POLITICAL LAW reviewer 2017 prof alexis medina version F.pdf

POLITICAL & INTERNATIONAL LAW Brief Review Guide For The 2017 Bar Examinations By Prof. Alexis F. Medina 1

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW JUDICIAL REVIEW Actual case requirement: Proposed bills do not present a justiciable controversy: One of the requirements for judicial review is the existence of an actual controversy. This means that there must be “an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.”  opinion.”  A proposed bill does not present an actual justiciable controversy.  The filing of bills is within the legislative power of Congress and is not subject to judicial restraint. Also, the judiciary cannot speculate on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not pass. (In The Matter Of: Save The Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movements v. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015) Actual case requirement: General Rule: Facial challenges to a law (penal statutes, for example) on vagueness vagueness or overbreadth overbreadth grounds are not allowed, as these will go against the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy: Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities. The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge , are not applicable to penal  laws. An on-its-face invalidation of penal statutes [such as RA 9372, which defines the crime of terrorism], may not be allowed. Employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds. Judicial grounds. Judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statute’s future effect on hypothetical scenarios.  scenarios.  (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-  Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010) 

Exception: Facial challenges are allowed in free speech cases to avert cha llenge in free the chilling effect on free speech:  The allowance of a facial challenge speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the chilling effect on protected speech. This rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an in terrorem effect terrorem effect in deterring socially harmful conduct. It is settled, on the other hand, that tha t the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a 1 AB Political Science, University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman; Order of the Purple Feather (OPF), UP, College of

Law; Valedictorian, San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, College of Law; Philippine Representative to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Preparatory Committee Meeting for Legal Review (Geneva, Switzerland, 2014); Litigation Lawyer & Transaction Adviser on Public Private Partnerships (PPPs); Professor of Constitutional Law, San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, College of Law, and Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), Manila, College of Law; former professor of Constitutional Law, New Ear University, College of Law, Quezon City; Bar Review Lecturer, Recoletos Review Center, Manila; Partner, Libra Law (Libarios & Partners) 

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facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.  The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling," deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Supreme Court assumes that an overbroad law’  law’ s "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010) 

Locus standi: In petitions asserting a public right, such as the people’s right to information on matters of public concern,   any citizen can be a real party in interest.  The requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. There is no need to show any special interest in the result. It is sufficient that petitioners are citizens and, as such, are interested in the faithful execution of the laws.  laws.   (Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment [IDEAL] v. Power Sector Liabilities and Management Corporation [PSALM], G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012) Locus standi: In a facial challenge on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness, there is no need to assert a violation of one’ s own right: A petitioner may mount a “facial” challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute.  This is to counter the “chilling effect” on protected speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014)  Political questions: Matters of foreign relations:  The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative--'the political'--departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. The question of whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. (Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010) Political questions: The determination of whether a narration of facts constitute an impeachable offense is purely a political question:  The Supreme Court cannot look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis-à-vis her submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints. This would require the Supreme Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional 2|Page

Commission. The issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power. (Gutierrez v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011) 

Political questions: The Supreme Court cannot review the decision of the Committee on Justice to impeach. The Supreme Court cannot review the sufficiency of the substance of the impeachment complaints. The sufficiency of the substance will delve into the merits of the impeachment complaints over which the Court has no jurisdiction. The Court can only rule on whether there is a gross violation of the Constitution in filing the impeachment complaint, in particular, whether the complaint was filed in violation of the one-year ban. The Court cannot review the decision of the Committee on Justice to impeach. Impeachment is a political process. Thus, the decision to impeach lies exclusively on Congress. (Gutierrez v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011) Doctrine of Operative Fact: In the interest of fair play, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized.  This is an exception to the rule that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. In the interest of fair play, under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is because the existence of a law or executive act prior to its invalidation is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. (Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012) THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH Why PDAF/Pork Barrel System is void:  The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” violates the principle of separation of powers, as it authorizes legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation, such as project identification, fund release and fund realignment, thus allowing legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution.  (Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)  The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” violates the principle of nondelegation of legislative power  considering that an individual legislator is given the authority to dictate (a) how much fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that he himself also determines, two (2) acts that comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)   The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” undermines the system of checks and balance by impairing the President’s item veto power. For the President to exercise his item-veto power, there must be a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. Because PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. The legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)   The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” undermines public accountability by impairing Congress’ oversight functions  considering that legislators would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. It also violates the constitutional prohibition on legis lators’ intervention on matters where he may be called upon to act. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)  3|Page

 The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” violates the constitutional principles on local autonomy as it allows district representatives who are national officers to substitute the judgement of local officials on use of public funds for local development. A Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his own. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)

Legislative inquiries: Valid reason to refuse attendance: The invitation does not indicate possible needed statute, subject of the inquiry and advance list of questions:  Invitations to attend congressional inquiries should contain possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof." Compliance with this requirement is imperative. There must be an advance list of questions. (See Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008; Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006) Legislative inquires: Valid reason to refuse attendance: Executive privilege: Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege.” When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. (Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006; Neri v. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008)  Executive privilege is “the power of the Government to withhold information from   the public, the courts, and the Congress.” (Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006) Executive privilege: Coverage: Military and diplomatic secrets, and those affecting national security ,  Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused. (Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006 citing Chavez v. Public Estates Authority; see also Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008) How executive privilege must be asserted:  The claim of privilege must not be implied, and must be clearly asserted; there must be a formal claim. The facts on which the claim is based must be established; the precise and certain reasons for the claim of privilege must be provided. (Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)   The privilege must be invoked by the President or on his behalf. (Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)

