Political Law Jurisprudence

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POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE 2012 Chairperson: Paul Nejudne Vice Chair: Lester Wee Members: Robie Quino, Gibran Abubakar, Jhona Grace Alo, Leah Lara Bardoquillo, Jennelyn Bilocura, Joy Bolivar, Kristine Athena Nedamo, Kristine Nejudne, Chelisa Roxas

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SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN POLITICAL LAW

2000 IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000 Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional. Issue/s: (1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review (2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces. The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

Ruling: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.

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2001 People of the Philippines vs. Ricardo de Guzman G.R. No. 134844-45 (2001) Facts: On or about the month of December, 1995 and of October 2, 1996, in Tagig, Metro Manila, the accused, with lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation, unlawfully have sexual intercourse with Marlyn Perlas y Roque, fourteen (14) years old, against her will and consent. The accused is the common-law spouse of the victim’s mother, but the prosecution failed to allege the relationship in the information. Two information were charged against the accused docketed as Criminal Case No. 110978-H and 110979-H. The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses who testified against the accused and further corroborated finding that the victim was indeed raped and intimidated due to the fact the she had poor mental development who acts like a 7-8 year old girl even if she was already 15 years old. The accused entered a plea of “no guilty”, upon arraignment, on the two information charging him the crime of simple rape. Presiding judge, however, rendered judgment of conviction for two (2) counts of the crime of rape, sentencing accused to suffer death penalty. A perusal of the Information reveals that Prosecutor Ma. Paz Reyes Izon intended to charge accused-appellant "with the crime of violation of Art. 335 (rape) of the RPC in relation to Section 5, R.A. 7610", (AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES) Issues: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in imposing two (2) death penalties upon accused-appellant despite failure of the prosecution to allege in the two (2) information that accused-appellant is the common-law spouse of the victim’s parent. Ruling: The court held that the two information charged accused-appellant with the crime of simple rape, penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code with the indivisible penalty of reclusión perpetua. There is no indication in the two Information that the crime charged is punishable by death under the foregoing law. Republic Act No. 7610 covers child prostitution, which is not the case here. Besides, Republic Act No. 7610 itself does not impose death for rape but rather refers the matter to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as the applicable law. Under the rules of criminal procedure, a qualifying circumstance to be considered as such must be so alleged in the information, which is not required of aggravating circumstances. "It has long been the rule that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment. If the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only

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as aggravating circumstances, since the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded. Indeed, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him, and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable with death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned" GEORGE MANANTAN vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA NICOLAS G.R. No. 107125 (2001) Facts: On or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Santiago, province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the driver and personin-charge of an automobile, willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same while along the Daang Maharlika at Barangay Malvar, in said municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence said automobile driven and operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep driven by Charles Codamon, thereby causing the said automobile to turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile. The defense version as to the events prior to the incident was essentially the same as that of the prosecution, except that defense witness Miguel Tabangin declared Manantan did not drink beer that night. The lower court promulgated a decision in petitioner’s favor. It finds the accused NOT GUILTY of the crime charged and hereby acquits him. Private respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the trial court's judgment. In their appeal, the appellate court decided in favor of the respondents. Decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that defendant-appellee is held civilly liable and sentenced to indemnify plaintiffs-appellants. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied the motion. Hence, the present case. Issues: 1.

2.

Whether or not the decision of the trial court acquitting the petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide foreclosed any further inquiry on the accused’s negligence or reckless imprudence because by then he will be placed in “double jeopardy” and therefore the Court of Appeals (CA) erred in passing upon the same again. The CA did not have jurisdiction to award damages and indemnity to the private respondents considering that the non-declaration of any indemnity or award of damages by the lower court was itself consistent with the

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3. 4.

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petitioner’s acquittal for the reason that the civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action and there was no express waiver of the civil action or reservation to institute it separately by the private respondents in the trial court.

CITY OF MANDALUYONG vs. ANTONIO N., FRANCISCO N., THELMA N., EUSEBIO N., RODOLFO N., all surnamed AGUILAR G.R. No. 137152 (2001 )

The CA did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case and render the decision sought to be reviewed when the same was prosecuted by the private respondents in their personal capacities and the filing fees not having been paid, thus violating the Manchester doctrine.

On August 4, 1997, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for expropriation. Petitioner sought to expropriate three (3) adjoining parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,847 square meters registered under Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 59780, 63766 and 63767 in the names of the defendants, herein respondents.

Ruling: The court ruled that: 1st issue: That the petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The judgment of acquittal became immediately final. Note, however, that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly show that no second criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower court's judgment, the appellate court did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal case against petitioner for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner's claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect. 2nd issue: The court supports the conclusion of the appellate court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioner's civil liability was not extinguished by his discharge. We note the trial court's declaration that did not discount the possibility that "the accused was really negligent." However, it found that "a hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the accused presented itself before the Court" and since said "hypothesis is consistent with the record…the Court's mind cannot rest on a verdict of conviction."The foregoing clearly shows that petitioner's acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his guilt had not been established with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies. 3rd issue: The actual damages claimed by the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid only if other items of damages such as moral, nominal, temporate, or exemplary damages are alleged in the complaint or information, or if they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgment. Criminal Case No. 066 contained no specific allegations of damages. Considering that the Rules of Criminal Procedure effectively guarantee that the filing fees for the award of damages are a first lien on the judgment, the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact to the institution of the criminal action. The filing fees are deemed paid from the filing of the criminal complaint or information.

Facts:

Respondents, except Eusebio N. Aguilar who died in 1995, denied having received a copy of Mayor Abalos' offer to purchase their lots. They alleged that the expropriation of their land is arbitrary and capricious, and is not for a public purpose; the subject lots are their only real property and are too small for expropriation, while petitioner has several properties inventoried for socialized housing. As counterclaim, respondents prayed for damages of P21 million. Respondents filed a "Motion for Preliminary Hearing" claiming that the defenses alleged in their Answer are valid grounds for dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendants and lack of cause of action. Respondents prayed that the affirmative defenses be set for preliminary hearing and that the complaint be dismissed. Petitioner filed an Amended Complaint which was admitted by the trial court. Respondents filed a "Manifestation and Motion" adopting their "Answer with Counterclaim" and "Motion for Preliminary Hearing" as their answer to the Amended Complaint. The motion was granted. The trial court issued an order dismissing the Amended Complaint after declaring respondents as "small property owners" whose land is exempt from expropriation under Republic Act No. 7279. The court also found that the expropriation was not for a public purpose for petitioner's failure to present any evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the expropriation are landless and homeless residents of Mandaluyong. In 1992, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act No. 7279, the "Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992." The law lays down as a policy that the state, in cooperation with the private sector, undertake a comprehensive and continuing Urban Development and Housing Program. Section 9 also exempts from expropriation parcels of land owned by small property owners. Petitioner argues that the exercise of the power of eminent domain is not anymore conditioned on the size of the land sought to be expropriated.

Issues:

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Whether or not respondents qualify as "small property owners” as defined in Section 3 (q) of R.A. 7279. Section 3. Ruling: Lands for socialized housing under R.A. 7279 are to be acquired in several modes. Among these modes are the following: (1) community mortgage; (2) land swapping, (3) land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation to the government; (6) joint venture agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation. The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; (b) parcels of land owned by small property owners are exempt from such acquisition. Respondents therefore appear to own real property other than the lots in litigation. Nonetheless, the records do not show that the ancestral home in Paco, Manila and the land on which it stands are owned by respondents or anyone of them. Petitioner did not present any title or proof of this fact despite Antonio Aguilar's testimony. Finally, this court notes that the subject lots are now in the possession of respondents. Antonio Aguilar testified that he and the other co-owners filed ejectment cases against the occupants of the land before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Mandaluyong, Branches 59 and 60. Orders of eviction were issued and executed on September 17, 1997 which resulted in the eviction of the tenants and other occupants from the land in question.71 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the orders dated September 17. 1998 and December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig City in SCA No. 1427 are AFFIRMED. SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MlRASOL and LILIA E. MIRASOL vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL and PHILIPPINE EXCHANGE CO., INC., respondent G.R. No. 128448 ( 2001) Facts:

The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it. President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and

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to make unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim. Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government. On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against PNB. Issues: 1. Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court. 2. Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional. 3.

Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.

Ruling: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts. The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. 15 In all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory. Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for violating the due process clause and the prohibition against the taking of private property without just compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial review.

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Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMIL VELEZ RAYOS G.R. No. 133823, February 7, 2001 Facts:

On or about the 9th day of April, 1997 at about 6 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at Barangay Binitinan, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with a nine-year old retardate Mebelyn B. Ganzan against her will and consent and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab the victim with the use of a knife which accused previously provided himself thus hitting her on the different parts of her body, causing her instantaneous death." The accused, when arraigned, entered a plea of “not guilty”. The facts were culled from the testimony of the individual witnesses presented, by the prosecution and the defense in the course of trial. It showed that the circumstantial evidence points out to the accused. However accused appellant contended that ohe was brought to the municipal hall on the same night and placed behind bars until he would have recovered from drunkenness. Eventually, he was released from jail but he was soon brought back to the police station and held for the rape-slay of the child victim. Accused-appellant, in the instant appeal, maintains his innocence and seeks a reversal of the decision rendered by the trial court holding him responsible for the rape-slay of the victim. He further contends that he has been coerced into executing his extrajudicial confession and insists that he only has been forced to affix his signature on the document by a policeman. Issues: Whether or not the trial court has erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, claiming to have been coerced into executing his extrajudicial confession. Ruling:

A confession is often said to constitute evidence of high order but before it can be taken in evidence, several requirements have to be satisfied. Chiseled in our jurisprudence are the four fundamental conditions needed for admissibility of a confession, to wit: (1) The confession

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must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing. Confessing to a crime has the semblance, at least insofar as its legal repercussions are concerned, of a plea of guilt. Extreme care must thus be taken by lawyers, prosecutors, and the police in seeing to it that the person under investigation for the commission of an offense has been properly secured in his constitutional rights. Article III, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution requires that – "(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. "(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him." The right to counsel, particularly, is designed to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false confessions or coerced admissions and to preclude the slightest suspicion that an accused would be led to an imprudent act. It ought to follow that a lawyer should see to the protection of an accused in ensuring his basic rights. The accused is entitled to no less than an effective and vigilant counsel who must be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Counsel should ascertain that the confession is voluntarily made and that the person making the same fully understands the nature and consequences of his extrajudicial confession. But while the Court in this case is not comfortable in giving weight to the confession made by the accused and holding it to bear out a faithful observance of the Constitution, the guilt of accused-appellant, nevertheless, has here been independently established. When there are no eyewitnesses to a crime, resort to circumstantial evidence becomes almost certainly unavoidable. Circumstantial evidence would be sufficient for conviction, if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences have been derived are proven; (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must be consistent with each other, from which the only rational hypothesis that can be drawn there from would be that the accused is guilty. The circumstances must create a solid chain of events, coherent and intrinsically believable, that pinpoints the accused, to the exclusion of others, as being the perpetrator of the crime and thereby sufficiently overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. Here, the pieces of evidence, taken in their entirety, unmistakably point to the guilt, not innocence, of accused-appellant. In rape with homicide, the evidence against an accused is basically circumstantial. The nature of the crime, where only the victim and the rapist would have been around during its commission makes the prosecution of the offense particularly difficult since the victim could no longer testify against the perpetrator. Thus, resorting to circumstantial evidence is inevitable and to demand direct evidence proving the modality of the

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offense and the identity of the perpetrator would be unreasonable. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORENCIO FRANCISCO Y ALEJO, G.R. No. 135200, (2001) Facts: On 3 October 1995, while the victim was asleep together with her mother, five (5) sisters and three (3) brothers in their tenement at No. 9 J. P. Rizal St., Barangay Sta. Lucia, Novaliches, Quezon City, her father, the accused, woke her up and told her to look for his slippers as he was going out to buy cigarettes. When she told him that she could not find his slippers he suddenly covered her mouth tightly with his hands and forcibly dragged her towards the toilet, undressed her, feasted on her young breast and inserted his penis into her vagina while the two (2) of them were standing" with the accused propping her up on the seat of the toilet bowl. Afterwards, he warned her not to tell anyone about what happened. Since the accused had been beating her and her siblings in the past, she was afraid of what the accused would do if she would tell anyone about what he did to her this time. Editha further disclosed that her father had been sexually abusing her repeatedly since she was only nine (9) years old until she learned that her father was also sexually molesting her two (2) younger sister, Baby Flor and Maria Coralyn. The accused alleged that his wife Isabelita Jucutan fabricated the charge as he denied the accusation against him. According to him, he used to beat and spank his wife and their daughters. He countered that it was actually the brother of his wife, Amuncio Jucutan, who sexually abused Editha but he did not file any charges against him upon the request of his wife Isabelita. The trial court then found the accused guilty of qualified rape and sentenced him to death, plus civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages. The accused appealed contending that rape was not committed and that he finds it inconceivable that Editha did not make any outcry when their house and those of her relatives were adjacent to the toilet where the rape was supposedly perpetrated. He also argues the absence of allegation in the information of the special qualifying circumstance of his relationship to Editha, which made it legally impossible to sentence him to death. Consequently, he must be imposed the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., reclusion perpetua. Issues:

1.

Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Editha despite her silence or failure to shout and cry for help.

2. Whether or not the trial court erred in holding him liable only for qualified rape as the Complaint failed to allege the special qualifying circumstance of his relationship to Editha.

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Ruling: The court disagree with accused-appellant that simply because complaining witness failed to shout for help he could not be guilty of rape. Even if accusedappellant did not cover the mouth of Editha, her silence would not by itself be sufficient to negate the conclusion that rape was committed. Being complainant’s father, accused-appellant had moral ascendancy and influence over his daughter who was then of tender years. Her fear of her father was more than enough to intimidate her to submit to his lewd advances without shouting for help. The answers of accused-appellant to the charges consisted only of bare denials and allegations that would not suffice to disprove rape. The court, however, ruled in favor of the accused in that the failure of the prosecution to allege in the Complaint the special qualifying circumstance of relationship between him and the victim will not allow the imposition of the death penalty. Under Sec. 11 of RA 7659, the death penalty shall be imposed for the crime of rape if the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. These circumstances are in the nature of qualifying circumstances that must be jointly alleged in the complaint or information. Such failure of the Complaint to implead the relationship of accused-appellant to the victim makes it legally impossible to convict him of qualified rape. Hence, he can only be convicted of simple rape. Indeed, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him, and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable with death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMA @ "BOBONG" and GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @ "BOBOY", G.R. No. 133917, (2001) Facts: On or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously was found in their possession 946.9 grants of dried marijuana which are prohibited. Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the accusation against them. Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y. Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as witnesses. The trial court then found the appellants guilty and through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against

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unreasonable searches and seizures. The demurrer was denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by accused-appellants, but this was likewise denied. Accused-appellants waived presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum. The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and MO1ion (In Lieu of Brief), wherein he prayed for the acquittal of both accusedappellants. The case was elevated to this Court on automatic review. Issues:

1. Whether or not the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence for having been seized in violation of appellants’ constitutional rights against unreasonable, searches and seizures; 2. Whether or not, assuming it is admissible in evidence, the government has otherwise proved their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and 3. Whether or not, assuming their guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the imposable penalty for violation of Sec. 8 of RA No. 7659 (sic), in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, is life imprisonment, not death.

Ruling: The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable cause. The pertinent provision of the Constitution provides: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus: Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words, valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so too, without this rule, the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish

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means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained there from may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search). In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its judgment of conviction on a finding that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent search conducted by the peace officers, are valid because accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of prohibited drugs. This brings us to the issue of whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present case fall within the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Accusedappellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. Moreover, it could not be said that accusedappellants waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of accusedappellants.

DELA CRUZ vs. ADJUTO ABILLE, G.R. No. 130196, (2001)

Facts: Herminio Abille, now deceased, had a total landholding of 13.0561 hectares, located in Infanta, Pangasinan, in which 2.84 hectares were tilled by Balbino dela Cruz, as an agricultural tenant since 1968, who died

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in 1981. After his death, he was, nevertheless, issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 0-064711pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. The certificate was entered in the Registration Book of the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan. Tax Declaration No. 3 in the name of Herminio Abille was cancelled and Tax Declaration No. 1134 was issued in the name of Balbino dela Cruz. In 1987, Abille filed a petition for exemption under Operation Land Transfer (OLT) of his landholdings alleging that he was not notified of the coverage of his land under OLT; that he learned of its coverage only on March 25, 1987; that prior to the issuance of the Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711, DAR did not notify him or his representative; that he has been deprived of his constitutional right to due process. 1989, Regional Director Antonio M. Nuesa of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, Region I, San Fernando, La Union, issued an Order, denying the petition for exemption, and granted the right of extension of not more than seven (7) hectares instead. He directed the petitioner to immediately select the retention areas, canceling the Certificates of Land Transfer issued on the tenants on the retained area and ordered MARO to prepare Agricultural Leasehold Contracts between the petitioner and the tenants and implement the Order. Herminio selected the 7-hectare retention area, which included the area covered by CLT No. 0-064711 issued to Balbino dela Cruz; hence, said CLT was automatically cancelled. Petitioners, on the other hand, who are the compulsory heirs of the late Balbino dela Cruz, filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform a petition for the issuance of emancipation patent, which was later referred to the Regional Director I, San Fernando, La Union, for appropriate action. They prayed for the dismissal of the petition for the issuance of emancipation patent on the ground that DAR Order, ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of Land Transfer of the retained area, had become final and had been implemented by the Provincial Agraria Officer of Pangasinan; hence, the petition had become moot and academic. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said Decision of the Secretary of DAR having been denied, they filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the said petition for review. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied by the appellate court. Petitioners argued that it was incorrect for the Court of Appeals to hold that they were accorded due process when the validity of the cancellation of Certificate of land Transfer No. 0-064711 was resolved in the Order dated April 19, 1989; and that their petition for issuance of an emancipation patent is a different proceeding from the petition filed by Herminio Abille where in Regional Director Antonio Nuesa ordered the cancellation of their predecessor's (Balbino dela Cruz) Certificate of Land Transfer; that in the said petition filed by Herminio Abille, they were not notified and given the opportunity to be heard. Petitioners maintained that they were denied due process so that the Order dated April 19,1989 of Regional Director Nuesa cancelling the Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711 in the name of Balbino dela Cruz is null and void, and cannot be used to deny their petition for the issuance of an emancipation patent.

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Issues: 1.

Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the petitioners were accorded due process when the validity of the cancellation of Certificate of land Transfer No. 0-064711 was resolved.

2.

Whether or not the petition for the issuance of emancipation patent may be granted due to lack of due process.

Ruling: The petition is devoid of merit. The court ruled that the CA was correct in holding that although the petitioners were not given the opportuniy to be heard when Regional Director Antonio Nuesa in his Order regarding the cancellation of Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711 on the retained area, nevertheless, in their petition for issuance of an emancipation patent, petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard as they raised in issue the validity of the cancellation of the said CLT, which was resolved by DAR Regional Director Eligio P. Pacis and also in their (petitioners') motion for reconsideration, which was treated as an appeal by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform and was resolved. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of (emphasis supplied). Futher, the petition filed by landowner Herminio Abille, which was for exemption of his property from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer, cognizable by Region I Director Antonio M. Nuesa of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, did not require notice to petitioners. Furthermore, the Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711 was validly cancelled. Said certificate was issued to petitioners' predecessor, Balbino dela Cruz, before landowner Herminio Abille was informed of such issuance and that his landholding was subject to Operation Land Transfer. Subsequently, Herminio Abille, who was found to own riceland with an area of 9.2903 hectares, was granted the right to retain an area not exceeding seven (7) hectares, and the right to select and segregate such area under P.D. No. 27. Where there is no showing, as in the case at bar, that there was fraud, collusion, arbitrariness, illegality, imposition or mistake on the part of a department head, in rendering his questioned decisions or of a total lack of substantial evidence to support the same, such administrative decisions are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be interfered with. DE RAMA vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION, THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FLORENIO RAMOS, G.R. No. 131136 , (2001) Facts:

Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitoner Conrado De Rama wrote a

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letter to the CSC seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal employees. Petitioner justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of said employees were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor, done in violation of Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution. The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the 14 employees for lack of merit. The CSC dismissed petitioner’s allegation that these were “midnight” appointments, pointing out that the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to local elective officials. The CSC opined that the appointing authority can validly issue appointments until his term has expired, as long as the appointee meets the qualification standards for the position. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CSC's Resolution, but petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied Petitioner then filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals, arguing that the CSC arrived at the erroneous conclusion after it ignored his "supplement to the consolidated appeal and motion for reconsideration" wherein he laid out evidence showing that the subject appointments were obtained through fraud. The Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit the petition for review. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the appellate court erred in upholding the CSC's resolutions despite the following defects: I. No screening process and no criteria were adopted by the Personnel Selection Board in nominating the respondents; II. No posting in three (3) conspicuous public places of notice of vacancy as required by the rules and the law; III. Merit and fitness requirements were not observed by the selection board and by the appointing authority as required by the Civil Service rules; IV. Petitioner has valid grounds to recall the appointments of respondents. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari. Issues:

1.

Whether or not the public respondent Court of Appeals, gravely and seriously erred in finding that the Civil Service Commission was correct in not upholding the petitioner's recall of the appointments of private respondents in the face of fraud and violation of rules and laws on issuance of appointments.

2. Whether or not the public respondent Court of Appeals seriously erred in finding that the particular grounds namely:

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I. No screening process and no criteria were adopted by the Personnel Selection Board in nominating the respondents; II. No posting in three (3) conspicuous public places of notice of vacancy as required by the rules and the law; III. Merit and fitness requirements were not observed by the selection board and by the appointing authority as required by the Civil Service rules; IV. Petitioner has valid grounds to recall the appointments of respondents. Petitioner assails the findings of both the CSC and the Court of Appeals for being contrary to law and not being supported by the evidence on record.

Ruling: The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-called “midnight appointments,” specifically those made within 2 months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. The records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of recalling the appointments of the fourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC, the only reason he cited to justify his action was that these were "midnight appointments" that are forbidden under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution. However, the CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. Petitioner certainly did not raise the issue of fraud on the part of the outgoing mayor who made the appointments. Neither did he allege that the said appointments were tainted by irregularities or anomalies that breached laws and regulations governing appointments. His solitary reason for recalling these appointments was that they were, to his personal belief, "midnight appointments" which the outgoing mayor had no authority to make. It has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointee's assumption of the position in the civil service, "he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by revocation of the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and hearing."17 Moreover, it is well-settled that the person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the position. This right is protected not only by statute, but by the Constitution as well, which right cannot be taken away by either revocation of the appointment, or by removal, unless there is valid cause to do so, provided that there is previous notice and hearing.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNEL MATARO y ELIZAGA and NICK PERUCHO y SINGSON, G.R. No. 130378, (2001) Facts: Two separate information were filed against appellants Amel Mataro and Nick Perucho. That on or about the 23rd day of October 1992 in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating with other persons whose true identities, whereabouts and other personal circumstances of which have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery, superior strength and evident premeditation, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one SPO1 ENRIQUE CASTILLO, JR. y BALBIN, by then and there shooting the latter with the use of firearms thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said SPO1 ENRIQUE CASTILLO, JR., y BALBIN. The prosecution presented two eyewitnesses, Victor Nilo Fernandez and Reden Guzman, seeing the two accused shot the victim. Appelants on the other hand, denied accusation against him, averring that they were in Aklan from June until November. Trial court rendered its decision, finding the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder, both to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Enrique Castillo the following: 1) P725,000.00 as actual damages; 2) P1,000,000.00 as moral damages; and 3) to pay the cost. The appellants question the credibility of Femandez and Guzman. They aver that during the investigation, a certain Ebalde gave his statements to the police that the car used by the assailants was a gray Kia Pride. They also point out that the witnesses of the prosecution did not agree on the number of persons riding the car which was stopped by Castillo. They likewise raise that during the initial investigation, the eyewitnesses described Mataro as a man between 35 to 40 years old. Mataro was only 24 years old at the time of the incident. Finally, they invoke the "equipoise" rule15 because their guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

Issues: Whether or not the trial court erred in: ...CONVICTING THE ACCUSED APPELLANTS AND IN NOT ACQUITTING THEM: (A) ON GROUNDS OF REASONABLE DOUBT; AND (B) BY APPLYING THE "EQUIPOISE RULE." Ruling: The accused appellants invoke the “equipoise” rule because their guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt. The SC said that it has enumerated the requisites for credible identification in the case of

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follows:

1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; 2) witness’ degree of attention at that time; 3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; 4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; 5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and 6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. 18 The Court held that in their view, these requirements were met. In the instant case, there is no question that both witnesses had the opportunity to view the incident as it unfolded before them with a degree of attention that allowed them to take in the important details and recall them clearly. Moreover, as repeatedly stressed, appellate court should accord to the factual findings of trial courts and their evaluation great weight and respect concerning the credibility of witnesses. The conditions of visibility being favorable and these witnesses not appearing to be biased, the conclusion of trial courts regarding the identity of the malefactors should normally be accepted. The SC also held that the trial court did not err in qualifying the killing as murder. There was treachery in this case since, as testified to by prosecution witness Fernandez, the victim had already dismissed the appellants after they talked to him. The victim was deliberately allowed to enjoy a false sense of security. They shot the victim when the latter had his hands raised. The SC therefore affirmed the ruling of the lower court, but made modifications with the costs to be paid by the accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANGELES STA. TERESA, G.R. No. 130663, (2001) Facts: That sometime in the month of October, 1996, at Brgy. Soledad, Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his own minor daughter LORNA STA. TERESA, who is about 12 years old, taking advantage of her tender age and innocence, against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice. When arraigned, appellant with the assistance of his counsel de oficio pleaded "not guilty." But after the prosecution presented its witnesses -- Dr. Maria Lorraine De Guzman, medico-legal officer, and the rape victim withdrew his plea of "not guilty" and changed it to a plea of "guilty." He said that he "had no intention to commit such act at the time but because I was drunk, I

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was not on my right mind x x x." He then asked that he be pardoned for his deed. The trial court then admitted all the documentary exhibits offered by the prosecution without any comment and/or objection from the defense counsel. It granted the motion of appellant to change his plea to one of guilt. The trial court, after evaluating the prosecution evidence and considering appellant's admission of the crime, convicted him of rape and sentenced him to death. Issues: 1. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in not entering a plea of not guilty for the accused-appellant and in not affording the latter the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence in blatant violation of his right to due process. 2. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant in spite of the material inconsistencies and improbabilities that tainted the testimony of the private complainant.

means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. "The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation." Using this standard, the court believes that the defense counsel's conduct falls short of the commitment and zeal required of him as appellant's attorney. Barely nine (9) days after appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged, his counsel de oficio made a manifestation in open court that his client is changing his plea to that of "guilty."

3. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant in spite of the fact that the testimony of the private complainant is contrary to the common knowledge and experience of mankind. 4. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant in spite of complainant's failure to offer any resistance prior to and even during her alleged rape. Ruling: The court finds that the stringent constitutional standards impelled by due process have not been complied with in the court a quo, thus necessitating the remand of this case for further proceedings. As can be gleaned from this Rule, the trial court must, if the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, first, conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused's full comprehension of the consequences thereof; second, require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and third, ask the accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. As shown in the records of the case, the trial court, after a brief exchange of remarks with appellant's counsel de oficio, and finally with appellant himself, issued the Order dated May 16, 1997 or nine (9) days after the accused was initially arraigned. The court held that the abbreviated and aborted presentation of the prosecution evidence and appellant's improvident plea of guilty, with the scanty and lackluster performance of his counsel de oficio, are just too exiguous to accept as being the standard constitutional due process at work enough to snuff out the life of a human being. The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically

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AKBAYAN – Youth, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 147066, (2001) MICHELLE D. BETITO, vs. CHAIRMAN ALFREDO BENIPAYO (COMELEC),G.R. No. 147179, (2001) Facts:

Petitioners in this case represent the youth sector and they seek to seek to direct COMELEC to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to them, around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC. However, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584 disapproving the request for additional registration of voters on the ground that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all preelection activities. Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners filed before the SC the instant which seeks to set aside and nullify respondent COMELEC's Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of R. A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar as said

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provision effectively causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated. Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters and to admit for registration petitioners and other similarly situated young Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May 14, 2001 General Elections Issues: 1. Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing COMELEC Resolution; 2. Whether or not the SC can compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELEC's imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections. Ruling: 1. No

The right of suffrage invoked by petitioners is not at all absolute. The exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by thefundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the "Voter's Registration Act of 1996." Section 8, of the R.A. 8189, explicitly provides that "No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election." The 100-day prohibitive period serves a vital role in protecting the integrity of the registration process. Without the prohibitive periods, the COMELEC would be deprived of any time to evaluate the evidence on the application. If we compromise on these safety nets, we may very well end up with a voter's list full of flying voters, overflowing with unqualified registrants, populated with shadows and ghosts. Likewise, petitioners invoke the so called "standby" powers or "residual" powers of the COMELEC, as provided under the relevant provisions of Sec. 28 of RA 8436 "Designation of Other Dates for Certain Pre- election Act".. The act of registration is concededly, by its very nature, a pre-election act. Under Section 3(a) of R.A. 8189, "(a) Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval by the Election Registration Board. It bears emphasis that the provisions of Section 29 of R.A. 8436 invoked by herein petitioners and Section 8 of R.A. 8189 volunteered by respondent COMELEC, far from contradicting each other. SC hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present

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case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election. The provisions of Section 28, R.A. 8436 would come into play in cases where the pre-election acts are susceptible of performance within the available period prior to election day.The "stand-by power" of the respondent COMELEC under Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes the possibility of its being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise. Moreover, the petitioners in the instant case are not without fault or blame. They admit in their petition that they failed to register, for whatever reason, within the period of registration and came to this Court and invoked its protective mantle not realizing, so to speak, the speck in their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo accedat curiam. Let no one come to court with unclean hands. Well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisdiction that the law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.Vigilantis sed non dormientibus jura in re subveniunt. 2.

NO .

SC believes that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of voters. TUNG CHIN HUI vs.RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, Commissioner of Immigration and the BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 141938, (2001) Facts: Petitioner, a "Taiwanese national," arrived in this country, as a temporary visitor. A few days later, he was arrested by several policemen, who turned him over to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). He was then duly charged, and the Bill of Commissioners issued Summary Deportation Order, finding him guilty of possessing a tampered passport earlier cancelled by Taiwanese authorities. Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a Petition for Habeas Corpus on the ground that his detention was illegal. In their Return of Writ, respondents denied petitioner's claim. In a Decision, the trial court granted his Petition and ordered his release and consequently denied respondents' Motion for Reconsideration. Respondents then filed a Notice of Appeal which was granted. Subsequently, the appellate court rendered its Decision, which as earlier mentioned reversed the trial court. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the proceedings before the CA, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before this Court, contending that the RTC should have rejected the appeal for allegedly being filed late-beyond the 48-hour period provided under the pre1997 Rules of Court. In its decision, which became final, this Court denied the Petition.

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The appellate court held that petitioner was not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus, because the BID Board of Commissioners had found him guilty of violating Section 37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. Citing documents from the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Offices (TECO), the CA found that petitioner's passport had been cancelled by the Republic of China on the ground that its holder was not the real Tung Chin Hui, but a fugitive from justice who had tampered the passport. The CA also held that the TECO documents, being public in nature, need not be testified to by the persons who had issued them. Issues: A. PRINCIPAL ISSUES: (1) Is the reglementary period within which to appeal in habeas corpus cases forty-eight hours from notice of the Decision appealed from? (as petitioner contends); or is it 15 days similar to other cases from notice of the Decision? (as contended by the respondents); (2) Was the appeal taken by the respondents from the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, denying respondents' Motion for Reconsideration, proper? (as postulated by the respondents) or improper and not allowable being violative of Sec. 1 (a), Rule 41, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure? (as comprehended by the petitioner) A. SECONDARY ISSUES: (1) Should the Court of Appeals give weight to findings of fact arrived at by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, based on the evidence presented or adduced during the trial of the case, in keeping with established precedents? (2) May the Honorable Court of Appeals consider extraneous facts brought out by the respondents in their memorandum but are not supported by the evidence presented, identified and admitted by the trial court during the hearing of the case? (3) Did the Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction over the case when the appeal was filed out of time and the Order appealed from is not appealable?" Ruling:

The Petition is not meritorious. Propriety of the Appeal The reglementary period for filing an appeal in a habeas corpus case is now similar to that in ordinary civil actions and is governed by Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules, which provides: 'SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required the appellant shall file a notice of appeal

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and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.' In this light, the appeal was seasonably filed within the 15-day reglementary period. Propriety of the Writ of Habeas Corpus Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. In the instant case, petitioner was properly charged before the Bureau of Immigration for illegally entering the Philippines with the use of a passport issued to another person and cancelled by the Taiwanese government in 1995. Alleged Lack of Notice The court rejects petitioner's reliance on the ruling of the trial court that "[w]hile it may be true that there is a Summary Deportation Order against the petitioner allegedly for being [an] undocumented alien, having used a passport which had already been cancelled, there is no showing that he was informed about it. There is no sufficient basis to overturn the presumption that the Bureau of Immigration conducted its proceedings in accordance with law. In sum, the court hold that petitioner's confinement was not illegal; hence, there is no justification for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Moreover, he has not shown any cogent reason to warrant the nullification of the Board of Commissioners' Summary Deportation Order. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO DE TORRES vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 132860, April 3, 2001 Facts: Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is an Associate Professor of the University of the Philippines in Los Baños (UPLB) who went on a vacation leave of absence without pay from September 1, 1986 to August 30, 1989 due to his service as the Philippine Government'' official representative to the Centre on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and [the] Pacific (CIRDAP). When the term of his leave of absence was about to expire, CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an extension of said leave of absence for another year, but was denied by then Director of the Agricultural Credit Corporation, Inc. (ACCI) of UPLBm advised De Torres to report for duty; while the then UPLB Chancellor apprised him on the rules of the Civil Service on leaves and warned of the possibility of being considered on Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL) if he failed to return and report for duty as directed.

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Dr. De Torres wrote UPLB that he had 'no alternative but to pursue the matter in continuing his commitment to CIRDAP, and was advised that failure to report within 30 days, he would be dropped from the rolls of personnel. Despite the warning, Dr. De Torres did not report to work. After almost five years of absence without leave, Dr. De Torres wrote the incumbent Chancellor Ruben L. Villareal that he was reporting back to duty. He was then notified he [was] considered to be on AWOL. Thus, he was advised to re-apply with UPLB. Dr. De Torres sought reconsideration and was further granted. Meanwhile, members of the academic Personnel Committee requested the Civil Service Commission regarding the employment status of Dr. De Torres. The Commission ruled that Dr. De Torres is considered to have been dropped from the service, hence, his re-employment requires the issuance of appointment subject to the requirements of Civil Service Law and Rules.' Dr. De Torres and the University of the Philippines at Los Baños (UPLB) filed separate requests for reconsideration of aforesaid CSC Resolution. The commission denied the motion for reconsideration, further stating that CSC Resolution [stood] and that since separation from the service [was] non-disciplinary in nature, the appointing authority may appoint Dr. De Torres to any vacant position pursuant to existing civil service law and rules. From the unfavorable Resolutions of the CSC, petitioners sought recourse before the Court of Appeals, but was dismissed for finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of CSC. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Issues: 1. Whether or not a new appointment is still necessary for Dr. de Torres to resume his post at the UNIVERSITY despite having remained continuously with the Civil Service, not having been dropped from the rolls of the University, and after returning to fulfill his service contract as a government scholar. 2. Whether or not the issuance by the COMMISSION of Resolution Nos. 95-3045 and 961041, was in excess of its authority. 3. Whether or not the COMMISSION violated the Subido-Romulo Agreement which is still in force and effect. 4. Whether or not the express repeal of the old law had the effect of doing away with the policy of automatic dropping from the government service in favor of notice before dropping. 5. Whether or not Section 33 of Rule XVI is ultra vires as it does not relate or is not in any way connected with any specific provision of R.A. No. 2260.

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6. Whether or not Resolution No. 95-3045 violated Dr. de Torres' constitutional right to due process." In the main, the issue is the validity of Dr. Alfredo de Torres automatic separation from the civil service due to his prolonged absence without official leave. Ruling: The Petition is meritorious. Petitioner De Torres was never actually dropped from the service by UP. He remained in the UPLB's roll of academic personnel, even after he had been warned of the possibility of being dropped from the service if he failed to return to work within a stated period. The action of the Chancellor, though, in advising the petitioner on the Civil Service Rules regarding leaves, constituted a sufficient notice. However, UP's actuations, in spite of Section 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules, are consistent with the exercise of its academic freedom. We have held time and again that "the University has the academic freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." Clearly, this freedom encompasses the autonomy to choose who should teach and, concomitant therewith, who should be retained in its rolls of professors and other academic personnel. Needless to say, UP definitely recognizes and values petitioner's academic expertise. As the vice chancellor for academic affairs explained, "[d]ropping him from the rolls will utterly be a waste of government funds and will not serve the best interest of the country which is suffering from 'brain-drain'." Consequently, there is no need for the issuance of a new appointment in favor of Dr. De Torres. His service in UP is deemed uninterrupted during his tenure at CIRDAP. PHILHOUSE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and/or SPS. JOVENAL and CELIA TORING, vs. CONSOLIDATED ORIX LEASING and FINANCE CORPORATION, G.R. No. 135287, (2001) Facts: Petitioners were declared in default when they and their counsel, Atty. Rodolfo L. Vega, failed to appear at the pretrial hearing on 22 April 1993. The order of default was subsequently lifted. Petitioners were again declared in default for having been absent in the pretrial hearing scheduled on that day. Respondent presented its evidence ex-parte. the default order was once more lifted but the evidence presented was retained in the records subject to cross-examination by petitioners. In the next pretrial hearing, petitioners and counsel still failed to show up. For the third time, they were declared in default. This time, the trial court considered the case submitted for decision. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent in a decision. Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration and/or Set Aside Judgment by Default", but were subsequently denied by the trial court.

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Petitioners then filed a "Petition for Relief from Judgment." Petitioners claimed that they were deprived of their right to present their evidence. Their non-appearance in the pretrial hearing was according to them, was due to their counsel’s "honest mistake and excusable negligence" of entering in his calendar the date of the pretrial to be "May 23" when it should have been "May 16". The trial court dismissed the petition for relief for lack of merit. The court said that the mistake of counsel cannot be countenanced and could not in any manner be attributed to fraud or deception committed by the prevailing party that could call for the setting aside of the judgment. Still undaunted, petitioners filed a notice of appeal to the order denying the petition for relief, which notice was approved by the court a quo. The Court of Appeals sent a letter-notice to petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Rodolfo L. Vega, requiring him to file the appellants’ brief within 45 days from notice. Meanwhile, counsel filed with the Court of Appeals a "Motion for Leave to Admit Late Payment with Notice of Change of Address," prompting the appellate court to send anew a letter-notice to counsel. Atty. Vega filed a "Motion for Extension to file Brief" alleging that he received the first notice on 04 October 1997 and praying for an additional 90 days, or until 12 February 1998, within which to file the required pleading. The motion for extension was granted by the Court of Appeals. Noting that counsel had, in fact, received the first letter-notice, the appellate court withdrew the second notice. Despite the extension, Atty. Vega still failed to file the appellants’ brief. The Court of Appeals thus considered the appeal by petitioners to have been abandoned and accordingly dismissed the case pursuant to Rule 50, Section 1(e), of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. After the receipt of the notice of dismissal, that counsel filed a "Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration." Consequently, the appellate court dismissed the motion for having been filed out of time. Petitioners, with a new counsel, now come before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari seeking the remand of the case to the appellate court and another chance to file the appellants’ brief on the ground that failure of their former counsel to file the required brief constitutes gross mistake or negligence which should not bind them as to do so would deprive them of due process and will cause them serious injustice. Issues: Whether or not the negligent act of counsel in failing to file the appellants’ brief, resulting in the dismissal of an appeal, a matter that binds the client. Ruling:

Regrettably, the Court finds itself unable to hold that the appellate court has committed a reversible error. Rule 50, Section 1(e), of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals on its own accord or on motion of the appellee for failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time prescribed by the Rules. The obvious reason for this rule is that upon appeal, the

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appellate court can only but place reliance on the pleadings, briefs and memoranda of parties such as may be required. The dereliction of duty by counsel affects the client. While, exceptionally, the client may be excused from the failure of counsel, the factual and case settings in this instance, however, would not warrant such an exception; indeed, petitioners themselves may not be said to be entirely faultless. Petitioners have not been denied their day in court. It is basic that as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he would have no reason to complain, for it is this opportunity to be heard that makes up the essence of due process. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral argument or through pleadings, is accorded, there can be no denial of procedural due process. Furthermore, petitioners could not have failed to notice the succession of blunders committed by their counsel, yet they took no precautionary measures such as by forthwith seeking the help of another counsel. No prudent party would leave the fate of his case completely to his lawyer. It should be the duty of the client to be in touch with his counsel so as to be constantly posted about the case.

Spouses VIRGILIO AND GLYNNA F. CRYSTAL, acting for themselves and as parents of minor children MONICA CLAIRE CRYSTAL and FRANCES LORRAINE CRYSTAL vs. CEBU INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, G.R. No. 135433 , April 4, 2001 Facts: The petitioners-spouses Virgilio and Glynna Crystal alleged that they sent all their children — Sheryll Louise, Doreen Angeli, Monica Claire and Frances Loraine — to study at the private respondent Cebu International School (CIS). In 1996, the petitioners' parents and children went to CIS to enroll. After complying with the school's enrollment and admission requirements, they were given the schedule of fees as well as the summary of total fees due upon enrollment in the amount. However, without any justifiable reason, the school refused to accept the payment by the petitioners of the enrollment fees unless they also pay the other charges called 'land purchase deposit' in the amount of P50, 000.00 per student plus surcharge of 2.5% per month starting from the school year 1995-1996. The petitioners thereafter repeatedly tendered payment of the total fees due upon enrollment computed at and pleaded for the admission of their daughters for enrollment and for the release of their report cards but were just ignored by the respondents. Accordingly, they prayed for the following reliefs: 1. Immediately enjoining the defendants from enforcing and collecting the 'land purchase deposit' and its 'surcharge' as prerequisite for enrollment and/or ordering the defendants to immediately accept, the plaintiffs' application for admission and/or to immediately admit the plaintiffs in Grade 4 and Grade 8 respectively at the

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defendant school and to accept the payment in the amount of P35, 187.00; 2. After trial, making the injunction above mentioned permanent and: a. Declaring the imposition and collection of 'land purchase deposit' and surcharge of 2.5% per month as illegal, unreasonable and oppressive; b. Declaring the imposition and collection of the increase in tuition fees and other fees not approved by the Department of Education and Culture as illegal and ordering the refund thereof to the plaintiffs; c. Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs the amount of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages; the amount of P500,000.00 as exemplary damages; the amount of P100,000;00 as . . . nominal damages; the amount of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; and costs of this suit; 3. Plaintiffs pray for such other reliefs and remedy consistent with law and equity. After the summary hearing, the respondent court issued a temporary restraining order, restraining defendants from imposing on the plaintiffs any amount, except the total amount due upon enrollment, as reflected in the Schedule of Fees for Grades 4 and 8. Meanwhile, private respondents, in their answer averred that petitioner did not pay with cash but with checks postdated. The postdated checks were not accepted because the respondent CIS Board of Trustees had earlier decided that the petitioners should pay either in cash or in manager's check because on several instances in the past their personal checks either bounced or were delayed in encashment due to their advice not to cash the same until further notice. The land purchase deposit of is not an additional requirement for enrollment or admission as it is refundable once the student graduates or otherwise decides to leave the school. It was imposed after prior consultation with the parents and upon agreement of all parents, including the petitioners, to enable the school to purchase a piece of land and to construct new school buildings and other facilities to which the CIS will transfer and occupy after the expiration of its lease contract with the Province of Cebu over its present site. The 2.5% surcharge per month refers to the late payment of the deposit under Option 3 which the petitioners themselves finally chose after they were not able to comply with Option 2 which was their earlier preference. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order was denied. Petitioners filed before the CA a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. They contended that the RTC had acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it issued its Order. The CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents from collecting from petitioners the questioned land purchase deposit. The appellate court promulgated the assailed Decision denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, holding that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. The former held that petitioners had not shown the existence of a right that was free from doubt. Issues:

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1. Whether the respondents' insistence on the land purchase deposit which is judicially admitted; by them as not a precondition or an additional requirement for enrollment is a valid challenge to the petitioners' right to enrollment. 2. Whether or not the minor children have a clear and legal right to be admitted to respondent school. 3. Whether or not respondents have the right to reject or bar the petitioners' children from enrollment for refusal to pay the land purchase deposit which is judicially admitted as [a] nonenrollment [requirement]. 4. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not issuing the writ of a preliminary mandatory injunction." 7 In the main, the Court is called upon to determine whether petitioners are entitled to a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction. Ruling: The Petition is devoid of merit. A writ of preliminary injunction is issued only upon proof of the following: (1) a clear legal right of the complainant, (2) a violation of that right, and (3) a permanent and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Petitioners have failed to show that they have a clear and unmistakable right that has been violated. Neither have they shown permanent and urgent necessity for the issuance of the writ. Furthermore, petitioners have no right or standing to pray for the issuance of an injunctive writ, because they failed to pay the required school fees on time. Not only had their personal checks bounced several times in the past, but these had been postdated as well; sometimes they were not even encashed upon petitioners' advice. It was not clearly shown any urgent and permanent necessity for the writ since the children are already enrolled in another school. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001 Facts: That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization for the stay of the aliens in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said disqualified aliens

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knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused. Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555 and No. 91-94897. Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to "Redetermine Probable Cause" and to dismiss or quash said information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner. On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to suspend her. The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of the suspension order Issues: Whether the Sandiganbayan suspension to petitioner.

has

jurisdiction

issuing

Ruling: The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute provides: "SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. In view of suspension NOT as a penalty It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be "no ifs and buts about it." Thus, it has been held that the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused. The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose

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a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In view of multiple petitions Petitioner next claims that the Amended information did not charge any offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019 because the official acts complained therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the information. "In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion that: (1) She was a public officer, (2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984; (3) Those aliens were disqualified; (4) She was cognizant of such fact; and (5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official functions.' In view of RA 3019 and Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks. Section 16, Article VI of the Constitution — which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days — is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives." In view of the power of the Court Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order. Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it

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appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue raised by petitioner. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO, G.R. No. 133254-55, April 19, 2001 Facts:

Two charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed docketed as Case No. Q-95-64357 and Case No. Q-95-64358 alleging the facts as follows: That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 11.14 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without the necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in violation of said law and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Prosecution presented three witnesses. For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was corroborated by his mother-inlaw. After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of six (6) months of arresto mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional; and, accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00. Issues:

1. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in declaring the search warrant valid 2. Whether the court a quo erred in convicting accused-appellant for illegal possession of methamphetamine hydro-chloride (SHABU)

house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not. Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. Second. Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis -for admitting the other items subsequently found. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in accordance with the "plain view doctrine," we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld. Third. The court justified the police officers’ claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open the door despite the fact that the searching party knocked on the door several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances justified the searching party's forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that the execution of their mission would be frustrated unless they do so. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO PASUDAG y BOKANG @ "BERTING",G.R. No. 128822, May 4, 2001 Facts:

3. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in convicting accused-appellant for violation Sec 8, R.A. No. 6425. 4. Whether or not the court a quo erred in admitting in evidence the two (2) bricks of marijuana. 5. Whether or not the court a quo erred in not finding that the policemen used excessive force in enforcing the search warrant. Ruling: First. It was held that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellant's

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Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Pangasinan, Urdaneta charging accused Alberto Pasudag y Bokang with violation of R.A. No. 6425, Sec. 9. That on or about September 26, 1995 and prior dates thereto at barangay Artacho, municipality of Sison, province of Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously plant, cultivate, and culture seven (7) hills of marijuana in the land tilled by him and situated beside the house of the accused, without authority or permit to do so. Contrary to Sec. 9 of R.A. 6425. The trial court arraigned the accused who pleaded not guilty. The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty as charged and, taking into consideration his educational attainment (he reached only grade IV), imposed the minimum of the imposable penalty. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of

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Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary penalty and other accessories of the law.

waiver of such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMPACION, G.R. No. 124442, July 20, 2001

Issues:

1.

2.

Whether or not trial court erred in finding that the marijuana plant submitted for laboratory examination was one of the seven (7) marijuana plants confiscated from his garden; and Whether or not the trial court erred in concluding that the confiscation report was not an extrajudicial admission which required the intervention of his counsel; and in convicting him on the basis of inference that he planted, cultivated and cultured the seven (7) plants, owned the same or that he permitted others to cultivate the same.

Ruling:

The court found the appeal meritorious. As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is required before a law enforcer may validly search or seize the person, house, papers or effects of any individual.The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, x x x." Any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible. In the case at bar, the police authorities had ample opportunity to secure from the court a search warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip inquired as to who owned the house. He was acquainted with marijuana plants and immediately recognized that some plants in the backyard of the house were marijuana plants. Time was not of the essence to uproot and confiscate the plants. They were three months old and there was no sufficient reason to believe that they would be uprooteds on that same day. The Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of law enforcement agencies in suppressing the illegal traffic of dangerous drugs. However, quick solutions of crimes and apprehension of malefactors do not justify a callous disregard of the Bill of Rights. With the illegal seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case, the seized plants are inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. Obviously, accused-appellant was a suspect from the moment the police team went to his house and ordered the uprooting of the marijuana plants in his backyard garden. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more that mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee." Even if the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and without a valid

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Facts:

Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that accused-appellant was growing and cultivating marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and SPO2 Basilio Sarong of the 6th Narcotic Regional Field Unit of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of the Bacolod City Detachment conducted a surveillance of the residence of accused-appellant who was then the barangay captain of Barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental on July 9, 1995. During the said surveillance, they saw two (2) tall plants in the backyard of the accusedappellant which they suspected to be marijuana plants. Despite failing to obtain a warrant, the team proceeded to Barangay Bagonbon and arrived at the residence of accused-appellant in the early morning of July 13, 1995. SPO4 Villamor knocked at the gate and called out for the accused-appellant. What happened thereafter is subject to conflicting accounts. The prosecution contends that the accused-appellant opened the gate and permitted them to come in. He was immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor about the suspected marijuana plants and he admitted that he planted and cultivated the same for the use of his wife who was suffering from migraine. The operatives then uprooted the suspected marijuana plants. Accusedappellant’s version of what transpired is that around onethirty in the early morning of July 13, 1995 while he and his family were sleeping, he heard somebody knocking outside his house. He went down bringing with him a flashlight. After he opened the gate, four (4) persons who he thought were members of the military, entered the premises then went inside the house. It was dark so he could not count the others who entered the house as the same was lit only by a kerosene lamp. One of the four men told him to sit in the living room. Some of the men went upstairs while the others went around the house. None of them asked for his permission to search his house and the premises. Issues: Whether or not the search and seizure performed at the backyard of the accused was valid. Ruling:

NO. In the instant case, the search and seizure conducted by the composite team in the house of accusedappellant was not authorized by a search warrant. It does not appear either that the situation falls under any of the exceptions. Consequently, accused-appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. It is extant from the records that accusedappellant did not consent to the warrantless search and seizure conducted. While the right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived either expressly or impliedly, such waiver must constitute a valid waiver made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The act of the accused-appellant in allowing

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the members of the military to enter his premises and his consequent silence during the unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and seizure especially so when members of the raiding team were intimidatingly numerous and heavily armed. As a general rule, objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure without a warrant. It is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Thus, the following elements must be present before the doctrine may be applied: (a) a prior valid intention based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) "plain view" justified were seizure of evidence without further search. Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. They forced their way into accused-appellant's premises without the latter's consent. It is undisputed that the NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the residence of accused-appellant on July 9, 1995 on the suspicion that he was growing and cultivating marijuana when they allegedly came in "plain view" of the marijuana plants. When the agents entered his premises on July 13, 1995, their intention was to seize the evidence against him. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search warrant but could not simply wait for one to be issued. The NARCOM agents, therefore, did not come across the marijuana plants inadvertently when they conducted a surveillance and barged into accused-appellant’s residence. SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, doing business as MANILA STANDARD, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001 Facts: Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in various fields, including economics, politics, demography, and social development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation, which features newsworthy items of information including election surveys. Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election. The term "election surveys" is defined in Section 5.1 of the law as follows: Election surveys refer to the measurement of opinions and perceptions of the voters as regards a candidate's popularity, qualifications, platforms or a

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matter of public discussion in relation to the election, including voters preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during the campaign period (hereafter referred to as "Survey"). The implement of Section 5.4, Resolution 3636, Sec. 24(h), dated March I, 2001, of the COMELEC enjoins: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election. Issues: Whether or not Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the press. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled Section 5.4 of R.A. No.9006 as unconstitutional. To be sure, Section 5.4 Iays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days immediately preceding a national election seven (7) days before a local election. Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. The Government thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for in enforcement of such restraint. There, thus a reversal of the normal presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation. What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of Sec. 5.4? The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien: “[A] Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” First, Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest "not related to the suppression of free expression." By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, Sec. 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion takers. In effect, Sec. 5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by referring personal opinion to statistical

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results. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression means that "the government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental, Sec. 5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the O 'Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated, Sec. 5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils. PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO, vs. SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA 357 SCRA 756; G.R. No. 147780 ; May 10, 2001 Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information against them was filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against them. Issues: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the same. Ruling: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless

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arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners’ prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which petitioners are not subjected to. Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang. FRANCISCO YAP, JR., a.k.a. EDWIN YAP vs. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 141529. June 6, 2001 Facts: The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of residence and travel abroad. For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, “in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years.” He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. Issues: Was the condition imposed by the CA on accused’s bail bond violative of the liberty of abode and right to travel? Ruling: Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure

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against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioner’s right to bail. ESTER M. ASUNCION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Second Division, MABINI MEDICAL CLINIC and DR. WILFRIDO JUCO G. R. No. 129329, July 31, 2001 Facts: Petitioner was an accountant/bookkeeper of the Mabini Medical Clinic. The NCR company discovered upon petitioner’s disclosure that there were violations of the Labor Standards Law. Later a memo was issued charging petitioner with chronic absenteeism, habitual tardiness, wasting time, getting money without a receipt, and disobedience and was asked to explain why she should not be terminated so she submitted her response. She was dismissed on the same day so she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was illegal dismissal. The NLRC set it saying that petitioner admitted that charges. Issues: Whether

or

not

there

was

illegal

dismissal.

