citizen and Author of The Prince” (1961) in his In Search of Florentine Civic Humanism (Princeton,1988), II, p. 101–51; J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, 1975); Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli (New York, 1981); idem, in Machiavelli and Republicanism, ed. Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli (Cambridge, 1990), p. 121–41, 293–309; John M. Najemy, Between Friends: Discourses of Power and Desire in the Machiavelli-Vettori Letters of 1513–1515 (Princeton, 1993). See also William J. Connell, “The Republican Idea,” in James Hankins, ed., Renaissance Civic Humanism: Reappraisals and Reflections (Cambridge, 2000), p. 14–29. 4 The argument for a strong distinction between The Price and the Discourses on grounds of intention, content and date of composition was made by J.H. Hexter, “Seyssel, Machiavelli and Polybius VI: The Mystery of the Missing Translation,” Studies in the Renaissance. 3 (1956), p. 75–96; and Baron, “Machiavelli: The Republican Citizen.” Compare the remarks of Felix Gilbert, “Machiavelli in Modern Historical Scholarship,” Italian Quarterly 14 (1971), p. 25 n. 20. On a longscanding tendency to find “dichotomies” in Machiavelli’s work see Dante Della Terza, “The Most Recent Image of Machiavelli: The Contribution of the Linguist and the Literary Historian,” Italian Quarterly. 14 (1971), p. 91–113. 5 For the most forceful statement of the coherence of Machiavelli’s thought, see Gennaro Sasso, Niccolo Machiavelli. Storia del suo pensiero politico. 2 vols. (Bologna, 1980–93). Mark Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli (Princeton, 1983); Sebastian de Grazia, Machiavelli In Hell (Princeton, 1989); Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Fortune is a Woman: Gender and Politica in the Thought of Niccolo Machiavelli (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984); and Victoria Kahn, Machiavellian Rhetoric: From the Counter-Reformation to Milton (Princeton, 1994), p. 15–59, argue (each in an original way) for a single Machiavelli. 6 See especially, Felix Gilbert, “Florentine Political Assumptions in the Period of Savanarola and Soderini”, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 20 (1957), p. 187–214; and idem, Machiavelli aud Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth-Century, Florence. rev. ed. (New York: Norton,1984). For another treatment of the changing mutual perceptions of an Italian republic and the outside world, see William J. Bouwsma, Venice and Republican Liberty: Renaissance Values in the Age of the Counter Reformation (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968), esp. p. 162–251, 417–82.
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In another effort to bridge the gap between the “internationalist” and “republican” readings of Machiavelli, a few scholars have recently indicated another context for Machiavellian research, namely the territorial State in Tuscany that was administered by Florence in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries7. The suggestion would seem to make good sense, for it was in the Florentine “dominion” — the territory that lay between the city walls and the Republic’s outer political boundaries — that Machiavelli received his own apprenticeship in statecraft. In his position as Second Chancellor, he oversaw correspondence with Florencine officers in the dominion; as Secretary to the Ten of Liberty and Peace, he helped manage the defense of Florentine territory; and as Chancellor of the Nine of Militia, Machiavelli raised and trained troops in the dominion. Moreover, Machiavelli’s writings as a chancery officer reveal a close attention to the mechanics of territorial government8. But what is perhaps most surprising is that, in contrast with his diplomatic experience, where influence on the later writings has often been demonstrated, there is a disjunction between Machiavelli’s work in Florentine territorial administration and the later discussions of The Prince and the Discourses. Notwithstanding the many claims that have been made with respect to Machiavelli and the development of the concept of the modern state, there was a decided primitivism to his treatment of the actual administration of states by their own governments. Certainly, Machiavelli was no Weberian. One finds in his writing little recognition of the growth of bureaucracy, the legal revolution of the later middle ages, or the rise of a capitalist economy. The department of government he treated most extensively was the military, and here Machiavelli was both unreasonably idealistic and technically backward.9 Especially indicative is Machiavelli’s near silence about the two areas of Renaissance state building in Florence that have been most investigated by modern historians: the chancery and the fisc.10 The chancery was the area of administration that Machiavelli knew best, yet he referred to it not once in the
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7 Elena Fasano Guarini, “Machiavelli and the Crisis of the Italian Republics” in Machiavelli and Republicanism, p. 17–40; Giovanni Silvano, “Dal centro alla periferia. Niccolo Machiavelli tra stato cittadino e staco territoriale”, Archivio storico italiano. 150 (1992), p. 1105–41. 8 Fredi, Chiappelli, “Machiavelli as Secretary,” Italian Ouarterly, 14 (1971), p. 27–44, suggested Machiavelli’s thought could be discovered in nuce in this writings, but the resulting Machiavelli was stripped of many essential qualities. Jean-Jacques Marchand, Niccolo Machiavelli. I primi scritti politici (1499–1512). Nascita di un pensiero e di un stile (Padua, 1975), an exemplary study, squeezed as much as possible from the early works, but found more “stile” than “pensiero.” 9 Piero Pieri, Il rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana (Turin, 1952). Felix Gilbert, “Machiavelli: The Renaissance Art of War,” in The Makers of Modern Strategy. 3rd ed., ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, 1984), p. 11–31, was only more sympathetic to Machiavelli. 10 On the Florentine fisc in relation to state-building, see Anthony Molho, “L’amministrazione del del debico pubblico a Firenze nel quindicesimo secolo. “In I ceti dirigenti nella Toscana del Quattrocento (Monte Oriolo: Papafava, 1987), p. 191–207; and idem, “Lo Stato e la finanza pubblica. Un’ ipotesi basata sulla storia tardomedioevale di Firenze,” in Origini dello Stato. Processi di formazione statale in Italia fra medioeva ed eta moderna, ed. Giorgio Chittolini, Anthony Molho, and Pierangelo Schiera (Bologna, 1994), p. 225–80). On the chancery, see especially Alison Brown, Bartolomeo Scala. 1430–1497. Chancellor of Florence: The Humanist as Bureaucrat (Princeton, 1979), p. 161–92; and Robert Black, “The Political Thought of the Florentine Chancellors,” Historical Journal. 29 (1986), p. 991–1003.
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Discourses or the Florentine Histories. Two chancellors, Leonardo Bruni and Poggio Bracciolini, were remembered as “historians,” but there was no mention of their service to the Florentine government.11 The only person mentioned as a “chancellor” in the Histories was Cola di Rienzo, a figure Machiavelli possibly admired, but who abandoned that line of work in 1347 when he seized power in Rome and declared himself Tribune.12 Machiavelli shows a similar lack of interest in fiscal matters. The argument in the Discourses and the Art of War against the common opinion that “money is the sinews of war” underlined his consistently held view that fiscal might was a secondary factor in the government of states.13 A state‘s fisc might reflect the “industry” of its citizens,14 but wealth alone would not always enable it to find good soldiers when they were needed. In the Florentine Histories he discussed the imposition of the 1427 catasto primarily in terms of the political struggle between the grandi and the popolo.15 He overlooked the catasto’s formidable centralizing role when he discussed its imposition on the dominion; and he seems to have viewed the Volterrans’ resistance to it with sympathy.16 Discussing the French, Machiavelli suggested the absence of fiscal uniformity helped keep their kingdom united.17 Clearly, Machiavelli found little that was worthy of imitation in Florentine administration. And yet, it was once assumed that Machiavelli was an advocate of the processes that transformed Florence into an early modern territorial state. An early proponent of this idea was Francesco Ercole, who in 1926 wrote that Machiavelli “recognized... the... tendency of the city-state to... transform itself, in one way or another, into a unitary and territorial state.”18 But the adjectives “unitary” and “territorial” as used by Ercole are quite misleading. One of the reasons Machiavelli stood out among the poltical writers of his day was that he rejected such conventional legal and institutional understandings of the territorial state. As we shall see, Machiavelli remained the consistent advocate of a quite different mode of government. For throughout his writings, the Florentine argued against the territorial state and in favor of an expansionist republican empire. In wishing to be free of the mistakes of the present, Machiavelli was thus rebelling against his “context.”19
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Istorie florentine. Proemio, in Tutte le opere. ed. Martelli (cited hereafter as Istorie), p. 632. 12 Note the assimilation that takes place when Machiavelli, Istorie, i. 3 t, p. 653, calls him “Niccolo di Lorenzo, cancelliere in Campidoglio”, using the Tuscan form of Cola’s Christian name. Machiavelli preserved the dialect form, “Cola,” for another historical figure, “Cola Montano,” at Istorie, vii. 33, p. 814. 13 Nicolo Machiavelli , Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Toti Livio, ii 10, in Tutte le opere, ed .Martelli (cited hereafter as Discorsi), p. 159; idem. Arte della guerra. Vii, in Tutte le opere, p. 386. 14 Istorie. Proemio, p. 633, referring to Florence’s war with Filippo Maria Visconti. 15 Ibid., iv. 14, p. 722–23. 16 Ibid., iv.i 5–7 , p. 723–25. 17 Il Principe, ed. Giorgio Inglese (Turin, 1995 — cited hereafter as Principe). iii. 10, p. 13. 18 Francesco Ercole, La politica di Machiavelli (Rome, 1926), p. 106–7. For similar views of Machiavelli and the modern state, see: Alfred Schmidt, Niccolo Machiavelli und die allgemeine Staatslehre der Gegenwart (Karlsruhe, 1907); Leonhard von Muralt, Machiavelli Staatsgedanke (Basel, 1945), p. 35; and Herfried Munkler, Machiavelli. Die Begrundung des politischen Denkens der Neuzeit aus der Krise der Republik Florenz (Frankfurt a.M., 1984), p. 329–37. 19 Compare Joseph R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton, 1970), whose “modern” state Machiavelli would certainly disliked. For the Florentine context, see Lauro Martines, Lauyers and State-craft in Renaissance Florence (Princeton, 1968), which might be read as a description of the world Machiavelli was trying to escape.
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Machiavelli’s most careful formulation of his views on territorial expansion can be found in Book I, chapter 6, of the Discourses. Here, in a passage that has sometimes been misunderstood, Machiavelli examined the differences that distinguished a popularly based republic such as Rome, from narrowly based aristocratic republics such as Venice and Sparta. The two kinds of republic presented the would-be founder of a republic, with an important choice. As Machiavelli put it, If anyone should wish to order a new republic, he would have to examine whether he whised that she expand (ampliasse) in domination and power, like Rome, or that she remain within narrow confines. In the first case, it is necessary to order her like Rome (with a popular constitution)... In the second case, you can (puoi) order her like Sparta and like Venice (with an aristocratic constitution). But, because expansion is the poison of republics of this (latter kind), he who establishes them most prohibit their aquisition of other territory (lo acquisire) in all possible ways, because when such acquisitions are piled upon a weak republic they are invariably its ruin.20 Modern commentators have sometimes interpreted this passage as establishing equally suitable alternatives for the founder of a republic21. However, the passage was constructed in such a way as to lead the reader to believe the second alternative was less desirable. Thus, Machiavelli used an abstracted third person when speaking of the founder of a republic like Rome, but changed to a tu of condescension (with the verb puoi) when describing the founding of a republic like Venice or Sparta.22 Sparta and Venice were thus “weak” republics because they could not stand the burden of territorial acquisitions. Machiavelli acknowledged that non-expansive republicanism had a certain appeal. That he was sincere in this is confirmed by a passage in his poem, L’Asino, in which he criticized Athens, Sparta and Florence for having subjected the territory surrounding them, and also by Castruccio Castracani’s deathbed wish in the Vita that he had made “friends” (amici) of neighboring states, rather than try to conquer them23. In the Discourses, Machiavelli wrote that he “would like to believe” that a long-lived republic might be founded by establishing it on a strong site and endowing it with only as much power as we needed for its own defense. “And without doubt I believe that if the thing (i.e., the constitution) could be kept balanced in this manner, that this would be the true political life (vivere politico) and true peace for the city”.24
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Discorsi. i.6, p. 86. 21 Alfredo Bonadeo, “Appunti sul concetto di conquista e ambizione nel Machiavelli e sull antimachiavellismo,” Annali dell’lstituto orientale. 12 (1970), p. 245–60; idem, “Machiavelli on War and Conquest,” Il pensiero politico. 7 (1974), p. 334–61. Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, p. 196–99 got it right, and so did Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Machiavellian Virtue (Chicago, 1996), p. 85–92. 22 Machiavelli’s use of the tu and the voi was more complicated than indicated in the nonetheless perceptive comment of Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Chicago, 1958), p. 77; later endorsed by Gian Roberto Sarolli, “Un dichirografo inedito del Machiavelli ‘dictante’ e ‘scribente,’” Modern Language Notes. 80 (1965), p. 58–9. In this regard, it might be mentioned that Sarolli’s article failed to distinguish between the normal use of the second person singular in letters from Florentine magistracies to their officers (a “collegial” tu) and the customary use of the voi in private correspondence in this period. 23 L’asino. eh. 5, in Tutte le opere. ed. Martelli, p. 966; Vita di Castruccio Castracani da Lucea. p. 626. Careful consideration of Machiavelli’s language in these two passages confirms that neither contradicts the general conclusion of the Discourses. 24 Discorsi. Ii. 6, p. 86.
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But, reading further, it becomes clear that Machiavelli thought the alternative represented by Sparta and Venice was a false one. Since all human affairs are in motion, “necessity” forces “you”25 to undertake “many things to which reason will not induce you”. Other states have their own interests and ambitions, and inevitably, the “necessity” of warfare impinges on even the republic of limited ambition. The republic without ambitions will be faced with a choice between expanding in order to maintain its liberty to seeing its liberty extinguished.26 Since he did not believe that it is possible “to balance this thing”, Machiavelli thought that it was neccesary in ordering a republic “ to think of the more honorable outcome”, and to establish the regime in such a way, “that even if necessity should induce it to expand, it would be able to preserve that which it had occupied”. Sparta and Venice, the republics of reason, were not ordered with empires in mind, and both lost within brief periods the empires that necessity forced tehm to acquire27. Only the German city-states of Machiavelli’s day were able to be free (and also economically and militarily strong) while also being unacquisitive — but this was owing to their living under Imperial protection28. Were such protection removed, Machiavelli implies, the German too, would be forced to expand, if they wished to preserve their liberty. Machiavelli’s argument is stated so plainly that it might be easy to overlook the extent to which his endorsement of the imperialism of the republic of “necessity” marked a significant break with earlier republican theorists. For Plato, Aristotle and Cicero, the purpose of government was the inculcation of virtue in the citizens of a regime: in Machiavelli’s writings empire takes the place of virtue as the end of the republic. Thus Plato and Aristotle condemned territorial expansion because they believe city-states would lose their ability to effectively shape citizens when they grew too large. The large polis would lose its “political” character.29 Among Roman writers, similar views were expressed by the historians Sallust and Livy, but this was not the opinion of Cicero in one of the most influential discussions of the problem of imperialism. In the De officiis — a text Machiavelli knew from his boyhood — Cicero argued that empire was a consequence of Roman virtue.30 Although Cicero’s position was quite different from Plato’s and Aristotle’s, the Roman orator agreed with Plato
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Again, a tu accompanies the lesser alternative. 26 Discorsi, ii.6, p. 86. Pocock, Machiavellian Moment. p. 199, rightly explained Machiavelli’s choice of Rome over Sparta on the grounds that “to reject expansion is to expose oneself to fortune without seeking to dominate her”. 27 Here, as has often been noted, Machiavelli ignored the astonishing revivel of Venetian fortunes after the battle at Agnadello (known to him as “Vaila”). For Machiavelli’s consistent belittling of Venetian political achievements, see Innocenzo Cervelli, Machiavelli e la crisi dello stato veneziano (Naples, 1974). 28 On the strenght (potentia) of the German cities that yet resulted in no acquisition (acquisto), see the Ritracto della cose della Magna. in Marchand, Niccolo Machiavelli. I primi scritti. p. 525–32 (esp. 525, 530). Similarly in a draft version, the Rapporto di cose della Magna. ibid., p. 480: “le comunita sanno che la acquisto d’Italia farebbe pe’ principi e non per loro, potendo questi venire ad godervi personalmente li paesi d’Italia e non loro.” 29 Plato, Republic, 423 b-c; Aristotle, Politia. 13246b-13276 b-13336 b-13343 a. 30 Cicero, De officiis. 2.26–27. Roberto Ridolfi, Vita di Niccolo Machiavelli rev ed. (Florence, 1978), p. 424 n. 7, noted the presence of a borrowed copy of the De officiis in the home of Machiavelli’s father, Bernardo. For Ciceronian influences on Machiavelli, see Marcia L. Colish, “Cicero’s De officiis and Machiavelli’s Prince.” Sixteenth Century Journal. 9 (1978), p. 81–93. See also Patricia J. Osmond, “Sallust and Machiavelli: From Civic Humanism to Political Prudence,”Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies. 23. (1993), p. 407–38.
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and Aristotle on the crucial point that the “end” of the republic was virtue: empire was a manifestation of virtue, not an end in itself.31 That Machiavelli disagreed with the republican theorists of antiquity on the question of imperialism is notable, since it shows him diverging from another of the “contexts” in which he is often discussed, namely classical republicanism. Of course, Plato was not always taken seriously, but Aristotle and Cicero were authorities of a different order. Interestingly, Machiavelli only once cited Aristotle favorably in his writings — on the violence done to women by tyrants — and elsewhere he preferred to criticize him.32 Was Machiavelli thinking of Aristotle’s moderate politeia — and not only of the regimes of Plato and Xenophon — when he wrote in The Prince against “republics and principalities that have never been seen to exist in truth”?33 But it was by inverting the key, terms of Cicero’s position that Machiavelli really changed the nature of the discussion concerning empire. Machiavelli ‘s vocabulary was perfectly Aristotelian and Ciceronian in its discussion of “ends,” their tele or fines becoming his fini, but the conclusion he reached was directly opposite. In Book I, chapter 29, of the Discourses, Machiavelli stated that the city has “two ends” (fini). The first is “to acquire” (lo acquisire) territory; the second is “to maintain its independence”. In Discourses, Book II, chapter 2, Machiavelli stated even more directly that “increase” (accrescere) is “the end of a republic” (il fine della republica). Thus expansion, not the inculcation of virtue, was the goal of Machiavelli government. To virtue in the classical sense Machiavelli assigned a subordinate role, as one of the means assisting expansion; and in so doing, he changed the meaning of virtue itself. Concomitant with the redefinition of virtue, which scholars have often discussed, Machiavelli’s endorsement of expansion predicated his reworking of other aspects of contemporary political language.34 It is true that Machiavelli’s political vocabulary and his stock of metaphors remained essentially those of the political writers who preceded him, and also of contemporary politicians, statesmen and bureaucrats; however, in the pages of Machiavelli’s chief works, some of these traditional elements assumed novel meanings.35 Time and again the reader of
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31 For Cicero’s views on Roman expansion, see Hans Dieter Meyer, Cicero und das Reich, (Cologne, 1957); and P.A. Brunt, “Laus Imperii,” in Imperialism in the the Ancient World. ed. P.D.A. Garnsey and C.R. Whitaker (Cambridge, 1978), p. 159–91. 32 Discorsi. iii.26, p. 233. For Machiavelli’s otherwise negative view of Aristotle, see his letter to Francesco Vettori of 26 August 1513, in Tutte le opere. ed. Martelli, p. 1156, referring to the Politics, and compare Vettori’s previous letter of 20 August 1513, ibid., p. 115 3. See also the Discursus Florentinarum Rerum Post Mortem Iunioris Laurentii Medices, ibid., p. 30. 33 Principe, xv. 4, p. 102. More’s Utopia, published in 1516 and therefore after the first redaction of The Prince was known to Francesco Vettori, who mentioned it in his Sommario della storia d’Italia dal 1511 al 1527. published in Francesco Vettori, Scritti istorici e politici, ed. Enrico Niccolini (Bari, 1972), p. 145. 34 The best discussions of Machiavellian virtu remain J.H. Withfield, Machiavelli (1946; rpt. New ‘York, 1966), p. 97–105; and Neal Wood, “Machiavelli’s Concept of Virtu Reconsidered,” Political Studies, 15 (1967), p. 159–72. 35 For the context, see Allan H. Gilbert, Machiavelli’s “Prince” and Its Forerunners: The Prince as a Typical Book “De Regimine Principum” (Durham, N.C., 1938); Felix Gilbert, “Florentine Political Assumptions in the Period of Savonarola and Soderini,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 20 (1957), p. 187–214; Federico Chabod, “Alcuni questioni di terminologia: ‘stato’, ‘nazione’, ‘patria’ nel linguaggio del Cinquecento,” in his Scritti sul Rinascimento (Turin, 1967), p. 627–61; Mario Santoro, Fortuna, ragione e
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Machiavelli encounters words and images employed in ways that would have run counter to such medieval and Renaissance expectations.36 After virtu, the most frequently discussed word in the Machiavellian vocabulary is stato. An older dispute — whether Machiavelli’s use of the word corresponded with the modern impersonal meaning of the word “state”37 — has been answered in the negative, inasmuch as in Machiavelli’s use of stato the word can be shown always to stand for the stato of some-one — of a person or a group of people.38 The modern juridical understanding of the “state” reached maturity only in the decades after Machiavelli’s death.39 The argument has since been recast, however, to show that Machiavelli’s use of stato differed from that of medieval writers in that he used stato in “exploitative” and “predatory” contexts, so that stato was generally the object of verbs of aggression, acquisition, and manipulation.40 It has been suggested rightly that Machiavelli’s “predatory” use of stato developed among preceding generations in the grasping, competitive world of Florentine oligarchical politics, in which “status” might be both acquired and lost.41 Finally, further study has shown that because of Machiavelli’s advice to both “and republics to aggrandize themselves, stato becomes in his work merely a static quality, but a quality whose possession brings with it an inherent obligation to increase.42 Thus, as others have shown, the word stato as Machiavelli uses it, ceases to indicate an “estate” as a “static” quality, becoming instead a quality the possession of which entails further increase or promotion. Machiavelli worked a similar transformation of the metaphor, traditional to both earlier and contemporary political writing, which likened the political regime to a human body.43 Although Machiavelli made use of the ancient and medieval
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(continuation) prudenza nella civilta letteraria del Cinquecento (Naples, 1967); Nicolai Rubinstein, “Notes on the word stato in Florence before Machiavelli” in Florilegium Historiale, ed. J.G. Rowe and W.H. Stockdale (Toronto, 1971) p. 313–26; idem, “Florentina Libertas,” Rinascimento, ser. 2, 26 (1986), p. 3–26. A helpful introduction to Machiavelli’s vocabulary may be found in appendix to Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (Cambridge, 1988), p. 100–13. Fredi Chiappelli, Studi sul linguaggio del Machiavelli (Florence, 1952), by design paid little attention to contemporary usage, which, paradoxically, sometimes makes his study all the more useful. 36 Cf. the description of Machiavelli’s refutation of the traditional catalogue of virtues in Felix Gilbert, “The Humanist Concept of the Prince and The Prince of Machiavelli,” in his History: Choice and Commitment (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), p. 91–114, esp. II off. 37 A position advanced by Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State (New Haven, 1946), p. 133–34, 140–41, 154–55. Compare also Chiappelli, Studi sul linguaggio, p. 59–73. 38 J.H. Hexter, “The Predatory Vision: Niccolo Machiavelli. Il Principe and Io stato” in his The Vision of Politics on the Eve of the Reformation: More Machiavelli, Seyssel (New York, 1973), p. 73–175; further supported by Skinner, Foundations, II, p. 353–54. 39 J-W. Allen, A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century, (1928; New York, 1960), p. 407; and Skinner, Foundations, II, p. 349–58. Alberto Tenenti, Stato: un’idea, una logica. Dal comune italiano all’assolutismo francese (Bologna, 1987), offers a rich discussion (esp. p. 15–97), but does not change the overall conclusion. 40 Hexter, “The Predatory Vision”. 41 Martines, Lawyers and Statecraft, p. 390–91. 42 Mansfield, Machiavellian Virtue, p. 281–94.On the obligation to acquire, see for example, Discorsi, i. 5, p. 84: “la paura del perdere genera in loro le medesime voglie che sono in quelli che desiderano acquistare; perche non pare agli uomini possedere sicuramente quello che l’uomo ha, se non si acquista di nuovo dell’altro.” 43 Jacques Le Goff, “Head or Heart? The Political Use of Body Metaphors in the Middle Ages”, in Fragments of a History of the Body, 3 vols. (New York, 1989), I, p. 12–27; Paul Archambault, “The Analogy of the ‘Body’ in Renaissance Political Literature”, Bibliotheque d’Humanisme et Renaissance, 29 (1967), p. 32–53.
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metaphors that spoke of the relationship between a king and his subjects as similar to that between a body’s head and limbs, it has by now become commonplace that Machiavelli interjected into this image an “organic” conception of the regime; that is, he thought of the regime as a living thing, subject to cycles of birth and death. An essentially traditional use of body imagery to describe political situations was already present in Machiavelli’s earliest chancery writings of 1498,44 in accordance with a typical usage of state scribes.45 Thus Machiavelli’s writings include a number of customary arguments regarding the relative importance of various parts of the body. An annexed province is “like an added member.”46 A policy of disarming one’s own people is mistaken, “because the heart and the vital parts of a body should be kept covered, and not its extremities.”47 Machiavelli also used a rich store of medical analogies to describe the illnesses of a state, and the methods for healing them.48 But at some point in the development of Machiavelli’s thought, his use of the metaphor of the body took a novel turn. For Machiavelli attributed to the political body an appetite. Herein lies the significance of the story that Machiavelli borrowed from Vitruvius of Alexander the Great, who, when the architect Deinocrates proposed building a city in the shape of a human body on Mount Athos, rejected the plan for the reason that the inhabitants would have nothing to feed them.49 In the Discourses, Machiavelli stated the position even more forcefully, asserting that “the end (fine) of a republic is to enervate and to weaken all other bodies in order that its own body might increase”.50 The republican regime that Machiavelli praised was a regime that consumed. Expansion was necessary, then, but how was the state to go about it? Machiavelli made it clear that he favored some modes of expansion over others. These were discussed in Book II, chapter 4, of the Discourses. Machiavelli wrote that the ancient republics employed three modes in aggrandizing themselves51. The first was to form a league of several republics, none of which had precedence over the other: Machiavelli adduced the example of the ancient Etruscans, whom he called “Tuscans”.52 The ancient Tuscans ruled all of Italy north of Rome and south of the Alps. The first mode had significant drawbacks, however. The ancient Tuscans were incapable of extending their rule beyond Italy and proved unable to defend Lombardy against the Gauls. They also left no history of
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44 Chiappelli, “Machiavelli as Secretary, p. 34–35. 45 See, for example, S. Grubb, Firstborn of Venice: Vicenza in the early Renaissance State (Baltimore, 1988), p. 26–27. 46 Principe. iii. I., p. 10. For the prince/general as head, and individual Italians as limbs, see xxvi, 16, p. 172. 47 Discorsi, ii. 30, p. 191. 48 E.g., Principe, iii. 26–8, p. 17–18; Chiappelli, Studi sul linguaggio, p. 78 and 88–89; Luigi Zanzi, I “segni” della natura e i “paradigmi” della storia: il metodo del Machiavelli. Ricerche sulla logica scientifica degli “umanisti” tra medicina e storiografia (Manduria, 1981); and especially the rich and suggestive treatment of Anthony J. Parei, The Machiavellian Cosmos (New Haven, 1992), p. 101–12 et passim. 49 Discorsi, i. I., p. 78. 50 Discorsi, ii. 2, p. 150. 51 Discorsi, ii. 4, p. 152–54. 52 On this theme, note Peter Godman, From Poliziano to Machiavelli: Florentine Humanism in the High Renaissance (Princeton, 1998), p. 258, 288.
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themselves53. A second mode of aggrandizement, the one followed by the Romans, was for a republic to make pattners (compagni: the word for “business partners”) of other states, always, however, reserving to itself the commanding rank, the seat of empire, and the title to all undertakings. The third mode was immediately to make subjects rather than partners of other states. This was the mode employed by Athens and Sparta in antiquity (although Machiavelli distorted both examples54), and by the Florentine and Venetian states in his own day. Machiavelli rejected the last method — immediate subjugation — on the grounds that governing cities with violence, especially cities that had been accustomed to liberty, was a difficult and costly business.55 The Athenian and Spartan empires were both ruined, he said, by the inability to maintain such dominions once they were acquired. The mode Machiavelli recommended most highly was the Roman mode, which operated through the adoption and creation of slightly inferior partner regimes. Although these partners were afforded equality in most matters, Rome reserved for herself the place of honor in their endeavors. The result was that unawares the partners spent their own labors and blood in subjecting themselves to Rome. For after the Romans had led their partners outside of Italy and reduced many foreign lands to the status of subject provinces, the partners found they were both surrounded by Roman subjects and oppressed by a greatly reinforced Rome. The partners revolted (in the Social War), and they were suppressed and reduced to the status of subjects. Thus, the final result of the Roman mode of aggrandizement differed little from that of the mode of the Athenians and the Spartans. But the more efficient Roman mode of expansion required delaying the final subjection of a republic’s neighbors until such a moment when the partners forced the republic to subject them. To be sure, the “partnership” of this mode of expansion was in effect a kind of fraud — and Machiavelli praised the Romans for their use of fraud as well as force in their conquests.56 Since Machiavelli evidently thought that Florence had made the mistake of immediately subjecting her neighbors, the first method, illustrated by the Etruscan league, merits further attention. Machiavelli suggested that this might be the best option still open to the Tuscans of his day. Castruccio seemed to indicate this path when he spoke of befriending neighboring states in the Life.57 And, as Machiavelli argued elsewhere, “men born in one ll’keep almost the same
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53 Discorsi, ii. 4, p. 154: “La quale potenza e gloria ... fu tanto spenta, che ... al presente non ce n’e quasi memoria.” And again in the following chapter, Discorsi, ii. 5, p. 155: “Talche, come si e detto, di lei ne rimane solo la memoria del nome.” 54 Machiavelli’s presentation of the Athenian and Spartan modes of expansion is misleading, since both Greek cities were the heads of “leagues” for many years before transforming them into empires. For Machiavelli’s use of Thucydides (but not on this point), see Marcello Simonetta, “Machiavelli lettore di Tucidide,” Esperienze letterarie, 22, n. 3 (1997), p. 55–68. 55 This explains the seeming anti-imperialism of the statements in The Ass and the Life of Castruccio, cited at note 23 above. 56 Cf. Discorsi, ii. 13, p. 163, “Che si viene di bassa a gran fortuna piu con la fraude che con la forza,” which restates Rome’s policy toward her neighbors as described in ii.4 as one of fraud in a laudable cause.See, too, iii. 40, p. 248–49, where Machiavelli’s iniþial condemnation of fraud was qualified by what followed.Also Principe, xviii, p. 115–20. R.T. Ridley, “Machiavelli and Roman History in the Discourses”, Quaderni di storia, 18 (1983), p. 200, is better than Whitfield, Machiavelli, p.153, on this question. 57 Note 23 above.
