Political Law Review Notes

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW NOTES

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THE BILL OF RIGHTS

Right against taking of private property without just compensation The land owner is entitled to 12% interest on the value of the property, computed from the time of the taking up to the time compensation is actually paid Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the property. However, compensation, to be "just," must also be made without delay. The owner’s loss is not only his property but also its income-generating potential. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. Just compensation due to the landowners for their expropriated property amounted to an effective forbearance on the part of the State. Applying the Eastern Shipping Lines ruling, the applicable interest rate is 12% per annum, computed from the time the property was taken until the full amount of just compensation was paid. (Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010; April 5, 2011, Brion; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santiago, G.R. No. 182209, October 3, 2012)

The right to claim just compensation cannot be barred by prescription or the doctrine of state immunity from suit Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. (Amigable v. Cuenca, G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972) The right to recover just compensation is enshrined in no less than our Bill of Rights, which states that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." This constitutional mandate cannot be defeated by statutory prescription. Thus, we have ruled that the prescriptive period under R.A. No. 6395 does not extend to an action to recover just compensation. It would be a confiscatory act on the part of the government to take the property of respondent spouses for a public purpose and deprive them of their right to just compensation, solely because they failed to institute 1 Prepared by Prof. Alexis F. Medina. Professor of Constitutional Law, San Sebastian College Recoletos-Manila, Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP) Manila, and New Era University.

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inverse condemnation proceedings within five years from the time the transmission lines were constructed. (National Power Corporation v. Spouses Saludares, G.R. No. 189127, April 25, 2012)

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures Stopping or flagging down a motorist for a traffic violation is not necessarily an arrest that justifies a subsequent search Under Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter. At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been "under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest. However, when there is intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation. There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that results from this will be illegal. (Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012)

Customs searches: No search warrant is required, except when the search is at a dwelling A law enforcement officer deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, can, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, and it is his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. He can lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he has reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 to enter, pass through or search any land, enclosures, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a 2|Page

dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace." (Papa v. Mago G.R. No. L-27360, February 28, 1968)

Immediate control test: The limitation on a search incident to a lawful arrest The Revised Rules of Court provide that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. The established rule is to absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or her person at the time of and incident to his or her arrest and to "dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest. However, warrantless searches made not only on the person of the suspect but also in a permissible area within his reach. The reach of a valid warrantless search includes the premises or surroundings under his immediate control or the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him. (People v. Leangsiri, G.R. No. 112659, January 24, 1996)

A search warrant for records of “all business transactions” whether legal or illegal is an invalid general warrant The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. (Stonehill v. Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967)

Mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of secondary and tertiary students is constitutional Schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students. Minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools. Schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty. Schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. The provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be 3|Page

sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements. (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008)

Mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of public and private employees is a “reasonable search” and therefore valid Petitioners failed to show that mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. "Reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed or reduced by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Also, the enabling law authorizing a search is "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused." Sec. 36 of RA 9165 contains provisions to protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. Also, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual's privacy interest under the premises. Taking into account the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional. (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008)

The right to privacy of communications

Detention officers may undertake reasonable measures to prevent the escape of detainees, including opening and reading the latter’s private letters RA 7438, which specifies the rights of detainees and the duties of detention officers, expressly recognizes the power of the detention officer to adopt and implement reasonable measures to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the detainees’ letters in the present case violated the detainees’ right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband. The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and 4|Page

their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees. That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizen’s privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights. (Alejano v. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005)

Writ of amparo and writ of habeas data The writ of amparo does not protect the right to property; it only addresses violations of, or threats, to the rights to life, liberty or security. The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court is not included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo. (Canlas v. Napico Homeowners’ Association, G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008) To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. (Masangkay v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008, Brion, underscoring supplied)

Direct evidence of enforced disappearance not required for the writ of amparo to issue We continue to adhere to the substantial evidence rule that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires, with some adjustments for flexibility in considering the evidence presented. When we ruled that hearsay evidence (usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence) may be admitted as the circumstances of the case may require, we did not thereby dispense with the substantial evidence rule; we merely relaxed the evidentiary rule on the admissibility of evidence, maintaining all the time the standards of reason and relevance that underlie every evidentiary situation. This, we did, by considering the totality of the obtaining situation and the consistency of the hearsay evidence with the other available evidence in the case. 5|Page

[T]he burden of proof must be lowered or relaxed (either through the use of circumstantial or indirect evidence or even by logical inference); the requirement for direct evidence to establish that an enforced disappearance occurred -- as the petitioners effectively suggest -- would render it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that an individual has been made to disappear. In these lights, we emphasized in our December 3, 2009 Decision that while the need for substantial evidence remains the rule, flexibility must be observed where appropriate . . . for the protection of the precious rights to life, liberty and security. This flexibility, we noted, requires that "we should take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence – even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence – taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum admissibility requirement." (Razon v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, February 16, 2010)