Ruling:

The SC ruled in favor of petitioner. For a valid dismissal not only must there be just cause supported by clear and convincing evidence, there must also be an opportunity ;to be heard. The employer has the burden to prove that the dismissal was just or authorized cause. Failure to discharge this burden means that the dismissal ;is unjustified. Here the evidence submitted was merely unsigned handwritten records and printouts. This is insufficient to justify a dismissal. The provision for flexibility in administrative procedure does not justify decisions without basis in evidence having rational probative value. Here both the handwritten listing and computer print outs being unsigned, so the authenticity is suspect and devoid of any rational probative value. Nor was there due process. There is no showing that there was warning of the absences and tardiness. The 2-day period given to answer the allegations is an unreasonably short period of time. The clinic can’t have given ample opportunity to answer the charges filed. There are serious doubts as to the factual basis of the charges against petitioner. There doubts shall be resolved in her favor in line with the policy rule list that if doubts exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be titled in favor of the latter. CITY OF MANILA vs. OSCAR, FELICITAS, JOSE, BENJAMIN, ESTELITA, LEONORA AND ADELAIDA,

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ALL SURNAMED SERRANO, G.R. No. 142304, June 20, 2001 Facts: On December 21, 1993, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance 7833, authorizing the expropriation of certain properties in Manila’s First District in Tondo, covered by TCTs 70869, 105201, 105202, and 138273 of the Register of Deeds of Manila, which are to be sold and distributed to qualified occupants pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. One of the properties sought to be expropriated, denominated as Lot 1-C, consists of 343.10 square meters, and was in the name of Feliza de Guia. Lot 1-C was assigned to Edgardo De Guia, one of the heirs of Alberto De Guia, in turn one of the heirs of Feliza de Guia. On 29 July 1994, the said property was transferred to Lee Kuan Hui, in whose name TCT 217018 was issued. The property was subsequently sold on 24 January 1996 to Demetria De Guia to whom TCT 226048 was issued. On 26 September 1997, the City of Manila filed an amended complaint for expropriation (Civil Case 94-72282) with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila, against the supposed owners of the lots covered by TCTs 70869 (including Lot 1-C), 105201, 105202, and 138273, which included herein respondents Oscar, Felicitas, Jose, Benjamin, Estelita, Leonora, Adelaida, all surnamed Serrano. On November 12, 1997, the Serranos filed a consolidated answer, praying the exemption of Lot 1-C from expropriation. Upon motion by the City, the trial court issued an order, dated October 9, 1998, directing the City to deposit the amount of P1,825,241.00 equivalent to the assessed value of the properties. After the City had made the deposit, the trial court issued another order, dated 15 December 1998, directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City. The Serranos filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On November 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision holding that although Lot 1-C is not exempt from expropriation because it undeniably exceeds 300 square meters which is no longer considered a small property within the framework of RA 7279, the other modes of acquisition of lands enumerated in Sec. 910 of the law must first be tried by the city government before it can resort to expropriation, and thus enjoined the City from expropriating Lot 1-C. In its resolution, dated February 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals likewise denied two motions for reconsideration filed by the City. The City filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. Issues: Whether it was premature to determine whether the requirements of RA 7279, Sec. 9-10 have been complied with. Ruling: Rule 67, Sec. 2 provides that “Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government

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depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary. If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall be fixed by the court. After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties.” Thus, a writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial. Herein, these requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it became the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the writ of possession. The distinction between the Filstream and the present case is that in the former, the judgment in that case had already become final while herein, the trial court has not gone beyond the issuance of a writ of possession. Hearing is still to be held to determine whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided in RA 7279. Whether the City has complied with these provisions requires the presentation of evidence, although in its amended complaint petitioner did allege that it had complied with the requirements. The determination of this question must await the hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the condemnation of the properties sought to be expropriated. Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners. SANTIAGO ESLABAN, JR., in his capacity as Project Manager of the National Irrigation Administration, vs. CLARITA VDA. DE ONORIO, G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001 Facts: Clarita Vda. de Onorio is the owner of a lot in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nino, South Cotabato with an area of 39,512 square meters (Lot 1210-A-Pad-11000586, TCT T-22121 of the Registry of Deeds, South Cotabato). On 6 October 1981, Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager of the NIA, approved the construction of the main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot, affecting a 24,660 square meter portion thereof. De Onorio’s husband agreed to the construction of the NIA canal provided that they be paid by the government for the area taken after the processing of documents by the Commission on Audit. Sometime in 1983, a Right-of-Way agreement was executed between De Onorio and the NIA.

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The NIA then paid De Onorio the amount of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages. De Onorio subsequently executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she waived any compensation for damages to crops and improvements which she suffered as a result of the construction of a right-of-way on her property. The same year, Eslaban offered De Onorio the sum of P35,000,00 by way of amicable settlement (financial assistance) pursuant to Executive Order 1035, §18. De Onorio demanded payment for the taking of her property, but Eslaban/NIA refused to pay. Accordingly, De Onorio filed on 10 December 1990 a complaint against Eslaban before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), praying that Eslaban/NIA be ordered to pay the sum of P111,299.55 as compensation for the portion of her property used in the construction of the canal constructed by the NIA, litigation expenses, and the costs. Eslaban admitted that NIA constructed an irrigation canal over the property of De Onorio and that NIA paid a certain landowner whose property had been taken for irrigation purposes, but Eslaban interposed the defense that: (1) the government had not consented to be sued; (2) the total area used by the NIA for its irrigation canal was only 2.27 hectares, not 24,600 square meters; and (3) that De Onorio was not entitled to compensation for the taking of her property considering that she secured title over the property by virtue of a homestead patent under Commonwealth Act 141. On 18 October 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, ordering the NIA to pay to De Onorio the sum of P107,517.60 as just compensation for the questioned area of 24,660 square meters of land owned by De Onorio and taken by the NIA which used it for its main canal plus costs. On 15 November 1993, the NIA appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on 31 October 2000, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. NIA filed the petition for review. Issues: Whether the valuation of just compensation is determined at the time the property was taken or at the time the complaint for expropriation is filed. Ruling: Whenever public lands are alienated, granted or conveyed to applicants thereof, and the deed grant or instrument of conveyance (sales patent) registered with the Register of Deeds and the corresponding certificate and owner’s duplicate of title issued, such lands are deemed registered lands under the Torrens System and the certificate of title thus issued is as conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued to private lands in ordinary or cadastral registration proceedings. The only servitude which a private property owner is required to recognize in favor of the government is the easement of a “public highway, way, private way established by law, or any government canal or lateral thereof where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries thereof have been pre-determined.” This implies that the same should have been pre-existing at the time of the registration of the land in order that the registered owner may be compelled to respect it. Conversely, where the easement is not pre-existing and is sought to be imposed only after the land has been

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registered under the Land Registration Act, proper expropriation proceedings should be had, and just compensation paid to the registered owner thereof. Herein, the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the contested property was built only on October 6, 1981, several years after the property had been registered on 13 May 1976. Accordingly, prior expropriation proceedings should have been filed and just compensation paid to the owner thereof before it could be taken for public use. With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value which should be paid or “that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefore.” Further, just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just” for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Nevertheless, there are instances where the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain. The value of the property, thus, must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, “whichever came first.” ANTONIO BENGZON III vs. HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and Teodoro Cruz, 357 SCRA 545; G. R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001 Facts:

Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.” He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for re-election. Issues: Whether or not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the

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House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.” Ruling:

Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a naturalborn citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. CITY WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL vs. RAYMOND S. ESTRELLA, G.R. No. 141211, August 31, 2001 Facts: The Integrated Bar of the Philippines National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) initiated a jail visitation program. IBP volunteer lawyers and law students visited various jails in Metro Manila. In the City Jail of Manila, they found 34 prisoners, herein respondents, whom they believed were entitled to be released after deducting time allowances for good conduct in the service of their respective sentences. Respondents asked herein petitioner Rosendo M. Dial, City Warden of the Manila City Jail, to effect their release on the ground that they had already served their sentences, less time allowances for good conduct. Respondents invoked Arts. 97 and 99 of the Revised PenalCode. Issues: Does the Director of supervision of the

Prisons have control and city jails of Manila?

Ruling:

No. Under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (R.A. No. 409), the Director of Prisons did not have control and supervision of the city jails of Manila. It was the Chief of Police of Manila who under Section 34 of the Charter "shall exercise supervision, administration, and control over the city jail and municipal prisoners." There is no inconsistency between Art. 99 and R.A. No. 6975. Repeals by implication are not favored. To the contrary, every statute must be so interpreted and brought in accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. Interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi. For there to be an implied repeal, there must be a clear showing of repugnance. The language used in the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what has been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice. ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC ,G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001

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Facts: Petitioner challenged a resolution issued by the COMELEC. Petitioner seeks the disqualification of certain major political parties in the 2001 party-list elections arguing that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented and not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Issues: (1) Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections. (2) Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and under-represented sectors and organizations.

August 31, 1995. Mayor Adiong failed to act on the request. Hence, on March 11, 1996, respondent Nuska appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The latter issued a resolution declaring the termination of Nuska’s employment to be invalid and ordering her immediate reinstatement. On March 17, 1997, petitioner Mayor Adiong filed a motion for reconsideration. On December 11, 1997, the CSC denied the motion. Mayor Adiong filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the resolution of CSC. Issues: Whether or not respondent Nuska’s termination of employment was valid.

Ruling: Under the Constitution and RA 7941, major political parties cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections merely on the ground that they are political parties. But while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of Representatives. In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. LACSASA M. ADIONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS ,G.R. No. 136480, December 4, 2001 Facts: In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals as well as its resolution denying reconsideration thereof. On December 6, 1994, Mayor Sultan Serad A. Batua issued a permanent appointment to Nasiba A. Nuska to the position of Municipal Local Civil Registrar. The same appointment was duly approved by the Civil Service Commission Office, Marawi City on December 9, 1994. The new mayor, Lacsasa M. Adiong issued a memorandum informing all municipal employees of the termination of their appointment and directing them to clear themselves from money and property accountabilities. On July 1, 1995, another memorandum clarified this by specifying that the mass termination of services applied only to temporary or casual workers and requiring those holding approved permanent appointments to submit copies of their appointments. Due to respondent Nuska's failure to submit a copy of her appointment coupled with her failure to make a courtesy call on the petitioner as the new mayor, he terminated her services and appointed a certain Nanayaon Samporna in her stead. On August 27, 1995, respondent Nuska wrote Mayor Adiong requesting for her reinstatement and payment of salaries covering the period July 1, 1995 to

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Ruling: NO. The Constitution provides that: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." It further mandates that: "No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed are suspended except for cause provided by law." In this case, respondent Nuska had a permanent appointment to the position of municipal civil registrar of Ditsaan Ramain, Lanao Del Sur. She thus enjoyed security of tenure as guaranteed by law. As an employee in the civil service and as a civil service eligible, respondent Nuska entitled to the benefits, rights and privileges extended to those belonging to the classified service. She could not be removed or dismissed from the service without just cause and without observing the requirements of due process. The reasons advanced by petitioner why respondent Nuska's employment was terminated were the following: failure to make a courtesy call, failure to submit her appointment papers, and failure to report to work which was tantamount to abandonment. The failure to make a courtesy call to one's superior is not an offense, much less a ground to terminate a person's employment. Respondent Nuska's failure to submit her appointment papers is not a cause for her outright dismissal. It was not shown that respondent Nuska was informed of the July 1, 1995 memorandum requiring those with permanent appointments to submit their papers. At the very least, petitioner could have reminded her to submit the documents without terminating her employment immediately. On the alleged abandonment by respondent Nuska of her position, the same is without any basis. It is significant to note that Nuska, in her letter dated 27 August 1995, informed Mayor Adiong that she did not resign and that the termination of her services was not in accordance with existing Civil Service rules and regulations. She requested that she be reinstated to her lawful position and her back salaries be paid accordingly. The foregoing explains that although Nuska was physically absent in the office premises, all the while, she had the intention to return to work. Hence, she could not be deemed to have abandoned or relinquished her right to

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the position under an appointment with permanent employment status. A person holding a public office may abandon such office by non-user or acquiescence. Non-user refers to a neglect to use a right or privilege or to exercise an office. However, nonperformance of the duties of an office does not constitute abandonment where such nonperformance results from temporary disability or from involuntary failure perform Abandonment may also result from acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful removal or discharge, for instance, after a summary removal; an unreasonable delay by an officer illegally removed in taking steps to vindicate his rights may constitute an abandonment of the office. If a person was still willing to return to work despite his physical absence, it would not constitute as abandonment.

BENEDICTO and RIVERA vs. COURT OF APPEALS , G.R. No. 125359, September 4, 2001 Facts: On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were indicted for violation of Section 10 of Circular No. 960 1 in relation to Section 34 of the Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in five Informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 91101879 to 91-101883, the charge sheets alleged that the trio failed to submit reports of their foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within the period mandated by Circular No. 960. Said Circular prohibited natural and juridical persons from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without prior authorization from the Central Bank. On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash all the Informations filed against them in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883; 91-101884 to 91-101892, and 91-101959 to 91- 101969. Their motion was grounded on lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, and absence of a preliminary investigation and extinction of criminal liability with the repeal of Circular No. 960. On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners' motion. A similar motion filed on May 23, 1994 by Mrs. Marcos seeking to dismiss the dollar-salting cases against her due to the repeal of Circular No. 960 had earlier been denied by the trial court in its order dated June 9, 1994. Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration, but the trial court likewise denied this motion on October 18, 1994. Issues: (1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the Motion to Quash for absence of a valid preliminary investigation. (2) Whether or not the repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 by Circular No. 1353 and Republic Act No. 7653 respectively, extinguish the criminal liability of petitioners.

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Ruling: (1) NO. Preliminary investigation is not part of the due process guaranteed by the Constitution. It is an inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well- founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof. Instead, the right to a preliminary investigation is personal. It is afforded to the accused by statute, and can be waived, either expressly or by implication. When the records of the case were disclosed to them, in opting to enter their respective pleas to the charges, and filed various motions and pleadings, they are deemed to have made an express waiver of their right to have a preliminary investigation. (2) NO. In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular No. 960, Circular No. 1353 retained the same reportorial requirement for residents receiving earnings or profits from non-trade foreign exchange transactions. Even the most cursory glance at the repealing circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows that both contain a saving clause expressly providing that the repeal of Circular No. 960 shall have no effect on pending actions for violation of the latter Circular. A saving clause operates to except from the effect of the repealing law what would otherwise be lost under the new law. In the present case, the respective saving clauses of Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 clearly manifest the intent to reserve the right of the State to prosecute and punish offenses for violations of the repealed Circular No. 960, where the cases are either pending or under investigation. BERNARDO vs. ABALOS , G.R. No. 137266, December 5. 2001 Facts: This is a petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of Resolution No. 98-3208 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc promulgated on December 1, 1998 dismissing the complaint for vote buying filed by petitioners against respondents. On April 21, 1998, petitioners Antonio M. Bernardo, Ernesto A. Domingo, Jr. and Jesus C. Cruz filed with the COMELEC a criminal complaint against respondents Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., Benjamin C. Abalos, Jr., Dr. Eden C. Diaz, Romeo Zapanta and Arcadio de Vera for vote buying in violation of Section 261, paragraphs (a), (b) and (j) of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), in relation to Section 28 of Republic Act 6646 and Section 68 of the OEC. The complaint, docketed as E.O. Case No. 98-110, alleged that: “Respondents sponsored, arranged and conducted an all-expense-free transportation, food and drinks affair for the Mandaluyong City public school teachers, registered voters of said city, at the Tayabas Bay Beach Resort, Sariaya, Quezon Province. “Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr. delivered a speech wherein he offered and promised the Mandaluyong City public school teachers and employees a ‘hazard’ pay of P1,000.00, and increasing their allowances from P1,500.00 to P2,000.00 for food, or with a total of P3,000.00 which they will get by the end of the month.

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“The offers and promises to said public school teachers, who are members of the Board of Election Inspectors of Mandaluyong City and registered voters thereat, were made a few weeks before the election to induce or unduly influence the said teachers and the public in general (the other guests) to vote for the candidacy of Benjamin ‘Benhur’ Abalos, Jr.” On December 1, 1998, the COMELEC En Banc issued the assailed Resolution No. 98- 3208 dismissing the complaint "for insufficiency of evidence to establish prima facie case." On February 09, 1999, petitioners, without first submitting a motion for reconsideration, filed the instant petition with this Court.

Issues: Whether petitioner’s failure to submit a motion for reconsideration was fatal to his cause of action. Ruling: YES. Petitioners did not exhaust all the remedies available to them at the COMELEC level. Specifically, they did not seek a reconsideration of the assailed COMELEC En Banc Resolution as required by Section 1, Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Petitioners' failure to file the required motion for reconsideration utterly disregarded the COMELEC Rules intended "to achieve an orderly, just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission." Contrary to petitioners' statement that a resort to a motion for reconsideration is "dilatory," it bears stressing that the purpose of the said motion is to give the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. If the error is immediately corrected by way of a motion for reconsideration, then it is the most expeditious and inexpensive recourse. But if the COMELEC refuses to correct a patently erroneous act, then it commits a grave abuse of discretion justifying recourse by the aggrieved party to a petition for certiorari. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, can only be resorted to if "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.'' Having failed to file the required motion for reconsideration of the challenged Resolution, petitioners' instant petition is certainly premature. Significantly, they have not raised any plausible reason for their direct recourse to this Court. CRUZ and PAITIM vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION , G.R. No. 144464, November 22, 2001 Facts: On September 9, 1994 it was discovered by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) that Paitim, Municipal Treasurer of Bulacan took the non-professional examination for Cruz after the latter had previously failed in the said examination three times.

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The CSC found after a fact finding investigation that a prima facie case exists against you for DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE. The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge entering a general denial of the material averments of the "Formal Charge." They also declared that they were electing a formal investigation on the matter. The petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that if the investigation will continue, they will be deprived of their right to due process because the Civil Service Commission was the complainant, the Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same time. On November 16, 1995, Dulce J. Cochon issued an "Investigation Report and Recommendation" finding the Petitioners guilty of "Dishonesty" and ordering their dismissal from the government service Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative case. Allegedly, in accordance with Section 47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC is vested with appellate jurisdiction only in all administrative cases where the penalty imposed is removal or dismissal from the office and where the complaint was filed by a private citizen against the government employee. Issues: Whether or not petitioners’ right to due process was violated when the CSC acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and jugde all at the same time. Ruling: NO. The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it could not be an impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision was based on substantial findings. Factual findings of administrative bodies, being considered experts in their field, are binding on the Supreme Court. The records clearly disclose that the petitioners were duly investigated by the CSC. After a careful examination of the records, the Commission finds respondents guilty as charged. The photograph pasted over the name Gilda Cruz in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) during the July 30, 1989 Career Service Examination is not that of Cruz but of Paitim. Also, the signature over the name of Gilda Cruz in the said document is totally different from the signature of Gilda Cruz. Petitioners' contention that they were denied due process of law by the fact that the CSC acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at the same time against the petitioners is untenable. The CA correctly explained that the CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative case instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal including actions of its officers and the agencies attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11 of the Administrative Code of 1987. It cannot be denied that the petitioners were formally charged after a finding that a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against them. They were properly informed of the charges. They submitted an Answer and were given

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the opportunity to defend themselves. Petitioners cannot, therefore, claim that there was a denial of due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the CSC to take cognizance of the case. DE LEON vs. COURT OF APPEALS ,G.R. No. 127182, December 5, 2001 Facts: In the Decision sought to be reconsidered, we ruled that private respondent's appointment on August 28, 1986, as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV of the Ministry of Local Government, was temporary. Applying the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig, we held that since private respondent was not a Career Executive Service (CES) eligible, his appointment did not attain permanency because he did not possess the required CES eligibility for the CES position to which he was appointed. Hence, he can be transferred or reassigned without violating his right to security of tenure. It appears, however, that in Jacob Montesa v. Santos, et al., decided on September 26, 1990, where the nature of private respondent's appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV, of the Ministry of Local Government, was first contested, this Court issued a Minute Resolution dated March 17, 1992, holding that Achacoso v. Macaraig is not applicable to the case of private respondent. There was no Career Executive Service Board during the Freedom Constitution or at the time of appointment of petitioner. The CESO was only reconstituted by the appointment of its Board of six (6) members sometime in August 1988. There was no CESO eligibility examination during petitioner's incumbency in the Department, as there was no CESO board. The first CESO examination was given on August 5 and 12, 1990. The CESO eligibility was not a requirement at the time of the appointment of petitioner. The only eligibility required is that of a first grader and petitioner is a first grade eligible. Therefore, having met all the requirements for the position to which he was appointed, he cannot be removed in violation of the constitutional guarantee on security of tenure and due process. Invoking res judicata, private respondent contends that the nature of his appointment can no longer be passed upon and controverted in the present case considering that said issue had already been settled in the foregoing Minute Resolution of the Court. Issues: Whether or not res judicata applies. Ruling: NO. Concededly, if we follow the conventional procedural path, i.e., the principle on conclusiveness of judgment set forth in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court, 3 would bar a re-litigation of the nature of private respondent's appointment. Indeed, once an issue has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of

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a competent court, it can no longer be controverted anew and should be finally laid to rest. Yet, the Court is not precluded from re-examining its own ruling and rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to res judicata would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality. It must be stressed that this is not the first time in Philippine and American jurisprudence that the principle of res judicata has been set aside in favor of substantial justice, which is after all the avowed purpose of all law and jurisprudence.

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148560, 19 November 2001 Facts: On 4 April 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Criminal Case 26558, for violation of Republic Act (RA) 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Criminal Cases 26559 to 26...562, inclusive, for violation of Sections 3, paragraph (a), 3, paragraph (a), 3, paragraph (e), and 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019 (AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Criminal Case 26563, for violation of Section 7, paragraph (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Criminal Case 26564, for Perjury (Article. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Criminal Case 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (Commonwealth Act 142, as amended by RA 6085). On 11 April 2001, Joseph Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification “d” of the charges in the Information in Criminal Case 26558; and, for reconsideration / reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications “a,” “b,” and “c” to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. The grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration / reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law. On 25 April 2001, the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding that “a probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused.” On 25 June 2001 petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan. On 14 June 2001, Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 9 July 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s Motion to Quash. Issues:

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Whether the Plunder law, and the information, are clear to inform Estrada of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense. Ruling: As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts,... conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Section 1, paragraph (d), of the Plunder Law. Herein, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which Estrada is alleged to have committed. There was nothing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse Estrada in his defense. Factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, Estrada is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense. There is no basis for Estrada’s claim that the Supreme Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The theory is that “[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.” This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.” The over breadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that “a governmental purpose may not be

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achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.” The doctrines of strict scrutiny, over breadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases. “On its face” invalidation of statutes has been described as “manifestly strong medicine,” to be employed “sparingly and only as a last resort,” and is generally disfavored.

JUDGE RENATO A. FUENTES vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO, et al. G.R. No. 124295, October 23, 2001 Facts: The Republic of the Philippines (represented by DPWH) filed an expropriation case against the owners of the properties affected by the project before the trial court presided by petitioner Judge Renato A. Fuentes. DPWH won the expropriation case and as of 19 May 1994, it still owed the lot owners the following amounts: Reynaldo Lao – P489, 000; Tessie Amadeo – P1, 094,200; and Alfonso Galo – P13, 927,215. On 5 April 1994, the trial court granted Amadeo’s motion for the issuance of a writ of execution against the DPWH to satisfy her unpaid claim. The writ was served by Sheriff Paralisan to the DPWHRegion IX. On 3 May 1994, Paralisan issued a Notice of Levy addressed to the Regional Director describing the properties subject of the levy. The auction sale pushed through on 18 May 1994 with Alex Bacquial as the highest bidder and the corresponding certificate of sale was issued by Paralisan. On 19 May 1994, Bacquial and Paralisan attempted to withdraw the auctioned properties but were prevented from doing so by the custodian of the subject DPWH properties. On 20 May 1994, Bacquial filed an exparte urgent motion for the issuance of a “break-through” order to enable him to effect the withdrawal of the auctioned properties. The motion was granted by petitioner on the same date. Armed with the court order, Bacqiual succeeded in hauling off the properties for 5 successive days until the lower court issued another order temporarily suspending the writ of execution earlier issued. However, on 21 June 1994, the lower court issued another order upholding the validity of the writ of execution. On the basis of letters from Cong. Manuel Garcia of the 2nd District of Davao City and the DPWH custodian, the Court Administrator, Supreme Court directed petitioner and Paralisan to comment on the report recommending the filing of an administrative case against the sheriff and other persons responsible for the anomalous implementation of the writ of execution. By virtue of an administrative complaint filed by the DPWH, Paralisan was dismissed from the service by the Supreme Court on 23 August 1995. The Court further directed the Court Administrator to conduct an investigation on petitioner and to charge him if the investigation so warrants. On 15 January 1996, Dir. Antonio Valenzuela of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended that petitioner be charged before the Sandiganbayan with

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violation of R.A. 3019, Sec. 3(e) and likewise be administratively charged before the Supreme Court for acts unbecoming of a judge. On 22 January 1996, Valenzuela filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao a criminal complaint charging petitioner with violation of R.A. 3019, Sec. 3 (e). On 22 February 1996, petitioner filed with the Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao a motion to dismiss complaint and/or manifestation to forward all records to the Supreme Court. The motion was denied. Issues: Whether or not the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court. Ruling: NO. R.A. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides: “Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction; it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the Government, the investigation of such cases.” “Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority, Exceptions. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only be impeachment, or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.” Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Judge of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and the court personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers. Petitioner’s questioned orders directing the attachment of government property and issuing a writ of execution was done in relation to his office, well within his official functions. The order may be erroneous or void for

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lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of execution was valid under the given circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the judicial action only by the Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the courts. “No other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision— whether final and executory or not—and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone.” PCGG vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al. G.R. Nos. 119609-10, September 21, 2001 Facts: On August 28, 1990, PCGG sent Corporate Secretary Victor A. Africa of Oceanic Wireless Network, Inc. (OWNI), a letter dated August 3, 1990, directing him to send notices to all stockholders of record of OWNI for special stockholders' meeting. On September 17, 1990, during the special stockholders' meeting of OWNI, PCGG voted all the Class "A" shares in the election of directors and elected to the board of directors Commissioners Maceren, Parlade and Gutierrez representing the Class "A" shares and Brooker and Miller representing Class "B" and "C" shares. None of the registered Class "A" shareholders of OWNI was present in that, special stockholders meeting. PCGG sequestered the Class "A" shareholding about 60% of the outstanding capital stock, and PCGG voted all the Class "A" shares. On October 9, 1990, Corporate Secretary Africa wrote the SEC questioning the election of PCGG nominees as directors of the OWNI board on the ground that they were not stockholders of OWNI. On January 27, 1991, the special stockholders' meeting of OWNI took place. Stockholders owning 63,573 Class "A" shares were represented. An election of directors for Class "A" shares was held. Nieto, Jr., J. Africa and A. Africa were elected as directors for Class "A" shares for 1991 until their successors are elected and qualified. Class "B" and "C" shareholders did not attend the meeting. No new directors for them were elected. On July 29, 1991, PCGG, acting for itself and in behalf of OWNI, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for injunction with damages against V. Africa, J. Africa, Nieto, Jr. and Ocampo. PCGG sought to enjoin the defendants from interfering with PCGG's management of OWNI and/or representing themselves as director. Issues: Whether or not the PCGG's takeover of OWNI is legal Ruling: NO. In PCGG v. Cojuanco, Jr., the Court ruled that who should vote the sequestered shares requires the determination of the ill-gotten character of those shares and consequently the rightful ownership thereof. The issue was still pending in the main case in the Sandiganbayan.

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This is only an incident of the main case and is limited to the stockholders' meeting held on September 17, 1990. This is without prejudice to the final disposition of the merits of the main suit. The ownership of the shares is still under litigation. It is not known whether the shares are part of the ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos and his "cronies." We find the writ of sequestration issued against OWNI not valid because the suit in Civil Case No. 0009 against Nieto, Jr. and J. Africa as shareholders in OWNI is not a suit against OWNI. This Court has held that "failure to implead these corporations as defendants and merely annexing a list of such corporations to the complaints is a violation of their right to due process for it would in effect be disregarding their distinct and separate personality without a hearing.'' Furthermore, PCGG issued the writs of sequestration on August 3, 1988, which was beyond the period set by the Constitution. Article XVIII, Section 26, of the 1987 Constitution provides: "Sec. 26.The authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 in relation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall remain operative for not more than eighteen months after the ratification of this Constitution. However, in the national interest, as certified by the President, the Congress may extend said period. "A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case. The order and the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith be registered with the proper court. For orders issued before the ratification of this Constitution, the corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed within six months from its ratification. For those issued after such ratification, the judicial action or proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the issuance thereof. "The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is commenced as herein provided." The sequestration orders issued against respondents shall be deemed automatically lifted due to the failure of PCGG to commence the proper judicial action or to implead the respondents therein within the period prescribed by Article XVIII, Section 26 of the 1987 Constitution. The lifting of the writs of sequestration will not necessarily be fatal to the main case since the lifting of the subject orders does not ipso facto mean that the sequestered property are not ill- gotten. The effect of the lifting of the sequestration against OWNI will merely be the termination of the role of the government as conservator thereof. In other words, the PCGG may no longer exercise administrative or housekeeping powers and its nominees may no longer vote the sequestered shares to enable them to sit on the corporate board of the subject firm. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARANZADO,[G.R. Nos. 132442-44, September 24, 2001 Facts: ZENY was born on 19 November 1984 in Sto. Nino, South Cotabato. Her parents were BERNARDINO and Lourdes Gerongani. At about midnight of 7 March 1997,

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she was sleeping with her sisters and younger brother in their house at Poblacion, Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat, when the knocking at the door of their room awakened her. When she opened the door, her father immediately slapped her and demanded to know why she locked the door. Then, BERNARDINO asked her daughter: "Can I touch your vagina?" Repulsed by the suggestion, ZENY refused, only to find just as quickly that her father had poked a knife at her neck. BERNARDINO thereafter pulled ZENY's hair, forcibly held her down the floor and boxed her stomach. Recognizing the weakness of his daughter, he undressed her; and while choking her he imposed his lechery. He was obstinate to her daughter's pleas for mercy and compassion. He warned her not to tell anyone of the deed or he would kill her. He then stood up, dressed up and left the daughter to her weeping. Unsatisfied with that single act of carnality, BERNARDINO repeated the assault, twice on the honor and chastity of ZENY about midnight of 10 March 1997. Upon arraignment on 19 May 1997, BERNARDINO, assisted by his counsel Atty. Balo, entered a plea of not guilty in each case. On 20 October 1997, BERNARDINO, through his counsel Atty. Balo, moved to withdraw his previous plea of not guilty in each of the three cases and to substitute the same upon rearraignment with pleas of guilty. Issues: Whether or not the accused was accorded with due process. Ruling: NO. The Court found that the trial court failed, albeit regrettably, to observe the rigid and severe constitutional mandate on due process, more particularly the demands of Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which reads: SECTION 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. - When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf. As pointed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Supreme Court had already outlined how compliance with said rule, where an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, should be attained by the trial court, thus: 1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension [by the accused] of the consequences of his plea; 2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and precise degree of his culpability, and 3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. There is no debate that the trial court had persuasively observed the second command of the rule by

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directing the prosecution to adduce evidence to determine the exact culpability of the accused, taking into account the presence of other possible aggravating or mitigating circumstances. On the first requirement, it bears to note that a searching inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea so that the plea of guilty can be truly said to be based on a free and informed judgment. While there can be no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry," it would be well for the court to do the following: 1. Ascertain from the accused himself a.) how he was brought into the custody of the law; b.) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and c.) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters. 2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty. 3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio- economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty. 4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not infrequently indeed an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions. SALES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 369 SCRA 293 G.R. NO. 143802; 16 NOV 2001 Facts: The petitioner, the incumbent mayor of Pagudpud Ilocos Norte, shot the former mayor and his political rival Atty. Benemerito. After the shooting, he surrendered himself and hence the police inspector and wife of the victim filed a criminal complaint for murder against him. The judge after conducting the preliminary examination (p.e. for brevity) found probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest. Also after conducting the preliminary investigation (p.i. for brevity), he issued a resolution forwarding the case to the prosecutor for appropriate action. Petitioner received a subpoena directing him to file his counter affidavit, affidavit of witnesses and other supporting documents. He did it the following day. While proceedings are ongoing, he filed a petition for habeas corpus with the C.A alleging that: the warrant was null and void because the judge who issued it was a relative by affinity of the private respondent and the p.e. and the p.i. were illegal

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and irregular as the judge doesn’t have jurisdiction on the case. The C.A. granted the petition holding that the judge was a relative by affinity by 3rd degree to the private respondent and the p.i. he conducted has 2 stages, the p.e. and the p.i. proper. The proceeding now consists only of one stage. He conducted the requisite investigation prior to the issuance of warrant of arrest. Moreover he did not complete it. He only examined the witness of the complainant. But the prosecution instead of conducting p.i. of his own forwarded the records to the Ombudsman (OMB for brevity) for the latter to conduct the same. The OMB directed the petitioner to submit his counter affidavit, but he did not comply with it finding the same superfluous. The graft investigator recommended the filing of information for murder which the OMB approved. Petitioner received a copy of the resolution but prevented seeking reconsideration thereof he filed a motion to defer issuance of warrant of arrest pending the determination of probable cause. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion. This is now a petition for review on the decision of the Sandiganbayan. Issues: (1) Whether or Not the OMB followed the procedure in conducting preliminary investigation. (2) Whether or Not petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard and to submit controverting evidence. Ruling: The proper procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation was not followed because of the following reasons. Firstly, the preliminary investigation was conducted by 3 different investigators, none of whom completed the preliminary investigation There was not one continuous proceeding but rather, cases of passing the buck, the last one being the OMB throwing the buck to the Sandiganbayan. Secondly, the charge of murder is a non bailable offense. The gravity of the offense alone should have merited a deeper and more thorough preliminary investigation. The OMB did nothing of the sort but wallowed the resolution of the graft investigator. He did a worse job than the judge, by actually adopting the resolution of the graft investigator without doing anything and threw everything to the Sandiganbayan for evaluation. Thirdly, a person under preliminary investigation by the OMB is entitled to a motion for reconsideration, as maintained by the Rules of Procedure by the OMB. The filing of the motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper. The denial thereof is tantamount to the denial of the right itself to a preliminary investigation. This fact alone renders preliminary investigation conducted in this case incomplete. And lastly, it was patent error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied purely on the OMB’s certification of probable cause given the prevailing facts of the case much more so in the face of the latter’s flawed report and one side factual findings. The court cannot accept the Sandiganbayan’s assertion of having found probable cause on its own, considering the OMB’s defective report and findings, which

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merely rekied on the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution and disregarded the evidence for the defense. Judgment is rendered setting aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan, ordering the Sandiganbayan to quash the warrant of arrest and remanding the OMB for completion of the preliminary investigation. YOUSEF AL-GHOUL, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. 126859, September 4, 2001 Facts: Presiding judge of the RTC of Kalookan City, issued search warrants for the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City. The police searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment No. 2 were 2 M-16 rifles with 2 magazines and 20 live M-16 ammunitions, among others. Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court information accusing them with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and detained. At the hearing for bail, the RTC denied petitioners' motion for bail earlier filed for the accused are being charged of two criminal offenses and both offenses under Presidential Decree 1866, Sections 1 and 3 thereof prescribe the penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period to Reclusion Perpetua. Under Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-94, particularly Section 7 thereof, no person charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights as well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure because the place searched and articles seized were not described with particularity.

petitioners. Now, in contrast, the search conducted at Apartment No. 2 could not be similarly faulted. The search warrants in question specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2. The search was done in the presence of its occupants, herein petitioners, in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners allege lack of particularity in the description of objects to be seized pursuant to the warrants. That the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the same kind and nature as those items enumerated in the search warrant appears to be beyond cavil. The items seized from Apartment No. 2 were described with specifity in the warrants in question. The nature of the items ordered to be seized did not require a technical description. Moreover, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or species would suffice. The case of Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, 835 (1971), pointed out that one of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a search warrant is when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. A careful examination of the Search Warrants shows that they were worded in such a manner that the enumerated items to be seized could bear a direct relation to the offense of violation of Section 1 and 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, penalizing illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives. What the warrants authorized was the seizure of articles proscribed by that decree, and no other.

Issues: Whether or not the respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that the search and seizure orders in question were valid and the objects seized admissible in evidence. Ruling: As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, we are constrained to declare that the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against

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2002 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BALTAZAR BONGALON y MATEOS G.R. No. 125025 January 23, 2002 Facts: On December 8, 1994, Baltazar Bongalon not being lawfully authorized by law, and by means of motor vehicle, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to another, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag/sachet containing brown crystalline substance weighing 250.70 grams, which was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug, in violation of. When arraigned, the accused pled not guilty. he prosecution presented the following witnesses, to wit: (1) PO3 Noel Castañeto, the poseur-buyer who discussed in details the preceding incidents prior to the entrapment operation; (2) PO3 Rogelio Galos, member of the buy-bust operation team who testified the same; and (3) Police Senior Inspector Julita de Villa, the forensic chemist who showed his findings of the specimen confiscated in the position of the accused. The presentation of PO2 Felipe Metrillo, member of the buybust team, was dispensed with after the prosecution and the defense had stipulated at the trial that he would merely corroborate the testimony of PO3 Galos. For its part, the defense presented the accused himself, Baltazar Bongalon who denied the allegations and saying among others that his house was search without securing any search warrant. After the trial, the trial court found the accused guilty as charged. The accused filed a Notice of Appeal. Thereafter, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial to present additional witnesses that included his 4-year old son, Mark Anthony. The motion was denied by the trial court on the ground that the additional witnesses he offered to present were available during the trial proper of the case. Subsequently, the accused filed several motions including a motion to inhibit, but they were all denied. The trial court ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to this Court for automatic review. In the meantime, the accused filed a “MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL” with this Court. Pursuant to its directive, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment. After considering their pleadings, we denied the motion for new trial for lack of merit. The accused’s motion for reconsideration was also denied. Finally, the appellant and the Solicitor General filed their respective briefs. Issues: 1. Whether or not the arrest without warrant is a valid arrest. 2. Whether or not the search conducted by the NARCOM agents constitutes a valid search even without securing a search warrant.

Ruling:

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Yes, it is a valid arrest. The appellant cannot assail the validity of his arrest on account of the absence of a warrant. He was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu. There was, therefore, no need for a warrant to effect his arrest pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure. Said section provides: “Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawful—A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; xxx xxx

xxx.” Moreover, the rule is that an accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move to quash the information against him before his arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Even in the instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect, and objection thereto is waived where the person arrested submits to arraignment without objection. The subsequent filing of the charges and the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest against a person illegally detained will cure the defect of that detention. 2. Yes, it is a valid search. The appellant claims that the search conducted in his house was unlawful. He also laments that the NARCOM agents robbed him of his personal properties during the search and they received money from his relatives after his arrest. This Court need not tarry on the validity of the said search for the appellant consented to the search. He admitted that he voluntarily accompanied the policemen to his house. As for the charges of robbery and extortion, as in the alleged unlawful search made in his house, those incidents transpired after his arrest. Whether true or not, his liability for the unlawful sale of shabu remains. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ANTHONY ESCORDIAL G.R. Nos. 138934-35. January 16, 2002 Facts: On December 27, 1996, the said accused, armed with a deadly weapon, a knife, with intent of gain and by means of violence and intimidation on the person, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take from Michelle Darunday y Jintula the sums of P3,650.00, belonging to said offended party and on the occasion thereof have carnal knowledge with the complainant Michelle Darunday y Jintula, against her will, and inside her room wherein she was temporarily residing as a boarder. When arraigned on February 25, 1997, accusedappellant pleaded not guilty to the charges, whereupon the two cases were jointly tried. The prosecution presented eight witnesses, namely, Jason Joniega and Mark Esmeralda who were playing inside a jeepney in front of the boarding house

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where the complainant resides and said accused told them to go home; Erma Blanca, one of the roommates of the victim who was in the room when the accident took place; Dr. Joy Ann Jocson who examined the victims and found bruises and lacerations; PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, one of the policemen who responded to the report shortly after the commission of the crime; Leo Asan, an employee at the City Health Office in Bacolod; Ma. Teresa Gellaver; and Michelle Darunday. The victim herself narrated facts pointing the appellant as accused. She said that eventhough she was blindfolded when raped, she could identify the accused because of the scar and rough skin which she accidentally touch and it so happened that the same scar was found in the body of the accused. The defense presented as its witnesses Elias Sombito, Aaron Lavilla, PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino, Ricardo Villaspen, Nestor Dojillo, the barangay captain of Barangay Miranda, accused-appellant Anthony Escordial, Jerome Jayme, and Lucila Jocame. These witnesses gave a different account of the events that led to the arrest of accused-appellant. The accused as his defense put up an alibi stating among others that he was in Pontevedra when the incident happened. However, the trial court found the accused guilty of the crime charged and is ordered to pay for damages. Hence, the accused appealed. In his appeal, he contends among others that the court erred in convicting him guilty of the crime charged. Issues: 1. Whether or not the arrest conducted against the accused constitutes an illegal arrest. 2. Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused to remain silent and to have an independent counsel are violated. 3. Whether or not the presence of counsel is needed in the conduct of police lineup. Ruling: 1. Yes. Accused-appellant questions the legality of his arrest without a warrant. Indeed, PO3 Nicolas Tancinco admitted that he and his companions had arrested accused-appellant without any warrant issued by a judge. Art. III, §2 of the Constitution states: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. To implement this provision, Rule 113, §5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person only under the following circumstances: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on

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personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. The cases at bar do not fall under paragraphs (a) or (c) of the aforequoted rule. At the time of his arrest, accused-appellant was watching a game in a basketball court in Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. He was not committing or attempting to commit a crime when he was arrested by the police on that day. Nor was he an escaped prisoner whose arrest could be effected even without a warrant. The question is whether these cases fall under paragraph (b) because the police officers had personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to believe that accused-appellant had just committed a crime. The phrase “personal knowledge” in paragraph (b) has been defined in this wise: Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5(b) of Rule 113 must be based upon “probable cause” which means “an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.” The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officer making the arrest. In these cases, the crime took place on December 27, 1996. But, accused-appellant was arrested only on January 3, 1997, a week after the occurrence of the crime. As the arresting officers were not present when the crime was committed, they could not have “personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the commission of the crime” so as to be justified in the belief that accused-appellant was guilty of the crime. The arresting officers had no reason for not securing a warrant. However, the records show that accusedappellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged against him during his arraignment on February 25, 1997 without questioning his warrantless arrest. He thus waived objection to the legality of his arrest. As this Court has held in another case: The accused waived objections based on the alleged irregularity of their arrest, considering that they pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and participated in the trial. Any defect in their arrest must be deemed cured when they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. For the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is not a sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid judgment rendered after a trial, free from error. The technicality cannot render subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to the culpability of the accused.

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2. No. Accused-appellant invokes Art. III, §12(1) of the Constitution which provides that “[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.” He contends that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without being informed of his right to remain silent and to have independent counsel preferably of his choice. Hence, he contends, the trial court erred in not excluding evidence obtained from him during such interrogation for violation of accused-appellant’s rights under this provision. While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant was deprived of his right to be informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement from him – whether inculpatory or exculpatory - which was used in evidence against him. The records do not show that he had given one or that, in finding him guilty, the trial court relied on such statement. In fact, accused-appellant testified that at no point, even when subjected to physical torture, did he ever admit committing the crime with which he was charged. In other words, no uncounseled statement was obtained from accused-appellant which should have been excluded as evidence against him. 3. No. As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest. However, the cases at bar are different inasmuch as accused-appellant, having been the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial investigation when these out-ofcourt identifications were conducted by the police. An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that purpose. During custodial investigation, these types of identification have been recognized as “critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution” which necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This is because the results of these pre-trial proceedings “might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.” We have thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him. Here, accused-appellant was identified by Michelle Darunda in a show-up on January 3, 1997 and by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after his arrest. Having been made when accused-appellant did not have the assistance of counsel, these out-of-court identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him. Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses regarding these identifications should have been held inadmissible for being “the direct result of the illegal lineup ‘come at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality.’”

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Be that as it may, as the defense failed to object immediately when these witnesses were presented by the prosecution or when specific questions regarding this matter were asked of them, as required by Rule 132, §36 of the Rules on Evidence, accused-appellant must be deemed to have waived his right to object to the admissibility of these testimonies. Furthermore, the inadmissibility of these out-ofcourt identifications does not render the in-court identification of accused-appellant inadmissible for being the “fruits of the poisonous tree.” This in-court identification was what formed the basis of the trial court’s conviction of accused-appellant. As it was not derived or drawn from the illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a consequence thereof, it is admissible as evidence against him. However, whether or not such prosecution evidence satisfies the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt is another matter altogether.

STA. CLARA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION v. Spouses VICTOR MA. GASTON and LYDIA GASTON, G.R. No. 141961 : January 23, 2002 Facts: Spouses Victor Ma. Gaston and Lydia M. Gaston were residents of San Jose Avenue, Sta. Clara Subdivision located in Mandalagan, Bacolod City. They purchased their lots in the said subdivision sometime in 1974, and at the time of purchase, there was no mention or requirement of membership in any homeowners' association. From that time on, they have remained non-members of Sta. Clara Homeowners’ Association (SCHA). They also stated that an arrangement was made wherein homeowners who were non-members of the association were issued "nonmember" gatepass stickers for their vehicles for identification by the security guards manning the subdivision's entrances and exits. This arrangement remained undisturbed until sometime in the middle of March 1998, when SCHA disseminated a board resolution which decreed that only its members in good standing were to be issued stickers for use in their vehicles. Thereafter, on three separate incidents, Victor M. Gaston, the son of the spouses Gaston who lives with them, was required by the guards on duty employed by SCHA to show his driver's license as a prerequisite to his entrance to the subdivision and to his residence therein despite their knowing him personally and the exact location of his residence. On March 29,1998 Victor Ma. Gaston was himself prevented from entering the subdivision and proceeding to his residential abode when security guards Roger Capillo and a "John Doe" lowered the steel bar of the KAMETAL gate of the subdivision and demanded from him his driver's license for identification. On April 1,1998, Spouses Victor Ma. Gaston and Lydia M. Gaston filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction/preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court in Negros Occidental at Bacolod City against Santa Clara Homeowners Association (SCHA) thru its Board of Directors, namely: Arneil Chua, Luis Sarrosa, Jocelyn

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Garcia, Ma. Milagros Vargas, Lorenzo Lacson, Ernesto Piccio, Dindo Ilagan, Danilo Gamboa, Jr., Rizza de la Rama and Security Guard Capillo and 'John Doe', and Santa Clara Estate, Incorporated (Civil Case 98-10217, RTCBranch 49, Bacolod City); alleging that the acts of SCHA, et al., done in the presence of other subdivision owners had caused the spouses Gaston to suffer moral damage. On 8 April 1998, SCHA, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case as it involved an intra-corporate dispute between SCHA and its members pursuant to Republic Act 580, as amended by Executive Orders 535 and 90, much less, to declare as null and void the subject resolution of the board of directors of SCHA, the proper forum being the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC). To support their claim of intra-corporate controversy, SCHA, et al. stated that the Articles of Incorporation of SCHA, which was duly approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on 4 October 1973, provides "that the association shall be a non-stock corporation with all homeowners of Sta. Clara constituting its membership"; and that its by-laws contains a provision that "all real estate owners in Sta. Clara Subdivision automatically become members of the association", among others. On 6 July 1998, the lower court resolved to deny SCHA et al.'s motion to dismiss, finding that there existed no intracorporate controversy since the Spouses Gaston alleged that they had never joined the association. On July 18,1998, SCHA, et al. submitted a Motion for Reconsideration, adding lack of cause of action as ground for the dismissal of the case. On August 17,1998, the trial court denied the said motion without however ruling on the additional ground of lack of cause of action. On August 18,1998, SCHA, et al. filed a motion to resolve its motion to dismiss on ground of lack of cause of action. On September 8,1998, the trial court issued an order denying the motion. On September 24,1998, SCHA. et al. elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari. On August 31,1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition and ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction over the dispute. The appellate court likewise denied SCHA, et al.'s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated 11 February 2000. SCHA, et al. filed the petition for review. Issues: Whether or not the Spouses Gaston considered members of the SCHA.

are

to

be

Ruling: No. The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association includes the freedom not to associate. The right to choose with whom one will associate oneself is the very foundation and essence of that partnership. Further, the Spouses Gaston cannot be compelled to become members of the SCHA by the simple expedient of including them in its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws without their express or implied consent. True, it may be to the mutual advantage of lot owners in a subdivision to band themselves together to promote their common welfare, but that is possible only if the owners voluntarily agree, directly or indirectly, to become members of the association. True also, memberships in homeowners' associations may be acquired in various ways — often

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through deeds of sale, Torrens certificates or other forms of evidence of property ownership. Herein, however, other than the said Articles of Incorporation and By-laws, there is no showing that the Spouses Gaston have agreed to be SCHA members. The approval by the SEC of the said documents is not an operative act which bestows membership on the Spouses Gaston because the right to associate partakes of the nature of freedom of contract which can be exercised by and between the homeowners amongst themselves, the homeowners' association and a homeowner, and the subdivision owner and a homeowner/lot buyer. Clearly, no privity of contract exists between SCHA and Spouses Gaston. When the Spouses Gaston purchased their property in 1974 and obtained Transfer Certificates of Titles T-126542 and T-127462 for Lots 11 and 12 of Block 37 along San Jose Avenue in Sta. Clara Subdivision, there was no annotation showing their automatic membership in the SCHA. Furthermore, the records are bereft of any evidence that would indicate that the Spouses Gaston intended to become members of the SCHA. Prior to the implementation of the aforesaid Resolution, they and the other homeowners who were not members of the association were issued non-member gate pass stickers for their vehicles; a fact not disputed by SCHA. Thus, the SCHA recognized that there were subdivision landowners who were not members thereof, notwithstanding the provisions of its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws. SALVADOR H. LAURELvs . HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO G.R. No. 145368, April 12, 2002 Facts: President Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 "constituting a Committee for the preparation ofthe National Centennial Celebration in 1998." The Committee was mandated "to take charge of thenationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration ofPhilippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.” President Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, "reconstituting the Committee for the preparation ofthe National Centennial Celebrations in 1988." It renamed the Committee as the "National CentennialCommission" and Vice-President Laurel was appointed as chair. Its duty is to "take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress and its existence shall terminate upon thecompletion of all activities related to the Centennial Celebrations. A corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created. Laurel was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators and was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer. Senator Coseteng delivered a privilege speech denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction andoperation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone. The privilege speech was referred to the Blue Ribbon Committee for investigation. President Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 35, creating an ad hoc and independent citizens’committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding

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the Philippine centennial projects. Senator Saguisag was appointed to chair the Committee. Blue Ribbon Committee filed its report recommending the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ ofLaurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding, relative to theaward of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract that has caused material injury to government and for participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused by the government for the implementation of the said contracts all in violation of the anti-graft law. The Saguisag Committee issued its own report. It recommended the further investigation by the Ombudsman, and indictment, in proper cases of Laurel for violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Section 4(a) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman issued its Evaluation Report, recommending: that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary investigation be conducted before theEvaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office of the Ombudsman against former NCC and EXPOCORP chair Salvador H. Laurel, former EXPOCORP President Teodoro Q. Peña and AK President Edgardo H. Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No.3019, as amended in relation to PD 1594 and COA Rules and Regulations; That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of this Office, act as the nominal complainant. Apostol, OICDirector of the EPIB, directed Laurel to submit his counteraffidavit and those of his witnesses. Laurel filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of said office. Ombudsman denied motion to dismiss. EPIB found probable cause to indict respondents LAUREL and PEÑA before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act No. 1594. Desierto, in his capacity as Ombudsman, approved the resolution with respect to Laurel but dismissed the charge against Peña. Laurel moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied. Hence this present petition for certiorari. Issues: 1. Whether or not Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case; Whether EXPOCORP is a private corporation and not a GOCC; Whether NCC was not a public office; Whether or not Laurel is not a public officer.

Ruling: The Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however,

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defines who public officers are. A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence 13 is that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject: a public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office. We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance." The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law. The NCC was precisely created to ensure a more coordinated and synchronized celebration ofthe Philippine Centennial and wider participation form the government and non-government or privateorganizatiuons and to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other countries and to carrythem into effect. E.O. No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998, cited the "need to strengthen the said Committee to ensure a more coordinated andsynchronized celebrations of the Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the governmentand non-government or private organizations." It also referred to the "need to rationalize the relevanceof historical links with other countries." There can hardly be any dispute that the promotion of industrialization and full employment is afundamental state policy. Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a publicoffice, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer. That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached. But it is a public office, nonetheless.The petition is DISMISSED. SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLDMINING CORP. vs. BALITE PORTAL MINING COOP., et al.[G.R. No. 135190, April 3, 2002

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Facts:

On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was granted Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the Diwalwal area. On June 27, 2991, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076, or the People's SmallScale Mining Act.The law established a People's SmallScale Mining Program to beimplemented by the Secretary of the DENR and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR Secretary's direct supervision and control. Subsequently, a petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the admission of aMineral Production Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed before theDENR Regional Executive Director, docketed as RED Mines Case. On February 16, 1994, while the RED Mines case was pending, Marcopper assigned itsEP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), which in turnapplied for an integrated MPSA over the land covered by the permit. In due time, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. XI in Davao City(MGB-XI) accepted and registered the integrated MPSA application of petitioner and thereafter,several MAC cases were filed. On March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act, was enacted.Pursuant to this statute, the MAC cases were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA)tasked to resolve disputes involving conflicting mining rights.The RPA subsequently tookcognizance of the RED Mines case, which was consolidated with the MAC cases. On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 whichprovided that the DENR shall study thoroughly and exhaustively the option of direct stateutilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus before the Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and BaliteCommunal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC). It prayed for the nullification of the abovequotedMemorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the "direct state utilization" espoused thereinwould effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133; and that the memorandum orderarbitrarily imposed the unwarranted condition that certain studies be conducted before mining andenvironmental laws are enforced by the DENR.