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nature for all times.58 A league at least appeared to offer the possibility of prolonged independence, if not the greatness that had been Rome’s. But Machiavelli’s recommendation of a league still has something slightly puzzling about it. Why would Machiavelli have recommended a mode of aggrandizement that led the Tuscans into “oblivion”‘? Perhaps Machiavelli believed that the advantage offered by a league was the ease with which it turned into a network of “partners.” Since the republic that desired to expand was supposed to deceive others into helping it expand, and since no state would willingly become a “partner” to another republic if it knew what future was in store for it, a “league” offered the best practical beginnings for expansion along the lines laid by the Roman republic. During the early stages of the growth of an empire, Machiavelli seems to have envisioned the preservation of substantial local autonomies. Partner republics would continue to administer justice by themselves, as Capua had done for three-hundred years while nominally under Roman control; and as Pistoia had done — though under Florentine control in other ways — during the fourteenth century.59 In France, similarly, the provinces of Burgundy, Briccany, Gascony, and Normandy were said in The Prince to have “become one whole body” with the French kingdom, not despite, but because they were allowed to retain their former laws and taxes.60 For Machiavelli the cohesion of states was not measured by unified legal codes or by centralized administrative and territorial structures, but in terms of a psychological cohesion that could better be achieved by preserving local autonomies. This is a far cry from Ercole’s “unitary” state. When, in The Prince, Machiavelli rejected the time-worn Florentine strategy for controlling Tuscany summarized in the maxim, “Rule Pisa with fortresses and Pistoia with factions,”61 he was hoping for the establishment of a territorial order quite different from the one that existed in his own day. Where fortresses were garrisoned in subject towns, they proved expensive, and, worst of all, they daily incurred the wrath of the subjects, by furnishing daily reminders of servitude.62 In place of hostile garrisons, Machiavelli would have granted substantial autonomy to the subject towns of Tuscany. Such towns would be more likely to defend themselves if attacked. And, as partners rather than subjects, they would be more likely to give of themselves in military action together with the Florentines. Factions, for their part, rendered subject towns highly vulnerable to external enemies63; and there was the risk that such factions would spread to the ruling city, just as they had spread from Pistoia to Florence in the past.64
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Discorsi, iii. 43, p. 250. 59 Discorsi, ii. 2i, p. 177–78. 60 Principe,iii, 7–10, p. 12–13. Machiavelli here underestimated the royal interference in these parts of France. Compare the Ritracto di cose di Francia in Marchand, Machiavelli. Primi scritti, p. 507–24, which gave a more accurate account. 61 Principe, xx, p. 138–46. 62 Ibid., for criticisms of fortresses; and Discorsi, ii. 24, p. 181–84. 63 Principe, xx. ii, p. 140; although such towns were prince or republic to hold. For the proper way to acquire a town riven by factions, see see Discorsi, ii. 25, p. 184–85. 64 Discorsi, iii. 27, p. 233–34; cf. Istorie, ii.i 6, p. 668 ff. See also William J. Connell, ‘“I fautori delle parti”. Citizen Interest and the Treatment of a Subject Town, c. 1500,” in Istituzioni e società in Toscana in età moderna (Rome, 1994), I, p .118–47; idem, La città dei crucci. Fazioni e clientele in ano stato repubblicano del ‘400 (Florence, 2000), p. 181–237.
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Machiavelli’s rejection of the customary policy toward factions in the territory leads us back to the capital city, however, to transform political thinking: what about factions in he capital? As Quentin Skinner justly pointed out, one of the fundamental ways in which Machiavelli broke with the expectations of his predecessors and contemporaries was through his striking praise, in the Discourses, of Roman civic discord.65 Guicciardini’s somewhat amazed response to Machiavelli’s argument was that “to praise discord was like someone who was ill.”66 But the extent and nature ment of “disunion” — and what motivated it — have not always been completely understood.67 To begin with, as we have seen, Machiavelli opposed factions in subject towns for reasons of security. But if he opposed them there, would he not oppose them in the capital city for the same reasons? On closer examination, it seems that Machiavelli distinguished between a healthy form of civic discord — which was essentially a class struggle between patricians and plebs — and an unhealthy form of discord, characterized by political factions and parties. Thus, although Machiavelli praised Rome’s disunion anei her tumults when these resulted from class antagonism between nobles and plebs,68 he was quite quick to condemn political factions (parti or sette) that sought to control the state for private benefit.69 Class divisions, on the other hand, produced both healthy competition and good laws tending toward the expansion of the republic, so long as the demands of the competing classes did not become excessive or degenerate into private hatreds.70 A similar tale was told in the Florentine Histories, where Machiavelli wrote that under the government of the Primo Popolo — a regime he interpreted as having originated in the conflict between Florentine magnates and popolani — “our city was never in greater or happier condition”.71 Machiavelli argued in the Discourses that “those who condemn the tumults between the nobles and the plebs” in ancient Rome erred by blaming “those things which were the first cause of Rome’s remaining free.”72 It has been suggested recently that Machiavelli saw these “tumults” as “a consequence of intense political involvement,” and hence consistent with internal liberty.
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65 Skinner, Foundations, I, p. 181. 66 Francesco Guicciardini, Considerazioni sui ‘Discorsi’del Machiavelli i. 4, in his Opere, 3 vols., ed. Emanuella Lugnani Scarano (Turin, 1970), I, p. 616: “laudare le disunione e come laudare in uno infermo la infermita.” 67 See Skinner, Foundations, I, p. 181, where it was argued that Machiavelli believed “that, since these conflicts served to cancel out sectional interests, they served at the same time to guarantee that the only enactments which actually passed into law were those which benefited the community as a whole.” Because Skinner did not grasp Machiavelli’s distinction between class conflict (which Machiavelli endorsed) and factional conflict (which Machiavelli criticized), the result was a Machiavelli inordinately close to the writers of the The Federalist and Adam Smith — as in Skinner’s Machiavelli, where he wrote (p. 66): “although motivated entirely by their selfish interests, the factions will thus be guided, as if by an invisible hand [sfic!] to promote the public interest in all their legislative acts”. 68 Discorsi, 1.4, p. 84; Alfred Bonadeo, Corruption, Conflict, and Power in the Works and Times of Niccolo Machiavelli (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1973), p. 35–71. 69 See, for example the description of the creation of a parte by an ambitious citizen in Discorsi, iii. 28, p. 235. 70 Discorsi, i.3–7, p. 81–88; Istorie , iii. I, p. 690–91. 71 Istorie , ii. I5, p. 668. Not only was there a popular army, but also “tutta la Toscana, parte come subietta, parte come amica.” obeyed Florence [my emphasis]. 72 Discorsi, i.4, p. 82.
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Although the airing of political differences was of a certain limited importance in Machiavelli’s brand of republicanism,73 it seems, however, that the “freedom” that interested Machiavelli was directed toward foreign powers, rather than domestic liberty.74 And, as was shown previously, territorial expansion was necessary to the preservation of freedom. By engaging the Roman people in the business of the commonwealth, the Roman constitution harnessed popular energy for Rome’s wars of conquest — toward achieving what Machiavelli considered the goal or “end” republic. The occasional domestic tumults of an empowered populace were a small price to pay for the advantages that accrued from a popular army.75 Machiavelli’s ideal of an imperialistic but minimally centralizing republican state that permitted class struggle ran quite contrary to the ideas of other contemporary writers. Francesco Guicciardini, a lawyer who devoted much of his career to creating an “impersonal” modern territorial state for the Papacy,76 was at great pains in his Considerations on Machiavelli’s Discources to show the extend to which Machiavelli’s ideas were out or “context” the early sixteenth century. Thus, Guicciardini argued that the Florentine and Venetian governments were not weakened but strengthened by having enlarged their jurisdictions and “domesticated” their neighbors77. Machiavelli, we have seen, viewed the immediate subjection of neighboring powers as creating early and unnecessary limits to a republic’s expansion. Questions of legal jurisdiction, which mattered a great deal to Guicciardini, were of minimal importance to Machiavelli. At various points in his writings, Machiavelli juxtaposed the term “imperio,” his equivalent for sovereignty, with “forza,” which might be best translated as “strenght”. According to Machiavelli, the expansion of a republic’s imperio, had the effect of weakening its forza. For a republic to achieve greatness, it was necessary for it to find the means to increase its forza through a form of imperialism more subtle and therefore more powerful than the simple of its jurisdiction. If, as Machiavelli stated in The Prince and the Discourses, men are greedy and ambitious by nature; then the politics of regione will invariably give way to the politics of necessita; and necessita requires that a state either expand or be conquered. But the preferred mode of expansion was not the simple subjection of vanquished states. That was a path to imperio — to increased jurisdiction — but not to forza.78 While imperio
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73 Compare, for example,the criticism of lengthy deliberations in republics in Discorsi, ii.I.5, p. 164–66. 74 See Rubinstein, “Florentina Libertas.” 75 Discorsi, i.4, p. 83: “dico come ogni città debbe avere i suoi modi con i quali il popolo possa sfogare l’ambizione sua, e massime quelle città che nelle cose importanti si vogliono valere del popolo.” 76 As papal governor, Guicciardini famously defended the territories of the Church from armed attack even while the Papacy was vacant. 77 Guicciardini Considerazioni, II. 19, in Opere, ed. Lugnani Scarano, I, p. 668. See, too, Osvaldo Cavallar, Francesco Guicciardini giurista (Milan, 1991). 78 Discorsi, ii.19, p. 175. Compare Ercole, La politica del Machiavelli, p. 114–16, who wrote that there were two kinds of imperio in Machiavelli, one backed by sufficient forza (“la... forza effettiva di attuarsi e di farsi rispettare”), the other not. Ercole overemphasized, however, the jurisdictional aspect of the first kind of imperio. On imperio in the Florentine context, see Alison Brown, “The Language of Empire,” in William J. Connell and Andrea Zorzi, eds., Florentine Tuscany: Structures and Practica of Power (Cambridge, 2000), p. 32–47.
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was characteristic of the early modern territorial state, forza, the quality that made the Romans great, lay in the creation of partners (not subjects), in citizen arms, and in finding ways to channel the energies of class conflict between the ambitious few and the popolo into foreign expansion. To conclude, in Machiavelli’s view it was a mistake for a republic to subject its neighbors and become a limited territorial state. Far from a prophet of the unitary territorial state, our examination of Machiavelli’s ideas on empire, the treatment of subject tertitories, and the problem of civic discord reveals him as what he in fact claimed to be at the outset of the Discourses: a writer who sought in the history of Rome’s growth a new and “untrodden”79 path for solving and moving beyond the problems of what today we call his historical “context.”
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79 Discorsi, i, preface, p. 76: “ho deliberato entrare per una via, la quale, non essendo ancora trita...”. On the passage, see Najemy, Between Friends, p. 337–38, esp. n. I0.
I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E L AT I O N S
THE MINORITIES OF ESTONIA AND THEIR STATUS YVES PLASSERAUD
Abstract. The Republic of Estonia is frequently mentioned critically in the Western press with reference to its treatment of non-citizens. At the same time, specialized publications praise Tallinn for its excellent and generous law on minorities. What can be the origin of such an apparent contradiction? To understand the situation, let us first of all examine the minority communities of Estonia.
I. Ethnic communities in Estonia today
These can be classified in two groups: A huge one: the Russophiles comprising the Russians, the Ukrainians, the Belarussians as well as members of other assimilated populations and a series of small or sometimes minute groups. The Russophiles These actually belong to several very distinct groups.
The Russians, the dominant foreign group The sizeable Russian community of Estonia (about 350,000 individuals) is far from being homogeneous. Over and above social or cultural divisions, there is also a difference in terms of their length of settlement. Among the citizens originating from the Republic of Estonia restored in 1990, there were about 40,000 Russians. Since then, a large number of other Russians, who had arrived (or were born) in the country during the Soviet period, obtained citizenship. All Russian citizens of Estonia belong to what the Estonian authorities consider as “the Russian minority” of the country. The geographic concentration of the Russian communities is very revealing of the history of these populations. First of all, there is a massive concentration in the capital of the country, in Tallinn (47%), for political, administrative and professional reasons. Secondly, the regions close to Russia which were industrialized during the Soviet era are largely Russian. Thirdly, the former “closed cities” and military bases such as Paldiski and Sillamäe continue to be centers of strong Russian settlement despite the departure of the Russian military personnel. And finally, mention should be made of the ports where many Russian, workers live. Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., IV, 1, p. 141–152, Bucharest, 2007.
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The people in these areas continue to live in the Russian style, following closely the Russian press, and the younger generation study in Russian. The lack of contact with the Estonian world makes their integration difficult despite the real progress achieved in the last few years.
Ukrainians and Belarussians: hardly noticed groups There are about 40,000 Ukrainians, usually assimilated with the Russians, and most of them do not know the Ukrainian language. Yet as the memory of the USSR recedes and the Ukrainian State becomes stronger, some Ukrainians (especially those from the west of the country) are increasingly claiming a different identity that in many ways is more western. The authorities naturally encourage the Ukrainians to distance themselves from the Russian and, above all, Soviet model. On the other hands the Belarussians, about thirty thousand of them, are on the whole much closer to the Russians from the linguistic (Belarussian is rarely used), cultural and sociological points of view. They do not seem to have strong ties with their State of origin, which in fact does not show much interest in them, and in general, they share the same memories and preoccupations with the Russians. There is very little identity or nationalistic activism among this group. Both Ukrainians and Belarussians live mainly in the region of Tallinn and the north-east of the country. The small groups These compose a colorful palette.
The Setus The Setus are at present a small community1 of about 10,000 individuals in the east of the country, who originated from the present Estonian territory and practiced the Orthodox religion since the 13th century. Living to the south of Lake Peipus, and initially speaking a south Estonian Finno-Ugric dialect, most of them now speak Russian and belong to the Orthodox religion2. The Setumaa (land of the Setus) or Petserimaa (named after the town of Petseri, at present Petchori in Russia) and its big Orthodox monastery, covers an area of 2,000 square kilometers which, under the regime of Imperial Russia, belonged to the province of Pskov3. During its first independence, this region and its Eastern borders, which in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Tartu had been handed over to Estonia, had a population that was two thirds Russian and one third Estonian. Most of the latter — 14,961 during the 1934 census — were Setus. This is when a westernized Setu intelligentsia emerged, with an awareness of the value of its cultural heritage.
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1 There has been no recent census. 2 Jakob Hurt, Ûber pleskauer Esten oder die sogenannten Setukesen, Anzeiger der Finnish-ugrischen Forschungen 3 (1903), 185–205. 3 In 1897, 14,000 Setus had been counted.
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By the end of the annexations of the Soviet period, the region (populated by the Setus straddled over the Estonian-Russian border (5,000 individuals in Russia, slightly less in Estonia). After the return to independence, the border was gradually sealed and visas became necessary to cross it4.
The Ingrians: almost Finnish The Ingrians are a Finno-Ugrian people whose historic land is situated at the bottom of the Finnish gulf, between Karelia and Estonia. In Estonia, they are frequently assimilated with the Finns. The Russian settlement the region of Saint Petersburg disturbed their traditional habitus. The collectivization in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and the destruction of existing cultural institutions came as a terrible blow to this small community. From 1928 onwards, there were mass deportations, which continued until the war. In 1944, 60,000 Ingrians were transported to Finland via Estonia. In accordance with the terms of the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty, the latter were then repatriated as Soviet citizens and settled far away from their homeland. After 1956, the survivors were finally allowed to return to the region but not yet to Ingria (Ingermanland). Some of them settled in Estonia. In this country, it is estimated that since 1989, 4,000 left the country for Finland where they have been granted the “right to return”. The others, mastering about 12,000 are now concentrated in four counties in the east of the country. Their vernacular language is 60% Estonian, and three quarters of them are Lutherans.
The Jews: a community of destiny with the Russians Today, the small Jewish community, consisting of about 3,000 people5 — very well integrated if not actually assimilated — is divided into two distinct groups. One group is composed of Estonian Jews, old residents of the country who speak the national language, who are accustomed to democracy, and consider themselves to be Estonians in their own right (about one third of the total). The other group is composed of Russian Jews who arrived from the USSR after 1945. The latter share the same lifestyle and outlook as the more recent Russian immigrants. There ate very few expressions of anti-Semitism in daily life in Estonia and, on the whole, the community lives peacefully6. It has a number of religions and cultural structures organized as associations. In terms of schooling, the first minority school to be reopened in Tallinn even before independence was the Jewish one. In 1999, about 260 pupils attended its 12 classes. According to practice in Tallinn, only individuals having the citizenship of the country are considered to belong to a minority. This concept, which in the last ten years has created a conflict between Tallinn and Western humanitarian organizations, is nevertheless considered crucial by the authorities of Tallinn. In
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4 Indrek Jääts, Ethnic Identity of the Setus and the Estonian-Russian Border Dispute, in Nationalities Papers, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2000. 5 Including 2,000 in Tallinn. 6 An active Community Centre enables it to keep in contact.
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the following review of the various communities, this criterion will not be taken into consideration. The topic of this paper being the protection of minorities, we shall particularly insist hereunder on the law of minorities. It is nevertheless not possible to refrain from giving here some information about the main issue, which concerns the bulk of the Russophiles (frequently just referred to as “Russians”) and which is repeatedly mentioned in the international press, the integration question.
II. The Citizenship Acts and the National Integration Program
In 1989 (last Soviet Census), there were 61% of Titulars (Estonians) and 19% of “Russians” in Estonia. Most of these Russophiles had arrived in Estonia during the Soviet Era and had little kinship with the newly born Independent Estonian Republic. Fearing to be overwhelmed by a population with such mixed feelings toward Estonia, the authorities of the reborn state chose to reconstitute the pre-world war two Corpus of Citizens that is to say to grant citizenship only to the pre-world-war two citizens and to their descendants. According to the March 30,1991 Act on Citizenship, this citizenship acquisition was submitted to a series of strict conditions (period of residency of 2 years after March 30, 1990, knowledge of the language, of the institutions of the country, oath and payment of a tax). The beginning of the process (starting legally March 31, 1993) was hesitant because the authorities — without saving it of course — wished as many “Russians” as possible to leave the country spontaneously. Nevertheless, the desire of integration was so strong amongst part of the Russian population that the process started quickly; in 1995 more than 85,000 persons had already received the citizenship. On January 15, 1995, aiming — for political reasons — at slowing the process, a new stricter law on Citizenship was adopted by the Riigikogu (Parliament). The number of applications for naturalizations fell dramatically immediately. After a friendly beginning of the Estonian-Russian state relationship Moscow, unhappy with the pace of the naturalizations and the treatment (a number of “non-citizens” suffered some professional exclusions, etc.) of its compatriots in the Estonian “near abroad”, progressively started to use the citizenship issue to exert a pressure on Estonia (particularly via international organizations). The situation became tense between the two countries. Around 1977, when it became obvious that the Russians (often locally called Migrants) who had not left the country were here to stay, Tallinn changed its mind and an integration plan was adopted by the Estonian authorities and rapidly implemented7. On March 31, 1998 a National Foundation for Integration was created with the support of European Organizations and in 2000 a Program for integration in the Estonian society 2000–2007 was adopted. Since then, the naturalization process has proceeded at a satisfactory pace.
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7 February 10, 1998.
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At present, the situation is the following: about 101,000 “Russians”, usually elderly and without any particular ties to the country other than the fact that it is their place of residence, have opted for Russian citizenship and they live in Estonia as foreign residents. Around 150,000 people acquired the citizenship and, finally, there are some 150,000 stateless persons of “Russian” origin. Many of them are poorly qualified and the majority of them do not speak Estonian8. In total, in 2003, 83% of the residents possess Estonian citizenship (compared to 68% in 1992). Despite these instances of progress, the situation concerning Moscow and the representative organizations of the local “Russians” remain tense and especially in Tallinn and in the Narva area, where the Slavic population is very concentrated, the integration process develops slowly and sometimes chaotically. But again, according to the Estonian authorities, these non-citizens do not belong to the category of minority populations and are thus not directly concerned by the laws on minorities. Moscow does not agree on this point of view and keeps acting against the Estonian government in various international circles. This is the origin of most of the harsh criticism voiced against Estonia in respect of its “Russian Minorities”. Considering all this is largely known, we shall, concentrate our attention here on the Estonian treatment of National Minorities in the narrow sense of the word.
III. The Law of Minorities
In total, in Estonia there are currently eight ethnic groups of more than 3,000 individuals (potential users of the legislation on cultural autonomy discussed below) and 13 groups of over1000 members. Let us now examine this legislation on cultural autonomy, bearing in mind that it functions in a legislative framework of laws on citizenship, where notions such as foreigners, the national language and everything else introduced at the end of the 1990s to implement the National Program for the Integration of NonCitizens. It is appropriate to start by examining the historic origins of the present law.
Origins of the current system At the beginning of the 20th century, since independence was not on the agenda, Estonian patriots favored the concept of cultural autonomy in general, and that of their people in particular. When independence became a possibility, most of them changed their position to become nationalists, and at that point, the supporters of autonomy were mainly Germans. At the Constitutional Assembly entrusted with the task of organizing the structures for the new State, four out of 120 delegates represented minorities, three of which were German. The manifesto announcing the independence of Estonia in 1918 was based on the concept of a national Estonian State, and in a democratic spirit, mentioned
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8 ECMI, Baltic Seminar 1998. Minority Rights and Integration in Estonia, Flensburg, 1998.
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cultural autonomy for all ethnic minorities of the country9. In these circumstances, it was logical for the Constitution of 15 June 192010 to provide for guarantees for minorities. The Constitution also guarantees minorities the right to an education in their mother tongue, and in the case of Germans, Russians and Swedes, the possibility of communicating with the central authorities of the State m their own language. The question of communicating with local authorities and law courts, on the other hand, is covered by the application texts except for regions where these populations are in the majority or where this possibility represents a right. According to the Constitution, minorities have the right to establish private community institutions as long as they do not run counter to the interests of the State. As a result of this legislation, a specific Jaw on cultural autonomy shall guarantee the culture of minorities.
The 1925 law on the cultural autonomy of minorities It was then left to Tallinn, to draft a bill on the autonomy of minorities. The authorities were in no hurry in this respect. The attempted Communist putsch of 1924, revealing the urgent need for “national consolidation”, made them decide to take the necessary steps. Werner Hasselblatt, a Baltic German jurist and internationally recognized expert on minorities, undertook most of the task. He received the assistance and advice of the Russian Economics Professor; Mikhail Kurchinskii. This law, inspired by Austrian Marxist and Bundist conceptions and in keeping with the international commitments of the country, was drawn up, approved by vote11 and implemented. According to the terms of the Law on the cultural autonomy of national minorities of 5 February 1925, minorities with the right to autonomy are the German, Russian and Swedish ones and, more generally, any ethnic group with at least 3,000 members. This figure was adopted to enable the small Jewish community of 3,045 members to benefit from the legislation. Membership of a minority group is a voluntary act and any citizen can register in the relevant national register as of the age of 18 years old. Subject to the approval of the government, the autonomous instructions of a national minority were authorized to introduce “regulatory decrees” that were compulsory for all members of the group, as well as to impose community taxes. The State itself also participated in the system. According to the law, minorities could benefit; from education in their mother tongue and have their own cultural12 institutions13.
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9 This bill was drafted, mainly by Hans Kukk, Deputy of the Labour Party at the Landesrat (Maandukogu). 10 Estonian constitutional law makes provisions for the autonomy of a certain number of social bodies, including the professions and later (1937) churches and scientific institutions. On this subject, see: Klessment Johannes: Personal Self-Government in Estonia, in Revue Baltique, June 1940, No. 2, Vol. 1, 232 s. 11 With the assistance of a good number of Estonian members of parliament since there were only 4 German MPs out of 100. 12 The bill for social institutions was turned down by Parliament. 13 It should be noted that this text also applied to Estonians in the regions where they themselves were in the minority (east of the country after the Tartu Treaty that attributed the overwhelmingly Russian speaking region of Ivangorod to Estonia).
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The organization of the system of personal autonomy was based on a pyramid pattern. At the base were the local authorities and at the top was the Cultural Council, elected for three years, which handled cultural affairs and appointed a cultural committee headed by a chairman. Their task was to organize, manage and supervise the schooling system and various community activities. The central administration was organized in five departments: schools, culture, youth and sports, finances and land surveys. As a public law institution, it was authorized to issue orders in the areas of its competence, receive the compulsory contributions of the State, and levy community taxes. The bill came into effect on the 3rd of March 1925 and the system was implemented very soon afterwards. It functioned for several years to the satisfaction of the groups (particularly Germans and Jews) which had succeeded in setting up the appropriate community institutions. Despite numerous attempts, the Russians, too heterogeneous and inadequately organized but sufficiently concentrated geographically not to have a real need for it, never adopted the system and were content with communal autonomy. The mechanism of cultural autonomy nevertheless very soon came up against a certain number of criticisms14. The first comment put forward was that it was only a “Framework Law” and that it was too vague about the contents of the application instruments. For instance, the Germans, who were anxious about their ageing population, denounced, the absence of a community system of social welfare. On the Estonian side, on the other hand, there was bitter criticism about a veritable “State within a State”, reflected in the educational autonomy of minorities. As for the day-to-day functioning of the system, the criticism was not less pronounced. The following examples can be mentioned: — The Cultural Councils could be suppressed by the Government at any time, and they were in reality “controlled” by the Ministry of the Interior. — In places where Estonians were in the minority, they could obtain their autonomy directly from the public authorities without having to set it up themselves. — The system had no international guarantee, and at every renewal of the legislature, the new Parliament had the power to cancel it, at least in theory. In fact, despite these criticisms, the system was applied properly, and it was constantlyput forward as a model by the League of Nations. After functioning for about fifteen years, the system came to an end on the 1st of January 1940 in the case of the Germans, and shortly afterwards in the case of the Jews, with the disappearance of the respective communities. The cultural autonomy system today At the end of 50 years of oblivion, the 1925 law reappeared in the time of the renaissance of the Sovereign State of Estonia in 1991. From the very outset,
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14 See, Cornelius Hasselblatt, Minderheitenpolitik in Eastland. Rechtsentwicklung und Rechtsentwirkligkeit, 1918–1995, Bibliotheca Baltica 1996; the same author, Der Geschehen der Kulturautonomie und seine gesetzliche und organisatorische Verwirklichung, in B. Meissner & al.
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going back to the 1925 law appeared to be a highly symbolic component in the restitution of the national legitimacy of the country. In Estonia today, over 30% of the residents are not ethnically Estonian, and among them, the majority do not have Estonian citizenship (80%), either because they are (still) stateless, or because they opted for the citizenship of another State (usually Russia). Among these minorities, only those with Estonian citizenship can benefit from the special status of members of a national minority (Article 1 of the law mentioned below). The advantage of this law, which endows minorities with a legal personality and enables their members to enjoy personal, “extra-territorial” cultural autonomy, was initially reserved — and this is the first paradox — for only a small percentage of the population of the country15. However, it has been observed that the number of minority citizens is rising along with rhythm of naturalization at a fairly satisfactory rate; between 1992 and 2000, 115,000 received Estonian citizenship. Secondly, according to Article 6 of the law, nothing prevents noncitizens from participating in activities organized by “national minorities”. They simply do not have the right to vote. However, the paradox goes even further. This law, used by all experts as a model, following the example of the Hungarian law of 1993, has until recently remained a dead letter. We will see why further on. The law on the autonomy of minorities (1993) By resuming independence in 2001, Tallinn wished to pay tribute to a legislation16, which at the time had earned it a flattering international reputation17. This new law is directly inspired by the one of 1925, except for a few adaptations dictated by the passage of time. The first article defines as belonging to a cultural community of Estonian citizens who observe the following traits: — reside in Estonia, — maintain solid and lasting links with this country, — have different ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic features from Estonians, — wish to preserve their identity, religion or cultural traditions. The main objective of the law is to allow minorities to benefit in concreto from the cultural rights incorporated in the Constitution18 through a system of cultural autonomy. This bill is in principle applicable to German, Russian, Swedish and Jewish minorities (but not to Roms19, because there are not enough of them!) and to any other group of more than 3,000 persons (Article 2).
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15 This is, incidentally, in keeping with the position of the United Nations and of the Council of Europe. 16 Adopted by the Riigikogu on 26 October 1993 and promulgated by the President of the Republic on 11 November 1993. 17 The Law of 15 December 1989 (JO: 1989, 40, 618) on the ethnic rights of citizens of the Soviet Republic of Estonia was repealed simultaneously. 18 Article 49 of the 1992 Constitution stipulates that “Everyone has the right to retain their ethnic belonging” and Article 50 says that “National minorities have the right, in the interest of ethnic culture, to create institutions of autonomy under the conditions and procedures laid down by the law on the cultural autonomy of national minorities.” 19 There are about 800 of them at present. The authorities seem to have forgotten them to a certain extent.
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There is one uncertainly over a vital point, the notion of “lasting ties”. Who maintains these ties, individuals or groups? And what does durable mean? Durability for a group is calculated in centuries, for an individual in decades, and this fact can change everything! Unlike the predominant interpretation, the formulation of the article, as well as the globally “individualistic” nature of the law, seem to prevail over the idea, of individual ties. The debate, however, is still open. The law stipulates then the right of every minority to preserve its identity and sanction any breaches of it, particularly forced assimilation (Article 3). According to the terms of Article 4, members of national minorities benefit from a certain number of positive rights especially in matters of self-organization of the community. Public use of the minority language is permitted within the limits set by the law on language. Among the main, objectives of the law, Article 5 refers to the organization of education in the minority language and, more generally, the management of the minority’s cultural life.