Power of inquiry includes the power to compel attendance of witness: The power of legislative investigation includes the power to compel the attendance of witnesses. Corollary to the power to compel the attendance of witnesses is the power to ensure that said witnesses would be available to testify in the legislative investigation. (Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007)  Power of inquiry includes the power to cite for contempt:  The conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge.  The indispensability and usefulness of the power of contempt in a legislative inquiry is underscored in a catena of cases, foreign and local.  (Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006)  The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of selfpreservation as that branch of the government vested with the legislative 4|Page

power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. (Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006) 

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH The role of the President as Commander-in-Chief: A civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the power to direct military operations and determine military strategy. While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his. As Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual. (Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012)  The President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, has full discretion to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion:  Congress may revoke the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Supreme Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law. It is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. (Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012)  Power to transfer appropriations:  The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices; (2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.  (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)

Why the transfer of funds under DAP is invalid:  The transfer of funds under the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) is invalid for lack of a valid law authorizing the transfer . The GAAs of 2011 and 2012 authorized the transfers "to augment any item in this Act", and the effect was that the 5|Page

2011 and 2012 GAAs allowed the transfer of funds to augment any item in the GAAs even if the item belonged to an office outside the Executive, contravention of the Constitution.  (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)   The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid because DAP funds were not necessarily “savings.” Savings are realized only when the purpose for which the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds had ceased to exist. Funds described as “unreleased or unalloted” are not necessarily savings. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)  The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid because DAP funds were not transferred to augment existing items in the GAA. There must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent items in the GAA. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)  The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid for because some of the transfers of appropriation were not made to their respective offices. Crossborder transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, are prohibited. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)

Presidential power to create investigating bodies: Pursuant to his duty to faithfully execute the law, the President has the power to conduct investigations and create an ad hoc investigating body.  The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.  The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws –   in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency  –  is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus , the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010) THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN The Ombudsman’s independence:  T he concept of Ombudsman’s independence covers three (3) things: First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made; Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office “may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its] functions; hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of government so as to impair said functions; and Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those within the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an internal authority.  That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)  The Ombudsman’s administrative disciplinary authority: The Ombudsman can impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, 6|Page

fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee: The Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government, with the exception only of impeachable officers, members of Congress and the Judiciary:  The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The challenge to the Ombudsman’s power to impose these penalties, on the allegation that the Constitution only grants it recommendatory powers, had already been rejected. Under RA 6770, the Office of the Ombudsman was given disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies (with the exception only of impeachable officers, members of Congress and the Judiciary). Also, it can preventively suspend any officer under its authority pending an investigation when the case so warrants. It is settled that the Office of the Ombudsman can directly impose administrative sanctions. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Apolonio, G.R. No. 165132, March 7, 2012) The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies: In case of concurrent jurisdiction, the body where the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction: The Ombudsman has primary  jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandemanian’s  jurisdiction extends only to public officials occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher. Consequently, as we held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez , any act or omission of a public officer or employee occupying a salary grade lower than 27 is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the regular courts or other investigative agencies. In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body where the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. In this case, the petitioner is a Barangay Chairman, occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 14. Under RA 7160, the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority over any elective barangay official. Since the complaint against the petitioner was initially filed   with the Office of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan whose exercise of jurisdiction is concurrent. (Alejandrino v. Office of the Ombudsman Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau, G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013)

The Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate a complaint involving an act of a public official that is not service-connected:  The Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint against petitioner although the act complained of involves a private deal between them. Section 13(1),13 Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that the Ombudsman can investigate on its own or on complaint by any person any act or omission of any public official or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, or improper. Under R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by any public officer or employee during his/her tenure. R.A. No. 6770 also states that the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which are unfair or irregular. Thus, even if the complaint concerns an act of the public official or employee which is not service-connected, the case is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The law does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the 7|Page

performance of official duty. (Samson v. Restrivera, G.R. No. 178454, March 28, 2011)

RA No. 6770 granting disciplinary authority in the President over the Deputy Ombudsman violates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and is thus unconstitutional: Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 is invalid for violating the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize. (Gonzales III v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014) The Court of Appeals can issue injunctive writs against the Ombudsman: The prohibition on court injunctions against Ombudsman investigation is ineffective:   The prohibition under Section 14, RA 6770 against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman encroaches upon the Supreme Court’s rule-making authority and should be considered ineffective, pending deliberation on whether or not the Supreme Court should adopt such prohibition. Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Supreme Court’s consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. These issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of the CA’s certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and which it had already acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)

OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL BODIES JBC can set standards for choosing nominees to the judiciary:  JBC’s policy of requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional. The JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every position. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)  COA has jurisdiction over money claims against the government: COA has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities, including local governments. The COA and not the RTC has primary jurisdiction to pass upon a money claim against a local government unit. (Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013)  COA’s authority over money claims is limited to liquidated claims, or those determined or readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers within reach of accounting officers.  (Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013)