Issues: Whether or not the "direct state utilization scheme" espoused in MO 97-03 divested petitioner of its vested right to the gold rush area under its EP No. 133. Ruling:

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No. MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt "direct state utilization" as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute.The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what wasdirected thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing else.Contrary to petitioner'scontention, it did not grant any management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scaleminers or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned toundertake studies to determine its feasibility. As to the alleged "vested rights" claimed by petitioner, it is well to note that the same isinvariably based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being disputed in the Consolidated Minescases.A reading of the appealed MAB decision reveals that the continued efficacy of EP No. 133 is one of the issues raised in said cases, with respondents therein asserting that Marcoppercannot legally assign the permit which purportedly had expired.In other words, whether or notpetitioner actually has a vested right over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still an indefinite andunsettled matter.And until a positive pronouncement is made by the appellate court in theConsolidated Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot be deemed as a source of any conclusive rightsthat can be impaired by the issuance of MO 97-03. It must likewise be pointed out that under no circumstances may petitioner's rights underEP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute.As correctly held by the Court of Appeals EP No.133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified orrescinded when the national interest so requires.This is necessarily so since the exploration,development and utilization of the country's natural mineral resources are matters impressed withgreat public interest.Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the granteeany permanent or irrevocable right within the purview of the non-impairment of contract and dueprocess clauses of the Constitution, since the State, under its allencompassing police power,may alter, modify or amend the same, in accordance with the demands of the general welfare. Additionally, there can be no valid opposition raised against a mere study of analternative which the State, through the DENR, is authorized to undertake in the first place. Worthnoting is Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4, Chapter II of the PhilippineMining Act of 1995. Thus, the State may pursue the constitutional policy of full control and supervision of theexploration, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral resources, by eitherdirectly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements with qualified entities.The DENRSecretary acted within his authority when he ordered a study of the first option, which may beundertaken consistently in accordance with the constitutional policy enunciated above.Obviously, the State may not be precluded from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it isthe only plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold rush. CRUZ and MONEDERO vs. JUDGE AREOLA

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A.M. No. RTJ-01-1642, March 6, 2002 Facts: On November 26, 1998, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information forEstafa against Marilyn Carreon, an employee of the Land Transportation Office, based on thecomplaint filed by herein complainants.The Office of the City Prosecutor found no cogent reasonto reverse, modify, or alter the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman and recommended thatthe case be set for trial. Complainants filed the instant complaint charging both respondent Judge and his BranchClerk of Court with ignorance of the law.Complainants take issue of the fact that althoughrespondent Judge already issued a warrant of arrest, he still deferred its implementation to giveway to a reinvestigation of the case on motion of the accused.They believe that there is nolonger any reason why the respondent Judge should withhold the issuance of a warrant of arrestconsidering that the Office of the City Prosecutor already made a finding that there existsprobable cause to indict the accused. In their Joint Comment, respondent Judge manifests that the issuance of a warrant ofarrest is not a ministerial function of a judge as he is mandated to determine the existence ofprobable cause before issuing a warrant.Respondent Branch Clerk of Court, on the other hand, claims that it is a ministerial duty on her part to release duly signed orders, resolutions anddecisions of the presiding judge of her branch. Issues: Whether or not the respondent Judge erred in deferring the implementations of the warrant of arrest. Ruling: NO. The 1987 Constitution provides that no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation forthe determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation forthe determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind ofpreliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution’s job. The secondkind of preliminary investigation is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. In making the required personal determination, a judge is not precluded from relying onthe evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers.The extent of reliance depends on thecircumstances of each case and is subject to the judge’s sound discretion. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue awarrant for the arrest of the accused, even after having personally examined the complainant andhis witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. For the

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determination of whether aprobable cause exists and whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustratethe ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. It appears from the records that the challenged Orders issued by the respondent Judgewere not at all baseless.The respondent Judge merely exercised his sound discretion in notimmediately issuing the warrant of arrest and in suspending further proceedings pendingreinvestigation of the case.On her part, respondent Branch Clerk of Court cannot be faulted forperforming a ministerial function, that is, releasing Orders duly signed by the respondent Judge. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BALOLOY G.R. No. 140740, April 12, 2002 Facts: At the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the evening of August 3, 1996, the dead body of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn Camacho was found.Autopsy reports found that Genelyn was raped before she was drowned.The one who caused its discovery was accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy himself, who claimed that he had caught sight of it while he was catching frogs in a nearby creek. While in the wake of Genelyn, Juanito confessed to the Barangay Captain that he only wanted to frighten the girl but ended up raping and throwing her body in the ravine. While in the custody of the authorities, he was asked incriminating questions by Judge Dicon who justified his actions saying that Juanito was not yet incustodial investigation. Based on his alleged extrajudicial confession, coupled with circumstantial evidence, the trial court found Juanito guilty of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death. On appeal, Juanito maintains that the trial court violated Section 12(1) of Article III of theConstitution when it admitted in evidence his alleged extrajudicial confession to Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon. According to him, the two failed to inform him of his constitutional rights before they took it upon themselves to elicit from him the incriminatory information. It is of no moment that Ceniza and Dicon are not police investigators, for as public officials it was incumbent upon them to observe the express mandate of the Constitution. While these rights may be waived, the prosecution failed to show that he effectively waived his rights through a written waiver executed in the presence of counsel. He concludes that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. Issues: (1) Whether or not Juanito’s extrajudicial confession before the barangay captain was admissible. (2)Whether or not Juanito’s extrajudicial confession before the judge was admissible. Ruling:

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1) YES.As to his confession with the Baragay Captain Ceniza, it has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous statement, note solicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime.Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under investigation.What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. In the instant case, Juanito voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped GENELYN and thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This narration was a spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinary manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed undercustody for investigation in connection with the commission of the offense. Moreover, Juanito did not offer any evidence of improper or ulterior motive on the part of Ceniza, which could havecompelled her to testify falsely against him. (2) NO.However, there is merit in Juanito’s claim that his constitutional rights during custodial investigation were violated by Judge Dicon when the latter propounded to himincriminating questions without informing him of his constitutional rights. It is settled that at themoment the accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police officers, the custodialinvestigation is deemed to have started. So, he could not thenceforth be asked about hiscomplicity in the offense without the assistance of counsel. Judge Dicon's claim that no complainthas yet been filed and that neither was he conducting a preliminary investigation deserves scantconsideration. The fact remains that at that time Juanito was already under the custody of thepolice authorities, who had already taken the statement of the witnesses who were then beforeJudge Dicon for the administration of their oaths on their statements. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MONTERON [G.R. No. 130709, March 6, 2002] Facts: Accused-appellant was formally charged with rape, he entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment.After trial, the lower court convicted him of the crime of rape. Accused-appellant contends that the RTC of Davao has committed an error in notacquitting him of the crime charged in the Information. He argues that his negative plea to theinformation filed against him, his filing of the notice of appeal, and his denial of the rape charges against him during trial, indicate his innocence. Issues: Whether or not the contention of the accused-appellant is correct.

furnish the accused with the description of the chargeagainst him as will enable him to make his defense; second, to avail himself of his conviction oracquittal, for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform thecourt of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support aconviction, if one should be had. The purpose of arraignment is to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even ofhis life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform himwhy the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him.Consequently, when the accused-appellant entered a negative plea during his arraignment, the same was not binding on the court as an indication of his innocence.Rather, it is a general denial of the charges impugned against him and an exercise of his right to be heard of his plea. Neither is the accused-appellant’s filing of a notice of appeal indicative of his innocence.Onthe contrary, accused-appellant’s appeal was necessitated by the judgment of convictionrendered against him by the trial court. While the accused-appellant is guilty of rape, the same was committed only in its attemptedstage.This and the fact that the accused-appellant was still a minor when the crime was committed warrant the modification of the decision of the RTC of Davao. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNAS [G.R. Nos. 133583-85, February 20, 2002] Facts: For automatic review are decisions promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur finding appellant Roberto Bernas y Nacario guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape of her two minor daughters. When first arraigned on the charges, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel,pleaded not guilty.When the case was submitted for decision, the prosecution moved to reopenthe case to present the Birth Certificate of the victims as well as the Marriage contract of theparents.This motion was granted over the objection of the defense counsel.Before theprosecution presented its evidence, appellant, through his counsel, moved for the change of hisformer plea of not guilty to that of guilty, a Motion which the RTC granted. Appellant was thus rearraigned and pleaded guilty to the charges. The defense waived itsright to present evidence and submitted them for decision based on the evidence presented by the prosecution.The RTC then rendered the assailed decisions. Issues: Whether or not the conviction of the accused was proper.

Ruling:

Ruling:

NO.Constitutional due process demands that the accused in a criminal case should be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.The rationale behind thisconstitutional guarantee are: First, to

NO.The Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.This right finds amplification and implementation in

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the different provisions of the Rules of Court.Foremost among these enabling provisions is the office of an Information.The facts stated in the body of the Information determine the crime that the accused stands charged and for which he must betried. This recital of the essentials of a crime delineates the nature and cause of accusation against an accused. Other than the allegation of carnal knowledge, no other element of rape asdefined by law is alleged in the Information. Since the Information fails to allege the essential elements of qualified rape, appellant should not have been convicted of that crime. Otherwise, his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him would be violated. LETICIA R. MERCIALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. [G.R. No. 124171, March 18, 2002] Facts:

On August 12, 1993, criminal cases for rape with homicide were filed against the private respondents for the death of Maritess Ricafort Merciales. During the trial, after presenting seven witnesses, the public prosecutor filed a motion forthe discharge of accused Joselito Nuada, in order that he may be utilized as a state witness.However, the prosecution contended that it was not required to present evidence to warrant thedischarge of accused Nuada, since the latter had already been admitted into the WitnessProtection Program of the Department of Justice. Consequently, the respondent judge denied themotion for discharge, for failure of the prosecution to present evidence as provided for by Section9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. On July 13, 1994, private respondents filed a motion to set the case for hearing, invokingtheir constitutional right to speedy trial.The respondent Judge granted the motion.On the saiddate, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, instead of presenting further evidence.The respondent Judge postponed the hearing and reset the same for August 9, 1994. On August 9, 1994, the respondent Judge called for a recess so as to let the prosecution decide whether or not to present an NBI agent, who was then present, to prove the due executionof the accused Nuada's extrajudicial confession.However, after the recess, the public prosecutordeclined to present the NBI agent, and instead manifested that he was not presenting any furtherevidence. On October 21, 1994, the trial court issued the assailed Order which acquitted all of theaccused.Petitioner Leticia Merciales, who is the mother of the victim in the said criminal cases filed before the respondent Court of Appeals a petition to annul the Order of the trial court.However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Issues: Whether or not the Order of the trial court is valid. Ruling: NO. The trial court, notwithstanding its knowledge that the evidence for the prosecution was

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insufficient to convict, especially after the public prosecutor tenaciously insisted on utilizing Nuada as state witness, the trial court passively watched as the public prosecutor bungled thecase.The trial court was well aware of the nature of the testimonies of the seven prosecution witnesses that have so far been presented.Given this circumstance, the trial court, motu proprio,should have called additional witnesses for the purpose of questioning them himself in order to satisfy his mind with reference to particular facts or issues involved in the case. It is evident that petitioner was deprived of her day in court. Indeed, it is not only the State, but more so the offended party, that is entitled to due process in criminal cases. Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused by the court a quo was done without regard to due process of law, the same is null and void.It is as if there was no acquittal at all, and the same cannot constitute aclaim for double jeopardy. By contending that the challenged decision is void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the petition does not violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. It is elementary that double jeopardy attaches onlywhen the following elements concur: (1) the accused are charged under a complaint orinformation sufficient in form and substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court hasjurisdiction; (3) the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are convicted oracquitted, or the case is dismissed without their consent. Thus, the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy because, from the verybeginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Any ruling issued without jurisdictionis in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist. The dismissal of the casebelow was invalid for lack of a fundamental prerequisite, that is, due process. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al. [G.R. No. 135789.January 31, 2002] Facts:

On May 5, 1982, Manuel G. Montecillo, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Cesar C. Zalamea and Jose Y. Campos organized HMHMI to serve as a holding company for the shares of stocks of Hans M. Menzi, Jose Y. Campos, Cesar C. Zalamea and Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. in Bulletin Publishing Corporation and the shares of stocks of Hans M. Menzi in other companies including Liwayway Publishing Incorporated. On June 27, 1984, Hans M. Menzi died. On July 6, 1984, the court appointed Manuel G.Montecillo executor of the Estate of Hans M. Menziand later the president of HMHMI. With the lone exception of Montecillo, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Cesar C. Zalamea and Jose Y.Campos, constitute the principal stockholders and incorporators of HMHMI. On February 12, 1987, the PCGG issued Sequestration Writ No. 87-0206 against allshares of stocks, assets, properties, records and documents of HMHMI. Forthwith, on February13, 1987, upon the request

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of PCGG, Central Bank Governor Fernandez instructed commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions to withhold the withdrawal of funds and assets by Liwayway Publishing Corporation and HMHMI. On July 29, 1987, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance,reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against the following defendants: Manuel G.Montecillo, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Cesar C. Zalamea, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.Marcos.On October 17, 1990, the PCGG filed a Second Amended Complaint naming specifically the estate of Hans M. Menzi as one of the defendants. On November 27, 1992, the estate of Hans M. Menzi, in behalf of HMHMI, filed with the Sandiganbayan a "Motion to Lift Freeze Order" dated February 12, 1987, alleging that: (1) Thestocks, assets, properties, records and documents of HMHMI were sequestered without anyjudicial action having been filed against it, or without impleading it as a defendant in Civil Case No. 0022; and (2) Such issuance of a writ of sequestration without filing a corresponding judicial action against HMHMI within the reglementary period established by Section 26, Article XVIII ofthe 1987 Constitution resulted in the automatic lifting of the sequestration order on August 12, 1987. On April 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion. On October 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. On January 15, 1993, the Republicof the Philippines filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review assailing the resolution of the Sandiganbayan lifting the freeze order. On July 16, 1996, the Court set aside the Sandiganbayan's resolution lifting the freeze order and remanded the case back to the Sandiganbayan for resolution.Sandiganbayan lifted the writ of sequestration dated February 12, 1987, reasoning that there was no prima facie factual basis for its issuance. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the Sandiganbayan denied. Issues: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in lifitng the writ of sequestration over the assets, shares of stock, property records and bank deposits of HMHMI. Ruling: NO. It is well settled that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions or final orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited to questions of law. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain setof facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidencepresented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubtor difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of thewhole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy ofspecific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, andthe probability of the situation.

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The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the Court's function to examine and weigh all over again the evidence presented in the proceedings below. At any rate, the Court agrees with respondents that the Sandiganbayan has full authorityto decide on all incidents in the ill-gotten case, including the propriety of the writs of sequestrationthat the PCGG initially issued. Based on the evidence the PCGG submitted so far to theSandiganbayan, the late Hans M. Menzi owned the Bulletin Publishing Corporation almost onehundred (100%) per cent since 1957, except those Bulletin shares sold to U. S. AutomotiveCorporation in 1985, those converted to treasury shares in 1986, and those sold to the generalpublic at public offerings. In the absence of competent evidence showing thus far that PresidentFerdinand E. Marcos or his cronies ever acquired Bulletin shares of the late Hans M. Menzi orHMHMI that might be subject to sequestration, the Court may not void the resolutions of theSandiganbayan in question. O'HARA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. [G.R. Nos. 148941-42, March 12, 2002] Facts: Petitioner and respondent Jovita Rodriguez were candidates for the position of vice- governor, province of Rizal during the May 14, 2001 elections. On May 19, 2001, upon conclusion of the canvassing of the certificates of canvass coming from the thirteen municipalities and one component city of Rizal, the Provincial Board ofCanvassers (PBC) proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected vicegovernor with 216,798 votesover respondent Rodriguez's 215,443 votes. On May 23, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Binangonan, Rizal filedwith the COMELEC, a petition to correct entries in the certificate of canvass of votes.It was alleged that there were typographical errors in the number of votes garnered by petitioner and respondent resulting in the addition of 7,000 votes to petitioner. The MBC of Binangonan submitted the affidavit of Evelyn Ramirez, the Municipal Accountant of Binangonan, Rizal, admitting that she committed the mathematical error. On May 25, 2001, respondent Rodriguez filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul the proclamation of the winning candidate for vice-governor of the province of Rizal, and to correct alleged manifest mathematical errors. Respondent Rodriguez asserted that after themathematical error would have been corrected, she would obtain a plurality of 215,422 votes as against petitioner's 209,798. Petitioner filed his answer to the petition, arguing that there was no manifest error apparent in the certificate of canvass which respondent Rodriguez and the MBC of Binangonan sought to correct. On July 25, 2001, the COMELEC issued a resolution in the cases, wherein it ordered that petitioner’s proclamation is annulled, the PBC of Rizal to reconvene and correct the manifest mathmatical error in the votes, and to proclaim respondent as the duly elected ViceGovernor of Rizal.

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Accordingly, on July 27, 2001, the PBC of Rizal reconvened.However, petitioner wasnot notified of the proceedings of the PBC of Rizal.On the same day, the PBC of Rizal issued another certificate of canvass of votes and proclamation of the winning candidates for provincial officers, and on the basis thereof proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected vice-governorof Rizal. Immediately, respondent Rodriguez took her oath of office before Judge Leila SuarezAcebo, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City. Issues: Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it annulled the proclamation of petitioner as vice-governor of Rizal and by ordering the PBC of Rizal to reconvene and correct the alleged manifest mathematical error supposedly committed by theMBC of Rizal. Ruling: YES. The COMELEC should have conducted further investigation or at least a technical inspection or examination of election returns to verify the existence of the alleged error before itgave credence to the statements of the MBC of Binangonan and concluding outright that theStatement of Votes submitted by respondents were accurate. The COMELEC cannot simply rely on these Statement of Votes because they wereprepared by the same members of the MBC who claimed to have made a mistake due to "fatigue, sleepless nights and physical exhaustion."It would have been more prudent to make a determination whether these same individuals committed any other mistake in the tabulation orstatement of votes. Even based on the statements/affidavits of the MBC of Binangonan, it is apparent that the errors sought to be corrected do not appear on the face of the certificate of canvass.As above-stated, the alleged error which the COMELEC perceived to be manifest does not fall under the definition of "manifest error" which was laid down in Chavez vs. COMELEC . . . “To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.” The Constitution gives the Commission on Elections the broad power "to enforce all laws and regulations to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendumand recall."The Commission indisputably exercises the power of supervision and control over boards of election inspectors and boards of canvassers. The Commission must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. The Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the statutory authority under Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 to grant the Commission broad and more flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, and to serve as the guardian of the people's sacred right of suffrage. In the absence of any manifest error in the certificate of canvass sought to be corrected, the

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Commission should have ordered the re-canvass of the election returns or the re-counting of the ballots in the municipality of Binangonan in order to validate the claim of its MBC. If after the re-canvass of the election returns or the re-counting of the official ballots, the clerical error or mathematical mistake in the addition of the votes had been established, the Commission should have annulled the canvass and proclamation based on the erroneous certificate of canvass. If the records had borne out that petitioner's proclamation was the result of a clerical error or simple mathematical mistake in the addition of votes and did not reflect the true and legitimate will of the electorate, there could have been no valid proclamation to speak of. The issue would involve a pre-proclamation controversy. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT [G.R. No. 88435, January 16, 2002] Facts:

In 1986, the Philippine Government, under the administration of then President Corazon C. Aquino, obtained from the World Bank (WB) an Economic Recovery Loan (ERL) in the amount of 310 Million US Dollars.The ERL was intended to support the recovery of the Philippine economy, at the time suffering severely from the financial crisis that hit the country during the latter part of the Marcos regime. As a condition for granting the loan, the World Bank required the Philippine government to rehabilitate the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) which was then saddled with huge non-performing loans.The government’s commitment was embodied in the Policy Statement ofthe DBP which, among others, provided that the mentioned bank will now be required to have aprivate external auditor. On November 28, 1986, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 1079 amending theCentral Bank’s Manual of Regulation for Banks and other Financial Intermediaries.Thus, on December 5, 1986, the Central Bank Governor issued Central Bank Circular No. 1124 which substantially provides that “the requirements for an annual financial audit by an external independent auditor shall extend to specialized and unique banks such as the Land Bank of thePhilippines and the DBP.”On December 12, 1986, pursuant to CB Circular No. 1124 and the government’s commitment to the WB, DBP Chairman Jesus Estanislao wrote the Commission on Audit (COA) seeking the approval of the DBP’s engagement of a private external auditor in addition to the COA. On January 20, 1987, the COA Chairman Teofisto Guingona, Jr. replied to the December 12, 1986 letter of the DBP Chairman with a statement that “the COA will interpose no objection to your engagement of a private external auditor as required by the Economic Recovery Program Loan Agrrement of 1987 provided that the terms for said audit are first reviewed and approved by the Commission.”Cosequently, the Board of Directors of the DBP approve the hiring of Joaquin Cunanan & Co. as the DBP’s private external auditor for calendar year 1986. However, a change in the leadership of the COA reversed the course of events. On April27, 1987, the new COA Chairman, Eufemio Doningo, wrote the CB Governor

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protesting the issuance of Circular No. 1124 which allegedly encroached upon the COA’s constitutional and statutory power to audit government agencies.On May 13, 1987, after learning that DBP had signed a contract with above-mentioned auditing firm, the new COA Chairman wrote the DBP Chairman that the COA resident auditors were under instruction to disallow any payment to the private auditor whose services were unconstitutional, illegal and unnecessary. On July 1, 1987, the DBP Chairman sent to the COA Chairman a copy of the DBP’scontract with Joaquin Cunanan & Co., signed four months earlier on March 5, 1987.The DBPChairman’s covering hand-written note sought the COA’s concurrence to the contract.During thependency of COA’s concurrence to the contract, DBP paid the billings of the private auditor in the total amount of Php 487,321.14 despite the former’s objection to the same.Thereafter, the COA chairman issued a memorandum disallowing the payments.On January 19, 1988, the DBP Chairman moved for a reconsideration of the memorandum issued by the COA which the latter also denied ratiocinating that the said Commission has the “power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures of uses of funds and property pertaining to the government.” (Sec. 2, Art. IX-D, 1987 Philippine Constitution) Issues: (1) Whether or not the constitutional power of the COA to examine and audit the DBP is exclusive and precludes the concurrent audit of the DBP by a private external auditor. (2)Whether or not there is a necessity of hiring a private auditor and the reasonableness of their fees. Ruling: (1) NO.The resolution of the issue herein requires an interpretation of Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constituition, which provides: “Sec. 2 (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty toexamine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, andexpenditures or uses of funds and property, owned and held in trust by, or pertaining to, theGovernment, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. (2) The Commission shall have the exclusive authority, subject to thelimitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniquesand methods required therefore, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.” The bare language of Section 2 shows that the COA’s power under the first paragraph is not declared exclusive, while its authority under the second paragraph

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is declared “exclusive.”The framers of the Constitution, in deleting the word “exclusive” in the first paragraph, deemed that the inclusion of such word would constitute a disincentive or obstacle to private investment. There are government institutions with private investments in them, and some of these investors—Filipinos, as well as in some cases, foreigners—require the presence of private auditing firms, not exclusively but concurrently. The qualifying word “exclusive” in the second paragraph of Section 2 cannot be applied to the first paragraph which is another sub-section of Section 2. A qualifying word is intended to refer only to the phrase to which it is immediately associated.Thus, the first paragraph of Section2 must be read the way it appears, without the word “exclusive,” signifying that non-COA auditors can also examine and audit government agencies. Besides, the framers of the Constitution intentionally omitted the word “exclusive” in the first paragraph of Section 2 precisely to allow concurrent audit by private external auditors. The clear and unmistakable conclusion from the reading of the entire Section 2 is that the COA’s power to examine and audit is non-exclusive.On the other hand, the COA’s authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessary expenditures is exclusive. Further, the mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does not divest COA of its power to examine and audit the same government agencies.The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and its findings and conclusions will still bind the government agencies and its officials.A concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit. (2)YES.The hiring of a private auditor being an express condition for the grant of the US $310 Million Economic Recovery Loan, a major objective of which was DBP’s rehabilitation, the same was a necessary corporate act on the part of the DBP. The national government, represented by the Central Bank Governor, as well as the Ministers of Finance, Trade, and Economic Planning, had already committed to the hiring by all government banks for private auditors in addition to the COA. For the DBP to refuse to hire a private auditor would have aborted the vital loan and derailed the national economic recovery, resulting in grave consequences to the entire nation.The hiring of a private auditor was not only necessary based on the government’s loan covenant with the World Bank, it was also necessary because it was mandated by Central Bank No. 1124 under pain administrative and penal sanctions. The hiring of a private auditor by the DBP being a condition of the loan, the fees of suchprivate auditors are in reality part of the government’s cost of borrowing from the World Bank.Anannual private audit fee of about half a million pesos added to the interest on a US $310 Millionloan would hardly make the cost of borrowing excessive, extravagant or unconscionable.Besides, the condition imposed by a lender, whose money is at risk, requiring the borrower tosubmit to audit by an independent public accountant, is a reasonable and normal business practice.

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Ruling: MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, et al. [G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002] Facts: On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC appointed petitioner as "Acting Director IV" of the EID.On February 15, 2000, then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of petitioner as Director IV of EID in a "Temporary" capacity. On February 15, 2001, Commissioner Rufino S. B. Javier renewed again the appointment of petitioner to the same position in a "Temporary" capacity. On March 22, 2001, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all expiring on February 2, 2008. Benipayo took his oath of office and assumed the position of COMELEC Chairman; and Borra and Tuason likewise took their oaths ofoffice and assumed their positions as COMELEC Commissioners. The Office of the President submitted to the Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001 the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for confirmations. However, the Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments. This process was repeated twice. On April 11, 2001, COMELEC Chairman Benipayo issued a Memorandum whereby here aasigned petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her reassignment to the Law Department but to no avail.Upon denial, petitioner filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07 and other pertinent administratve and civil service laws, rules and regulations. During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borraand Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Issues: (1)Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of thead interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointmentprohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. (2)Whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. (3)Whether or not Benipayo's removal of petitioner from her position as Director IV of the EIDand her reassignment to the Law Department is illegal and without authority, having been done without the approval of the COMELEC as a collegial body.

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(1) NO. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows: "The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of theCongress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress." Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis. Hence the ad interim appointments extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra andTuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting appointments prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. (2) NO. There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the appointingauthority of the President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing power.In this instance, the President can no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but because of a final decision by the Commission onAppointments to withhold its consent to the appointment. An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter.A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at theclose of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. (3) NO. The Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is expressly empowered on his own authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in

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accordance with the Civil Service Law. In the exercise of this power, the Chairman is not required by law to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner's appointment papers dated February 2, 1999, February 15, 2000 andFebruary 15, 2001, indisputably show that she held her Director IV position in the EID only in anacting or temporary capacity. Petitioner is not a Career Executive Service (CES) officer, and neither does she hold Career Executive Service Eligibility, which are necessary qualifications for holding the position of Director IV as prescribed in the Qualifications Standards (Revised 1987) issued by the Civil Service Commission. Obviously, petitioner does not enjoy security of tenure as Director IV. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ACELO VERRA, G.R. No. 134732 - May 29, 2002 Facts: A day in court is the touchstone of the right to due process in criminal justice. It is an aspect of the duty of the government to follow a fair process of decisionmaking when it acts to deprive a person of his liberty.1 But just as an accused is accorded this constitutional protection, so is the State entitled to due process in criminal prosecutions.2 It must similarly be given the chance to present its evidence in support of a charge. Petitioner, People of the Philippines, claims that it was denied its day in court and its due process right was breached. Filing this Petition under Rule 45, it seeks to set aside, on pure questions of law, the April 6, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals. On November 14, 1988, respondent Acelo Verra was charged with the crime of murder for killing a certain Elias Cortezo. A warrant of arrest was issued by the Regional Trial Court against him on November 21, 1988. He remained at-large until May 24, 1996 when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court accompanied by his counsel. Immediately, arraignment proceeded during which he entered a plea of "Not Guilty." On the same day, the prosecution called to the witness stand the wife of the victim, private complainant Damiana Cortezo. She testified that: (1) she has executed an affidavit of desistance;3 (2) she is no longer interested in prosecuting the case; and (3) other witnesses of the shooting incident have turned hostile and have similarly lost concern in pursuing the same. Thereafter, the prosecution, joined by the counsel for the accused, moved for the dismissal of the case. In light of these developments, the trial judge issued an Order dated May 24, 1996 granting the motion, thus the Court dismissed the case. Subsequently, two other witnesses of the shooting incident appeared after learning of the dismissal of the case and manifested their willingness to testify. Further, two sisters of the victim assailed the allegation of lack of interest. Consequently, the prosecution filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal on July 22, 1996 asserting that Damiana and the accused misled the trial court and deprived the plaintiff, People of the Philippines, its day in court. For which reason, it argued, the Order dismissing the case should be voided.

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The Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court and reinstated the case. Hence, the present course of action. Issues: Whether or not the court of appeals committed a grave abuse of decision on reinstating the case. Ruling:

Petitioner cannot complain that it was denied its day in court. It was, in the first place, represented by a public prosecutor who was personally present in every stage of the proceeding -- from the arraignment to the promulgation of the dismissal order -- to protect its interests. It was given the chance to submit its evidence as it in fact called to the stand its own witness, Damiana (who incidentally was the only witness presented here), during the day of the hearing. Then, the prosecutor was able to conduct her direct examination. More importantly, petitioner was the one who jointly moved with accused's counsel for the dismissal of this case due to lack of evidence. The Order of Dismissal was given in open court by the presiding judge without any remonstrance from the prosecution. In the case at bar, we find all the above-cited requisites present. First, there was a valid information, sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, filed on November 14, 1988 duly signed by 4th Assistant Provincial Fiscal Cesar M. Merin.16Second, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Tacloban City clearly had jurisdiction to hear and try the murder charge against the respondent. Third, he was arraigned in open court on May 24, 1996 with the assistance of a counsel de officio.17 Fourth, during the arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty.18 Finally, there was a valid termination of this case on the basis of the trial judge's Order to Dismiss the case. While it is true that the respondent joined the prosecution in praying for its dismissal, double jeopardy will still attach since the basis for the ruling was the insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution. In view of private complainant's desistance and her testimony that other witnesses have turned hostile and are also no longer interested in prosecuting this case, petitioner clearly lacks the evidence to support the charge. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL GONZALES, JOSEPH BERNALDEZ, and ROMEO BERNALDEZ, G.R. No. 142932 May 29, 2002 Facts: This is an appeal from the decision,1 dated February 10, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 6, Mati, Davao Oriental, insofar as it finds accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez guilty as principals of the complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the victim Nicanor Suralta in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P2,425.00, plus the costs of the proceedings. When arraigned on December 1, 1992, the three entered a plea of not guilty, whereupon they were tried. Trial Court adjudged them to be guilty beyond reasonable

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doubt. Counsel for accused-appellant Joel Gonzales appealed contending that the evidence adduced by the prosecution during the trial are inadmissible in law. Accused-appellant Gonzales contends that during the interrogation and investigation, he and his co-appellant Romeo Bernaldez were not informed of their rights to remain silent and to secure the services of counsel, in violation of §§2 and 12, Art. III of the Constitution. Hence, their admission of the commission of the crime is inadmissible in evidence against them. Issues: Whether or not the appellant was corrent in his claim that the evidence be inadmissible in trial. Ruling: This contention lacks merit. Accused-appellants were already under custodial investigation when they made their admissions to the police. At that point, the investigation had ceased to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and had began to focus on the guilt of a suspect and for this reason the latter were taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom in a substantial way.40 Hence, the admissions made by accused-appellants are inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Art. III, § 2(1) and (3) of the Constitution. However, the defense failed to raise its objections to the admissibility of these statements immediately, as required by Rule 132, §36, when Inspector Malintad was presented as a witness for the prosecution or when specific questions concerning the confession were asked of him. Consequently, accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their right to object to the admissibility of Inspector Malintad's testimony.41 Indeed, it was even the defense counsel who provided the opportunity for Inspector Malintad to elaborate on the circumstances of accused-appellant Gonzales' admission in the course of his cross-examination of the said witness. JOEY POTOT y SURIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LOLITO DAPULAGG.R. No. 143547, June 26, 2002 Facts:

After the accused has filed with the trial court a manifestation that he is not appealing its Decision convicting him of homicide and that he is ready to serve his sentence, can the same court, upon motion by the private complainant with the conformity of the public prosecutor, set aside the said judgment and remand the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and the filing of the corresponding charge? This is the issue raised in the instant petition for review on certiorari.1âwphi1.nêt Joey S. Potot, petitioner, was charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 2739 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Catarman, Northern Samar. Upon arraignment on February 1, 2000, wherein the information was read to him in his own dialect, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty to the charge.2 Forthwith, he invoked not only the mitigating

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circumstance of plea of guilty, but also the circumstance of voluntary surrender since, as shown in the records, he surrendered voluntarily to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Headquarters immediately after the commission of the crime. The public prosecutor did not raise any objection. Instead, he manifested that there is no aggravating circumstance which attended the commission of the crime. Thereupon, the trial court, after being satisfied that petitioner understood the meaning and consequences of his plea of guilty, rendered and promulgated its Decision3 in open court convicting him of homicide, with the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender appreciated in his favor. On February 3, 2000, petitioner, through counsel, filed a manifestation with motion5 informing the trial court that he is not appealing from the Decision and praying that a commitment order be issued so he could immediately serve his sentence. Attached to the motion is petitioner's letter to the court stating that he does not intend to appeal from its Decision.6 However, on February 11, 2000, the private complainant, Rosalie Dapulag (wife of the victim), filed through counsel, a motion for reconsideration/retrial7 praying that the Decision be set aside and that the case be heard again because "there were irregularities committed before and during the trial which caused miscarriage of justice." The motion, which bears the conformity of the public prosecutor, alleges, among others, that: Petitioner opposed8 the motion, asserting that there was no irregularity in the preliminary investigation of the case and in the proceedings before the trial court; and that the decision can no longer be modified or set aside because it became final when he formally waived his right to appeal. The trial court, in its order dated May 3, 2000,9 granted private complainant's motion and set aside its February 1, 2000 Decision "as proceeding from a rigged, hence, sham hearing." It likewise ordered that the records of the case be remanded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor "for re-evaluation of the evidence and to file the corresponding charge," Issues: Whether or not the Trial Court was correct in its decision to reopen the case because of the irregularities in the previous proceedings. Ruling:

It is thus clear that only the accused may ask for a modification or setting aside of a judgment of conviction. And this he must do before the said judgment becomes final or before he perfects his appeal. Such judgment becomes final in any of the following ways: (a) when no appeal is seasonably filed by the accused, except in case of automatic review of the decision imposing the capital penalty;13 (b) when he has partially or totally served his sentence; (c) when he expressly waives his right to appeal the judgment, except when the death penalty is imposed; or (d) when he applies for probation. When one of these circumstances is present, the trial court which rendered

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the judgment of conviction loses jurisdiction to alter, modify or revoke it.14 It is an undisputed fact that on February 3, 2000, or three days after the promulgation of the judgment of conviction, petitioner filed a manifestation expressly waiving his right to appeal therefrom. His intention not to appeal is further indicated by his prayer in the same manifestation for the immediate issuance of a commitment order so he could serve his sentence. Such waiver has the effect of causing the judgment to become final and unalterable.15 Thus, it was beyond the authority of the trial court to issue the order of May 3, 2000 setting aside its February 3, 2000 Decision which had attained finality. In Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City16 and in a long line of cases, this Court (En Banc) held that a judgment which has acquired the status of finality becomes immutable. Any error, assuming one was committed in the judgment, will not justify its amendment except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. Finally, we agree with the petitioner that the assailed orders would violate his constitutional right against double jeopardy.19 Such right prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted. The objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the peril and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense. To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. These requisites have been established. Records show that petitioner was charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 2739 under a valid information before the trial court which has jurisdiction over it. He was arraigned and pleaded guilty to the charge. On the basis of his plea, petitioner was convicted and meted the corresponding penalty. As petitioner has been placed in jeopardy for the crime of homicide, he cannot be prosecuted anew for the same offense, or any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense charged.

SALVADOR H. LAUREL vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, G.R. No. 145368 July 1, 2002 Facts: Petitioner Salvador H. Laurel moves for a reconsideration of this Court's decision declaring him, as Chair of the National Centennial Commission (NCC), a public officer. Petitioner also prays that the case be referred to the Court En Banc. First, petitioner points out that the decision has "serious constitutional repercussions"1 because the composition of the NCC included members of the Cabinet, the Senate, the House of Representatives and the

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Supreme Court,2who are prohibited by the Constitution from holding any other office during their term or tenure. In connection, the Court, in its decision, allegedly disregarded the pronouncement in Manila Electric Co. vs. Panay Transportation Co.4 that the "Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions." Issues: Where or not the petitioner as Chair of the NCC is a public officer under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Ruling:

Assuming, as petitioner proposes, that the designation of other members to the NCC runs counter to the Constitution, it does not make petitioner, as NCC Chair, less a public officer. Such "serious constitutional repercussions" do not reduce the force of the rationale behind this Court's decision. Second, petitioner invokes estoppel. He claims that the official acts of the President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Supreme Court, in designating Cabinet members, Senators, Congressmen and Justices to the NCC, led him to believe that the NCC is not a public office.6 The contention has no merit. In estoppel, the party representing material facts must have the intention that the other party would act upon the representation.7 It is preposterous to suppose that the President, the Senate President, the Speaker and the Supreme Court, by the designation of such officials to the NCC, intended to mislead petitioner just so he would accept the position of NCC Chair. Estoppel must be unequivocal and intentional.8 Moreover, petitioner himself admits that the principle of estoppel does not operate against the Government in the exercise of its sovereign powers.9 Third, as ground for the referral of the case to the Court En Banc, petitioner submits that our decision in this case modified or reversed doctrines rendered by this Court, which can only be done by the Court En Banc. It is argued that by designating three of its then incumbent members to the NCC, the Court took the position that the NCC was not a public office.10 The argument is a bit of a stretch. Section 4 (3), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that "no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc." In designating three of its incumbent members to the NCC, the Court did not render a "decision," in the context of said constitutional provision, which contemplates an actual case. Much less did the Court, by such designation, articulate any "doctrine or principle of law." Invoking the same provision, petitioner asserts11 that the decision in this case reversed or modified Macalino vs. Sandiganbayan,12 holding that the Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division and the Head of the Loans Administration & Insurance Section of the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) is not a public officer under Republic Act No. 3019. This contention also has no merit. The rationale for the ruling in Macalino is that "the PNCC has no original charter as it

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was incorporated under the general law on corporations." However, as we pointed out in our decision, a conclusion that EXPOCORP is a government-owned or controlled corporation would not alter the outcome of this case because petitioner's position and functions as Chief Executive Officer of EXPOCORP are by virtue of his being Chairman of the NCC. The other issues raised by petitioner are mere reiterations of his earlier arguments. The Court, however, remains unswayed thereby REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. KER AND COMPANY LIMITED, G.R. No. 136171 July 2, 2002

and that for the purpose of appraisal, the fair market value of the property is taken into account and such value refers to the highest price in terms of money which a Lot No. Site I

TCT No.

2-D-1-A- T-212616 2

Total Area 29.583 m.

Affected Area sq. 1,186 sq. m.

Site II

2-D-1-B- T-212617 2,902 sq. m. 1,035 sq. m. 1 property will bring if exposed for sale in the public market. Issues:

Facts: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways, assailing the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 54256 entitled, "Republic of the Philippines v. Ker and Company Limited." The decision in question affirmed the trial court in ordering petitioner to pay herein respondent Ker Company Limited the sum of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) per square meter as just compensation for the 1,186 square meter lot (Site I) which was expropriated by the government. Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City a petition for expropriation of portions of two (2) parcels of land owned by respondent described as follows: Petitioner needed the parcels of land for the widening of the road component of J.P. Laurel-Buhangin Interchange in Davao City. The provisional value of the properties sought to be expropriated was fixed at the aggregate sum of Two Million Two Hundred Twenty One Thousand Pesos (P2,221,000.00) or One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per square meter. Respondent claimed that the value of the properties subject for expropriation is more than Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) per square meter. While petitioner found the valuation of respondent’s property in Site II reasonable, petitioner, in its comment on the Report of the Appraisers found the estimate for Site I excessive, stating that: 1) the provincial Appraisal Committee in a joint Appraisal Report dated January 14, 1993 recommended the market value of Ker and Company’s property at P1,000.00 per square meter; 2) the highest valuation of lots within the JP Laurel-Buhangin area adjudicated by the RTC, Davao City in a decision rendered on December 23, 1993 is at P4,000.00 per sq. meter; and, 3) the appraisers did not take into account that the areas in the proceedings are being expropriated for use in a government project vested with public interest. On September 27, 1996, the RTC rendered a decision declaring plaintiff to have a lawful right to acquire possession of and title to tne two lots ordering to pay just and fair compensation. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the lower court in toto, ruling that just compensation cannot be measured by the assessed value of the property as stated in the tax declaration and schedule of market values approved by the Provincial Appraisal Committee

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Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the decision of the lower court. Ruling: The appellate court did not err in not upholding petitioner’s claim that the valuation for the lot in Site I is excessive and unreasonable since the tax declaration of the property indicated its assessed value at only Four Hundred Twenty-Five Pesos (P425.00) per square meter while its market value was only Eight Hundred Forty-Nine Pesos (P849.00) per square meter based on the revised 1993 schedule of market values. We have declared in Manotok v. National Housing Authority3, that the statements made in tax documents by the assessor may serve as one of the factors to be considered but they cannot exclude or prevail over a court determination after expert commissioners have examined the property and all pertinent circumstances are taken into account and after all the parties have had the opportunity to fully plead their cases before a competent and unbiased tribunal. That the tax declaration of the property in Site I indicated a much lower assessed or market value therefore does not make commissioners’ valuation of just compensation for the property excessive or unreasonable. The duly appointed commissioners of both parties made a careful study of the properties subject of expropriation. They considered factors such as the location, the most profitable likely use of the remaining area, size, shape, accessibility as well as listings of other properties within the vicinity to arrive at a reasonable estimate of just compensation for both lots due the respondent. Petitioner, in fact, does not question the commissioners’ appraisal value as just compensation for the area affected in Site II. Petitioner maintains that the assessment of just compensation for the lot in Site I is excessive since the highest valuation made for the properties within the vicinity of J.P. Laurel-Buhangin Road was pegged at Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) in a decision rendered by Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao in December 1993. This contention is not plausible. In computing just compensation for expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint not at the time of the rendition of judgment which should be taken into consideration.4 Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the taking or the filing of the complaint whichever came first. On this matter, the appellate court is correct in disregarding petitioner’s claim.

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Nonetheless, we find merit in petitioner’s contention that there are no substantial distinctions between the lot in Site I and the lot in Site II to warrant different valuations. The lots subject of expropriation are adjacent to each other. The Appraisal Report even indicated that the remaining area of the lot in Site II has the same problem as in Site I with respect to access. The construction of the service road has created a problem pertaining to ingress or egress to the remaining portions of both Sites.5Considering that there is no evidence showing substantial distinctions between the lots affected by Site I and Site II and no explanation was given by the commissioners as to why Site I had been given a higher valuation than Site II, we find it just and reasonable that the undisputed sum of Five Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Three Pesos and Forty-Eight Centavos (P5,423.48) per square meter as just compensation for Site II should likewise apply to Site I. REGALADO P. SAMARTINO vs. LEONOR B. RAON, AGUSTIN G. CRISOSTOMO, THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF NOVELETA, CAVITE, HON. MANUEL A. MAYO, and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 131482 July 3, 2002 Facts: Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse, respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the properties left by the deceased was her one-half share in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 131898 in the name of co-owners Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena Bernardo. On January 25, 1996, respondents instituted against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for ejectment, docketed as Civil Case No. 744 of the Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta, Cavite.1 They alleged that during the lifetime of Filomena Bernardo, she leased her share in the property to petitioner for a period of five years counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that petitioner refused to vacate the property despite demands therefor. The trial court, despite the written certification from NBI-TRC, granted respondents’ motion to declare petitioner in default and ordered them to present evidence ex-parte. On March 21, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents. After learning of the adverse decision against him, petitioner’s counsel filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 16, a motion to set aside judgment. The motion was treated as an appeal and docketed as Civil Case No. N-6281. On July 18, 1996, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC.5 Certificate of Title No. T-283572, was levied and sold at public auction to respondents in full satisfaction of the monetary award.7 On November 25, 1996, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, a petition for relief from judgment, docketed as Civil Case No. N-6393.8 In support thereof, petitioner submitted an affidavit of merit,9alleging in fine that the parcel of land from which he was being evicted had been sold to him by Filomena

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Bernardo-Crisostomo, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 13, 1988.10 The following day, November 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the petition for relief from judgment.11Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied on December 12, 1996. A second Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied on January 14, 1997.12 On the same day, a writ of demolition was issued commanding the sheriff to remove the building and improvements made by petitioner on the subject premises and to deliver the possession thereof to respondents.13 Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 432O2.14 On August 29, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.15 Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied on November 14, 1997.16 Hence this petition for review. Issues: Whether or not the petition of Regalado Samartino is with merits. Ruling: The petition is impressed with merit. In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. If efforts to serve the summons personally to defendant is impossible, service may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. Otherwise stated, service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly served in person will substituted service be availed of. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 133250July 9, 2002 Facts: This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation. On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.

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On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands."1 On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay"2 under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA." On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City. The Freedom Islands have a total land area of One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty One (1,578,441) square meters or 157.841 hectares. On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding.4 On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA.5On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.6 On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997.7 Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal. On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice,8 the Chief Presidential Legal

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Counsel,9 and the Government Corporate Counsel.10 The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.11 On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there were ongoing renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy Officer Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating panel of PEA. On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed the petition "for unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of the case before the proper court."12 On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion. After several motions for extension of time,13 PEA and AMARI filed their Comments on October 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively. Meanwhile, on December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to submit the terms of the renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the case for hearing on oral argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999. In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda. On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement ("Amended JVA," for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA. Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void." Issues: Whether or not the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement. Ruling:

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Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information on matters of public concern in this manner: "Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." (Emphasis supplied) The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's right to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus: "Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." (Emphasis supplied) These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential to the exercise of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its official acts, transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed without any restraint, will be speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also essential to hold public officials "at all times x x x accountable to the people,"29 for unless citizens have the proper information, they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the right. Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will degrade the quality of decisionmaking in government agencies. Government officials will hesitate to express their real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public dissemination of their discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure before they decide. The right covers three categories of information which are "matters of public concern," namely: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3) government research data used in formulating policies. The first category refers to any document that is part of the public records in the custody of government agencies or officials. The second category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing, establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts, transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials. The third category refers to research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the government and used in formulating government policies. The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other documents

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attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA.34 The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying.35 The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the separation of powers.36 The right does not also apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have long recognized as confidential.37 The right may also be subject to other limitations that Congress may impose by law. There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress,38 are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.39 This is not the situation in the instant case. We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in several legislations. ANTONIETTE V.C. MONTESCLAROS, MARICEL CARANZO, JOSEPHINE ATANGAN, RONALD ATANGAN and CLARIZA DECENA, and OTHER YOUTH OF THE LAND SIMILARLY SITUATED vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATOR FRANKLIN, THE PRESIDENT OF THE PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN, AND ALL THEIR AGENTS AND REPRESENTATIVES, G.R. No. 152295 July 9, 2002 Facts:

Before us is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. The petition seeks to

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prevent the postponement of the Sangguniang Kabataan ("SK" for brevity) elections originally scheduled last May 6, 2002. The petition also seeks to prevent the reduction of the age requirement for membership in the SK. Petitioners, who are all 20 years old, filed this petition as a taxpayer's and class suit, on their own behalf and on behalf of other youths similarly situated. Petitioners claim that they are in danger of being disqualified to vote and be voted for in the SK elections should the SK elections on May 6, 2002 be postponed to a later date. Under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), membership in the SK is limited to youths at least 15 but not more than 21 years old. Petitioners allege that public respondents "connived, confederated and conspired" to postpone the May 6, 2002 SK elections and to lower the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but less than 18 years of age. Petitioners assail the alleged conspiracy because youths at least 18 but not more than 21 years old will be "summarily and unduly dismembered, unfairly discriminated, unnecessarily disenfranchised, unjustly disassociated and obnoxiously disqualified from the SK organization." Petitioners pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction . Issues: Whether or not the bill to abolish SK may be under the Judicial Review powers of the Supreme Court. Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit. The Court's power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.21 In the instant case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. With respect to the date of the SK elections, there is therefore no actual controversy requiring judicial intervention. Petitioners' prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or from setting into motion the legislative mill according to its internal

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rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint: the filing of bills by members of Congress, the approval of bills by each chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of approved bills, and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by each chamber of Congress. Absent a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the internal processes or procedures of Congress. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON, G.R. No. 143944 July 11, 2002 Facts: This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated December 27, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542, finding accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 64252 as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged in an Information which reads, thus: "That on or about March 13, 1999, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control eight (8) packs of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known as Shabu, weighing approximately 400 grams, without the corresponding license or prescription. Contrary to and in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA 7659."3 During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The accused-appellant contends that the Samsonite suitcase containing the methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him. He also contends thatPeople v. Marti15 is not applicable in this case because a vessel security personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a policeman. Issues: Whether or not the court erred in holding the drug admissible in evidence against accused. Ruling: The contentions are devoid of merit. The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution.16Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any

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proceeding.17 Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is against transgression committed by the government or its agent. As held by this Court in the case of People v. Marti,18 "[i]n the absence of governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State."19 The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.20 In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only after they found "shabu" inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply. There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is against them and other agents of the state that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CRISPIN VELARDE y BANDOJO, G.R. No. 139333 July 18, 2002 Facts: A municipal mayor cannot be considered a competent and independent counsel qualified to assist a person under custodial investigation. Hence, the extrajudicial confession taken from the accused with His Honor as counsel is inadmissible in evidence. Without this confession, the remaining evidence, which is circumstantial, fails the test of moral certainty. Hence, acquittal is inevitable. For automatic review by this Court is the Decision1 dated February 12, 1999, issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan (Branch 11), finding Crispin Velarde y Bandojo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide in Criminal Case No. 773-M-97. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows: "WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused CRISPIN B. VELARDE GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape with Homicide and hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of Death and to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages."2 "Accused declared on June 19, 1998 that he has been detained since May 12, 1997 or more than one (1)

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year already because he was told that he was the one who committed a crime against his cousin Brenda Candelaria. According to him, on the night of May 11, 1997 he was arrested while selling balot in Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan, by four (4) Barangay Officials. When said Barangay Officials asked him where he brought the child Brenda Candelaria, he told them he 'don't know' [sic]. He did not insist answering them 'because I don't know what they were asking about the child'. He just went with them because if he will not go with them 'di nila lulubayan and pamilya ko'. He was brought to the Barangay Hall of Barangay Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. He was kicked and mauled by the father and brothers of Brenda. The father of Brenda is his uncle and was the one who hurted [sic] him. He was boxed several times, hitting him in all parts of his body. While he was being boxed, he told them to stop because he did not know about the incident. Ruling of the Trial Court The RTC found the existence of enough circumstantial evidence pointing to appellant as the culprit in the crime. It also found his written extrajudicial confession admissible in evidence. As a consequence, it convicted him of rape with homicide and imposed upon him the supreme penalty of death. Hence, this automatic review.9 Assignment of Errors In his Brief, appellant faults the court a quo for the following alleged errors:10 "FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR The trial court erred in relying merely on the weight and sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution and the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession of the accused contained in his Sworn Statement made before the police authorities of Malolos, Bulacan. Issue/s: Whether the extrajudicial confession of appellant is admissible in evidence, The Court's Ruling Ruling: The appeal is meritorious. Barangay tanods and officials of Barangay Tikay, Municipality of Malolos arrested appellant while he was sellingbalut on the night of May 11, 1997.11 He was subsequently brought to the Malolos Police Station, where he was initially incarcerated and allegedly mauled.12 On May 14, 1997, his case was referred by the Malolos police to the incumbent mayor of Malolos, Bulacan, Atty. Danilo Domingo, who asked that appellant be brought to him.13 Upon the advice of the mayor, Velarde's written extrajudicial confession was taken. During the investigation, appellant was assisted by the mayor as counsel.14 Armed police officers were also present during the investigation.15 Article III Section 12 (1) of the Constitution provides: "Any person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,

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he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." The dead body of Brenda Candelaria was found in the Municipality of Guiguinto, Bulacan. But appellant, a resident of Barangay Tikay, Municipality of Malolos was brought to and detained in the Malolos Police Station, where he was investigated by the Malolos police. Under the circumstances, Atty. Domingo cannot be considered as an independent counsel. He was the mayor of Malolos at the time. As such, he exercised "operational supervision and control"18 over the PNP unit in that municipality. His powers included the utilization of the elements thereof for the maintenance of peace and order, the prevention of crimes, the arrest of criminal offenders and the bringing of offenders to justice.19 As mayor of Malolos, his duties were inconsistent with those of his responsibilities to appellant, who was already incarcerated and tagged as the main suspect in the rape-slay case. Serving as counsel of appellant placed him in direct conflict with his duty of "operational supervision and control" over the police. "What the Constitution requires in Article III Section 12 (1) is the presence of competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client's defense without any intervening conflict of interest."20 Evidently Atty. Domingo, being the mayor of the place where the investigation was taken, could not act as counsel, independent or otherwise, of appellant. During the investigation, Atty. Domingo failed to act as the independent and competent counsel envisioned by the Constitution. He failed to give any meaningful advice to protect the rights of appellant. The former did not even bother to inform the latter of the consequences of an extrajudicial confession. People vs. Dy G.R. Nos. 115236-37 (395 SCRA 256) Facts: This is a consolidated resolution of two motions for reconsideration filed by the accused in the decision by the Supreme Court to affirm judgment rendered by the RTC of Baguio City. In the said decision, the accused were found to be guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness. The accused contented, among others, that the 1st division has no jurisdiction over “all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher,” as it is Supreme Court en banc shall take cognizance of the case. Issue/s: Whether or not the accused are correct in pointing out that it should be en banc that should take the case. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the contention is misleading. Under Article VIII, Section 4 (1) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. At present, it is made up of three divisions. However, the divisions of the Supreme Court are not to be considered as

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separate and distinct courts. Actions considered in any of these divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in effect, by the same Tribunal. The divisions are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts, but as divisions of one and the same court. The Motions for Reconsideration filed by accusedappellants Bryan Ferdinand Dy and Giovan Bernardino are DENIED WITH FINALITY. People vs. Libnao GR No. 136860 (395 SCRA 407) Facts: In November 19, 1988, the RTC Branch 65 of Tarlac City convicted the accused for violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drug Act of 1972) and was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay two million pesos in fine. The accused were arrested in a tricycle flagged down by an officer. Basing on the intelligence report from surveillance conducted, two drug pushers will be making a delivery of dangerous drugs riding in a tricycle. They were brought to Kabayan Center where they were asked on the ownership and content of the black bag they were carrying with them witnessed by the Barangay Captain, during which they were not represented with a counsel. The bag turned out to contain bricks of marijuana. Issue/s: (1) Whether or not the arrest without warrant was valid. (2) Whether or not their constitutional rights were violated when they were not represented by a counsel during the custodial investigation. Ruling:

The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute. There are certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to search of moving vehicles. Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operation for three months in the area. The surveillance yielded the information that once a month, appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. The two were riding a tricycle and carrying a suspiciouslooking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what its content was, both became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure of appellant’s bag was not illegal. It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a criminal offense. She was making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under

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the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto. Thus the warrentless arrest was valid. The High Court also ruled that there was no extra judicial confession used, during the custodial investigation, for the conviction thus no infringement of constitutional rights happened.

People vs. Tee GR No. 140546-47 (395 SCRA 419) Facts: Thereafter, a search warrant was issued to look for more prohibited drugs within the residence of the accused-appellant which yielded more marijuana. Thus, he was charged with 2 counts of violations of RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drug Act of 1972. He moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too general because the amount of marijuana was not specified, and that the NBI had not complied with the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. During the trial, the case was put into rest because of the failure of the witness to appear and testify on several occasions despite postponements of the hearing. However, after some time, the witness agreed to finally testify and the trial court ordered the reopening of the case. The trial court dismissed the motion to quash search warrant and convicted the accused for the violation of RA 6425 with regard to items found at the residence of the appellant but acquitted for the charge filed as regards the items found on the leased place. The penalty provided was that of death penalty thus, resulted to this automatic review, with issues in question on validity of search warrant and violation of constitutional rights of the accused-appellant. Issue/s: 1) Whether or not the search warrant is illegal on the ground of defects in securing it and the generality of description of items being searched; (2) Whether or not there was a violation of constitutional rights of the accused-appellant. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that what the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense. However, it is

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not required that technical precision of description be required, particularly, where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, since the requirement of a technical description would mean that no warrant could issue. The description "an undetermined amount of marijuana or Indian hemp" must be held to satisfy the requirement for particularity in a search warrant. Noteworthy, what is to be seized in the instant case is property of a specified character, i.e., marijuana, an illicit drug. By reason of its character and the circumstances under which it would be found, said article is illegal. A further description would be unnecessary and ordinarily impossible, except as to such character, the place, and the circumstances. \ The specified description has satisfied the Constitution’s requirements on particularity of description. The description therein is: (1) as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; (2) expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law - by which the peace officers may be guided in making the search and seizure; and (3) limits the things to be seized to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. The High Court also ruled, contrary to the claim of the accused-appellant, is not a general warrant because even if the warrant did not specify provision of the law violated, it was nevertheless, specific on the offense committed. It further ruled that the operatives, although they themselves cannot be eyewitnesses to the crime, relied on a witness with personal knowledge of the offense, thus it is not hearsay information was used to secure evidence, notwithstanding the failure to attach the disposition of the said witness. The address stated in the warrant was held as specific as can be, supported by a detailed sketch of the premises. It was ruled that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. There was also no violation of right to speedy trial, rejecting view that there was unjustified and willful delay of resolution of the case due to failure or willful refusal of the witness to testify against him. This was proven, among others, by issuance of warrants of arrest against the witness and even punishing NBI supposedly having custody over the witness for contempt due to failure to produce the witness. Finding neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the present case, appellant’s possession of dangerous drugs, no matter how enormous, does not merit capital punishment but only the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.