Institutions of cultural autonomy Article 2 of the law defines what should be understood by cultural autonomy. This is the right of individuals belonging to a national minority to form autonomous cultural governments with a view to exercising their cultural rights as recognized by the Constitution. Minorities that have decided to adopt the regime of the law will thus have a national organization, directed by an institution elected according to the terms fixed by the State and functioning under its supervision. Its areas of competence are teaching the minority language, managing schools, organizing cultural events and, more generally, administering the cultural organizations of the said minorities. In view of the law, a provision has been made for a National Register of National Minorities (NRNM20) in Chapter II. Requests for cultural autonomy are formulated on the basis of the NRNM21. The specific registers for each of the groups concerned will be prepared by the ethnic cultural societies or by their federations but the State will be responsible for handling the registers. Individual registration (or voluntary cancellation) on a register will depend solely on a decision (in writing) of the person concerned. Children below the age of 16 years old will be registered by their parents. The personal nature of the autonomy lies in this voluntary and individual approach. The list is submitted to the Ministry of the Interior for verification and then made official by the Department of Culture. Provisions are made for the creation of organizations of cultural autonomy in Chapter III of the law. The principal cultural autonomy institutions are the Cultural Council (elected for three years by the registered minorities and composed of 20 to 60 members), and the Cultural Committee of each group. Any person wishing to set up such an institution must submit a request to the State. The Cultural
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20 Called rahvusnimekiri in Estonian, meaning “list of nationalities”. 21 Decree of 1st October 1996.
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Council of each minority is elected by direct and uniform suffrage through secret ballots. Voting is carried out within the electoral districts, under the responsibility of a general Electoral Committee functioning under State control. The statutes of cultural autonomy institutions must be adopted at the first meeting of the Cultural Council, together with their functioning principles. The expenses incurred by the Cultural Council of each minority are covered by autonomy authorities except those related to the election of the Cultural Council, which are borne by the State. The Cultural Council has great liberty in matters concerning the action it takes to promote the language and culture of the minority. If can, for instance, set up “Cultural Commissions” (kultuurivolikogu) at the local or regional levels, appoint local representatives (kohalik kultuurivolinik) and, above all, set up the following autonomy institutions as provided for by the law: — Primary and secondary schools in the minority language, — Ethnic cultural institutions, — Ethnic cultural companies and publishing firms, — Minority charity institutions.
Minority schools come under the regulations governing private schools. The institutions of each Cultural Autonomy ate independent moral entities. They can own property and are-responsible for their financial obligations. The financing of cultural autonomy and its (Article 27) is covered by: — Grants from the State budget as provided by the law 23, — Contributions from regional authorities, — Fees from members of the autonomies, — Voluntary contributions, subsidies and donations, — Donations from foreign organisations.
Institutions of minority autonomies can be dissolved by the authorities if the population in question falls below 3,000 members during five consecutive years, if it turns out to be impossible to draw up electoral lists, or if less than half the members registered have participated in two successive elections, and finally if the Cultural Council recommends this suspension.
The functioning of the system The deficiencies noted about the 1925 act have been remedied to in the new text. However, new critical remarks have been formulated. At the end of 50 years of German and Soviet occupation, the ethnological situation of the country no longer has much in common with what it was like before the war. The old communities, with their rich historic past and strong identity, have disappeared. There are practically no Germans (3,500 in 1989) or Swedes (600) left and a large number of the Russian-speaking population tends to be rootless, having an individualist immigrant mentality rather than being a minority attached to its roots. In these circumstances, the logic behind the adoption of the above-mentioned law is no longer very relevant.
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In consequence, the law of 25 October 1993 has until very recently been a dead letter in that no group has yet created an institution in accordance with its terms. Even the Department of Culture does not seem to have much faith in it (the decree laying down the detailed terms for the election of a Cultural Council has yet to be introduced). A few years ago, however, two groups (the Ingrians of Estonia and the Association of Slav Educational and Charitable Organisations) asked the Department of Culture for permission to draw up lists of names with a view to setting up minority institutions. Although the Russians seem to have neglected their project, the Ingrians have moved ahead. In may 2004, the Ingrian autonomy was formed and on June 1, 2004, the result of the subsequent elections was approved by the authorities. This is certainly a great step forward but it is however not yet possible to judge the pertinence of the criticism levelled at a system that some people look upon as outmoded while others feel it was introduced merely for cosmetic purposes22. Between 1997 (18 June) and 1999 (22 March), two proposed draft amendments to the law, mainly on the modification of the legal status of the autonomous cultural government, transforming it from a corporation under public law to a non-profitable association, were submitted to Parliament. Withdrawn for consultation, the last draft seems to have subsequently been dropped, thus giving an idea of the intentions (that are fluctuating to say the very least) of the authorities on this matter.
Conclusion At the end of this brief study, it appears that the paradoxes mentioned at the beginning are more apparent than real and cannot be analysed in a univocal way. The fact of having an advanced law on minorities has in no way prevented the government of Tallinn from treating its Russian-speaking community in a summary manner, and in all legality since the said law does not concern them. The same Estonia can therefore be easily praised by international authorities for its legislation on minorities and at the same time criticised for the application terms of its national integration programme. What is more, the fact that the law of 1993 has almost remained a dead letter is not too serious either in that: — In the world of today, unlike the 1930s, an active association movement, with an international outlook, irrigates minorities. — Other structures, such as the Presidential Roundtable, already mentioned, or the Council of Minorities at the Department of Culture, set up in 1997, play a similar role in liaison with the OSCE and the Council of Europe. — Furthermore, the approach of the law, which is centralist, costly and Stateoriented, is no longer entirely in keeping with the spirit of the times. — Finally, the objective of the law was widely circulated in society and the fact that no group has decided to use it proves that it is now possible to function without it.
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22 There are still some uncertainties on this point.
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BIBIOGRAPHY
Kemp, Walter, A. Quiet Diplomacy in Action. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. Kluwer Law International, La Haye, 2001. Lesage, Michel (co-ordinated by), Constitutions d’Europe centrale, orientale et balte. La Documentation Française, 1995. Nahaylo, Bohdan, Swoboda, Victor, Après l’Union Soviétique, les peuples de l’espace soviétique, (translated from), PUF, 1994.
Minorities of the Baltic States
Hiden, John, Defender of Minorities. Paul Schiemann, 1876-1944. Hurst & Co., Londres, 2004. Plasseraud, Yves, Les États baltiques, les sociétés gigognes, Armeline, Crozon, 2003. Sepp, Tanel (& al Eds.) Keeping the Pot Boiling. Students on Integration in the Baltic States. EuroUniversity, International Relations, vol. 2/4, Tallinn, 2001. Smith, Graham, The Ethnic Democracy Thesis and the Citizenship Question in Estonia and Latvia. Nationalities Papers, 1996, vol. 24, N° 2, p. 199–16. Smith, Graham, Law, Vivien, Wilson, Andrew, Bohr, Annette, Allworth, Edward, Nation-building in the PostSoviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities. Cambridge U.P., 1998. Villecourt, Louis, La protection des minorités dans les pays baltiques et la société des Nations, J. Bière, Bordeaux, 1925. Zaagman, Rob, Conflict Prevention in the Baltic State: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, ECMI Monograph N1°, 1999. Ziemele, Ineta, The Role of State Continuity and Human Rights in Matters of Nationality in the Baltic States, in: Talavs Jundzis (ed.): The Baltic States at Historical Crossroads. Riga: Latvian Academy of Science, 1998, p. 248–271.
Minorities and Integration in Estonia
Angelus, Oskar, Die Kulturautonomie Estland, Detmold, 1951. Aun, Karl, Der Völkerrechtliche Schutz Nationaler Miinderheiten in Estland, 1917–1940, Hamburg, 1951. Heidmets, Mati, Integration of Minorities into Estonian Society: Developmental Scenarios, in: The Integration of National Communities in Ida-Virumaa in Estonian Society. 27–29–11–1996. Collection of Materials. Tallinn: Disantrek, 1997, p. 162–172. Jarve, Priit, Ethnic Democracy and Estonia: Application of Smooha’s Model, ECMI Working Paper N° 7, Flensburg, July 2000. Kask, Peer, National Radicalisation in Estonia: Legislation on Citizenship and Related Issues. Nationalities Papers, 1994, vol. 22, n°2, p. 379–392. Katus, Kalev, Puur, Allan, Sakkeus, Luule, National Minorities in Estonia, paper presented to the third Conference on Baltic Studies in Europe, Tallinn, 1999. Kirch, Aksel, The Integration of Non-Estonians into Estonian Society: History, Problems and Trends, Estonian Academy Publisher, Tallinn, 1997. Lauristin, Marju & al. Integration of Estonian Society, Monitoring 2000, Integration Foundation, Tallinn, 2000. Saks, Katrin, Cultural Societies of Ethnic Minorities in Estonia, Directory, Support to the Estonian State Integration Programme, Tallinn, 2001. Semjonov, Aleksei (Ed.) Ethnic Minorities in Estonia: Domestic Laws and International Instruments, Report of an International Seminar, LICHR & Presidential Round Table on National Minorities, Tallinn, 1997. Trifunovska, Snezana, Minorities en Europe — Croatia, Estonia and Slovakia, Kluwer Law International, Nimègue, 1999. Viikberg, Jüri (Ed.) Eesti Rahvaste Raamat: Rahvus vähemused-rümad ja killud (The Book of Nationalities of Estonia: National Minorities and Ethnic Groups: from the Biggest to the Smallest), Tallinn, 1999.
The Russians of the Baltic States
Brusina, O.I, Novaïa russkaia diaspora (hronika) The New Russian Diaspora (chronicles), Etnographicheskoié obozrenie (Ethnographic Revies), 1993, N° 4. Chinn. J & Kaiser, R., Russians as a New Minority. Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Soviet Successor States. Westview Pres, Boulder, 1996. Dawiska Karen & Parrott Bruce, The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The International Politics of Eurasia, Vol. 1, M.E. Sharpe, NY, 1994. Melvin, Neil, Russians beyond Russia, The Politics of National Identity. The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Chatham House Papers, 1995. Rose, Richard, Russians outside Russia: A 1991 VCIOM Survey. Studies in Public Policy, N° 283, Glasgow, University of Strathclyde, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1997. Shlapentokh, Vladimir, Sendlich, Munir, Payn, Emil (Ed.), The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics, Armonk, NY, ME Sharpe, 1994.
HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE OF EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION LUCIAN JORA
Abstract. The idea of a Europe is basically untraceable, not because it does not exist or is indefinable but because it exists in a form that makes it hard to pin down on account of a large number of contradictions that prevent our finding a logic on which to base a definition. That is also why the best way of approaching Europe is not to try to find out about some dispiritingly complex object, but to identify the values that allow us to keep under constant review all the attempts to come to terms with it. Europe is primarily perceived in terms of its diversity, and to live that diversity it quickly became indispensable to identify similarities, as when detailed comparisons of education and training systems reveal identical or very similar concerns despite greatly contrasting administrative and teaching arrangements.
Efforts to arrive at an undisputed definition of Europe fail. They do not reveal an essence of Europe that might form the basis for its identity and the characteristics of that identity. Attempts in this direction are hampered by contradictions which prevent the characteristics being integrated into a unitary structure, or by characteristics which are not peculiar to Europe but belong to most countries in the world. All the statements on the European dimension allude to a heritage that Europeans supposedly have in common. This may embrace historic events, geographical features, trends in literary and artistic creativity, and many other traits which will vary depending on the time and place at which the statements were made. Even in the 19th century, conservative circles did not refer to the same shared tendencies as did the adherents of the early democratic movements. And, as is demonstrated by the arguments about whether to mention the role of Christianity in the European heritage when the European Constitution was being drafted, these disagreements still persist today. A first point to stress is therefore that it is far from easy to identify the heritage that Europeans are supposed to share1. Attempts at world history or at histories of large areas or periods have frequently been criticised on these grounds, and a similar reaction continues to greet enterprises of this nature. It has been argued, for example, that there is no such thing as European baroque art because the baroque breaks down into a
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1 Jean-Michel Leclerq, The European Dimension in History Teaching: Plural Images and Multiple Standpoints, DGIV/EDU/HISTDIM (2007) 03, p. 32.
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., IV, 1, p. 153–158, Bucharest, 2007.
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number of styles, the contrasts between which cannot be bridged artificially or simplistically2. Discovery of supposedly common heritage shared by Europeans is also at risk of being based on questionable knowledge that is easily dismissed as impossible, rather than on incontrovertible evidence that it was hoped would instantly unveil a Europe needing no further definition. It is difficult to see how features will emerge by themselves that are sufficiently significant to allow those who share them to feel a sense of common belonging akin to that which has grown up in the nation-states. In the latter case the shared heritage is assumed to have the solidity and self-evidence conferred by a supposedly intangible past, while it is merely a future promise in the case of Europe3. Analysis of aspects of the European dimension reveals that each of them takes the form of a set of practices that refer to values. The linguistic aspect is the quest for communication between interlocutors who mutually respect one another on the basis of acceptance of multilingualism and multiculturalism. The spatial aspect is characterised by exchanges in which others are not always treated as equal partners because the rules may not permit it despite providing an ideal that shows up inadequacies. The situation is similar with the cognitive aspect: knowledge of a shared heritage is problematic, but it is still a requirement that signals the key goal to aim for. The 1994 Commission green paper on the European dimension caused some concern by giving priority to knowledge of European institutions, thus seemingly borrowing the civics model used in member states, with its implicit compulsory acquisition of attitudes and behaviours laid down in advance by the powers that be. It is well known that this is not the way to introduce the European dimension4. Going even further in this direction, one author believes that Europe can be recognised by its “secondarily” — that is, the absence of any claim that is has made choices that are its alone — and by the plurality of heritages with which it has to contend and which cannot always be reconciled5. It is remarkable that even in the dossiers, or looked at from the standpoint of secondarily; the process of defining Europe and its identity never arrives at a one and single Europe. It is always a matter of assemblage through a process of overcoming obstacles. Even the European Union adopts this approach. We never find, therefore, an immediately comprehensible, absolute identity. Hence the identity is far more potential than actual, always needing to be discovered rather than already there, with the result that Europe will probably always be a project. It therefore remains to be shown that, contrary to widespread opinion, this is a form of existence which, far from being a sign of fragility and inconsistency, has substance and is not without advantages over other forms6.
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2 See for example Pierre Charpentrat, L’art baroque, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1967 (quoted by Jean-Michel Leclerq). 3 Jean-Michel Leclerq, The European Dimension in History Teaching: Plural Images and Multiple Standpoints, DGIV/EDU/HISTDIM (2007) 03, p. 33. 4 Ibidem. 5 Rémi Brague, Europe, la voie romaine, 1999, Folio Gallimard, Paris. 6 Jean-Michel Leclerq, The European Dimension in History Teaching: Plural Images and Multiple Standpoints, DGIV/EDU/HISTDIM (2007) 03, p. 34.
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Some are emphasising the need to accept the idea of a Europe that is basically unfindable, not because it does not exist or is indefinable but because it exists in a form that makes it hard to pin down on account of a large number of contradictions that prevent our finding a logic on which to base a definition. That is also why the best way of approaching Europe is not to try to find out about some dispiritingly complex object, but to identify the values that allow us to keep under constant review all the attempts to come to terms with it. It is therefore less a matter of working out a concept or concepts of Europe than of encouraging the attitudes most likely to ensure participation in the European project7. In addition to the interest in history teaching, there has been parallel interest in historical knowledge itself. This is well seen in the project “History teaching in the 21st century” (1997–2001) and the project “The European dimension in history teaching” (2002–2006). These projects had two main aims. One was to encourage teaching of European history that took account of the results of the latest research and of interpretations promoting pluralist, tolerant visions. The other aim, particularly in the second project, was to address the European dimension more effectively8. It should be pointed out that the orientation chosen by the Council of Europe projects risked exposing identification of the European dimension to certain difficulties. It was agreed first of all that the focus should be on a study of “key events” in the history of Europe, without spelling out from the outset whether this should mean events that revealed the European dimension and if so, in what way. Secondly and most importantly, all the key events selected were associated with conflicts, mostly of great violence and degenerating into massacre. The question was therefore raised as to whether the European dimension, conceived up to that point as generally peaceful, could still be invoked, and if so, how, in these spirals of violence of which the outcomes were very uncertain. This Committee of Ministers recommendation of 30 October 2001 is of particular importance from two points of view. On the one hand it restates the guidelines on history teaching as detailed in earlier documents. On the other it explicitly sets out for the first time in practical terms how the European dimension is to be seen and applied. Three objectives stand out in particular in relation to history teaching which, it must be stressed, is not clearly distinguished from historical knowledge here any more than anywhere else. History teaching, and in consequence a knowledge of history, are essential to European construction. This was also the thinking behind Recommendation 1283 (1996) on history teaching in Europe, Article 2 of which states that history also has a key political role to play in today’s Europe, and had been the line taken by the 1994 Delphi symposium on history teaching and European awareness9. Secondly, the study of history plays a key role in the development of mutual understanding between peoples and between individuals (an aim likewise found in Recommendation 1283, according to which a knowledge of history fosters a democratic, tolerant
—————— 7 Ibidem. 8 Ibidem. 9 Idem, p. 36.
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and responsible civic attitude10 and in the recommendation on teaching history in the 20th century, which favoured a pluralist, tolerant conception and open approaches to sensitive issues in the teaching of history). Thirdly, history teaching needs to stimulate respect for difference and a range of ways of looking at historical events and situations, as had already been explained in the recommendations referred to and in many other documents, particularly those concerned with democratic citizenship. The project on the European dimension in history teaching followed up the recommendation just examined, which is reason enough to consider it in detail. But the recommendation viewed the publications that were to form part of the project as one way of promoting the European dimension, giving us further reason to devote attention to them. This is all the more natural in that the project chose to study “key events” in European history, reflecting the objective assigned to the European dimension of teaching about periods and developments with the most obvious European dimension. This project gave rise to five symposia: The year 1848 in the history of Europe; 1912–1913: impact of historical events on the changing lives of ordinary citizens; 1919; The year 1945; and 1989. Each symposium was given ten or so papers by high-level specialists, mostly on the situation in a particular country during the period in question. But another equally strong impression is the paucity, and indeed absence, of reference to the European dimension of the events11. There is never any doubt that these events are of signal importance in European history (“major” events, “key” events). The 1848 Revolution marked the beginning of Europe’s march towards the spread of democracy and the nation-state. The sequel to the Balkan wars was implacable hatred between neighbours, which produced unmanageable situations for which the rest of Europe eventually paid the price of a first world war that bled it white and destabilised it for many years. It is scarcely necessary to reiterate how crucial the post-Yalta split was from a European point of view or the reunion after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Or was there a “Europeanness” so obvious that to mention it in terms of a European dimension would have been a huge understatement? Were these events thought self-evidently European, having embroiled vast portions of the continent and so many European states? Equally self-evidently, the events had an undeniable European impact which could, for example, be seen at a glance from the new maps that had to be redrawn after each conflict. The publication The European dimension in history teaching in the 20th century discusses the European dimension at great length12 without revealing clearly what it is or how it can be used in practice. According to the author, there are two possible options as to what best characterises Europe, one being its shared heritage, the other its diversity. Each option has its advantages and its drawbacks. The first, which emphasises a continuous narrative, favours a linear
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10 Article 4. 11 Jean-Michel Leclerq, The European Dimension in History Teaching: Plural Images and Multiple Standpoints, DGIV/EDU/HISTDIM (2007) 03, p. 38. 12 Op. cit., p. 29–39.
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development embracing the main branches of the European heritage such as the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition, the main artistic and architectural trends, and the emergence of the nation-state. Hence it rests on the idea of a European civilisation that presents common phenomena within different cultures, but it ignores the areas and periods not demonstrating the influences considered essential. The main feature of the second option is the diversity that manifests itself in the dynamism that Europe has displayed in all fields — political, economic and cultural. There is thus a danger either of developing an atomised vision of Europe or of highlighting darker aspects not tempered by developments which might generally permit greater optimism. A balance has to be struck between these two points of view, between the general and the particular, between a vertical perspective emphasising vast periods and general trends, and a horizontal perspective emphasising specifics. But there are no details as to how this balance is to be reflected in the practice of history, and we constantly come back to the need to focus on what is historically important and has had a major impact on a large part of Europe. As will be shown briefly, these aspects of the European dimension remain usable but have to be adapted to the context, and the images of the Other to which they refer have to change appreciably. Even among historians, there was still no very clear distinction between fiction and what was verifiable. As is evident from the works of Michelet and many others, the roman des nations was an acceptable genre which did not start to be decried until after the second world war. There was thus a presumption of knowledge fairly comparable to what we see with the European dimension as envisaged now, but with less care taken to avoid over-ambition and unfounded statements. This, then, is also an aspect of the European dimension which is still absolutely relevant despite necessary qualifications because of the specific nature of the context. Talking about diversity implies referring to relative differences rather than to the marked contrasts. For many philosophers, historians and sociologists, the issue is one of opposing and even contradictory phenomena rather than reducible diversity. The attitude of Edgar Morin is well known. Many agree with him when he writes: While Europe is law, it is also force; while it is democracy, it is also oppression; while it is spirituality, it is also materialism; while it is moderation, it is also hubris; while it is reason, it is also myth, including the inner core of the notion of reason13. And this means that we need to acknowledge the disagreements of all sorts and the conflicts resulting from them which have punctuated the history of Europe. There is therefore no question of inventing a “soft” version of it14. The history of Europe has to accommodate all the wars and the violence that have caused bloodshed not only in Europe but also on practically all the other continents, frequently on Europe’s behalf. If we look for historical continuity we discover a history composed as much of disjointed, contradictory periods as of periods linked by some hidden meaning in some miraculous unity. Nor can the Europe that, in theory, is at peace today always escape their reappearance. It is the hope of finally eliminating the risk of this
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Penser l’Europe, Gallimard, 1987, p. 33. 14 To borrow from Jean-Frédéric Schaub’s article Les dangers d’une histoire douce de l’Europe, presented at the colloquium Les détournements de l’histoire: un enjeu pour l’éducation en Europe au XXIème siècle (Council of Europe July 2001).
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which drives contemporary European projects, but this is not some happy ending that means we can forget the past. As Jean-Frédéric Schaub again writes, European countries have had relations sometimes and indeed often dominated by violence rather than transaction, by contempt rather than understanding, by resentment rather than by recognition and nothing could be more contrary to the vocation attributed to historians than to forge a golden legend with no historical substance15. The primacy of the national framework stems both from political concerns and traditions of historical research. From the 19th century onwards the nationstate relied on history, backed by civic education, to give its citizens points of reference for reinforcing their attachment to the values enshrined in the political model. By celebrating the nation’s uniqueness, continuity and merits, national history provided it with a unique destiny that justified the devotion and sacrifices it demanded. Historians played their part in this by writing national histories based on archives that were also national, because they had been collected on that principle and were frequently only available to the citizens of the country in which they were located. A plural vision of events should prevail, encapsulating the ethical dimension of historical enquiry. This recognises the fact that there is never one single definitive interpretation of a series of events, and it is this recognition which makes it possible for historical knowledge to make a crucial contribution to the development of dialogue and mutual understanding both between teachers and pupils, and among pupils themselves. This should lead pupils naturally to develop critical minds, independent objective judgment and curiosity. A feeling for research should also be encouraged so that all the information available is used to best advantage, from archives to the new information and communication technologies. This is necessary to guard against subversion and manipulation of history, of which racism, xenophobia and nationalism are the most poisonous examples. This approach will also give considerable space to comparison, which is in fact inevitably encouraged by the application of key concepts and key skills, although this is an aspect of historical enquiry that is too often neglected. Europe is primarily perceived in terms of its diversity, and to live that diversity it quickly became indispensable to identify similarities, as when detailed comparisons of education and training systems reveal identical or very similar concerns despite greatly contrasting administrative and teaching arrangements. The exchanges of all sorts that are still growing in number today throughout Europe are very often comparisons experienced locally or at first hand before being extended more widely. Comparison is part and parcel of Europe16: our glances inevitably meet on account of a proximity which is a constant invitation to penetrate the mystery surrounding our neighbours. This is probably what makes it possible to distinguish between a European dimension and an international dimension, the former leading to an actual relationship between partners who can have quite easy and frequent contact because of their spatial and human proximity, and the latter involving partners much further apart from each other both physically and ethically.
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Ibidem. 16 Jean-Michel Leclerq, The European Dimension in History Teaching: Plural Images and Multiple Standpoints, DGIV/EDU/HISTDIM (2007) 03, p. 39.
IN FOCUS
A FORM OF RE-ACTIVATING THE POLITICAL FREEDOM — MASS-MEDIA (Theoretical aspects of a Postmodern Simulacrum) VIORELLA MANOLACHE
Abstract. For more than fifteen years since we (re)conquered the freedom of expression, a reality of a different kind established itself within the Romanian space: a system of indexes, emblems, constituents of a typical language which asks for solving out, first and foremost politically speaking, the terms of the polis. These terms are clear of haphazard dross, conjugated and anchored in a background level, where we refine ourselves as carriers and victims of discourse.
In order to approach mass-media as a form of re-activating the political freedom, I am going to analyze the process of liberty (as a nimrod vision, creator of polis with all the syndromes of left-right over adding becomes a network of intentions) describing the contemporary political context. Seen from this perspective, “the faces of liberty” present a geography of the concepts of a term understood as always-postpone speaking, as a worn out, shabby, damped term, semantically speaking but which asks for rewriting capital letters. There is a need to philosophically (re)shape a new conceptual space very well-marked, by a lake of concord, availability or participation in providing arguments. Romanian society, which has just gotten out of the Soviet isolationalism and protectionalism, has tried to diminish the impact between the Romanian phenomenon and the global one. The idea according to which communism, as a social-political ideology, manifested itself, paradoxically, in the LeninistBolshevist variant (of socialist revolution) upon the “weakest link of the chain”, in the under-developed countries, is nowadays more and more difficult to accept. As compared to the model from the West, communism signified a type of accelerated development (with forced, quickened steps), of modernization through the “dissolution of intermediate steps” (which means nothing else than the transposition not only of the steps, but also of the order itself of the genesis of a social reality!). This so-called Romanian modernization took place through “an immense and brutal work of social engineering”, typical for the East-European peripheral societies. If on the one hand, in the West the coming out of modernity was achieved simultaneously, and almost unanimously, in an organized manner, through the Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., IV, 1, p. 159–168, Bucharest, 2007.
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Europeanization of the structures, in the East, on the other hand, the coming out of modernity was forced. Thus, Romania did not step out of modernity. “Romania was stolen its modernity” (Sorin Alexandrescu), as it was forced to head towards regression, towards premodern behavior and mentalities. Romanian postmodernity can be sooner accepted as a version of our (re)integration in a Europe which is mostly postmodern. This is why in Romania, the postmodernity does not replace modernity, but it joins it, creating the impression of a society which, if it is not hybrid, it certainly is heterogeneous, marked by a “violent imaginary” (Ruxandra Cesereanu). Our getting out of modernity corresponds to a sort of ecumenism, which is rather vague, open to the values from the West or to present-day experiences. The political alternative of “coming out from modernity” and of accepting a postmodernity which would result in a definitive abandonment of modernity and its values would presuppose a serene contemplation, the acceptance of a hard, polemical, indecisive version. The Romanian politics is embodied in the deconstructive, intentionally distorting and annihilating, discourse, breaking into pieces any form of discovering a rhetorical finality. Postmodernity is a concept which invites us to take part to a debate over the nature and the direction of movement of our present-day society, in the context of globalization. Most of the political parties meet the political and social dissatisfactions, offering some guidelines capable of diminishing the differentiation. We call to mind, in this respect, Durkheim’s sociological theories, mostly on the difference between the notion of work and that of spare time, religion, home etc. Thus, the Romanian public life is also, in its turn, distinguished from the private life, sometimes even leading to rationalized forms, in Max Weber’s terms. The unpractical creation/ foundation is a political one, sequentially reduced to a contextual approach from the perspective of the one used to liberty, to the assessment of any praxis of thinking and action. The political practice implies a derivation of politics from principles, the (re)thinking of a course of (inter)action of the principles of liberty, embodying the same structure of the perspectives: from the individual to the community, from micro to macro, from the validity of norms to the clarifying version of the problem of liberty. We take into account the liberty understood in a liberal way, as the liberty of the individual subject towards the choices and political judgments of the subject (negative liberty) and the liberty of the individual subject to accede to or to fall, respectively to detect politically speaking as a result of the individuals exclusive thinking (positive political liberty!). Freedom from the ferocity of the unique, structural, artificial discourse presupposes a coming back in force to “the enlightened rationalism”, to a (re)conquering of the language, in which a species of instinctual nominalism established itself. Liberty reappears, therefore from the perspective of a cultural accomplishment in a space specific for temporal refuge, in which the citizen gradually processualizes the liberties (in a defensive or a projective way) within a quotidian institutional reconstruction found at the basis of impartial assessment of moral conflicts of action. The expansion of liberty functions in the sense of diminishing to the minimum of the exterior constrains and in the sense of the
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necessity of assuring the subject. The assertion of liberty, the assertion of the cumulative forces of liberty, participation as a political reaction, involvement, impose the portrait of the citizen, perceived as a guarantee of freedom, as participant at reasoning. “The faces of liberty” impose to the citizen metamorphoses of various nuances: socialization and solidarity, individualization and attachment, as well as socio-political protection, sanction and promotion. The umma society1 involves living together in terms of freedom and a reciprocal influence of the “I” and the “other”. The structural and basically or only random limits clarify the status of state-freedom, by avoiding abuse of any kind. Society becomes the compound shape, in which man’s disposure to his equal with a view to living together receives a special significance. The empiric diagnosis of the disintegration of the liberal public sphere and the standard point-of-view of the democratic-radical appear require the redemption of the functional interpenetration of the objectives of state and society. If it is analyzed in a conceptual manner, political freedom appears as a correct measure among law, coercition, obligation, responsibility, creation and assertion. The political liberty in Romanian follows the route: from international codes to national ways of defining. It can be easy seen, that the butte of the Romanian freedom covers the way from a logocratic society towards regaining the status of freedom, including everything that means non-devouring, incoherence of settlement, non-assuming of freedom as objective reality. Our established conviction is that in order to function, freedom needs not only guarantees from the institutions of the state. Freedom needs to be rallied according to the cultural inheritance and the model of socialization of political culture of population used to its hardships.