What can be the legal basis or bases for impleading military commanders in amparo cases? Subsequently, we have clarified that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. Commanders may therefore be impleaded—not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court defined responsibility and accountability as these terms are applied to amparo proceedings, as follows: x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. x x x (Balao v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050, December 13, 2011)

Free speech guarantee Clear and present danger: The valid justification for X-rating a TV program In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the 6|Page

danger. (Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996)

A content-based prior restraint is presumed invalid A content-based regulation of speech bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague. To recapitulate, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media. (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008)

The right against self-incrimination A court order for DNA testing does not violate the right against self-incrimination Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity case will not violate the right against self-incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence that is "communicative" in essence taken under duress. The right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. As such, a defendant can be required to submit to a test to extract virus from his body; the substance emitting from the body of the accused was received as evidence for acts of lasciviousness; morphine forced out of the mouth was received as proof; an order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of pants for size was allowed; and the court can compel a woman accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test, since the gist of the privilege is the restriction on "testimonial compulsion." (See Herrera v. Alba, G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005)

Right against double jeopardy Requirements for double jeopardy to attach and the reason for the rule Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 7|Page

A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable. The State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. The underlying idea is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty. On the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The Constitution has adopted the double jeopardy policy and thus bars multiple criminal trials, thereby conclusively presuming that a second trial would be unfair if the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a previous final judgment. Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s culpability. (People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 168982, August 5, 2009, Brion)

Rights under custodial investigation Miranda rights do not apply in cases of confessions to private persons, such as a radio reporter The accused-appellant’s confession to the radio reporter, Celso Manuel is admissible. In People vs. Andan, the accused in a rape with homicide case confessed to the crime during interviews with the media. In holding the confession admissible, despite the fact that the accused gave his answers without the assistance of counsel, this court said: Appellant’s confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. (People vs. Domantay, G.R. No. 130612, May 11, 1999, People v. Silvano, G.R. No. 144886, April 29, 2002)

STRUTURE OF GOVERNMENT Judicial Review A political question, such as the propriety of deregulating the oil industry, is not susceptible of judicial determination; hence there is no “actual case” calling for the exercise of judicial review An actual case or controversy is one that involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the issue involved must be susceptible of judicial determination. Excluded are questions of policy or wisdom, otherwise referred to as political questions. 8|Page

Political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government." What petitioner Garcia raises as an issue is the propriety of immediately and fully deregulating the oil industry. Such determination essentially dwells on the soundness or wisdom of the timing and manner of the deregulation Congress wants to implement through R.A. No. 8497. The issue is not for us to resolve; we cannot rule on when and to what extent deregulation should take place without passing upon the wisdom of the policy of deregulation that Congress has decided upon. (Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009, Brion)

Powers of Congress

The “pork barrel” system, wherein Members of Congress propose, identify and recommend projects, which are then implemented by the Executive Branch, is valid Petitioners claim that the power given to the members of Congress to propose and identify the projects and activities to be funded by the Countrywide Development Fund is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power. Under the Constitution, the spending power or "the power of the purse," belongs to Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President. The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be. The Countrywide Development Fund is explicit that it shall be used "for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries." It was Congress itself that determined the purposes for the appropriation. Executive function under the Countrywide Development Fund involves implementation of the priority projects specified in the law. The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be implemented by the President. Under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994, the President must perforce examine whether the proposals submitted by the members of Congress fall within the specific items of expenditures for which the Fund was set up. Thereafter, if the proposed projects qualify for funding under the Fund, it is the President who shall implement them. In short, the proposals and identifications made by the members of Congress are merely recommendatory. (Philippine Constitutional Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994)

Powers of the President The President has the power to create an ad hoc investigating body 9|Page

Under Section 17, Article VII, the President “shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.” The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010)

The President does not have continuing authority to reorganize the national government Is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to create a public office? According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772. The said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and materials. The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree. Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010)

The President has the power to keep the peace The power to prevent the return to the country of a person who is a threat to peace and order involves the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. It is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commanderin-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989) Diplomatic negotiations in progress or prior to conclusion of treaties are privileged 10 | P a g e

The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. An essential characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature. In this vast external realm (of diplomacy), the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. It is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be "ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved" – the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that "historic confidentiality" would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations. (Akbayan Citizen’s Action Party v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008, underscoring supplied)

Election Law The “second-placer” should be proclaimed winner, if the certificate of candidacy of the first placer is void due to ineligibility A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible from the start to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a valid candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections – Cardino – who received the highest number of votes. Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the firstplacer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a firstplacer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. (Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012)

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Failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections is a ground for cancellation of party list registration COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. (Philippine Guardian’s Brotherhood v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010, Brion, underscoring supplied)

Preventive suspension is not an effective interruption of a term for purposes of the application of the three-term limit rule The "interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law. Because the preventive suspension of an elective local official does not involve loss of title to office but only bars him from exercising his functions or leads to a temporary cessation of the exercise of power or authority, there is no effective interruption in his service of three terms. Thus, the three term limit applies to him. (Aldovino v. Commission on Elecions, G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009)

Constitutional Commissions The “no report, no release” policy is a violation of fiscal autonomy That the "no report, no release" policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution which provides: “The Civil Service Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.”