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Pe People vs. Macalaba G.R. Nos. 146284-86 (395 SCRA 461) Facts Accused was charged of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, Possession of Forged Money and Possession of Dangerous Drugs. On the order for search of a carnapped car allegedly perpetrated by the accused, police officers made a search of the accused and luckily were able to tag down the accused. There they saw a gun. When pressed on the papers of the gun, they saw the forged money and the sachet of shabu from the clutch bag of the accused. The lower court convicted the accused of possession of dangerous drugs and acquitted him of other charges for lack of evidence. Issue/s: Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid.

Facts: An expropriation proceeding, separate from the current, transpired between petitioners and respondents. The ruling ordered the respondent to pay the petitioner the defined just compensation and cost of proceedings. After sometime the petitioner came before the court praying for forfeiture of the expropriation rights because of the failure of the respondents to effectuate the “public use” requirement in eminent domain. Furthermore, the petitioner argued that the respondent failed to implement the relocation proceedings which is the purpose sought by the taking. The trial court dismissed the petition prayed for by the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed such dismissal. Issue/s: Whether or not petitioner has the right to ask for forfeiture of expropriation rights.

Ruling:

Ruling:

The warrantless arrest of, or warrantless search and seizure conducted on, ABDUL constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement. The evidence clearly shows that on the basis of an intelligence information that a carnapped vehicle was driven by ABDUL, who was also a suspect of drug pushing, the members of the CIDG of Laguna went around looking for the carnapped car. They spotted the suspected carnapped car, which was indeed driven by ABDUL. While ABDUL was fumbling about in his clutch bag for the registration papers of the car the CIDG agents saw four transparent sachets of shabu.[ These sachets of shabu were therefore in "plain view" of the law enforcers.

The constitutional restraints in the exercise of the power of eminent domain over private properties upon just compensation, are public use and just compensation.

Under the "plain view" doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. Nonetheless, the seizure of evidence in plain view must comply with the following requirements: (a) a prior valid intrusion in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) the plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. We are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt under the circumstances above discussed that all the elements of seizure in plain view exist in the case at bar. Thus, the warrantless search and seizure conducted on ABDUL, as well as his warrantless arrest, did not transgress his constitutional rights. Supreme court affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. Reyes vs. National Housing Authority

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Petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been abandoned. The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience.” The act of respondent NHA in entering into a contract with a real estate developer for the construction of low cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated public purpose of their taking. The Supreme Court likewise do not subscribe to petitioners’ contention that the stated public purpose was abandoned when respondent NHA failed to occupy the expropriated lots by relocating squatters from the Metro Manila area. The expropriation judgment declared that respondent NHA has a lawful right to take petitioners properties "for the public use or purpose of expanding the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project." The taking here is absolute, without any condition, restriction or qualification. When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any

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impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.

serious charges under Sections 8 and 9, respectively, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

The Court ruled that non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of their expropriated lots.

Thus, Supreme Court fined the respondent judge and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely in the future.

Vda. De Danao vs Ginete A.M. No. MTJ–03–1474 (395 SCRA 542)

People vs. Estella G.R. Nos. 138539-40 (395 SCRA 553)

Facts:

Facts:

Merlita Dapadap Vda. de Danao charged Judge Manuel V. Ginete with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, delay in rendering judgments and serious misconduct for (1) issuing a writ of seizure a 6 x 6 truck despite being informed by police officers that the said truck was in custodia legis; and (2) for ordering her arrest solely on the basis of the purported affidavits of witnesses. These affidavits turned out to be “nonexisting,” as indicated by a Certification by the Clerk of Court.

Issue/s:

Issue/s: Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty as charged for issuing the warrant of arrest basing on nonexisting affidavits. Ruling: Respondent judge also gravely erred in ordering the arrest of complainant based on non-existing witnesses. In his order, he ruled that probable cause was established on the basis of witnesses’ affidavits allegedly submitted together with the Complaint. However, a Certification issued by Clerk of Court attested to the fact that there were no affidavits of the witnesses in a separate case against petitioner. The assumption of office by respondent judge placed upon him duties and restrictions peculiar to his exalted position. While the determination of probable cause that would warrant the arrest of a person is subject to “judicial discretion,” he should not have carelessly used or abused such discretion. Also, while the lone affidavit of a complainant might have been sufficient to determine probable cause, respondent should have nevertheless clearly indicated such fact in his Order of Arrest. Instead, he made it appear that Atty. Serra had submitted the affidavits of the latter’s witnesses’ along with the Complaint. Further, respondent pretended that he had personally examined these Affidavits to show that he had ample basis to order Danao’s arrest. As a member of the judiciary, he must be beyond suspicion. He must be perceived, not as a repository of arbitrary power, but as one who dispenses justice under the sanction of the rule of law. Issuing a patently erroneous order and undue delay in rendering a ruling constitute serious and less

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A search warrant was issued in search for dangerous drugs in a particular house allegedly owned by the appellant. Appellant was outside the said house when the search was performed and the searching officer found firearms, ammunition and dangerous drugs. The search was continued despite the appellant pointing to a different house as his and not the one they are searching. The trial court convicted the appellant of the crime possession of dangerous drugs but was acquitted with other crimes.

Whether or not the search was valid. Ruling: The Constitution bars the admission of evidence gathered in violation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure. In the present case, the illegal drug was searched for and found in a hut that has not been proven to be owned, controlled, or used by appellant for residential or any other purpose. Hence, he cannot be held guilty of illegal possession of the illegal drug found therein. The OSG argues that appellant is deemed to have waived his right to object to the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence seized through that search because, during the trial, he did not raise these issues. On the contrary, during the trial, appellant constantly questioned the legality of the search. This was manifested by his objection of admittance of evidence, testimony concerning the evident and the Demurrer To Evidence filed. All told, without sufficient admissible evidence against appellant, the prosecution failed to establish his guilt with moral certainty. Not only did its evidence fall short of the quantum of proof required for a conviction, it has also failed to present any evidence at all. Under our Bill of Rights, among the fundamental rights of the accused is to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. To overcome such presumption, the prosecution must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Our criminal justice system dictates that if the prosecution fails to do so, it becomes not only the right of the accused to be set free, but also the constitutional duty of the court to set them free. This principle leaves this Court no option but to acquit Appellant Antonio C. Estella for insufficiency of evidence.

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The appealed decision was set aside. Edna Collado, et.al, vs. Court of Appeals and Republic of The Philippines, thru the Director of Lands , G. R. No. 107764. October 4, 2002 Facts: This Petition seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 22, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 25597, which declared null and void the Decision dated January 30, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179, confirming the imperfect title of petitioners over a parcel of land. On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,200,766 square meters or 120.0766 hectares (“Lot” for brevity). The Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro (formerly known as Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to the application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-inCharge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which stated, “[t]his survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.” On March 24, 1986, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed an Amended Application to include additional co-applicants. Subsequently, more applicants joined (collectively referred to as “petitioners” for brevity). The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners’ application. In due course, the land registration court issued an order of general default against the whole world with the exception of the oppositors. Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902. Petitioners declared the Lot for taxation purposes and paid all the corresponding real estate taxes. The land registration court held that petitioners had adduced sufficient evidence to establish their registrable rights over the Lot. Accordingly, the court rendered a decision confirming the imperfect title of petitioners. The Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment pursuant to Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on the ground that there had been no clear showing that the Lot had been previously classified as alienable and disposable making it subject to private appropriation. In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared null and void the decision dated January 30, 1991 of the land registration court on the ground that the private respondents failed to present any evidence whatsoever that the land applied for as described in Psu-162620 has been segregated from the bulk of the public domain and declared by competent authority to be alienable and disposable. And worse, the technical description of Psu162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-inCharge, Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which was

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attached to the application of private respondents, categorically stated that "This survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed”. Issues: Whether the petitioners have registrable rights over the subject lot. Ruling: Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII [25] on “National Economy and Patrimony”. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong to the State. And Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource. In Municipality of Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that inalienable public lands “x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, does not run against the State. ‘The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.’ ” The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show clearly and positively that the Lot had been officially released from the Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Supreme Court pronounced that once a parcel of land is included within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant case, a presumption arises that the land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent declassification is shown. It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither petitioners nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title. Even if they submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had been excluded from the MWR upon the issuance of Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974, petitioners’ possession as of the filing of their application on April 25, 1985 would have been only eleven years counted from the issuance of the proclamation in 1974. The result will not change even if we tack in the two years Sesinando Leyva allegedly possessed the Lot from 1902 until the issuance of EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners’ case falters even more because of the issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977. According to then DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 reverted Lot A or the townsite reservation, where petitioners' Lot is supposedly situated, back to the MWR.

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Pedro Cupcupin v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 132389. November 19, 2002 Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to set aside the November 27, 1997 decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 17334, which affirmed with modification the November 18, 1994 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 170, wherein petitioner Pedro Cupcupin was found guilty of the crimes of violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and of violation of Section 1, Presidential Decree 1866, otherwise known as the Unlawful Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, in Criminal Case No. 13374MN and Criminal Case No.13375-MN. 5784, respectively. Version of the Prosecution. Based on a confidential information that petitioner, Pedro Cupcupin is engaged in selling methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), and in possession of firearms and ammunitions without the necessary license, NBI Agent Timoteo Rejano of the National Capital Region, conducted a surveillance on the vicinity of petitioners residence at Int. David Santos, C. Arellano Streets, Malabon, Metro Manila.After confirming said confidential information, Agent Rejano applied for the issuance of search warrants before Judge Romeo J. Callejo, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49. Contention of the Accused. Petitioner contends that the items allegedly seized from his residence are inadmissible as evidence because the search warrants issuedagainst him failed to comply with the constitutional and statutory requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. Specifically, petitioner claims that said warrants were defective on the grounds that: (1) NBI Agent Timoteo Rejano who applied for the issuance thereof had no personal knowledge of the facts on which the warrants were based; and (2) subject warrants failed to particularly describe the place to be searched because there are two houses (the residential house and the nipa hut which is the workshop room) located in the address stated in the said warrants. Issues: 1. Whether the NBI agent who applied the issuance of the search warrants has personal knowledge of the facts on which the warrants were based. 2. Whether the subject warrants are able to particularly describe the place to be searched. Ruling: Yes, the NBI agent who applied the issuance of the search warrants has personal knowledge of the facts on which the warrants were based. In the case at bar, NBI Agent Timoteo Rejano who applied for the issuance of Search Warrant Nos. 56-93 and 57-93, had personal knowledge ofthe circumstances on which the warrants were based. Admittedly, Rejanos knowledge of petitioners illegal possession of firearms and prohibited drugs came

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from a confidential informant, and therefore, initially hearsay. Nevertheless, the surveillance and investigation he conducted on the basis of said confidential information enabled him to gain personal knowledge of the illegal activities of petitioner. Hence, his testimony was sufficient justification for the examining judge to conclude that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. Yes, the subject warrants are able to particularly describe the place to be searched. It is clear that the workshop room where the packs of shabu were found is actually an integral part of petitioner’s residence. Hence, it cannot be argued that there are two houses in the address stated in the warrants and that the same failed to particularly describe the place to be searched. The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched. Tested against the foregoing rule, the Court finds that the residence of petitioner stated in the warrants as Int. David Santos, C. Arellano Street, Malabon, Metro Manila, can with reasonable effort be ascertained and identified by the NBI agents who were ordered to search the above address, including the rooms located therein. Supreme Court found the contention of the petitioner not meritorious.

Fredesminda Dayawon v. Judge Zeida Aurora B. Garfin, Mtcc, Branch 2, Iriga City, A.M. NO. MTJ-011367. SEPTEMBER 5, 2002 Facts: In a verified letter-complaint dated June 25, 1999, complainant Fredesminda Dayawon charged Judge Zeida Aurora B. Garfin of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Iriga City, Branch II, with ignorance of the law and serious misconduct relative to Criminal Case Nos. 20420, 20424, 20426 and 20428, all entitled People of the Philippines v. Fredesminda Dayawon. Judge Garfin allegedly convicted complainant, who was the accused in said cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, without conducting a trial on the merits. As a result, complainant was deprived of her day in court and was found guilty of the crime charged without due process of law. After arraignment and in the course of proceedings in the criminal cases, complainant’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss (or a motion to quash) the informations on the ground that the amount of the four bouncing checks she issued have already been paid. On December 2, 1996, Judge Garfin issued an order setting the hearing on complainant’s motion to dismiss on January 21, 1997. Pursuant to the trial courts directive, complainant presented evidence in support of her motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the prosecution presented evidence in support of its opposition. On August 24, 1998, the motion was submitted for resolution. On March 19, 1999, Judge Garfin rendered a joint judgment in the criminal cases denying the Motion to Dismiss and convicting the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Apparently, Judge Garfin simultaneously resolved

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complainant’s motion to dismiss and the criminal cases on the merits without setting the cases for trial. Arguments of the Respondent. In view of complainant’s admission and the presentation of evidence for both parties at the hearing of the motion to dismiss, Judge Garfin maintained that the proceedings were converted into a full-dress hearing on the merits with the consent of both parties, who actively participated therein. Judge Garfin further emphasized that with the admission made by complainant that she issued the bad checks, the burden of proving that she did not violate Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shifted to her. Since there is no specific provision in the Rules of Court governing such a remedial situation, she applied Section 6, Rule 135, to wit: “Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules” Arguments of the Complainant. Complainant denied that she consented to the conversion of the hearing on the motion to dismiss into a trial on the merits of the criminal cases. According to complainant, there was no order to this effect. Judge Garfin merely adopted her own rules of procedure to the prejudice of complainant’s constitutional right to due process. Had she known that the proceedings were already on the merits; complainant stated she would have endeavored to present other evidence in her defense. She reiterated that the evidence presented in the criminal cases pertained only to the motion to dismiss. Issues: Whether complainant is deprived of her constitutional right to due process. Ruling: Yes, complainant is deprived of her constitutional right to due process. Supreme Court pronounced that conformably, a modified order of trial is authorized whenever an accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense. This does not mean, however, that in such a case, trial could be dispensed with altogether. A judge must nonetheless ascertain whether the defense put up by the accused could withstand judicial scrutiny. In other words, while the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to an extenuating circumstance, the trial court is still duty-bound to establish that the accused, in fact, did not incur any liability relative to his admission. Needless to say, a regular trial on the merits is necessary for this purpose. Furthermore, it was not for respondent judge to unilaterally determine that the entire case was submitted for decision without giving complainant the opportunity to submit or at the very least, manifest if she had additional evidence to prove her innocence. Granting that complainant was accorded the chance to offer proof as to the alleged payment in support of her motion to dismiss, it remained incumbent upon respondent judge to

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notify complainant that the case will be decided on the merits. An accused in a criminal case must not be precluded from availing of every option allowed by the rules to adduce evidence in his defense. In this case, respondent judge deprived complainant of this opportunity when she adopted procedural shortcuts and decided the criminal cases without conducting a trial on the merits. Contrary to respondent judge’s claim, there is no showing that complainant consented to submit the cases for decision without a trial. Neither could such consent be inferred from the active participation of complainant in the hearing of the motion to dismiss because, understandably, she participated therein under the supposition that what was being heard at that time was only her motion. The rules likewise do not sanction the automatic conversion of a hearing on a motion to dismiss to a hearing on the merits of a case, in the absence of any clear waiver by the accused of his right to a regular trial. Consequently, respondent judge has no valid excuse for her error, which resulted in a violation of complainant’s right to be properly heard on her defenses. GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002 Facts: This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the Orders dated May 23, 2001 and July 3, 2001 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42.The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez. Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law. Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution. By an identical vote of 9-6 --

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after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and executory. Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069. Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,” which prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001. Issues:

1. 2. 3.

Whether respondent is entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Whether is respondent entitled to bail? Whether due process is violated in the immediate deprivation of appellant’s liberty prior to his being heard.

Ruling: No, respondent is not entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution does not require a notice

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or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides: “Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest. In Ho v. People and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of conducting a hearing just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we required was that the “judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.” In Webb v. De Leon, the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest: “Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.” That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondent’s demonstrated predisposition to flee. Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure: Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the

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issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will “best serve the ends of justice” in extradition cases. No, the respondent is not entitled to enjoy the constitutional right to bail. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the constitutional provision (Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution), as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended” does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application “only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.” Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. No, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due process. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point it does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.There is no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJ’s filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judge’s independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the court’s custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.

Facts: Susan Canton (hereafter SUSAN) was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City with the violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425. On February 12, 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, was found possessing nine hundred ninety eight point two eight hundred zero nine (998.2809) GRAMS of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding prescription or license. Version of the Prosecution. Susan was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), being a departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. When she passed through the metal detector booth, a beeping sound was emitted. Upon frisking SUSAN, a civilian employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) named Mylene felt something bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand under the skirt of SUSAN, pinched the package several times and noticed that the package contained what felt like rice granules. When Mylene passed her hand, she felt similar packages in front of SUSAN’s genital area and thighs. She asked SUSAN to bring out the packages, but the latter refused and said that was money only. Mylene forthwith reported the matter to SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes, her supervisor on duty who in turn instructed Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac and bring SUSAN to a comfort room for a thorough physical examination. Upon further frisking in the ladies’ room, Mylene touched something in front of SUSAN’s sex organ. She directed SUSAN to remove her skirt, girdles and panty. SUSAN obliged. Mylene and Lorna discovered three packages individually wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing tape, which SUSAN voluntarily handed to them. Together with SUSAN, they brought the gray plastic packs to the customs examination table, opened the same and found that they contained white crystalline substances which, when submitted for laboratory examination, yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. SUSAN signed a receipt of the articles seized from her. For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the First Regional Aviation Office, testified that he informed SUSAN of her constitutional rights but admitted that she did not have a counsel when she signed the receipt. Yet he told her that she had the option to sign or not to sign the receipt. Version of the Accused. After the trial court rendered a decision finding SUSAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the alleged offense, SUSAN filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, alleging therein that the trial judge erred in upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of police officers, since lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc is not even a police officer. SUSAN also assailed the propriety of the search and seizure without warrant on the ground that the seized items were not in plain view. Issues: 1.

Whether the warrantless search against Susan was legal.

2.

Whether the arrest of Susan was legal.

People of the Philippines vs. Susan Canton, G.R. No. 148825. December 27, 2002

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Whether the constitutional right to counsel afforded an accused under custodial investigation was violated.

Ruling: Yes, the warrantless search against Susan was legal. Supreme Court pronounced that the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as the arrest of SUSAN, were not violative of her constitutional rights. Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. XXX Sec. 3…. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court. The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute. The recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence are (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 reading as follows: SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the following condition printed thereon: “Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for , and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft,” which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier. This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and seizures. In the case of People v. Johnson, which involves similar facts and issues, The Court held in this wise: Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as

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checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. Yes, the appellant, having been caught flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested without a warrant. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides: SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. The present case falls under paragraph (a) of the afore-quoted Section. The search conducted on SUSAN resulted in the discovery and recovery of three packages containing white crystalline substances, which upon examination yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. As discussed earlier, such warrantless search and seizure were legal. Armed with the knowledge that SUSAN was committing a crime, the airport security personnel and police authorities were duty-bound to arrest her. As held in People v. Johnson, her subsequent arrest without a warrant was justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person flagrante delicto. No, the constitutional right to counsel afforded an accused under custodial investigation was not violated. Entrenched is the rule that the rights provided in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be invoked only when a person is under “custodial investigation” or is “in custody interrogation.” Custodial investigation refers to the “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession from him. And the right to counsel attaches upon the start of such investigation. The objective is to prohibit “incommunicado” interrogation of individuals in a policedominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.

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In this case, as testified to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, no custodial investigation was conducted after SUSAN’s arrest. She affixed her signature to the receipt of the articles seized from her, but before she did so, she was told that she had the option to sign or not to sign it. In any event, her signature to the packages was not relied upon by the prosecution to prove its case. Moreover, no statement was taken from her during her detention and used in evidence against her. Hence, her claim of violation of her right to counsel has no leg to stand on. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO ASIS y FONPERADA and GILBERT FORMENTO y SARICONGR 142531, 15 October 2002

other hand, contends that it was Formento’s wife who voluntarily surrendered the bag that contained the bloodstained trousers of the victim, and thus claims that her act constituted a valid consent to the search without a warrant.

Issues: Whether the voluntarily surrender by Formento’s wife of the bag that contained the bloodstained trousers of the victim constitutes a valid consent to the search without a warrant on the part of Formento. Ruling:

Facts:

Danilo Asis y Fonperada and Gilbert Formento y Saricon were charged in an Information dated 18 February 1998; the information stating “That on or about February 10, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and by means of force and violence upon person, to wit: by then and there stabbing one YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING with a bladed instrument on the different parts of the body thereafter take, rob and carry away the following, to wit: Cash money in the amount of P20,000.00; one (1) wristwatch’ one (1) gold necklace; and undetermined items; or all in the total amount of P20,000.00 more or less, belonging to said YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING against his will, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount more or less of P20,000.00, Philippine Currency, and as a result thereof, he sustained mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death.” When arraigned on 9 July 1998, both accused pleaded not guilty. Found to be deaf-mutes, they were assisted, not only by a counsel de oficio, but also by an interpreter from the Calvary Baptist Church. The prosecution presented 9 witnesses. Although none of them had actually seen the crime committed, strong and substantial circumstantial evidence presented by them attempted to link both accused to the crime. After due trial, both accused were found guilty and sentenced to death. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 54; Criminal Case 98-163090), on 8 March 2000, held that the “crime charged and proved is robbery with homicide under Article 294, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code,” ruled that “although no witnesses to the actual killing and robbery were presented, the circumstantial evidence including the recovery of bloodstained clothing from both accused definitely proved that the two (2) x x x committed the crime,” and appreciated the aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence, superior strength and treachery and thus sentenced both accused to the supreme penalty of death. Hence, the automatic review before the Supreme Court. Both the accused do not question the legality of their arrest, as they made no objection thereto before the arraignment, but object to the introduction of the bloodstained pair of shorts allegedly recovered from the bag of Formento; arguing that the search was illegally done, making the obtainment of the pair of shorts illegal and taints them as inadmissible. The prosecution, on the

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NO, the voluntarily surrender by Formento’s wife of the bag that contained the bloodstained trousers of the victim does not constitute a valid consent to the search without a warrant on the part of Formento. Primarily, the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or who is expressly authorized to do so on his or her behalf. In the present case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show that at the time the bloodstained pair of shorts was recovered, Formento, together with his wife and mother, was present. Being the very subject of the search, necessarily, he himself should have given consent. Since he was physically present, the waiver could not have come from any other person. Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs does not apply as the accused therein was not present when the search was made. Further, to constitute a valid waiver, it must be shown that first, the right exists; second, the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and third, the person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Herein, Formento could not have consented to a warrantless search when, in the first place, he did not understand what was happening at that moment. There was no interpreter to assist him — a deaf-mute — during the arrest, search and seizure. The point in the case Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, i.e. “as the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law,” becomes even more pronounced in the present case, in which Formento is a deaf-mute, and there was no interpreter to explain to him what was happening. His seeming acquiescence to the search without a warrant may be attributed to plain and simple confusion and ignorance. The bloodstained pair of shorts was a piece of evidence seized on the occasion of an unlawful search and seizure. Thus, it is tainted and should thus be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Lastly, as to evidence vis-a-is the case in its totality, circumstantial evidence that merely arouses suspicions or gives room for

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conjecture is not sufficient to convict. It must do more than just raise the possibility, or even the probability, of guilt. It must engender moral certainty. Otherwise, the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails, and the accused deserves acquittal. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUILLERMO SAMUS, G.R. Nos. 135957-58. September 17, 2002 Facts: This is for automatic review of the Decision dated October 8, 1998, issued by the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, in Criminal Case Nos. 501596-C and 5016-96-C. The trial court found Guillermo Samus guilty beyond reasonable of two counts of murder. Samus, appellant, was a farmer, tilling and living in the land of Miguel Completo at Barangay Niugan, Cabuyao, Laguna. The victims, sixty two (62) year old Dedicacion Balisi and her grandson, six (6) year old John Ardee Balisi, were the neighbors of appellant’s father at San Ramon de Canlubang, Brgy. Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna. Version of the Prosecution. On September 2, 1996, 4th PNP Criminal Investigation Group Regional Office at Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba, Laguna received a telephone call from a local barangay official informing them of the victims’ deaths. Arriving at the victims’ residence at Block 8, Lot 6 at San Ramon, Brgy. Canlubang, Calamba, Senior Police (SP) Inspector Rizaldy H. Garcia the team found a pair of maong pants, a white T-shirt, a handkerchief and dirty slippers in the bathroom and roof of the house. A pair of earrings worn by Dedicacion Balisi was reported missing from her body. On September 10, 1996, Major Jose Pante of the Criminal Investigation Group received information that appellant was the principal suspect in the killing of the two (2) victims and that he was sighted inside the residence of spouses Rolly and Josie Vallejo at Barangay Macabling, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. His team, accompanied by local barangay authorities, went to Vallejo spouses’ house and shortly thereafter, they heard loud footsteps on the roof. Rushing outside, they saw appellant crawling on the roof. They ordered him to stop, but he suddenly jumped from the roof and landed hard on the ground, sustaining an injury on his ankle and bruises on his left and right forearm. At that point, the police team closed in on appellant who, while trembling and shaking, admitted the killings upon a query from Rolly Vallejo. Appellant was brought to the Camp Vicente Lim PNP Investigation Office where he was informed of his constitutional rights by SPO3 Alex Malabanan. In the morning of September 11, 1996, appellant, assisted by Atty. Arturo Juliano, gave his statement admitting the killings. Later that day, SPO3 Mario Bitos was able to recover the pawned earrings from Ponciano, to whom appellant allegedly pawned the same, who turned them over to SPO3 Malabanan. Version of the Defense. Alleging denial and alibi as defenses, appellant presents his version of the incident. He alleged that he was brought to Camp Vicente Lim where he was tortured until he lost his consciousness. On the same night, he was brought to a hospital, was given medicine, then brought back to the cell where he was handcuffed at the door of the cell. The CIS got hold of the medical certificate. He was forced by the CIS to admit the

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killing of the victims and the sale of jewelry by means of torture and threat. He also testified that he was forced to execute a document admitting the killing. He was forced to sign said document. He did not know Atty. Juliano and did not talk to him. According to witness Vallejo, appellant Guillermo Samus was in their house at about 6:00 p.m. of September 10, 1996. It was then that CIS operative together with their Brgy. Captain entered their house, arrested and handcuffed appellant. It was not true that accused Guillermo Samus hid himself on the roof of her house. When the accused was arrested by the CIS men, together with the barangay officials, the other persons present were the witness and her 3 children. The police were not armed with a warrant of arrest or search warrant. On cross-examination, he testified that media interviewed him 2 days after his arrest. He and his relatives in Laguna did not have the capacity to hire/secure the services of a lawyer. Issues:

1.

Whether the arrest of appellant is lawful.

2.

Whether the confession made by appellant to the media while in police custody be admissible as evidence.

3.

Whether the testimony of Pontaños and the picture of a pair of earrings together with the turnover receipt, which appellant identified during his testimony, be considered inadmissible as the fruit of the poisonous tree and hence be disregarded at this stage of appeal. Ruling: No, the arrest was unlawful. The police officers’ version of the arrest is incredible. Supreme Court finds it hard to believe that anyone would jump from the roof of a two-story house to escape and, after landing on the ground without any broken bones, make a complete turnaround and just meekly surrender without further ado. Even if this story were true, jumping from a roof is not a crime that would justify the warrantless arrest of appellant. It is undisputed that when the CIS team went to the Vallejo residence on the evening of September 10, 1996, it had no warrant of arrest against appellant. Yet, they arrested him. Under the Rules, peace officers may, without a warrant, arrest a person under any of these circumstances: (a) when, in their presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit, an offense; (b) when an offense has just been committed, and they have probable cause to believe, based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another, or from a penal establishment where he or she is serving final judgment or

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is temporarily confined while the case is pending. None of these circumstances was present when members of the Criminal Investigation Group (CIG) arrested appellant. He was not a prisoner. The killing of Dedicacion and John Ardee Balisi was not done in the presence of the arresting officers. Since it took place on September 2, 1996, it could not have been considered as “having just been committed.” Evidently, they unlawfully arrested appellant on September 10, 1996. Yes, the confession made by appellant to the media while in police custody is admissible as evidence. Supreme Court clarified that after being illegally arrested, appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel. Hence, any admission elicited from him by the law enforcers during custodial investigation is normally inadmissible in evidence. Nonetheless, even if the uncounselled admission per se may be inadmissible, under the present circumstances Supreme Court cannot rule it out because of appellant’s failure to make timely objections. Indeed, the admission is inadmissible in evidence under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution, because it was given under custodial investigation and was made without the assistance of counsel. However, the defense failed to object to its presentation during the trial, with the result that the defense is deemed to have waived objection to its admissibility. No, the testimony of Pontaños and the picture of a pair of earrings together with the turnover receipt, which appellant identified during his testimony, cannot be considered inadmissible as the fruit of the poisonous tree. Upon examination of the records, we find that during the entire examination in court of Prosecution Witness Pontaños, appellant did not question or object to the admissibility of the former’s testimony. Worse, the latter’s counsel even freely cross-examined the witness without any reservations. Having made no objection before the trial court, appellant cannot raise this question for the first time on appeal.i[21] The evidence having been admitted without objection, we are not inclined to reject it. If only appellant had made a timely objection to the admissibility of the said testimony, the prosecution could have been warned of the need to present additional evidence to support its case. To disregard unceremoniously a major portion of its case at this late stage when it can no longer present additional evidence as substitute for that which is now claimed to be inadmissible goes against fundamental fairness. Be that as it may, and even if Supreme Court affirmed appellant’s conviction for murder, the Court does not agree with the trial court’s imposition of the death sentence, because the proven aggravating circumstance of dwelling was not alleged in the Information. Pimentel, et al. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal , GR 141489, 29 November 2002; Facts: On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the PartyList System Act which took effect on 3 March 1995, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups

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and organizations whose nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 partylist representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. District representatives belonging to various political parties were also elected. Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional bodies which was done through nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA). From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the PartyList System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer ‘and as a member of the CA. He

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was joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.

Issues: 1. Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the HRET. 2. Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Ruling: 1. NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with

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the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time. 2. There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves. Republic of the Philippines, Represented by Energy Regulatory Board vs. Manila Electric Company, G.R. No. 141314. November 15, 2002 Facts: On December 23, 1993, MERALCO filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the revision of its rate schedules. The application reflected an average increase of 21 centavos per kilowatt/hour (kwh) in its distribution charge. The application also included a prayer for provisional approval of the increase pursuant to Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act and Section 8 of Executive Order No. 172. On January 28, 1994, the ERB issued an Order granting a provisional increase of P0.184 per kwh, subject to the condition that in the event the Board finds that the applicant is entitled to a lesser increase in rates, all excess amounts collected from the applicant’s customers shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly credited in their favor for application to electric bills covering future consumptions. On February 11, 1997, the COA submitted its Audit Report SAO No. 95-07 (the COA Report) which contained, among others, the recommendation not to include income taxes paid by MERALCO as part of its operating expenses for purposes of rate determination and the use of the net average investment method for the computation of the proportionate value of the properties used by MERALCO during the test year for the determination of the rate base. Subsequently, the ERB rendered its decision adopting the above recommendations and authorized MERALCO to implement a rate adjustment in the average amount of P0.017 per kwh, effective with respect to MERALCOs billing cycles beginning February 1994. The ERB further ordered that the provisional relief in the amount of P0.184 per kilowatt/hour granted under the Boards Order dated January 28, 1994 is hereby superseded and modified and the excess average amount of P0.167 per kilowatt/hour starting with [MERALCOs] billing cycles beginning February 1994 until its billing cycles beginning February 1998, be refunded to [MERALCOs] customers or correspondingly credited in their favor for future consumption. The ERB held that income tax should not be treated as operating expense as this should be borne by the stockholders who are recipients of the income or profits realized from the operation of their business hence, should not be passed on to the consumers.

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On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the ERB decision insofar as it directed the reduction of the MERALCO rates by an average of P0.167 per kwh and the refund of such amount to MERALCOs customers beginning February 1994 and until its billing cycle beginning February 1998. Separate Motions for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners were denied by the Court of Appeals. Petitioners seek before the Court a reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Issues: 1. Whether the private property used for a public purpose is subjected to regulation under the police power of the State. 2. Whether there is a proper delegation of legislative power to Energy regulation Board with regard to the fixing of the rate of energy watts. 3. Whether the issue on fixing the energy watt rate can be subjected for judicial review. Ruling: 1. Yes, the private property used for a public purpose be subjected to regulation under the police power of the State. The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public regulation. In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the public against arbitrary and excessive rates while maintaining the efficiency and quality of services rendered. However, the power to regulate rates does not give the State the right to prescribe rates which are so low as to deprive the public utility of a reasonable return on investment. Thus, the rates prescribed by the State must be one that yields a fair return on the public utility upon the value of the property performing the service and one that is reasonable to the public for the services rendered. [10 The fixing of just and reasonable rates involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests. In his famous dissenting opinion in the 1923 case of Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission, Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote: The thing devoted by the investor to the public use is not specific property, tangible and intangible, but capital embarked in an enterprise. Upon the capital so invested, the Federal Constitution guarantees to the utility the opportunity to earn a fair return. However, the Constitution does not guarantee to the utility the opportunity to earn a return on the value of all items of property used by the utility, or of any of them. The investor agrees, by embarking capital in a utility, that its charges to the public shall be reasonable. His company is the substitute for the State in the performance of the public service, thus becoming a public servant. The

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compensation which the Constitution guarantees an opportunity to earn is the reasonable cost of conducting the business. 2. Yes, there was a proper delegation of legislative power to Energy regulation Board with regard to the fixing of the rate of energy watts. The ERB was created under Executive Order No. 172 to regulate, among others, the distribution of energy resources and to fix rates to be charged by public utilities involved in the distribution of electricity. In the fixing of rates, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. It has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. What is a just and reasonable rate is a question of fact calling for the exercise of discretion, good sense, and a fair, enlightened and independent judgment. The requirement of reasonableness comprehends such rates which must not be so low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to be oppressive. In determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given situation, requirements and opportunities of the utility. Settled jurisprudence holds that factual findings of administrative bodies on technical matters within their area of expertise should be accorded not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence even if not overwhelming or preponderant. In one case, we cautioned that courts should "refrain from substituting their discretion on the weight of the evidence for the discretion of the Public Service Commission on questions of fact and will only reverse or modify such orders of the Public Service Commission when it really appears that the evidence is insufficient to support their conclusions." 3. Yes, the issue on fixing of energy watt rate can be subjected for judicial review to determine whether the administrative body is acting within the limit of its power and discretion. While the power to fix rates is a legislative function, whether exercised by the legislature itself or delegated through an administrative agency, a determination of whether the rates so fixed are reasonable and just is a purely judicial question and is subject to the review of the courts. In the cases at bar, findings and conclusions of the ERB on the rate that can be charged by MERALCO to the public should be respected. The function of the court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is to determine whether under the facts and circumstances, the final order entered by the administrative agency is unlawful or unreasonable. Thus, to the extent that the administrative agency has not been arbitrary or capricious in the exercise of its power, the time-honored principle is that courts should not interfere. The principle of separation of powers dictates that courts should hesitate to review the acts of administrative officers except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion. In determining the just and reasonable rates to be charged by a public utility, three major factors are considered by the regulating agency: a) rate of return; b) rate base and c) the return itself or the computed revenue to be earned by the public utility based on the rate of return and rate base. The rate of return is a judgment percentage which, if multiplied with the rate base, provides a fair return on the public utility for the use of its

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property for service to the public. The rate of return of a public utility is not prescribed by statute but by administrative and judicial pronouncements. This Court has consistently adopted a 12% rate of return for public utilities. The rate base, on the other hand, is an evaluation of the property devoted by the utility to the public service or the value of invested capital or property which the utility is entitled to a return. Joel M. Sanvicente vs. People of the Philippines , G.R. No. 132081. November 26, 2002 Facts: Petitioner was charged with homicide for the killing of one Dennis Wong y Chua. Petitioner fatally shot the victim outside the Far East Bank along Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City after the latter allegedly attempted to rob him of a large amount of cash which he had just withdrawn from the automatic teller machine. Responding policemen found the lifeless body of the victim at the parking space in front of the Far East Bank and Trust Company Branch along Katipunan Road, Loyola Heights, Quezon City. Recovered at the scene were five empty caliber .45 shells, two live caliber .45 bullets and an ATM card in the name of Violeta Sanvicente. Petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Leonardo A. Valmonte, turned over to Police Station 9 petitioner’s .45 caliber Mark IV pistol bearing Serial No. 5504095. He also wrote a letter addressed to P/Major Antonio Diaz, Station Commander of PNP Station 9, CPDC, Anonas Road, Quezon City which serves as a voluntary surrender of his client, however, without admission of guilt. At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. The prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits, which included the above-quoted letter of petitioner’s counsel to P/Maj. Antonio Diaz, marked as Exhibit LL which the trial court. Meanwhile, petitioner begged leave to file a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the trial court. Hence, on August 29, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion To Dismiss (On Demurrer to Evidence), based on the following grounds: (1) the lack of positive identification of the accused is a fatal omission warranting dismissal; (2) prosecution’s evidence are totally hearsay/incompetent, hence, inadmissible and the guilt of the accused was not proven by positive evidence beyond reasonable doubt. On October 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the case together with the civil aspect thereof for insufficiency of evidence. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on the ground, among others, that with the dismissal of the case double jeopardy had set in. Prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which was granted by the appellate court and nullified the October 7, 1996 Order of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

Ruling: Yes, the Court of Appeals’ nullification of trial court’s order dismissing the case is repugnant to the right against double jeopardy of the petitioner. Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. In resolving accused’s demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy. The finality-of-acquittal rule was stressed thus in People v. Velasco: The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into the “humanity of the laws and in jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizens, when brought in unequal contest with the State xxx.” Given the far-reaching scope of an accused’s right against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case, or where the trial was a sham.

Issues: Whether the Court of Appeals’ nullification of trial court’s order dismissing the case is repugnant to the right against double jeopardy of the petitioner.

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2003 Bagaoisan vs Nat'l Tobacco Administration (2003) Facts: 1. The petitioner was terminated from there position in the national tobacco administration as a result of the executive order issued by president Estrada which mandates for the stream lining of the national tobacco administration, a government agency under the department of agriculture. 2. The petitioners filed a letter of appeal to the civil service commission to recall the Organization Structure and Staffing Pattern (OSSP) 3. Petitioner all file a petition for certiorari with prohibition an mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and a temporary restraining order with the regional trial court of Batak to prevent the respondent from enforcing the notice of termination and from ousting the petitioners in their respective offices. 4. The regional trial court issued an order ordering the national tobacco administration to appoint the petitioner to the OSSP to position similar to the one that they hold before. 5. The national tobacco administration appealed to the court of appeals who reversed the decision of the RTC. 6.

Petitioner

appealed

to

the

Supreme

Court.

Issues: Whether or not, the reorganization of the national tobacco administration is valid true issuance of executive order by the president. Ruling: According to the supreme court, the President has the power to reorganized an office to achieve simplicity ,economy and efficiency as provided under EO 292 sec. 31 and section 48 of RA 7645 which provides that activities of executive agencies may be scaled down if it is no longer essential for the delivery of public service. WHEREFORE, the Motion to Admit Petition for En Banc resolution and the Petition for an En Banc Resolution are DENIED for lack of merit. Let entry of judgment be made in due course. No costs. BAROT VS. COMELEC (2003) Facts: In the May 14, 2001 elections Barot was proclaimed the 10th winning candidate for councilor of Tanjay City, Negros Oriental. On May 29, 2001 the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers sent a Memorandum to the COMELEC requesting for authority to correct the

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Certificate of Canvass and to proclaim Tabaloc, instead of Barot, as the 10th winning candidate for Councilor, by errors committed by the Board of Canvassers. The COMELEC considered the Memorandum as a petition, and after notice and hearing, granted the request. Tabaloc was proclaimed the 10th winning Councilor. Barot filed with the Supreme Court a petition for and prohibition. Ruling: 1. Rule 27, Sec.5, par (b) of the COMELEC Rules provides that a petition for correction must be filed not later than five (5) days following the date of proclamation, impleading the candidates who may be adversely affected thereby. Rule 1, Sec.4 of the COMELEC Rules also provides that “in the interest of justice and in the order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any option thereof may be suspended by the Commission.” The filing of the petition beyond the 5- day period was upheld in the interest of justice, it having been clearly shown that it was Tabaloc and not Barot who was the 10th winning candidate for councilor. 2. The COMELEC had the authority to consider the Memorandum of the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers, after notice and hearing, may even motu propio correct errors committed by in the tabulation of the votes. CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY (2003) Facts: President Marcos through a presidential decree created PEA, which was tasked with the development, improvement, and acquisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of lands. The then president also transferred to PEA the foreshore and offshore lands of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project. Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed areas of land and then, years later, PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI for the development of the Freedom Islands. These two entered into a joint venture in the absence of any public bidding. Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator President Maceda denouncing the JVA as the grandmother of all scams. An investigation was conducted and it was concluded that the lands that PEA was conveying to AMARI were lands of the public domain; the certificates of title over the Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This prompted Ramos to form an investigatory committee on the legality of the JVA. Petitioner now comes and contends that the government stands to lose billions by the conveyance or sale of the reclaimed areas to AMARI. He also asked for the full disclosure of the renegotiations happening between the parties. Issues:

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W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of the lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution. Ruling: The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine, which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine. It declares that all natural resources are owned by the State and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated. The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750 hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the area are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay. Further, it is provided that AMARI will reimburse the actual costs in reclaiming the areas of land and it will shoulder the other reclamation costs to be incurred. The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the public domain, waters and other natural resources and consequently owned by the State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienable unless they are classified as agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by the PEA doesn’t convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use. Constantino-David vs. Pangandaman-Gania 156039, 14 August 2003)

(GR

Facts: Zenaida D. Pangandaman-Gania is a Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer of the Mindanao State University (MSU). She has been holding this position after the confirmation of her appointment by the MSU Board of Regents on 1 June 1995. On 2 October 1998 Gania received a copy of Special Order 477-P dated 28 September 1998 designating a certain Agnes Mangondato as Acting Director in her place in view of the alleged expiration of her term and was no longer allowed to report for work. She verified the status of her appointment and found out that her appointment was not submitted to the Civil Service Commission for attestation. Gania immediately brought the matter to the CSC for a ruling on the validity of the termination of her employment. In Resolution 00-1265 dated 24 May 2000 the CSC upheld her dismissal for lack of attestation and prolonged absence without official leave from the time she was removed from her post in September 1998 as a result of Special Order 477-P. Gania moved for reconsideration.

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In Resolution 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 the CSC found merit in her motion, declared her removal from office as illegal, exonerated her from the charge of being on absence without official leave and ordered her reinstatement as Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer of MSU but disallowed the payment of back salaries for the period she was not working as a result of the illegal dismissal. The CSC explained the nonpayment of her back wages, i.e. "the incumbency of Dr. Gania is governed by the principle of 'quantum meruit' (as you work so shall you earn). In other words, her entitlement to compensation depends on her actual performance of work. Short of approval by the Commission, the appointment while already effective, by itself is not a basis for payment of salary but the assumption of duties of her office x x x x Such being the case, Dr. Gania is not entitled to compensation for the period that she was not reporting to work." MSU moved for reconsideration of CSC Resolution 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001, while Gania moved for its early execution. In Resolution 01-1225 dated 19 July 2001, the CSC denied MSU’s motion for reconsideration and ordered its President to allow Gania to assume and exercise the functions of Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer. MSU appealed from the denial of its motion for reconsideration under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (CA-GR SP66188), to the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court did not issue any restraining order or injunction to prevent the execution of the resolution on appeal. Gania did not seek a review of any of the resolutions of the CSC including the order denying back salaries and other benefits for the period she was out of work. She instead pursued her prayer for reinstatement but MSU refused to employ her back. Hence, she was compelled to file a second motion for the execution of CSC Resolution 010558 dated 8 March 2001, citing Sec. 82 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which states that “[t]he filing and pendency of petition for review with the Court of Appeals or certiorari with the Supreme Court shall not stop the execution of the final decision of the Commission unless the Court issues a restraining order or an injunction.” In Resolution 01-1616 dated 4 October 2001 the CSC granted Gania’s motion and held that “CSC Resolution 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 has attained finality and must be immediately implemented,” as it again ordered the MSU President to reinstate Gania. On 8 October 2001 Gania for the first time questioned the portion of CSC Resolution 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 prohibiting the payment of back wages and other benefits to her for the period that her employment was terminated, and moved for the modification of the resolution by granting her the relief prayed for. On 29 October 2001 the Court of Appeals dismissed MSU’s petition for review on the ground that the certificate of non-forum shopping was not personally signed by pertinent officers of the university but by its counsel of record. MSU moved for reconsideration of the dismissal. On 12 December 2001, there being still no action on her request to be paid her back salaries and other benefits, Gania moved for an immediate ruling thereon. On 21 February 2002 the Court of Appeals denied MSU’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of its petition for review for lack of merit. On 28 February 2002 the CSC in Resolution No. 02-0321 denied Gania’s motion. Without the aid of an attorney, Gania appealed CSC Resolution 02-

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0321 dated 28 February 2002 to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (CA-GR SP 69668). In her petition for review, she did not mention that she did not seek a review of CSC Resolution 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 which was the real object of her appeal. In addition, she impleaded only Chairperson Karina Constantino-David and Commissioners Jose F. Erestain Jr. and Waldemar V. Valmores of the CSC, but did not name as the Mindanao State University or any of its officers. On 28 October 2002 the Court of Appeals partially found merit in Gania’s petition for review. The Court of Appeals ruled that back wages should be paid to Gania from the time of her illegal dismissal until she was ordered reinstated by the CSC as Director II of MSU on 8 March 2001, but excluded the period after the CSC had ordered MSU to admit Gania back to work since the damages she suffered for that period were chargeable in the proper forum against the MSU President who in bad faith refused to abide by the relevant CSC resolutions. On 3 January 2003 the OSG filed the present petition for review under Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, allegedly in behalf of the Chairman and Commissioners of the CSC. Issues: Whether the Court can still take jurisdiction of the issue of backwages even if Gania had lost the right to ask for the modification of CSC Resolution 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 and to demand compensation for her back salaries and other benefits. Whether Gania is entitled to receive back salaries and other benefits for the period that she was illegally dismissed. Ruling: There are special circumstances in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play that warrant such liberal attitude on the part of the CSC and a compassionate like-minded discernment by this Court. To begin with, Gania was consistently denied reinstatement by the responsible officers of MSU and vehemently barred from resuming her previous position. The first order for her return to work was issued on 8 March 2001 which was followed by repeated personal appeals for the immediate execution of the CSC resolution. Thereafter, when Gania was still forced out of work, the CSC issued its second and third orders on 19 July 2001 and 4 October 2001, respectively, for the President of MSU to restore her to the item from which she was illegally dismissed. As these private requests and official directives were cruelly rejected by her employer and the period of her unemployment was unduly prolonged, Gania had no choice and was compelled to ask for back salaries and other benefits to offset the callous repudiation of what was due her. To prevent Gania from claiming back wages would leave incomplete the redress of the illegal dismissal that had been done to her and amount to endorsing the wrongful refusal of her employer or whoever was accountable to reinstate her. A too-rigid application of the pertinent provisions of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service as well as the Rules of Court will not be given premium where it would obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice

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in the light of the prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration. There is more than substantial evidence in the record consisting of the general payroll and attendance sheets to prove that Gadia assumed and exercised the functions of Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer at MSU as early as June 1995 after the MSU Board of Regents approved her permanent appointment which was issued earlier on 10 April 1995. It cannot be refuted that in September 1998 she was terminated from the service on the alleged ground of expiration of her term and stopped from performing the functions of her position, and subsequently reinstated to her job upon the declaration of the CSC that her dismissal from the service was illegal. Clearly, the CSC gravely erred when thereafter it ruled that Gania did not actually assume and perform the duties of her position so as to deprive her of back wages and other benefits. As held in Gabriel v. Domingo, an illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to back wages and other monetary benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement. This is only fair and sensible because an employee who is reinstated after having been illegally dismissed is considered as not having left his office and should be given a comparable compensation at the time of his reinstatement. Gania cannot be faulted for her inability to work or to render any service from the time she was illegally dismissed up to the time of her reinstatement. The policy of “no work, no pay” cannot be applied to her, for such distressing state of affairs was not of her own making or liking even as her family suffered tremendously as a consequence of her removal and while she was jobless. Verily, to withhold her back salaries and other benefits during her illegal dismissal would put to naught the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure for those in the civil service. However, MSU cannot be made to pay all accruing back salaries and other benefits in favor of Gania. MSU as a government institution must compensate Gania with back salaries and other benefits only from the time of her illegal dismissal, which according to the case record began sometime in October 1998, until the motion for reconsideration of the MSU was denied and a writ of execution for Gania’s reinstatement as Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer was issued. The reckoning period is not 8 March 2001 as determined by the appellate court but 19 July 2001 when CSC Resolution 01-1225 was promulgated wherein the motion for reconsideration of the MSU was denied with finality and the latter was explicitly commanded to allow Gania to assume and exercise the functions of Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer. For, a final decision of the CSC is immediately executory unless a motion for reconsideration is filed in the meantime. The back wages and other benefits accruing after 19 July 2001 are to be treated separately since they must be collected in the proper forum wherein the assertions of malice and ill will in the failure to reinstate Gania to her post are threshed out and the concerned parties given the full opportunity to be heard. Until such separate proceeding has been instituted and decided, it is premature to fix the liability for this portion of Gania’s back wages and other benefits upon either the government as represented by MSU or the accountable officers thereof.

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ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC (IDCP) vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, et al (2003) Facts: Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD, is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. Among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State and that it is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. Issues: Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision as to freedom of religion Ruling: The Court grants the petition. OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the nonestablishment clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails

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to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. There is no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims. With these regulatory bodies given detailed functions on how to screen and check the quality and safety of food products, the perceived danger against the health of Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. The halal certifications issued by petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the official religious approval of a food product fit for Muslim consumption. The petition is GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s. 2000, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID. JUDGE MARIANO JOAQUIN S. MACIAS vs. MARGIE CORPUS MACIAS (2003) Facts: Judge Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (herein petitioner)filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, a petition fordeclaration of nullity of marriage against MargieCorpus Macias-service of summons thyough publication innewspapers in Dapitan and Dipolog. Instead of ananswer respondent, through counsel, on April 10,2001, filed a motion to dismiss the petition. On April19, 2001, the trial court issued an Order denyingrespondent’s motion to dismiss. Incidentally, in thesame Order, the trial court granted respondent’srequest (via long distance telephone call) to set thehearing on April 30, 2001-April 30 hearing was cancelled and moved to May 2and 3,2001. but petitioner received notice only onMay 8.. Thus, when the case was called for hearingas scheduled, respondent and counsel, not beingduly notified, did not appear. Surprisingly, the trialcourt allowed the petitioner to present his evidence ex parte-On May 5, 2001, respondent still unaware that thecase had been submitted for decision, filed a motionfor reconsideration of the Order dated April 19, 2001denying her motion to dismiss. The trial court merely noted the motion for reconsideration in hisOrder dated May 16, 2001.-May 18, 2001, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or awrit of preliminary injunction challenging the trialcourt’s Order dated April 19, 2001 which denied her motion to dismiss; and Order dated April 30, 2001cancelling the April 30, 2001 hearing and resetting it on May 2 and 3, 2001.-Acting thereon, the Court of Appeals, in a Resolutiondated May 23, 2001, enjoined the

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trial court fromconducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. S-695.Meanwhile, on May 15, 2001 the trial court rendered its Decision declaring the nullity of the marriage between the parties on the ground of psychologicalincapacity on the part of herein respondent -July 13, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting respondent’s petition for certioraristating: “Petitioner had until April 16, 2001 within which to file a ‘Motion to Dismiss’ under Section 1,Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure or file an Answer to the complaint. However, she opted to file on April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion to Dismiss,’ instead of filing an Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file herAnswer to the complaint. Until said motion isr esolved by the Respondent Court with finality, itbehooved the Respondent Court to suspend thehearings of the case on the merits… What is so triteis that the Respondent Court violated its own Orderdated February 27, 2001, declaring that the hearing of the case on its merits will ensue only after thePetitioner shall have filed her ‘Answer’ to thecomplaint” Issues: WON the CA erred in nullifying the orders of the trial court. Ruling: No. -the trial court did not observe the rudimentary principle of due process enshrined in our Constitution. Neither did it comply with pertinent procedural rules.-the trial court, without even waiting for respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the April 19, 2001Order denying her motion to dismiss, hurriedly setthe case for hearing. Also, without allowing therespondent to file her answer to the petition and knowing there was no joinder of issues as yet, thetrial court hastily authorized petitioner to present hisevidence ex-parte -Pursuant to Section 3 (e), Rule 9 of the 1997 Rulesof Civil Procedure, as amended, where the defendingparty fails to file his or her answer to the petition, thetrial court should order the prosecutor to intervenefor the State by conducting an investigation todetermine whether or not there was collusionbetween the parties. Here, the trial courtdisregarded such procedure-As stated at the outset, respondent received thenotice of hearing only on May 8, 2001. So how couldshe be present in court on May 2 and 3In Uy vs. Court of Appeals , we ruled that “(a)decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result,a party (as in this case) is deprived of theopportunity of being heard-Indeed, in depriving respondent her constitutionaland procedural right to due process, the trial courtgravely abused its discretion. It is, therefore,imperative that the instant case for declaration of nullity of marriage be litigated anew in accordance with the Rules. MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC, ROMULO, and BONCODIN (2003)

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Facts: Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) are unconstitutional. The Court upholds petitioner’s right to file the instant petition, stating in essence that the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino people, considering that public funds are to be used and appropriated for the implementation of said law. (1) That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 ing the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution; (2) That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives, including the President and the VicePresident, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winningcandidates for President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress; and (3) That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in the same section) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the independence of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. Issues: 1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. 2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution. 3) Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. Ruling: 1) NO. Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is not violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. 2) YES. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the votes of the President and VicePresident, and not to the votes of the Senators and partylist representatives, is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution. 3) YES. Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the second sentence in its second paragraph allowing Congress to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the IRR that the COMELEC shall promulgate, is violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. PCIB v. CA (G. R. Nos. 121413 and 121479 & G. R. No. 128604) Facts:

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This case is composed of three consolidated petitions involving several checks, payable to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, but was embezzled allegedly by an organized syndicate. I. G. R. Nos. 121413 and 121479 On October 19, 1977, plaintiff Ford issued a Citibank check amounting to P4,746,114.41 in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the payment of manufacturer’s taxes. The check was deposited with defendant IBAA (now PCIB), subsequently cleared the the Central Bank, and paid by Citibank to IBAA. The proceeds never reached BIR, so plaintiff was compelled to make a second payment. Defendant refused to reimburse plaintiff, and so the latter filed a complaint. An investigation revealed that the check was recalled by Godofredo Rivera, the general ledger accountant of Ford, and was replaced by a manager’s check. Alleged members of a syndicate deposited the two manager’s checks with Pacific Banking Corporation. Ford filed a third party complaint against Rivera and PBC. The case against PBC was dismissed. The case against Rivera was likewise dismissed because summons could not be served. The trial court held Citibank and PCIB jointly and severally liable to Ford, but the Court of Appeals only held PCIB liable. II. G. R. No. 128604 Ford drew two checks in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, amounting to P5,851,706.37 and P6,311,591.73. Both are crossed checks payable to payee’s account only. The checks never reached BIR, so plaintiff was compelled to make second payments. Plaintiff instituted an action for recovery against PCIB and Citibank. On investigation of NBI, the modus operandi was discovered. Gorofredo Rivera made the checks but instead of delivering them to BIR, passed it to Castro, who was the manager of PCIB San Andres. Castro opened a checking account in the name of a fictitious person “Reynaldo Reyes”. Castro deposited a worthless Bank of America check with the same amount as that issued by Ford. While being routed to the Central Bank for clearing, the worthless check was replaced by the genuine one from Ford. The trial court absolved PCIB and held Citibank liable, which decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Issues: (1) Whether there is contributory negligence on the part of Ford (2) Has petitioner Ford the right to recover from the collecting bank (PCIBank) and the drawee bank (Citibank) the value of the checks intended as payment to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue? Ruling: (1) The general rule is that if the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concuring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter's negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superior's action against the third person, asuming, of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made. As defined, proximate cause is

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that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause produces the injury and without the result would not have occurred. It appears that although the employees of Ford initiated the transactions attributable to an organized syndicate, in our view, their actions were not the proximate cause of encashing the checks payable to the CIR. The degree of Ford's negligence, if any, could not be characterized as the proximate cause of the injury to the parties. The mere fact that the forgery was committed by a drawer-payor's confidential employee or agent, who by virtue of his position had unusual facilities for perpertrating the fraud and imposing the forged paper upon the bank, does notentitle the bank toshift the loss to the drawer-payor, in the absence of some circumstance raising estoppel against the drawer. This rule likewise applies to the checks fraudulently negotiated or diverted by the confidential employees who hold them in their possession. (2) We have to scrutinize, separately, PCIBank's share of negligence when the syndicate achieved its ultimate agenda of stealing the proceeds of these checks. a. G. R. Nos. 121413 and 121479 On record, PCIBank failed to verify the authority of Mr. Rivera to negotiate the checks. The neglect of PCIBank employees to verify whether his letter requesting for the replacement of the Citibank Check No. SN-04867 was duly authorized, showed lack of care and prudence required in the circumstances. Furthermore, it was admitted that PCIBank is authorized to collect the payment of taxpayers in behalf of the BIR. As an agent of BIR, PCIBank is duty bound to consult its principal regarding the unwarranted instructions given by the payor or its agent. It is a well-settled rule that the relationship between the payee or holder of commercial paper and the bank to which it is sent for collection is, in the absence of an argreement to the contrary, that of principal and agent. A bank which receives such paper for collection is the agent of the payee or holder. Indeed, the crossing of the check with the phrase "Payee's Account Only," is a warning that the check should be deposited only in the account of the CIR. Thus, it is the duty of the collecting bank PCIBank to ascertain that the check be deposited in payee's account only. Therefore, it is the collecting bank (PCIBank) which is bound to scrutinize the check and to know its depositors before it could make the clearing indorsement "all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsement guaranteed". Lastly, banking business requires that the one who first cashes and negotiates the check must take some precautions to learn whether or not it is genuine. And if the one cashing the check through indifference or other circumstance assists the forger in committing the fraud, he should not be permitted to retain the proceeds of the check from the drawee whose sole fault was that it did not discover the forgery or the defect in the title of the person negotiating the instrument before paying the check. For this reason, a bank which cashes a check drawn upon another bank, without requiring proof as to the identity of persons presenting it, or making inquiries with regard to them, cannot hold the proceeds against the drawee when the proceeds of the checks were afterwards diverted to the hands of a third party. In such cases the drawee bank has a right to believe that the cashing bank (or the collecting bank) had, by the usual proper investigation, satisfied itself of the authenticity of the negotiation of the checks.