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1 Using a deluged register, I am going to approach two concepts: umma society and political freedom — concepts which hold forth dual antimonies: pressure / oppression. According to C. Gellner, umma society is more than a hafiz form of reciprocal influence, is a community, an invariant for the social and political conditions of liberty. I assimilate the concept of new tribes (as a postmodern invariant for the umma society) to a conscious self, and the political freedom space to a habitable substrate. The variability: the citizen overlaps to the oppressive dichotomy — captive/inhabitant into a status space. Taking over a concept by Michel Mafesoli, we consider the community as new tribes. The new tribes are sociability outbursts, spontaneous expeditions into the world of the inaccessible morality. Because these are not some hereditary or legislative patterns, the new tribes organize short recognition invasions. These are like a phenomenon described by Ilyia Prigogine , that of creating the crystal in saturate solvents. In the Romanian territory, sociability is assaulted by socializing. It is a tendency that won consistency along with the means of rebuilding the social and political organism after December 1989. Bauman thinks that this tendency has acquired power while local traditions, persistently undermined, lost their influence and “the ability to establish moral duties and to supervise their implementation”. It is a phenomenon that we identify in the time of Ceauºescu’s mass politics, when the gradual dissipation of community in masses was a general phenomenon. This tendency can be seen in the practice of the ex-socialist body of countries that attempted to achieve what George L. Mosse considered to be an integrative part of a political theory in which even spontaneity is planned. The communists, as well as the Nazi, are acknowledged to be masters in the building of the sacred destined to serve the profane. At this point we remember the invention of “new traditions” adapted to the needs of the nation and comply with under its strict supervision. (23th August, the President’s and his wife’s birthdays, etc.) Bauman remembers the “fascination of the intelligentsia” that, with “a mixture of admiration and envy”, used to watch the unfolding manifestation of popular enthusiasm created by command. Such enthusiasm in the postindustrial world of the West was missing, disclosing an exhausted, weary face of civilization. The stereotypy of daily duties, of duties that were mechanistically carried out would institutionalize the mania.
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The citizen appears disputed by the exterior sphere of opportunities, by that the interior one of constraint. In the sphere of privacy, the individual organizes it morally and politically, according to the driving principles and the principle of concord that require means of manifestation and liberation from the pressure of its negation as an entity, and the achievement of certain ways of manifestation at the level of individual, the group, the micro-macro community. Searching for reasons to validate it self, the individual that is subdued to freedom suggests extensive variants of choosing freedom as a resurrection of a dynamic way of making history. For the human being, essential remains the practice of freedom, perceived both from the inside — as means of interior manifestation — as well as from outside — as political action. The constant question concerning the existing relationship between the “ever greater influence of reason” over thinking, ideology and techniques of government, over the ever increased restrictions brought to the individual and collective liberties nowadays appears on the background of a “recoil” of hope in a general emancipation of mankind. The zoonpolitikon appears cultivating the “productive hypnosis” (Cioran) of becoming accustomed to freedom. What is produced by tearing from the communist logocracy is the attempt to organize these principles of freedom step by step, to take them serious, in order to draw pre-requisites and conclusions. The removal of all the elements of “supervising history (Foucault) transposes us into a sphere of (re)irrigating the human perspective from a perspective of liberating decisive historical close-ups. The totalitarian forms, heresies and ecumenist tendencies involve each other and the authority self-annihilates. The “encounter of liberty (Baudrillard) requests its inventory from the point of view of its practical nuance of outburst in history and reality: on one hand, freedom means the possibility of the subject to choose its shape of human achievement and on the other hand, freedom means the free subject’s possibility to create itself and the world according to its nature. These “laws” imply the existence of an active subject, whose actions start and become obvious through constructions and permanent de-constructions of freedom. As part of this actionable motivation, the individual that is subject to the “reasons of subjectivity” distinguishes between freedom as rational choice and freedom as volunteering, pathos or dissolution. Far from abandoning projection, concept and experience, we are outlined an interpretation which pleads in favor of liberty as a principle that can support itself, after a main weighing. Even if the liberties nowadays are perceived as essential subject-liberties for the individual and personality as an object, negative liberties, and as direction-liberties of the risk and of exploring, liberty as a principle must be understood as a progressively democratic value and perception. In the attempt to get accustomed to freedom as a vision and mission, the Romanian space is required to eliminate any kind of means of alienation in the framework of a viable community consensus, as a reverse of passivity and technical reasoning. After so many haphazard cold-hammerings, we understand to treat the phenomenon of manifestation in / through politics from the point of view of art,
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it is because this suffers a “widening” of the perspectives. Its approach differs from commitment by the fact that it is less a politicizing of art, but an extension of the creative spirit, that has become structurally political, to the processes of social adjustment and upheaval. Despite any pressures, the writing and (re)writing of the political segment, especially on its discursive and image side, follows the route of a socialized art, which requires an activity of political socialization, of interiorizing any standards, and reactivate it by “in situ” approaches. I therefore suggested, in a first phase of analysis, a socialization of the public conflict / public discourse, banking on establishing the legitimacy from the interior of the sociopolitical networks. If art bears a socio-political meaning, it is because, according to Haskell2 meditation is conversely proportional to that of art, considering that the horizon of political expectation (still!) demands an aesthetic leap. Jauss3 systematically invites to a removal of the contrast between passive consumption and active understanding, reaching a constitutive experimentation which is referential to aesthetics of interception. The receiver is a political mediator. The confusions and difficulty pile up: the receiver — public (which often appeals in its approach especially, to the responsible public organizations) considers it self repelled / rejected, guided towards the private sector. According to Habermas, the support of a public sphere implies the homology between art and politics, both structured in this public space considered as intermediate sphere of analysis.4 The matrix of discourse follows the approach of the political receiver situated between private and public, thus creating an “enlarged private”. But in a full postmodernist disintegration of the public sphere, we can only speak about a sphere of alchemy and hybridization as exponential reference of a project about political resumption: an art enlarged towards the political. The moment politics — arts that we might catch on the Romanian segment after 1989, simulates the paradox and the communicational network, banking on a generalized interaction, by connection to the discourse / image / political action. We can speak, in this case, about duplicity and tension: the political communication lays possession over art, allowing it yet to artificially maintain a certain appearance. In this respect, the Romanian political shows do not but place itself in the prolongation of some technologies displaced towards diffusely. The political consequences of these images reconstitute a public space, suggesting a “return to” in the hypostasis of seizing / monopolizing the past, as up — to — datedness and heading towards the minor / secondary.5
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2 C. Haskell, La norm et la caprice, 1986. 3 H.R. Jauss, For an Aesthetics of Interpretation, 1978. 4 See Jurgen Habermas, Conºtiinþã moralã ºi acþiune comunicativã, Substanþial, Bucureºti, 2000 and J. Habermas, Probleme de legitimare în capitalismul târziu, Institutul European, Iaºi, 2000. 5 It seems that, according to the author of Postmodern Ethics (Cambridge, Blackwell, 1993), we are involved in a new worldwide disorder or, in other words, in a game of reorganizing the world. It is the rule of a political puzzle in which the potential of disagreement and dissonance between spheres (moral, political, minority, sexual) “never totally halted, erupts and comes to light”. Bauman’s conviction restricts to the fact
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In Foucault's Pendulum, Umberto Eco deals less with the Templars than with the story that Belbo transcribes on the computer. According to J. Jacques Gleizal, this return to the collectors and the beginning of the 1990’s is filtered by the interest for design, for maintaining a functional memory of the object.6 The “filtering in” into this fault of an “eternal network”, defines the political network as a system of informing, having a self-organizational and self-referential character, that functions in an organics way. The positioning of the communication product, the framework of the network, establishes the passing from decision to communication, as a phenomenon which represents a major danger. If, however, communication works by help of the political paradox and the semblance, it remains virtual and destructive. While interpenetrating, the parts dissolve, starting from the level of emission to that of reception. “Everything lies in everything”! This risk of the network imparts a tension on the “society show”. The unstable balance of recognition by a partial deviation towards the outskirts of communication, organizes itself in large places, in which great mutations take place. We are thus placed out of an organic criticism (as inventing and preparing political mediators, placed beyond the public orders) and close to the improvement and territorization of the political. The territorization policy implies (re)defining the relationship among the political actors. Generally speaking, it replaces a sector function with a coordination function, pleading for a public actor / private actor partnership. While the network is a social term, the territory, as redistribution of chances, belongs exclusively to the political domain. The symbolical structuring of the territory implies the contract procedure mediator / receiver, as reconciliation between autonomy and political purpose of the transmitted political message. The reconstruction of the public space, in its territorialized hypostasis requires the urban territory7, as a relay-point of the
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(continuation) that there is no efficient centralized control that could offer to the unsafe area, continuously reproduced, a naturalness appearance. Indeed, as Foucault had demonstrated, “the fight for power and the endless war” are the only safe foundation of an organized abode. At this moment, despite globalization and its effects that were felt in the common effort to build a new social, economic, political sphere, we are going through a time of insecurity and of dissolution of megalothymy in contemporary liberal democracies. We are, in Fukuyama’s words, free and unequal. Thus, the liberal democracy could be overthrown whether by the excess of megalothymy, whether by that of izothymy, that is of the fanatic desire of equal recognition. The only forms of megalothymy that are not allowed in contemporary societies are those which lead to political tyranny. The difference between these societies and the aristocratic ones proceeding them is that megalothymy has not been chased away, but left to manifest itself subterraneous. The democratic societies start from the premise that all persons are created equal, and that their predominant ethos is that of equality. Thus, those manifestations of megalothymy that survived in modern democracies are somehow opposed to the ideals that society publicly sustains. 6 J. Jacques Gleizal, Art and politics, 1990. 7 The new aspect of Romanian localities best illustrates the bent towards the culture of consumption. Where in the past there were only mix stores, food stores, butcher’s shops, joineries, tailor’s shops etc., now there appeared the new forms of stimulating the consumption: fast-food, shops with technical outfit, computers, all dominated by the attractive image of banks, associations or travel agencies ready to offer their customers all sorts of facilities. These marks of the Romanian postmodernism are, naturally, associated with a society in which the consumer’s life style, mass consumption, dominate its members’ conscious life. This is a society in which fashion and taste are eclectic, “opportunities” seem numberless, and the search of new market segments seems constant. The services and industries mainly offer entertainment. It is known that, in its canonic sense, the term nation-state used to imply, beside its juridical nature, (in this sense, as a set of norms that euphemize and dissolve forces and interests within some legitimating illusions) a civic nature, as a system of force rapports. Yet, the nation-state gives way to the prerogatives of the wealth-state. This represents an attempt to mobilize the economic interests as a means of setting free the political calculation from moral restraints.
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centre. The new territory of communication is the meeting place of fluxes and networks, but also of achieving symbolical productions, according to an imperative of institutional exigencies. The elements implied, according to Murray Edelman8 into this “route” of territorial politics, are marked by referential symbols and concentration. The transmitted political opinions, especially social adjustment, thus contributing to the relieving of the anguish, may they be or not according to the reality. The blurring of the political detail, its dilution, organizes itself according to an “instinct of handicraft”, often assuming political realities, profitable maneuvers, economic mobility, or efficient models that pull on the public. Therefore, a maximum adherence as obsessive attachment is viewed, so as benefit of real feed-backs, easy to anticipate as a “minimum necessary”. At a local level, the detailing of the activity of the reform groups abounds. These groups serve rather as a means of expression, because “symbolical forms / shapes can be applied to any object”. The local television and press make up a model of communicational identification, taking into account the existence of behaviour of consenting behalf of the receiver (whether it is about public policy or detailing of an act of violence!). The characteristic of this type of territoriality, according to Bauman is represented by the fact that politics implies “that public dialogue, that noisy conversation that society keeps up with itself in order to produce and manage its own historicity, as a faithful–performant expression of a social formation that proves capable to tell in a conscious way, what it wants and what it can be”. Such political options about public risks of technical communicational difficulties, view a double axiom, according to which, by these public variants “what you can do, but also what you must do” is accessed. What can be decoded from the score of these models is the fact that, from the point of view of the present political transmitters technology has become a closed system. According to Bauman, this means that she considers the rest of the world an environment, a “source of food, of raw materials for technological processing, or the place for depositing offal”, who defines her own mistakes or several older or more recent accidents as effects of her own /personal insufficiency. The problems resulting from this communicational (and local!) crisis are taken over by the discursive variants as a surplus, built on the assumption according to which “the more problems technology creates, the more technology is needed”. The absence of concepts like the Left / the Right, street movements, trade union terrorism, erosion and infused endemism, inculcates upon the “danger” of
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(continuation) However, the effects of urbanism are best felt in the “lewd economics”, a concept launched by J.F. Lyotard. Indeed, urbanism is dependant on what Marx named “power of production”. The axiom according to which each political economy is lewd starts from the conviction that there is no reference to external reality. In Michel Foucault’s words, urbanism, psychiatry, criminalities, sexology etc. — all this knowledge constitutes “legitimation” and a new way of applying the power. “The power” is everywhere. The sovereignty of the state, as juridical-reflexive frame, or the domination of a minority is not initial attributes, but “ending forms”. The postmodernist preference for hybridization presupposes a boundless availability in which the ruling word is, in one of Guy Scarpetta’s terms, “impurity”. 8 Murray Edelman, Politics and the usage of symbols, 1999.
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the media, equal doses, making its way from the antipodes of a yesterday's antinomy and of a new source of polluting the social mental. The televised alarming, the exaltation of the mass-media, display a culture of the interjection and the capital letter, in a concessiveness that is almost insane of tricks and shock: the screen crystallizes the essence of the person, decisively placing a personality in the horizon of expectance / frustration of the spectator / reader. Apart from these “centrings” and “uncentrings”, the exultant synonymy of mass-media causes a certain mechanism of “language forgetting itself”, as a process of forgetting and discovered memory. The “method of language” (re)thinks the breaking-up, as a way to recreate small restrained ensembles (totals). The flexions of the media language follow their political applicability as (over) added facts. The former presumption of my analysis starts from former comparing, designed according to the following prerogatives: 1. the debasement from its rights of the symbol / political language. The facts stated in the media, appear synchronically restrained as prevailing of the diachronic explanation and 2. the restoration of the initial complexity. The rehabilitation of this space bends on a comparison of the types and ways of action of the political characters. The assumption of the detail gives off coherent ensembles, political codes/strategies as a variant of a regular and repeated form in different contents. The potentially infinite number of enunciated forms formalizes and displaces the content towards effective political structures, established in redistributed repertories. Be it about the morphology, physiology or the generality of the political discourse, the enunciation conditions the technique, as a desultory succession / sequence of technical dimensions. Fetishism, despite so many irreconcilable oppositions and fractions, settles in mass-media a “zero degree” of representation, regarding structure and drama. These blind ideograms9 suggest a coordination of some agreements — repetitions, imitations, minimum frequencies of representable images, of simultaneous apprehension of some aspects, forms, things, ideas and facts which are the aim of collective — effervescent representation. Resorting to the political act,
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Serge Moscovici model of a social psychology seem to fit better to the (apparently!) politically functioning Romanian reality. Borrowing a set of concepts that Paul Ricoeur used to employ (Memory, History, Forgetting, Amarcord Publishing House, Timiºoara, 2001), we hold that the Romanian political sphere of the 1980s has been subject to the parallelism and complementarily of forced memory and forgetting abuses. The postmodern denouncing of “the duty of memory” presupposes the guilty approximation of the distance between history and memory. This deepens, in its explanatory form, the link between explanation and understanding, continuing to keep the ability to decide exerted by the social agents and the self-understanding indebted to memory. Such political reality confirms us the fact that we are prisoners of some assemblies made up of series and acts. The picture of Breugel’s blind people places us too in the neighborhood of a violent denial of the survival instinct in case of redressable lesions at the level of suggestion and decision. Breugel’s blind people (cranking blind ideograms) are united by object (fetish), as an idea that the total and finite world cannot contain its own image any longer. The postmodern culture institutionalizes the “melancholy” by the contempt towards ceremonies and rituals, fights against passions on the field of personal interests and against collective outburst of enthusiasm in the name of organization. It is a condition of active indifference, counterbalanced by promoting the national spirit, overbidden by left-right parties. The postmodern break that Bauman speaks of can be identified in the fact that the Romanian state, in its version after December 1989, does not claim anymore the capacity, the need and the desire to dominate, setting the antistructural forces of sociability free, either unwillingly or on purpose.
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Romanian mass-media causes unequal, cumulative assaults within the framework of the public language. The real is possible, only as virtuality, as incomplete, cyclic image. The reference points of these co-ordinates are the egocentric private persons, disguised as actors and receivers, integrated into a relation of referential designation. “The message of the second grade” incubates an operational zone of transgression of precision to the transmitter, marked by dissemblance and indetermination. The multiple transmissions make the rigour of the factors which participate in the determination of the discourse questionable. Nevertheless, the denial of the traditional structures, the overlapping of successive movements make up an answer given to the public necessity of “putting on stage” as a way of concentrating feelings, of organizing events or determining space. No matters how serious the crisis of the Romanian mass-media might be, the fact that the need to introduce one into “foreign” universes and to follow the coordinates of the event seems consubstantial to a political conditioning, remains a constant. Ecstatic or imaginary, planted or extirpated, the exclusively political time penetrates into the public co-ordinates. Thus, Romanian television as well functions as a machine of the consumption civilization, in the sense that it is no longer a stage for the manifestation of life style. The pretensions and the power of absorption of the message by each category of population guide those who finance, for instance, the political advertising. The new political direction in the U.S.A that of “yuppes” groups that in Romania correspond to wealthy technocrats, with a limited social consciousness and an extremely developed consumer consciousness, adapt the social category of the “average man” to the new reality. The fundamental values acknowledged by this “average man” (“the common Romanian person”) are those of friendship, of solidarity, of his acceptance by a whole community. The commercials for cleaning products, beer, etc., and overbid the common Romanian person’s tendency, especially of those from the countryside, perceived as “keepers of old traditional customs”. On the other hand, the attention is also directed towards the new “blue jeans” generation, the “Pepsi and Orbit generation” that esteems the “unity of the group” constituted beyond any social prejudice. The policy of altruism, of lacking any sense of identity, of blurring the outlines of personality, up to its total absorption in the group is addressed precisely to this category. To conclude, the political economics of Romanian television has a circular nature, in the sense that its serial movement cannot sustain but the image of the spectator-self, a simulacrum, in fact, of its way of life. How is mass-media a form of re-activating the political freedom? The decisive role in the rise of a probable Romanian postmodern society is mainly taken over by mass-media. Mass-media define the Romanian society after December 1989 not as “a more transparent, more self-aware, more enlightened” society, as Vattimo would say, but as a more complex one (even chaotic). My conviction restricts to the finding that it is precisely in this chaos (viewed by some political persons as a dimension of a society in transition, which is, by the way, questionable) that the Romanian hopes of emancipation reside. If I place
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these means (newspaper, radio, television, etc.) at the foundation of Romanian postmodernity and as a form of re-activating the political freedom, I shall do it on the ground that the pressure they exert has been decisive in “bringing about the dissolution of the central point of view”, of what J.-F. Lyotard called the supremacy of “great narratives” (political, cultural, economic, social, scientific, a.s.o.). Starting with the cessation of the “great communist story”, we can speak of the instauration, in our country, of the mass-media effect. This is an effect contrary to the image that the philosopher Th. Adorno created in his work, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, in collaboration with Horkheimer, or in Minima Moralia (imitated as a pastiche by the Romanian A. Pleºu), through which he foresaw that the radio, and afterwards television would achieve the general approval of society, an aim towards which the communism ideology guiltily aspired (transposed in the reports at the Romanian Communist Party congresses). The events from December 1989, as all that happened in the East-European communist countries, demonstrated that, despite any efforts made by monopoly, mass-media became the sustaining element of the new “explosion” of the general multiplication of the Weltanschauung, of particular, fragmentary outlooks on the world. The hypothesis on which my study is built restricts to the fact that Romanian postmodernity is assumed primarily as a “means of communication society”. In this world, the place of the ideal of emancipation (modeled after the self-conscience of the one who knows how things are going — Hegel’s Absolute Spirit or Camus’s or Marx’ Man of Revolt) is subjected to erosion, oscillation and plurality. Torn posters, empty canvasses, burnt and rent newspapers, instantaneous explosions of displays, drawing lots for speeches, the awkwardness of political reverence imposes the following, re-active imperative: what is going on, an apparent the desire to communicate, is in fact the need of sharing, as a “double reality”, as a puzzle and a decreeing of a fascination, by difficulty! BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bauman, Zygmund, Intimation of Postmodernity, New York, London, Routledge, 1992. Bauman, Zygmund, Postmodern Ethics, Cambridge, Blackwell, 1993. Bell, Daniel, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. The information Technology Revolution, Oxford, Blackwell, Cambridge M.a., Mit Press, 1980. Brown, G., Yule, G., Discourse analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999. Deleuze, Gilles, Guattare, F., Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism ºi schizofrenie, New York, 1977. Derrida, Jacques, The Ends of Man, in “Philosophy and Phenomenological Research”, Vol. XXX, No. 1 (September, 1969). Debord, Guy, Society and the Spectacle, Detroit, 1983. Habermas, Jurgen, Conºtiinþã moralã ºi acþiune comunicativã, Substanþial, Bucureºti, 2000. Habermas, Jurgen, Probleme de legitimare în capitalismul târziu, Institutul European, Iaºi, 2000. Hutcheon, Linda, Postmodernism goes to the Opera, in “Euresis”, nr. 1–2, 1995. Hassan, Ihab, Postmodernism — The Postmodern Turn, Ohio State University Press, Ohio, 1987. Havel, Vaclav, The Power of the Powerless, ed. John Keane, New York, 1985. Krocker, Arthur, Cook, David, The Postmodern Scene: Excremental Culture and Hyper-Aesthetics, New York, 1968. Lange, Yasha, Palmer, Andrew, Media and Elections, Tacis, Bruxelles, 1995. Lyon, David, A bit of Circus: Notes on Postmodernity and New Age, in “Religion” 23: 2, 1993. Lyotard, J.F., Thebaud, Loup, Just Gaming, Minneapolis, University Press, Philadelphia, 1993. Masaryk, T.M., Psilosophy and Political Change in Eastern Europe, ed. Barry Smith, University Press, Chicago, 1989. Menson, Wayne, The talk-show in Media Culture, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1993. Morley, David, Television, Audiences and Cultural Studies, Routledge, London, 1994. Parsons, Talcott, Social Systems and the Foundation of Action Theory, New York, Free Press, 1995.
I S P R I ’s A C A D E M I C L I F E
SCIENTIFIC EVENTS WITHIN THE WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS1 32nd Congress of the International Committee of the History of Arts (CIHA) on “Crossing Cultures: Conflict, Migration, Convergence” The University of Melbourne 13–18 January 2008 Please visit: http/www.cihamelbourne2008.com.au/
5th EuPRA Conference: “Challenges of Peace and Democracy in Europe”. Sakarya University, Turkey 21st – 24th August 2007 The conference of the European Peace Research Association (EuPRA) in co-operation with Sakarya University, Department of International Relations. Conference Coordinator: Dr. Nesrin Kenar, Assistant Professor, Sakarya University e-mail:
[email protected]
“Nationalism(s), Postnationalism(s )” Annual International Two-day Conference CICLaS – Université Paris Dauphine, France 11th – 12th October 2007 Submissions Deadline: 31st May 2007 Call for papers: In the Age of Globalisation a certain discourse of crisis has arisen around the notions of national identity, culture and sovereignty, and some have declaimed the loss of local cultural and social values in favour of a nebulous globalised system. For some we are already in a postnational world in the 21st century and the political, social, economic and philosophical notions implied are food for debate and discussion. This conference invites participants to discuss how European and Postcolonial societies are imagining themselves in this historical moment. Enquiries and submissions (± 300 words) + biographies (± 100 words) should be sent to Martine Piquet and Deirdre Gilfedder Submissions for the forthcoming no 13 issue of Les Cahiers du CICLaS (ISSN 1637-7060) on the same theme are also welcome.
PSAI25 Dublin city (Ireland) 19–21 October 2007 The 2007 PSAI (Political Studies Association of Ireland) Annual Conference is hosted by the School of Law and Government at Dublin City University. Many of the 25th anniversary celebrations will be held here — included the launch of a new reader on Irish politics to be published jointly with Routledge. The theme of this year’s conference is ‘Politics and the Law’. A roundtable discussion of the relationship between the courts and politicians is planned. For further details, please contact: http://webpages.dcu.ie/~omalle/PSAI251.htm
ECPR (European Consortium for Political Research) For information on ECPR Joint Session and Conferences, please visit: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/
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1 Courtesy of Melbourne University, Centre for Research on Europe.
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., IV, 1, p. 169–184, Bucharest, 2006.
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4th ECPR General Conference, Pisa (Italy) The University of Pisa (Italy) 6–8 September 2007 Deadline for paper proposals is 1 May 2007. Please visit: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/generalconference/pisa/callfor.aspx
2008 Joint Sessions, Rennes (France), April 2008 Deadline for applications is 16 February 2007. Deadline for workshop proposals is 14 February 2007. General information is available at http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/index.aspx 2nd ECPR Graduate Conference in 2008 Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona (Bellaterra campus) 25–27 August 2008
2009 Joint Session, Lisbon (Portugal), 14-19 April 2009. Further information, including exact dates, will be available in due course.
2009 General ECPR Conference, Postdam (Germany), 10–12 September 2009 Further information, including exact dates, will be available in due course.
International Sociological Association (ISA) – Sociology Conferences For ISA events see the following web site: http://www.ucm.es/info/isa/cforp0.htm
European Sociological Association (ESA) — Conferences For ESA events see the following web site: http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/esa/conferences.htm Although the submission deadlines for the following items have already lapsed, there might be some interest in attending the events below or in following up presented papers.