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NATIONAL ECONOMY Constitutional requirements for a valid service contract:  The Constitutional requirements for a valid service contract for the large-scale exploration and development of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils are the following: 1) the service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions; 2) the President shall be the signatory for the government; and 3) within 30 days, the President shall report it to Congress. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape of Tañon Strait v. Secretary Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015) CITIZENSHIP As a matter of law, foundlings are natural-born citizens: As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. The deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution.  This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. (Poe-  Llamanzares v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016)  Foundlings are citizens under international law:   Under Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth. Under Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found. The principles found in these two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law. Thus, they part of the law of the land. (Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016) It is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is found. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. (Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016) Reacquisition of citizenship:  Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 for those who have lost the same by naturalization before the effectivity of RA 9225 -- has no retroactive effect. A former natural-born Filipino citizen re-acquires his Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. (David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015)  POLICE POWER Police power and taking of property:  The State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community. The requirement under the ordinance for owners of educational institutions to build their fences six meters back for beautification purposes is invalid for being unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)  Test for a valid exercise of police power: There must be reasonable relation between the purpose of the police power measure and the means employed for its accomplishment. The means employed must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the government purpose. Limiting the height of fences of private properties to one meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter to be at least 80% see-thru has no reasonable relation to its purpose of ensuring public safety and security. The ordinance is thus an 9|Page

invalid exercise of police power. Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed ordinance is, thus, a clear encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily includes their right to decide how best to protect their property. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)

EMINENT DOMAIN What constitutes “taking” of prope rty in eminent domain cases: Where the owner is deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property or of its value by its being diverted to public use, there is taking within the Constitutional sense. In the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, there is a "taking" when the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction or a material impairment of the value of his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof. There is a "taking" in this sense when the expropriator enters private property not only for a momentary period but for a more permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. For ownership, after all, "is nothing without the inherent rights of possession, control and enjoyment. Where the owner is deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property or of its value by its being diverted to public use, there is taking within the Constitutional sense.  (Republic v. Borbon, G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015) 

A city ordinance requiring land owners to setback their fences by five meters to provide for parking space is a compensable taking: A city ordinance requiring land owners to setback their fences by five meters to provide for parking space is tantamount to a taking of private property for public use without just compensation. The total destruction of value of the property is not required for a taking to be compensable. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)  Reckoning point for determining the value of the property: Value of the property at the time of taking.  The reckoning point for determining just compensation is the value of the property at the time of taking. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Spouses Sta. Romana, G.R. No. 183290, July 9, 2014)  Even if the government taking was in 1940, and the action for payment of just compensation was only filed in 1995, the reckoning point for determining just compensation is still the value of the property at the time of taking. Thus, just compensation should be fixed not as of the time of payment but at the time of taking, that is, in 1940, even though this valuation appears outdated. (Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013)

Compensation to property owner in case expropriation proceedings are discontinued: The expropriator who has taken possession of the property subject of expropriation is obliged to pay reasonable compensation to the landowner for the period of such possession although the proceedings had been discontinued on the ground that the public purpose for the expropriation had meanwhile ceased. In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the property to the respondents, there is no need to pay "just compensation" to them because their property would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full market value of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry in March 1993 until the time of restoration of the 10 | P a g e

possession by paying to them actual or other compensatory damages. (Republic v. Borbon, G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015)

DUE PROCESS Due process in NBI investigations: The NBI does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial powers.  There is no violation of due process in an NBI investigation if the respondents are not given an opportunity to file an answer or submit counter-evidence. The NBI does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial powers and its findings are merely recommendatory. (Shu v. Dee, G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014) Procedural safeguards in student disciplinary cases:  Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those in courts of justice. Proceedings may be summary; crossexamination is not an essential part of the investigation or hearing; and the required proof in a student disciplinary action is only substantial evidence. Official action must meet minimum standards of fairness to the individual, which generally encompass the right of adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. (Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015) Counsel’s mistake and due process: To properly claim gross negligence on the part of the counsel, the petitioner must show that the counsel was guilty of nothing short of a clea r abandonment of the client’s cause.  The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique, unless the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law. The negligence of counsel must be so gross that the client is deprived of his day in court. To properly claim gross negligence on the part of the counsel, the petitioner must show that the counsel was guilty of nothing short of a clear abandonment of the client’s cause. (Uyboco v. People, G.R. No. 211703, December 10, 2014)

EQUAL PROTECTION The policy of JBC requiring 5 years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts does not violate the equal protection clause.  There is a substantial distinction between judges with 5-year experience and those with less than 5 five years.  The classification is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose of selecting those with proven competence. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015) The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission to investigate reported graft and corruption during the previous administration only violates the equal protection clause:  Although the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 creating the Philippine Truth Commission is invalid for transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. “Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned 11 | P a g e

truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration" only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. The Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. In order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. In Executive Order No. 1, the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional. The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination. (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010) 

FREE SPEECH The law penalizing “aiding and abetting the commission” of internet libel: Void for being vague and overbroad.  The law penalizing “aiding and abetting” the commission of internet libel is void for being vague and overbroad. The terms "aiding or abetting" unnecessarily sweep broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms, generating a chilling effect on those who express themselves in cyberspace. Also, netizens are not given "fair notice" or warning as to what is criminal conduct and what is lawful conduct. Its vagueness also causes a chilling effect on the freedom of expression. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014)

Why Comelec regulation of political speech on oversized tarpaulins posted on private property by non-candidates during elections is void: Speech with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.  Tarpaulins put up by private individuals that contain statements of their approval or criticisms of public officials’ vote on the RH Law, as part of these private individuals’ advocacy campaign against the RH Law, and not paid for by any candidate or political party  –   are not election propaganda subject to Comelec regulation.  (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015) Prohibiting non-candidates from posting on their private property tarpaulins containing their opinions that may affect elections is a contentbased regulation that is presumed invalid. A content-based prior restraint will only be valid it if passes the clear and present danger test. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)  The act of the Comelec in restraining private individuals from posting tarpaulins expressing political views in their own private property is an impermissible encroachment on the right to property. The Comelec prohibition is a deprivation of property without due process. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