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Thus, one who encashed a check which had been forged or diverted and in turn received payment thereon from the drawee, is guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to the success of the fraud practiced on the drawee bank. The latter may recover from the holder the money paid on the check. b. G. R. No. 128604 In this case, there was no evidence presented confirming the conscious participation of PCIBank in the embezzlement. As a general rule, however, a banking corporation is liable for the wrongful or tortuous acts and declarations of its officers or agents within the course and scope of their employment. A bank will be held liable for the negligence of its officers or agents when acting within the course and scope of their employment. It may be liable for the tortuous acts of its officers even as regards that species of tort of which malice is an essential element. In this case, we find a situation where the PCIBank appears also to be the victim of the scheme hatched by a syndicate in which its own management employees had participated. But in this case, responsibility for negligence does not lie on PCIBank's shoulders alone. Citibank failed to notice and verify the absence of the clearing stamps. For this reason, Citibank had indeed failed to perform what was incumbent upon it, which is to ensure that the amount of the checks should be paid only to its designated payee. The point is that as a business affected with public interest and because of the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. Thus, invoking the doctrine of comparative negligence, we are of the view that both PCIBank and Citibank failed in their respective obligations and both were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in the encashment of Citibank Check Nos. SN 10597 AND 16508. Thus, we are constrained to hold them equally liable for the loss of the proceeds of said checks issued by Ford in favor of the CIR. PEOPLE VS. FERRER [48 SCRA 382; NOS.L-3261314; 27 DEC 1972] Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness. The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar

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associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association. Issues: (1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law. (2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression. Ruling: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the AntiSubversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.) In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person. Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a member’s direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts. Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis

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mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made. The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY. The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established: 1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. 2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. ET AL. V. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC) (2003)

their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial. 2. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative body contravenes the law or the constitution is within the judicial power as defined by the Constitution which is “ the duty of the Courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there haw been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” The NTC circular was issued pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. Hence, the action must be filed directly with the regular courts without requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. 3. Where the act of administrative agency was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, exhaustion of administrative remedy is required, before going to court. 4. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasijudicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the same must be referred to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body. In such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.

Facts: The NTC issued Billing Circular 13-6-2000 which promulgated rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services. Petitioners filed with the RTC a petition to declare the circular as unconstitutional. A motion to dismiss was filed by the NTC on the ground of petitioner’s to exhaust administrative remedies. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss but on certiorari, the CA reversed RTC. Ruling: 1. Administrative bodies had (a) quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and (b) quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. To be valid, such rules and regulations must conform to, and be consistent with, the provisions of enabling statute. Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. In carrying out

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Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc vs. Macaraeg G.R. No. 145800 (395 SCRA 720) Facts: Respondents are employees of the cooperative who were dismissed for serious misconduct, and breach of trust and confidence reposed on them by management. The dismissal was due to the misappropriation by respondents through encashing private checks with funds from the company. The dismissal was brought before the labor arbiter who ruled in favor of the respondents, reinstating the petitioner, in light of the CBA requirement that dismissal case must go through grievance committee. The decision of the arbiter was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Thus, this petition for review on certiorari. Issue/s: Whether or not the arbiter was correct in ordering the reinstatement of the respondents. Ruling:

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The Supreme Court held that the issue raised in the petition pertaining to the alleged violation of the CBA grievance procedure is moot and academic. The parties’ active participation in the voluntary arbitration proceedings, and their failure to insist that the case be remanded to the grievance machinery, shows a clear intention on their part to have the issue of respondents’ illegal dismissal directly resolved by the voluntary arbitrator. We therefore find it unnecessary to rule on the matter in light of their preference to bring the illegal dismissal dispute to voluntary arbitration without passing through the grievance machinery. This leads us to the next issue of whether respondents were validly dismissed. To constitute a valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must be met, namely: (1) it must be for a just or authorized cause, and (2) the employee must be afforded due process. We hold that there exist a valid reason to dismiss both employees. Article 282(c) of the Labor Code allows an employer to dismiss employees for willful breach of trust or loss of confidence. Proof beyond reasonable doubt of their misconduct is not required, it being sufficient that there is some basis for the same or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that they are responsible for the misconduct and their participation therein rendered them unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of their position. The acts of the respondents were clearly inimical to the financial interest of the petitioner. Nor is there any doubt that petitioner observed procedural due process in dismissing the respondents. The respondents were both appraised of the particular acts or omissions constituting the charges against them. They gave their own "answer/explanation" to the charges. They participated in the investigation conducted at petitioner’s board. They were represented by counsel during the investigation. Finally, notices were sent to them, informing them of the basis of their termination. In fine, private respondents were given due process before they were dismissed. Time and again, we have stressed that due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. Alauya, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections G.R. Nos. 152151-52 (395 SCRA 742)

Whether or not there was a violation of due process. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that aparty cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due process if he was accorded the opportunity of a hearing, through either oral arguments or pleadings. There is no denial of due process when a party is given an opportunity through his pleadings. We find no breach of Alauya’s right to due process. Contrary to Alauya’s claim, it appears that notices were given to all concerned parties requiring them to file their answer to the petition and setting the case for. The COMELEC noted that Alauya did not appear during the hearing. Subsequently, Alauya filed his Answer with Motion to Dismiss to the petitions. Verily, Alauya was given an opportunity to be heard during the hearing held which he failed to attend and was in fact heard through the pleadings he filed with the COMELEC. The petition is DISMISSED. People vs. Ostia G.R. Nos. 131804 (398 SCRA 132) Facts: Accused was initially charged of rape with homicide which he pleaded not guilty. However, after he was assigned a new counsel, the accused retracted his previous plea and instead signified intention to plea guilty for murder. The lower court allowed his change of plea and informed him that the penalty for murder was reclusion perpetua to death, two indivisible penalties, and that the court may impose the death penalty on him depending on the circumstances found by the trial court. Indeed the trial court convicted the accused of murder characterized by three aggravating circumstances. Issue/s: Whether or not the court was correct in convicting the accused despite the improvident plea of the accused.

Facts:

Ruling:

Petitioner and private respondents are candidates of the ARMM election for the post of regional assemblyman. COMELEC declared failure of election for 1 municipality, while respondent Tamano prayed for the declaration of failure of election on 5 provinces and also the suspension of the proclamation of winners. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and private respondent Sarangani filed an answer and opposition to the suspension. COMELEC issued an order to suspend proclamation. Thus, a certiorari and prohibition is filed before the Supreme Court alleging among others violation of due process for failure of notice of the suspension of proclamation as required in Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code

The Court is convinced that the trial court failed to comply with its duties under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. It bears stressing that accused-appellant did not even know how to read and write.

Issue/s:

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The trial court failed to explain to accusedappellant: (a) the nature of murder and the elements thereof; (b) that killing a four-year old girl, constituted treachery, a qualifying circumstance; accused-appellant being unlettered could not be presumed to understand the requisites of treachery, a highly technical legal term; (c) the nature and effect of a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the killing of Beverly and its effect on the penalty that may be imposed on him;

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(d) what heinous crimes are and the meaning and import of indivisible penalties; (e) the specific circumstances which may be considered by the court in the imposition of reclusion perpetua or death penalty; (f) whether his plea of guilty after the prosecution had commenced presenting its evidence may still be considered by the trial court as a mitigating circumstance; the nature of civil liabilities that he may be ordered to pay and the amounts thereof. The trial court even failed to probe into the reasons for accused-appellant’s change of plea from "not guilty" of rape with homicide to "guilty" of murder and for his failure to adduce evidence during the reinvestigation of the case despite having been granted the right to do so by the trial court. The trial court did not even bother inquiring from accused-appellant whether he sought the advice of his counsel before pleading guilty to murder and whether he wanted to adduce evidence in his behalf to prove any mitigating circumstances in the commission of the crime to warrant the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. Notwithstanding the improvident plea of guilty of accused-appellant, this Court finds it unnecessary to remand the case to the trial court. This is so because independent of accused-appellant’s plea of guilty and his testimony admitting liability for Beverly’s death, the evidence adduced by the prosecution, albeit circumstantial, established the guilt of accused-appellant for murder beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court modified the decision of the lower court removing the appreciation of qualifying circumstances as they were not alleged in the information.

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2004 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHULE Y. LIM, G.R. No. 153883 January 13, 2004 Facts: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court stemmed from a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court filed by respondent Chule Y. Lim with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4933. Respondent claimed that she was born on October 29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that both her Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous entries, and prays that they be corrected. First, she claims that her surname "Yu" was misspelled as "Yo". She has been using "Yu" in all her school records and in her marriage certificate. She presented a clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)3 to further show the consistency in her use of the surname "Yu".Second, she claims that her father’s name in her birth record was written as "Yo Diu To (Co Tian)" when it should have been "Yu Dio To (Co Tian)."Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her father and mother never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen. The trial court granted respondent’s petition. The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s decision. Issue/s: 1.) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the correction of the citizenship of respondent from “Chinese” to “Filipino” despite the fact that respondent never demonstrated any compliance with the legal requirements for election of citizenship. 2.) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in allowing respondent to continue using her father’s surname despite its finding that respondent is an illegitimate child. Ruling: It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to

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be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines." Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children. As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old.14 The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her father’s surname. What it did allow was the correction of her father’s misspelled surname which she has been using ever since she can remember. In this regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for her to use her father’s surname.To bar her at this time from using her father’s surname which she has used for four decades without any known objection from anybody, would only sow confusion. Concededly, one of the reasons allowed for changing one’s name or surname is to avoid confusion. The instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68893 dated May 29, 2002, is AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the Civil Registrar of Iligan City is DIRECTED to make the following corrections in the birth record of respondent Chule Y. Lim. SENATOR ROBERT S. JAWORSKI vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION and SPORTS AND GAMES ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 144463 January 14, 2004 Facts: The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to nullify the "Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming," executed by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (hereinafter referred to as PAGCOR) in favor of respondent Sports and Games and Entertainment Corporation (also referred to as SAGE). On March 31, 1998, PAGCOR’s board of directors approved an instrument denominated as "Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming", which granted SAGE the authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting station in PAGCOR’s casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local and international bettors, provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and procedures are established to ensure the integrity and fairness of the games. Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commenced its operations by conducting gambling on the Internet on a trial-run basis,

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making pre-paid cards and redemption of winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza outlets. Petitioner, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports, files the instant petition, praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. He contends that PAGCOR is not authorized under its legislative franchise, P.D. 1869, to operate gambling on the internet for the simple reason that the said decree could not have possibly contemplated internet gambling since at the time of its enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet was yet inexistent and gambling activities were confined exclusively to real-space.

While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s and/or management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR can not delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so. The instant petition is GRANTED. The "Grant of Authority and Agreement to Operate Sports Betting and Internet Gaming" executed by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE is declared NULL and VOID.

Issue/s:

Facts:

1.) Whether or not respondent PAGCOR is authorized under P.D. 1869 to operate gambling activities on the internet 2.) Whether PAGCOR acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it authorized respondent SAGE to operate internet gambling on the basis of its right “to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs and other amusement places under Section 10 of P.D. 1869 Ruling: Considering that the instant petition involves legal questions that may have serious implications on public interests, we rule that petitioner has the requisite legal standing to file this petition. A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations. It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and administration, either by the government directly, or by public agents, under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose on them in the interest of the public. After a circumspect consideration of the foregoing discussion and the contending positions of the parties, we hold that PAGCOR has acted beyond the limits of its authority when it passed on or shared its franchise to SAGE. In the case at bar, PAGCOR executed an agreement with SAGE whereby the former grants the latter the authority to operate and maintain sports betting stations and Internet gaming operations. In essence, the grant of authority gives SAGE the privilege to actively participate, partake and share PAGCOR’s franchise to operate a gambling activity. The grant of franchise is a special privilege that constitutes a right and a duty to be performed by the grantee. The grantee must not perform its activities arbitrarily and whimsically but must abide by the limits set by its franchise and strictly adhere to its terms and conditionalities.

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DORCAS G. PETALLAR vs. JUDGE JUANILLO M. PULLOS, MCTC, SAN FRANCISCO, SURIGAO DEL NORTE, [A.M. No. MTJ-03-1484. January 15, 2004]

In a complaint-affidavit dated February 7, 2002, Judge Juanillo M. Pullos, former presiding judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco, Surigao del Norte, stands charged by complainant Dorcas G. Petallar of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.02 and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; as well as Rule 140, Section 4 and Rule 70, Sections 10 and 11 of the Rules of Court; for undue delay in rendering a decision in Case No. 137 for Forcible Entry. For his part, respondent judge in his comment, by way of 2nd Indorsement dated August 6, 2002, stated that he handed down his decision in Case No. 137 on June 2, 2002. He pointed out that said decision is, in fact, the subject of an appeal. Respondent submitted that the charges against him had become moot. The Office of the Court Administrator observed that said decision was rendered out of time, in breach of Rule 70, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that judgment must be rendered within thirty (30) days after receipt of the affidavits and position papers or the expiration of the period for filing the same. On March 30, 2003, respondent retired from the judiciary Issue/s: Whether or not respondent violated Rule 70, Sec. 11 of the Rules of Court for undue delay in rendering judgment. Ruling: Respondent indeed violated Rule 70, Section 11 of the Rules of Court for undue delay in rendering judgment. The records show that the parties in Special Civil Action Case No. 137 had filed their respective position papers as early as February 2, 2000. Thus, respondent had until March 4, 2000 to render judgment. Had there been circumstances which prevented him from handing down his decision within the prescribed period, respondent should have at least requested from this Court for an extension of time within which to render judgment. As respondent himself admitted, Case No. 137 was decided only on June 2, 2002 or two (2) years and some three (3)

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months beyond the reglementary period. Moreover, he could not even come up with an explanation for the delay. We cannot overemphasize the Court’s policy on prompt resolution of disputes. Justice delayed is justice denied. Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a serious violation of Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution. Respondent Judge Juanillo M. Pullos, former presiding judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco, Surigao del Norte, is found LIABLE for undue delay in rendering a decision in Case No. 137, tantamount to GROSS INEFFICIENCY. He is hereby ORDERED to pay a FINE of P10,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement pay and benefits. SHOPPES MANILA, INC., vs. THE HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER ERMITA ABRASALDO-CUYUCA and LORIE TORNO, G.R. No. 147125 January 14, 2004

right to due process before she was dismissed from her employment and that the petitioner failed to show that it notified the private respondent of the charges against her. Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the decision to the NLRC, alleging that it was deprived of its right to a formal hearing before the labor arbiter rendered her decision. The NLRC issued a resolution dismissing the appeal. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals. The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the NLRC. The petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition. Issue/s:

1.

2. Facts: The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in garments manufacturing using the brand name "KAMISETA." On May 6, 1994, the petitioner employed private respondent Lorie Torno as trimmer. Sometime thereafter, the petitioner started to receive information from the head of its production department that, according to other employees, Buan and the private respondent had been stealing "KAMISETA" items from the factory. The petitioner had the witnesses interviewed. Susan Paligamba and Loly dela Cruz, co-employees of Buan and the private respondent, executed unverified statements implicating the latter. During the said inspection, the representatives found the following items: KAMISETA fabrics (approx. 1¼ yds), 2 pcs. shirts made out of KAMISETA excess cuttings, NAUTICAL SHOP wall paper. The private respondent failed to appear during the scheduled hearing. Consequently, the petitioner decided to dismiss the private respondent from her employment. When notified of the petitioner’s decision, the private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of backwages, non-payment of service incentive leave pay and 13th-month pay against the petitioner before the National Capital Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The petitioner filed a motion for the labor arbiter to conduct a formal investigation on its claim. Acting on the motion, LA Tumanong granted the same and set the case for hearing. In the meantime, LA Tumanong was replaced by Labor Arbiter Ermita Abrasaldo-Cuyuca (LA Cuyuca for brevity) who issued an order declaring that the case was submitted for decision. The petitioner filed a manifestation and motion informing LA Cuyuca that a formal hearing had been set by LA Tumanong and requested that the case be set for hearing anew. However, no action was taken by LA Cuyuca on the said motion. LA Cuyuca rendered a decision holding that the respondent was illegally dismissed and directed the petitioner to pay P62,530 as backwages and P19,240 as separation pay to the private respondent. LA Cuyuca declared that the private respondent was denied of her

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Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the absence of a formal hearing did not amount to a denial of petitioner’s right to due process Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the illegality of private respondent’s dismissal despite the existence of just causes in support thereof

Ruling: The petition is barren of merit. Petitioner did not have a vested right to a formal hearing simply and merely because Labor Arbiter Tumanong granted its motion and set the case for hearing. Pursuant to Section 5, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,the labor arbiter has the authority to determine whether or not there is a necessity to conduct formal hearings in cases brought before him for adjudication. The holding of a formal hearing or trial is discretionary with the labor arbiter and is something that the parties cannot demand as a matter of right. It is entirely within his authority to decide a labor case before him, based on the position papers and supporting documents of the parties, without a trial or formal hearing. The requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers wherein they are supposed to attach all the documents that would prove their claim in case it be decided that no hearing should be conducted or was necessary. Similarly, we affirm the finding of the CA that the private respondent was illegally dismissed. In order to effect a valid dismissal, the law requires that (a) there be just and valid cause as provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code; and (b) the employee be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. As stated by the CA, the petitioner had failed to show that it had complied with the two-notice requirement: (a) a written notice containing a statement of the cause for the termination to afford the employee ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires; (b) if the employer decides to terminate the services of the employee, the employer must notify him in writing of the decision to dismiss him, stating clearly the reason therefore. The petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCO BALLESTER, [G.R. No. 152279. January 20, 2004] Facts: Appellant Franco Ballester was charged with Rape before the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4038. That on the third week of January, 1999, at noontime, at Barangay Catumag, Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd and unchaste design, by means of force, threat and intimidation and while armed with a knife did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) MARICEL ODOÑO, 12 years of age, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. On arraignment, appellant pleaded “not guilty” to the crime charged. On December 14, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death there being no mitigating circumstance but with the presence of one aggravating circumstance of dwelling. In his Brief, appellant assails his conviction.

death penalty on the basis of a qualifying circumstance not alleged in the information. Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that the complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given in the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstance. When, as in this case, neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the minimum penalty, i.e. reclusion perpetua, should be the penalty imposable pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Franco Ballester is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As modified, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and is further ordered to INDEMNIFY the victim the reduced sum of P50,00.00 as civil indemnity, in addition to P50,000.00 as moral damages.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FOURTH DIVISION), CLAUDIO FRANCISCO, JR. and RUDY PACAO, G.R. No. 142051 February 24, 2004

Issue/s: Whether or not the Trial Court erred in giving full weight to the testimony of the offended party and in not giving full weight and credence to the denial and alibi of the accused and his witnesses Ruling: A truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an error-free testimony, considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. Thus we have followed the rule in accord with human nature and experience that honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen, rather than destroy, the credibility of a witness, especially of witnesses to crimes which shock the conscience and numb the senses. More importantly, the alleged inconsistencies referred to by the defense pertain to matters extraneous to the crime of rape that do not detract from the fact that the offended party had indeed been sexually defiled. The defense of alibi and denial interposed by appellant must likewise fail. For alibi to serve as a basis of acquittal it must be established with clear and convincing evidence, with the requisites of time and place strictly observed. Where the accused fails to convincingly show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, as in the instant case, alibi must altogether be rejected. In imposing the maximum penalty of death, the trial court took into account the absence of a mitigating circumstance and the presence of one aggravating circumstance of dwelling. This is clearly erroneous. Not being alleged in the Information, dwelling cannot be properly considered in determining the imposable penalty. Indeed, it would be a denial of appellant’s right to be informed of the charges against him which would amount to a denial of due process if he were to be meted the

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Facts: Claudio Francisco, Rudy Pacao, Capt. Rodolfo Malbarosa, Pfc. Catalino Bonganay, Sgt. Roberto Cana, Sgt. Virgilio Azucena, Sgt. Nathaniel Interino, Pat. David Valenciano, Pat. Cesar Quiambao, Joseph Pellas, and Gabriel Alosan were charged with Murder for the fatal shooting of one Marcial "Boyet" Azada. That on or about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1989, inside the Le Janni Restaurantthe above named accused conniving, confederating and helping one another, moved by one common interest and design to kill, did then and there with Pat. Pacao, using his service pistol caliber .38 TM Squire Bingham and accused Claudio "Danny" Francisco, Jr. likewise using a gun TM Smith and Wesson, caliber .38 revolver with Serial No. 11327, with treachery shot one Marcial "Boyet" Azada y Garza while the latter had both arms raised and his back was turned against accused Pat. Rudy Pacao a means employed and consciously adopted by both accused to ensure the death of said Marcial "Boyet" Azada without danger to their persons and thereafter with criminal intent and design to conceal his (Pacao) criminal act did knowingly and willfully altered, tampered and/or attempted to destroy his service pistol, while accused Francisco did knowingly and deliberately planted the gun he used in shooting his victim on the latter’s (Azada) body, all of said acts of the herein accused were done with the sole aim and purpose to conceal and mislead the authorities as to the authorship of the crime. In a decision dated February 7, 1994, the court a quo exonerated accused Pellas and Alosan and convicted respondents Francisco Jr. and Pacao for homicide and attempted murder. On appeal, the trial court’s decision was reversed and respondents Francisco and Pacao were acquitted of the crime charged.

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In absolving respondent Pacao of any culpability, the Court of Appeals found that Azada, instead of surrendering peacefully to the apprehending police officers, resisted arrest and fired his gun towards their direction. Respondent Pacao was therefore acting in selfdefense and in fulfillment of his duty as a police officer when he returned fire at the victim. The prosecution, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, vehemently challenges the acquittal in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in exonerating the private respondents notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence of their guilt. Issue/s:

1.

2.

Whether or not the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is the proper legal recourse for the reversal of the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals Whether or not an appeal of the judgment of acquittal by the Court of Appeals violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution

Ruling: The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. "the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison d’etre for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. While petitioner in the case at bar ostensibly alleges grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the discussions therein however ascribe to the Court of Appeals errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction. Specifically, petitioner delves on, among others, the testimonies relative to the positions of the victim vis-à-vis the accused, and the opinions of the expert witnesses in respect to certain physical evidence. Obviously, these are errors that goes deeply into the appellate court’s appreciation and assessment of the evidence proffered by the parties. On this score alone, the dismissal of the instant petition is called for. As earlier mentioned the circumstances of the case at bar call for a judicial inquiry on the permissibility of appeal after a verdict of acquittal in view of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against double jeopardy faithfully adheres to the principle first enunciated in Kepner v. United States. In this case, verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable. Noteworthy is the case of People v. Velasco where the Court likewise dismissed a similar petition not only on the ground that the acquittal of the defendant by

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the lower court was not reviewable via the extraordinary writ of certiorari, but more importantly, the grant of said petition would constitute a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. In Velasco, we clarified that in the absence of a finding of mistrial, i.e. the criminal trial was a sham, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or at the Court of Appeals.18 Respondents Francisco and Pacao, after having been found not guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction, must be afforded rest and tranquility from repeated attempts by the State at conviction and their anxiety finally laid to rest. Their acquittal must therefore be accorded finality in faithful adherence to the rule against double jeopardy. Petition is DISMISSED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARIEL MACARANG, G.R. Nos. 151249-50 February 26, 2004 Facts: On or about November 8, 1999, in San Juan, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, being the father of Armie Christine Macarang y Amboy, with lewd designs, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said Armie Christine Macarang y Amboy, 13 years old, against her will and consent. In Criminal Case No. 116969-H, the accused is convicted of the crime of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection and the accessory penalty provided by law and to pay the costs. Appellee, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its brief, entitled "Brief For The Appellee With Recommendation To Remand The Cases To The Court A Quo For Further Proceedings", calling our attention to the fact that the trial court had considered appellant to have waived his right to present his evidence without any showing that the latter was fully aware of the consequences of such waiver. When the case was called supposedly for the initial presentation of defense evidence, the defense counsel manifested that the accused had intimated to him that he was not prepared to testify, the reason being that he was just recuperating from an illness. Considering that the trial of this case had been repeatedly postponed and that Defense Counsel had been the subject at least two (2) show cause orders, reset for the last time to August 28 and September 18, 2001 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning, with a warning that if on the next scheduled hearing accused would not still be ready to present evidence, he would be deemed to have waived his right to do so. Record shows that such presentation had been repeatedly postponed mostly at the instance of the accused and/or his lawyer. Thus, as prayed for by the Public Prosecutor and pursuant to the order of August 28, 2001, accused is now deemed to have waived his right to

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present evidence. As further prayed for, this case is now deemed submitted for decision. Based on the prosecution evidence, the trial court, on November 13, 2001 promulgated its Decision dated October 17, 2001, convicting appellant of the crime of qualified rape and sentencing him to suffer the ultimate penalty of death in each of the criminal cases. Issue/s: Whether or not the appellant was deprived of his right to due process when the trial court had considered appellant to have waived his right to present his evidence without any showing that the latter was fully aware of the consequences of such waiver. Ruling: In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present cases, the presiding judge is called upon to see to it that the accused is made aware of the consequences of not heeding the warning given by the trial court. It must be noted that the waiver of the right to present defense evidence in the present cases was not even voluntary nor upon the instance of the appellant but imposed by the trial court, apparently to penalize appellant, after he and his counsel repeatedly moved for the postponements of the scheduled hearings. Thus, a simple forewarning to the appellant that the next time that he would not be ready with his defense evidence, he would be deemed to have waived his right to present it, did not satisfy appellant’s constitutional right to due process. The trial court should have first apprised appellant or explained to him in clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver. Moreover, in the same Order declaring appellant to have waived his right to present evidence, the trial court granted the motion of appellant’s counsel to withdraw his appearance. Appellant, therefore, had no more counsel. The trial court did not ask him if he would wish to solicit the services of another counsel de parte or want the court to designate a de oficio counsel for him. It is obvious then that the appellant was deprived of his right to due process. In the light of the foregoing, we have no other recourse but to set aside the judgment of the trial court convicting appellant and order the remand of the records of the case to the trial court to conduct further proceedings.

City, for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 6425. They were ordered to "forthwith seize and take possession of an undetermined quantity of shabu and marijuana leaves." They coordinated with the barangay officials and proceeded to the house pointed out to them by the local officials. Upon reaching the house, its door was opened by a woman. SPO3 De Leon introduced themselves as policemen to the woman who opened the door, whom they later identified in court as the appellant. They informed her they had a search warrant, but appellant suddenly closed and locked the door. It was only after some prodding by the barangay officials that she reopened the door. The authorities then conducted the search. They found a bundle of marijuana wrapped in Manila paper under the bed and inside the room. They asked appellant who owned the marijuana. She cried and said she had no means of livelihood. Appellant was brought to the police headquarters for further investigation. Both SPO1 Lumabas and SPO3 De Leon identified the confiscated five (5) bundles of marijuana in court. Appellant assailed the validity of the search warrant against her. She contended that she lived at 376 Dama de Noche, Barangay Baesa, Caloocan City, and that on August 1, 1997, she was merely visiting a friend, Marlyn, who lived at 275 North Service Road corner Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. She went to Marlyn's house to borrow money. Marlyn was out and she waited. While appellant was seated near the door, several people introduced themselves as policemen, made her sign a white paper and entered the house. The trial court convicted appellant. In this appeal, she raises the lone error that "the lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged, when her guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt." Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to establish who owned the house where the search was conducted, and avers that her mere presence therein did not automatically make her the owner of the marijuana found therein. She likewise argues that the search warrant specified the name of Ising Gutierrez as the owner of the house to be searched, and that since she is not Ising Gutierrez, the lower court erred in admitting the confiscated drugs as evidence against her. Issue/s: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged, when her guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PRISCILLA DEL NORTE, G.R. No. 149462 March 29, 2004 Facts: SPO1 Lumabas testified that on August 1, 1997, their group was tasked to serve a search warrant against a certain Ising Gutierrez Diwa residing at No. 275 North Service Road corner Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan

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We reverse the trial court's decision. The prosecution failed to establish the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

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We cannot countenance the irregularity of the search warrant. The authorities did not have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the search. They did not conduct surveillance before obtaining the warrant. It was only when they implemented the warrant that they coordinated with the barangay officials. One of the barangay officials informed SPO3 De Leon that Ising Gutierrez Diwa and Priscilla Del Norte are one and the same person, but said barangay official was not presented in court. The authorities based their knowledge on pure hearsay. On the merits, we believe the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's witnesses failed to establish appellant's ownership of the house where the prohibited drugs were discovered. Except for their bare testimonies, no other proof was presented The prosecution likewise failed to prove that appellant was in actual possession of the prohibited articles at the time of her arrest. In fact, it seems that the authorities had difficulty looking for the drugs which were not in plain view. In all criminal cases, it is appellant's constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. In the case at bar, we hold that the prosecution's evidence treads on shaky ground. The decision of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City is reversed. Appellant is acquitted based on reasonable doubt. REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 161872 April 13, 2004 Facts: Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The COMELEC, acting on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution,1 by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the

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electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the candidate’s bio-data and his program of government. Issue/s: Whether or not petitioner’s right to “equal access to opportunities for public service” is violated upon COMELEC’s refusal to give due course to petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy Ruling: Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions9 of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 645210 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence which it considered in determining that petitioner was a nuisance candidate. This precludes the Court from reviewing at this instance whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of

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discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review would necessarily take into account the matters which the COMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions. The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. As to petitioner’s attacks on the validity of the form for the certificate of candidacy, suffice it to say that the form strictly complies with Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its findings to this Court with deliberate dispatch. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FREDDIE MURILLO, G.R. No. 134583 July 14, 2004 Facts: That on or about the 6th day of June, 1997, in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Paz Abiera with a bladed weapon on her chest, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wounds which directly caused her death after the latter slapped, scolded him and uttered hurful words. With the aggravating circumstances of cruelty and abuse of superior strength. Issue/s: Whether or not the accused be prosecuted of the severest penalty on account of his improvident plea of guilty. Ruling: Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.--- When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. The reason for this rule is that courts must necessarily proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form – death – for the reason that the execution of such sentence is irrevocable. Experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment, or upon

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bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. An accused might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeit his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and consequences of his plea. The judge therefore has the duty to ensure that the accused does not suffer by reason of mistaken impressions. Requiring the trial court to take further evidence would also aid this Court on appellate review in evaluating the propriety or impropriety of the plea. It is well established that the due process requirement is part of a person's basic rights and is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. An accused needs the aid of counsel lest he be the victim of overzealous prosecutors, of the law's complexity or of his own ignorance and bewilderment. Indeed, the right to counsel springs from the fundamental principle of due process. The right to counsel, however, means more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is sufficiently accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. This right necessitates an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being wellversed on the case and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. Indeed, the right of an accused to counsel finds meaning only in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client and an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance which is not just a simple perfunctory representation. While our jurisdiction does not subscribe to a per se rule that once a plea of guilty is found improvidently he is at once entitled to a remand, the circumstances of this case warrant that a remand to the trial court be made. To warrant a remand of the criminal case, the Court has held that it must be shown that as a result of such irregularity there was inadequate representation of facts by either the prosecution or the defense during the trial. Where the improvident plea of guilty was followed by an abbreviated proceeding with practically no role at all played by the defense, we have ruled that this procedure was just too meager to accept as being the standard constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a human life. What justifies the remand of the criminal case to the trial court is the unfairness or complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the proceedings a quo as occasioned by the improvident plea of guilt. In this case, apart from the testimony of appellant, the prosecution does not have any other evidence to hold him liable for the crime charged. In view of the foregoing, we find that it is imperative to remand the case for the proper arraignment and trial of the accused, considering not only the accused's improvident plea of guilt but also his lawyer's neglect in representing his cause. AIDA POBLETE and HON. REUBEN P. DE LA CRUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM LU , G.R. No. 128859 June 29, 2004

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Facts: Sometime in 1995, upon complaint of private respondent William Lu, filed an Information against the petitioner Aida Poblete, for Estafa. The Information alleged that the petitioner committed the crime of estafa in relation to P.D. 818 by willfully and unlawfully making, drawing and issuing to William Lu, with deliberate intent to defraud and by means of deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneous with, checks amounting to P2,318,047.60. The Information did not recommend bail. On December 18, 1995, counsel for the petitioner, accused Aida Poblete, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. She prayed therein that execution of the warrant of arrest be held in abeyance pending the reinvestigation of the case. The lower court issued an Order denying accused’s Motion for Reinvestigation and directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest, with the bail for her provisional liberty fixed at P40,000.00. The Order stated that the accused is entitled to bail as a matter of right since the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In his Motion for Reconsideration dated February 9, 1996, private respondent sought the setting aside of the Order, stressing that the imposable penalty upon the accused in view of the amount involved would exceed 30 years and that applying section 1 of P.D. 818 in relation to section 3 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, bail would not be a matter of right. That being the case, hearing on any application for bail would be mandatory, he urged. On March 31, 1997 the Court of Appeals reversed the Order of the presiding judge and required him to conduct hearing on the bail issue. The appellate court ruled that P.D. 818 needs no further interpretation or construction, pointing out that the trial judge’s pronouncement that the penalty for the crime charged at bar should be termed reclusion perpetua only in connection with the accessory penalties imposed under the Revised Penal Code is erroneous. In making the pronouncement and in granting bail ex parte, the Court of Appeals stressed, the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the petitioner elevated the Court of Appeals’ D E C I S I O N to this Court by a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Issue/s:

academic. This Court has no alternative but to dismiss the Petition. GEORGE VINCOY vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 156558 June 14, 2004 Facts: On or about March 14, 1996, the accused, by means of deceit defraud Lizah C. Cimafranca and Rolando Flores, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused represented that he could mobilize 30 dump trucks and 2 payloaders for use of the complainants subject to the payment ofP600,000.00 mobilization fund and, believing this representation to be true, the said complainants paid and delivered the said amount to the accused at Banco de Oro Bank, Pasig City Branch, which representation accused knew well to be false and fraudulent and were only made to induce the complainants to give and deliver as in fact they gave and delivered the said amount of P600,000.00 to the respondent, and accused once in possession of said amount, misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the complainants, Lizah C. Cimafranca and Rolando Flores, in the amount ofP600,000.00. In May 1996, Lizah Cimafranca filed a complaint for estafa against petitioner with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. It was, however, dismissed on the ground that petitioner’s obligation was purely civil in nature and for complainant’s failure to attend the hearings.4 On October 8, 1996, Lizah Cimafranca, joined by Rolando Flores, re-filed the complaint charging the same offense against petitioner with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City which filed the corresponding information in court, root of the present petition. The trial court sustained the version of the prosecution. The trial judge found incredible petitioner’s averment that he failed to notice that the check in question was not issued in his name. A judgment of conviction was rendered on February 23, 2000. Accused appealed to the Court of Appeals to no avail. Hence, this petition for review. He points out that the dismissal of the previous complaint for estafa filed by Lizah Cimafranca by the City Prosecutor’s Office of Pasay City supports his acquittal. Issue/s:

Whether or not bail would still be required when the accused was already acquitted.

Whether or not dismissal during investigation constitute double jeopardy?

preliminary

Ruling:

Ruling:

Before deciding the case, the Court asked for the complete records of the case from the lower court. The Court for the first time learned that the criminal case subject of this case was dismissed as early as October 15, 1999, when the lower court, acting upon the accused’sDemurrer to Evidence, issued an Order acquitting the accused. With the acquittal of the accused, the instant case which involves the issue of bail for the provisional liberty of the accused has become moot and

The dismissal of a similar complaint for estafa filed by Lizah Cimafranca before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Pasay City will not exculpate the petitioner. The case cannot bar petitioner’s prosecution. It is settled that the dismissal of a case during its preliminary investigation does not constitute double jeopardy9 since a preliminary investigation is not part of the trial and is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence but only such as may engender a well-

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grounded belief that an offense has been committed and accused is probably guilty thereof.10 For this reason, it cannot be considered equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal. Hence, petitioner was properly charged before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City which is not bound by the determination made by the Pasay City Prosecutor who may have had before him a different or incomplete set of evidence than that subsequently presented before the Pasig City Prosecutor. BENITO ASTORGA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154130 August 20, 2004 Facts: Private offended parties Elpidio Simon, Moises de la Cruz, Wenefredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias are members of the Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Tacloban City. On September 1, 1997, they, together with SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian of the Philippine National Police Regional Intelligence Group, were sent to the Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence operations on possible illegal logging activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two boats measuring 18 meters in length and 5 meters in breadth being constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob. There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be the owner of the boats. A heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the DENR team. Petitioner called for reinforcements and, moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some wearing fatigues, arrived at the scene. The DENR team was then brought to petitioner’s house in Daram, where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m. Issue/s: Whether or not there petitioner is entitled to presumption of innocence when all the elements of arbitrary detention are not attendant. Ruling: The quoted portions of SPO1 Capoquian’s testimony negate the element of detention. More importantly, fear is a state of mind and is necessarily subjective. Addressed to the mind of the victim, its presence cannot be tested by any hard-and-fast rule but must instead be viewed in the light of the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the crime. As such, SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, not being victims, were not competent to testify on whether or not fear existed in the minds of the private offended parties herein. It was thus error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied on their testimonies in convicting petitioner. Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1 Capoquian created a reasonable doubt as to whether petitioner detained the DENR Team against their consent. The events that transpired are, to be sure, capable to two interpretations. While it may support the proposition that the private offended parties were taken to petitioner’s

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house and prevented from leaving until 2:00 a.m. the next morning, it is equally plausible, if not more so, that petitioner extended his hospitality and served dinner and drinks to the team at his house. He could have advised them to stay on the island inasmuch as sea travel was rendered unsafe by the heavy rains. He ate together with the private offended parties and even laughed with them while conversing over dinner. This scenario is inconsistent with a hostile confrontation between the parties. Moreover, considering that the Mayor also served alcoholic drinks, it is not at all unusual that his guests left the house at 2:00 a.m. the following morning. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. He is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral certainty, the presumption of innocence of the accused must be sustained and his exoneration be granted as a matter of right. For the prosecution’s evidence must stand or fall on its own merit and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Furthermore, where the evidence for the prosecution is concededly weak, even if the evidence for defense is also weak, the accused must be duly accorded the benefit of the doubt in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys. When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. It is better to acquit a guilty man than to convict an innocent man. JORDAN P. OKTUBRE vs. JUDGE RAMON P. VELASCO, Municipal Trial Court, Maasin, Southern Leyte, A.M. No. MTJ -02-1444 July 22, 2004 Facts: Complainant is the attorney-in-fact of one Peggy Louise D'Arcy vda. De Paler ("D'Arcy"), a non-resident American. D'Arcy is the widow of Abraham Paler ("Abraham"), a resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. Respondent Judge is Abraham's nephew. During his lifetime, Abraham built a four-storey commercial and residential building ("Paler building") in Maasin city. D'Arcy, through complainant, administered the Paler building. Shortly after his appointment to the MTC Maasin in March 1998, respondent Judge, with D'Arcy's permission, stayed in the Paler building for a few days. He sought an extension of his stay but D'Arcy turned down his request since during her next visit to the country she would use the room respondent Judge then occupied. Nevertheless, respondent Judge was able to continue staying in the Paler building by transferring to a room reserved for a sister of Abraham.

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Complainant filed a complaint with the respondent Judge for changing the lock of his room. Complainant also charged respondent Judge for taking the jeep out of the garage of the Paler building. Complainant and respondent Judge met at the Office of Punong Barangay of Abgao for mediation but there was no settlement as respondent Judge questioned complainant's residency in Abgao. Complainant Mr. Jordan Oktubre was arrested and detained pursuant to a Warrant of Arrest and a Commitment Order issued by the respondent Judge, the basis for which is a Criminal Complaint for Robbery supported by an affidavit executed by the respondent Judge Ramon Velasco himself. Also, in Criminal Case for "Malicious Mischief", records show that the complaint is supported by the lone affidavit of the same.. Aggrieved by the issuance of respondent Judge of the warrant of arrest, herein complainant elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court, via "Certiorari and/or Prohibition with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction". The RTC in its Order dated December 7, 2000 ruled that "respondent Judge in issuing a warrant of arrest violative of Rule 112, Sec. 6, par. 2 of the Rules of Court may not only be committing grave abuse of discretion but gross ignorance of the law. Complainant sought to annul the warrant of arrest which was consequently granted by the RTC. Because of these events, complainant prays that the Court discipline respondent Judge for using his sala's letterhead, for his failure to inhibit himself from his own criminal complaints, and for his issuance of the warrant of arrest. Issue/s: Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest upon the complainant. And W/N failure to comply with this mandatory procedure would result to his dismissal from service. Ruling: The Office of the Court Administrator ("OCA") recommends that respondent Judge be fined P10, 000 for Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority is well-taken. However, the Court finds the recommended penalty disproportionate to respondent Judge's offenses and instead imposes on him the penalty of dismissal from service. Here, although he is the complainant in the three criminal complaints, respondent Judge did not disqualify himself from the cases. Worse, he even issued a warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 5485, resulting in the arrest and detention of complainant. By doing so, respondent Judge violated Rule 3.12 and, by implication Section 1 of Rule 137, which covers the preliminary stages of criminal prosecution. To be sure, the situation in this case does not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Rule 3.12. Nevertheless, as the provision itself states, such enumeration is not exclusive. More importantly, paragraph (d) prohibits a judge from sitting in a case where he is related to a party or to counsel within the sixth and fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, respectively. Thus,

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there is more reason to prohibit a judge from doing so in cases where he is a party. Indeed, the idea that a judge can preside over his own case is anathema to the notion of impartiality that such was no longer included in the enumeration in Rule 3.12 nor covered by Section 1 of Rule 137. Respondent Judge's subsequent inhibition from the three cases does not detract from his culpability for he should not have taken cognizance of the cases in the first place. The evil that the rule on disqualification seeks to prevent is the denial of a party of his right to due process. This became fait accompli when respondent Judge refused to abide by such rule. Equally damaging was the effect of respondent Judge's conduct on the image of the judiciary, which without a doubt, immeasurably suffered from it. Respondent Judge aggravated his liability when he proceeded to issue the warrant of arrest. Section 6 of Rule 112 provides: When warrant of arrest may issue. — x x x (b) By the Municipal Trial Court. — If the municipal trial court judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest. This is the same procedure prescribed in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution and in Section 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. A judge who issues a warrant of arrest without first complying with such mandatory procedure is liable for gross ignorance of the law. We have held, in a number of cases before this Court, that the procedure described in Section 6 of Rule 112 is mandatory because failure to follow the same would amount to a denial of due process. With respect to the issuance by inferior courts of warrants of arrest, it is necessary that the judge be satisfied that probable cause exists: 1) through an examination under oath and in writing of the complainant and his witnesses, which examination should be 2) in the form of searching questions and answers. This rule is not merely a procedural but a substantive rule because it gives flesh to two of the most sacrosanct guarantees found in the fundamental law: the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures and the due process requirement. The only instance where the judge may dispense with such procedure is when the application for the warrant of arrest is filed before a Regional Trial Court judge. In such a case, the RTC judge can rely on the report of the prosecutor on the finding of probable cause. R TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs. ROGELIO EJANDRA, G.R. No. 148508 May 20, 2004 Facts: Private respondent Rogelio Ejandra worked as a bus driver of petitioner R Transport Corporation for almost six years, from July 15, 1990 to January 31, 1996 until he was apprehended by an Officer of the Land Transportation Office for obstruction of traffic for which his license was confiscated. He was able to retrieve his license only a

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week thereafter. This led the respondent to indefinite suspension. He was likewise accused of causing damage to the bus he used to drive. He denied the charge, considering that the damage was sustained during the week that he did not drive the bus. Petitioner denied private respondent’s allegations and claimed that private respondent, a habitual absentee, abandoned his job. Had it been true, he should have presented an apprehension report and informed petitioner of his problems with the LTO. But he did not. Petitioner further argued that private respondent was not an employee because theirs was a contract of lease and not of employment, with petitioner being paid on commission basis. Labor arbiter Rogelio Yulo rendered his decision in favor of private respondent. That the dismissal of Rogelio Ejandra was without cause, therefore, illegal and ORDERING R-Transport REINSTATE him to his former position without loss of seniority and other benefits and to pay him backwages from the time of his dismissal until actual reinstatement. Labor arbiter Yulo gave no weight to petitioner’s claim that private respondent abandoned his work. His one-week absence did not constitute abandonment of work considering that it took him the whole week to reclaim his license. Private respondent could not retrieve it unless and until the apprehending officer first transmitted it to their office. His inability to drive for petitioner that whole week was therefore not his fault and petitioner could be held liable for illegal dismissal. Due process was not accorded to private respondent who was never given the opportunity to contest the charge of abandonment. Moreover, assuming actual abandonment, petitioner should have reported such fact to the nearest employment office of the Department of Labor and Employment. But no such report was ever made. The NLRC rendered a decision affirming the decision of the labor arbiter. It is very clear that from no less than appellants’ admission, that complainant was not afforded his right to due process prior to the severance of his employment with respondents. Appellants’ defense of denying the existence of employer-employee relationship with the complainant based on the manner by which complainant was being paid his salary, cannot hold water. Petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari on the ground that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the labor arbiter. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision. Categorizing the issues raised by petitioner as factual, the appellate court held that the findings of fact of the labor arbiter (affirmed by the NLRC) were entitled to great respect because they were supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioner was barred from denying the existence of an employeremployee relationship because petitioner invoked its rights under the law and jurisprudence as an employer in dismissing private respondent. Issue/s: Whether or not petitioner can validly sever their employment with respondent without following the procedural requirement of due process due to the nonexistence of employee-employer relationship.

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Ruling: In the case at bar, the labor arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals were unanimous in finding that private respondent worked as a driver of one of the buses of petitioner and was paid on a 10% commission basis. After he was apprehended for a traffic violation, his license was confiscated. When he informed petitioner’s general manager of such fact, the latter gave him money to redeem his license. He went to the LTO office everyday but it was only after a week that he was able to get back his license. When he reported back to work, petitioner’s manager told him to wait until his services were needed again. Considering himself dismissed, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner. We have no reason to disturb all these factual findings because they are amply supported by substantial evidence. In addition to the fact that petitioner had no valid cause to terminate private respondent from work, it violated the latter’s right to procedural due process by not giving him the required notice and hearing. Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of Department Order No. 9 provides for the procedure for dismissal for just or authorized cause. SEC.2. Standards of due process; requirement of notice xxx. ATTY. REYNALDO P. DIMAYACYAC vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 136264 May 28, 2004 Facts: The Assistant City Prosecutor accuses Lourdes Angeles, Estrella Mapa, Atty. Ponciano R. Gupit, and ATTY. Reynaldo P. Dinayacyac of the crime of Falsificartion of Public Document. Before his arraignment, petitioner Dimayacyac moved to quash the information on 2 grounds. First, that the officer who filed the information had no legal authority to do so, and second, that more than one offense was charged in the information. Pending resolution of the motion to quash, petitioner was arraigned. By Order of August 23, 1991, Judge Benigno T. Dayaw was holding that the "grant or denial of Motion to Dismiss whether the accused is arraigned or not is discretionary on the part of the court, thus granted the petitioner’s motion to quash upon the second ground. Accordingly, the information was quashed. More than 2 years after the quashal of the information, the Quezon City Prosecutor filed against the same accused including petitioner 2 informations for falsification of public documents. The Informations arose from the questioned acts of falsification subject of the earlier quashed information. Petitioner later filed with a motion for the quashal thereof on the ground of double jeopardy. He argued he would be placed in double jeopardy as he was indicted before for the same offenses and the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. By the assailed Order of December 18, 1996, public respondent, Judge Vicente Q. Roxas to which the 2 informations against petitioner, et al, were eventually lodged, held that the information in Criminal Case No. Q93-49988 involved a different document as that involved

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in the first one which had already been quashed. Resolution of the motion to quash the information in the second one was stayed pending the submission by petitioner of the documents required by the court a quo. Public respondent thus denied the motion to quash the information and ordered petitioner’s arraignment, he holding that said case did not place petitioner in double jeopardy. Herein petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which denied his petition stating in its Decision that since the Information in the first Criminal Case, on petitioner’s motion, was quashed on the ground that more than one offense was charged, he is not placed in double jeopardy by the filing of another Information for an offense included in the charge subject of the first Information. Issue/s:

1.

2.

Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner under the second Information would constitute double jeopardy, considering that when the first Information in Criminal was previously quashed, he had already been arraigned; and Whether or not petitioner’s constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case has been violated.

Ruling: With regard to the first issue, we are in accord with the ruling of the CA that not all the elements for double jeopardy exist in the case at bench. To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. The duplicitous information was a valid indictment. We ruled in the long line of cases that when an appellant fails to file a motion to quash within the time prescribed, he is thus deemed to have waived the defect in the Information. The accused who fails to object prior to arraignment to a duplicitous information, may be found guilty of any or all of the crimes alleged therein and duly proven during the trial, for the allegation of the elements of such component crimes in the said information has satisfied the constitutional guarantee that an accused be informed of the nature of the offense with which he or she is being charged. Verily, a duplicitous information is valid since such defect may be waived and the accused, because of such waiver, could be convicted of as many offenses as those charged in the information and proved during trial. It should be noted that the termination of the first Information was upon motion of petitioner who, on April 1, 1991, filed with the court an Urgent Motion to Quash which was granted by Resolution dated August 23,

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1991. The reinstatement of criminal case against the accused did not violate his right against double jeopardy since the dismissal of the information by the trial court had been effected at his own instance when the accused filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. In this case, considering that since the dismissal of the previous criminal case against petitioner was by reason of his motion for the quashal of the information, petitioner is thus deemed to have expressly given his consent to such dismissal. There could then be no double jeopardy in this case since one of the requisites therefore, i.e., that the dismissal be without accused’s express consent, is not present. As to whether the subsequent filing of the two informations constitutes a violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases, we rule in the negative. There is no showing that petitioner was made to endure any vexatious process during the two-year period before the filing of the proper informations. We emphasize our ruling in Ty-Dazo vs. Sandiganbayan14 where we held that: The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. In the determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are: the length of the delay the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. What the records clearly show is that petitioner never asserted his right to a speedy disposition of his case. The only ground he raised in assailing the subsequent filing of the two informations is that he will be subjected to double jeopardy. Petitioner did not raise the issue of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. We are not convinced that the filing of the informations against petitioner after two years was an unreasonable delay. MERIAM BALAGTAS vs. OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR., Judge, MTCC, Branch 2 Cebu City, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1377 June 17, 2004 Facts: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received the sworn Letter-Complaint1 of Ms. Meriam Balagtas accusing Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., MTCC, Branch 2, Cebu City, of knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order, gross ignorance of the law and serious irregularities in the performance of judicial duties in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 82863-R and 83186-

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R, entitled "People of the Philippines versus Hermann Peith," for violation of B.P. 22. Balagtas was the private complainant in the aforementioned criminal cases. She alleges that accused Hermann Peith filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Leave for Abroad which was granted by the respondent judge on the same day it was filed without notice to her or the prosecution. Balagtas then filed a Motion for the Inhibition of Judge Olegario Sarmiento on grounds of bias and partiality. She claimed therein that she filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Hold Departure Order against Peith which the respondent judge did not act upon. However, in a move evincing bias in favor of Peith, the respondent judge granted his Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Leave for Abroad. The respondent judge granted the motion for inhibition. He remarked that "Herein judge is responsibly informed that the herein parties have had a special personal relationship only that accused married another woman. This Court does not want to be an instrument of the misgivings, sourgrapings and importunings of complainant." And that Balagtas "can push through with her personal agenda of vendetta without unnecessarily dragging" him into it once Peith sets foot on Philippine soil. He further states that he "cannot act as ‘Berdugo’ for complainant’s personal ill motive and selfish interest." Balagtas now asserts that the respondent judge’s Orders are unjust and amount to gross ignorance of the law. She also claims that the respondent judge committed serious irregularities in the performance of his duties. The Court referred the complaint to another Judge for investigation, during its pendency another Judge took over. The OCA sustains with modification the findings and recommendation of the investigating judges. The OCA, therefore, recommends the dismissal of the case against the respondent judge but admonishes him to refrain from resorting to insulting and offensive language in his future judicial actions. Issue/s:

1.