“Responding to Genocide before it’s too late: Genocide Studies and Prevention” The International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) 7th Biennial meeting Institute for Research into Crimes against Humanity and International Law, University of Sarajevo 9–13 July 2007 Please note that only paid members of IAGS may present papers. For information on membership, please contact the IAGS Secretary-Treasurer, Professor Steven Jacobs, at:
[email protected] 2007 European Congress on “Transcending Europe’s Borders: The EU and Its Neighbours” Humboldt University (Berlin, Germany), 2–4 August 2007. Please visit: http://www.iccees-europe.de/
37th UACES Annual Conference on “Exchanging Ideas on Europe 2007: Which Common Values, Which External Policies?” Centre for European and International Studies Research, University of Portsmouth (UK), 3–5 September 2007. For further information, please visit: http://www.uaces.org
European Sociological Association (ESA) 8th Conference on “Conflict, Citizenship and Civil Society” Glasgow (UK) 3–6 September 2007. For further information, please contact
[email protected] giving your name, address an contact email. Alternatively, please visit http://www.esa8thconference.com/
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Beyond the Nation: Critical Reflections on Nations and Nationalism in Uncertain Times Queen’s University, Belfast (UK), 12–14 September 2007. For more information, please visit: http://www.qub.ac.uk/pisp/NewsandEvents/ Making Sense of a Pluralist World: Sixth Pan-European Conference on International Relations University of Turin, Italy, 12–15 September 2007. For further information, please visit: http://www.sgir.org/conference2007/index.htm Summer Academy on Political Consulting and Strategic Campaign Communication International University in Germany, Bruchsal 25th – 29th September 2007. For more information, please visit: www.political-campaigns.net The Economics of Corruption — University Training on Good Governance and Reform University of Passau, Germany 7th – 13th October 2007. This international event continues to be offered on a pro bono basis. It joins the world of research with the world of practice, attracting graduate and post-graduate students in the social sciences and anti-corruption policymakers and practitioners. The program consists of training modules, lectures, workshop sessions, case studies, and poster and keynote presentations. For applications and the full program please visit: http://www.icgg.org The Evolution of the European Courts: Institutional Change and Continuity 6th International Workshop for Young Scholars (WISH) 16th – 17th November, 2007, University College, Dublin (Ireland) The Workshop will take place over one and a half days. It will comprise six panels (two per half-day). Each panel will include approximately three presentations by young scholars. Another young scholar will serve as discussant. Each panel will be chaired by a senior scholar. Ample time will be left for discussion. The working languages are English and French. The costs of travel and accommodation (up to 2 nights hotel: Friday, Saturday) of paper-givers and discussants will be covered by the organisers. For further information, please visit http://www.ucd.ie/law/WISH.htm “Anthropology, Ethnography and Comparative Folklore of the Balkans” Summer School University of Ioannina, Greece 30th July – 10th August 2007 The summer school offers the following: — 1st Week courses: Anthropological theory and the understanding of the Balkans; Ethnography of “socially marginalized groups”: Theoretical and methodological approaches; Introduction to the study of oral tradition: Comparative method, fieldwork and ethnography; Ethnographic research in border areas: Field practice in both sides of the Greek-Albanian border; the migratory phenomenon: evidence and policies. — 2nd Week courses: The migratory phenomenon: evidence and policies; doing fieldwork in contemporary world: Epistemology of post-socialism in South Eastern Europe; Music and dance in the Balkans: Culture, identity, and power. Workshops: The Future of anthropology in the 21st century; Culture and space in anthropological perspectives. Guest lectures: The Future of anthropology in the 21st century; Sitting culture. For any further questions and clarifications regarding the Konitsa Summer School contact the School’s email address:
[email protected]
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ECPR Summer School in Methods and Techniques Ljubljana, Slovenia 22 July – 4 August 2007 Fifteen two-week courses will be offered, including the following: Mathematical concepts and formal modelling; Generating qualitative data: expert interviews and documentary sources; Crossnational survey design; Multivariate statistics; Multiple regression analysis; Ethnographic methods; Quantitative narrative analysis; Comparative research design and introduction to configurational comparative methods; Comparative historical analysis and case study design; Network analysis; Qualitative textual analysis; Web-based research methods; Time and sequence. The tuition fee for ECPR participants has been set at a flat rate of 590 Euro, with a 50 discount for those participants who register and pay before 1st April 2007. In addition to the above courses, we will also be offering some crash courses, beginning immedialy prior to the start of the summer school. The crash course tuition fee for ECPR participants is set at a flat rate of 200 Euro (please note that as places will be limited and priority will be given to those students who are attending the full two week programme). For further information, you can visit: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/summerschools/ ljubljana/index.aspx. Alternatively, you can also contact Emer Padden (
[email protected]). European Training Institute European Training Institute is the only training centre in Brussels offering a full range of programmes and seminars dedicated to European Public Affairs. European Training Institute programmes and seminars are fully interactive. They examine all aspects of Public Affairs management, the working of the European Institutions and the best ways of influencing their policies. For information on upcoming training programs in EU Public Affairs, please visit: http://www.eutraining.be
Internships in the Institutions of the European Union For information on internships, trainee ships and stages in EU institutions, please visit: http://www.delaus.cec.eu.int/employment/Internships_europe.htm
Calls for Papers, Articles, Submissions and Prizes “Much ado about nothing? The European Neighbourhood Policy since 2003” University of Nottingham, UK 25th – 26th October 2007 The organisers of this workshop invite paper proposals in three broad areas: What are the appropriate methods and theories for the study of the ENP? How does the ENP fit into the broader framework of the EU’s external relations and foreign and security policies? What are the achievements of the ENP to date, and how can we explain successes and failures in individual cases and of the policy more generally? Papers can be theoretical/conceptual in nature, and/or focus on one or more case studies. It is envisaged that selected papers will be published in an edited volume and/or special issue of a relevant journal. Proposals (to include a paper title and a 250 abstract of the proposed paper) should be submitted via email as MS Word attachment to Richard Whitman (
[email protected]) and Stefan Wolff (
[email protected]). Europe and Asia — between Islam and the United States The Lessons of Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Iran 5–7th December 2007 Melbourne, Australia Jointly sponsored by The Centre for Dialogue, La Trobe University; The Innovative Universities European Union Centre; Contemporary Europe Research Centre, University of Melbourne; Università degli Studi di Napoli “L’Orientale”, Naples, Italy; The Institute for Social
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Ethics, Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan; The Institute of International Relations, Warsaw University, Poland; The Cold War Studies Centre, London School of Economics (UK) 1) Conference Background This conference follows on from a number of other workshops and symposia that have been organised by the Centre for Dialogue in collaboration with other institutions in Europe and Asia. They form part of a larger research programme Europe and Asia between Islam and the United States: Politics of Transition. The question of Islam now rightly occupies centre stage in many discussions of contemporary international relations. Such discussion are of central importance for Europe, given its large Muslim minorities, its proximity to the Middle East, the cultural and political relevance of the Mediterranean for the whole of Europe, and the importance which the various conflicts occurring in different parts of the Middle East have assumed in relations between Europe, the United States, the world’s sole superpower, and the Middle East. For Europe the relationship with the Muslim world generally and with the Middle East and North Africa in particular has been a critical factor in its history. It remains just as pivotal today. Precisely the same issues apply to Asia: proximity to Muslim neighbours; presence of significant and growing Muslim minorities; alliance relationships with the United States, which have led junior partners to deploy troops in Iraq and or Afghanistan and to become involved in the ‘war on terror’; actual or potential vulnerability to terrorist attacks; varying degrees of dependence on Middle Eastern (Muslim) oil, especially in the case of Japan. A major debate is rapidly developing in Europe and Asia as to the long-term implications of these complex relationships. An important part of this debate bears upon Europe’s and Asia’s alliances with the United States and the extent to which Europe and Asia, two major centres of geopolitical gravity can forge a distinctive and constructive relationship with the Islamic World. The purpose of this conference is to create a productive encounter between leading European scholars and their counterparts in the Asia-Pacific region. Attention will focus on European perspectives and policies, informed and illuminated by comparison with Asian policies and perspectives. Comparative analysis will highlight the role of regional institutions, in particular the EU and ASEAN. This project is unique in the way it proposes to combine, and analyse the interaction of three key dualities: — the juxtaposition of the European and Asian experiences, with particular reference to the role of regional institutions; — the relationship between culture and religion on the one hand and geopolitics on the other; — the complex nexus between the domestic and international dimensions of conflict and dialogue across major religious and cultural traditions. These three dualities will play a critical part in shaping Europe’s and Asia’s future place in the world.
2) Call for Papers A Call for papers is now addressed to scholars and experts interested in considering any of the themes outlined above. Proposals should be received by 14 May 2007. Proposals should include: Title of proposed paper; 250-word abstract; Author’s name and institutional affiliation; One paragraph bio-note of the author. In line with the themes outlined above, proposals are encouraged to consider one or other of the following key questions: — To what extent have the conflicts in the Middle East and the ‘war on terror’ (and the underlying hostility of much of the Muslim world towards key aspects of US policy) impacted on Europe’s and Asia’s self-understanding of their place in the world? What have been the implications for transatlantic and transpacific alliances? — How have European and Asian regional institutions (as well as member states in the two regions) handled these conflicts, and with what impact on the development of regional approaches to foreign and security policy? — How have EU efforts to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy been affected by the tensions that have characterised the post-September 11 international environment? How have
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the Iraq, Afghanistan and other Middle East conflicts impacted on the EU’s internal and external relations? — What have been the implications for EU enlargement and for current negotiations regarding Turkish entry into the EU? — What has been the tenor of the responses of states, media, and the wider community in different parts of Europe and Asia to domestic and international tensions associated with these conflicts? To what extent and in what way have issues of culture and religion intruded into domestic politics and external policy making, and with what consequences? — How have post-September 11 tensions impacted on the role of Muslim minorities in Europe and Asia? To what extent, if any, have the EU and ASEAN been able to harmonise the responses of member states to these questions? — To what extent has the European Union and ASEAN (as well as other regional attempts at multilateralism) developed responses to terrorism that synthesise different areas of policy, including external relations, home security, immigration and refugee policy, citizenship and cultural policy? All applicants will be informed of the Organising Committee’s decision by 1 July 2007. Successful applicants will be given two weeks to confirm their participation. The Conference Organising Committee must receive by 1 November 2007 the written papers (approximate length 6,000 words), which have to represent an original contribution not published elsewhere. The Conference’s working language is English. Those selected to present a paper will not be required to pay the registration fee which will cover lunches, morning and afternoon teas and copies of papers. The Organising Committee is not able to provide support covering participants’ travel and accommodation expenses. Please submit paper proposals, preferably as a Word or Rtf document, together with full contact details to: Dr. Luca Anceschi, Centre for Dialogue, La Trobe University Victoria 3086 Australia Ph: +61 3 9479 2295 Fax: +61 3 9479 1997 Email:
[email protected]
Mechanisms of Religious Influence in Politics: Call for Chapters Edited by Paul A. Djupe, Denison University You are invited to contribute to a novel enterprise in the study of religion and politics: experimental tests of mechanisms of religious influence. Experimental work is widespread in the study of public opinion and voting behavior, but this method has not been adopted in the study of religion and politics. Experimental work can be employed effectively to assess the efficacy of cues, arguments, and imagery from religious figures and elected officials. When many of us often lament the fact that religion and politics scholarship has not been distinguished by broad theoretical progress, rigorous experimental work can help make a major contribution by narrowing the rangeof theories worth pursuing and opening up new ways of thinking about religious influence. Research to be considered for the volume should be original (not previously published). It must include some experimental manipulation that tests a mechanism of religious influence on public opinion or voting behavior. Ideally, research will focus on the effects of religion on contemporary attitudes, but all submissions will be considered. Additionally, multiple submissions are welcome. Included chapters need not be long (though they can be) nor must they include exhaustive literature reviews. The goal is to include many explorations to cover as many different types of questions as possible. I am ecumenical about the populations involved in the experiments, whether special populations (such as evangelicals, Catholics, and students) or the general population. If there is sufficient interest, I plan to submit full panel proposals to professional conferences (especially the WPSA and MPSA) to support development of this research. Chapters will be requested by the end of Summer, 2007. If you are interested, please contact me to discuss your design. Paul A. Djupe Associate Professor Department of Political Science Denison University Granville, OH 43023-0810 Phone: 740-587-6310 Fax: 740-587-6601 Email:
[email protected]
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Nations and Nationalism “Nations and Nationalism” is one of the world’s leading journals in the field of ethnicity, nations and nationalism. The journal publishes high quality and innovative political science research and is now seeking papers on the politics of ethnicity and nationalism. The journal encourages submissions based on research in every region of the world, as well as comparative and theoretical work. Articles for the journal should be addressed to: The Editors, Nations and Nationalism, Room H808, Connaught House, London School of Econonmics & Politics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK. Books for review should be sent to the Book Review Editor at the same address. Typescripts: Authors are required to submit four copies of their article, which should not be under consideration by any other journal. A copy of the article should also be retained by the author. Articles should be typed on white A-4 sized paper on one side only and should be double spaced throughout, including notes and list of references. All pages, including notes, references and tables, should be numbered. In order to meet the criterion of anonymity we would strongly advise authors not to refer to themselves by name in the text of their submission. A statement of the author’s title and position, as you would wish them to appear in the list of contributors, along with a brief summary of your recent work and research in progress should be typed on a separate sheet. An abstract of 100–150 words should also be typed on a separate sheet.Authors must also include a copy of the article on a 3.5 in. floppy disk (IBM-PC formatted), preferably in Microsoft Word. Length: Articles should not exceed 9000 words (including Endnotes and References), 3000 for Review Articles and 800 words for Book Reviews. The minimum length for Articles is 7000 words (including Endnotes and References). A word count must be provided in all cases. The Editors regret that articles and reviews over the stipulated word lengths cannot be considered. For further information, please visit: http://blackwellpublishing.msgfocus.com/q/12iaK8riaojhx/wv
UACES/Routledge Book Series on “Contemporary European Studies” Proposals are now accepted. The new UACES/Routledge book series, Contemporary European Studies, is inviting proposals for high quality research monographs in all sub-fields of European Studies. We are particularly keen to publish interdisciplinary research, but all proposals will be given serious consideration. For further advice and information, or to submit proposals, please contact one (or all) of the series editors: Tanja Boerzel (
[email protected]); Michelle Cini (
[email protected]); Alex Warleigh (
[email protected]).
Journal of Contemporary European Research (JCER) Submissions throughout the year The editorial team of the JCER would like to invite scholars and practitioners to submit their work for publication. The JCER is committed to promoting original research and insightful debate in European Studies. To this aim, it publishes full-length research articles (7000–8000 words) as well as shorter comment pieces (3000–5000 words) in the fields of European politics, law, economics and sociology. JCER aims to provide a forum for emerging scholars of European Studies by allowing them to present their ideas alongside those of more established academics and practitioners. Therefore, contributions from PhD students in the advanced phase of their doctoral research, post-doctoral students, as well as the wider academic and practitioner community are encouraged. The journal is published biannually in May and November. Please note that the closing date for submissions for November issue was 30 June 2005. The contributions should be emailed to the Editor, Lars Hoffman (
[email protected]). Should you want to review books in your area of expertise, please send an email to Stijn Billiet (
[email protected]) with your name, institutional affiliation, position and up to three areas of expertise, and you will be included in the JCER pool of experts. Further information as well as guidelines for authors are to be found on our web site: http://www.jcer.net
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European Journal of Political Research Submissions throughout the year. The European Journal of Political Research, published by Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), would like to invite scholars and practitioners to submit their work for publication, or offer their services as reviewers. Potential author and referees are welcome to register at http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ejpr For further details, please visit: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0304-4130/
Masters in Peace and Socioconflict Studies International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), ANU (Canberra), and Bjørknes College (Oslo) Rolling Application Deadline A joint exciting postgraduate degree program in international relations specialising in peace and conflict studies. This innovative program brings together academics at the forefront of international relations, peace and conflict research from two sides of the globe. For further information, please visit http://www.prio.no/education/australia/
Master in European Economy and International Finance The University of Roma, Italy. The purpose of the Master is to fulfill the demand of expertise which comes from: Public national and local Administrations subject to European directives and recipient of resources from the European Union; Firms which operate in the real and financial sectors of the economy, interested in the incentive and regulatory policies of the European Union; International and European institutions with a focus on European affairs and directives. The program is full-time and lasts one year. It is divided into two terms. Classes are taught in English. For further information, please visit: http://www.economia.uniroma2.it/MEEFI/
NOHA: Joint European Master’s in International Humanitarian Action Application Deadline: 13th December 2007 The Joint European Master’s in International Humanitarian Action is an inter-university, multidisciplinary postgraduate programme that provides high quality academic education and professional competencies for personnel working or intending to work in the area of humanitarian action. This European Master’s Degree was created in 1993 as result of concerted efforts on the part of the Network on Humanitarian Assistance (NOHA) Universities, working in close collaboration with two Directorates-General of the European Commission: DG for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) and DG for Education and Culture. The initiative was a response to a growing need for higher educational qualifications specifically suited to addressing complex humanitarian emergencies. In September 2004, the European Commission awarded the NOHA Master’s the status of an Erasmus Mundus Programme. The latter is a co-operation and mobility programme in the field of higher education that promotes the European Union as a centre of excellence in learning around the world. It provides EU-funded scholarships for a limited number of outstanding third-country nationals participating in Erasmus Mundus Master’s Courses. In 2005, NOHA was awarded by the European Commission Erasmus Mundus Partnerships Programme in order to establish and develop a framework for cooperation and student and scholar mobility between the NOHA institutions and the following partner universities: Monash University (Australia), Universidade de Brasilia (Brazil), York University (Canada); Universidad Javeriana (Colombia), Universitas Gadjah Mada (Indonesia), Université Saint-Joseph de Beyrouth (Lebanon), University of the Western Cape (South Africa), and Columbia University (United States). Third country scholarships are available: http://www.nohanet.org/online.aplication.asp For further information, please visit: http://www.nohanet.org/ EU Immigration and Asylum Policy Certificate Brussels University, Belgium 2nd – 13th July 2007 After five years of successful experience with a summer school, the Odysseus Network has decided to create a one year certificate in European Law on Immigration and Asylum. The aim of
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this new programme is to provide its participants with an in-depth understanding of the legal rules on immigration and asylum adopted by the European Union. The courses will also have a comparative dimension and cover the internal laws of the Member States, in particular the way they transpose EU directives. This programme will be of interest to all persons who wish to acquire a special knowledge in immigration and asylum law, for instance civil servants, advocates or persons working for NGOs, and in particular researchers, PhD students and other students, who frequently confront the complex legal dimension of immigration and asylum in their work or studies. This programme is organised by the “Academic Network for Legal Studies on Immigration and Asylum in Europe” founded in 1999 with the support of the Odysseus Programme of the European Commission and co-ordinated by the Institute for European Studies of Brussels University (ULB). The course provides the opportunity to live in a unique European environment, with instructors coming from academic institutions in many different Member States as well as from the EU institutions, and to take part in an intellectually stimulating experience as part of a group of 30–40 participants specialising in the area of immigration and asylum with different backgrounds from all over Europe. Professional networking within and outside this group will be encouraged by the organisers. For more information, please visit: http://www.ulb.ac.be/assoc/odysseus/
Call for PhD Students, Masters of Science and Executive Masters Politecnico of Turin, Italy Applications Ongoing The Politecnico of Turin we have now 1.600 foreign students (about 6% of the total), but our dream is to reach the 10% (al least!). Since Monday March 19 we opened the new section of our web site (www.polito.it) for the on line applications of new foreign students for the academic year 2007/08. Please check it and send the information to your friends in Italy and around the world to promote the Politecnico di Torino. I really hope to have more and more “excellent foreign students” studying in our School. The call is for Bachelor, Master of Science, PhD and Executive Masters students and we offer a good school, student residences, financial support, and courses in English, a good environment, a “warm and beautiful city” and many friends coming from 89 different countries!
Institute of Advanced Studies, Vienna (Austria) The Department of Political Science at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna is offering a 3-year postgraduate course in European Integration starting October 2007. The programme aims to provide advanced training in political science and qualitative and quantitative research methods. A special emphasis is put on European integration studies. The core of the programme consists of intensive seminars conducted by internationally renowned visiting professors and members of the department. Students enrol at universities as doctoral candidates and are also expected to pursue their dissertation. This is a full-time course and attendance at the IHS is required. We offer a cooperative environment, office space, an excellent library, and other facilities. The course is taught in English and in German. Approximately 8 stipends can be awarded. For further information, please visit: http://www.ihs.ac.at/
Masaryk University (Czech Republic) Masaryk university, the second largest university in the Czech Republic, offers English-taught programs Sociology and European Politics. The quality of the program is class-world and the awarded Master degree is recognizable all over the world. Other advantages: there are small studentsgroups in the courses (the aim is to preserve individual approach to every student)and the tuition fee is very favourable. New students will be given a friendly welcome by other international students and the city Brno that is known as a cultural centre and a “students city”. Duration of both programs: 4 semesters Tuition fee: 960 Euro per semester, possibility of getting a scholarship Deadline: April–May (EU members) 2007 Information: Office for International Relations: Mgr. Veronika Gbov,
[email protected],
[email protected] Web-sites: http://www.fss.muni.cz/Eng
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Master Programme Politics in Europe — Interactions between Domestic and Supranational Arenas The University of Siena Info: www.gips.unisi.it/gradschool The courses offered will cover both a “Comparative politics” and a “European politics” perspective. The first approach focuses on similarities and differences among national political systems, while the second one on European institutions and decision-making processes. Activities such as meetings with national and international officers and policy makers, and visits to EU institutions, are also provided. A number of internships and stages at European and Italian institutions, during and at the end of the teaching programme, will be available. A study visit to the European and international institutions in Brussels is regularly organized at the end of the courses. The programme is entirely offered in English. Applications should normally be received by July 30th. The fee is set in euro 3.500. Enquiries: Silvina Cabrera (tel. + 39 0577 235311; mail:
[email protected]) Scotland Scholarship Are you a permanent resident of China, India, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand or Singapore who would like to study for a Masters in Scotland? The Scottish International Scholarship Programme is targeted at graduates in science, technology and the creative industries, and aims to create lasting connections between Scotland and industry leaders and entrepreneurs across the world. It is supported by the Scottish Executive’s Fresh Talent initiative which aims to encourage bright, talented and hard-working individuals to live, work and study in Scotland. The programme is offering 22 scholarships for the academic year 2007/8 for courses at any Scottish higher education institution. The scholarship covers the tuition fees, return economy airfare and a living allowance. The course must be a Masters programme of not more than 12 months based in a Scottish institution during the academic year 2007/8. Priority will be given to courses in science and technology and the creative industries. For further information, please visit: http://www.scotlandscholarship.com/
Funding Opportunities for Masters Students Keele University, SPIRE: School of International Relations, Politics and Philosophy Applications are invited for a number of Bursaries for Masters students starting in September 2007, studying for one of our MA or MRes programmes: International Relations; Global Security; Diplomatic Studies; European Politics and Culture; European Environmental Politics and Regulation; Environmental Politics; Human Rights, Globalisation and Justice. Bursaries are worth at least the value of half of the fees and are open to home or overseas students. Students are expected to make a limited contribution (not more than 50 hours in the year) to work in the School. Applications should be made via the normal application process. Please see the School’s website for details: http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/spire. Enquiries can be made to the MA Programme Director, Dr. Helen Parr (
[email protected]), or to the MA Programme Administrator, Mrs. Kathryn Ainsworth (
[email protected]).
PhD Studentships in Politics at Manchester University Politics is one of Europe’s top centres for research and teaching, bringing together one of the largest groupings of politics staff in the UK and covering almost all areas of the discipline. In the 2001 Research Assessment Exercise, we secured a grade 5, thereby denoting international excellence. We also scored top marks of 24, in the most recent external evaluations of teaching, held in 2001. The Graduate Centre can offer PhD supervision in a range of areas and potential candidates should consult the following weblink for information about the application procedures http://www.socialsciences.man.ac.uk/politics/postgraduate/apply.htm
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If candidates wish to be considered for ESRC 1+3/+3 Quota and Open Competition Awards and AHRC Awards, they need to complete and submit an internal politics application form. The information on this form will provide the basis for selecting a shortlist of candidates who will be considered for Quota Awards and those who will be put forward to the ESRC or AHRC Open Competition. For further information, please visit: http://www.socialsciences.man.ac.uk/politics/ postgraduate/funding.htm
Masters Course in International Conflict and Co-operation Department of Politics, The University of Stirling (United Kingdom) For deadlines, please contact the program director. The Department of Politics in the University of Stirling has launched a new and exciting Masters course in the field of International Relations. The MSc in International Conflict and Cooperation is a taught post-graduate course focusing on the changing dynamics of conflict and cooperation after the end of the Cold War and 9/11. It is designed to meet the needs of policy practitioners, Chevening scholars as well as to provide students with adequate training before starting a PhD degree. Substantial components of the course include the themes of Conflict in the Balkans, Christendom vs. Islam, Conflicts in Independent Africa, EU-Russian Relations, Cyprus and International Relations. The two core modules are “International Conflict and Cooperation” and “International Organsiations”. The MSc has close links with the Centre for European Neighbourhood Studies (CENS) based in the Department of Politics. Attached to the Programme and the Centre is the reputable academic periodical, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans where students may be contributing with book reviews. For further information, please visit: http://www.external.stir.ac.uk/postgrad/course_info/arts/ politics/conflict-coop.php Alternatively, you can contact the program director, Dr Vassilis K Fouskas, via phone (+44 (0) 1786 467570) or via email (
[email protected]).
Masters Course in European Identities LSE European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science (London, United Kingdom) A new MSc degree in ‘European Identities’, started in September 2006, is provided by the European Institute at the London School of Economics from 2006/7. The degree programme is open to graduates across the humanities and social sciences. The programme offers students the opportunity to investigate a wide range of issues around the intersections of European society and identity. Students will be encouraged to engage with and to develop theoretical ideas and perspectives that relate to the various and often conflicting sources of European identity today. Further information on the programme, including module choices and entry requirements, please visit: http://www.lse.ac.uk/resources/graduateProspectus2006/taughtProgrammes/MSc EuropeanIdentities.htm (link to Graduate Prospectus) or http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/ europeanInstitute/study/InformationforProspectiveStudents/graduate_prog.htm (link to European Institute prospective student pages). For information on how to apply, please visit the LSE Graduate Admissions homepage: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/graduateAdmissions/
The Joint Academic Scholarship Online Network (JASON) Completely searchable, JASON is a national database of postgraduate scholarships. It includes a broad range of funding opportunities — from one-off payments for particular research projects, to full scholarships covering living expenses and fees. JASON is available at: http://www.jason.edu.au/
ASiE — Australians — Study in Europe! This web site is dedicated to making it easier for Australians to embark on postgraduate study in Europe. As well as providing a host of links to relevant web sites in Europe and Australia , ASiE
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also undertakes research and consultation with the EU Commission, European governments and a great number of universities and foundations. The aim is to produce and update as much as possible all information concerning grants and scholarships available to Australian students seeking to pursue doctoral studies in Europe. For further information and the database, please visit: http://www.asie.unimelb.edu.au The results of ASiE’s research on grants and scholarships are delivered into the Jason database with which this site is connected.
Postgraduate and PhD Positions, Postdoctoral Fellowships and Scholarships Visiting Scholar Office Space IERES, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. IERES are especially interested in encouraging scholars with Western European research agendas. In addition to the office comes telephone, computer and library privileges. The building is new, air conditioned, and located four blocks from the White House and walking distance from Washington’s elegant Metro. For further information, please contact Greg Zalasky, at
[email protected], or visit the IERES website, at www.ieres.org Post-graduate research studentship in EU law and governance. School of Law, University of Sheffield, UK For more information, please visit: http://jobs.ac.uk/jobfiles/ZE510.html
Europe Studies: Environment and Sustainable Development Doctoral Researchers Institute for European Studies (IES) at Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) The Institute for European Studies (IES) at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) intends to strengthen its research cluster on environment and sustainable development. It therefore calls for applications for two positions of full-time doctoral researchers. Final year students, young researchers and other prospective PhD candidates are herewith invited to submit project proposals in the area of Environment and Sustainable Development as it relates to European Studies. Project proposals by qualified PhD candidates should advance research in line with the IES research strategy that focuses on the EU in an international context. Research may focus on any relevant discipline (political science, law, economics, etc.) or be inter-disciplinary in approach. In order to ensure a disciplinary balance at the IES, we in particular wish to encourage applications by law students. The IES will consider any proposal that fits its general research strategy. The successful candidates will have a MA degree with good study results. They will be fluent in English and have a thorough knowledge of European policy and/or law. They will be selected on the basis of the quality of the project proposal and on the basis of their CVs. The successful candidates will receive a research grant for one year (extendable to 4 years). Prolongation of the contract is subject to the agreement of the doctoral committee. Remuneration is at the level of a full time research assistant at a Flemish university (i.e. approx. euro 1.500,00 net per month) and includes contributions for social security / insurance. Secondary employment is not allowed. Candidates will need to fill in and send the forms that are available from the IES website (www.ies.be) as well as a full CV, a list of publications, a detailed outline describing the research project (max. 10 pages!) and a copy of their most recent diploma. The IES requires that at least one (co)promoter of the project be from the VUB. The IES may assist successful candidates in finding a suitable (co-)promoter at the VUB. Co-promotership from other Belgian or foreign universities is encouraged. Successful candidates are expected to base themselves in Brussels and work at the IES. The deadline for applications: 31 May 2007 (for posts to be taken up as of 1 September/October). A list of exemplary research subjects that may qualify, further information on the IES research strategy and the relevant application forms are available at www.ies.be . Applications need to be addressed to: Institute for European Studies; The Academic Director; Vrije Universiteit Brussel; Pleinlaan 2; B-1050 Brussels (Belgium) or by email:
[email protected]
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MSc DEPARTMENTAL STUDENTSHIPS The Department is able to offer: Three Fee-Waivers (to cover the costs of full-time UK/EU or Overseas fees) Three Departmental Bursaries (£2,000 each for full-time students) The Department offers the following taught postgraduate programmes (both full-time and part-time): MSc Public Policy; MSc European Public Policy; MSc International Public Policy; MSc Political Research. Application details and further information on any of our courses/bursaries are available from: Fiona Macintyre, Postgraduate Administrator, Department of Government, University of Strathclyde, 16 Richmond Street, Glasgow, G1 1XQ email:
[email protected] 0141 548 2215 http://www.strath.ac.uk/government/
Job Vacancies Carleton University, Ottawa (Canada) Short term Visitor, 30th July – 13th August 2007 Applications ongoing until position filled. The Centre for European Studies at Carleton University (Ottawa) invites applications from European scholars for a short-term research-teaching visit to Carleton University. The visit is expected to be approximately 3 weeks in length, including the time period from July 30-August 13, 2007. The visitor will be expected to assist a Canadian course instructor in teaching a two week graduate module on policy issues in trans-Atlantic (Canada-EU) relations. Applied policy experience will be considered an asset. The visitor is also expected to give a public lecture at Carleton University. An allowance for travel costs, living expenses and a stipend will be offered. Applicants should be from EU member countries and should have expertise in European integration and the EU, and/or trans-Atlantic relations (EU-Canada). Applicants should send a curriculum vitae, letters from two scholarly referees (including email addresses), and a letter of application outlining your interest in the position. Consideration of applications will commence on February 22, 2007 and will continue until the position is filled. Please send materials to Prof. Joan DeBardeleben, Director, Centre for European Studies, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1S 5B6; fax (613)520-7501, or by e-mail to joan
[email protected]. This program is supported by a grant from the European Commission. Carleton University is committed to equality for women, aboriginal peoples, visible minorities, and persons with disabilities. Persons from these groups are encouraged to apply. Academic and Research Positions in the EU For information and new entries, please visit: http://www.academicjobseu.com/
The European Researchers’ Mobility Portal The European Commission’s “The European Researchers’ Mobility Portal” includes current grants and fellowships, research job vacancies — in the EU, at national as well as international level. It also provides practical information on the research activities of the EU (The European Research Area, Framework Progams, etc.) The portal is available at http://europa.eu.int/eracareers/index_en.cfm ECPR Research Market For information and new entries, please visit: http://www.ecprnet.org/researchmarket/search.asp
ANNOUNCEMENT — Living Reviews in European Governance (LREG) Living Reviews in European Governance is an entirely web-based, peer-reviewed journal, publishing reviews of research on core themes relating to European Governance. It is offered as a free service to the scientific community. The articles in LREG are solicited from specialists in their fields and are directed towards the scientific community at or above the graduate student level. The articles provide up-to-date critical
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reviews of the state of research in the fields they cover. They also offer annotated insights (and where possible, active links) into the key literature and describe online resources available in these fields. One of the most important features of LREG is that its articles are kept up to date by their authors. This is the significance of the word “Living” in the journal’s title. Additionally, all articles appearing in Living Reviews, and all references appearing in those articles, will be collated into an online searchable reference database. Queries to the database will return active links to cited materials available on the web. For the first edition and further information: http://europeangovernance.livingreviews.org/ European studies and research organizations European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Website: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/ European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Website: http://www.eustudies.org/ European Communities Studies association (ECSA) Website: http://www.ecsanet.org/ The University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) Website: http://www.uaces.org/
Europe Research Centres in Australia The Innovative Research Universities Network encompasses the following instituions: La Trobe (VIC) Macquarie University (NSW) Newcastle (NSW), Flinders (SA), Murdoch (WA) and Griffith in QLD. Monash European and EU Centre (Monash University) Website: http://www.monash.edu.au/europecentre/ Macquarie University: Website: http://www.pr.mq.edu.au/macnews/showitem.asp?ItemID=472 Latrobe University: Website: http://www.latrobe.edu.au/news/2006/mediarelease_2006-13.php Centre for European Studies (The University of Adelaide) Website: http://www.arts.adelaide.edu.au/humanities/euro Centre for European Studies (The University of New South Wales) Website: http://www.arts.unsw.edu.au/ces/CES_Web.htm Centre for Scandinavian Studies (Flinders University of South Australia) Website: http://www.ssn.flinders.edu.au/scanlink/index.php Contemporary Europe Research Centre / Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence (The University of Melbourne) Website: http://www.cerc.unimelb.edu.au/ The European Studies Centre (The University of Sydney) Website: http://www.arts.usyd.edu.au/departs/eurostudies/about.shtml The National Europe Research Centre (The Australian National University) Website: http://www.anu.edu.au/NEC/
CERC Bulletin The CERC email bulletin is a regular email newsletter (fortnightly during the academic year, monthly in vacation period) that keeps subscribers up-to-date about events and happenings relating to Europe at CERC and also around Australia and the world. The CERC bulletin lists upcoming seminars and conferences in all aspects of European Studies. It also lists calls for papers, publications, scholarships and job vacancies and any other news that may be of interest. Subscription to the CERC Email Bulletin is free! Simply email the following address
[email protected] with “subscribe” in the subject line. For further information, please visit: http://www.cerc.unimelb.edu.au/common/Emailbullinfo.htm
Directory of European Postgraduate Studies in Australia (DEPSA) DEPSA is an initiative of the Contemporary Europe Research Centre at the University of Melbourne. This Directory is one of CERC’s Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence projects. The
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purpose of DEPSA is to allow students, academics, and others, to see what postgraduate research relevant to Europe is being undertaken by students in Australia. DEPSA form: http://www.cerc.unimelb.edu.au/JM/DEPSAform.pdf For further information, please contact CERC (
[email protected]) or visit the CERC website: http://www.cerc.unimelb.edu.au/JM/DEPSA_hm.htm.