Why the aggregate air-time limit on campaign advertising is invalid: This unreasonably restricts the freedom of speech and of the press and violates the people’s right to suffrage . Restriction on freedom of speech and of the press: The Comelec’s rule -- limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes for political campaigns or advertisements -- is unreasonable and arbitrary, as it unreasonably restricts the freedom of speech and of the press. It unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people.  (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014) Violation of the right to suffrage:  The COMELEC’s aggregate time-limit rule [rule limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and 12 | P a g e

political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes for political campaigns or advertisements] violate the people’s right to suffrage by restricting the right of the people to be adequately informed for the intelligent exercise of their right to determine their own destiny. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014)

The Comelec prohibition on posting of an election campaign material during an election period in Public Utility Vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals is void because it is a prior restraint on free expression.  The Comelec prohibition on posting of an election campaign material during an election period in Public Utility Vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals -- constitutes a prior restraint on the right to free expression. Prior restraints are presumed invalid. (1-United Transport Koalisyon [1-Utak] v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015) A content-neutral regulation, which merely controls the time, place or manner of speech, is valid if the following requisites concur: first, the government regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government; second, it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; third, the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and fourth, the incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election campaign materials is an invalid content-neutral regulation because, first, it is not within the constitutionally delegated power of the Comelec, and second, there is no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. (1-  United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015)  Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election campaign materials cannot be justified under the captive-audience doctrine.  The commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals, nor are they incapable of declining to receive the messages contained therein. (1-United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015)

Public Figure Doctrine/Actual Malice Rule: To be liable for libel against a public official or public figure, the latter must prove that the statements were made with actual malice  —   that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not:  Even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statements was made with actual malice  —   that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. This is the gist of the ruling in the landmark case of New York Times v . Sullivan . This is the rule of "actual malice." In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. (Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118971, September 15, 1999)  Honest criticisms on the conduct of public officials and public figures are insulated from libel judgments. The guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibit a public official or public figure from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice, i .e ., with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The raison d' être for the New York Times doctrine was that to require critics of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions on pain of libel judgments would lead to self-censorship. A "public figure" as defined in Ayers Production Pty., Ltd. v. Capulong   refers to celebrity. It includes, in short, anyone who has 13 | P a g e

arrived at a position where the public attention is focused upon him as a person. (Borjal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999)  In order to justify a conviction for criminal libel against a public figure, it must be established beyond reasonable doubt that the libelous statements were made or published with actual malice, meaning knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true. (Guingguing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128959 September 30, 2005) 

The actual malice rule applies even if the person subject of criticism is not a public figure, for as long as he is involved in a public issue:   But even assuming ex-gratia argumenti that private respondent, despite the position he occupied would not qualify as a public figure, it does not necessarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment even if he was not a public official or at least a public figure, for he could be, as long as he was involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved or because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety. (Borjal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999) RIGHT TO PEACEABLY ASSEMBLE Application for a permit to rally can only be denied or modified on the showing of a clear and present danger:  Freedom of assembly is not to be limited or denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. If the mayor is to refuse an application for a permit to a rally or modify it (the venue, for example), such refusal or modification must be based on the clear and present danger test; also, the mayor must immediately inform the applicant who should be heard first on the perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the change of venue. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010) UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES A proclamation of a state of emergency is not a valid legal basis for general searches and seizures:  A proclamation of a state of emergency by a provincial governor cannot serve as legal basis for general searches and seizures, including warrantless arrests. Even a declaration of martial law by the President does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ." (Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012) Description in search warrants: The specific room in the house to be searched need not be identified. A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. The specific room in the house to be searched need not be identified. (People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010) Search must precede the arrest: In a search incident to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the process cannot be reversed. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014) Airport security searches: Valid even without a warrant, because of their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the 14 | P a g e

reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. (Sales v. People, G.R. No. 191023, February 06, 2013)

Requirements to establish violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures:  To establish a violation of one’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures, one must first prove that he has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy in the place searched or the item seized; and second, his subjective expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)  Reduced expectation of privacy for a government employee in his office: A government employee’s expectation of privacy in a regulated office environment is reduced. The employee’s privacy interest in an office is to a large extent limited by the compan y’s work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace.  (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011) No expectation of privacy for a government employee in his government-issued computer if the employee is so notified based on office policy: A government employee cannot have a subjective expectation of privacy in his government-issued computer containing his personal files, if the government office implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers.  (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)  Requirement for warrantless search by the government employer of a government employee’s office: reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct: A warrantless search by a government employer of an employees’ office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. Thus, a search of a government employee’s files in the government-issued computer, conducted in connection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint -- is reasonable. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011) Overt act requirement in in flagrante delicto arrest: For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer." Trying to run away when no crime has been overtly committed, and without more, cannot be evidence of guilt. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt. (People v. Edano, G.R. No. 188133, July 7, 2014) Reliable information alone is not enough to justify a warrantless arrest. The accused must perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. (People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010)  “Overt act” requirement in in flagrante delicto arrest:  The mere act of leaving a residence of a known drug peddler is not sufficient for a valid arrest, unless there is an overt manifestation that the person had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in the criminal activity of illegal possession of shabu. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)