Whether or not respondent Judge should be punished from resorting to insulting and offensive language.

2.

Whether or not the respondent judge can be punished for gross ignorance of the law because of violation of the basic and fundamental rights, due process.

Ruling: On the first issue, the respondent judge deserves the sternest reproof for making these remarks. Judges should refrain from expressing irrelevant opinions in their decisions which may only reflect unfavorably upon their competence and the propriety of their judicial actuations. Moreover, intemperate speech detracts from the equanimity and judiciousness that should be the constant hallmarks of a dispenser of justice.

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On the second issue, the Rules of Court is explicit on this point. A motion without notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper. It presents no question which the court could decide. The court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it. The rationale behind the rule is plain: unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing, the court will be unable to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection. The objective of the rule is to avoid a capricious change of mind in order to provide due process to both parties and to ensure impartiality in the trial. The essence of due process is the right to be heard. Therefore, every motion which may prejudice the rights of a party should be set for hearing. The intendment of the law will never be achieved if notice is not served, such as in this case. In granting Peith’s Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Leave for Abroad, the respondent judge violated a basic and fundamental constitutional principle, due process. When the law is elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance thereof. After all, judges are expected to have more than just a modicum of acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Hence, the respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS RICHARD BRIAN HORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON vs. ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, G.R. No. 154598 August 16, 2004 Facts: Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton. However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province. Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan issued a certification3 that respondent was no longer residing there. Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent’s cellular phone bills showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila

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and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country. However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).

Issue/s: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions.

appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by the legislature: the child’s welfare and well being will be prejudiced. From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved. One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition. As explained by the Solicitor General: That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all over the country" does not represent an insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no more different from or difficult than the duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise enforceable anywhere within the Philippines. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAXIMO IBARRIENTOS y PERICO, G.R. Nos. 148063-64 June 17, 2004

Ruling: In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors has rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The petition is granted. The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. We disagree with the CA’s reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor General: The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote the Solicitor General: To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus involving a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of the situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the child’s privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the

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Facts:

On August 1996 the accused who is the Uncle of the victim, LORILIE a.k.a. LORELIE I. BRILLO, then an 8 years old minor while in their house, did then and there, with lewd design willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of said Lorelie I. Brillo, who afterwards reported the incident to her Aunt, Imelda Ibarrientos, the wife of the accused, to her damage and prejudice. On February 1998, in Barangay Sagurong, Municipality of Pili, Camarines Sur, the above-named accused, being the father of and having parental authority, influence and moral ascendancy over victim JOAN IBARRIENTOS, his 7 year old daughter, while the latter was sick and sleeping in their bedroom, did then and there, with lewd design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie on top of her and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her which she reported immediately to her mother, Imelda, to her damage and prejudice. The trial court found that the appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt on both counts of rape, and sentenced him to death. Issue/s: Whether or not accused is sentenced to the severest penalty when the qualifying circumstance was not specifically alleged in the information. Ruling: already

We agree with the OSG. The Aquino case settled the issue on the proper allegation of

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circumstances. What properly informs the accused of the nature of the crime charged is the specific allegation of the circumstances mentioned in the law that raise the crime to a higher category. The new Rules on Criminal Procedure require the qualifying circumstances to be specifically alleged in the information, in order to comply with the constitutional right of the accused to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose is to allow the accused to prepare fully for his defense to prevent surprises during the trial. This requirement is satisfied as long as the circumstances are alleged in the information, even if these are not specified as aggravating or qualifying circumstances. In the present two cases of rape, however, the death penalty imposed on appellant is improper and erroneous. Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase its penalty to death cannot be the subject of speculation. The appellant cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the gravity and irreversibility of capital punishment. Proof of the age of the victim cannot consist merely of testimony. Neither can a stipulation of the parties with respect to the victim’s age be considered sufficient proof of minority. In the instant case, no authentic document was presented as evidence of the victim’s age other than a poor photocopy of what is claimed to be Lorelie’s birth certificate. The prosecution failed to present an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth. Neither was it shown that these were lost, destroyed or unavailable at the time of trial. Thus, secondary evidence is inadmissible to prove the age of the victim in Crim. Case No. P-2696. The testimonies tending to prove the victim’s age cannot be accepted as adequate proof thereof. Much as we abhor child abuse, nevertheless, we are constrained to hold that capital punishment cannot be imposed on appellant in these two cases. Even if we agree that the victims are indeed minors below 12 years old, at most, appellant is liable only for statutory rape. Gregorio Amante vs Bibiano Serwelas 471 SCRA 348 Facts: Danilo Bicomong, a plant supervisor of Amante Motors, was the registered owner of a 1990 Isuzu Jitney. In 1992, he sold the vehicle to respondent Bibiano Serwelas for P200,000 in a deed of absolute sale. The respondent had the vehicle registered in his name, which was later used as a common carrier, on a boundary system.

Despite respondent's demand, Gregorio Amante refused to return the vehicle. Hence, respondent instituted a replevin suit with the trial court. Asserting ownership of the vehicle, petitioner Vicente Amante, the proprietor of Amante Motors, intervened in the suit. But the trial court rendered a decision stating that respondent Serwelas is the lawful owner of the vehicle. The court also awarded damages to respondent for lost earnings as premium for the replevin bond of respondent. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision holding respondent as the rightful owner of the vehicle. It ruled that respondent had established ownership of the vehicle to the exclusion of the whole world. It also affirmed the award of damages as unrealized earnings but deleted the award for replevin bond premium since no claim for it was made in the complaint. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Issue/s: Is there a violation of the right against unreasonable seizure of a moving vehicle in this case? Ruling: The resolution of San Pablo City Assistant Prosecutor Esperidion Gajitos could not but strengthen respondent's claim of good faith. Petitioner Gregorio Amante's criminal complaint for violation of RA 6539 and the Anti-Fencing Law was filed in court only against Bicomong. Respondent was exonerated of any liability whatsoever. As to the issue of damages, we concur with the Court of Appeals that only petitioner Gregorio Amante should be held liable for the unrealized rentals of respondent during the period he was deprived of the vehicle's possession. Petitioner Vicente Amante was not privy to the unlawful seizure and detention of the vehicle. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 28, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondent Bibiano Serwelas is hereby declared the owner of the disputed vehicle. Petitioner Gregorio Amante is hereby ordered to pay respondent the amount of P103,200 as unrealized rentals plus P37,963 as premium for the replevin bond.

On December 9, 1993, the vehicle was seized by the police highway patrol group in General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite without a warrant, upon the request of petitioner Gregorio Amante, the manager of Amante Motors. The vehicle was brought to Camp Vicente Lim in Laguna and, after being subjected to macro-etching examination by SPO1 Elfin B. Rico of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory Service, was later released to petitioner Gregorio Amante.

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2005 Pimentel, et al. vs. Ermita, et al. GR 164978, 13 October 2005 Facts:

The Senate and the House of Representatives (“Congress”) commenced their regular session on 26 July 2004. The Commission on Appointments, composed of Senators and Representatives, was constituted on 25 August 2004. Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments to Arthur C. Yap (Department of Agriculture, 15 August 2004), Alberto G. Romulo (Department of Foreign Affairs, 23 August 2004), Raul M. Gonzalez (Department of Justice, 23 August 2004), Florencio B. Abad (Department of Education, 23 August 2004), Avelino J. Cruz, Jr. (Department of National Defense, 23 August 2004), Rene C. Villa (Department of Agrarian Reform, 23 August 2004), Joseph H. Durano (Department of Tourism, 23 August 2004), and Michael T. Defensor (Department of Environment and Natural Resources, 23 August 2004) as acting secretaries of their respective departments. Defensor, et al., took their oath of office and assumed duties as acting secretaries. On 8 September 2004, Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. (“Senator Pimentel”), Edgardo J. Angara (“Senator Angara”), Juan Ponce Enrile (“Senator Enrile”), Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada (“Senator EjercitoEstrada”), Jinggoy E. Estrada (“Senator Estrada”), Panfilo M. Lacson (“Senator Lacson”), Alfredo S. Lim (“Senator Lim”), Jamby A.S. Madrigal (“Senator Madrigal”), and Sergio R. Osmeña, III (“Senator Osmeña”) filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as Senators of the Republic of the Philippines, to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo (“President Arroyo”) through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita (“Secretary Ermita”). The petition also sought to prohibit respondents from performing the duties of department secretaries. Issue/s: Whether President Arroyo’s appointment of Defensor et al. as acting secretaries was constitutional, even without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session Ruling: The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be. The office of a department

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secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee. The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that “[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent. Pimentel, et al. assert that Section 17 does not apply to appointments vested in the President by the Constitution, because it only applies to appointments vested in the President by law. Petitioners forget that Congress is not the only source of law. “Law” refers to the Constitution, statutes or acts of Congress, municipal ordinances, implementing rules issued pursuant to law, and judicial decisions. Finally, Pimentel, et al., claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse. They, however, fail to consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. In distinguishing ad interim appointments from appointments in an acting capacity, a noted textbook writer on constitutional law has observed that "Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments." The Court find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments to Defensor et al. immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of

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2006 ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR vs. HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, EULOGIO M. MARIANO, JOSE D. JIMENEZ, JR., TORIBIO E. ILAO, JR. and ERNESTO R. SALENGA G.R. No. 136433 (December 6, 2006) Facts: Pending resolution on an agrarian case, the instant case was instituted by the petitioner Antonio Baltazar, an alleged nephew of Faustino Mercado, the attorney-in-fact of the lot owner. This was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging private respondents of conspiracy through the issuance of the TRO in allowing respondent Salenga to retain possession of the subject property. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion on public respondent Ombudsman for allowing respondent Ilao, Jr. to submit his Counter-Affidavit when the preliminary investigation was already concluded and an Information filed with the Sandiganbayan which assumed jurisdiction over the criminal case. This contention is utterly erroneous. Issue/s: a. Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing b. Whether or not the ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion for allowing respondent Ilao, Jr. to submit his Counter-Affidavit when the preliminary investigation was already concluded c. Whether or not the ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing his finding of probable cause Ruling: a. Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice x x x on a given question." In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-partiesin interest" rule. Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." The records show that petitioner is a non-lawyer appearing for himself and conducting litigation in person. Petitioner instituted the instant case before the Ombudsman in his own name. In so far as the ComplaintAffidavit filed before the Office of the Ombudsman is concerned, there is no question on his authority and legal standing. The Ombudsman can act on anonymous complaints and motu proprioinquire into alleged improper official acts or omissions from whatever source, e.g., a newspaper. Thus, any complainant may be entertained by the Ombudsman for the latter to initiate an inquiry and investigation for alleged irregularities. However, filing the petition in person before the Supreme Court is another matter. The Rules allow a nonlawyer to conduct litigation in person and appear for oneself only when he is a party to a legal controversy. In the case at bar which involves a criminal proceeding stemming from a civil (agrarian) case, it is

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clear that petitioner is not a real party in interest. Except being the complainant, and not being an agent of the parties in the agrarian case, the petitioner is a stranger to the agrarian case. Hence, the instant petition must be dismissed on that score. b. The graft court cannot be faulted in granting the prayed for re-investigation as it can readily be seen from the antecedent facts that respondent Ilao, Jr. was not given the opportunity to file his Counter-Affidavit. Courts are given wide latitude to accord the accused ample opportunity to present controverting evidence even before trial as demanded by due process. Thus, we held inVillaflor v. Vivar that "[a] component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before trial. To deny their claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive them of the full measure of their right to due process. c. The Court will not delve into the merits of the Ombudsman’s reversal of its initial finding of probable cause or cause to bring respondents to trial. Petitioner has not shown that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering such reversal. The function of determining the existence of probable cause is proper for the Ombudsman in this case and the Court will not tread on the realm of this executive function to examine and assess evidence supplied by the parties, which is supposed to be exercised at the start of criminal proceedings. It cannot pass upon the sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to determine the existence of probable cause. ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR [492 SCRA 1 ; AM NO P-021651; 22 JUN 2006] Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act. Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Issues: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement. Ruling:

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No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a freeexercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the freeexercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion. OSCAR Z. BENARES vs. JOSEPHINE LIM, G.R. No. 173421 (December 14, 2006) Facts: Petitioner Oscar Beñares was accused of estafa. Trial thereafter ensued. After the prosecution presented its last witness, it was given 15 days to formally offer its evidence. However, the prosecution did not make any formal offer of evidence, hence petitioner filed a motion praying that the prosecution's submission of formal offer of evidence be deemed waived and the case dismissed for lack of evidence. The motion was granted; the case was dismissed. Respondent moved to reconsider the order of dismissal claiming that she had difficulty securing documents from the court which were marked during trial; Motion for Reconsideration was granted. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC. In granting the petition, the RTC noted that the MeTC Order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute "had the effect of an acquittal" which is "a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged.” The Resolution.

Court

of

Appeals

reversed

the

RTC's

Issue/s:

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a. Whether or not the right of the petitioner to speedy trial was violated b. Whether or not the petitioner has the right to invoke double jeopardy Ruling: a. Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. In the instant case, there is no question as to the presence of the first four elements. As to the last element, there was yet no conviction, nor an acquittal on the ground that petitioner's guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, but the dismissal of the case was based on failure to prosecute. A dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy, except in two instances, to wit: (1) the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or (2) the case is dismissed for violation of the accused's right to speedy trial. However,.. b. Petitioner's claim that the prosecution's delay in filing its formal offer of evidence violated his right to speedy trial is not well taken. It appears that there was justifiable reason for the prosecution's failure to formally offer its evidence on time, i.e., the documents which were previously marked in court were misplaced. There is no showing that the criminal case was unreasonably prolonged nor there was deliberate intent on the part of the petitioner to cause delay in the proceedings resulting to serious and great prejudice affecting the substantial rights of the accused. Delay is not a mere mathematical computation of the time involved. Each case must be decided upon the facts peculiar to it. Since the delay was not vexatious or oppressive, it follows that petitioner's right to speedy trial was not violated, consequently he cannot properly invoke his right against double jeopardy. Petition is DENIED. AMELIA CABRERA vs. MANUEL LAPID, FERNANDO BALTAZAR, REYNALDO F. CABRERA and DIONY VENTURA, G.R. No. 129098 (December 6, 2006) Facts: Petitioner Amelia M. Cabrera accused respondents of violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. In her Complaint-Affidavit, petitioner stated that she entered into a lease agreement with the Municipality of Sasmuan over a tract of land for the purpose of devoting it to fishpond operations. A month later, petitioner learned from newspaper reports of the impending demolition of her fishpond as it was purportedly

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illegal and blocked the flow of the Pasak River. Despite pleas from petitioner, respondents ordered the destruction of petitioner's fishpond. At the preliminary investigation, respondents, except Senior Superintendent Ventura, submitted counteraffidavits, denying the accusations against them. In the counter-affidavit jointly filed by Mayor Baltazar and ViceMayor Cabrera, they insisted that contrary to petitioner's claim, the fishpond was an illegal structure because it was erected on the seashore, at the mouth of the Pasak River, and sat on an inalienable land. They claimed that the demolition was done by the Task Force Bilis Daloy upon the directive of then President Fidel V. Ramos. On 13 May 1996, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution, dismissing petitioner's complaint. The dismissal was based on the declaration that the fishpond was a nuisance per se and, thus, may be abated by respondents in the exercise of the police power of the State. Issue/s: Whether or not the Supreme Court can review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. Ruling: Clearly, this is an appeal from the questioned issuances of the Ombudsman. However, such direct resort to this Court from a resolution or order of the Ombudsman is not sanctioned by any rule of procedure. Neither can petitioner avail of Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989. The provision allowed direct appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. The right to appeal is granted only in respect to orders or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. The provision does not cover resolutions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. More importantly, Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770 insofar as it allowed a direct appeal to this Court was declared unconstitutional in Fabian v. Hon. Desierto However, an aggrieved party in criminal actions is not without any recourse. Where grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction taints the findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion should be differentiated from an error in judgment. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by an appeal. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of

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judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Absent any grave abuse of discretion tainting it, the courts will not interfere with the Ombudsman's supervision and control over the preliminary investigation conducted by him. It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. Petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

CATERPILLAR, INC. vs. MANOLO P. SAMSON, G.R. No. 164605 (October 27, 2006) Facts: Petitioner Caterpillar, Inc. is a foreign corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing shoes, clothing items, among others. Upon the request of petitioner, the Regional Intelligence Investigation Division-National Capital Region Police Office (RIID- NCRPO) filed search warrant applications against respondent Manolo P. Samson for violations of unfair competition, provided under the Intellectual Property Code. On the same day, the trial court issued five search warrants against respondent and his business establishments. Respondent filed a Consolidated Motion to Quash the search warrants. Pending the resolution thereof, RIIDNCRPO filed five complaints against the respondent and his affiliate entities before the Department of Justice (DOJ). Later, the trial court issued an order denying the respondent’s motion to quash, but nevertheless directed the release of the articles seized on the ground that no criminal action had been commenced against respondent. The Court of Appeals denied the Petition for lack of merit ruling that there was no arbitrariness in the way the trial court exercised its discretionary power to release the items seized in the absence of a criminal action filed in court. It also noted that the criminal complaints filed before the DOJ that underwent preliminary investigation were all dismissed by the investigating prosecutor. Issue/s:

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Whether or not the facts that no criminal complaint had been filed against the private respondent and the subsequent dismissal by the investigating state prosecutor justify the immediate return of the seized items. Ruling: The petitioner asserts that the seized articles can only be returned when a criminal case can no longer possibly materialize since the seized articles are crucial to the eventual prosecution of the respondent. The petitioner’s assertion is incongruent with the peculiar circumstances of this case. The articles seized – the thousands of articles of clothing, footwear, and accessories, among others - had little, if any, evidentiary value for the criminal action for unfair competition, which the petitioner expected to file. There exists a constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Constitution, however, does not provide a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures, rather the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between persons and the police, there must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with the power to issue or refuse such search warrant. Yet, the responsibilities of the magistrate do not end with the granting of the warrant, but extends to the custody of the articles seized. In exercising custody over these articles, the property rights of the owner should be balanced with the social need to preserve evidence, which will be used in the prosecution of a case. In the instant case, no criminal action had been prosecuted for almost a year. Thus, the court had been left with the custody of highly depreciable merchandise. More importantly, these highly depreciable articles would have been superfluous if presented as evidence for the following reasons: (1) the respondent had already admitted that he is the owner of the merchandise seized, which made use of the trademarks in dispute; (2) the court required the respondent to execute an undertaking to produce the articles seized when the court requires and had already in its possession a complete inventory of the items seized as secondary evidence; (3) actual samples of the respondent’s merchandise are in the possession of the police officers who had applied for the search warrant, and photographs thereof had been made part of the records, and respondent did not dispute that these were obtained from his stores. Where the purpose of presenting as evidence the articles seized is no longer served, there is no justification for severely curtailing the rights of a person to his property. In ordering the return of the articles seized, the trial court had reasonably exercised its discretion in determining from the circumstances of the case what constitutes a reasonable and unreasonable search and seizure. Petition denied. LECA REALTY CORPORATION vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 155605 (September 27, 2006) Facts:

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On 18 March 1996, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), filed a complaint for eminent domain for the taking of some portions of the properties of the private respondents. On October 7, 1997, the court a quo appointed three (3) competent and disinterested persons; as commissioners to ascertain and report the just compensation of the properties sought to be taken. On January 9, 1998, the commissioners submitted their report dated January 8, 1998, and recommended the fair market value of the subject properties. In arriving at the said Report, the Commissioners took into consideration the following factors: property location, identification[,] neighborhood data, community facilities and utilities, highest and best use, valuation and reasonable indication of land values within the vicinity. "On March 30, 1998, the court rendered the decision whereby the Commissioners' Report was adopted."7 The CA affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court likewise debunked the contention of the Republic of the Philippines that the commissioners had erred in fixing the fair market values of the properties, because the appraisals exceeded the zonal values determined in Department of Finance Order No. 71-96. The CA held that the zonal valuation was made for taxation purposes only and was not necessarily reflective of the actual market values of the properties in the area. Issue/s: Whether or determined.

not

just

compensation

was

properly

Ruling: Just compensation, is the full and fair equivalent of a property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss. Note must be taken that the word "just" is used to stress the meaning of the word "compensation," in order to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. Necessarily, just compensation must not be arrived at arbitrarily, but determined after an evaluation of different factors. In the present case, the Commissioners' Report made use of the so-called market-data approach in arriving at the valuation of the properties. In this method, the value of the land is based on sales and listings of comparable property registered within the vicinity. Well-settled is the rule that in expropriation proceedings, the value of a property must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever comes first. In this case, the Complaint was filed on March 18, 1996, and the trial court issued the Writ of Possession on June 19, 1997. The offers cited in the Commissioners' Report, though, were made between May 1996 to February 1997, a period after the filing of the Complaint on March 18, 1996. Thus, there

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is no evidence on record of the fair market value of the property as of March 1996. Moreover, the offers for sale were good for properties inside the Ortigas Center.41 Thus, those offers cannot be used as bases for the values of properties along EDSA, where the property of Petitioner Leca is situated. In fact, no listing or evidence of concluded sales was submitted for properties in areas outside the Ortigas Center. While it is true that adjoining properties may be valued differently, competent evidence still has to be presented to establish the differences in market values. The Republic is incorrect, however, in alleging that the values were exorbitant, merely because they exceeded the maximum zonal value of real properties in the same location where the subject properties were located. The zonal value may be one, but not necessarily the sole, index of the value of a realty. Petition of Leca Realty Corporation is remanded to the trial court for the proper determination of the amount of just compensation.

RUPERTO LUCERO, JR., PABLO LUCERO and ANTONIO TENORIO, vs. CITY GOVERNMENT OF PASIG, as represented by the Market Administrator, G.R. No. 132834 (November 24, 2006) Facts: Petitioners were granted lease contracts to occupy and operate stalls in the public market of Pasig by virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 25, series of 1983. Later, the municipal government of Pasig renovated the market facilities and constructed annex buildings to the old public market. The Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig then enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 56, series of 1993, entitled "An Ordinance Prescribing the Rules and Regulations in Occupying and Using Market Stalls and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof." Pursuant to the new ordinance, municipal officials urged all stall occupants to fill up and submit the necessary application forms which would serve as the lease contract. Petitioners, however, refused to apply for a new lease on their market stalls. Hence, the city government of Pasig filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioners for failing to pay the required P10,000 performance bond and their rental fees since January 1994 as required by the municipal ordinance. Petitioners mainly assail the non-renewal of their lease contracts on stalls in the public market when they did not comply with the requirements of the new ordinance. They claim to have a vested right to the possession, use and enjoyment of the market stalls based on their 1983 lease contracts. This, they assert, could not be impaired by the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 56 in 1993.

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The MTC ruled in favor of petitioners and dismissed the complaint; The RTC reversed the MTC decision and decided in favor of the city government. The appeal by the petitioners was denied by the CA. Issue/s: Whether or not the petitioners can are covered by Municipal Ordinance No. 56 in 1993 Ruling: Contrary to petitioners’ contention that they were no longer covered by the 1993 ordinance their 1983 lease contracts did not grant them irrefutable rights to the market stalls. They were mere grantees of a privilege to occupy and operate such booths. What petitioners had was a license to occupy and operate particular stalls over a period of time. Their possession and use of these facilities could not be characterized as fixed and absolute. It was within the ambit of the Sanggunian’s authority in the exercise of police power to regulate the enjoyment of the privilege to lease the market stalls. The enactment of the Municipal Ordinance No. 56, series of 1993 repealing Municipal Ordinance No. 25, series of 1983 (the basis of petitioners’ lease) was a valid exercise of such governmental authority to regulate the possession and use of the public market and its facilities. The lease (and occupation) of a stall in a public market is not a right but a purely statutory privilege governed by laws and ordinances. The operation of a market stall by virtue of a license is always subject to the police power of the city government. An application for this privilege may be granted or refused for reasons of public policy and sound public administration. The city government, through its market administrator, is not dutybound to grant lease privileges to any applicant, least of all those who refuse to obey the new ordinance prescribing the rules and regulations for the market stalls. Moreover, a public market is one dedicated to the service of the general public and operated under government control and supervision as a public utility. Hence, the operation of a public market and its facilities is imbued with public interest. Petitioners’ 1983 lease contracts contained an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power could be exercised any time to change the provisions of the contracts or even abrogate them entirely, for the protection of the general welfare. Such an act did not violate the non-impairment clause which is anyway subject to and limited by the paramount police power. Petition denied. NS TRANSPORT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NSTEA), et. al., vs. NS TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC.(NSTS), NICANOR SORIANO, JAIME MENDOZA, and TERESITA MENDOZA, G.R. No. 164049 (October 30, 2006) Facts: In a proceeding before the NLRC for compulsory arbitration to settle a dispute between the NSTEA (the

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Union) and the NSTS (the Company), the labor arbiter ruled in favour of the Union, holding that the strike staged by the Union was legal.

the least attention to technicalities, the fundamental requisites of due process must not be sacrificed. Petition denied.

The company sought reconsideration of the resolution, claiming that it was denied due process when they were not allowed to adduce evidence on the illegality of the strike and the violation of the Return-to-Work Order. The NLRC dismissed the motion without resolving the company’s protest on the lack of notice of the hearings.

RUBEN S. SIA and JOSEPHINE SIA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and TERESITA LEE, G.R. No. 159659 (October 12, 2006)

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the company and remanded the case to the NLRC for further proceedings. Petitioners claim that the NLRC did not violate the company’s right to due process since its resolutions were based on the parties’ respective pleadings and on the records of the case. Respondents maintain that the company was deprived of its constitutional right to due process when the NLRC disallowed it to present its evidence due to the conceived "failure to attend" the three (3) scheduled hearings, when in fact the company and its counsel were not notified of the hearings since the NLRC sent the notice of said hearings to a wrong address Issue/s: Whether or not the Company was deprived of its constitutional right to due process Ruling: In labor cases, it has been held that due process is simply an opportunity to be heard and not that an actual hearing should always and indispensably be held since a formal type or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of controversy. The holding of an adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right. However, when such a formal hearing is allowed but a party is not informed thereof, as a consequence of which he is unable to attend the same, such failure to attend should not be taken against him. As the labor arbiter allowed the holding of a formal hearing, he must accord the parties the opportunity to participate therein and allow the formal hearing to proceed its natural course, if due process and the elements of fair play are to be observed. In the instant case, the labor arbiter has granted his imprimatur on the holding of a formal hearing, as agreed upon by the parties. However, the company was not given the chance to exercise the same privilege, since the case was submitted for decision even before it was able to adduce its evidence during the formal hearing. While the speedy and inexpensive disposition of cases is much desired and should be pursued, the swift resolution of labor disputes is counterproductive if it is achieved through a lop-sided hearing and at the expense of the employer’s rights. Thus, it has been held that while labor laws mandate the speedy disposition of cases with

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Facts: Petitioners were charged with three counts of violation of Section 17 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957, otherwise known as The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree. The trial court appointed a counsel de oficio for petitioner Ruben S. Sia and proceeded with the arraignment. Petitioners asserted that petitioner Ruben was denied his right to counsel when the trial court forced him to enter a plea with only a counsel de oficio. The appellate court ruled that the trial court did not transgress petitioner Ruben S. Sia's right to counsel since the preference in the choice of counsel expressed in Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution does not necessarily mean that such choice by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent lawyers from handling the defense. Issue/s: Whether or not the petitioner Ruben S. Sia deprived of his right to counsel when only a counsel de oficio assisted him during his arraignment despite his insistence to be assisted by their newly hired counsel de parte Ruling: We agree with the herein respondent Lee when she said that petitioners were given ample time by the trial court to get a counsel of their choice, but did not. Through the course of the proceedings, the petitioners filed several motions. In its Orders dated November 21, 2001, the trial court noted that although the informations were filed on August 7, 2000, the petitioners have not yet been arraigned as of that day. The delay could no longer be countenanced. Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution assuring an accused of counsel of his choice pertains specifically to a person under investigation. Even if we were to extend the choice of a counsel to an accused in a criminal prosecution, the matter of the accused getting a lawyer of his preference cannot be so absolute and arbitrary as would make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused. In Amion v. Chiongson this Court stated: Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation, will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who for one

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reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers of the charter.

surprises which could merely complicate the issues and prolong the trial. There is a dire need to lessen technicalities in the process of settling labor disputes."

SIME DARBY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, GR 148021 (December 6, 2006)

SKECHERS, U.S.A., INC. vs. INTER INDUSTRIAL TRADING CORP., et al. 164321 (November 30, 2006)

Facts:

Facts:

Due to a deadlock in the negotiations regarding the Collective Bargaining Agreement of the Union and the Company resulting to a lockout and dismissal of some employees, the dispute was brought before the NLRC.

Petitioner is a foreign corporation existing under the laws of the State of California, United States of America and engaged in the manufacture of footwear. Petitioner is not doing business in the Philippines and is suing before the trial court only to protect its intellectual property rights. Petitioner engaged the services of a private investigative firm, to conduct an investigation on Inter Pacific Industrial Trading Corporation (Inter Pacific) in coordination with the NBI to confirm if Inter Pacific is indeed engaged in the importation, distribution and sale of unauthorized products bearing counterfeit or unauthorized trademarks owned by petitioner. Special Investigator Borromeo of the NBI, with a witness, applied for warrants against the warehouse and outlet store being operated and managed by respondent for infringement of trademark. After personally examining the search warrant applicant and his witness, the court a quo found probable cause to issue the search warrants applied for and thus issued on the same day. That same afternoon, the search warrants were simultaneously served by the operatives of the Intellectual Property Rights Division of the NBI. After concluding that there are glaring differences that an ordinary prudent purchaser would not likely be mislead or confused in purchasing the wrong article, the lower court issued the assailed Order quashing Search Warrant and directing the NBI to return to respondents the items seized by virtue of said search warrant.

Labor arbiter ruled in favour of the Company, dismissing for lack of merit the petitioner’s complaints. Petitioner appealed the arbiter’s decision to the NLRC. It was dismissed for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Petitioner argued that had the labor arbiter allowed them to present evidence during a formal trial, the decision would have been different. Respondents maintains that the decisions of the labor arbiter and the NLRC and the Court of Appeals are supported by substantial evidence. Issue/s: Whether or not the labor arbiter erred in not holding a formal hearing. Ruling: Petitioners’ argument that had the labor arbiter allowed respondents to present their evidence during the formal trial, the Decision would have been different, cannot be sustained. As previously stated, the labor arbiter enjoys wide discretion in determining whether there is a need for a formal hearing in a given case, and he or she may use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of each case without regard to technicalities. With or without a formal hearing, the labor arbiter may still adequately decide the case since he can resolve the issues on the basis of the pleadings and other documentary evidence previously submitted. When the parties submitted their position papers and other pertinent pleadings to the labor arbiter, it is understood/given/deemed that they have included therein all the pieces of evidence needed to establish their respective cases. The rationale for this rule is explained by the Court in one case, thus: (P)etitioner believes that had there been a formal hearing, the arbiter’s alleged mistaken reliance on some of the documentary evidence submitted by parties would have been cured and remedied by them, presumably through the presentation of controverting evidence. Evidently, this postulate is not in consonance with the need for speedy disposition of labor cases, for the parties may then willfully withhold their evidence and disclose the same only during the formal hearing, thus creating

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PACIFIC G.R. No.

Issue/s: Whether or not that the trial court may be faulted for quashing the search warrants. Ruling: The power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested with the trial judges in the exercise of their judicial function. And inherent in the courts’ power to issue search warrants is the power to quash warrants already issued. After the judge has issued a warrant, he is not precluded to subsequently quash the same, if he finds upon re-evaluation of the evidence that no probable cause exists. In the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily resolve whether or not an offense exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the search warrant. In the case at bar, the subject search warrant was issued allegedly in connection with trademark infringement, particularly the unauthorized use of the "S" logo by respondent in their Strong rubber shoes. After conducting the hearing on the application for a search warrant, the

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court a quo was initially convinced that there was sufficient reason to justify the issuance of the search warrant. However, upon motion of respondent to quash the search warrant, the lower court changed its position and declared that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant as there was no colorable imitation between respondent’s trademark and that of petitioner. In ruling that there was no colorable imitation of petitioner’s trademark in light of the factual milieu prevalent in the instant case, the trial court may not be faulted for reversing its initial finding that there was probable cause. Based on the courts’ inherent power to issue search warrants and to quash the same, the courts must be provided with the opportunity to correct itself of an error inadvertently committed. After reevaluating the evidence presented before it, the trial court may reverse its initial finding of probable cause in order that its conclusion may be made to conform to the facts prevailing in the instant case.

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2007 ROMONAFE CORP. vs NATIONAL POWER CORP. (NPC) GR No. 168122, January 30, 2007 Facts: Respondent National Power Corporation is a government owned and controlled corporation which filed a complaint on July 12, 1995 for eminent domain with the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite against Romonafe Corporation and Vine Development Corporation. The trial court designated commissioners to determine just compensation for the properties involved in this case. NPC filed an opposition to the commissioner’s valuation on the ground that the valuation used as basis the present (1997) market value of the property instead of the market value on July 12, 1995, the time of the filing of the complaint. The trial court rendered judgment ordering plaintiff to pay defendant based on the value starting from the time the plaintiff took possession of the property up to the time the full amount have been paid. NPC thus filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court received the Compromise Agreement between NPC and Romonafe. The Office of the Solicitor General questioned such compromise agreement on the ground that the attorneys of the NPC who signed the agreement were not authorized to sign in its behalf. The appellate court nullified the compromise agreement for being disadvantageous to the government as it is against public policy. It further ruled that the market value of the expropriated parcel of land is fixed at P1,500 per square meter. Issue/s: 1. 2.

regulated drug; and that he was in possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver. City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) two separate Informations against respondent, one for illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride and another for illegal possession of firearm. Respondent filed with the trial court a motion for reinvestigation on ground that he was apprehended without a warrant of arrest and that no preliminary investigation was conducted. trial court granted respondent’s motion.However, Prosecutor Virgilio Patag, designated to conduct the reinvestigation, was appointed judge of the RTC in Iloilo. Apparently, he did not inform the prosecutor who took his place about the pending reinvestigation. Meanwhile, respondent has remained in detention. Respondent filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the Informations, contending that the delay in the reinvestigation violated his right to due process. The trial court issued an order denying respondent’s motion to dismiss the Informations. Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals granted the petition, dismissed the criminal charges against respondent and ordered that respondent be released from custody. The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, moved for reconsideration but was denied. Issue/s: Wether the appellate court erred in holding that respondent’s right to due process has been violated Ruling:

Whether or not the payment of just compensation is based upon the filing of the complaint Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by NPC and Romonafe is valid

Ruling: On the first issue, the court held in the affirmative. Just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the taking of the of the property or the filing of the complaint whichever comes first. In the case at bar, just compensation should thus be determined as of July 12, 1995 when the expropriation case was filed before the trial court. On the second remanded the to the appellate court.

issue,

the

court

PEOPLE vs ANONAS,GR No. 156847, January 31, 2007 Facts: SPO4 Emiliano Anonas, respondent, assigned at the Western Police District, was apprehended by his colleagues during a raid in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The apprehending police officers claimed that he and four other persons were sniffing methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu, a

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No. Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that “All persons shall have the right to speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.” There can be no question that respondent was prejudiced by the delay, having to be confined for more than four oppressive years for failure of the investigating prosecutors to comply with the law on preliminary investigation. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals, respondent’s right to due process had been violated. UNITED BF HOMEOWNER’S ASSOC. INC. vs THE (MUNICIPAL) CITY MAYOR,GR No. 141010, February 7, 2007 Facts: BF Homes Parañaque Subdivision with a land area straddling the cities of Parañaque, Las Piñas, and Muntinlupa, is the largest subdivision in the country. Municipal Council of Parañaque enacted Municipal Ordinance reclassifying El Grande and Aguirre Avenues in BF Homes Parañaque from residential to commercial areas. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the Municipal Ordinance alleging that the reclassification of certain portions of BF Homes Parañaque from residential to commercial zone is unconstitutional because it amounts

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to impairment of the contracts between the developer of BF Homes Parañaque and the lot buyers. Public respondents alleged that the passage of the Municipal Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power by the Municipal Council of Parañaque and that such ordinance can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations entered into by the petitioners and the developer. El Grande Aguirre Commerce and Trade Organization (EL ACTO), a non-stock, non-profit corporation, intervened as respondent EL ACTO asserted that the Municipal Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power and that petitioners are guilty of estoppel since petitioners endorsed the opening of many of these commercial establishments in BF Homes Parañaque. Court of Appeals held that the enactment of Municipal Ordinance was a valid exercise of police power by the Municipality of Parañaque. Issue/s: Whether the Municipal Ordinance is unconstitutional considering that it impairs a contractual obligation annotated in homeowners’ titles and violates the doctrine of separation of powers Ruling: Under Section 447 of RA 7160, the Sangguniang Bayan or the Municipal Council, as the legislative body of the municipality, has the power to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants. There was no sufficient evidence disputing the regularity of the enactment of the Municipal Ordinance. Before the Municipal Council of Parañaque passed the Municipal Ordinance, it has been the subject of barangay consultations and committee hearings in accordance with Executive Order No. 72 and is found to be reasonable and not discriminating or oppressive with respect to BF Homes Parañaque. Moreover, several homeowners along El Grande and Aguirre Avenues already converted their residences into business establishments. As found by the Court of Appeals, El Grande and Aguirre Avenues are main thoroughfares in BF Homes Parañaque which have long been commercialized. The Court has upheld in several cases the superiority of police power over the non-impairment clause. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. The Municipal Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power and the reclassification of El Grande and Aguirre Avenues in BF Homes Parañaque is not arbitrary or unreasonable. PEST MGT. ASSOC. OF PHILS. (PMAP) vs FERTILIZER AND PESTICIDE AUTHORITY (FPA), GR No. 156041, February 21, 2007 Facts: Petitioner, a non-stock corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, is an association of pesticide handlers duly licensed by respondent Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). It

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questioned the validity of Section 3.12 of the 1987 Pesticide Regulatory Policies and Implementing Guidelines. Petitioner argued that the specific provision on the protection of the proprietary data in FPA’s Pesticide Regulatory Policies and Implementing Guidelines is unlawful for going counter to the objectives of Presidential Decree No. 1144 (P.D. No. 1144); for exceeding the limits of delegated authority; and for encroaching on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Intellectual Property Office. Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the provision on the protection of proprietary data in the FPA's Pesticide Regulatory Policies and Implementing Guidelines is valid and legal as it does not violate the objectives of P.D. No. 1144; the proprietary data are a substantial asset which must be protected; the protection for a limited number of years does not constitute unlawful restraint of free trade; and such provision does not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Intellectual Property Office. Respondents expound that since under P.D. No. 1144, the FPA is mandated to regulate, control and develop the pesticide industry, it was necessary to provide for such protection of proprietary data, otherwise, pesticide handlers will proliferate to the the detriment of the industry and the public since the inherent toxicity of pesticides are hazardous and are potential environmental contaminants respondents emphasize that the provision on protection of proprietary data does not usurp the functions of the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) since a patent and data protection are two different matters. Issue/s: Did the FPA go beyond its delegated power and undermine the objectives of P.D. No. 1144 by issuing regulations that provide for protection of proprietary data? Ruling: The answer is in the negative As stated in the Preamble of said decree, “there is an urgent need to create a technically-oriented government authority equipped with the required expertise to regulate, control and develop both the fertilizer and the pesticide industries.” Under P.D. No. 1144, the FPA is given the broad power to issue rules and regulations to implement and carry out the purposes and provisions of said decree, i.e., to regulate, control and develop the pesticide industry. In furtherance of such ends, the FPA sees the protection of proprietary data as one way of fulfilling its mandate. PEOPLE vs. NUEVAS, GR No. 170233, February 22, 2007 Facts: Jesus Nuevas was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City with illegal possession

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of marijuana. Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio were likewise charged with the same crime. RTC rendered a Decision finding all accused in the above-entitled cases guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Issue/s: Whether or not the warrantless searches and seizure made by the police officers is valid and the evidence obtained by virture thereof is admissible Ruling: First, the Court holds that the searches and seizures conducted do not fall under the first exception, warrantless searches incidental to lawful arrests. Arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed as in this case where the search preceded the arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the persons to be arrested had committed an offense. The searches conducted on the plastic bag then cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest. Secondly, neither could the searches be justified under the plain view doctrine. If the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags that Nuevas and Din were carrying and were not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers. In Nuevas’s case, the dried marijuana leaves found inside the plastic bag were wrapped inside a blue cloth. In Din’s case, the marijuana found upon inspection of the plastic bag was “packed in newspaper and wrapped therein.” It cannot be therefore said the items were in plain view which could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further search. On the other hand, the Court finds that the search conducted in Nuevas’s case was made with his consent. The Court is convinced that he indeed voluntarily surrendered the incriminating bag to the police officers. However, with respect to the search conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no such consent had actually been given. Thus the Court modified the judgment. Appellants Reynaldo Din and Fernando are ACQUITTED. GARCIA vs J.G. SUMMIT PETROCHEMICAL CORP. GR No. 127925, February 23, 2007

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Facts: Respondent J.G. Summit Petrochemical Corporation was registered by the BOI as a new domestic producer of polyethylene and polypropylene resins, for which it was issued on May 24, 1994 BOI Certificate of Registration. Respondent informed the BOI that its plant would be located in barangay Alangilanan, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental. On January 29, 1996, however, it advised the Board in writing that its plant site would be located in barangay Simlong, Batangas City, instead of Negros Oriental. BOI caused the publication of respondent’s amended application for registration in a newspaper of general publication to enable interested persons to file their sworn objections within one (1) week from said publication. In due time, petitioner and concerned residents of barangay Simlong, Batangas submitted separate letters of opposition Petitioner objected to the Batangas plant site, citing as basis the 1990 decision of this Court in G.R. No. 92024, which annulled the Board’s approval of the change of plant site from Bataan to Batangas, and of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). He argued that by the said decision, this Court declared the Bataan petrochemical zone as the only possible site for petrochemical plants as provided for under P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803. Issue/s: Whether Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 949 and 1803, the laws creating a petrochemical complex in Limay, Bataan, prohibit the establishment of a petrochemical facility outside of it. Whether or not petitioners were denied due process and access to information of national concern Ruling: The Court ruled “that the establishment of a petrochemical plant in Batangas does not violate P.D. 949 and P.D. 1803.” What is clear then is that the law reserved an area for a petrochemical industrial zone in Bataan and that PNOC was to operate, manage and develop it. There is, however, nothing further in the law to indicate that the choice of Limay, Bataan as a petrochemical zone was exclusive. On the contrary, the use of the word “may” in the proviso of Section 2 runs counter to the exclusivity of the Bataan site because it makes it merely directory, rather than mandatory, for the PNOC to lease, sell and/or convey portions of the petrochemical industrial zone to private entities or persons locating their plants therein. When the law makes no distinction, the Court should not distinguish. As for petitioner’s claim that he was denied due process and access to information of national concern because of the Board’s omission to make the SRI report known before and during the hearings of respondent’s amended application, it is bereft of merit. Petitioner has not denied having actively participated in the August 23, 1995 meeting of the ad hoc committee on the

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petrochemical industry in which the report was discussed. But even granting that the report was not mentioned during the hearings, petitioner could have easily moved for a reconsideration of the BOI Decision, reserving his right to refute the SRI findings upon actual receipt of a copy thereof. Finally, it is not for this Court to rule on whether the national interest would be served by allowing respondent to locate its plant in Batangas, instead of Bataan. As the first Garcia case held, “this Court is not concerned with the economic, social, and political aspects of this case for it does not possess the necessary technology and scientific expertise to determine whether the transfer of the proposed BPC petrochemical complex from Bataan to Batangas and the change of fuel from naphtha only to ‘naphtha and/or LPG will be best for the project and for our country. This Court is not about to delve into the economics and politics of this case . . . .” DIMACUHA vs PEOPLE, GR No. 143705, February 23, 2007 Facts: Petitioner Ruby E. Dimacuha seeks her acquittal by a reversal of the October 22, 1999 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 20720 which affirmed her earlier conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila, Branch 273, for violations of Sections 15 and 16 of Article III of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Dimacuha’s motion for reconsideration of said decision was denied by the CA in its June 19, 2000 resolution. After due assessment of the evidence presented, the trial court gave full faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and upheld the presumption applied in cases involving violation of Dangerous Drug Acts of regularity in the performance of duty by public officers conducting anti-narcotics operations when the police officers have no motive in testifying falsely against an accused. It found that the evidence for the prosecution convincingly established petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Unable to accept the trial court’s judgment of conviction, petitioner went on appeal to the CA. Issue/s: Whether or not the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies is credible; and, the the arrest and search conducted on the person and belongings of the petitioner without a warrant is valid. Ruling: Petitioner questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies by giving stress over the non-presentation in court of Benito Marcelo, the professed police asset. She argues that the non-presentation of Marcelo was a denial of her constitutional right to meet and confront her accuser.

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The right of the petitioner to confront the witnesses against her is not affected by the failure of the prosecution to present the informant. The matter of presentation of witnesses is not for accused nor even for the trial court to decide. Discretion belongs to the prosecutor as to how the State should present its case. The prosecutor has the right to choose whom he would present as witnesses. Moreover, in illegal drugs cases, the presentation of an informant is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative As stated earlier, the testimony of the police officers carried with it the presumption of regularity in the performance of official function. Absent any persuasive evidence showing why these officers would falsely testify against the petitioner, the logical conclusion is that no improper motive exists, and that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. Finally, petitioner contends that the arrest and the search conducted incidental to her arrest were illegal as the surrounding circumstances of the arrest were not within the purview of the allowable warrantless arrests under Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. Here, the petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto while in the act of delivering 1.15 grams and in actual possession of another 10.78 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) as a result of an entrapment operation conducted by the police on the basis of information received from Benito Marcelo regarding petitioner's illegal drug trade. Petitioner's arrest, therefore, was lawful and the subsequent seizure of a bag of shabu inserted inside the cover of her checkbook was justified and legal in light of the prevailing rule that an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any property found upon his person in order to find and seize things connected with the crime. The seized regulated drug is, therefore, admissible in evidence, being the fruit of the crime. The Court finds the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the CA to be correct TAYABAN vs PEOPLE, 2007

GR No. 150194, March 6,

Facts: Petitioner Robert Tayaban was the Municipal Mayor of Tinoc, Ifugao Sometime in 1988, then Mayor Tayaban submitted a project proposal to provincial governor Benjamin Cappleman for the construction of the Tinoc Public Market. Subsequently, Tayaban was informed by the Governor that his proposal was approved and that the project shall be funded by the Cordillera Executive Board (CEB). Subsequently, a bidding was conducted and private complainant Lopez Pugong (Pugong) won the contract for the construction of the said public market. On March 1, 1989, a formal contract was executed by and between Pugong, as the contractor, and the CEB, as the project owner. Actual construction of the public market was commenced in June 1989 Tayaban and his copetitioners, together with some men, proceeded to the construction site and demolished the structures and improvements introduced thereon. As a result, Pugong filed an Affidavit-Complaint against herein petitioners.

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Issue/s: Whether or not there is undue injury committed by the officials for which they should be held liable Ruling: The following indispensable elements must be established to constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended: 1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official functions or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; 2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his official duty in relation to his public position; 3. The public partiality, evident bad negligence; and

officer acted with manifest faith or gross inexcusable

4. His action caused undue injury to the government or any private party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such parties. The Court agrees with the findings of the Sandiganbayan that petitioners were guilty of bad faith in causing the demolition. First, petitioner Tayaban admitted that when he submitted the project proposal for the construction of the Tinoc Public Market, he did not indicate the exact location where the market should be put up saying that he shall specify the location when the budget for the project shall have been approved. However, despite meeting the Governor twice in 1989, and being informed by the latter that the project had already been approved and funded, Tayaban still did not suggest to the Governor nor mention to him the specific place where he and the Sangguniang Bayan desire to have the public market erected. Worse, when the construction was commenced and petitioners discovered that the public market was being built allegedly in a place where it should not be, petitioner Tayaban even admits that he still did not inform the Governor of such fact. The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan that petitioners are liable to reimburse the said amount lost by the Government.

of the Philippines (LBP). Complying with the Order, LBP, on 14 February 2007, deposited P71,634,027.30 in its head office in cash under its account in trust for, and in bond payable to, the trial court’s clerk of court. Seven days after such deposit, during which Camara remained in detention, respondent judge issued the 21 February 2007 Order finding LBP’s deposit insufficient because LBP should have “placed [the deposit] in the name of Josefina S. Lubrica as payee, in a form that is readily withdrawable.” Thus, respondent judge ordered Camara to remain in detention until LBP complies with such order. What petitioner assails is respondent judge’s refusal to release Camara from detention despite LBP’s deposit with its head office on 14 February 2007 of the full amount of the preliminary compensation provided in respondent judge’s 4 March 2005 Order Issue/s: Whether respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of his jurisdiction. Ruling: The facts of this case highlight respondent judge’s failure to appreciate, in full measure, the nature of his power to cite litigants in contempt of court. It is a drastic and extraordinary attribute of courts, to be exercised in the interest of justice and only when there is clear and contumacious refusal to obey orders. If a bona fide misunderstanding of the terms of an order does not justify the immediate institution of contempt proceedings, with more reason that it should not serve as basis to prolong a litigant’s detention under a prior contempt citation when, as here, there has been an attempt to comply with the order. Thus, we find the detention of Camara unlawful. To ensure that Camara will not be detained again for the same cause, we deem it necessary to order respondent judge to desist from doing so, irrespective of the outcome of CA G.R. SP No. 98032 in the Court of Appeals. This ruling is without prejudice to Camara’s availment of administrative reliefs. CELSO VERDE vs. VICTOR E. MACAPAGAL, AIDA MACAPAGAL, RECTOR E. MACAPAGAL, HECTOR MACAPAGAL, FLORIDA M. GUIRIBA, REDENTOR E. MACAPAGAL, NESTOR E. MACAPAGAL and ZENAIDA E. MACAPAGAL Facts:

CAMARA vs PAGAYATAN,GR No. 176563, March 6, 2007 Facts: This resolves the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus filed by Mark Darwin Camara (petitioner) for the release from detention of Leticia Lourdes A. Camara (Camara), Assistant Vice-President and Head of the Land Compensation Division of the Land Bank

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Vicente F. Macapagal and Irenea R. Estrella were the owners of 2.5 hectares of agricultural land, subject of this dispute, denominated as Lot No. 4714, Cad-320-D, Case 1, situated in Palapala, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. After their demise, said piece of land passed on to their children (respondents herein) who are now the pro-indiviso owners of the same. On the other hand, petitioner is the leasehold tenant of the subject land having succeeded his father, Francisco Verde, in the tenancy thereof.

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On 14 July 1995, respondents initiated an action for ejectment against petitioner before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in Malolos, Bulacan. In a decision dated 07 February 1996, Provincial Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz dismissed the case for lack of merit. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the provincial adjudicator. Respondents then filed an appeal before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which, however, affirmed the earlier ruling of the provincial adjudicator. Undaunted by these setbacks, respondents filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In the decision now assailed before us, the appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the DARAB. According to the Court of Appeals, Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 1199[11] prohibits a share-tenant from employing a subtenant to work or furnish labor on the land subject of a tenancy agreement. Hence, this petition.

petitioner's motion for reconsideration. In an order dated 06 December 1996, the provincial adjudicator recalled his 10 July 1996 order and instead scheduled another hearing on 14 January 1997 for the purpose of asking clarificatory questions.[29] Yet again, petitioner failed to attend this hearing, thus, respondents moved that petitioner's motion for reconsideration be resolved.[30] Given this series of events, petitioner cannot now be heard to complain that the Court of Appeals erred in putting premium on the joint sworn statement of Sanciangco and Cruz as he was given ample opportunity to challenge its contents. Notwithstanding this finding, we still find merit in the instant petition and resolve to grant the same.

Issue/s:

This is an administrative complaint against respondent Judge Henry B. Avelino of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pontevedra-Panay, Pontevedra, Capiz for gross neglect of duty relative to a civil case for unlawful detainer and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 405 and entitled “Spouses Estanislao V. Alviola and Carmen L. Alviola v. Spouses Dullano and Theresa Suplido.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that petitioner did not personally cultivate the subject land thereby justifying his ejectment there from. Ruling: Under Section 5(a) of Rep. Act No. 1199, a 'share tenant is defined as a person who himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a pricecertain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. In the present case, it is not disputed that dela Cruz is not a member of petitioner's immediate household. The question thus posed is whether by petitioner's hiring his services and that of his carabao, the agricultural lease relationship between the parties in this case ceased to exist. We rule that it did not. We cannot, however, sustain petitioner's stance that the appellate court erred in giving credence to the joint sworn statement of Sanciangco and Cruz in contravention of the pertinent provision of the Rules of Court. The DARAB New Rules of Procedures explicitly ordains that technical rules of procedure which bind the regular courts find no application in proceedings before said board and its Regional and Provincial Adjudicators. To give effect to this rule, the DARAB New Rules of Procedure commands that all agrarian cases, disputes or controversies should be resolved 'in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity. But what makes petitioner's stance on this matter even more unavailing is the fact that the provincial adjudicator, acceding to petitioner's prayer in his motion for reconsideration that a hearing be conducted for the purpose of asking clarificatory questions, set the date for the parties' oral argument on 10 July 1996. Despite notice, however, petitioner failed to show up during said date prompting provincial adjudicator to submit for resolution

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ESTANISLAO V. ALVIOLA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE HENRY B. AVELINO, MCTC, PONTEVEDRAPANAY,CAPIZ,RESPONDENT. Facts:

In a Resolution dated 21 June 2006, the Court noted the OCA’s report and directed the parties to manifest their willingness to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. Complainant, in his Manifestation dated 30 August 2005, informed the Court of his willingness to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted. Respondent judge likewise manifested the same willingness in his Manifestation dated 23 March 2007. Paragraph 8, Title I (A) of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC entitled Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures states that: The judge shall issue the required Pre-Trial Order within ten (10) days after the termination of the pre-trial. Said Order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control the course of the action during the trial x x x Issue/s: Whether or not Judge Henry B. Avelino of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pontevedra-Panay, Pontevedra, Capiz for gross neglect of his duty Ruling: Evidently, respondent judge violated the abovequoted provision by issuing the pre-trial order only on 2 January 2005 or more than four (4) months after the termination of the pre-trial conference. It should likewise be underscored that since the civil case is an unlawful detainer case falling within the ambit of the Rules on Summary Procedure, respondent judge should have

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handled the same with promptness and haste. The reason for the adoption of the Rules on Summary Procedure is precisely to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases. It is therefore not encouraging when, as in the case at bar, it is the judge himself who occasions the delay sought to be prevented by the rule. By no means is the aim of speedy disposition of cases served by respondent judges inaction. Section 9 (1), Rule 140, as amended, of the Revised Rules of Court provides that undue delay in rendering an order is classified as a less serious charge punishable by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. For the record, respondent judge was fined P20,000.00 in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1583, entitled Arcenas v. Avelino[21] for gross inefficiency. In addition, respondent Judge was fined P20,000.00 in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1606, Office of the Court Administrator v. Avelino,[22] likewise for gross inefficiency. As such, the Court agrees with the OCA that a sterner penalty is in order.