About the CERC Postgraduate Bulletin What is it? The CERC Postgraduate Bulletin is a new initiative, part of the Contemporary Europe Research Centre”s (CERC) “Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence” activities. It is designed to provide postgraduate students in Australia researching on European topics, broadly defined, with information specifically relevant to them. Who will be compiling the Postgraduate Bulletin? The CERC Postgraduate Bulletin is compiled by the postgraduate community based at CERC (The University of Melbourne). How often will it be produced and distributed? A new issue will be produced approximately once a month. What kind of information will it contain? The aim of the CERC Postgraduate Bulletin is to keep you up-to-date on relevant postgraduate events and news. The Postgraduate Bulletin will inform you of any opportunities (both academic and otherwise) in your field for: postgraduate workshops and major conferences; calls for papers and articles; news items on joint projects and research as well as employment and funding opportunities. How to unsubscribe: The CERC Postgraduate Bulletin is being distributed widely to peers and academics on the current “CERC Bulletin” email list. If you wish to be removed from the CERC mailing list, please send a reply e-mail to CERC at
[email protected] with the subject line “unsubscribe Eurograd”. How to subscribe: For those not already on the “CERC Bulletin” email list, you can subscribe by email to CERC at
[email protected] with “subscribe Eurograd” in the subject line. Please note that the CERC Postgraduate E-Bulletin is a separate and additional source of information to the CERC Bulletin and is posted to the one address list. More information about CERC can be found on our website: www.cerc.unimelb.edu.au Submitting items for the Postgraduate Bulletin The CERC Postgraduate Bulletin welcomes submissions from academic departments, cultural bodies and research institutes, and postgraduate students on items listed above. Please send your brief submission in the body of the email, to:
[email protected] with “submission postgraduate” in the subject line – please do not send attachments. Please use the following structure in your email submission: TYPE OF ITEM: conference, call for papers, employment opportunities, grant etc. NAME: title of conference/workshop/journal/ organisation/institution etc. TIME: date of event or deadline for submission/application/registration. BRIEF OUTLINE (up to 100 words): description of event/opportunity, including themes of conference, eligibility of application, funding opportunities, reviewing process, etc. NAME AND ADDRESS OF CONTACT PERSON: for further information. WEBSITE: if any applicable, for further information, links to registration forms etc. Compiled by: Alistair D. B. Cook. Eurograd Editor, Contemporary Europe Research Centre, University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia. Telephone +61 (0)3 8344 0997. Email
[email protected] Philomena Murray (Assoc Prof) Jean Monnet Chair ad personam Director
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Contemporary Europe Research Centre Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence T: + 61 3 8344 5151 F: + 61 3 8344 9507 E:
[email protected] W: www.cerc.unimelb.edu.au Leslie Holmes (Prof) Deputy Director Contemporary Europe Research Centre Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence T: + 61 3 8344 7293 F: + 61 3 8344 9507 E:
[email protected] Alison Lewis (A/Prof.) Deputy Director Contemporary Europe Research Centre Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence T: + 61 3 8344 5103 F: + 61 3 8344 9507 E:
[email protected]
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The production of this bulletin is financially supported by the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence.
BOOK REVIEWS
Francesco Guida Storia d’Europa nel XX secolo. Romania, Edizioni Unicopli, Milano, 2006 Di solito, gli storici occidentali quanto scelgono di trattare la storia dell’Europa Orientale prendono in considerazione alcuni modelli del ovest e poi per dare la sensazione del espansione del discorso storico, fanno dei riferimenti riguardo alla storia dalla Russia, assai importante per non essere se non analizzata, almeno menzionata. L’Europa Centrale e Sud-Orientale sono viste come continuità della zona d’espansione russa, oppure imitatrici poco felici e poco riusciti di alcuni modelli occidentali. Cosi si fa che sull’Europa Orientale la preoccupazione della storiografia è poco significativa e di una debole consistenza. Ci sono stati pero, fortunatamente, anche dei storici occidentali che esaminarono questi spazi considerati creatori di storia europea e fonti per la propria produzione storiografica. Ricordiamo tra questi che ebbero particolare riguardo sulla storia della Romania: ...Francesco Guida si distingue tra questi. Innanzitutto perché, conoscitore di magiaro, bulgaro, romeno, russo è stato in grado di conoscere in originale tanti lavori dei storici dell’Europa Orientale e tanti storici della regione. Inoltre ha scritto studi di riferimento riguardo i popoli della zona. Di conseguenza, egli sì che è in grado di fare dei paragoni, può utilizzare con successo il metodo comparativo, esenziale nel caso della storia europea, una storia delle diversità. Suo recente volume — Romania — riconferma la capacita e la polivalenza dello storico Francesco Guida. Sua opera si basa sulla storiografia romena oppure estera sulla Romania, pero, alla stesso tempo, o addirittura dinanzi a tutto sulle ricerche originali dell’autore. Cosi si spiega che questo libro e’ un alternanza continua tra la narrazione e la riflessione storica. Francesco Guida interroga il materiale storico a sua disposizione, sono delle incessanti interrogazioni. E le risposte che ci da vengono inquadrate sia alla sua preparazione di storico occidentale, sia alla sua qualità di acuto osservatore della storia dei romeni e dei popoli vicini ad essi. Nemmeno lui riesce sfuggire alla tentazione di osservare più le contraddizioni della storia dei romeni che la sua continua evoluzione nel trovare un’identità propria. Le contraddizioni esaminate da Guida sono tante e in tanti campi: “la democrazia in questa storia fu sempre una democrazia guidata, mimata”; “la modernizzazione fu e rimase incompiuta, parziale”; “i partiti politici non hanno chiarito fino in fondo la loro personalità (eccetto le estremi, sia di destra, sia di sinistra)”; “le riforme non sono state finalizzate”; “le minorità ebbero un ruolo troppo significativo, lasciando in secondo piano la manifestazione della maggioranza”; “i fattori esterni hanno avuto un peso eccessivo nella storia dei romeni” ecc. Tutto ciò sono invero delle realtà nella storia dei romeni. Pero il loro peso non può prevalere nella caratterizzazione d’insieme del corso della storia dei romeni. Per esempio, il periodo fra le due guerre, fu in maniera più che evidente un periodo delle contraddizioni social-economici, politici e culturali, ma allo stesso tempo ha dimostrato chiaramente che lo stato romeno, reso integro dopo il 1918, era una soluzione viabile. I successi sono più evidenti che le contraddizioni. Francesco Guida porta dei punti di vista molto interessanti in tanti argomenti presi in dibattito. Leggendo questo libro, ho ripreso la mia breve storia dei romeni, arricchendola e dandogli delle nuove sfumature, inspirate dalle sostanziose opinioni emesse da Guida. A volte credo che quando scrisse suo libro Francesco Guida ha pensato anche me. E per questo gli sono grato. Il modo in cui scrive Guida è molto chiaro e attraente, è lo scrivere di un vero intellettuale. Non so quanto successo ebbe il libro in Italia, ma in Romania la sua pubblicazione (imminente, anche se un po’ in ritardo) sarà un sorpresa estremamente piacevole soprattutto per i giovani lettori.
Ion Bulei
Constantin Nica Liberalismul din România — Teorie ºi practicã (vol. I and vol. II), Editura Institutului de ªtiinþe Politice ºi Relaþii Internaþionale, Bucureºti, 2005, vol. I 338 pag., vol. II 349 pag. Organized after the principle of making one clearly analyses on the point of view of the Romanian liberalism, volumes I and volumes II of the study Romanian Liberalism — Theory and Practice, is concentrated in establishing this construction theoretical and practical in the germs substance, meanings and evolution of the Romanian political liberalism. Clearly apart from the canonical approaches, partial and braking up the Romanian liberal phenomenon, the work of Constantin Nica is focusing in recreating the Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., IV, 1, p. 185–200, Bucharest, 2006.
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liberalism following a new perspective that of a historical and monographic description, based on practical researches in the field of the liberal politics, truly active in promoting the Romanian modernism. Linking to the liberal politics the fundamental moments of the Romanian social and political profile, Constantin Nica is taking as a first idea of the study Romanian Liberalism — Theory and Practice, the fact that the liberalism, from the Reigns devoted to the request of the social modernism and to establish an equal line with the Occident — evolved and maturely consecrated the usage of the aristocracy searching the key to modernize Romania, pleading for a dynamic rhythm, with the purpose to reflect the idea of cultural, political and economical integration of the Romanian territory. Following the same perspective as that from the first volume of Constantin Nica, the use of various social and political works will represent the most frequent and fundamental example of the liberal action. Taking and evaluating the substance and the meanings of the papers exposing fundamental theoretical ideas over the modern society, reformatting political programs (revolutionary proclamations, petitions for right, modern/European laws, Constitutions, projects constitutions, projects for social organizations, memories with political-social essence, programs to modernize economy memories to the greatest countries, request political skit, explanatory pamphlets, social and political press, literary works), are responding to the final decision, taken by Constantin Nica, that of considering that “Romanian liberalism was born, evolved and was present in social and political decisions in the XIXth century, around 1820 and towards 1890, starting from the analysis of the degree of social development of the country of the terms of civilization and from the need to left behind the old structure and social relations, to need to conserve and give a solid base to the relations with more developed countries on the continent” ( Nica, Constantin, Romanian Liberalism — Theory and Practice, vol. I, p. 261). With the mention that such a construction will not make invisible the obvious powerful contrast between new developments of a crucial significance in a special case those from the field of public administration (introduced with the Organic Regulations) and the persistent oriental tradition, phenomenon existing towards the period between the two important wars. Let’s not forget the fact that after the administration union of the Reigns in 1862, we can notice the fragment between the liberals. The phenomenon is more obvious in the Romanian Country where “the reds” led by C.A. Rosetti and Brateanu, organized in centre and committees, grouped in clubs and societies from towns and boroughs use modern methods to promote the liberalism, directing to this purpose the journal “The Romanian”. The result: crucial concentration of the liberal aristocracy into a liberal party. Such a procedure is characterized by Constantin Nica though the call of the typical/specific marks that will separate, apparently in conciliatory, the classic liberalism from the mature one establishing that the later one wore the symbol of the most important cultural and political elite exponents and of the ideologists and enterprisers, being young “bonjurnists” of 1848, the grown ups in the rich decade of the grate reform, the “gray-haired” (1877–1878) of the ones who have reached the eternity. Avoiding choosing for a study that would represent the recognition of the collocation liberal elite, the study Romanian Liberalism — Theory and Practice approves that the point of the confrontation used the first Romanian modernism (Matei Calinescu insisted on the idea of modernism/emancipation as a constructive confrontation between the enterprising spirit that was theorized by Max Weber and traditionalism!) is upheld by the idea of connecting it at the European model. This is marked by capitalism assumed as a continuous rational step, always renewed by lucrativeness. The liberals accepted it though the angle of the reforming project, while the conservatives were receiving it carefully worried because of the background’s annihilation and because of the dissipation of national identity. It must be mentioned that the liberalism represented in that period of time a summary of the reforming elites’ ideas in the period of Organic Regulations of the ideology of reforming elite from 1848 and of the much more radical aspirations from the end of the 1850s and the beginning of the 1860s. Such a general look on the genesis, recognition, specific features and foreign cultural inflations, allows Constantin Nica to focus on a positive finding: traditionalism coexisting with the modern mutations that happened on the economical and political plan at which is added the occidental importation, separating for good the Romanian space from this traditional architecture and naming him though clues like: liberalism in the phrase of social theory regarding emancipation, liberalism from the Principalities — genesis and founders; the ’48 movements the foundation of modern society and liberalism seen as an original structure on one side and on the other one, sub missed to the western influence. Without assuming any historical “theoratisation” the first volume of the Romanian Liberalism — Theory and Practice wants to harmonize the “didacticism” perspective with “theoretical application” belonging to liberalism, succeeding in being more an introduction than a contribution to the establishment of the liberalism’s merits in causing the unleash of the Romanian modern phenomena according to the European rhythm and caught inside its Zeitgeist. The second volume proposes/asks for the prolonging of the emancipation idea of political institutions in Romania Principalities, based mainly on the liberalism’s view over democracy parliamentary-representative.
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In this purpose Constantin Nica tries to mix together the political-social works of the liberal elite of the XIX century with the “century spirit”, the Romanian democracy parliamentary-representative drew out his ideological, axiological and institutional mark from the political regimes from the Occident. The theoretical structure of the Romanian Liberalism — Theory and Practice (second volume) is organized around the experience of Romania’s political emancipation, as the engine unlashed between 1821–1848, devoted in 1858–1866, confirmed though the peculiarities of genetic nature, found functionally and dynamically at the level of liberal democratic system in Romanian Principalities and later in Romania between 1821–1822 until the Parliamentary system’s crush in 1938 at 11 February. The detailed study on liberalism and democracy parliamentary representative allows Constantin Nica to state that the symbol for Romanian modern space with which the parliamentary democracy was to develop, replacing the old political institutions reconsidering the position of the autocratic possessive and by giving new politic roles to the lower classes and to the people. By setting the concept of liberal elite, Constantin Nica, establishes that such a concept becomes justified thought the phenomena of socialization of power, though the appearance of the “centers of political decision”. Avoiding any possible derailment in the contention of the liberal elite, the main aim of the study of Romania liberalism is to reveal the phenomenon of their programmatic implication in history. The structure of the Romania up-to-dateness including the agonic and constructive conflict between the tradition and the new, will be supported, politically speaking, by the confrontation between the traditional elites and the modern, progressive elite, confrontation that will have as background the changes of the “go on”. But we should not forget that we cannot talk about compromise/imitation, but rather about an organic natural process, in which the Romanian elite will be compelled by the oppression (historical, political, economic oppression). If the 19th century has settled the practical concept of elite of the power — as liberal prodemocratic elite — the liberal state will name the people as the possessor of the power. With the mention that that the essence of the parliamentary democracy was to be found in authority and legitimacy, as main features of the will of the people, setting a new image of the political order, the liberalism proposed “the best way of governing in the 19th century, causing a series immediate and future mutations and in the spirit of its lacks, it proved to be the best way of all the ways of governing favorable for the creation of the political and national ideal of Romanian people, is to say that of the a better administration of the emancipation” (Constatin Nica, Romanian Liberalism — Theory and Practice, volume II, p. 16). Consciously analyzed, the liberal Romanian democracy required the getting over of same natural phases, mentioned in the second volume of the study Romanian Liberalism — Theory and Practice. Beginning, thought the 19th century in Romania, the modern democracy has functioned as an aristocratic democracy, and the right to be chosen and to occupy the main function/offices in state was designed to the favored, the owners of wide agrarian lands, the merchants, and the owners of industrial trades. Such a “censitory scheme” succeeded in changing the criterion of the access to the public life and especially to power, with new political elites associated wealth with an attested aptness. In these historical and political coordinates, the democracy represented by the Parliament functioned and developed up to the end of the First War World, being conditioned by the request that the Romanian model offered in a contact in which the “culture of freedom” wasn’t present yet and the function and the aim of the middle and intermediate classes weren’t finished actions. In the first part of the 20th century, the political class, generally and the cultural elite, especially will act in order to change the practices of the “aristocratic democracy” with generalized political participation and the active implication of “intermediate categories” (Constatin Nica, Romanian Liberalism — Theory and Practice, volume II, p. 314–315). According to these ways studying the problem, the characteristics of the Romanian modernism would be related to elements such as: the victory of the bourgeoisie, industrialization, rationalization and utilitarianism. On these conditions we can talk about a dual conflict: modernism (understood as aesthetic of the daily life, manifested though refinement, contemplative values, elitism) and/or up-to-dateness as pragmatic attitude, rationalism, lucidity, financial approximation, solid sentiments but in connection with earth, caress of the sublime, cynicism. So by up-to-dateness we understand the Romanian political space, as a dual relationship in which the autonomy and the self creation of the individual, the projection realized in complete freedom are more important. Focusing on the ingredients of formation of the Romanian modernism Constantin Nica’s study Romanian Liberalism — Theory and Practice wants to find out up to what extend we can talk about a direct “plunge” of our transition towards “a new and original modernism” (settled yet according to Sorin Alexandrescu in the collocation “original democracy”), proposing either the direct assimilation of the results of the Western modernism, or a reference of the Romanian society, though a residual identification of this backgrounds.
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In what concerns our up-to-dateness, liberalism and modernism are also 2 norms that modernism creates new fix rules (of cultural and political values!) in which more important is the trust in the institutional structure and in the impersonal procedures and which functions according to the logic of the effectiveness of a collective mechanism. So the revolving strategy of the big parties (liberal and conservator) was also a partisan way to evaluate any political, social and economical attitude though the articulation of some admissible information or though the elimination (by means of a hidden censorship) of the rival speeches.
Viorella Manolache
Tendinþe actuale în filosofia politicã, Editura Institutului de ªtiinþe Politice ºi Relaþii Internaþionale, Bucharest, 2006, 300 p. Analysing the major tendencies of the political philosophy of the last decades, the volume Tendinþe actuale în filosofia politicã (Current Tendencies in Political Philosophy) proposes a reading that scientifically spreads over the “geography” of the contemporary political philosophy with a twofold movement: of panoraming and of analysing, by means of permanent connections and references to moments of political philosophy — studies that beyond assuming a mere statute of “table of hierarchies” are critical, participative insights, into the contemporary political repertoire. Such a systematic approach insists upon regaining the paradigms of the contemporary political philosophy, setting out distinct reference points in “equations”, until recently considered theoretically duplicitous, liberalism vs. libertarianism, philosophic comunitarianism, conservatism, the New Right Wing, “ethic” socialism. By placing the analysis in a contemporary philosophical and political area it points out a transparent framework, marked by the critical expansion of the protester political theories and ideologies: feminism, ecologism, populism and neopopulism. The constant references to acknowledged studies of the philosophy of European Integration, to economic analysis of the political phenomenon and of the present-day philosophy concerning the political-ethical ratio, open, pluralistic, pluridisciplinary crossings with simultaneous political implications, designating a strategy for a correct investigation of the political philosophy and of its alternatives. The volume Current Tendencies in Political Philosophy unravels the major themes of the contemporary political and philosophical investigation and warns over the epiphenomenon of the contemporary political philosophy, confining itself to draw attention on two “events” engaged in a “twofold entrance” analysis report: the balancing of the well-known paradigms of political philosophy and refocusing of the reflexive dimension of the new ones. Denying themselves the status of “etiquette” for the diagnosis of a developing political reality, the studies in this volume propose a new, dynamic way of reference to the political “signs”, through their “other contextualization”, as a solid “system of transmission”, with verified plans and attentively theorized angles of analysis. An approach to synthesizing and systematizing, the volume Current Tendencies in Political Philosophy builds up a heterogeneous mixture of styles and visions, recovering its homogeneity on the strict level of discourse, each nodular subunit study, leaving the impression of an autonomous functioning, with its specific, particularized rhythm of presentation, designation and analysis. Gabriela Tãnãsescu notified in “foreword” that this study’s intention was not to conceptually exhaust the themes of the present political philosophy, but to render its thematic nuclei, relevant not only for the theoretical dimension of the contemporary political reflection, but also for the complex manner of influence on the present-day political life. In an approach that nourishes the avoidance of “inventorying” the specific marks of present-day political philosophy — the studies are not blocked up in an utilitarian intention but they indicate and organize the functionalities of political philosophy, as long as the glosses concerning this theme are still dominated by the hypothesis of political functioning- as a closed system, thickened by structuring schemes. Encouraged by John Rawls’ endeavour in “A Theory of Justice”, drawn upon by some rebirth experiences of the liberal philosophy and of the last decades’ political philosophy, the studies gathered in the volume about Current Tendencies in Political Philosophy encourage the understanding of the new political philosophy’s construction, drafting its strong directions, promoting and affirming new theories. Lorena Pãvãlan Stuparu’s study, The Philosophy of the European Integration as a Pluridisciplinary Reflection. Conceptual and Discoursive Framework, opens the collective volume, (re)building the concept of the European integration as a “metaphysical” discourse alternative, by valorising her multiple economic, judicial, political sciences, anthropological and cultural approaches. Such an approach is doubled by the interpretation of the integration project as a dynamic, normative and prospective, philosophic-political, identity and citizenly imperative. Such an approach places us on the theoretical dimension of a Europe united by its former construction, on one side, and by its present-day notes of political reflection, on the other.
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Marking the difference between the present relevant modes of an attempt to theorize the role of morality in politics and in political decision, Adela Deliu’s study, Ethical Foundations in Contemporary Political Thought, settles the signification of the connection between ethics and international political norms. This focus induces at the level of formal international decision, a determinant balance upon world order and upon the regulations of the balance between states, as well as the moral dilemmas associated with those international initiatives where responsibility is assumed at a declarative level. Ethics and Social Justice in the Political Philosophy of the Contemporary Social Democracy propounds the perspective of the role of social justice when “a crisis comes to an end” and the perspective of the decline of the “modernization” of socio-democracy after the failure of Marxism as well as of the Left Wing philosophy and political criticism. Gheorghe Lencan Stoica offers a new perspective on the Left Wing’s conception about the notion of social statute, doubled by its fundamental principles and values in the present-day context of the “complex society”. Grounding his study on the Liberal and Libertarian Perspectives in the American Political Thought, on the presentation of two “philosophical artificial means” intrinsic to a “pure contractual scenario”, Bogdan M. Popescu states that the theorizing of some notions like “the initial position” or “the veil of ignorance” are preceded by the explicit definition of the theory of justice from a deontological perspective. The study suggests a (re)conceptualization of the rawlsian theory, re-evaluating distinctions turned into present debates. Gabriela Tãnãsescu’s approach in The Political Philosophy of Communitarianism. The LiberalismCommunitarianism Dispute, subordinates itself to the idea according to which, communitarianism is diagnosed as a “therapeutic theory”, assuming the statute of the “alternative paradigm” of liberalism. In a theoretical approach, the study relies on the detailed presentation of the second wave of anti-liberalism, and on the genealogy and the redefinition of the communitarian meaning, placing this analytical approach under the sign of analicity, constructionism, relationism and interpretativeness, as a theoretical anchoring of this paradigm on the “map of liberalism”. In Tatiana Disparte’s opinion, the promotion of liberalism — in a traditional-liberal manner, triggers the sphere of differences — moral or social, the liberal tradition being unable to any longer represent the vital “technical support” for a “a vision that tries to preserve and defend the values of the past”. The study dedicated to the American Conservatorism foregrounds the reactivation of new forms of the American conservative space: traditional, economic, libertarian conservatorism, neoconservatorism, the religious and fundamentalist Right Wing. Making use of the same analytical system of the “conjunctions” — contradictions spotted in the area of the American and British conservatorism, Gabriela Tãnãsescu’s analysis dedicated to The New Right Wing and the British Conservatorism, grants the British conservatorism “with a gain”, by using social arguments, doubled by cultural, identity, family, moral risks, by the risks of affecting the British institutional heritage, of undermining the “tory paternalism”, specifying that these unstable marks are the natural result of the adaptation of communitarian traditions to the conditions of the inherent late modernity industrial society. Anchored to a recurrent background of analysis, Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban’s study — Current Modes of Challenging the Instituted Power. Feminism and Ecologism, places such an approach of analysis, in the weak context of postmodernism, as a way of reactivating and phagocytizing the marginal speeches, launched at the footlights of public opinion, as “forms to certify personal subjectivity”. Following the foulcaultian model, the study places these “soft ideologies”, in opposition with the “strong terms” permanently related to the conquering of the political power, to emancipation and complaint, in a philosophical-political framework, dislocated by its own ways of analysing the mechanisms of power. Rãzvan Pantelimon’s study places itself in the same manner of oppositional analysis, cantered on the concepts and practices of populism and neopopulism. These concepts are anchored in a theoretical system that constantly operates with terms like — the merits of the providential leader, anti-bureaucratic revolution, charismatic leader — concretely establishing their contesting nature and the attempt to reject the system and to circumscribe a crisis of the institutions — a sign of political decadence. The volume Current Tendencies in Political Philosophy concludes with Cristian Ion Popa’s study, as an economic perspective on the political phenomenon. Theoretically placing itself along the line of the concepts launched by James M. Buchanan or Anthony Downs, Cristian Ion Popa (re)launches theories like “the theory of public elections” and of their de-structuring role, “the common good”, “the people’s will-power” “political enterprise”, “competition for political leadership”, “the axiom of interest”, etc. Counterbalanced by the resurgent bifocal attitudes-a global vision vs. a particularising, local vision — the studies reunited in the volume about the Current Tendencies in Political Philosophy, are organized as signals of the philosophical-political projects, achieving a mediated reconciliation of the theory with its applied function. Closely interdependent, the two “signs” of analysis appear in the theoretical deconstruction and reconstruction of the new strategies of the contemporary political philosophy. This is not an exhausting philosophical-political strategy but an adequate one in order to reopen debates and to clarify the rhythm of the political philosophy in the present attempt to recover its conditions of legitimacy.