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Police presence at the scene not required in a hot pursuit arrest: In a hot pursuit arrest, police presence at the scene while the crime was being committed is not required. It is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent and the police officer has probable cause to believe, based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime. (Pestilos v. Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014)  Arrest of someone who voluntarily surrenders to clear his name: The arrest of a person who has presented himself before the police station to clear his name and prove that he is not the accused -- is not valid, as he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense, and the police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. (In the Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo, v. Warden, Quezon City Jail, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015)  RIGHT TO PRIVACY Determining violation of the right to privacy: Reasonable expectation of privacy test:  The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test should be used to determine whether there is a violation of the right to privacy.  The reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013) Surveillance cameras should not pry into or cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)

Expectation of privacy and use of privacy tools in Facebook:  To have an expectation of privacy in Facebook posts, a user must show intention to keep certain posts private through the use of privacy tools. A Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her post or profile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice. (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014)  An ordinance requiring property owners such as private schools to expose their property by limiting the height of fences to one meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter to be at least 80% see-thru is a violation of the right to privacy of the property owners. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013) 

Writ of habeas data: There must be a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other for the writ of habeas data to be granted. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012)  Right to privacy must yield to an overriding legitimate state interest: An application for a writ of habeas data may be denied if the right to privacy in life, liberty or security must yield to an overriding legitimate state interest, such as dismantling of private armed groups (PAGs). The state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa. Thus, the act of the police in collecting information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, such as Gamboa, and in sharing and forwarding such information to a government body tasked to investigate PAGs was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The fact that the PNP released information to the government investigating commission without prior communication to Gamboa 16 | P a g e

and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation. The right to privacy is not absolute. It may succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012)

An ordinance requiring property owners to expose their property by limiting the height of fences can be a violation of the right to privacy of the property owners. Ordinance No. 192 limits the height of fences to one meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter to be at least 80% see-thru. Requiring the exposure of their property via a see-thru fence is violative of their right to privacy, considering that the residence of the Benedictine nuns is also located within the property. The right to privacy has long been considered a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. The right to privacy is essentially the right to be let alone, as governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of its citizens. It is inherent in the concept of liberty, enshrined in the Bill of Rights (Article III) in Sections 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8, and 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)  RIGHTS IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATIONS Meaning of custodial investigation: Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. Applying the foregoing definitions, accused-appellant was not under custodial investigation when he admitted, without assistance of counsel, to POI  Torre and POI Macusi that he stabbed his father to death. Accused-appellant's verbal confession was so spontaneously and voluntarily given and was not elicited through questioning by the police authorities. At that point, PO I Macusi still had no idea who actually committed the crime and did not consider accused-appellant as the suspect in his father's killing. Accusedappellant was also merely standing before POI Torre and POI Macusi in front of the Camiling Police Station and was not yet in police custody. Accusedappellant was arrested and subjected to custodial investigation by the police officers only after his confession. Hence, herein accused-appellant's confession, even if done without the assistance of a lawyer, is not in violation of his constitutional right under Section I2, paragraph I, Article III of the I987 Constitution. (People v. Guting, G.R. No. 205412, September 9, 2015) 

Miranda rights not applicable in administrative investigations: Rights in custodial interrogation apply only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. Thus, an employee’s  written statement given during an administrative inquiry conducted by an employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his employment -- is admissible as evidence against the employee, even if he was not assisted by a lawyer when he signed the written statement. (Tanenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013)  Voluntary confession without the assistance of counsel given before police investigation or arrest is admissible as evidence, because it was made not under custodial investigation: Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the 17 | P a g e

commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. If a person, before he is arrested and placed under custodial investigation, voluntarily confesses to the police his commission of a crime, such confession, even if done without the assistance of a lawyer, is not in violation of his constitutional right, and is admissible as evidence. (People v. Guting, G.R. No. 205412, September 9, 2015) 

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION Mandatory drug testing for those arrested: Mandatory drug testing of a person arrested for alleged extortion violates a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the right against self-incrimination. The constitutional right against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. However, a drug test result is immaterial evidence in prosecuting non-drug offenses. Moreover, to impose mandatory drug testing on the accused for all persons arrested regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest was made is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution. We cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014) Paraffin test without a lawyer is valid: The right against selfincrimination extends only to testimonial compulsion: As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question, under the sixth assigned error, that it was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer.  This right is afforded to any person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose confession or admission may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. His right against self-incrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined as in this case. Indeed, the paraffin test proved positively that he just recently fired a gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution. (People v. Fieldad, G.R. No. 196005, October 1, 2014) RIGHT TO BAIL Bail when incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to the health or endangers the life of the accused: Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged , should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge , provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial. Granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly , will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.  (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015) RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY Dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation would not put the accused in danger of double jeopardy: The first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Since the preliminary investigation stage is not part of the 18 | P a g e

trial, the dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation would not put the accused in danger of double jeopardy in the event of a re-investigation or the filing of a similar case. (Jamaca v. People, G.R. No. 183681, July 27, 2015)