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2008 REPUBLIC V. JUDGE EUGENIO G.R. NO. 174629, 14 FEBRUARY 2008 Facts: After the Agan v. PIATCO ruling, a series of investigations concerning the award of the NAIA 3 contracts to PIATCO were undertaken by the Ombudsman and the Compliance and Investigation Staff (“CIS”) of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (“AMLC”). The OSG wrote AMLC requesting AMLC’s assistance “in obtaining more evidence to completely reveal the financial trail of corruption surrounding the NAIA 3 Project,” and also noting that the Republic was presently defending itself in two international arbitration cases. The CIS conducted an intelligence database search on the financial transactions of certain individuals involved in the award, including Alvarez (Chairman of the Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards Technical Committee). By this time, Alvarez had already been charged by the Ombudsman with violation of Section 3(J) of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The search revealed that Alvarez maintained 8 bank accounts with 6 different banks. The AMLC issued a resolution authorizing its Executive Director to sign and verify an application to inquire into the deposits or investments of Alvarez et al. and to authorize the AMLC Secretariat to conduct an inquiry once the RTC grants the application. The rationale for the resolution was founded on the findings of the CIS that amounts were transferred from a Hong Kong bank account to bank accounts in the Philippines maintained by respondents. The Resolution also noted that by awarding the contract to PIATCO (despite its lack of financial capacity) Alvarez violated Section 3(E) of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The MAKATI RTC rendered an Order granting the AMLC the authority to inquire and examine the subject bank accounts of Alvarez et al. In response to a letter of Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio, AMLC issued a Resolution authorizing its Executive Director to inquire into and examine the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several other entities involved in the nullified contract. AMLC filed an application before the MANILA RTC to inquire into the accounts alleged as Sec 3 Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled. (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

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This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions having been used to facilitate corruption in the NAIA 3 Project. The ex parte application was granted and the MANILA RTC issued a bank inquiry order. Alvarez alleged that he fortuitously learned of the bank inquiry order, which was issued following an ex parte application, and he argued that nothing in the Anti- Money Laundering Act (“AMLA”) authorized the AMLC to seek the authority to inquire into bank accounts ex parte. After several motions, manifestations, orders and resolutions the case went up to the SC. Alvarez et al.’s position: The AMLA, being a substantive penal statute, has no retroactive effect and the bank inquiry order could not apply to deposits or investments opened prior to the affectivity of the AMLA (17 October 2001). The subject bank accounts, opened in 1989 to 1990, could not be the subject of the bank inquiry order without violating the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

Issue/s: Whether or not the proscription against ex post facto laws applies to Section 11 of the AMLA (a provision which does not provide a penal sanction BUT which merely authorizes the inspection of suspect accounts and deposits). Ruling: YES. It is clear that no person may be prosecuted under the PENAL provisions of the AMLA for acts committed prior to the enactment of the law (17 October 2001). With respect to the AUTHORITY TO INSPECT, it should be noted that an ex post facto law is one that (among others) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. PRIOR to the AMLA: (1) The fact that bank accounts were involved in activities later on enumerated in the law did not, by itself, remove such accounts from the shelter of absolute confidentiality. (2) In order that bank accounts could be examined, there was need to secure either the written permission of the depositor OR a court order authorizing such examination, assuming that they were involved in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in a case where the money deposited or invested was itself the subject matter of the litigation. (3)Please read the original for the other issues aside from Art. 3, section 22. (4) Section 11. Authority to inquire into Bank Deposits.– Notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as amended; Republic Act No. 6426, as amended; Republic Act No. 8791, and other laws, the AMLC may inquire into or examine any particular deposit or investment with any banking institution or non-bank

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financial institution upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of this Act when it has been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments involved are in any way related to a money laundering offense: Provided, That this provision shall not apply to deposits and investments made prior to the effectivity of this Act. The passage of the AMLA stripped another layer off the rule on absolute confidentiality that provided a measure of lawful protection to the account holder. The application of the bank inquiry order as a means of inquiring into transactions entered into prior to the passage of the AMLA would be constitutionally infirm, offensive as to the ex post facto clause. NEVERTHELESS, the argument that the prohibition against ex post facto laws goes as far as to prohibit any inquiry into deposits in bank accounts OPENED prior to the effectivity of the AMLA even if the TRANSACTIONS were entered into when the law had already taken effect cannot be sustained. This argument will create a loophole in the AMLA that would result to further money laundering. It is hard to presume that Congress intended to enact a self-defeating law in the first place, and the courts are inhibited from such a construction by the cardinal rule that “a law should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than destroying it.” IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS OF EUFEMIA E. RODRIGUEZ, filed by EDGARDO E. VELUZ, vs. LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and TERESITA R. PABELLO, G.R. No. 169482 January 29, 2008 Facts: This is a petition for review1 of the resolutions2 dated February 2, 2005 and September 2, 2005 of the Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 88180 denying the petition for habeas corpus of Eufemia E. Rodriguez, filed by petitioner Edgardo Veluz, as well as his motion for reconsideration, respectively. Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor state of mental health and deteriorating cognitive abilities.4 She was living with petitioner, her nephew, since 2000. He acted as her guardian. In the morning of January 11, 2005, respondents Luisa R. Villanueva and Teresita R. Pabello took Eufemia from petitioner Veluz’ house. He made repeated demands for the return of Eufemia but these proved futile. Claiming that respondents were restraining Eufemia of her liberty, he filed a petition for habeas corpus5 in the Court of Appeals on January 13, 2005. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to present any convincing proof that respondents (the legally adopted children of Eufemia) were unlawfully restraining their mother of her liberty. He also failed to establish his legal right to the custody of Eufemia as he was not her legal guardian. Thus, in a resolution dated February 2, 2005,6 the Court of Appeals denied his petition. Issue/s:

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Whether or not petitioner failed to present any convincing proof that respondents were unlawfully restraining their mother of her liberty and failed to establish his legal right to the custody of Eufemia as legal guardian. Ruling: We rule for the respondents. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the one entitled thereto.10 It is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal custody over another person.11 Thus, it contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a person’s liberty either through illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of the custody of any person from someone entitled to such custody. In this case, the issue is not whether the custody of Eufemia is being rightfully withheld from petitioner but whether Eufemia is being restrained of her liberty. Significantly, although petitioner admits that he did not have legal custody of Eufemia, he nonetheless insists that respondents themselves have no right to her custody. Thus, for him, the issue of legal custody is irrelevant. What is important is Eufemia’s personal freedom. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.12 In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. "The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient."13 (emphasis supplied) In this case, the Court of Appeals made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her liberty. It found that she was not: There is no proof that Eufemia is being detained and restrained of her liberty by respondents. Nothing on record reveals that she was forcibly taken by respondents. On the contrary, respondents, being Eufemia’s adopted children, are taking care of her.21 (emphasis supplied) The Court finds no cogent or compelling reason to disturb this finding. Facts: On October 24, 1991, an Information for double murder was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

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Dagupan City, Branch 40, docketed as Crim. Case No. D10678, against Manolo Salcedo, Romulo Salcedo, Ricardo Samuco, Rolando Pingol and one Joel Doe for the death of the brothers Mario and Tito Untalan on October 21, 1991. Respondent denied the motion for reconsideration on January 10, 1992. On March 15, 1992, respondent issued an Order denying the motion, stating: Considering that time is of the essence because all the accused except Joel Doe have been under detention at the City Jail since October 21, 1991 and considering that the City Prosecutor has not yet resolved the matter of reinvestigation on December 23, 1991 as ordered by the Court, and considering further that Asst. City Prosecutor Rosita Castro interposed no objection to the granting of bail in the amount of P40,000.00 which she considered reasonable, without determining whether or not the proper charge could be double homicide, the Court granted bail for the provisional liberty of each accused in the amount of P40,000.00. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no legal and factual basis for the Motion to Inhibit.1 On April 13, 1992, complainant moved for the reconsideration of the Order of March 15, 1992. Respondent denied the motion in an Order dated June 8, 1992.

Issue/s:

Issue/s: Whether or not respondent committed gross ignorance of the law when he granted bail to the accused in Crim. Case No. D-10678. Ruling:

Whether or not petitioner was deprived of her right to due process, whether the penalty of dismissal is proper and whether petitioner's guilt for grave misconduct and dishonesty is supported by substantial evidence. Ruling:

The Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA. Respondent clearly failed to accord the prosecution the basic and elementary entitlements of due process, such as timely notice and opportunity to be heard. Such failure equally clearly resulted either from ignorance of the law or, worse, partiality in favor of the accused. The recommendation is thus in order. The Court notes that respondent has been dismissed from the service in A.M. No. 99-731-RTJ entitled Hilario De Guzman, Jr. v. Judge Deodoro J. Sison,5 promulgated on March 26, 2001. However, the dismissal of respondent in 2001 does not prevent the Court from imposing a sanction against him for gross ignorance of the law while in office. LORNA A. MEDINA, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), represented by the Audit Team of EUFROCINIA MAWAK, SUSAN PALLERNA, and MA. DOLORES TEPORA, G.R. No. 176478 February 4, 2008 Facts: Rule 45 reversal Appeals decision

of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon finding herein petitioner Lorna A. Medina guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The Resolution of the same court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said decision. In a Decision7 dated 8 November 2004, Deputy Ombudsman Victor C. Fernandez approved the recommendation of the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer to dismiss petitioner from service based on the existence of substantial evidence of a discrepancy in petitioner's account totaling P4,080,631.36. The said decision noted petitioner's supposed failure to file a counter-affidavit and position paper despite due notice. On 29 November 2004, petitioner filed an urgent motion8 stating that she complied with the directive to file a counter-affidavit and position paper and praying that the defenses therein be considered in reversing the 8 November 2004 decision. The motion was treated as a motion for reconsideration of the said decision. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in the assailed Decision dated 23 October 2006.15 It held that petitioner was not entitled to a formal investigation and it affirmed the deputy ombudsman's factual finding that petitioner was guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The appellate court also denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated 30 January 2007.

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the of the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of in CA-G.R. SP No. 89539. The Court of Appeals' affirmed the two joint orders issued by the Office

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Petitioner's theory is erroneous. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the denial of petitioner's request for a formal investigation is not tantamount to a denial of her right to due process. Petitioner was required to file a counter-affidavit and position paper and later on, was given a chance to file two motions for reconsideration of the decision of the deputy ombudsman. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one's side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.28 Petitioner's assertion that the Court of Appeals refused to reopen and review the case and ignored material issues and arguments in her motion for reconsideration of the 23 October 2006 Decision in violation of her right to due process, is quite hollow. To end, it must be stressed that dishonesty and grave misconduct have always been and should remain anathema in the civil service. They inevitably reflect on the fitness of a civil servant to continue in office. When an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of such officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public's faith and confidence in the government.

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JEFFREY T. GO, vs. LEYTE II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., G.R. No. 176909 February 18, 2008 Facts: This petition for review on certiorari1 assails the November 30, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 02010 setting aside the April 4, 2006 and May 2, 2006 Orders of Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City in Special Civil Case No. 2006-0324, which ordered the issuance of a writ of injunction against respondent Leyte II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (LEYECO II). Also assailed is the February 27, 2007 Resolution3 denying the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner Jeffrey T. Go is a resident of Block 16, Lot 14, Imelda Village, Tacloban City. He bought the property from Rosita Mancera, who is the registered consumer and member of respondent LEYECO II. At about 10:20 a.m. of February 13, 2006, respondent’s inspection team went to petitioner’s residence to inspect his electric meter. They requested the occupant of the house to witness the inspection but were told that the owner was out of town. Petitioner immediately filed a "Petition for Injunction and Damages with Preliminary Injunction with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order"6 before the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City. He claimed that the inspection was irregular and illegal, and that respondent had no legal basis to cause the disconnection of his electric service. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court in its November 30, 2006 Decision. Petitioner’s motion denied, hence this petition.

for

reconsideration

was

Issue/s: 1) whether the inspection of petitioner’s electric meter was in accordance with R.A. No. 7832; 2) whether petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto; and 3) whether the writ of preliminary injunction was properly issued against respondent LEYECO II. Ruling: We find merit in the petition. The inspection was conducted in accordance with Section 4 of R.A. No. 7832, While it is not disputed that petitioner’s electric meter had a broken seal and shunting wire, petitioner claims that the foregoing circumstances cannot be considered prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity because the inspection was not conducted in the presence of an "officer of the law" as contemplated under R.A. No. 7832. He argues that only a barangay chairman witnessed the inspection, and that his presence failed to

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satisfy the requirements of the law which specifies the police or the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) as competent authority to verify the findings of a private electric utility or rural electric cooperative. However, under Section 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7832, an officer of the law is defined as one "who by direct provision of the law or by election or by appointment of competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property." Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the definition is not limited to members of the police force or the NBI. The rules specifically state that a barangay chairman is considered an officer of the law. Thus, his presence during the inspection satisfies the requirements of the law. We now come to the issue whether petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto. In flagrante delicto means "[i]n the very act of committing the crime." To be caught in flagrante delicto, therefore, necessarily implies positive identification by the eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such is a "direct evidence" of culpability, or "that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption." In the instant case, it was impossible for petitioner to have been caught in the act of committing an offense considering that he was not present during the inspection. Nor were any of his representatives at hand. The presence of a broken seal and a shunting wire in petitioner’s electric meter will not suffice to support a finding that petitioner was in flagrante delicto. Such circumstances merely operate as prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity under Section 4 of R.A. No. 7832. Absent a finding of in flagrante delicto, there is no basis for the immediate disconnection of petitioner’s electric service under Section 6 of R.A. No. 7832. Respondent’s reliance on the said provision is clearly misplaced. As to whether the writ of preliminary injunction was properly issued against respondent LEYECO II, we rule in the affirmative. Section 9 of R.A. No. 7832 provides that unless there is prima facie evidence that the disconnection of electric service was made with evident bad faith or grave abuse of authority, a writ of injunction or restraining order may not issue against any private electric utility or rural electric cooperative exercising the right and authority to disconnect such service. However, the second paragraph of the same provision provides for another instance when a writ of injunction or restraining order may be issued. Consistent with the foregoing provision, Rule VIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7832. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the only instance where the court can issue a restraining order or injunction is when there is prima facie evidence of bad faith or grave abuse of authority.16 As the law stands, there are two exceptions to the restriction on the issuance of restraining orders or writs of injunction, to wit: 1) when

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there is prima facie evidence that the disconnection was made with evident bad faith or grave abuse of authority; and 2) when, even in the absence of bad faith or grave abuse of authority, the electric consumer deposits a bond with the court in the form of cash or a cashier’s check equivalent to the differential billing. In the instant case, petitioner filed a bond in the form of a cashier’s check in the amount of One Hundred One Thousand Five Hundred Ninety Seven and 99/100 (P101,597.99), the equivalent of the differential billing charged against him by respondent in compliance with Section 9 of R.A. No. 7832 and Rule VIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7832. R.B. Michael Press and Annalene Reyes Escobia, petitioners, vs Nicasio C. Galit Facts: Respondent was employed by petitioner R.B. Michael Press as an offset machine operator, Duringhis employment, Galit was tardy for a total of 190 times and was absent without leave for a totalof nine and a half days. Respondent was ordered to render overtime service in order to comply with a job order deadline,but he refused to do so. The following day respondent reported for work but petitioner Escobiatold him not to work, and to return later in the afternoon for a hearing. When he returned, a copyof an Office Memorandum was served on him. Petitioners aver that Galit was dismissed due to the following offenses: (1) tardiness constitutingneglect of duty; (2) serious misconduct; and (3) insubordination or willful disobedience. Respondent was terminated from employment, gave him his two-day salary and a terminationletter. Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims before theNational Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The CA found that it was not the tardiness and absences committed by respondent, but his refusalto render overtime work which caused the termination of his employment. It ruled that the timeframe in which respondent was afforded procedural due process is dubitable; he could not havebeen afforded ample opportunity to explain his side and to adduce evidence on his behalf. Itfurther ruled that the basis for computing his backwages should be his daily salary at the time of his dismissal which was PhP 230, and that his backwages should be computed from the time of his dismissal up to the finality of the CA’s decision. Issue/s: 1. whether there was just cause to terminate the employment of respondent 2. whether due process was observed in the dismissal process 3. whether respondent is entitled to backwages and other benefits despite his refusal to be reinstated. Ruling:

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The Court’s Ruling Respondent’s tardiness cannot be considered condoned by petitioners In the case at bar, respondent did not adduce any evidence to show waiver or condonation on the part of petitioners. Thus. the findings of the CA that petitioners cannot use the previous absences and tardiness because respondent was not subjected to any penalty is bereft of legal basis. The petitioners did not impose any punishment for the numerous absences and tardiness of respondent. Thus, said infractions can be used collectively by petitioners as a ground for dismissal. Respondent is admittedly a daily wage earner and hence is paid based on such arrangement. For said daily paid workers, the principle of "a day’s pay for a day’s work" is squarely applicable. Hence it cannot be construed in any wise that such nonpayment of the daily wage on the days he was absent constitutes a penalty. For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, these two elements must concur:(1) the employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude(2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. The issue now is, whether respondent’s refusal or failure to render overtime work was willful; that is, whether such refusal or failure was characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude. The fact that respondent refused to provide overtime work despite his knowledge that there is a production deadline that needs to be met, and that without him, the offset machine operator, no further printing can be had, shows his wrongful and perverse mental attitude; thus, there is willfulness. The Court rule that respondent unjustifiably refused to render overtime work despite a valid order to do so. The totality of his offenses against petitioner R.B. Michael Press shows that he was a difficult employee. Under the twin notice requirement, the employees must be given two (2) notices before his employment could be terminated: (1) a first notice to apprise the employees of their fault, and (2) a second notice to communicate to the employees that their employment is being terminated. On the surface, it would seem that petitioners observed due process (twin notice and hearing requirement ): On February 23, 1999 petitioner notified respondent of the hearing to be conducted later that day. On the same day before the hearing, respondent was furnished a copy of an office memorandum which contained a list of his offenses, and a notice of a scheduled hearing in the afternoon of the same day. The next day, February 24, 1999, he was notified that his employment with petitioner R.B. Michael Press had been terminated. The hearing was immediately set in the afternoon of February 23, 1999—the day respondent received the first notice. Therefore, he was not given any opportunity at all to consult a union official or lawyer, and, worse, to prepare for his defense. Regarding the February 23, 1999 afternoon hearing, it can be inferred that respondent, without any lawyer or friend to counsel him, was not given any chance at all to adduce evidence in his defense. In the February 24, 1999 notice of dismissal, petitioners simply justified respondent’s dismissal by citing his admission of the offenses charged. It did not specify

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the details surrounding the offenses and the specific company rule or Labor Code provision upon which the dismissal was grounded. The Court concludes that termination of respondent was railroaded in serious breach of his right to due process. Therefore, the CA decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court declares respondent’s dismissal from employment VALID and LEGAL. Petitioners are, however, ordered jointly and solidarily to pay respondent nominal damages in the amount of PhP 30,000 for violation of respondent’s right to due process.

evidence to show that Javilgas was dismissed or prevented from reporting for work; that Javilgas could not categorically state when he was dismissed. In fine, the NLRC held that Javilgas voluntarily resigned, and not illegally dismissed.

PADILLA MACHINE SHOP, RODOLFO PADILLA and LEONARDO PADILLA, vs. Petitioners, RUFINOA.JAVILGAS, G.R.No.175960 February19, 2008

The appellate court did not lend credence to petitioners claim that respondent voluntarily resigned since the issue was only raised for the first before the NLRC. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied hence, the instant petition.

Facts:

Issue/s:

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC and reinstated the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. It held that the burden of proof is on the petitioners, to show that Javilgas was dismissed for a valid and just cause.

This petition for review assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89164 which reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding respondent Rufino A. Javilgas to have been illegally dismissed. Also assailed is the Resolution of December 21, 2006 denying the motion for reconsideration. On December 10, 2002, Javilgas filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of 13th month pay, separation pay and non-remittance of SSS contributions against petitioners Padilla Machine Shop, Rodolfo Padilla and Leonardo Padilla. Javilgas alleged that in January 1998, he was hired by Padilla Machine Shop, located at Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. Javilgas further alleged that in April 2002, Rodolfo Padilla called him by telephone and told him to stop working, but without giving any reason therefore. He stopped reporting for work and sued petitioners for illegal dismissal, with a prayer for the payment of backwages, pro rated 13th month pay, separation pay, and moral and exemplary damages. On the other hand, petitioner Rodolfo Padilla (Rodolfo), proprietor of Padilla Machine Shop, alleged that in 1999, SSS and Medicare contributions were deducted from Javilgas salary and remitted to the SSS; that in 2000, they (petitioners) submitted a report to the SSS that Javilgas had voluntarily left and abandoned his work, and transferred to another shop, Raymond Machine Shop, located within the same vicinity as Padilla Machine Shop; that some months after, Javilgas returned and pleaded to be re-employed with them; that Rodolfo Padilla took Javilgas back to work, but their customers were not satisfied with the quality of his work; hence Javilgas was assigned to the Novaliches branch; that Javilgas incurred numerous absences in the Novaliches branch; that Javilgas had opened his own machine shop and even pirated the clients of petitioners; and finally, Javilgas again voluntarily left Padilla Machine Shop without prior notice. On March 31, 2004, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision that Javilgas was illegally dismissed. Petitioners appealed the decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC found no sufficient

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1.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the said consistent position adopted by petitioners “ that they never dismissed Javilgas “ is not sufficient to negate the charge of illegal dismissal;

2.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in awarding attorney’s fees to the respondent who was being represented pro bono by the Office of Legal Aid of the U.P. College of Law.

Ruling: In the instant case, petitioners failed to adduce evidence to rebut Javilgas claim of dismissal and satisfy the burden of proof required. As regards the eight-month hiatus before Javilgas instituted the illegal dismissal case, we sustain the Court of Appeals ruling that Javilgas filed the complaint within a reasonable period during the threeyear period provided under Article 291 of the Labor Code. Finally, there is no merit in petitioners’ claim that attorney’s fees may not be awarded to the respondent since his case was being handled pro bono by the U.P. Office of Legal Aid, which provides free legal assistance to indigent litigants. In this jurisdiction, there are two concepts of attorney’s fees. In the ordinary sense, attorney’s fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. On the other hand, in its extraordinary concept, attorney’s fees may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party,and not counsel. In its extraordinary sense, attorney’s fees as part of damages is awarded only in the instances specified in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, among which are the following which obtain in the instant case: (7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers; (8)

In

actions

for

indemnity

under

workmen's

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laws;

MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO vs. ROGELIO I. RAYALA Facts: On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). The committee constituted found Rayala guilty of the offense charged. Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy of the Committee Report and Recommendation to the OP, but with there recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day, in accordance with AO 250. It was ordered that Rayala be dismissed from service for being found guilty of grave offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct. Rayala filed Motions for Reconsideration until the case was finally referred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action. The CA found Reyala guilty and imposed the penalty of suspension of service for the maximum period of one (1) year. Domingo filed a Petition for Review before the SC. Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review19 with this Court essentially arguing that he is not guilty of any act of sexual harassment. The Republic then filed its own Petition for Review. On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation of the three (3)petitions. G.R. No. 155831 ± Domingo Petition 1. The President has the power to remove presidential appointees; and 2. AO No. 250 does not cover presidential appointees. G.R. No. 155840 ± Rayala Petition In his petition, Rayala raises the following issues: 1. He‘s act does not constitute sexual harassment; a. demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor; b. the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, re- employment, or continued employment; or c. the denial thereof results in discrimination against the employee. 2. Intent is an element of sexual harassment; and 3. Misapplication of the expanded definition of sexual harassment in RA 7877 by applying DOLE AO 250. Issue/s: (1) Whether or not Rayala committed sexual harassment? (2) what is the applicable penalty? Ruling: CA and OP were unanimous in holding that RAYALA is guilty of sexual harassment. They only differ in the appropriate imposable penalty. That Rayala committed the acts complained of ± and was guilty of sexual harassment ± is, therefore, the common factual finding of not just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee,

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the OP and the CA. It should be remembered that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts.39 The principle, therefore, dictates that such findings should bind us. He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual harassment, because Domingo did not allege in her complaint that there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor as a condition for her continued employment or for her promotion to a higher position.41 Rayala urges us to apply to his case our ruling inA quino v. Acosta. We find respondent’s insistence unconvincing. Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently of the others.43 This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment. The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayala’s culpability is not to be determined solely on the basis of Section 3, RA 7877, because he is charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal infraction, of sexual harassment.44 It should be enough that the CA, along with the Investigating Committee and the Office of the President, found substantial evidence to support the administrative charge. Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that sexual harassment is an offense malum prohibitum. He argues that intent is an essential element in sexual harassment, and since the acts imputed to him were done allegedly without malice, he should be absolved of the charges against him. The SC reiterated that what is before us is an administrative case for sexual harassment. Thus, whether the crime of sexual harassment is malum in se or malum prohibitum is immaterial. The SC also rejected Rayala’s allegations that the charges were filed because of a conspiracy to get him out of office and thus constitute merely political harassment. The SC held that Rayala was properly accorded due process. Thus, when the President found that Rayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such offense. As cited above, the imposable penalty for the first offense of either the administrative offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President to impose upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a second offense.

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2009 Ama computer College – East Rizal Vs. Ignacio 590 SCRA (2009)

essence, both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution.

Facts:

Issue/s:

Allan Ignacio was a supervisor of AMA Computer College. He was dismissed by the said school on the ground that he committed a gross misconduct for destroying the school property and for the loss of school records. The event happened during the renovation of the school. The respondent facilitated in the demolition of the concrete partition wall of the computer laboratory without any approval of the concerned department of the school. The petitioner wrote a written notice to the respondent regarding his conduct and let him explain why he committed such act, His contention was that, there’s no need for such approval because Ignacio was already informed of the problem in the building which needs to be renovated based on the copy of the building plan provided by the owner. Seeing that the renovation plan was signed by the VP for Education and the School Director, so he decided to start with the demolition of the partition taking into serious consideration that he was given only a few days to comply with the deadline, and after the respondent explained on his side, the petitioner send back a written notice of dismissal. The Department of labor and the NLRC decided that there was no illegal dismissal since the grounds for gross negligence was substantial and the petitioner followed the procedural due process of dismissing their employee. However, the CA reversed the decision in favour with the respondent and affirmed that there was an illegal dismissal Issue/s: Whether or not the respondent was accorded with procedural due process? Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the chance afforded to respondent, although limited, is a clear opportunity to be heard on the issue at hand. What the law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard. However, affirmed the decision of the CA that there is an illegal dismissal for the lack of substantive evidence of proving gross misconduct on the part of the respondent. Lozano vs. Nograles 589 SCRA (2009) Facts: The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled "A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress." In

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WON the court controversy?

has

the

power

to

review

such

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that in determining whether such case is subject to judicial review, there must be an actual controversy, there must be a proper party, the case must be raised at an earliest opportunity, and there must be a necessity of deciding the constitutional question. In the case at bar, the petitioner failed to establish these elements for the house resolution no.1109 was not yet enacted, hence, neither the case has an actual controversy nor is the petitioner the injured party. House resolution number 1109 may happen or may not happen, hence, the SC dismissed the petition for lack of actual controversy. People vs Nunez 591 SCRA (2009) Facts: This petition for certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision dated January 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR. H.C. No. 02420. The appellate court affirmed the Decision dated February 11, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, which convicted appellant in Criminal Case No. 8614-01-C for violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, also known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659. At 6:00 a.m. on April 26, 2001, operatives of the Sta. Cruz, Laguna Police Detectives in coordination with the Los Baños Police Station (LBPS) and IID Mobile Force conducted a search in the house of Raul R. Nuñez based on reports of drug possession. The group, led by Commanding Officer Arwin Pagkalinawan, included SPO1 Odelon Ilagan, SPO3 Eduardo Paz, PO1 Ronnie Orfano, PO2 Gerry Crisostomo, PO2 Alexander Camantigue, PO2 Joseph Ortega and Senior Inspector Uriquia. Before proceeding to appellant’s residence in Barangay San Antonio, the group summoned Barangay Captain Mario Mundin and Chief Tanod Alfredo Joaquin to assist them in serving the search warrant. Upon arriving at appellant’s house, Mundin called on appellant to come out. Thereafter, Commanding Officer Pagkalinawan showed Nuñez the warrant. SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Crisostomo then surveyed appellant’s room in his presence while his family, PO2 Ortega and the two barangay officials remained in the living room. SPO1 Ilagan found thirty-one (31) packets of shabu, lighters, improvised burners, tooters, and aluminum foil with shabu residue and a lady’s wallet containing P4,610 inside appellant’s dresser. The group also confiscated a component, camera, electric planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw, electric tester, and assorted carpentry tools on suspicion that they were acquired in

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exchange for shabu. Following the search, SPO1 Ilagan issued a Receipt for Property Seized and a Certification of Orderly Search which appellant signed. The trial court rendered the decision and convicted Nunez for a sentence of Reclusion perpetua. The accused appeal to the CA contending that such evidence were planted against him, and the appellant assails the validity of the search warrant as it did not indicate his exact address but only the barangay and street of his residence. He maintains that none of the occupants witnessed the search as they were all kept in the living room. Finally, appellant questions why the prosecution did not call the barangay officials as witnesses to shed light on the details of the search. Despite his contention, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. And the appellant elevate the case to the SC. Issue/s:

1. 2.

WON the search warrant is valid? WON the seizure of the property were valid?

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the question of the validity of the search warrant was deemed waive since the appellant failed to raise such question to the trial court and the appellant signed the receipt of the property seized and the certification of orderly search. The right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures, like any other right, can be waived and the waiver may be made expressly or impliedly. The SC affirmed and modified the decision of the lower court and ruled that the seizure of personal things not subject for seizure was invalidated. LBC vs Mateo 589 SCRA (2009) Facts: Respondent James Mateo, designated as a customer associate, was a regular employee of petitioner LBC Express – Metro Manila, Inc. (LBC). His job was to deliver and pick-up packages to and from LBC and its customers. For this purpose, Mateo was assigned the use of a Kawasaki motorcycle. On April 30, 2001 at about 6:10 p.m., Mateo arrived at LBC’s Escolta office, along Burke Street, to drop off packages coming from various LBC airposts. He parked his motorcycle directly in front of the LBC office, switched off the engine and took the key with him. However, he did not lock the steering wheel because he allegedly was primarily concerned with the packages, including a huge sum of money that needed to be immediately secured inside the LBC office. He returned promptly within three to five minutes but the motorcycle was gone. He immediately reported the loss to his superiors at LBC and to the nearest police station. LBC, through its vice-president petitioner, Lorenzo A. Niño, directed Mateo to appear in his office to

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explain his side and for formal investigation. As directed, Mateo appeared and presented his side. After investigation, he received a notice of termination from LBC dated May 30, 2001. He was barred from reporting for work. The Department of Labor and the NLRC dismissed the complaint of the respondent for the petitioner has followed the due process of terminating their employee with the sufficient ground of gross negligence on the part of the respondent. The respondent appealed to the CA and reversed the decision of NLRC. The petitioner elevates the case to the Supreme Court contending that they terminate their employee with sufficient ground of gross negligence and followed due process. Issue/s: Did the petitioner violate the procedural due process in dismissing their employee? Ruling: The SC ruled that in applying the procedural due process in terminating an employee, requires that the employee be informed of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought. The memorandum did just that. Mateo was thereafter given the opportunity to explain his side and was handed the requisite second notice (of termination). Procedural due process was therefore complied with. The substantive loss of a property of the company is sufficient evidence that the employee committed a gross negligence on his part. The petition was granted. Triumph international vs. Apostol 589 SCRA (2009) Facts: This a petition for a certiorari on the decision rendered by the CA. The respondent was an assistant manager hired by the petitioner, wherein the respondent was terminated by the petitioner on the ground that the latter has loss his trust and confidence with the former. The respondent was given a memorandum to explain why there is a huge discrepancy of the inventory in the warehouse and permitted to leave with pay by the petitioner since the investigation was still ongoing. After the respondent explained his side, he was given a notice of termination of his employment. The respondent goes to the Department of Labor and NLRC and assailed that they are illegally dismissed by the petitioner. The Department of labor and NLRC ruled that their dismissal was legal and the petitioner followed the procedural due process in terminating the respondent. The CA reversed the decision of the NLRC and the petitioner went to the SC contending that their ground for termination was sufficient. Issue/s: Did the petitioner follow the procedural due process in terminating the respondent?

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Ruling: The SC held that the petition have merit. The mere fact that the petitioner gave notice to the respondent and gave him an opportunity to explain on his part why such discrepancies occurred, and complying the second requisite of notice of termination is a sufficient requirement on applying the procedural due process. Managerial position does not need proof beyond reasonable doubt because his employment is base on trust and confidence compared to the rank and file employees. In the case at bar, the respondent was not a rank and file employee, he has a position wherein the company gives his trust and confidence to the respondent, hence, the petitioner has a legal grounds for terminating the respondent. The petition was granted. Republic vs Libunao 594 SCRA (2009) Facts: The respondents were the owners of the land which was taken by the petitioners the Republic of the Philippines represented by NAPOCOR through eminent domain. The RTC rendered their decision by approving such taking by paying just compensation of the value of whole lot area. The petitioners move their case to the CA but they affirmed the decision with modification that the petitioner should pay the interest of 6% of the value of the land from the time of taking until the full payment of the Value of the land. The petitioners contend that they are only allowed to pay the 10% value of the land since they are only using a portion of the land as a means of right of way. Issue/s: Is the contention of the petitioners meritorious? Ruling: The SC ruled in affirming the decision of the CA. The Court held that the nature and effect of the installation of power lines and the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period should be considered, as the owners of the properties would be deprived of the normal use of their properties. For this reason, the property owners are entitled to the payment of just compensation based on the full market value of the affected properties. Abelita III vs Doria 596 SCRA (2009) Facts: Judge Felimon Abelita III (petitioner) filed a complaint for Damages under Articles 32(4) and (9) of the Civil Code against P/Supt. German B. Doria (P/Supt. Doria) and SPO3 Cesar Ramirez (SPO3 Ramirez). Petitioner alleged in his complaint that on 24 March 1996, at around 12 noon, he and his wife were on their way to their house in Bagumbayan, Masbate, Masbate when P/Supt. Doria and SPO3 Ramirez (respondents), accompanied by 10 unidentified police officers, requested them to proceed to the Provincial PNP Headquarters at

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Camp Boni Serrano, Masbate, Masbate. Petitioner was suspicious of the request and told respondents that he would proceed to the PNP Headquarters after he had brought his wife home. Petitioner alleged that when he parked his car in front of their house, SPO3 Ramirez grabbed him, forcibly took the key to his Totoya Lite Ace van, barged into the vehicle, and conducted a search without a warrant. The search resulted to the seizure of a licensed shotgun. Petitioner presented the shotgun’s license to respondents. Thereafter, SPO3 Ramirez continued his search and then produced a .45 caliber pistol which he allegedly found inside the vehicle. Respondents arrested petitioner and detained him, without any appropriate charge, at the PNP special detention cell. P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident in Barangay Nursery. He dispatched a team headed by SPO3 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SPO3 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while petitioner, who was implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for petitioner and when he found him, he informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested petitioner to go with him to the police headquarters as he was reported to be involved in the incident. Petitioner agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence. P/Supt. Doria and his companions chased petitioner. Upon reaching petitioner’s residence, they caught up with petitioner as he was about to run towards his house. The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver’s seat as petitioner opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver’s seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested petitioner. P/Supt. Doria alleged that his men also arrested other persons who were identified to be with petitioner during the shooting incident. Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder. An administrative case was also filed against petitioner before this Court. The trial court ruled that petitioner’s warrantless arrest and the warrantless seizure of the firearms were valid and legal. The trial court gave more credence to the testimonies of respondents who were presumed to have performed their duties in accordance with law. The trial court rejected petitioner’s claim of frame-up as weak and insufficient to overthrow the positive testimonies of the police officers who conducted the arrest and the incidental search. Issue/s: Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure were illegal. Ruling: The SC ruled that for the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the offender has just committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Personal knowledge should be based on probable cause. SPO3 Ramirez investigated the

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report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was involved in the incident. They were able to track down petitioner, but when invited to the police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase. Petitioner’s act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause. The seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain view doctrine. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. In this case, the police authorities were in the area because that was where they caught up with petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just took place and it was reported that petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the firearms may be evidence of a crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms. Hence the warrantless search and seizure were justified. The petition was denied. UNILAB, INC. vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 163858. Facts: UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing fake UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some photographs where the clandestine manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a search warrant directing the police to seize “finished or unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins.” No fake Revicon was however found; instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The respondents then filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the respondents.

Ruling: It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view doctrine. However, seized things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the doctrine to apply are present, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on plain view. It is not enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents. However, the NBI failed to present any of officers who were present when the warrant was enforced to prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the enforcing officers had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to the seized items.

PEOPLE’S JOURNAL et. al. vs. FRANCIS THOENEN, G.R. No. 143372 Facts: On 30 September 1990, a news item appeared in the People’s Journal claiming that a certain Francis Thoenen, a Swiss national who allegedly shoots wayward neighbors’ pets that he finds in his domain. It also claimed that BF Homes residents, in a letter through lawyer Atty. Efren Angara, requested for the deportation of Thoenen to prevent the recurrence of such incident in the future. Thoenen claimed that the article destroyed the respect and admiration he enjoyed in the community. He is seeking for damages. The petitioners admitted publication of the news item, ostensibly out of a “social and moral duty to inform the public on matters of general interest, promote the public good and protect the moral public (sic) of the people,” and that the story was published in good faith and without malice.

Issue/s: Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view doctrine.

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Issue/s:

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Whether or not the news report fall under privileged communication and therefore protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of speech. Ruling: The right of free speech is not absolute. Libel is not protected speech. In the instant case, even if we assume that the letter written by Atty. Angara is privileged communication, it lost its character when the matter was published in the newspaper and circulated among the general population, especially since the individual alleged to be defamed is neither a public official nor a public figure. Moreover, the news item contained falsehoods on two levels. First, the BF Homes residents did not ask for the deportation of Thoenen, more so because the letter of the Atty. Anagara was a mere request for verification of Thoenen’s status as a foreign resident. The article is also untrue because the events she reported never happened. Worse, the main source of information, Atty. Efren Angara, apparently either does not exist, or is not a lawyer. There is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate. Calculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances which “are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality… The knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection”

To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. The inescapable conclusion, then, is that the first information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge against them, is reasonably complied with. Moreover, an administrative order of the Supreme Court designated Regional Trial Courts to exclusively try and decide cases of … violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, regardless of the quantity of the drugs involved. (PP. vs. Velasco) Therefore, the requisites of double jeopardy being present, the defense attaches.

MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA, vs. HON. MONINA A. ZENAROSA, G.R. No. 129472. Facts: On July 2, 1996 the accused were arrested fro possession and transport of marijuana leaves (in bricks). They were charged with the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, with the information containing the fact that they were in possession of and were transporting, selling or offering to sell 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops. The accused was then arraigned, pleaded guilty and convicted. Subsequently they applied for probation. Thereafter the prosecutor’s office filed two motions to admit amended information (claiming that the marijuana recovered was 42.410 kilos, not grams) and to set aside the arraignment of the accused; the accused then moved to quash the motion raising the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Issue/s: Whether or not double jeopardy attaches. Ruling:

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2010 ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 161602 (July 13, 2010) Facts: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to annul the Sandiganbayan's rulings and prevent it from further proceeding with Civil Case 0167 until another preliminary investigation is conducted in their case. On March 6, 1996 respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an action for the forfeiture of alleged unlawfully acquired property with the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case 0167 against petitioner Alfredo T. Romualdez and his wife Agnes Sison Romualdez as well as against Romson Realty, Inc., R & S Transport, Inc., Fidelity Management, Inc., and Dio Island Resort, Inc. (collectively, the Romualdezes) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) 1379. On January 16, 2000 the Romualdezes filed a motion to dismiss the action on grounds of a) violation of their right to a speedy disposition of their case; b) lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the action; c) prematurity; d) prescription; and e) litis pendentia. On September 11, 2002 the Sandiganbayan denied the motion. It also denied on March 10, 2003 their subsequent motion for reconsideration. On March 31, 2003 the Romualdezes next filed a motion for preliminary investigation and to suspend proceedings. They claim that since Civil Case 0167 was a forfeiture proceeding filed under R.A. 1379, the Ombudsman should have first conducted a "previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases" before the filing of the case pursuant to Section 2 of the law. In its Comment on the motion, the Republic pointed out that the Office of the Ombudsman in fact conducted such a preliminary investigation in 1991 in OMB-0-91-0820law and issued on January 22, 1992 a resolution, recommending the endorsement of the matter to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for the filing of the forfeiture case. On August 13, 2003 the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, law denying the Romualdezes' March 31, 2003 motion. It also denied by resolution on December 3, 2003 their subsequent motion for reconsideration.

As the Sandiganbayan correctly pointed out, quoting Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman has under its general investigatory powers the authority to investigate forfeiture cases where the alleged ill-gotten wealth had been amassed before February 25, 1986. Thus: While we do not discount the authority of the Ombudsman, we believe and so hold that the exercise of his correlative powers to both investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth is restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth which were amassed after February 25, 1986. Prior to said date, the Ombudsman is without authority to initiate such forfeiture proceedings. We, however, uphold his authority to investigate cases for the forfeiture or recovery of such ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed even before the aforementioned date, pursuant to his general investigatory power under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770. The Court cannot also subscribe to the Romualdezes' claim that they are entitled to a new preliminary investigation since they had no opportunity to take part in the one held in 1991, in OMB-0-91-0820. They admit that the subpoena for that investigation had been sent to their last known residence at the time it was conducted.cracralaw The Republic categorically insists that the appropriate subpoena had been served on the Romualdezes. The Ombudsman could not be faulted for proceeding with the investigation of the Romualdezes' cases when they did not show up despite notice being sent to them at their last known residence. As the Court held in a case: The New Rules on Criminal Procedure "does not require as a condition sine qua non to the validity of the proceedings [in the preliminary investigation] the presence of the accused for as long as efforts to reach him were made, and an opportunity to controvert the evidence of the complainant is accorded him. The obvious purpose of the rule is to block attempts of unscrupulous respondents to thwart the prosecution of offenses by hiding themselves or by employing dilatory tactics." In sum, no reason exists for suspending or interrupting the conduct of the forfeiture proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. NEW PUERTO COMMERCIAL AND RICHARD LIM vs. RODEL LOPEZ AND FELIX GAVAN, G.R. No. 169999 (July 26, 2010)

Issue/s: Whether or not the preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman conducted in OMB-0-91-0820 in 1991 satisfied the requirement of the law in forfeiture cases. Ruling:

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Facts: This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeal's (CA's) June 2, 2005 Decisioncralaw in CA-G.R. SP. No. 83577, which affirmed with modification the October 28, 2003 Decisioncralaw of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NCR CA No. 034421-03, and the September 23,

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2005 Resolutionralaw denying petitioners' motion for partial reconsideration. Petitioners contend that the investigation of respondents was not an afterthought. They stress the following peculiar circumstances of this case: First, when the labor complaint was filed on November 3, 2000, respondents had not yet been dismissed by petitioners. Rather, it was respondents who were guilty of not reporting for work; Lopez starting on October 23, 2000 and Gavan on October 28, 2000. Second, at this time also, petitioners were still in the process of collecting evidence on the alleged misappropriation of company funds after they received reports of respondents' fraudulent acts. Considering the distance between the towns serviced by respondents and Puerto Princesa City, it took a couple of weeks for petitioners' representative, Armel Bagasala (Bagasala), to unearth the anomalies committed by respondents. Thus, it was only on November 18, 2000 when Bagasala finished the investigation and submitted to petitioners the evidence establishing that respondents indeed misappropriated company funds. Naturally, this was the only time when they could begin the formal investigation of respondents wherein they followed the twin-notice rule and which led to the termination of respondents on December 18, 2000 for gross misconduct and absence without leave for more than a month. Petitioners lament that the filing of the labor complaint on November 3, 2000 was purposely sought by respondents to pre-empt the results of the then ongoing investigation after respondents got wind that petitioners were conducting said investigation because respondents were reassigned to a different sales area during the period of investigation. Respondents counter that their abandonment of employment was a concocted story. No evidence was presented, like the daily time record, to establish this claim. Further, the filing of the illegal dismissal complaint negates abandonment. Assuming arguendo that respondents abandoned their work, no proof was presented that petitioners' served a notice of abandonment at respondents' last known addresses as required by Section 2, Rule XVI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. According to respondents, on November 3, 2000, petitioners verbally advised them to look for another job because the company was allegedly suffering from heavy losses. For this reason, they sought help from the Palawan labor office which recommended that they file a labor complaint. Respondents also contest the finding that they misappropriated company funds. They claim that the evidence is insufficient to prove that they did not remit their sales collections to petitioners. Neither were the minutes of the proceedings before the labor officer presented to prove that they admitted misappropriating the company funds. Respondents add that they did not hold a position of trust and confidence. They claim that the criminal cases for estafa against respondents were belatedly filed in order to further justify their dismissal from employment and act as leverage relative to the subject labor case they filed against petitioners.

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Issue/s: 1.

Whether x x x the Court of Appeals erred in construing that the investigation held by petitioners is an afterthought; and

2. Whether x x x the Court of Appeals erred in awarding the sum of P30,000.00 each to the respondents as nominal damages.cra Ruling: The petition is meritorious. When the requirements of procedural due process are satisfied, the award of nominal damages is improper. An employee's right to be heard in termination cases under Article 277 (b) as implemented by Section 2 (d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code should be interpreted in broad strokes. It is satisfied not only by a formal face to face confrontation but by any meaningful opportunity to controvert the charges against him and to submit evidence in support thereof. In the instant case, the appellate court ruled that there are two conflicting versions of the events and that, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the courts are precluded from resolving factual issues. Consequently, the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC, that petitioners stopped reporting from work and misappropriated their sales collection are binding on the courts. However, the CA found that respondents were denied their right to procedural due process because the investigation held by petitioners was an afterthought considering that it was called after they had notice of the complaint filed before the labor office in Palawan. Indeed, appellate courts accord the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC not only respect but also finality when supported by substantial evidence. The Court does not substitute its own judgment for that of the tribunal in determining where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible. It is not for the Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses nor substitute the findings of fact of an administrative tribunal which has gained expertise in its specialized field.cra19 However, while we agree with the CA that the labor tribunal's factual determinations can no longer be disturbed for failure of respondents to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC, as in fact respondents effectively accepted these findings by their failure to appeal from the decision of the CA, we find that the appellate court misapprehended the import of these factual findings. For if it was duly established, as affirmed by the appellate court itself, that respondents failed to report for work starting from October 22, 2000 for respondent Lopez and October 28, 2000 for respondent

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Gavan, then at the time of the filing of the complaint with the labor office on November 3, 2000, respondents were not yet dismissed from employment. Prior to this point in time, there was, thus, no necessity to comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing. As can be seen, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, it cannot be concluded that the sending of the notices and setting of hearings were a mere afterthought because petitioners were still awaiting the report from Bagasala when respondents pre-empted the results of the ongoing investigation by filing the subject labor complaint. For this reason, there was sufficient compliance with the twin requirements of notice and hearing even if the notices were sent and the hearing conducted after the filing of the labor complaint. Thus, the award of nominal damages by the appellate court is improper. SALVADOR V. REBELLION vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175700 (July 5, 2010) Facts: This petition for review assails the September 26, 2006 Decision1cralaw of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CR No. 29248 which affirmed with modification the December 8, 2004 Decision2cralaw of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 209, finding petitioner guilty of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, as amended (otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended). On July 31, 2000, an Information was filed charging petitioner Salvador V. Rebellion with violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, the accusatory portion thereof reads: That on or about the 27th day of July 2000, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not having been lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance and one (1) piece of aluminum foil strip with trace of white crystalline substance, which were found positive [for] Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu", a regulated drug, without the corresponding license and prescription, in violation of the above cited law. Contrary to law. When arraigned on September 6, 2000, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. After pre-trial, trial on the merits forthwith commenced. At about 4:40 in the afternoon of July 27, 2000, PO3 George Garcia (PO3 Garcia) and PO3 Romeo Sotomayor, Jr. (PO3 Sotomayor), together with Michael Fermin and Joseph Apologista, all members of the Mayor's Action Command (MAC) of Mandaluyong City, were on routine patrol along M. Cruz St., Barangay Mauway, when they chanced upon two individuals chanting and in the act

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of exchanging something. The police officers introduced themselves and then inquired from petitioner what he was holding. Petitioner took out from his possession three strips of aluminum foil which PO3 Garcia confiscated. PO3 Sotomayor also found on petitioner a plastic sachet which contained white crystalline substance which looked like tawas. Suspecting that the substance was "shabu", he confiscated the plastic sachet. Petitioner and his companion, who was later identified as Clarito Yanson (Clarito), were brought to the MAC station at the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) for investigation. After laboratory examination, the contents of the plastic sachet weighing 0.03 gram were found positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. The test on the three strips of aluminum foil also yielded positive for traces of shabu. On the basis thereof, petitioner was correspondingly charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Clarito, on the other hand, was further investigated by the City Prosecutor's Office. Petitioner denied the charge against him. He claimed that he was merely standing in front of a store waiting for the change of his P500.00 bill when he was suddenly accosted by the MAC team.

Issue/s: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the Rigional Trial Court finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Ruling: The court sustained the appellate court affirming petitioner's conviction by the trial court.

in

A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private individual under any of the following circumstances:7cralaw Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and

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he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112.

Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations, G.R. No. 176278 (June 25, 2010)

Our own review discloses sufficient evidence that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was effected under Section 5(a), or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. The MAC team witnessed petitioner handing a piece of plastic sachet to Clarito. Arousing their suspicion that the sachet contains shabu, team members PO3 Garcia and PO3 Sotomayor alighted from their motorcycles and approached them. Clarito was not able to completely get hold of the plastic sachet because of their arrival. At the first opportunity, the team members introduced themselves. Upon inquiry by PO3 Garcia what petitioner was holding, the latter presented three strips of aluminum foil which the former confiscated. At a distance, PO3 Sotomayor saw petitioner in possession of the plastic sachet which contains white crystalline substance. There and then, petitioner and Clarito were apprehended and brought to the CID for investigation. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline substance placed inside the plastic sachet was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. Under these circumstances, we entertain no doubt that petitioner was arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then committing a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the arresting team. Thus, his case comes under the exception to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest. Consequently, the results of the attendant search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove his guilt of the offense charged. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court in addressing the matter of the purportedly invalid warrantless arrest:

Facts:

In any event, the warrantless arrest of accusedappellant was lawful because he was caught by the police officers in flagrante delicto or while he was in the act of handing to Clarito Yanson a plastic sachet of "shabu". Upon seeing the exchange, PO3 Sotomayor and PO3 Garcia approached accused-appellant and Clarito Yanson and introduced themselves as members of the MAC. PO3 Sotomayor confiscated from accused-appellant the plastic sachet of "shabu" while PO3 Garcia confiscated the aluminum foil strips which accused-appellant was also holding in his other hand. Jurisprudence is settled that the arresting officer in a legitimate warrantless arrest has the authority to search on the belongings of the offender and confiscate those that may be used to prove the commission of the offense. x x x RA 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, increased the penalty for illegal possession of less than five grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu to an imprisonment of 12 years and one day to 20 years and a fine ranging from P300,000.00 to P400,000.00. Said law, however, not being favorable to the petitioner, cannot be given retroactive application in this case. ALAN F. PAGUIA vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., in his capacity as Permanent

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Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's nomination of respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davide's age at that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65. Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davide's entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and employees. In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the petition. First, they question petitioner's standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite suspension from the practice of law. Second, the Office of the President and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public respondents) argue that neither petitioner's citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with standing to question respondent Davide's appointment because petitioner remains without personal and substantial interest in the outcome of a suit which does not involve the taxing power of the state or the illegal disbursement of public funds. Third, public respondents question the propriety of this petition, contending that this suit is in truth a petition for quo warranto which can only be filed by a contender for the office in question. Issue/s: Whether or not Congress has the power to limit the president’s prerogative to nominate ambassadors by legislating age qualifications despite the constitutional rule limiting Congress' role in the appointment of ambassadors to the Commission on Appointments' confirmation of nominees. Ruling: The petition presents no case or controversy for petitioner's lack of capacity to sue and mootness. Taxpayers' contributions to the state's coffers entitle them to question appropriations for expenditures which are claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal. However, the salaries and benefits respondent Davide received commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed by law and other executive issuances, the funding for which was included in the appropriations for the DFA's total expenditures contained in the annual budgets Congress

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passed since respondent Davide's nomination. Having assumed office under color of authority (appointment), respondent Davide is at least a de facto officer entitled to draw salary, negating petitioner's claim of 'illegal expenditure of scarce public funds.'

petition for the determination of just compensation in Agrarian Case 99-0214 and that, consequently, the DARAB decision became final and executory on April 1, 1999.

An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioner's suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing 'any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.' Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.