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Construction and deconstruction in American contemporary philosophy, Coord. Angela Botez, Aniºoara ªerban, Marius Drãghici, The Publishing House of the Romanian Academy, Bucharest, 2006 Preoccupied with drawing the “hard lines” of contemporary American philosophy, the volume Construction and deconstruction in American contemporary philosophy is tributary to the obvious intention to capture a structured image of the seven dimensions of American contemporary philosophy as “landmarks” for its possible positioning on the pragmatism-transcendentalism-consciousness philosophy-neopragmatism postmodern route. Such a reinstatement of the qualities of American contemporary philosophy becomes the demand of this volume, organised on the model of an objective and critical laboratory, dealing collaterally with the marginal attention given to the “made in USA” philosophy, unfairly ignored in Romania. The volume Construction and deconstruction in american contemporary philosophy mixes and thematises the decisive effects of American contemporary philosophy, depicting landmarks such as: Trends and currents in the American philosophy, Pragmatism and neopragmatism, The Philosophy of the mind, Logic and Philosophy of science, Postmodernism and hermeneutics, Perspectives in moral and social-political philosophy, Interdisciplinarity and communication According to the warning launched by Angela Botez, such an initiative is relevant both for the development of philosophic and scientific research, and for the socio-political evolution in Romania. The ideas of American contemporary philosophy can stimulate a philosophy based on pragmatism and efficiency, proposing a holist perspective that conceives of science, morality, religion and politics in close connection to liberalism and pragmatism as typical trademarks of human progress be it on a global or individual scale. According to the perspective brought forward by Angela Botez “for having an understanding of the perspectives comprising the contemporary American philosophic conceptions, it is necessary to know the real complexity of pragmatism and transcendentalism, following a holist route from Edwards to Dewey. The contemporary American philosophic conception does not impose the end of philosophy, but imposed pragmatism as public American philosophy”. The studies collected in the volume Construction and deconstruction in American contemporary philosophy hesitate, in a less than innocent manner, between theoretical and/or pragmatic commitments to a highlighting of the essential dimensions of American contemporary philosophy, premeditatedly giving the impression of a redistribution of the points of view launched by the Romanian authors, on the one hand, and by the American authors (in Romanian translation), on the other hand. The diagnosis and osmosis of the landmarks of American contemporary philosophy as operated by Mircea Flonta, Alexandru Boboc, Liubomira Miroº, Gabriel Nagâþ, Dan Laurenþiu Biºa, Viorel Pâslaru, Adrian Niþã, Bogdan Popescu, Eduard Barbu, Ilie Pârvu, Mircea Dumitru, Marius Drãghici, Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban, Vasile Morar, Victor Popescu, Eric Gilder, Vasile Macoviciuc, Viorel Miulescu sau Viorel Zaicu, sustained by the informal translation of American authors, illustrates not only the stage and the study of American contemporary philosophy but also the “strategy” of a systematic articulation and balancing of perspectives and dimensions in the American philosophical construction and deconstruction. Such a furthering of the American philosophic perspective distancing itself from any gratuitous, boring and mostly useless approach, since the volume is organised on the transtrav model (be it even a postmodern phenomenon!) as a successful attempt to pin down analytical perspectives simultaneously, while still keeping its real dimensions. The transplant of American contemporary philosophical ideas is, according to Angela Botez’s warning, filtering and signalling pragmatism and neopragmatism, like a post-surgery action towards the fundamental directions and the metamorphoses produced and proposed by James, Peirce, Dewey, Mead, Rorty, Putnam, Sellars, Searle, Paul de Man, Calvin O.Schrag, J.Sallis etc., etc. Initiated by texts signed by John Searle, E. McMullin, John Sallis, Barry Smith, Richard Rorty, Mircea Florian or H.R. Castaneda, chapter 1 brings forward a double perspective, detailing the inner mechanisms of the American philosophic route/direction, inspired both by the ancient Greek philosophic sources, and by the modern and contemporary European philosophic ones, by articulating existence and experience, in a context that invites discussions about phenomenology and liberal philosophy. The second chapter explores the American pragmatism and its transformations sustained through neopragmatism in the studies signed by Al. Boboc and Liuba Miloº. According to Gabriel Nagâþ, pragmatism relied on Empiricism as a philosophic landmark that influenced the whole modern era, Dan L. Biºa adding as an essential attribute of American pragmatism the notion of truth, while Viorel Pâslaru furthers the neopragmatic theme, as a notion situated on/within the co-ordinates of emergence. If chapter 3 focuses on aspects of the mind and consciousness (D. Rosenthal, Roy Sorensen, A. Niþã, Bogdan Popescu, Eduard Barbu), chapter 4 chooses studies that shed light on such notions as Logic and the Philosophy of science. Chapter 5 is dedicated to postmodernism and hermeneutics, investigating the hermeneutics’ relationship to the philosophy of science and the latter’s relationship to phenomenology as the effect of the crisis of
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rationality and of the subject. The landmarks of contemporary American postmodernism are analysed as related to Fukuyama’s demand, according to which “the postmodern type loads with the pragmatism and relativism specific to the analytic philosophy used for the latter half of the century, while the quasi-economic type meets the new premises of anthropology and sociology”. Such an analysis brings to the foreground the “problem of being” approached from the perspective of the articulating character of the ontological hermeneutic gesture. According to H.A.ªerban’s study, the interest American postmodernism takes in polymorphism and deconstruction explains, to a large extent, the inclusion of contemporary philosophy into the “continental philosophy” typology. While opting for an area of interest focusing on moral and socio-political philosophy, chapter 6 deals mainly with scientific image and the debates around it, such an approach giving Victor Popescu the opportunity to go into the details of American philosophy from a social-axiological standpoint. Chapter 7 emphasizes the interdisciplinary character of American contemporary philosophy, choosing to situate semiotics, the possible ontologies of subjectivity, of the end of history and of confrontation and dialogue within the global society, in a philosophical system open to such interdisciplinary landmarks. Delineating the seven qualities of construction and deconstruction in American philosophy the volume Construction and deconstruction in american contemporary philosophy limits itself to an analytical diagnosis of this continuum of American contemporary philosophy in its attempt to self-determination, the studies bringing to the foreground not so much the “clarifications” of such an attempt but a diagnosis of its trend towards postmodern deconstruction. The volume answers a so far unfulfilled challenge, that of looking, in a serious and uninhibited analytical debunking manner, at the landmarks of contemporary American philosophy, with its postmodern brand and particularities. The qualities of the new American philosophical paradigm are thought to be influenced by the ability of the American philosophical construction to decisively separate itself from the “exhausted philosophic models”, an attempt re-biographised and mapped out in the volume Construction and deconstruction in american contemporary philosophy. Face to face with each other, the studies/translations of the Construction and deconstruction in american contemporary philosophy volume outline within open analytical circuits a different perspective on American contemporary philosophy as a philosophical project full of retrieving conceptualisations and decisive experiments of distancing itself from modernity. Mention should be made that novelty and experiment are backed up by matching (and equally new) attempts of American contemporary philosophy to get free from the verdict of an eternal gap between itself and the European philosophic models.
Viorella Manolache
Mihai Dinu Gheorghiu Intelectualii în câmpul puterii. Morfologii ºi traiectorii sociale, Iaºi, Polirom, 2007, 353 p.1 The above mentioned book offers to readers the opportunity to confront themselves with what the author himself specified as: “the x-ray photograph from a sociological perspective of the successive transformations of the intellectuals as elite group in two societies of the ‘really existing socialism’, Eastern Germany and Romania, in the second half of the 20th century: relations with the main competing groups (the exile), as well as elaborated ideological codes for legitimating their power of representation” (the back cover). The author is convinced that the social history is the one that could solve the crisis of the sociology and history after 1989, which were reduced to “caricature representations of their own vocation: the first — reduced to the survey technique, and the second — reduced to searching the truth in documents from archives” (p. 11). That is why, based on his research of this issue, which covered a period of twenty years, Mihai Dinu Gheorghiu offers in a socio-graphical manner (of describing the institutions and biographies in the context of the theoretical analysis starting from concepts and hypotheses) a panoramic view of the problem of the staff and elite belonging to the ‘really existing socialism’, focusing on the formation of the party intellectuals and on the symbolic power and also on the writers’ political power. (This second aim of the book is connected to the author’s early preoccupations for literary criticism and interest for “the history of the fight of intellectuals for autonomy” (p. 11). These preoccupations lead him to research the sociology of intellectuals and culture). As a result, in the bulky Introduction about staff and elites, Mihai Dinu Gheorghiu describes the way in which the research began in Eastern Germany regarding the party schools as “schools of power” for the established nomenclature and party intellectuals at the same time, namely achieving “the specific
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1 Mihai Dinu Gheorghiu, Intelectualii în câmpul puterii. Morfologii ºi traiectorii sociale (The Intellectuals In The Field Of Power. Morphologies And Social Trajectories), Iaºi, Polirom, 2007, 353 p. (plus the bibliography 379 p.) References to this book — in the text.
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equivalencies between the cultural capital and the political one” (p. 15). The author starts from the assumption to analyse the concrete historical determination of theories and “fore-notions” of the domain, that is to say the “re-historicising of different concepts and theories” (p. 16). This methodological specification is even more important today when a tendency (of a neo-dogmatic Stalinism with a modified sign) to agree the selected data with the concepts which are considered as fixed and indubitably true in a trans-historical sense, namely reducing the concepts to the current mainstream clichés, still exists. In this sense, the introduction enumerates different historical schools which have interpreted — most of the times in a politicised manner –the age (“Totalitarianism” and “modernisation”, p. 20–22) and the phenomenon of party schools. One can note the empirical studies following “sociological” variables (the inverted commas belong to the author, p. 23) on the party staff, as well as the autobiographies and the bildungsroman of the staff, before and after 1989. What is important is, through referring to the most reliable bibliographic sources on this issue, the emphasis of the contradictions inside the analysed concepts: vanguards, elites, staff in relation with the class — or with the “popular classes” (p. 26) —, the fiction of the symbolic connection between caste and class, the domination and circulation manner of the elites, the status of the staff within the vanguard made up from party members. It is necessary to notice that the status of party member was not only eroded in moments of political crisis but also “trivialised as a result of the considerable extension of the party apparatus and of the generalisation of the party teaching system which had included every population category; an even more powerful trivialisation taking into consideration that the political de-differentiation process was more important” (p. 28). The author considered “the strategy of academic elevation of the party teaching system to be an academic process, a strategy of primitive accumulation of cultural and symbolic capital, representing the equivalent of the primitive socialist accumulation in economy” (p. 29). In 1. and 2. of Part I. The education of the party intellectual, the description of this process take place on the basis of discussing the sociology of elites in the countries of the ‘really existing socialism’ after 1989, as well as the stages and the significance of the change occurred in 1989 regarding the altering of the elites and, of course, on the basis of the exposure of the sociologic methods used, before anything else the comparative one, (in the Eastern Germany and Romania party schools, but also in other countries of the former communist system, as noticed in the bibliography). In Part I. ..., after presenting a history of the party schools, carried on from a sociological perspective (1. The party teaching system from a historical perspective), the issue of the academic recognition of the party educational system emphasises the fact that “the “academic” history of the party schools is thus a direct effect of the de-Stalinization process: that of the condemning Stalin’s self-destructing violence, directed towards his own party, but also the organisation of the neo-Stalinist intellectual processes, which were put an end to reforms” (p. 20–121). But contemporary with the academic recognition of the party schools, were also the ideological processes of the party intellectuals. These have marked “the disappearance of the militant intellectual, to whose establishment the communist parties had contributed, subsequently leading to the outlining of an alternative image, stated in the following decades, the image of the dissident intellectual”. (AB, I would say that the cycle of the mainstream intellectual in the countries of the former “socialist” system continues with the right-wing anti-communist intellectual, which also means the rejection, as obsolete, of the humanist militant intellectual, in the name of “neutralism” whose origin can be discovered also in the predominance of the analytic Anglo-Saxon philosophy in the field of (Romanian) philosophy after 1989 (but basically also before 1989). “The condemnation of the heretics (for deviationism) sanctioned the incapacity of the doctrine to renew itself from within, from its own resources” (p. 121). (AB: why the doctrine, and not the Stalinist system? The doctrine concept here is correctly used only if we understand it as Stalinist doctrine. But the formulation allows for conclusions regarding Marx’s doctrine as well.) The book is not only captivating because it offers a rigorous analysis of the issues mentioned above (including emphasising the importance of the behaviour – visible in the description of the various members of the teaching body of party schools – but also because it analyses, due to the logic of exposure, extremely important theoretical problems for the field of philosophy and social sciences (ideological processes of philosophers in DGR, the debates related to Hegel and Nietzsche). From this point of view the inference between the political processes and the Stalinist control over ideology is exemplary, and on the other hand, the framework (the limits) of philosophy: “the main perverse effect of the political processes in the 1950’s and of the institutionalised censorship was the consolidation of the dependency of any innovation in philosophy and in social sciences towards the loans received from the Occident...” (p. 128). But it is also noticeable, as compensation for the Stalinist closure of social theory, “a shy opening of the empirical social sciences, and especially of sociology” (p. 131). But the “return to a political economy of command” marked the decline of the sociological studies and research... beginning with the mid 1970’s” (p. 142). Chapters: 3. Structural changes: from the political teaching system to the private one and 4. The lives of the school and the re-conversion after 1989, in Part I, offer a clear and revealing perspective — which was needed — on the evolution of the didactic personnel from party schools, as well as on the evolution of the
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schools themselves. It is difficult to select a topic, in the space provided by a review, from all the mentioned issues. Nevertheless I cannot omit from chapter 3. the issue of the structural changes in the inter-socialist university framework, as well as the reversal of the migrating waves, all discussed from a sociological approach. Thus, if the “studies in USSR (had become) one of the main ways of educating the new elite” (p. 157), “with the growth of the autonomy of the national schools markets” (p. 158) the inter-socialist university framework has become varied. It was marked by the economic and political position that the countries — inside the “socialist” system — occupied, and also by the fact that “the recruitment criteria for obtaining a state scholarship which made possible living abroad, implied connections with the bureaucratic system, thus making political loyalty one of the main conditions for success, the effect being the strengthening of the bureaucratic control over people’s careers...” (p. 160). If, starting with 1990, the place of destination of the waves of students was the Occident,” an expansion of Western type pattern of political sciences and management and administration sciences towards East also took place” (p. 166), as well as the autonomy of universities and private universities. Related to the re-conversion of the former political management personnel, it was quite successful in the private economy, as well as, in limited number, at governmental level and as civil servants of certain international organisations. But the economical regime of the former elites is differentiated: first of all because of the country — for example in Germany the pensions obtained before the unification were larger in amount and were kept this way through the respective clause of the reunification treaty — and secondly because of the interference with other criteria. Anyway, together with “the precarious survivals” of the elder population it took place a certain, week, integration of the few capable ones “the practice of the continuous self-promotion” (p. 193) within the ranks of the new intellectual elites. On the ground of the discouragement due to the new moral order, within the former elites differentiations had taken place: some considered that critical takings of stand towards the past would be mere acts of opportunism (p. 201), being incapable of a critical retrospective view (p. 188), while others have insisted on the opposition between the critical intellectual — manifested even before 1989 — and the obedient party intellectual (p. 204–205). Finally, here, by continuing the method of biographies and interviews, the author emphasised the distance between the new elites connected to the party, which in Germany, represented a certain continuation of the themes supported by the leading party and the dominant ideology before 1989, and on the other hand the common militants. After an Addendum referring to the excellence centres concerned with socio-humanist sciences and their insertion in the emerging scientific communities in Eastern Europe — where the concepts of excellence, elite institutions and the history and typology of the excellence centres in general and those in socio-humanist sciences in particular are being analysed, and where the issues and contradictions, noticed even by the social sciences researchers, are emphasised — the author ends this first part of the book with a concluding chapter about the party schools and the social-political academies as total and bastard institutions. If these institutions corresponded to some contradictory functions — of ensuring “an ascending mobility to certain fractions of the popular classes” and that of ensuring the control and the consolidation of the political power in favour of the single party (p. 237) — therefore to the characteristics of total institutions, but also bastard institutions, the competition of the state universities but also the visible tendency, in the 1970’s, of the state schools education system of the ‘really existing socialism’ to re-establish the differences between elites and the others, have underlined the strengthening of the second function of party schools in the entire period: “the schools represented instruments of political mobilisation, whilst the academic type of legitimisation strengthened the political socialisation of the students” (p. 245). And after 1989, “a part of the new managerial elite of the 1990’s” (p. 246) originated precisely from these schools. If the first Part of the book is important especially for the researchers in socio-human sciences, the second Part, The symbolic and political power of writers, is interesting, not only for the above mentioned researchers but also for the protagonists of the research described in this part of the work. Unfortunately we only have enough room so as to mention a few of the analysed themes: literary and political ideologies, the international institutions of the literary field, exile, dissidence and the “second culture”, the crisis of the institutions of consecration in the Romanian literary field, the modification of the ideological codes in the Romanian literature after 1989, the time of prophecies, the new structures, the politicisation of intellectuals, the establishers of the new moral order. We cannot refrain from referring to the issue of the new ideologies after 1989. The author underlined that “the social differentiation fights which accompany the appearance of the new elites super-determines the neoliberal type of discourse as well as its “extremist” and “plotting” opposite in the new ideological field of production” (p. 327). An example of consensus between the two extremes is represented by the ideological brainwashing operations, i.e. by the creation of the new myths, like the myth around Nae Ionescu. Regarding Nae Ionescu, the author resumes the conclusions of George Voicu2’s analysis: the complicity between the
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2 George Voicu, Mitul Nae Ionescu (The Nae Ionescu Myth), Bucharest, Ars Docendi, 2000.
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former censors of the “communist period” and the new supporters (p. 329); but he also notices the double “extremist discourse, the ordinary fascist one as well as the elitist one, which sometimes claim to be apolitical or even liberal and pro-occidental” (p. 330). The great problem, from a sociological point of view, is the “accelerated social mobility, the numerous situations of conversion and re-conversion, political, religious or professional (which) contrast the manifested inertia of behaviour and of the ‘mentalities’ manifested through a variety of forms of resistance to the change” (p. 334–335). This precise issue represented the aim of the book. Mihai Dinu Gheorghiu’s research is not only concerned with deciphering the mechanisms of establishing the political elites inside the ‘really existing socialism’ — and in this sense, the criticism of the literature after 1989 regarding this issue and the framework provided by the political regime — but also the re-conversion of the former political elites after 1989. I kept in mind the emphasising of the continuation of relationships — of trust and complicity — not only of those of the former party schools, or of the various generations belonging to these schools, but also the ones in the structures of state academic legitimisation in the university education system as well as in institutions with political connections. I do not consider this continuation to be diabolical: simply, the new academic power networks have the same characteristic of group, closed and refractory to the officially accepted criteria of excellence. It is about the constitution of the same bureaucratic and elitist intellectual system — so not necessary formed by real elites — specific to the historical systems up to now. Mihai Dinu Gheorghiu’s book is not an essay, but a scientific paper, scrupulously carried out. In this respect, it does not reveal “the secrets” of concrete ascension of concrete3 post-revolutionary intellectuals — this ascension is explained as the decline of “the two dominant intellectual figures (in Stalinism) — the prophetic and the politicizsd intellectual — in the benefit of a competing figure: that of the expert and media exposed intellectual” (p. 344) — but it demonstrates, by the means of criticism of the theory and concrete research, how the political elites were created and that, if intellectuals have been politicised and used as instruments, after 1989 one can also notice an aggressive process of politicising and transforming the intellectuals into instruments, by using new means, of course. Today there is also a mainstream, made up of the former right-wing anticommunist dissidents, which has imposed “the institutions or the commissions entrusted with conserving the social memory of the recent history” (p. 344) and “a new ideological literature about the historical and political ‘process of communism’” (p. 348). Describing motifs of this literature — manifested as “the distance towards the old institutions, repudiating the ‘communist’ political and intellectual model (as) a proof of adhering to the new moral and political order” (p. 349), “the washing away of the collective and individual past” (p. 350), the inconsistency in evaluating fascism and anti-Semitism —, the books reveals the fact that the “neo-conservatory ideology has quickly set itself up behind the façade of liberal politics” (p. 351). This is a book about a structural aspect belonging to the recent past. The book equally underlines a continuity of the polarisation in the field of power, as well as of the separation of the political intellectuals from the values in which they cover themselves4 (before — the communist values of a better world, more just for everyone, of social equality; today — the values of democracy, human rights and pluralism). But the discontinuity, detected in the “breaking away with the past” processes, is also present: the manifested elitism (unlike the hidden one), the occidental type (extremist — p. 330) neo-conservatory tendencies were grasped in the dominant intellectual discourses; the re-conversion and the mobilisation of intellectuals by economic and political pluralist mechanisms, the establishing of competing aggressive groups, (the Stalinist type) neo-conservatory tendencies were detected in the discourse of the losers. Anyway, “the aesthetisation of the political discourse as sign of ‘high culture’ opposes the rigor and the precision of the reasoning process” (p. 332). The critical analysis of every type of dogmatism — the Stalinist one as well as that of the “brave new world” — under the circumstances that the intellectual market is clearly dominated by the latter, is an act of intellectual integrity and civic courage. Could one say that this analysis took place because too much evidence of the limitation of closed thought has already been gathered? This evidence has an indisputable power of suggestion. Nonetheless, we should notice the position, constantly unique and unrepeatable, of the creator: the author of the book in question, Mihai Dinu Gheorghiu, was a dissident, who emigrated in France and then later
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3 As Adrian Gavrilescu masterfully does in Noii precupeþi. Intelectualii publici din România de dupã 1989 (The New Petty Traders. Public Intellectuals In Romania After 1989), Bucharest, Compania, 2006 (see the significant titles: the Media-cracy and the vulgarisation through mass-media, “the Intello-crats” and the corrupt ethics, Public intellectuals as political annalists, Public intellectuals who write books and manage publishing houses, Public intellectuals who write for magazines and comment on screen, Public intellectuals enjoy television as guest or as producers, Public intellectuals devise surveys and write editorials). 4 It is the old separation between the legitimising values of a system based on power relations, and on the other hand, the power structures (the structural relations and the social relations.)
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became quite exterior to the phenomenon of the Romanian exile, preferring not to renounce to the deontology of criticism (therefore including the assumptions considered by some as being taboo) and working in present as researcher (Centre de Sociologie Européenne, Paris) and as professor at the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences in “A.I. Cuza” University in Iaºi. As a last observation: the research regarding the “practical” aspect leaves open the necessity to progress into, what I call, the critical social theory, i.e. in the understanding of the ‘really existing socialist’ system — and not only in the understanding of the political regime, or surpassing the impression that the system and the political regime would be equivalent — of its articulations and its values. After 1989, especially the social theory is suffering: through the annulment of its usefulness by the new political intellectuals, the “winners” who legitimised themselves precisely with this Manichean description — within institutions, political reports and (subsidised) materials — of the former political regime (equivalent to the system) only in terms of crimes, victims and torturers. It is an à rebours Stalinism and Mihai Dinu Gehorghiu’s book contributes to its deciphering and overcoming.
Ana Bazac
Noam Chomsky Failed States. The Abuse of power and the Assault on Democracy, Metropolitan Books, New York, 2006, 311 p. The book is structured to sustain the argument of the author portraying the United States as a failed state. In this respect Failed States is a very interesting book for the realist international relations were criticism of both the United Nations and the United States is necessary. On the other hand, the book may be perceived as yet another conspiracy theory book, seraching editorial success while damaging the image of the greatest power of the world as main fighter for installing and preserving democracy on the international scene. The author’s daring stance is that intellectuals should acknowledge the growing democratic deficit introduced by the United States into the world and “at home”. N. Chomsky states: “The concept of democracy promotion at home may seem odd or even absurd. After all, the United States was the first modern (more or less) democratic society, and has been a model for others ever since. And in many dimensions crucial for authentic democracy — protection of freedom of speech, for example — it has become a leader among the societies of the world. (...) The concern is not unfamiliar. The most prominent scholar who concentrates on democratic theory and practice, Robert Dahl, has written on seriously undemocratic features of the US political system, proposing modifications. Thomas Ferguson’s “investment theory” of politics is a searching critique of deeper institutional factors that sharply restrict functioning democracy.” (p. 207) Then, at the same page, the author underlines that besides the institutional factors that are creating the deficit of democracy there are also other important factors damaging the democratic activity of the government, and first of all is the activity of the US media. “The same is true of Robert McChesney’s investigations of the role of the media in undermining democratic politics, to the extent that by the year 2000 presidential elections had become a “travesty”, he concludes, with a reciprocal effect on deterioration of media quality and service to the public interest.”Another extremely important factor is the concentration of private power, as the author explains: “Subversion of democracy by concentrations of private power is, of course, familiar: mainstrearn commentators casually observe that “business is in complete control of the machinery of government” (Robert Reich), echoing Woodrow Wilson’s observation, days before he took office, that “the masters of the government of the United States are combined capitalists and manufacturers of the United States.” He quotes John Dewey, considered America's leading twentieth-century social philosopher, with “politics is the shadow cast on society by big business” and considers that the situation of the US and if the world will remain so as long as power resides in “business for private profit through private control of banking, land, industry, reinforce? by command of the press, press agents and other means of publicit and propaganda.” (p. 208) The central question of the book is: “How can meaningful democracy be brought?” His answer is that reforms will not suffice, but there is compulsory fundamental social change. He incriminates “the new spirit of the age” and the lack of ethics of the big corporations that are enjoying the rights of the people and numerous business advantages without getting themselves involved in supporting charitable and educational causes. Image, profit and market share are the key words of the moment and the hidden essence of politics, shaping a political system that has too little ressemblance with the original one, created by the founding fathers. Yet, even back then — Chomsky reminds us all — James Madison, was already making clear that power should be held in the hands of “the wealth of the nation ... the more capable set of men (...) People "without property, or the hope of acquiring it,” Madison reflected at the end of his life, “cannot be expected to sympathize sufficiently with its rights, to be safe depositories of power over them.” (p. 209)
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In conclusion, since the founding fathers framed the United States until today, the rights are not those of property, which has no rights, but of property owners, who therefore should have extra rights beyond those of citizens generally. There is a determination to protect minorities against majority that Chomsky underlines and interprets in its serious consequences resulting in the democratic deficit. “While popular struggle over centuries has gained many victories for freedom and democracy, progress does not follow a smooth upward trajectory. There has been a regular cycle of progress under popular pressure, followed by regression as power centers mobilize their considerable forces to reverse it, at least partially. Though over time the “cycle tends to be upward, sometimes regression reaches so far that the population is almost completely marginalized in pseudo-elections, most recently mirrored in the “travesty” of 2000 elections and the even more extreme travesty of 2004. Instead of democracy, the United States are experiencing and exporting a “corporatized state capitalist democracy”, a deficitary democracy, going from bad to worse given the current Bush administration policies. The fierce critique of Bush administration led the author to create the phrase “demonic messianism” in order to explain the propagandistic ingredient that sustains this sort of “democracy for the rich” — the messianism. He says: “Demonic messianism is a natural device for leadership groups that are at the extreme of the spectrum in their dedication to the short-term interests of narrow sectors of power and wealth, and to global domination. It takes willful blindness not to see how these commitents guide current US policy. The goals pursued and programs enacted are opposed by the public in case after case. That impels the need for mass mobilization, employing the skills of the huge industries that have been created in a business-run society to influence attitudes and beliefs.” (p. 213) The author’s dedication for democracy is reflected both in his criticism and in the suggestions he proposes as solutions for the deficit for democracy: (1) accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and the World Court; (2) sign and carry forward the Kyoto protocols; (3) let the UN take lead of the international crises; (4) rely on diplomatic and economic measures rather than military ones in confronting terror; (5) keep to the traditional interpretation of the UN Charter; (6) give up the Security Council veto and have “a decent respect for the opinion of the mankind” as the Declaration of Independence advises, even if power centers disagree; (7) cut back sharply on military spending and sharply increase social spending. He underlines: “For people who believe in democracy, these are very conservative suggestions: they appear to be the opinions of the majority of the US population. (...) To be sure, we cannot be very confident about the state of public opinion on such matters because of another feature of the democratic deficit: the topics scarcely enter into public discussion and the basic facts are little known. In a highly atomized society, the public is therefore largely deprived of the opportunity to form considered opinions.” (p. 262)
Angela Botez Filosofia mentalului. Izvoare. Teorii. Autori, Bucureºti, Editura Floare albastrã, 2006, 272 p. Within the effort of assessing and reinterpreting the place and the role of the human ego in the political sciences the philosophy of mind can provide useful theories. From this perspective, Angela Botez’s book is an extremely valuable source. The volume is structured in five parts: “Introduction to the philosophy of mind”, “The history of the the philosophy of mind and conscience”, “Interviews with philosophers of mind” and “Romanian philosophers on mind and conscience”. By the end of this volume the researcher can find a study about “Philosophers of mind who have published in Romania”, a substantial bibliography, an abstact in English, and a section of illustrations. The book examines the history of mind philosophy views, the integrative concepts that could be considered central to mind philosophy — intentionality, supervenience and reliability — the new trends of mind philosophy, for instance, the “anomalous monism” proposed by Donald Davidson, the reductionists and the non-reductionists representatives of the field, and the three main direction of investigation in mind philosophy (the cognitive science, the mind-body relationship and the mental representation). The author not only investigates the history of mind philosophy views to offer a string of perspectives and names, but also identifies the forerunners of the contemporary philosophy of mind given certain concepts and methods they use (for instance, Occam with the language of the mind, Descartes with the mind-matter dualism, Wundt with the psychomental processes and their paris, Wittgenstein with the game of language and of the forms of life, Ramsey with the functionalist theory of belief) and underlines the elements of the philosophy of mind at various Romanian philosophers (as C. Rãdulescu-Motru, L. Blaga, M. Florian, and S. Odobreja). This volume offers a clear perspective over the main trends under debate within this field: eliminative materialism and anomalistic monism, naturalism, physicalism and functionalism1; mentalism and emergentist
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1 The author explains that according to this trend the mind is part of the natural world as a function of the corporeal.
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holism2, connectionism3, contextualism4, cognitivism5 and constructivism6. The author proposes other subjects that should be taken into a further consideration within the discussions of the field: externalism, reliabilism, internalism, neutralism, and the more complex theory of identity and unity concerning the constitution of the mental and the physical. Angela Botez selects the personalities explicitly representing this discipline, including: Stawson, Ryle, Searle, Davidson, Sellars, Block, Fodor, Churchland, Dennet, Hacker, Honderich, Putnam, Nozick, Pollock, Papineau, Rorty, Mellor, Wilkes, Parfit, Sperry, Harre, Mclntyre, Crane and others. Extremely useful for the students and young scholars is also the mentioning of a number of leading reviews on the philosophy of mind and cognitive science that are being published, such as: Mind, Mind and Machines, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophy and Psychology. Contextualism is also interesting for political philosophy, describing the interpretations from the philosophy of language emphasising the context in which action, utterance, or expression occur, at the same time sustaining that, for the most part, they can only be understood in relation to that context. Contextualist views are quite common in political analysis. They hold that philosophically controversial concepts, such as “being true” or “being right”, “meaning P” or “knowing that P,” only have meaning relative to a specified context. From an epistemological point of view, knowledge can always be accounted for in relevant alternative manners, according to a certain context. In political ethics, “contextualist” views are most closely associated with situational ethics, moral relativism, the criticism of postmodernism. Angela Botez capitalizes on another concern of contemporary philosophy of mind, the problem of mental representation, that it is considered also central to political philosophy and to the theory of democracy. She explains: “Conscience and representative thinking are two of the essential themes of the philosophy of mind: how can a mechanism (even a psychological and not a physical one) become conscious and how can one think about and form representations of things outside it. The philosophers of mind therefore focus on the idea of representation. It is directily related to the life of the spirit. Uttered and written words, images, signs, symbols, gestures, mimicry are representations in everyday life, they signify things and events; the question is, how is this done? On the one hand, they seem to have a natural origin, on the other hand they are themselves physical structures — vibrations of the air, movements, material signs, etc. Although they seem natural, from the philosophical viewpoint representations carry a mysterious load that combines the concepts of time, truth and existence. Currently, a very strong position among the philosophers is held by antirepresentationism, illustrated by Polanyi, Rorty, and the schools of social constructivism and of epistemological relativism.” (p. 255) This schools have become lately a lot more relevant for disciplines that are distinct from the philosophy of mind, as are the political sciences. Thus, philosophy of mind can be seen as a relatively new philosophical “threasure chest” of concepts and trends for the mainstream political sciences.
Henrieta ªerban
Ana Bazac (editor) Comunicarea politicã: repere teoretice ºi decizionale (The Political Communication: Theoretical and Decision Guiding Marks), Bucureºti, Editura Vremea, 2006, 384 p. Even though we are living in a new era, when fascism, Stalinism and other forms of personal, governmental and clan dictatorship are in process of disappearing, the final point of the ideological evolution of the human race and the universality of the Western type, liberal democracy as supreme manner of the human governing, still remains an open question. If it were not the case, the theory and practices of mass media, described in the present work, should be considered as being the ultimate and absolute stage of the political communication. The explosion of information offered by mass media, and especially by Internet, produces the integration and socialisation of that Aristotle’s, but also contemporaneous zoon politikon. This fact doesn’t exclude the role of the political communication in the transmission on several voices of the information and political messages in the form of “puzzles of nets” in permanent change.