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"Automatic release" of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. (Civil Service Commission v. Department of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 158791, July 22, 2005)

Education Academic freedom of institutions of higher learning includes the power to discipline and even expel students Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. The essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic freedom" encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds: (1) Who may teach, (2) What may be taught, (3) How it shall be taught, and (4) Who may be admitted to study. The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach." Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident than in "who may be admitted to study." If a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges. The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. (Mirriam College Foundation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127930, December 15, 2000)

Citizenship How an alien woman can benefit from the naturalization of her husband as a Filipino citizen Under Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino, citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. (Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289, October 4, 1971)

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Holding of foreign passport and registering as an alien do not amount to express renunciation of citizenship In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. The mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. As held by this court in Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well. (Valles v. Comelec, G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000)

Local Governments An ordinance cannot contravene a statute because the delegate cannot be superior to the principal The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. By and large, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties, G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994)

The President has no power to remove elective local government officials It is clear from the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 that the penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a court of law. Thus, in Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al., we held that "the Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the Section 60." (Pablico v. Villapando, G.R. No. 147870, July 31, 2002) 14 | P a g e

LGUs IRA must be automatically released To the Court’s mind, the entire process involving the distribution and release of the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just share” of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee (of Congress) from time to time, as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the release not automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the “just share” of the LGUs “shall be automatically released to them.” Indeed, the Oversight Committee exercising discretion, even control, over the distribution and release of a portion of the IRA, the LGSEF, is an anathema to and subversive of the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the Constitution. (Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004)

Administrative Law An administrative agency has no power to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. In other words, a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can constitute a crime punishable as provided in the authorizing statute and by virtue of the latter. To declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished is a power vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body or agency. (People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977)

Rate fixing may be a quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative function; when an administrative agency fixes rates in the exercise of quasi-judicial power, notice and hearing are required The rate-fixing power of administrative bodies may be quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative. Although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact-based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office-that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said 15 | P a g e

finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing. Where the function of the administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law. If the nature of the administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are not necessary. Notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing. (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz, G.R. No. 84818, 18 December 1989)

Public Officers Prohibition on dual positions and double compensation; an ex officio position is not “another office” and does not entitle an official to additional compensation Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, 2 which provides: “The President, VicePresident, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.” The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. (Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991) The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. (Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 189767, July 3, 2012)

For a petition for quo warranto to be successful, the suing private individual must show a clear right to the contested office; an acting appointee has no cause of action for quo warranto against the new appointee Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a public office. The person instituting the quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must show that he is entitled to the office in dispute; otherwise, the action may be dismissed at any stage.

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For a petition for quo warranto to be successful, the suing private individual must show a clear right to the contested office. His failure to establish this right warrants the dismissal of the suit for lack of cause of action. Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. The essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing authority. The petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail. (General v. Urro, G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011, Brion) The Ombudsman’s powers include the power to investigate and the power to impose discipline on elective and appointive officials in government Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. Section 22. Investigatory Power. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted. (Republic Act 6770) The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The challenge to the Ombudsman’s power to impose these penalties, on the allegation that the Constitution only grants it recommendatory powers, had already been rejected by this Court. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Apolonio, G.R. No. 165132, March 7, 2012, Brion)

When to pay back salaries in cases of preventive suspension The employee is entitled to back salaries from the time he was dismissed until his reinstatement to his former position - i.e., for the period of his preventive suspension pending appeal. For the period of his preventive suspension pending investigation, the respondent is not entitled to any back salaries. (Civil Service Commission v. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011) Two conditions before an employee may be entitled to back salaries: a) the employee must be found innocent of the charges and b) his suspension must be unjustified. The reasoning behind these conditions runs this way: although an employee is considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of a successful appeal, the law itself only authorizes preventive suspension for a fixed period; hence, his suspension beyond this fixed period is unjustified and must be compensated. (Civil Service Commission v. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011)

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International Law An exchange of notes is a form of executive agreement and does not need Senate concurrence to be valid and binding An "exchange of notes" is similar to a private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other. The terms "exchange of notes" and "executive agreements" have been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement. Moreover, Senate concurrence is not required for an exchange of notes to be binding on the Philippines and the US. International agreements may be in the form of (1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or (2) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties. International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties [while] those embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executive agreements. Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned. (Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011)

National Economy “Capital” for purposes of determining Filipino ownership of a public utility means shares with voting rights For a corporation to be granted authority to operate a public utility, at least 60 percent of its "capital" must be owned by Filipino citizens. Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term "capital" shall include such preferred shares, because the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors. This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public utilities. The right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full beneficial ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a corporation. (Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011; October 9, 2012) 18 | P a g e

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