RIGHT TO INFORMATION Access to information on the winning bidder for a government project: The people’s constitutional right to information is intertwined with the government’s constitutional duty of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. The people have the right to access the papers and documents relating to the company profile and legal capacity of the winning bidder for a government project. (Initiatives For Dialogue And Empowerment Through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation, G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012) LIBERTY OF ABODE When evictions and demolitions without any court order are valid:  The Constitution provides that urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. RA 7279 allows summary evictions and demolition in cases where persons or entities occupy danger areas and when persons occupy areas where government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented. To ensure that evictions and demolitions are conducted in a  just and humane manner, RA 7279 commands requires compliance with a prescribed procedure in executing eviction and/or demolition orders, including prior 30-day notice and adequate consultation. Evictions and demolitions without any court order under RA 7279 are valid.  (Kalipunan Ang Damay Ang Mahihirap v. Robredo, G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014)  ACADEMIC FREEDOM Academic freedom  gives institutions of higher learning the right to impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel students who violate disciplinary rules. The power to discipline students is subsumed in the academic freedom to determine what may be taught, how it shall be taught and who may be admitted to study. (Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015) THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS A person who is illegally arrested and detained because of a mistaken identity can avail himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus. It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner. The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued. (In the Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo, v. Warden, Quezon City Jail, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015) WRIT OF AMPARO Presidential immunity in amparo proceedings: A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure. Hence, former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny, within the context of amparo proceedings, to determine if she was responsible or accountable for the 19 | P a g e

abduction of a person. Moreover, there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo  and habeas data   proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. (Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 193160, November 15, 2011) 

Writ of amparo: Command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable individuals who have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. Amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.  (Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011)  In amparo proceedings, a former President can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings:  Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the president [ex-President Arroyo], as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.  To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain: a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.  The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through circumstantial evidence. Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the acts are widespread within the government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office personnel are involved. Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively command, control and discipline the military. (Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011) 

In amparo proceedings, responsibility or accountability for extrajudicial killing must be established by substantial evidence:  The next 20 | P a g e

question that must be tackled is whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his abduction. We rule in the negative. Aside from Rodriguez’s general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it. (Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW Right to counsel not imperative in administrative proceedings: In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel. As such, the right to counsel is not imperative. Thus, there is nothing objectionable in the denial by an adjudicating body of a request to reschedule an administrative conference because the counsel for the respondent would not be available. In an administrative proceeding like that conducted against the petitioner, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel. As such, the right to counsel is not imperative because administrative investigations are themselves inquiries conducted only to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.  (Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013) Before enforcement of administrative that impose a heavy and substantial burden on the citizenry, there must be prior opportunity to be heard: Prior opportunity to be heard is required before an administrative agency enforces rules and regulations that substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed. Thus, the Comelec should have conducted prior hearings before promulgating the resolution on aggregate-based air time limits for political advertising, as this administrative rule introduces a radical change, and adversely affects, or imposes a heavy and substantial burden on, the citizenry. Otherwise, the new rule is ineffectual. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014) The doctrine of res judicata  applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers:  The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers. Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a q uasi-judicial character. In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and evaluating evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved. The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with respect to the matter in controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the contending parties are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rights and obligations of the parties. In Bedol v. Commission  on Elections, the Supreme Court declared:  The Supreme Court has laid down the test for determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial or merely investigatory functions: adjudication signifies the exercise of the power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties. Hence, if the only purpose of an investigation is to evaluate the evidence submitted to an agency based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of 21 | P a g e

 judicial discretion and judgment.  (Encinas v. PO1 Agustin and PO1 Caubang, G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013) 

The results of a fact-finding investigatio n are not a “judgment on the merits” for purposes of the application of the doctrine of res judicata : In this case, there is no "judgment on the merits." The dismissal of the BFP Complaint in the Resolution  dated 05 July 2005 was the result of a fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should be filed. Hence, no rights and liabilities of parties were determined therein with finality. The proceedings before the BFP yields the conclusion that they were purely administrative in nature and constituted a fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should be filed against petitioner. The proceedings before the BFP were merely investigative, aimed at determining the existence of facts for the purpose of deciding whether to proceed with an administrative action.  This process can be likened to a public prosecutor’s preliminary investigation, which entails a determination of whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty, and whether a crime has been committed.  The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rulemaking functions. The public prosecutor exercises investigative powers in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. Similarly, the BFP exercised its investigative or fact-finding function to determine whether, based on the facts and the evidence presented, further administrative action — in the form of a formal charge — should be taken against petitioner. In neither instance is there in adjudication upon the rights, obligations, or liabilities of the parties before them. The dismissal of the BFP Complaint cannot operate as res judicata. (Encinas v. PO1 Agustin and PO1 Caubang, G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013)

THE LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS Impeachment Process: The one-year bar starts from “initiation” of impeachment complaint:  Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: "No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." The term "initiate" means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one-year period. (Gutierrez v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011) 

Condonation doctrine has no legal basis:  The doctrine of condonation is bereft of legal bases. The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official’s administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second 22 | P a g e

term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned by the President. When a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)