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2 The major claim here is that mental existence differs from the physical one and has both a psycho-linguistic structure and an intentional behaviour. 3 The mental acts are the result of internal neuronal connections with parallel nodal structures. 4 The mental acts result from the influence of the environment on the subject. 5 All mental acts are of a cognitive nature. 6 Cognitive and social factors interact in the construction of mental acts.
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By pointing out, au fond, the crisis of the political system in its entirety, the studies aimed also to discern between ideal types and the description of real processes. In this respect, the studies put, explicitly and implicitly, many questions as: how much important is the form (or spectacle) of the political communication than the content of the message? Is really the focus on the role of the public opinion as dominant opinion not substituting the questioning of the formation of the opinion as dominated one? And should really the estimation at the consequences of the non-alignment to this formation not to be had in view when one insists on the role of the imitation and psychology of conformism to the public opinion? (p. 14) To say it by paraphrasing C.W. Mills (The Power Elite, 1956), “the political communication is structured around the power relations” (p. 16). The comprehension of the political communication as “part of the leadership process itself”, as interface between leaders and the population, as “stratum” of the political relations, raises many problems: how the “emission” of the decisions takes place, but also how the political class’ messages towards the audiences happen? What kind of power have “the mediators” between the leaders and the population? How important are the media of communication for the change of the political opinions? These interrogations were at the bottom of the researches included in the volume, has Ana Bazac insisted in the Introduction (p. 17). The aim of the research in the domain the book focuses on was therefore endorsing “the dialectics of the process of political communication linked to the dialectics of the process of political leadership” (p. 18). The conclusion, apparently general, to which the coordinator of volume arrived, is that “not the simply transmitterreceiver relationship explains the political communication, but the complex existing and entailing it in upstream and the complex consequences in downstream, as well as its internal pattern: the political leadership in different concrete-historical hypostases... The stake of political communication, and especially of the new types of vertical communication is just the “impression of sincerity” of the transmitters and, consequently, what is the objective of the political communication: “the credibility of the leaders” (p. 29). Structured in three parts, the researches brought together in the book offered a multidisciplinary approach, by including the premise of self-criticism and conscience of the inherent limits of the discussed standpoints. The first part presents, from a philosophical perspective: the notions of information and communication, and the debates about them in the professional literature; the cognitive approach of informatics and artificial intelligence (AI) on the political communication; the setting-up of different philosophical polarities as objectives of research: human being-world, individual-ambiance, human being-machine, nature-culture, cerebral features-mental structure, the limit of the understanding of the infinite flux of information-the integration of the AI systems in the informational society. Inside the same preliminary analysis, the history of the constitution of the science of information was doted from the perspective of the library, to which Borges has dedicated his entire life. With theirs studies — “Model and information” (G.G. Constandache), “The information science” (Elena Târziman), „The information society in fact and the knowledge society in act” (Cãtãlin loniþã) — the authors tried to decipher the origins and historical evolution of the political communication under the impact of the development of information technologies and, implicitly, of social information sciences. In the second part of the collection, the analysis of the history of philosophy and the one of the contemporary history interweave. If Ana Bazac’s study emphasised the manner the philosophical communication is not exterior to the political, philosophy itself being considered as a “mirror” but also a “model” of the practice of politics, the case study realised by Adrian-Claudiu Stoica (“Propaganda acts of Romania in France in a dark period (1940-1942)”) gave us an example of continuity of the process of political communication between states, by emphasising the pattern of promotion of the international relations, as well as the official international political communication. This part includes also the research “Time factor in the political communication” (Ana Bazac). There are analysed aspects as: irreversibility and the different evaluations of the time, the dependence of the political communication, the role of the political communication in the manipulation of the public opinion, the attack on the ‘young time’ of the young generation and the bureaucratisation of the political communication. For all of these, the author mentioned, “the discussion of the time factor in the political communication involves, beyond the grasping of some philosophical significations, the disclosure of some, usually covered, aspects of the political communication” (p. 195-196). In the third part of the work there are gathered up essential aspects of political science analysis as: the roles of receivers and transmitters of the information and political messages; the character of the political communication as structuring of politics; and its ideological character as well; the functions of the political communication (expressive, denotative and connotative of the doctrine block); the comprehensive-reactive function of the addressee; the pragmatic, structural and symbolic dimension of the political communication; the complex and asymmetric character of the political communication relations; the specialisation in electoral communication and political marketing; the political communication — spectacle in the detriment of the ‘essence’ of democracy; the expectations linked to the new media (blogs, chats, on lines reviews, on line forums) through which it could take place, and indeed it do, the political communication for the raising of the participation and alignment of the receivers to the political ‘model’; the effects of the (relative) copying of the power relations by the PC games and some virtual spaces, generating new possibilities of stressing the social
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integration and the individual consent and satisfaction; the position of the communication of the international events inwards the political communication as such; the communication of the international political scandals. Relevant for the numerous problems enunciated are the studies: “A paradigm of the political communication” (Rozmari Pogoceanu); „Elements of the process of political communication” (Daniela Cotoarã); „The political communication in the representative democracy” (Georgiana Margareta Scurtu). According to the last author mentioned here, “mass media have an essential role in the democratic education of citizens; it prescribes and indicates the political rules, structures and mediates the understanding of the decision-making processes, and coordinates the movements of the actors on the political scene” (p. 243). Other aspects were analysed from the perspective of juridical sciences: the manner the public, and especially the electoral one, appears in the Romanian and international laws which regulate the rights and duties in the frame of political communication during the electoral process (“The electoral public – subject of the juridical relations linked to mass media communication”, Maria Nãstase Georgescu). From the social psychology perspective, the problematic is deepened by Beatrice-Adriana Balgiu, who presented the principles of the use of transactional analysis — concept introduced by Eric Berne (see Games People Play, 1964, in the Romanian translation Jocuri pentru adulþi, Bucureºti, Editura Amaltea, 2002) — in the political communication. Starting from the Freudian topic (Self, Ego, Supra-Ego), the author compels attention that Berne’s theory was completed by Mary and Robert Goulding, who introduced the gestalt techniques and re-decisional therapy, according to the principle that “the individual restructures the mode of thinking, feeling and action in function of correctly directed decisions” (p. 279). The coordinator has obtained and translated two contributions from abroad, one, original, from Belgium, and another from Japan. Their approach of political psychology enriches the understanding of the state and growing of the political communication in the present world. In their study “MUDs and power. Reducing the democratic imaginary?”, the Belgian Nico Carpentier ºi Niky Patyn concluded that “ the use of these virtual space inside the nets of technologies which provide the communicational medium and form on line communities on the ground of the game, does not exclude the presence of the power and doesn’t annul the democratic solutions to the problems linked to the organisation of creative processes, to the socialisation of the members, and to the solving of the political conflict (p. 356). An interesting contribution, illustrating the thesis of the power of the cultural specific in the political communication in Japan, is the first chapter of Ofer Feldman’s book Talking Politics in Japan Today (Brighton, UK, Sussex Academic Press, 2004). The place of each country in the world modern system, the level of economic development in relation to modernity, the accelerated rhythm of the politics of “alphabetisation”, entailed the apparition of the regular political communication through written media. Later, mass culture has passed from “Gutenberg galaxy” (based on the print) to “Marconi galaxy” (based on radio, cinema, TV) and has today more and more its dwelling in the “PC and Internet galaxy”. The acceleration of the historical rhythm of development of the new media of communication and political information in some Western countries toward the Romanian princedoms has implied the precarious socialeconomic structure of Romania, visible from the second half of the 19th century: Constantin DobrogeanuGherea named this structure as new state of serve relations (see Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea, „Neoiobãgia. Studiu sociologic al problemei noastre agrare”, 1910). Consequently, Ana Bazac has considered it would be opportune to rememorize the social history of the modernising Romania, the ground of the utopian projects and political reforms till the ones of modernisation in the 20th century, on which just the political communication after 1989 took place (p. 19-50). The development of the democratic political regime in the post 1989 Romania, even if it changed the usual totalitarian type mentalities, generated a contradictory situation: the existential needs as food, dwelling, workplaces, not being solved in a satisfactory manner for a certain majority of the population, the democratic rights of expression seems to not be much appreciated. The distance between the liberties of expression and those of real action remained as in Stalinism, or even rose. The difference between the “legal country’ and the “real country” is so significant in Romania also because the freedom of expression is rather indirect, through the media, or just a part of them (p. 36-37). One could observe, as Ana Bazac has noted, the coexistence of two tendencies: a) one is that through which the transmitters address to different target-publics, giving the impression that the messages would be diversified, and at the same time tend to uniform the receivers, the public opinion, and b) the other in which the spreading of information is opposite to the political propaganda and advertising. The power of the spreading of the information technologies is so rapid that the rhythm of the apparition of the critique towards the establishment will generate, including in Romania, the perfecting of the contents of the transmitted political messages, as well as of the types of political communication. Instead of conclusion, Ana Bazac stressed the social impact of the manners the exceptional phenomena are presented in the official political communication and the responsibility of the rulers. Just because the exceptional phenomena challenge the politicians and population to conceive new types of solidarity, global, stronger and
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more efficient…the manifestation of the political responsibility in all the communities…the political communication offers frequently the dream of ‘return to normality’ in this world transition” (p. 367). The book put face to face critical and conventional interpretations about the political communication. It applies to both students aiming the acquisition of a profession linked to politics and its communication, and those interested in the effects of the access of the information technologies (internet) for the reduction of the informational discrepancy between the Western developed countries and the countries in course of development all over the world. The studies has concerned limited aspects but rezoning with the idea Hannah Arendt suggested in The Origins of Totalitarianism, and which Ana Bazac has formulated as “the total domination — the totalitarianism, as it was named at the end of the First World War — is not a simple question of political regime, but has in view the transformation and submission of the entire social system towards the movement of conquest, levelling, conviction in the best single way everywhere, without relentless. The political communication is a medium of this domination, it re-writes history, and doesn’t give form to the present and future” (p. 51). The pleasure of the lecture of this book is given also by the footnotes which, sometimes, double the intrinsic content of the themes. In the context of the integration of Romania in the European Union, the publication of this volume of studies constitutes an objective informational necessity, but also an intellectual banquet.
Monica Marinescu
THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS
REVUE ROUMAINE DE PHILOSOPHIE, tomul 50, nr. 1–2/2006, is edited often in English, French and German. The current issue consists of three parts, “Lucian Blaga’s Philosophy (1895–1961)”, “The Philosophy of Early Modernity” and “Phenomenological Approaches”. Within the first part, R.T. Allen related to in-depth aspectsconcerning the possibility of a philosophy of culture, viewed in relationship to the historical studies. He investigates comparatively this matter at R.G. Collingwood and L. Blaga. Angela Botez juxtaposes three postmodern perspectives on metaphysics, as they appear in the philosophy of Heidegger, Derrida and Blaga. The guiding idea of the study is developed starting from the fact that the philosophical exercise is defined by the ability of creating metaphysics. This idea is already clarified at Blaga, as the author emphasizes: the metaphysical ideas are considered visions in themselves, and the plurality of the metaphysics, forms of the literary creation, of the fiction and of myth. (p. 18) H. ªerban and E. Gilder attempt to describe the scope of an “ironism” avant-lalettre within the philosophical works of Blaga, using a comparative investigation Blaga-Rorty. V. Macoviciuc underlines the problematics of clarifying the aspects of the style in philosophy and culture, a predominant among the philosophical preoccupations of Blaga. In the study there is an analysis of the fact that the style has modeling functions and all are to be considered in relationship with mystery. A. Niþã investigates the matter of individuation at L. Blaga. Blaga brings a particular solution, that is analyzed here within the frame of the other theories of individuation. V. Cernica places the accent on the discourse about man within Blaga’s philosophy, in the context of the different hermeneutical positions represented by the “contriving” and the “dissimulating” postures. G.G. Constandache approaches the poetical aphorisms of Blaga through traditional poetics, as well as through the specific philosophy. The aesthetics is correlated with linguistics, always with attention to the philosophical dimension. Among the works dedicated to early philosophical modernity R. Ariew approaches a philosophical oxymoron, the “Carthesian empiricism”. Certain Carthesiens, such were Desgabets and Regis, are now capitalized in order to sustain the possibility and the extent to which carthesianism and atomism could be “mixed” together with, ipothetico-deductivism, falibilism, probabilism and empiricism. D. Jalobeanu discusses the ideas that Newton developed concerning the absolut space and the creation of the matter. Ioana Manea writes about the ideas of Mothe Le Vayer and the correct average between the rationalization of reason and the Pyrrhonian doubt, commenting along several pages that are of special interest for political philosophy as well, the problematics of the authority of the rationalized doubt. There are also relevant pages for political philosophy signed by G. John Abbarno on the topics of the integration of values via a value matrix. “The more we investigate what we know and what reality is, the more we become detached, and the less we base ourselves on the personal prejudices, entertained in what concerns the”. (p. 137) The author argues that the pattern theory of value could contribute to the “dimensioning” of value, improving certain choices that, at their turn, are going to improve the human character, discouraging degrading values. REVISTA DE FILOSOFIE, tomul LIII, nr. 1-2/2006 stands out because of the collection of articles named “The Matrix of Spanish Language Philosophy” (authors: Gheorghe Vlãduþescu, José Patricio Brickle Cuevas, Maria Fernanda Herrera Acuna, Angela Botez, Teodor Vidam, Nicolae I. Mariº, Emilia Irina Strat, G.G. Constandache and Daniel Mazilu), “Lucian Blaga — 110 Years Anniversary” (authored by Teodor Dima, Alexandru Boboc, Henrieta A. ªerban, Eric Gilder, Vasile Macoviciuc, Viorel Cernica, Ioan N. Roºca, Adrian Niþã, Andreea ªchiopu-Pally), “The History of Universal Philosophy” (collection of articles signed by Sabin Totu, Laurenþiu Ostafe, ªerban N. Nicolau, ªtefan-Dominic Georgescu, Claudiu Baciu) and “Jean-Paul Sartre”. Within this last collection there are several aspects especially interesting for political philosophy. Gheorghe Vlãduþescu addresses the provocative question “What can one still read from Sartre?” and he is answering it by a range of suggestions, reccomending him as a representative author for French culture — as a poet, a scientist, a theologue, yet, always a a philosopher — maybe to a lesser extent than Paul Valéry, but to a wider extent than Camus. Alexandru Boboc underlines the fact that the last investigations of Sartre remain extremely important for the dynamics of contemporary philosophical orientations, and for the new manner in which are interacting the philosophical styles, under the double impact of science and social assistance. Marin Aiftincã approaches the theme of freedom at Sartre from an axiological point of view. The value has in Sartre’s thought the idealist character it has at Platon. As a consequence, the human reality belongs to the reality of the value that has put its mark on the world. “The phenomenology of the emotional conscience at Jean-Paul Sartre”, an article signed by Petre Mareº, argues that, according to Sartre, the phenomenologist gives more meaning to human deeds, a meaning that has to be analyzed in itself, so it shall “lead us within the very heart of the human reality, but rather to its nonexitence and its liberty”. (p. 289) Adriana Neacºu shows that for Sartre the body proves to be Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., IV, 1, p. 201–203, Bucharest, 2006.
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nothing else than the consciousness in its specific modality of insertion into the world. This insertion represents an original justification for the unity between our consciousness and our body that are mutually presupposing each other. Magda Stroe approaches an unfinbished Satrian work, L’Idiot de la famille, in order to examine the Sartrian analysis between the real and the imaginary, starting from the life and work of Flaubert. REVISTA DE FILOSOFIE, tomul LIII, nr. 3–4/2006 offers inedite articles on topics that are already traditional within the universal philosophy. Roberto Poli investigates the theory of judgement at Franz Brentano and Anton Marty. Alexandru Boboc discusses “The Concept of Intentionality in the Phenomenology of Husserl”. More interesting for the political philosopher is the article signed by Petru Vaida, “Form and history. The Concept of Form at the Young Lukács”. Cristian Ciocan is the author of the article entitled “Notes on the problematics of death at Heidegger and Scheler”, and Dragoº Popescu “On the Categorial Structure of the Logic and Metaphisycs from Jena of Hegel”. From the collection of articles gathered under the title “The Logic and the Philosophy of Science” there are a couple of articles that are interesting as well for political philosophy and for political sciences: “A Theory of Meaning — Donald Davidson’s Semantics” by Bogdan Teodor Udrea and “Karl R. Popper on Explanation, Prediction and Verification within Social Sciences”. With a similar interest for political philosophy, the reader may check the study from rubric “The History of Romanian Philosophy” entitled “Emil Cioran and the Communism. Between the ‘Enforced Illusion’ and the ‘Embodied Illusion’ ”, by Marius Dobre. BRITISH ACADEMY REVIEW, nr. 8/2005 (issue 2006) is the journal of the British Academy for humanities and social sciences. Many of the interesting articles published are interesting for a political scientist, too. As a first example, Linda McDowell, is investigating in “ ‘Betweeness’: The Lives of Latvian Women Migrants” the experiences of the Latvian women who have arrived in Great Britain given the economic migration process, after the Second World War, according to certain patterns for the import of labour agreed upon from the official standpoint. Neill Lochery, in “Israel’s Soviet Immigrants” researches the impact of the Russian Immigrants on the Israelian contemporary politics in this domain. Sin Yi Cheung and Anthony Heath signed the study entitled “Ethnic Minority Disadvantage in the Labour Market in Cross-National Perspectives”, approaching the issue of the relationship between either the elevated rates of unemployment or the small salaries of the ethnical minoroties and their lower investments in the human capital, with attention given to the discrimation manifested even before the members of minority groups get to the labour market, through the educational process and through a process of economic migration that is very selective. Peter Hill, in “Kabuki-ch? Gangsters: Ethnic Succession in Japanese Organised Crime?”, investigates the complex relation between the criminal indigenous groups and the criminal immgrant groups from nowadays Japan. Starting from the statistics, he analyzes also a few more delicate aspects, related to the political culture and to the political symbols specific to the Far East. Finally, Sarah Trypena proposes the topic “Abraham Lincoln: The Great Emancipator?”. The author underlines as well the elements of the emancipatory plan thatwere specific to Abraham Lincoln, as the elements that were characteristic for the historical, social and political context, that have had a “propulsion” effect for the emancipatory wave leading to a redefinition of the American nationality. JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS, vol. 67, nr. 3, iulie 2006 is an interdisciplinary journal edited by the University of Pennsylvania Press. Even from its beginnings in 1940, the journal served as a medium for promoting the research within the field of intellectual history. This research endeavour was always dedicated to encouraging the diversity in what is concerning the approach of varied problematics from a regional,chronological and methodological point of view. At the same time, the journal is interested in interdisciplinarity, bringing together literature, the art, the natural and social sciences, religion and political thought. In what concerns this issue I stopped at the study entitled “Mind and Language in Philosophy”, by David G. Robertson and “A Woman’s Influence? John Locke and Damaris Marsham on Moral Accountability”, by Jacqueline Broad. The author evaluates the possibility that the intense discussions of John Locke with Lady Marsham might influenced to a great extent the famous work of J. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding. She sustains her investigation with many quotes from Locke’s memories, such as the following: she “is so much occupied with study and reflection on theological and philosophical matters that you could find few men with whom you might associate with greater profit and pleasure. Her judgement is singualrly keen...” (p. 494) One may distinguish also the book review for the forth volume of the Encyclopedia of Enlightenment underlining the dynamics Enlightenment — Counter-Enlightenment and of the importance of the works of Cassirer, Hazard, Venturi and Peter Gay, as key figures for delineating the concept of “Radical Enlightenment” in its full importance.
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THE JOURNAL OF POPULAR CULTURE, vol. 39, nr. 4, 2006 is published bimonthly for the Popular Culture Association by Blackwell publishing. From the contents we emphasize the part entitled “Who Watches the Watchmen?”, with the articles “Ideology and Real World Superheros” by Janine A. Hughes, Carlos Castaneda and “His followers: Finding Life’s Meanings in Your Local Bookstore” by David L. Krantz and “Freudian Psychology and Beth Henley’s Popular Culture Satire: Signature”, by Gene A. Plunka. The conclusion that J. A Hughes draws is that “we are all subjected to that same power — that of ideology.” (p. 556) D. L. Krantz shows that “In the world of self-help books, the reader can create a negociable eclectic mix of appelaing possibilities. Any counsel as to life’s meaning is consequently appraised as to how well it meets the consumers’ prefereces as they, in turn, fit with cultural values. While consumers may be satisfied and continue to buy these books there remains the issue as to what extent self-help approaches to life’s meaning provide a sound, useful product.” (p. 596–7) Gene A. Plunka construes the world of satirical magazines arriving at the conclusion that “In effect, Signature demonstrates how modern society which diminishes our libidinal desires for human happiness, produces misery.” (p. 658)
Henrieta ªerban
THE AUTHORS
Josef Karl is currently working as an academic analyst of Southeast Europe and Sub-Sahara Africa in Munich, Germany. He has been working so far in different academic, political and international positions in Germany, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Romania, the Republic of Macedonia and in Zambia, also as Robert Bosch Lecturer of German History and Culture and Economics at the Academy of Economic Studies D A Tsenov, Svištov, Bulgaria. He has published several articles and academic contributions, in particular on the field of South-Eastern European History and Politics of the post-communist era and participated at numerous academic conferences and workshops in Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Germany, the Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom. He acted as the conference convenor of the intercultural and interdisciplinary lecture series “European Dialogues Svištov/Bulgaria” comprising eight lectures, hosting nine academics from seven European countries and publishing the interdisciplinary and multilingual compilation “Paving the Way to Europe”. He was reading Economic and Social History (MSc), History, Politics (Focus: Western Europe) and Italian Philology (MA), Economics (Diploma) and Politics (Focus: Eastern Europe) (BA) at Oxford and Regensburg University.
Cristi Pantelimon is a researcher within the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations (Romanian Academy) in Bucharest. He has a PhD in Sociology from Bucharest University. He had a PhD scholarship at Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris (noiembrie 1999 – aprilie 2000). He is currently editor of Noua Revistã Românã, Euxin. Revista de sociologie, geopoliticã ºi geoistorie, România XXI, Revista de ªtiinþe Politice ºi Relaþii Internaþionale, Polemica. He edited the volume Prin cenuºa naþiunii (Through the Ashes of the Nation), Editura Etnologicã, Bucharest, 2006. Authored book: Sociologie politicã (Political Sociology), Bucharest, Editura Fundaþiei România de Mâine, 2005. He translated De la division du travail social, by Emile Durkheim, Editura Albatros, Bucharest, 2001. His research interests are: political sociology, the history of sociology, nation and nationalism.
Cãlin Cotoi is a lecturer at the Sociology and Social Security Faculty, Bucharest University. He has a PhD in Anthropology from Bucharest University. He is currently secretary general of Sociologia Româneascã, member of European Association of Social Anthropologists, Association for the Study of Nationalities and International Association for Southeast European Anthropology. Authored book: Primordialism cultural ºi geopoliticã româneascã (Cultural primordial and Romanian geopolitics), Editura Mica Valahie, Bucureºti, 2007, several articles in Martor, The Museum of the Romanian Peasant Anthropology Review, Revista Românã de Sociologie, Sociologie Româneascã, Studii de Securitate. His research interests are: sociology, anthropology, primordial cultural aspects of the Romanian geopolitics, materialized in some articoles published in several books such as „New Technologies in National Minorities Invention”, in Globalization, European Integration and Social Development, Psihomedia Publishing House, 2003; “Csangos, the Inventing of a National Minority. Ethnic and Religious Identity”, in Geopolitica Integrãrii Europene, Editura Universitãþii din Bucureºti, 2003; Nicolae C. Paulescu in The Enciclopedy of Repressed Values, Pro Humanitate Publishing House, 2000. Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., IV, 1, p. 204–206, Bucharest, 2006.
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Ana Bazac Ph. D., Professor of Social Philosophy and Political Science at “Politehnica” University of Bucharest. Research and teaching interests:social philosophy, politics linked to economy, mediations in the frame of the social relationships, interests behind mentalities and their disclosure; international relations and the new technologies; ethics; political communication. She has published chapters in edited books, studies and numerous academic papers in different Romanian and international journals. Edited book: Comunicarea politicã: repere teoretice ºi decizionale (The Political Communication: Theoretical and Decision Guiding Marks), Bucureºti, Editura Vremea, 2006, 384 p.
Henireta Aniºoara ªerban is a researcher within the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations (Romanian Academy) in Bucharest. She is specialized in political communication, with a PhD in Philosophy from the Romanian Academy. She had grants at Naples and Maastricht, and she presented several topics related to communication and ideology at the Catholic University of Brussels and at Louborough University, UK. Authored book: Limbajul politic în democraþie (Political Language in Democracy), Bucharest, Editura Institutului de ªtiinþe Politice ºi Relaþii Internaþionale al Academiei Române, 2006. Edited volume, with Angela Botez and Marius Drãghici, Construcþie ºi deconstrucþie în filosofia americanã contemporanã (Construction and Deconstruction in the American Contemporary Philosophy), Bucharest, Editura Academiei, 2006. Several articles in Appraisal, Higher Education in Europe, Revue roumaine de philosophie, Romanian Review of Political Sciences and International Relations.
Gabriela Tãnãsescu is a researcher within the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations (Romanian Academy) in Bucharest. She is specialized in political philosophy. Since 1997 she is an editor of Revista de Teorie Socialã and Revue Roumaine de Théorie Sociale. At present she is editor of Revista de ªtiinþe Politice ºi Relaþii Internaþionale. She is a PhD student in Philosophy at the Bucharest University with a thesis entitled „Freedom and Reason at Spinoza” (final phase). Co-authored book: Individ, libertate, mituri politice (Idividual, Freedom and Political Myths), Bucharest, Editura Institutului de Teorie Socialã, 1997. Edited book: Tendinþe actuale în filosofia politicã (Current Tendencies in Political Philosophy), Bucharest, Editura Institutului de ªtiinþe Politice ºi Relaþii Internaþionale, 2006. Editor of the translated book Giovanni Sartori Ingineria constituþionalã comparatã, Editura Mediterana 2002, revised edition, 2006.
William J. Connell is a Professor of History, and directs the Charles and Joan Alberto Italian Studies Institute. He received his B.A. summa cum laude from Yale University, and his Ph.D. in Italian History from the University of California at Berkeley. He has been a Fulbright Scholar to Italy, a Giannini Italian-American Scholar, a Fellow at the Harvard University Center for Italian Renaissance Studies in Florence, and a Member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. He is Secretary of the Journal of the History of Ideas, and a member of the editorial advisory board of Renaissance Quarterly, member of the American Historical Association, the American Catholic Historical Association, the American Italian Historical Association, and the American Association for Italian Studies, and the Medieval Academy of America. From 2002 to 2005 he served as a commissioner on the New Jersey Italian American Heritage Commission and as Co-Chair of the New Jersey Institute for Italian and Italian American Heritage Studies. He has published numerous books and articles on Italian history, including a new translation of Machiavelli’s Prince. Specialist in late medieval and early modern European history, he is the author of several books and articles on the subjects: Florentine Tuscany: Structures and Practices of Power (edited by William Connell and Andrea Zorzi, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), La Citta dei Crucci (Florence: Nuova Toscana Editrice. 2000), Lo Stato Territoriale Fiorentino (Secoli XIV–XV) — Collection of essays. Seminar on the Florentine State in the XIV and XV century, hold in June 1996, Renaissance Essays II (Boydell & Brewer 1993), Society and Individual in Renaissance Florence (University of California Press, 2002).
Yves Plasseraud graduated from l’Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris et du Centre d’Etudes Internationales de la Propriété Intellectuelle (CEIPI). He owns a PhD in the law of industrial property. Among his fields of specialization are: markets, designs and models, authorship rights.
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He is member: Compagnie Nationale des Conseils en Propriété Industrielle (CNCPI), Association des Conseils en Propriété Industrielle (ACPI), Fédération Internationale des Conseils en Propriété Industrielle (FICPI), Association Française des Praticiens du Droit des Marques et Modèles (APRAM), Association Internationale des Conseils en Propriété Industrielle (AIPPI) and International Trademark Association (INTA). He is an international juridical consultant, Chairman of the group for the rights of the minorities (GDM), and Professor at the Faculty of History of the University of Vilnius (Lituania). Author of numerous articles and books on minorities issues, the questions of identity and the the problem of racism and prejudice in France and abroad. His most recent books are: Lituanie juive 1918–1940: Message d’un monde englouti, Henri Minczeles, Yves Plasseraud et all, 2006; Atlas des minorités en Europe: De l’Atlantique à l’Oural, diversité culturelle, Yves Plasseraud et all, Cécile Marin, Yves Ternon, 2005; Les Etats Baltiques: Les Sociétés Gigognes, la dialectique minorités-majorités, 2004.
Lucian Jora is a researcher within the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations (Romanian Academy) in Bucharest. Postgraduate studies at the University of Catania, Copenhagen University and Jagelonian University. At the moment is preparing a PhD at Babes Bolyai University in European Studies with a research on Cultural Diplomacy through the representation of History. Mr. Jora authored several articles with a focus on International Relations, European Studies and Cultural Diplomacy.
Viorella Manolache graduated Science Political Faculty, Law Faculty, has a master in Journalism and Public Relations, and Post-Graduated with a research theme concerned with Romanian Political Elitism. She has published several books: Postmodernitatea româneascã între experienþa ontologicã ºi necesitate politicã (Romanian Postmodernity — Between Ontological Experience and Political Necessity), Editura Universitãþii “Lucian Blaga”, Sibiu, 2004, 167 pages; Cecitatea politicã ca sindrom ereditar (Political Blindness as a Heredity Syndrome), Editura Universitãþii “Lucian Blaga”, Sibiu, 2005, 160 pages; Ipostaze ale fetiºismului în presa culturalã româneascã (Fetishism. Hypostasis of the Romanian Cultural Press), Editura Universitãþii “Lucian Blaga”, Sibiu, 2006, 100 pages; Elite. Conceptualizãri moderne (Elitism. Modern Conceptualization), “Lucian Blaga” Editura Universitãþii “Lucian Blaga”, Sibiu, 2006, 120 pages. At present she works as an assistant researcher at the Romanian Academy, Institute of the Political Science and International Relations, the Department of Political Philosophy.