Nepotism: The prohibition against nepotism applies to appointments made by a group of individuals acting as a body.   A relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of a member of the body that is the appointing authority (such as the Civil Service Commission) cannot be appointed by such body. (Civil Service Commission v. Cortes, G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014) Back salaries during the suspension pending an appeal: Two conditions must be met before an employee may be entitled: 1) the employee must be found innocent of the charges; and 2) his suspension must be unjustified: The issue of entitlement to back salaries, for the period of suspension pending appeal, of a government employee who had been dismissed but was subsequently exonerated is settled in our jurisdiction. The starting point for this outcome is the no work-no pay principle public officials are only entitled to compensation if they render service. There are two conditions before an employee may be entitled to back salaries: a) the employee must be found innocent of the charges and b) his suspension must be unjustified. The reasoning behind these conditions runs this way: although an employee is considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of a successful appeal, the law itself only authorizes preventive suspension for a fixed period; hence, his suspension beyond this fixed period is unjustified and must be compensated.  (Civil Service Commission v. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011)  In case of an employee’s complete exoneration of the administrative charge against him (i.e., the employee is not found guilty of any  other offense), or the employee’s acquittal of the criminal charge based on his innocence, the requirement (for payment of back wages for the period of the suspension pending appeal) that the suspension must be unjustified is automatically subsumed in the other requirement of exoneration:  The payment of back salary to a government employee -- who was illegally removed from office -- because of his eventual exoneration on appeal, is merely incidental to the ordered reinstatement. Also, where the employee, who was dismissed after being found administratively liable for dishonesty, was acquitted on a finding of innocence in the criminal case based on the same acts for which he was dismissed the executive pardon granted him in the administrative case (in light of   his prior acquittal) entitled him to back salaries from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his actual reinstatement.  The above situation should be distinguished from the case of an employee who was dismissed from the service after conviction of a crime and who was ordered reinstated after being granted pardon. We held that he was not entitled to back salaries since he was not illegally dismissed nor acquitted of the charge against him. In case of the employee’s complete exoneration of the administrative charge against him (i.e.,  the employee is not found guilty of any other offense), or his acquittal of the criminal charge based on his innocence -- the conditions laid down in Gonzales become the two sides of the same coin; the requirement that the suspension must be unjustified is automatically subsumed in the other requirement of exoneration. (Civil Service Commission v. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011)  23 | P a g e

Meaning of exoneration: If the administrative offense found to have been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot be considered exonerated, if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the same: However, the employee found guilty of a lesser offense may only be entitled to back salaries when the offense actually committed does not carry the penalty of more than one-month suspension or dismissal. The mere reduction of the penalty on appeal does not entitle a government employee to back salaries if he was not exonerated of the charge against him. This is the Court’ s teaching in City Mayor of Zamboanga v. CA. In this case, the employee was initially found guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct and was given the penalty of dismissal by the City Mayor of Zamboanga. On appeal, however, the CA limited the employee’s guilt to improper conduct and correspo ndingly reduced the penalty to six-months suspension without pay with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely." Bangalisan clearly laid down the principle that if the exoneration of the employee is relative (as distinguished from complete exoneration), an inquiry into the factual premise of the offense charged and of the offense committed must be made. If the administrative offense found to have been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the same. The employee found guilty of a lesser offense may only be entitled to back salaries when the offense actually committed does not carry the penalty of more than one-month suspension or dismissal. Bangalisan   reiterated that the payment of back salaries, during the period of suspension of a member of the civil service who is subsequently ordered reinstated, may be decreed only if the employee is found innocent of the charges which caused the suspension and when the suspension is unjustified. A careful reading of these cases would reveal that a strict observance of the second condition for an award of back salaries becomes important only if the employee is not totally innocent of any administrative infraction. As previously discussed, where the employee is completely exonerated of the administrative charge or acquitted in the criminal case arising from the same facts based on a finding of innocence, the second requirement becomes subsumed in the first. Otherwise, a determination of the act/s and offense/s actually committed and of the corresponding penalty imposed has to be made. (Civil Service Commission v. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011)

Liability of Public Officers: The Arias Doctrine:  Heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction. Even if the head of office erred in his assessment of the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of the documents presented to him for endorsement, his act is all the same imbued with good faith because the otherwise faulty reliance upon his subordinates. (Jaca v. People, G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013) Exception to the Arias Doctrine:  If there are peculiar circumstances that should have prompted a head of office to exercise a higher degree of circumspection, he must go beyond what his subordinates had prepared or recommended. (Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 156577, December 3, 2014)  The Arias Doctrine will not apply if the documents in question bore irregularities too evident too ignore. In such case, the head of office must exercise a higher degree of circumspection, and go beyond what their subordinates had prepared.  (Lihaylihay v. People, G.R. No. 191219, July 31, 2013)

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 The Arias Doctrine applies only to heads of offices, not to public officials whose duty is to examine each voucher to ascertain whether it was proper to sign it. (Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 189343, July 10, 2013)  The Arias Doctrine applies only where the head of an office is being held to answer for his act of relying on the acts of his subordinate. It is not applicable when the head of an office is being held liable for relying on other independent offices. (Jaca v. People, G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013)

Next-in-Rank Rule: The next in rank has no vested right to be appointed to the position next higher:  The next-in-rank rule is a rule of preference on who to consider for promotion. The rule does not give employees next in rank a vested right to the position next higher to theirs should that position become vacant. Appointment is a discretionary power of the appointing authority. Who to appoint is "a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide." As long as the appointee possesses the minimum qualifications prescribed by law or regulations, there is no question that his appointment must be respected by the Civil Service Commission even if it be proved that there are others with superior credentials. (Abad v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 207422, March 18, 2015)  De facto Officers: Acts are valid and binding: One who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, meaning an authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, is a de  facto   officer. A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired. (Funa v. Chairman, Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014) The actions of a de facto  officer are valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons are concerned: A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. (Funa v. Chairman, Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)

ELECTION LAW Biometrics validation as part of the registration process is not a "qualification" to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate: Essentially, the present petition is a constitutional challenge against the biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, including COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013. As non-compliance with the same results in the penalty of deactivation, petitioners posit that it has risen to the level of an unconstitutional substantive requirement in the exercise of the right of suffrage. They submit that the statutory requirement of biometric validation is no different from the unconstitutional requirement of literacy and property because mere non-validation already absolutely curtails the exercise of the right of suffrage through deactivation. Further, they advance the argument that deactivation is not the disqualification by law contemplated as a valid limitation to the exercise of suffrage under the 1987 Constitution. The contestation is untenable. Registration is a form of regulation and not as a qualification for the right of suffrage: Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right: Registration is a mere 25 | P a g e

procedural requirement which does not fall under the limitation that "[n]o literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage." The requirement of biometrics validation for voters is not a "qualification" to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate.  The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. The State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election. (Kabataan Party List v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015) 

Comelec has no jurisdiction over the expulsion of party-list representative from his party: Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives. (Lico v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015)  The COMELEC also has no jurisdiction to decide on the validity of the expulsion of an incumbent Member of the House of Representatives from the winning party-list organization that he represents. His expulsion from the party-list organization is not a mere intra-corporate matter because it necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. The COMELEC failed to recognize that the issue on the validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop is integral to the issue of his qualifications to sit in Congress. (Lico v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015) 

False nickname is not material misrepresentation:  An allegedly false nickname in the CoC is not a “material misrepresentation” that is a ground to cancel or deny due course to a CoC under Section 78. (Villafuerte v. Comelec, 25 February 2014) Due process in cancellatino of CoC:   Opportunity to be heard is required before cancellation of or denial of due course to a CoC.  (Cerafica v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014) For cancellation of/denial of due course to a CoC for material misrepresentation, there must be a verified petition. (Cerafica v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014)  Nuisance candidates: Comelec must give the candidate opportunity to be heard before cancellation of/denial of due course of CoC. (Timbol v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015)

Requirements for former natural-born Filipinos to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections: Oath of allegiance and oath of renunciation: Natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship must (1) take the oath of allegiance under RA 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. (Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012) 

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 The mere act of running for public offices does not suffice to serve as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.  (Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012)

Effect of use of foreign passport after oath of renunciation: Recantation of oath of renunciation: Recantation of Oath of Renunciation .  The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’ s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position. (Maquiling v. Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013)  Rules on determination of residence: There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate’s compliance with residency requirement since the question of residence is a question of intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time. To hold that  Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere. (Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012)  No requirement to own a house to establish residence:  A candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. (Jalosjos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012)   The fact that a candidate has no registered property under his name does not belie his actual residence because property ownership is not among the qualifications required of candidates for local election. It is enough that he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative.  To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. (Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014) 

No requirement of 24-7 presence to establish residence: The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement.  (Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014)  Subjective non-legal standards (such as, a man of stature does not live in a dilapidated house or a feedmill) cannot be used to determine residence. (Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014) Three-term limit rule: In case of legislative reapportionment, where the district is practically the same as the district that previously elected the same candidate, the three-term limit rule applies. (Naval v. Comelec, G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014) 

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS The Mayor has the power to demolish illegal constructions after due process:  Under Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the Local Government Code, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition. This 27 | P a g e

power is separate and distinct from the power to summarily abate nuisances per se . (Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014)

Local autonomy does not preclude the national government from taking a direct hand in national social welfare programs:  The concept of local autonomy does not imply the conversion of local government units into "mini-states." The national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. Policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. Thus, the national government is not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national social welfare programs.  Thus, the Department of Social Welfare and Development can embark on a poverty reduction strategy with the poorest of the poor as target beneficiaries, such as the Conditional Cash Transfer Program (CCTP) and have full control over the identification of beneficiaries and the manner by which services are to be delivered, instead of allocating the P21 Billion CCTP Budget directly to the LGUs. (Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012) 

Requirements for government projects affecting the ecological balance of local communities:  prior public consultation and prior sanggunian approval: Under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian . Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal. The lack of  prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by a subsequent endorsement. (Boracay Foundation v. Province of Aklan, G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012) 

INTERNATIONAL LAW How the Philippines can be bound by an international treaty that it has not signed: Under the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.  That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. Their principles are binding as generally accepted principles of international law. "Generally accepted principles of international law" are based not only on international custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. (Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016)

Generally accepted principles of international law include customary international la and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations: Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates   (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. "General principles of law recognized by civilized 28 | P a g e

nations" are principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal systems generally, such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice," and the "general principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation. (Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016)

Basic principles that should govern the relations between and among States:  Under international law, what basic principles should govern the relations between and among States? The United Nations Charter provides that its Members should act in accordance with the following principles: Sovereign equality of states:  “ The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” Pacta sunt servanda:  “All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.” Peaceful settlement of disputes:  “All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.” Prohibition on the threat or use of force:  “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Assistance to the UN:  “All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.” Ensuring compliance by non-members:  “ The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.” Non-intervention in domestic or internal affairs:  “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” (see Article 2, Chapter 1, United Nations Charter)  The principle of complementarity and the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC):  The principle of complementarity simply means that the ICC is intended to complement, not replace, national criminal systems; it prosecutes cases only when States do not or are unwilling or unable to do so genuinely. (https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works)  Under Article 17 of the Rome Statute, a case is inadmissible if: (a) the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; (b) the case has been investigated by a State which has  jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; or (c) the person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint.

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