1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that, since Land Bank filed its original judicial action in Agrarian Case 99-0214 beyond the 15-day period set under Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules, the DARAB determination of just compensation became final and executory; and

A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for moot. Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FORTUNE SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, G.R. No. 177511 (June 29, 2010) Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari. Respondent Fortune Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (Fortune Savings) owned a 4,230-square meter agricultural land in San Gregorio, Malvar, Batangas, [1] that it acquired for P80,000.00 after foreclosing on the mortgage constituted on the land by one of its borrowers who defaulted on a P71,500.00 loan. Fortune Savings offered to sell the property for P100,000.00 to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for inclusion in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). But petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), the financial intermediary for the CARP,[2] fixed the land's value at only P6,796.00. Rejecting this amount, Fortune Savings filed a summary administrative proceeding for the determination of just compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). On April 7, 2000 or four months after the RTC dismissed Agrarian Case 99-0214, Land Bank filed another petition for the determination of just compensation for the subject land in Agrarian Case 2000-0155. Because Fortune Savings failed to file a responsive pleading, the RTC declared it in default. Land Bank presented its evidence ex parte and on May 30, 2002 the RTC rendered a decision, upholding Land Bank's valuation of the property at P6,796.00 based on a technical formula adopted by the DAR. Fortune Savings appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),[4] arguing that the DARAB decision had already become final and executory and that the Land Bank valuation of P6,796.00, adopted by the RTC was erroneous. On August 29, 2006, the CA rendered judgment, reinstating the March 3, 1999 DARAB decision and its P93,060.00 valuation.[5] The CA ruled that Land Bank incurred delay in filing only on April 5, 1999 its

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Issue/s:

2. Whether or not the CA erred in adopting the valuation fixed by DARAB for the property at P93,060.00 instead of the P6,796.00 established by Land Bank. Ruling: Although the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or CARL to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation for lands taken under the CARP, such determination is subject to challenge in the courts. [6] The CARL vests in the RTCs, sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation.[7] This means that the RTCs do not exercise mere appellate jurisdiction over just compensation disputes.[8] The RTC's jurisdiction is not any less 'original and exclusive' because the question is first passed upon by the DAR. The proceedings before the RTC are not a continuation of the administrative determination. Indeed, although the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable, still a resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action.[9] Consequently, Land Bank's filing of Agrarian Case 2000-0155 after the dismissal without prejudice of Agrarian Case 99-0214 cannot be regarded as barred by the filing of the latter case beyond the 15-day period prescribed under Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules. The procedural soundness of Agrarian Case 20000155 could not be made dependent on the DARAB case, for these two proceedings are separate and independent. The CA adopted the DARAB valuation of P93,060.00 for the subject land for a technical reason. But, since DARAB fixed the amount based on its expertise and since that amount is not quite far from the price for which Fortune Savings bought the same at a public auction, the Court is inclined to accept such valuation. Considering the relatively small amount involved, this would be a far better alternative than remanding the case and incurring further delay in its resolution. IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF BIRTH, EMMA K. LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG, JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD LEEMIGUEL, VICTORIANO K. LEE, and THOMAS K. LEE,

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represented by RITA K. LEE, as Attorney-in-Fact, G.R. No. 177861 (July 13, 2010) Facts: This case is about the grounds for quashing a subpoena ad testificandum and a parent's right not to testify in a case against his children. Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had 11 children, namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh children). In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him. Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu's children with Lee (collectively, the Lee's other children) claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lee's presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lee's stepmother.cra3cralaw On August 5, 2005 the RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and oppressive considering that Tiu was already very old and that the obvious object of the subpoena was to badger her into admitting that she was Emma Lee's mother. Because the RTC denied the Lee-Keh children's motion for reconsideration, they filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 92555. On December 29, 2006 the CA rendered a decision,4cralaw setting aside the RTC's August 5, 2005 Order. The CA ruled that only a subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also held that Tiu's advanced age alone does not render her incapable of testifying. The party seeking to quash the subpoena for that reason must prove that she would be unable to withstand the rigors of trial, something that petitioner Emma Lee failed to do.

Ruling: Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the subpoena ad testificandum it issued against Tiu on the ground that it was unreasonable and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter would be badgered on oral examination concerning the Lee-Keh children's theory that she had illicit relation with Lee and gave birth to the other Lee children. But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds citedunreasonable and oppressive-are proper for subpoena ad duces tecum or for the production of documents and things in the possession of the witness, a command that has a tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of privacy. Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides:chan robles virtual law library SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. - The court may quash a subpoena duces tecum upon motion promptly made and, in any event, at or before the time specified therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear, or if the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the production thereof. Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the LeeKeh children's action, obviously, they would want Tiu to testify or admit that she is the mother of Lee's other children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died and so could not give testimony that Lee's other children were not hers. The Lee-Keh children have, therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking Tiu's testimony and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive them of their right to compel the attendance of such a material witness. But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections to requiring Tiu to come to court and testify: a) considering her advance age, testifying in court would subject her to harsh physical and emotional stresses; and b) it would violate her parental right not to be compelled to testify against her stepdaughter. Regarding the physical and emotional punishment that would be inflicted on Tiu if she were compelled at her age and condition to come to court to testify, petitioner Emma Lee must establish this claim to the satisfaction of the trial court. About five years have passed from the time the Lee-Keh children sought the issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear before the trial court. The RTC would have to update itself and determine if Tiu's current physical condition makes her fit to undergo the ordeal of coming to court and being questioned. If she is fit, she must obey the subpoena issued to her.

Issue/s: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court may compel Tiu to testify in the correction of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is not Keh's daughter.

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Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might subject her to badgering by adverse counsel. The trial court's duty is to protect every witness against oppressive behavior of an examiner and this is especially true where the witness is of advanced age.

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2. Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, which reads: SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants. The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendants or descendants. But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides: Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends. Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELIZABETH MARCELINO y REYES, G.R. No. 189278 (July 26, 2010) Facts: This is an appeal from the June 29, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03153 entitled People of the Philippines v. Elizabeth Marcelino y Reyes, which affirmed the Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 3048-M-2002 and 3049-M-2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76 in Malolos City, Bulacan. The RTC found accused-appellant Elizabeth Marcelino guilty of violating Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Issue/s: 1. 2.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that a search warrant was not necessary. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the integrity and identity of the shabu was preserved.

Ruling: Search warrant and warrant of arrest not needed In People v. Villamin, involving an accused arrested after he sold drugs during a buy-bust operation,

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the Court ruled that it was a circumstance where a warrantless arrest is justified under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Rules of Court. The same ruling applies to the instant case. When carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, it is a judicially sanctioned method of apprehending those involved in illegal drug activities. It is a valid form of entrapment, as the idea to commit a crime comes not from the police officers but from the accused himself. The accused is caught in the act and must be apprehended on the spot. From the very nature of a buy-bust operation, the absence of a warrant does not make the arrest illegal. illegal drug seized was not the "fruit of the poisonous tree" as the defense would like this Court to believe. The seizure made by the buy-bust team falls under a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Rule 126, Sec. 13 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides: A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. Since the buy-bust operation was established as legitimate, it follows that the search was also valid, and a warrant was likewise not needed to conduct it. Chain of custody The prosecution's failure to submit in evidence the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated will not result in accused-appellant's acquittal of the crimes charged. Non-compliance with the provisions of RA 9165 on the custody and disposition of dangerous drugs is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's case. Neither will it render the arrest of an accused illegal nor the items seized from her inadmissible. We discussed in People v. Pagkalinawan both what the law provides and the level of compliance it requires: Sec. 21 of the Implementing Regulations of RA 9165 provides:

Rules

and

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a

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representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. x x x (Emphasis supplied.) As can be gleaned from the language of Sec. 21 of the Implementing Rules, it is clear that the failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with it is not fatal. It does not render appellant's arrest illegal nor the evidence adduced against him inadmissible. What is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused." Here, the chain of custody was established through the following links: (1) SPO1 Dela Cruz marked the seized sachet with "MDC-1" for the sachet that was the subject of the buy-bust, and "MDC-2" for the sachet found on accused-appellant's person; (2) a request for laboratory examination of the seized items "MDC-1" and "MDC-2" was signed by Police Senior Inspector Arthur Felix Asis; (3) the request and the marked items seized were received by the Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory; (4) Chemistry Report No. D-628-02 confirmed that the marked items seized from accused-appellant were shabu; and (5) the marked items were offered in evidence as Exhibits "C-1" and "C-2." As there is no proof to support the claim that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized shabu have been compromised at some stage, we find no reason to overturn the finding of the trial court that what were seized from Elizabeth were the same illegal drugs presented in the trial court. As it is, there was substantial compliance with the requirements under RA 9165, and the prosecution adequately established that there was an unbroken chain of custody over the shabu seized from Elizabeth. Also working against Elizabeth's cause is the presumption of regularity accorded those involved in the buy-bust operation. It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Accused-appellant failed to overcome this presumption by showing clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive. DR. EDILBERTO ESTAMPA, JR. vs. CITY GOVERNMENT OF DAVAO, G.R. No. 190681 (June 21, 2010)

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Facts: On February 1, 2001 the City Government of Davao appointed petitioner Dr. Edilberto Estampa, Jr. as Medical Officer VI at its City Health Office. The position made him head of a Task Force Unit assigned to deal with any untoward event taking place in the city and Disaster Coordinator for the Davao City Health Office under the Davao City Disaster Coordinating Council. On March 4, 2003, at around 6 p.m., a powerful bomb exploded at the passengers' terminal of the Davao International Airport, killing 22 persons and injuring 113 others. Dr. Estampa had just arrived home at that time and was taking care of his one-year-old daughter. He learned of the bombing incident between 7 to 8 p.m. His wife arrived at 9 p.m. from her work at the Davao Medical Center where most of the bombing victims were brought for treatment. She prevailed on Dr. Estampa to stay home and he did. On March 6, 2003 Dr. Roberto V. Alcantara, Officer-in-Charge of the Davao City Health Office, required Dr. Estampa to explain in writing why he failed to respond to the bombing incident. Dr. Estampa submitted his explanation. Apparently satisfied with the explanation and believing that Dr. Estampa's presence in the aftermath of the bombing was not indispensable considering the presence of other medical practitioners, Dr. Alcantara considered the case closed. The latter did not, however, bother to endorse the case to a superior officer or to the City Legal Office with his recommendation. At the pre-trial, Dr. Estampa waived his right to counsel. The parties agreed to dispense with a formal hearing and to just submit their position papers or memoranda. On November 12, 2004 the City Legal Officer found Dr. Estampa guilty of "grave" neglect of duty and recommended his dismissal. On February 8, 2005 the city mayor approved the recommendation and dismissed Dr. Estampa. The latter moved for reconsideration but this was denied, prompting him to appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). On June 2, 2006 the CSC denied Dr. Estampa's appeal, corrected the denomination of his offense to gross neglect of duty, and affirmed his dismissal. The CSC also denied Dr. Estampa's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Dr. Estampa appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for review under Rule 43. The CA denied his application for issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction and eventually rendered a decision on March 30, 2009, denying his petition and affirming the resolutions of the CSC. The CA also found no merit in his motion for reconsideration. Issue/s: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the rulings of the City Legal Officer and the CSC that found Dr. Estampa guilty of gross neglect of duty for failing to respond to the March 4, 2003 Davao City bombing.

For Private

Political Law Jurisprudence University of Cebu College of Law

UCLASS Bar Operations: Political Law Society

Ruling: In his letter-explanation, Dr. Estampa justified his absence from the emergency rooms of the hospitals to attend to the bombing victims with the claim that he needed to attend to his family first. Initially, he could not leave his one-year-old daughter because they had no house help. When his wife arrived from work shortly, he also could not leave because she was six months pregnant. Further, a bomb was found some meters from their apartment a few weeks earlier. Dr. Estampa said in his letter that he was unable from the beginning to give full commitment to his job since he gave priority to his family. He simply was not the right person for the job of disaster coordinator. Dr. Estampa's defense is not acceptable. A person's duty to his family is not incompatible with his jobrelated commitment to come to the rescue of victims of disasters. Disasters do not strike every day. Besides, knowing that his job as senior medical health officer entailed the commitment to make a measure of personal sacrifice, he had the choice to resign from it when he realized that he did not have the will and the heart to respond. Assuming that he had a one-year-old daughter in the house, he could have taken her to relatives temporarily while his wife was still on her way from work. But he did not. And when his wife arrived shortly at 9 p.m., he still did not leave under the pretext that his wife was six months pregnant. Yet, he had in fact permitted her to work away from home up to the evening. What marked his gross irresponsibility was that he did not even care to call up his superior or associates to inform them of his inability to respond to the emergency. As a result, the city health office failed to provide the needed coordination of all efforts intended to cope with the disaster. Who knows? Better coordination and dispatch of victims to the right emergency rooms could have saved more lives. The Court finds no excuse for reinstating Dr. Estampa to the position he abandoned when it needed him. HENRY "JUN" DUEÑAS, JR., vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ANGELITO "JETT" P. REYES, G.R. No. 191550 (May 4, 2010) Facts:

memoranda. However, in its Order dated September 25, 2008, the HRET directed the continuation of the revision and appreciation of ballots for the remaining 75% of the counter-protested precincts. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said Order was denied in a HRET Resolution dated October 21, 2008 which reiterated the Order to continue revision in the remaining 75% of the counter-protested precincts. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 185401, seeking the nullification of said order of revision, alleging that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion. On July 21, 2009, the Court promulgated a Decision dismissing the petition. Said Decision became final and executory and the HRET continued the proceeding in the electoral protest case. On February 25, 2010, the HRET promulgated its Decision which declared private respondent as the winner with a margin of 37 votes. Issue/s: Whether or not HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in its decision. Ruling: of merit.

The Court resolves to dismiss the petition for lack

The Court has long declared in Dueñas, Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, that the HRET was acting well within the rules when it ordered the continuation of revision of ballots. Petitioner cannot resurrect his claims, which had been finally adjudged unmeritorious by this Court, through the present petition. Thus, the fact that the HRET went on with the revision of ballots in 75% of the counter-protested precincts cannot be considered as grave abuse of discretion on the part of the electoral tribunal. Likewise, the circumstance that none of the three Supreme Court Justices took part in the Decision, cannot be taken as proof of grave abuse of discretion. Rule 89 of the 2004 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal provides that "[f]or rendition of decisions and the adoption of formal resolutions, the concurrence of at least five (5) Members shall be necessary." The HRET Decision dated February 25, 2010 had the concurrence of six of its members. Verily, the HRET was acting in accordance with its rules and cannot be said to have committed any abuse of its discretion.

This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) dated February 25, 2010 and its Resolution2cralaw dated March 18, 2010 be declared null and void ab initio. Petitioner was proclaimed as the Congressman for the Second Legislative District of Taguig City. Private respondent filed an election protest with the HRET. After revision of ballots in 100% of the protested precincts and 25% of the counter-protested precincts, the case was submitted for resolution upon the parties' submission of

Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car! and Personal Use Only 135

For Private

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SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS POLITICAL LAW FEBRUARY 2009-APRIL 2010

FEBRUARY 2009 CASES Administrative Law ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY. It is a fundamental principle in the law on public officers that administrative liability is separate from and independent of criminal liability. A simple act or omission can give rise to criminal, civil or administrative liability, each independently of the others. This is known as the “threefold liability rule.” Thus, absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, and vice-versa. The dismissal of the administrative cases against the petitioners will not necessarily result in the dismissal of the criminal complaints filed against them. Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. et al. Vs. People of the Philippines, et al. G.R. No. 166086-92, February 13, 2009. REORGANIZATION. A reorganization “involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.” It alters the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them to make the bureaucracy more responsive to the needs of the public clientele as authorized by law. It could result in the loss of one’s position through removal or abolition of an office. For a reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, however, it must pass the test of good faith, otherwise it is void ab initio. In the case at bar, petitioner claims that there has been a drastic reduction of plantilla positions in the new staffing pattern in order to address the local government unit’s gaping budgetary deficit. Thus, he states that in the municipal treasurer’s office and waterworks operations unit where respondents were previously assigned, only 11 new positions were created out of the previous 35 which had been abolished; and that the new staffing pattern had 98 positions only, as compared with the old which had 129. The CSC, however, highlighted the recreation of six (6) casual positions for clerk II and utility worker I, which positions were previously held by respondents Marivic, Cantor, Asor and Enciso. Petitioner inexplicably never disputed this finding nor proferred any proof that the new positions do not perform the

same or substantially the same functions as those of the abolished. Nowhere in the records does it appear that these recreated positions were first offered to respondents. The appointment of casuals to these recreated positions violates R.A. 6656. Pan vs. Pena, G.R. No. 174244, February 13, 2009. Constitutional Law EXPROPRIATION. The National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a complaint for the acquisition of easement right of way over lots of Co in connection with the construction of NPC’s transmission lines. The Supreme Court held that: (a) Republic Act No. 8974 applies to properties expropriated for the installation of NPC’s power transmission lines; (b) NPC is liable to pay the full amount of the fair market value and not merely a 10 percent easement fee for the expropriated property; (c) the value of the property should be reckoned as of 27 June 2001, the date of the filing of the complaint in compliance with Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. National Power Corporation vs. Co, GR No. 166973, February 10, 2009. POLITICAL QUESTION. The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to hear the so called Moscow incident effectively asks the Court to inquire into a matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question that, in Tañada v. Cuenco, was characterized as a question which, under the Constitution, is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. Pursuant to this constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication. It is not for the Supreme Court to intervene in what is clearly a question of policy, an issue dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of the Senate’s action. Sps. PNP Director Eliseo D. Dela Paz, et al. Vs. Senate Committee., G.R. No. 184849, February 13, 2009. DUAL CITIZENSHIP. Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position. Cordora vs. Comelec, et al..R. No. 176947, February 19, 2009.

Miscellaneous Laws WITNESS. The Supreme Court held that “for an allegation of tampering to be the basis for the disconnection of a customer’s electric supply, the discovery of such must be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or an ERB representative. This requirement can not be dispensed with. In the present case, it is admitted that no police officer or ERB representative was present during the inspection, removal and subsequent replacement of the electric meters alleged to have been tampered with, hence, the requirement of the law was not complied with – a lapse fatal to MERALCO’s cause. Manila Electric Company Vs. Hsing Nan Tannery Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 178913, February 12, 2009

MARCH 2009 DECISIONS Administrative law BIDDING.

During the preliminary examination stage, the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) checks whether all the required documents were submitted by the eligible bidders. Note should be taken of the fact that the technical specifications of the product bidded out is among the documentary requirements evaluated by

the BAC during the preliminary examination stage. At this point, therefore, the BAC should have already discovered that the technical specifications of Audio Visual’s document camera differed from the bid specifications in at least three (3) respects, namely: the 15 frames/second frame rate, the weight specification, and the power supply requirement. Using the nondiscretionary criteria laid out in R.A. No. 9184 and IRR-A, therefore, the BAC should have rated Audio Visual’s bid as “failed” instead of “passed.” Commission on Audit, etc. vs. Link Worth International Inc., G.R. No. 184173, March 13, 2009. BURDEN OF PROOF. It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant. In fact, if the complainant upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense. Even in administrative cases, if a court employee or magistrate is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail. In the present case, complainant failed to substantiate his imputations of impropriety and partiality against respondent Justice. Aside from his naked allegations, conjecture and speculations, he failed to present any other evidence to prove his charges. Hence, the presumption that respondent regularly performed his duties prevails. On the other hand, respondent Justice adequately explained that since his voluntary inhibition from the case, he no longer participated in the case and his perceived participation in the issuance of the assailed Resolution was a result of a typographical mistake. The Law Firm of Chavez Miranda Aseoche, etc. vs. Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. No. CA-09-48-J, March 13, 2009., see also Rodolfo B. Baygar, Sr. vs. Judge Lilian D. Panontongan, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-08-1699, March 17, 2009. Agrarian law BREACH BY AGRICULTURAL LESSEE. R.A. No. 3844 does not operate to take away completely every landowner’s rights to his land. Nor does it authorize the agricultural lessee to act in an abusive or excessive manner in derogation of the landowner’s rights. After all, he is just an agricultural lessee. Although the agrarian laws afford the opportunity for the landless to break away from the vicious cycle of having to perpetually rely on the kindness of others, a becoming modesty demands that this kindness should at least be reciprocated, in whatever small way, by those benefited by them. Here, the Supreme Court held that the construction of the reservoir by the leseee constitutes a violation of Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844, an unauthorized use of the landholding for a purpose other than what had been agreed upon, and a violation of the leasehold contract between the lessee and lessor, for which the former was penalized with permanent dispossession of his leasehold. P’Carlo A. Castillo vs. Manuel Tolentino, G.R. No. 181525, March 4, 2009. JUST COMPENSATION; WHEN DETERMINED . As to the legal basis of just compensation for land taken by the Department of Agrarian Reform for distribution to farmerbeneficiaries, the Supreme Court held that the applicable law is R.A. No. 6657. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pacita Agricultural Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., etc., et al., the Court made a comparative analysis of cases that confronted the issue of whether properties covered by P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228, for which the landowners had yet to be paid, would be compensated under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 or under the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6657. The Court observed that in Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines – a case which LBP invokes in this controversy – the Court declared that the reckoning period for the determination of just compensation should be the time when the land was taken, i.e., in 1972, applying P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228. However, the Court also noted that after Gabatin, the Court had decided several cases in which it found it more equitable to determine just compensation based on the value of the property at the time of payment. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Hernando T. Chico, et al., G.R. No. 168453. March 13, 2009 JUST COMPENSATION; MARKET DATA APPROACH. In the instant case, the regional trial court (RTC) did not consider Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 as well as Department Administrative Order (DAO) DAO No. 6 in determining just compensation for agrarian reform cases. Instead, it adopted, hook, line and sinker, the market data approach introduced by the commissioner nominated by Allied. This undoubtedly constitutes a glaring departure from the established tenet on the mandatory nature of Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and DAO No. 6, as amended. It is worthy to note that Allied did not provide any evidence that the market data approach, which based the value of the land in question on sales and listings of similar properties situated within the area, conformed to the subject administrative order, and it is not also clear if same approach took into consideration the said administrative order. Such being the case, the market data approach espoused by Allied cannot be a valuation that complies with the requirements under the agrarian law. Besides, this Court has once refused to accept the market data approach as a method of valuation compliant with the agrarian law and enforced by the DAR. Allied Banking Corp. vs. The Land Bank of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 175422, March 13, 2009

Constitutional Law. COMELEC POWERS. Under Sec. 2, Article IV-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC exercises original jurisdiction over all contests, relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials, and has supervision and control over the board of canvassers. The COMELEC sitting en banc, however, does not have the authority to hear and decide election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies in the first instance, as the COMELEC in division has such authority. The COMELEC en banc can exercise jurisdiction only on motions for reconsideration of the resolution or decision of the COMELEC in division. Petitioners’ contention that the COMELEC’s choice of officials to substitute the members of the Board of Canvassers is limited only to those enumerated under Sec. 21 of Republic Act. No. 6646 is untenable. Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the enumeration above is not exclusive. Members of Board of Canvassers can be filled up by the COMELEC not only from those expressly mentioned in the above-quoted provision, but from others outside if the former are not available. Arturo F. Pacificador and Jovito C. Plameras, Jr. vs. Comelec, etc., et al., G.R. No. 178259, March 13, 2009. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. Prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, illegally dismissed overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment. The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage. There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means. What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical standards, or in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern. In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state interest that the subject clause may possibly serve. Antonio M. Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009. IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. The Commission on Audit (COA) is an unincorporated government agency which does not enjoy a separate juridical personality of its own. Hence, even in the exercise of proprietary functions incidental to its primarily governmental functions, COA cannot be sued without its consent. Assuming that the contract it entered into with Audio Visual can be taken as an implied consent to be sued, and further that incidental reliefs such as damages may be awarded in certiorari proceedings, Link Worth did not appeal the Court of Appeals’ Decision deleting the award of damages against COA. Consequently, Link Worth is bound by the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court of Appeals, including the deletion of the award of exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs. Commission on Audit, etc. Vs. Link Worth International Inc., G.R. No. 182559, March 13, 2009. OMBUDSMAN. The scope of the authority of the Ombudsman in administrative cases as defined under the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 is broad enough to include the direct imposition of the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine or censure on an erring public official or employee. RIGHT TO COUNSEL. Under Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, an accused is entitled to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. The phrase “preferably of his own choice” does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense. Otherwise, the tempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct, the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. While the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel – or where the preferred lawyer is not available – is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by

the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection to the counsel’s appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores did not object to the appointment of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous as their lawyers, respectively, during their custodial investigation. Prior to their questioning, appellants Arnaldo and Flores conferred with Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Appellant Arnaldo manifested that he would be assisted by Atty. Uminga, while appellant Flores agreed to be counseled by Atty. Rous. Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous countersigned the written extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores, respectively. Hence, appellants Arnaldo and Flores are deemed to have engaged the services of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous, respectively. Since the prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extra-judicial confessions of appellant Arnaldo and appellant Flores were obtained in accordance with the constitutional guarantees, these confessions are admissible. They are evidence of a high order because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. People of the Philippines vs. Domingo Reyes Y Paje, et al., G.R. No. 178300, March 17, 2009. TERM LIMITS. The three-term limit for elective local officials is contained in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. The Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service. The discussions in the Constitutional Commission showed that the term of office of barangay officials would be “[a]s may be determined by law,” and more precisely, “[a]s provided for in the Local Government Code.” Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code provides that barangay officials are covered by the three-term limit, while Section 43(c) thereof states that the term of office of barangay officials shall be five (5) years. The rule on the three-term limit, embodied in the Constitution and the Local Government Code, has two parts. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. The second part of the rule on the three-term limit shows the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term. The Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same government post; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms, satisfying the first condition for disqualification. Indeed, petitioner was serving his third term as Punong Barangay when he ran for Sangguniang Bayan member and, upon winning, assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as Punong Barangay which the Court deems as a voluntary renunciation of said office. Nicasio Bolos, Jr. vs. The Commission on Election, et al., G.R. No. 184082, March 17, 2009. Election Law APPRECIATION OF BALLOTS. The object of the appreciation of ballots is to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it can be determined with reasonable certainty. When placed in issue, the appreciation of contested ballots and election documents, which involves a question of fact, is best left to the determination of the COMELEC. The Supreme Court did not find grave abuse of discretion when the COMELEC credited to respondent the vote for “Mantete,” following the idem sonans rule. Aldo B. Cordia Vs. Joel G. Monforte and Comelec, G.R. No. 174620, March 4, 2009. PRE-PROCLAMATION CASES. The COMELEC should rule on pre-proclamation cases individually, even if the ruling is simply couched in a minute resolution. This will dispel qualms about lack of adequate notice to party litigants, and obviate the confusion that generally results from the issuance of omnibus resolutions. In all, such a practice would be consistent with the constitutional principle of transparency, and lend itself to greater public confidence in our electoral system. In the case at bar, the petitioner may have been equally confused on the remedies available to him vis-à-vis Resolution No. 8212. We do not fault him for this, but we nonetheless dismiss his petition because we find no grave abuse of discretion in the assailed COMELEC Resolution and Order. Elpidio B. Valino vs. Alvin P. Vergara, Tomas N. Joson III, et al., G.R. No. 180492, March 13, 2009.

A DEBATE OVER A REGIME OF ISLANDS On March 10, 2009, the President signed into law Republic Act No. 9522, entitled “An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446, to Define the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines, and for Other Purposes. “ Congress passed the law in order to comply with a May 13, 2009 deadline of the United Nations for countries to define the boundaries of its continental shelf under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Section 1 of the law defined the baselines of the Philippine archipelago. The geographic coordinates mentioned in Section 1 do not include the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), or better known as the Spratly Islands (which are also being claimed by such countries as China, Vietnam and Malaysia). Congress chose to deal with the KIG (and Scarborough Shoal) in Section 2, which provides: The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likes (sic) exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as “Regime of Islands” under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): a)

The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and

b)

Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.

Prior to the passage of the law, it appears that four options were being considered in defining the territorial baselines of the country: 1. ..

The main archipelago and Scarborough Shoal are enclosed by the baselines while KIG is classified as regime of islands.

2. Only the main archipelago is enclosed by the baselines while KIG and Scarborough Shoal are classified as regime of islands. . . 3.

The main archipelago and KIG are enclosed by the baselines while Scarborough Shoal is classified as regime of islands.

4.

The main archipelago, KIG and Scarborough Shoal are enclosed by the baselines. . .

(see Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, The territorial baseline issue, Malaya, March 14, 2009) According to reports, the House of Representatives version of the bill includes the Scarborough Shoal and KIG within the baselines (see option 4) while the Senate version classified the disputed territory as a “regime of islands” (see option 2). The Senate position prevailed during the bicameral conference committee deliberations held for the purpose of reconciling the two bills. (see Congress set to ratify baselines bill, Inquirer.net) In her sponsorship speech on her version of the 2009 baselines bill, Senator Miram Defensor-Santiago explains the adoption of the “regime of island” principle. There are three important reasons why the bill adopts the “regime of islands” principle: First, it has the advantage of avoiding conflicting basepoints with other claimants to the Spratlys. Conflicting basepoints is the reason why your Committee decided not to adopt other bills. The Committee takes the view that if a modern baselines bill includes conflicting basepoints with other claimant states, this would certainly be a source of diplomatic strain with such states as China , Vietnam , Malaysia , and Taiwan . Second, the “regime of islands” principle increases the size of our archipelagic waters and EEZ by about 76,518 nautical miles over existing laws. Third, the pending bill does not deviate from the natural shape of our archipelago, thus complying with Unclos, Article 47, para. 3, which provides that “the drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.” (see Sponsorship Speech, The 2009 Baseline Bill)

Not everyone agrees that KIG and Scarborough Shoal should be excluded from the baselines. For example: . . . former Ambassador to the United Nations Lauro Baja says the baseline bill is seriously flawed because it excludes the disputed Kalayaan islands from Philippine territory. Baja says the exclusion of the Kalayaan islands, which is part of the province of Palawan, runs counter to national interest. That’s because Kalayaan is part of the Spratly Group of Islands, a disputed atoll in the South China Sea that is claimed not just by the Philippines but by China, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan. Baja says these countries have included the Spratlys in their own baselines, and that by excluding it from our own baseline law, the Philippines is effectively undermining our claim to Kalayaan. (see Baja: Baselines bill weakens RP claim to Kalayaan, ABS-CBN News) , On the other hand, while Senator Trillanes does not have objections to the exlcusion of the KIG from the baselines, he disagrees with the exclusion of the Scarborough Shoal from the baselines. In his version of the baselines bill (Senate Bill No. 1467), he included the Scarborough Shoal in the baselines. He says: . . . there are some misconceptions regarding the label “regime of islands” that it supposedly weakens our claim or reduces our sovereignty over the areas labeled as such. On the contrary, “regime of islands” is defined in Art. 121 [of the UNCLOS] as: 1) island/s that is naturally formed, surrounded by water and is above water at high tide; and 2) it shall have its own 12nm territorial sea, 24nm contiguous zone, 200nm EEZ and continental shelf. In other words, islands classified as regime of islands are treated the same way as other land territory. The only possible reason that coastal states would be forced to classify their territory as a regime of islands is because such territory is impossible to enclose within the baselines without violating other UNCLOS provisions. The Falkland island group is one example. Since the UK is at the other end of the Atlantic which made it impossible to include Falkland in its own baseline, it has no choice but to classify Falkland as a regime of islands. The Scarborough Shoal was included in the baselines [of Senate Bill No. 1467] primarily because its distance from Luzon is less than the 125nm limit. With this, our country stands to gain approximately 14,500sq nm of EEZ and continental shelf. Another reason for its inclusion is that Scarborough Shoal is basically a rock and according to Paragraph 3 of Art. 121, the regime of islands definition has an exception and that is: “Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.” Therefore, while it is advantageous for us to designate KIG as a regime of islands, we would be depriving ourselves of the EEZ and continental shelf of Scarborough Shoal if it would be designated as a regime of islands. (see Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, The territorial baseline issue, Malaya, March 14, 2009) ABS-CBN News has learned that some lawyers are considering questioning the baseline bill before the Supreme Court. (see Baja: Baselines bill weakens RP claim to Kalayaan, ABS-CBN News) .

RELIGIOUS SPEECH OR INDECENT SPEECH? On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner Eliseo Soriano, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the following remarks: Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito. Two days later, several members of the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC) filed affidavit complaints with the MTCRB. The MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of the hearing on August 16, 2004 in relation to the alleged use of some cuss words in the August 10, 2004 episode of Ang Dating Daan. After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004, preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days. The same order also set the case for preliminary investigation.

The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, praying that Chairperson Consoliza P. Laguardia and two other members of the adjudication board recuse themselves from hearing the case. Two days after, however, petitioner sought to withdraw his motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing with the Supreme Court of a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 164785, to nullify the preventive suspension order thus issued. On September 27, 2004, in Adm. Case No. 01-04, the MTRCB issued a decision, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered, finding respondent Soriano liable for his utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months suspension from his program, “Ang Dating Daan”. In resolving the petition for certiorari and prohibition, the Supreme Court ruled that: (1) the MTCRB has the power to issue a preventive suspension against the petitioner; (2) the preventive suspension order did not violate petitioner’s right to equal protection, his freedom of religion and his freedom of speech. PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION Petitioner argued that the preventive suspension imposed against him and the relevant IRR provision authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled: A perusal of the MTRCB’s basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. This authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its power of regulation and supervision. . . The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCB’s authority and functions expressly set forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), as quoted above, which empowers the MTRCB to “supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television. EQUAL PROTECTION Petitioner also argued that the MTRCB denied him his right to the equal protection of the law, arguing that, owing to the preventive suspension order, he was unable to answer the criticisms coming from the INC ministers. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled: Petitioner’s position does not persuade. The equal protection clause demands that “all persons subject to legislation should be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.” It guards against undue favor and individual privilege as well as hostile discrimination. Surely, petitioner cannot, under the premises, place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are not facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he offers no proof that the said ministers, in their TV programs, use language similar to that which he used in his own, necessitating the MTRCB’s disciplinary action. If the immediate result of the preventive suspension order is that petitioner remains temporarily gagged and is unable to answer his critics, this does not become a deprivation of the equal protection guarantee. The Court need not belabor the fact that the circumstances of petitioner, as host of Ang Dating Daan, on one hand, and the INC ministers, as hosts of Ang Tamang Daan, on the other, are, within the purview of this case, simply too different to even consider whether or not there is a prima facie indication of oppressive inequality. FREEDOM OF RELIGION Petitioner next injects the notion of religious freedom, submitting that what he uttered was religious speech, adding that words like “putang babae” were said in exercise of his religious freedom. The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioner’s utterances in question can come within the pale of Sec. 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution on religious freedom. . . There is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioner’s attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language used in retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group. They simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to contradict and disprove

his detractors, but opted for the low road. FREEDOM OF SPEECH Petitioner urges the striking down of the decision suspending him from hosting Ang Dating Daan for three months on the main ground that the decision violates, apart from his religious freedom, his freedom of speech and expression. The Court rules otherwise. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-value expression refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or “fighting words”, i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national security. The Court finds that petitioner’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child. Hence, it is, in that context, unprotected speech. . . Even if we concede that petitioner’s remarks are not obscene but merely indecent speech, still the Court rules that petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech. Said statements were made in a medium easily accessible to children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances are to be treated as unprotected speech. No doubt what petitioner said constitutes indecent or offensive utterances. . . After a careful examination of the factual milieu and the arguments raised by petitioner in support of his claim to free speech, the Court rules that the government’s interest to protect and promote the interests and welfare of the children adequately buttresses the reasonable curtailment and valid restraint on petitioner’s prayer to continue as program host of Ang Dating Daan during the suspension period . . . Eliseo F. Soriano vs. Ma. Consoliza P. Laguardia etc., G.R. No. 164785/G.R. No. 165636, April 29, 2009. Constitutional Law ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION; VOID. Executive Order No. 566, which grants the CHED the power to regulate review center, is unconstitutional as it expands Republic Act No. 7722,. The CHED’s coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities. A review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722. It does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED. Review Center Associations of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretatry Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009. AGRARIAN REFORM; COVERAGE. For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come within the coverage of P.D. No. 27, it is necessary to determine whether the land is agricultural. Here, the subject parcels of land cannot be considered as within the ambit of P.D. No. 27 considering that the subject lots were reclassified by the DAR Secretary as suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes way before petitioner filed a petition for emancipation under P.D. No. 27. Laureano V. Hermoso, et al. vs. Heirs of Antonio Francia and Petra Francia, G.R. No. 166748, April 24, 2009. COMPENSATION. Officers who in good faith have discharged the duties pertaining to their office are legally entitled to the compensation attached to the office for the services they actually rendered. Although the present petition must inevitably be dismissed on a technicality that serves as penalty for the pernicious practice of forum shopping, the Court nevertheless cannot countenance the refund of the compensation differential corresponding to petitioner’s tenure as HEDF head with the upgraded rank of Director III, since she had actually rendered services in the office with the elevated grade for that period. Alicia D. Tagaro vs. Ester A. Garcia, etc.,G.R. No. 173931, April 2, 2009. COMELEC; VOTING.

Section 5 (a)of Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure and Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution require that a majority vote of all the members of the Comelec, and not only those who participated and took part in the deliberations, is necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling. Rodante Marcoleta, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al./ Alagad Party-list represented by Diogenes S. Osabel, President vs. Commission on Elections, et al.,G.R. No. 181377, April 24, 2009. DEPORTATION; POWER. The settled rule is that the entry or stay of aliens in the Philippines is merely a privilege and a matter of grace; such privilege is not absolute or permanent and may be revoked. However, aliens may be expelled or deported from the Philippines only on grounds and in the manner provided for by the Constitution, the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and administrative issuances pursuant thereto. It must be remembered that aliens seeking entry in the Philippines do not acquire the right to be admitted into the country by the simple passage of time. When an alien, such as respondent, has already physically gained entry in the country, but such entry is later found unlawful or devoid of legal basis, the alien can be excluded anytime after it is found that he was not lawfully admissible at the time of his entry. Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people. The Secretary of Justice, et al. vs. Christopher Koruga, G.R. No. 166199, April 24, 2009. DOUBLE JEOPARDY. The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent. These elements are present here: (1) the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 96-413 against Postanes was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the MeTC had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 96-413; (3) Postanes was arraigned and entered a non-guilty plea; and (4) the MeTC dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-413 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence amounting to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had. Clearly, for this Court to grant the petition and order the MeTC to reconsider its decision, just what the RTC ordered the MeTC to do, is to transgress the Constitutional proscription not to put any person “twice x x x in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.”David Tiu vs. Court of Appeals and Edgardo Postanes, G.R. No. 162370, April 21, 2009. DUE PROCESS; COURT DECISIONS. Faithful adherence to Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. In the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals reiterates the rule that a notarized and authenticated deed of sale enjoys the presumption of regularity, and is admissible without further proof of due execution. On the basis thereof, it declared Antonio a buyer in good faith and for value, despite petitioner’s contention that the sale violates public policy. While it is a part of the right of appellant to urge that the decision should directly meet the issues presented for resolution, mere failure by the appellate court to specify in its decision all contentious issues raised by the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe appellant’s contentions is not sufficient to hold the appellate court’s decision contrary to the requirements of the law and the Constitution. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary findings of facts to warrant its conclusions, we cannot declare said court in error if it withheld “any specific findings of fact with respect to the evidence for the defense.” We will abide by the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed,and all matters within an issue in a case were laid down before the court and were passed upon by it. Marissa R. Unchuan vs. Antonio J.P. Lozada, Anita Lozada and the Register of Deeds of Cebu City, G.R. No. 172671, April 16, 2009. Ecozone. R.A. No. 7903 does not authorize the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate and/or license games of chance/gambling. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, etc. vs. Philippine EGaming Jurisdiction, Incorporated (PEJI) Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone Authority (ZAMBOECOZONE), et al., G.R. No. 177333, April 24, 2009. ELECTION CONTESTS; JURISDICTION. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s (HRET’s) sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives “begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.” Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over elections relating to the

election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Señeres filed this petition before this Court on July 23, 2007, the right of the nominees as party-list representatives had been recognized and declared in the July 19, 2007 Resolution and the nominees had taken their oath and already assumed their offices in the House of Representatives. As such, the proper recourse would have been to file a petition for quo warranto before the HRET within ten (10) days from receipt of the July 19, 2007 Resolution and not a petition for certiorari before this Court. Dr. Hans Christian M. Señeres vs. Commission on Elections and Melquiades A. Robles,G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009. EMINENT DOMAIN; PROCEEDINGS. In an expropriation proceeding there are two stages: first, the determination of the validity of the expropriation, and second, the determination of just compensation. In Tan v. Republic, the Supreme Court explained the two (2) stages in an expropriation proceeding, to wit: (1) Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, with condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon payment of just compensation. An order of expropriation is final. An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, as it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the courts on the merits. The order of expropriation would also be a final one for after its issuance, no objection to the right of condemnation shall be heard. The order of expropriation may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby by filing a record on appeal. (2) Determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before the court and findings of the commissioners would likewise be a final one, as it would leave nothing more to be done by the court regarding the issue. A second and separate appeal may be taken from this order fixing the just compensation. Metropolitan Cebu Water District vs. J. King and Sons Company, Inc., G.R. No. 175983, April 16, 2009. EMINENT DOMAIN; POWER. For Metropolitan Cebu Water District to exercise its power of eminent domain, two requirements should be met, namely: first, its board of directors passed a resolution authorizing the expropriation, and; second, the exercise of the power of eminent domain was subjected to review by the LWUA. In this case, petitioner’s board of directors approved on 27 February 2004, Board Resolution No. 015-2004 authorizing its general manager to file expropriation and other cases. Moreover, the LWUA did review and gave its stamp of approval to the filing of a complaint for the expropriation of respondent’s lot. Specifically, the LWUA through its Administrator, Lorenzo H. Jamora, wrote petitioner’s manager, Armando H. Paredes, a letter dated 28 February 2005 authorizing petitioner to file the expropriation case “against the owner of the five-square meter portion of Lot No. 921-A covered by TCT No. 168805, pursuant to Section 25 of P.D. No. 198, as amended.” Metropolitan Cebu Water District vs. J. King and Sons Company, Inc., G.R. No. 175983. April 16, 2009 EMINENT DOMAIN; WRIT OF POSSESSION. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974 is emphatic to the effect that “upon compliance with the guidelines…the court shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and start the implementation of the project.” Under this statutory provision, when the government, its agencies or government-owned and controlled corporations, make the required provisional payment, the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession.Metropolitan Cebu Water District vs. J. King and Sons Company, Inc., G.R. No. 175983, April 16, 2009. EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPENSATION . Under the factual circumstances of the case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage RA 6657 before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. Excise tax. Section 145 of the Tax Code, as amended by RA 9334: (1) does not violate the equal protection and unformity of taxation clauses; (2) does not violate the constitutional prohibition on unfair competition; and (3) does not vilate the constitutional prohibition on regresssive and inequitable taxation. British American Tobacco vs. Jose Isidro N. Camacho, et al. G.R. No. 163583, April 15, 2009. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION.

Jurisprudence distinguishes between a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; and a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. Content-based laws are generally treated as more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with discrimination in the regulation of expression. Content-neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to speech, are subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny. Ostensibly, the act of an LGU requiring a business of proof that the property from which it operates has been zoned for commercial use can be argued, when applied to a radio station, as content-neutral since such a regulation would presumably apply to any other radio station or business enterprise within the LGU. However, the circumstances of this case dictate that we view the action of the respondents as a content-based restraint. The Court is of the position that the actions of the respondents warrant heightened or strict scrutiny from the Court, the test which we have deemed appropriate in assessing content-based restrictions on free speech, as well as for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. The immediate implication of the application of the “strict scrutiny” test is that the burden falls upon respondents as agents of government to prove that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners’ constitutional rights. As content regulation cannot be done in the absence of any compelling reason, the burden lies with the government to establish such compelling reason to infringe the right to free expression. Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Ceasar G. Dy, et al., G.R. No. 170270/G.R. No. 179411, April 2, 2009. IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. GTZ consistently has been unable to establish with satisfaction that it enjoys the immunity from suit generally enjoyed by its parent country, the Federal Republic of Germany. Consequently, both the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals acted within proper bounds when they refused to acknowledge that GTZ is so immune by dismissing the complaint against it. Our finding has additional ramifications on the failure of GTZ to properly appeal the Labor Arbiter’s decision to the NLRC. As pointed out by the OSG, the direct recourse to the Court of Appeals while bypassing the NLRC could have been sanctioned had the Labor Arbiter’s decision been a “patent nullity.” Since the Labor Arbiter acted properly in deciding the complaint, notwithstanding GTZ’s claim of immunity, we cannot see how the decision could have translated into a “patent nullity.” Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Techniche Vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 152318, April 16, 2009. INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION. A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; and to determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation. While Sabio and Standard Chartered Bank advert only to pending criminal and administrative cases before lower courts as not posing a bar to the continuation of a legislative inquiry, there is no rhyme or reason that these cases’ doctrinal pronouncement and their rationale cannot be extended to appealed cases and special civil actions awaiting final disposition before this Court. . . When the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in connection with its investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution, which was quoted at the outset. And the Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. Sabio emphasizes the importance of the duty of those subpoenaed to appear before the legislature, even if incidentally incriminating questions are expected to be asked. Reghis M. Romero II, Edmond Q. Sese, Leopoldo T. Sanchez, Reghis M. Romero III, Michael L. Romero, Nathaniel L. Romero and Jerome R. Canals vs. Sen. Jinggoy E. Estrada and Senate Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009. JUDICIAL REVIEW. It is beyond cavil that the BI has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and that the BOC has jurisdiction over deportation proceedings. Nonetheless, Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution has vested power of judicial review in the Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the CA, as established by law. Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment from

that of Congress or of the President, the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or not such judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive department is contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias. The Secretary of Justice, et al. vs. Christopher Koruga, G.R. No. 166199, April 24, 2009. JUDICIAL REVIEW; POLITICAL QUESTION. In asking the Supreme Court to declare Section 19 of the Oil Deregulation Law as unconstitutional for contravening Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution, petitioner invokes the exercise by the Supreme Court of its power of judicial review, which power is expressly recognized under Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution. The power of judicial review is the power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts for their conformity with the Constitution. Through such power, the judiciary enforces and upholds the supremacy of the Constitution. For a court to exercise this power, certain requirements must first be met, namely: (1)

an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(2) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3)

the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and

(4)

the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

The Supreme Court ruled that that the issues petitioner presented to thee Supreme Court are non-justiciable matters that preclude the Supreme Court from exercising its power of judicial review. The immediate implementation of full deregulation of the local downstream oil industry is a policy determination by Congress which the Supreme Court cannot overturn without offending the Constitution and the principle of separation of powers. Congressman Enrique T. Garcia Vs. The Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009. JUST COMPENSATION. The Special Agrarian Court and the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it ruled that it is the provisions of RA 6657 that is applicable to the present case. The SAC arrived at the just compensation for respondents’ property after taking into consideration the commissioners’ report on the nature of the subject landholding, its proximity from the city proper, its use, average gross production, and the prevailing value of the lands in the vicinity. The SAC correctly determined the amount of just compensation due to respondents in accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Carolina vda. de Abello, et al., G.R. No. 168631, April 7, 2009. PARTISAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY. Robles’ act of submitting a nomination list for BUHAY cannot, without more, be considered electioneering or partisan political activity within the context of the Election Code. The twin acts of signing and filing a Certificate of Nomination are purely internal processes of the party or organization and are not designed to enable or ensure the victory of the candidate in the elections. The act of Robles of submitting the certificate nominating Velarde and others was merely in compliance with the COMELEC requirements for nomination of party-list representatives and, hence, cannot be treated as electioneering or partisan political activity proscribed under by Sec. 2(4) of Art. IX(B) of the Constitution for civil servants. Dr. Hans Christian M. Señeres vs. Commission on Elections and Melquiades A. Robles, G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009. PARTY LIST. In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed: (1) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. (2) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. (3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

(4)

Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs. Commission on Elections/ Bayan Muna, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179271/G.R. No. 179295, April 21, 2009. POLICE POWER. Police power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and the general welfare of the people flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex – the welfare of the people is the supreme law. Police power primarily rests with the legislature although it may be exercised by the President and administrative boards by virtue of a valid delegation. Here, no delegation of police power exists under RA 7722 authorizing the President to regulate the operations of non-degree granting review centers. Review Center Associations of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretatry Eduardo Ermita, et al.,G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009. PUBLIC DOMAIN; CLASSIFICATION. The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types, i.e., primary classification and secondary classification. The primary classification comprises agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. These are lands specifically mentioned in Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution. The same provision of the Constitution, however, also states that agricultural lands of the public domain may further be classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This further classification of agricultural lands is referred to as secondary classification. Under existing laws, Congress has granted authority to a number of government agencies to effect the secondary classification of agricultural lands to residential, commercial or industrial or other urban uses. Laureano V. Hermoso, et al. vs. Heirs of Antonio Francia and Petra Francia, G.R. No. 166748, April 24, 2009. Public Land Act; encumbrance. Section 118 of the Public Land Act, as amended, prohibits any encumbrance or alienation of lands acquired under homestead provisions from the date of the approval of application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant. The same provision provides that no alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before 25 years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds. A homestead patent is one of the modes to acquire title to public lands suitable for agricultural purposes. Under the Public Land Act, as amended, a homestead patent is one issued to any citizen of this country, over the age of 18 years or the head of a family, and who is not the owner of more than 24 hectares of land in the country. To be qualified, the applicant must show that he has resided continuously for at least one year in the municipality where the land is situated and must have cultivated at least one-fifth of the land applied for. The Court also cannot consider the subject property to have been held in trust by Hermogenes for and on behalf of Hizon. Settled is the rule that a homestead applicant must personally comply with the legal requirements for a homestead grant. The homestead applicant himself must possess the necessary qualifications, cultivate the land, and reside thereon. It would be a circumvention of the law if an individual were permitted to apply “in behalf of another,” as the latter may be disqualified or might not comply with the residency and cultivation requirements. Marcelino Lopez, et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al./ Noel Rubber and Development Corp, et al. vs. Jose Esquivel, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 168734/G.R. No. 170621, April 24, 2009. Small scale mining permits. Petitioners’ small-scale mining permits are legally questionable. Under Presidential Decree No. 1899, applications of small-scale miners are processed with the Director of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7076, which took effect on 18 July 1991, approval of the applications for mining permits and for mining contracts are vested in the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. Composed of the DENR representative, a representative from the small-scale mining sector, a representative from the big-scale mining industry and a representative from an environmental group, this body is tasked to approve small-scale mining permits and contracts. In the case under consideration, petitioners filed their small-scale mining permits on 23 August 1991, making them bound by the procedures provided for under the applicable and prevailing statute, Republic Act No. 7076. Instead of processing and obtaining their permits from the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board, petitioners were able to get the same from the governor of Davao del Norte. Considering that the governor is without legal authority to issue said mining permits, the same permits are null and void. Leonora P. Calanza, et al. vs. Paper Industries Corp., et al., G.R. No. 146622, April 24, 2009.

SPEEDY TRIAL. Under the circumstances of the cases, the right to the accused to a speedy tril was not violated. Dante Tan vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009. SUBPOENA; CONGRESS. PS Resolution Nos. 537 and 543 were passed in 2006 and the letter-invitations and subpoenas directing the petitioners to appear and testify in connection with the twin resolutions were sent out in the month of August 2006 or in the past Congress. On the postulate that the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate before and after it, the aforesaid invitations and subpoenas are considered functos oficio and the related legislative inquiry conducted is, for all intents and purposes, terminated. Reghis M. Romero II, Edmond Q. Sese, Leopoldo T. Sanchez, Reghis M. Romero III, Michael L. Romero, Nathaniel L. Romero and Jerome R. Canals vs. Sen. Jinggoy E. Estrada and Senate Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009. USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER. EO 566 in this case is not supported by any enabling law. Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHED’s quasi-legislative power. Review Center Associations of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretatry Eduardo Ermita, et al. G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009. WARRANTLESS SEARCH. There is no question that the police officers went to the house of petitioner because of the information relayed by Sunit that petitioner had in his possession illegally cut lumber. When the police officers arrived at the house of petitioner, the lumber were lying around the vicinity of petitioner’s house. The lumber were in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in “plain view” of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. When asked whether he had the necessary permit to possess the lumber, petitioner failed to produce one. Petitioner merely replied that the lumber in his possession was intended for the repair of his house and for his furniture shop. There was thus probable cause for the police officers to confiscate the lumber. There was, therefore, no necessity for a search warrant. The seizure of the lumber from petitioner who did not have the required permit to possess the forest products cut is sanctioned by Section 68 of the Forestry Code. Olympio Revaldo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170589, April 16, 2009. WARRANTLESS ARREST. On whether the police officers had the authority to arrest petitioner, even without a warrant, Section 80 of the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of the DENR or any personnel of the PNP to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined by the Forestry Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and equipment used in committing the offense or the forest products gathered or taken by the offender. Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary documents when the police officers accosted him. In open court, petitioner categorically admitted the possession and ownership of the confiscated lumber as well as the fact that he did not have any legal documents therefor and that he merely intended to use the lumber for the repair of his dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but that is the law. Olympio Revaldo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170589, April 16, 2009. Election Law ELECTION CONTESTS. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal begins over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications, and mere allegation as to the invalidity of her proclamation does not divest the Electoral Tribunal of its jurisdiction. Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32/G.R. No. 179120/G.R. Nos. 179132-33/G.R. Nos. 179240-41, April 1, 2009. ELECTION PROTESTS. Jurisprudence makes it clear that the mere filing of a petition denominated as a pre-proclamation case or one seeking the annulment of a proclamation will not suspend the ten-day period for filing an election protest. It is required that the issues raised in such a petition be restricted to those that may be properly included therein. in the absence of any clear showing or

proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects; appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress; and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, which would affect the result of the election, a petition cannot be properly considered as a pre-proclamation controversy. The purpose of a preproclamation controversy is to ascertain the winner or winners in the election on the basis of the election returns duly authenticated by the board of inspectors and admitted by the board of canvassers. It is a well-entrenched rule that the Board of Canvassers and the COMELEC are not to look beyond or behind electoral returns. A pre-proclamation controversy is summary in nature. It is the policy of the election law that pre-proclamation controversies be summarily decided, consistent with the law’s desire that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as possible. There is no room for the presentation of evidence aliunde, the inspection of voluminous documents, and for meticulous technical examination. That is why such questions as those involving the appreciation of votes and the conduct of the campaign and balloting, which require more deliberate and necessarily longer consideration, are left for examination in the corresponding election protest. Harlin Castillo Abayon Vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 181295, April 2, 2009. Administrative Law DISHONESTY. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees enunciates the State’s policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. And no other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than in the judiciary. Persons involved in the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowest clerk, must live up to the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness and diligence in the public service. As the assumption of public office is impressed with paramount public interest, which requires the highest standards of ethical standards, persons aspiring for public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the law. While dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal even at the first instance, jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court lowered the penalty of dismissal to suspension taking into account the presence of mitigating circumstances such as length of service in the government and being a first time offender. Office of the Court Administrator Vs. Ma. Celia A. Flores, A.M. No. P-07-2366, April 16, 2009. RE-ASSIGNMENT; DETAIL. A reassignment is a movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of an appointment. A detail, on the other hand, is a movement from one agency to another. National Transmission Corp. Vs. Venusto

JUNE 2009 DECISIONS Constitutional Law IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution and has been an established principle that antedates the Constitution. It is a universally recognized principle of international law that exempts a state and its organs from the jurisdiction of another state. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy — that public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of the government. The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms, namely: a suit against the Republic by name; a suit against an unincorporated government agency; a suit against a government agency covered by a charter with respect to the agency’s performance of governmental functions; and a suit that on its face is against a government officer, but where the ultimate liability will fall on the government. In the present case, the writ of attachment was issued against a government agency covered by its own charter. The TESDA performs governmental functions, and the issuance of certifications is a task within its function of developing and establishing a system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country. From the perspective of this function, the core reason for the existence of state immunity applies – i.e., the public policy reason that the performance of governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor can these suits control the use and disposition of the

means for the performance of governmental functions. Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with PROVI and thereby gave its implied consent to be sued, TESDA’s funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment. Professional Video, Inc. vs. Technical Education and Skills Development Authority, G.R. No. 155504, June 26, 2009. JUST COMPENSATION; EASEMENT RIGHT OF WAY. Easement of right of way falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. In installing the 230 KV TalisayCompostela transmission lines which traverse respondent’s lands, a permanent limitation is imposed by petitioner National Power Corporation against the use of the lands for an indefinite period. This deprives respondent of the normal use of the lands. In fact, not only are the affected areas of the lands traversed by petitioner’s transmission lines but a portion is used as the site of its transmission tower. Because of the danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath the high-tension live wires, the landowner will not be able to use the lands for farming or any agricultural purposes. Thus, there is no reason to disturb the findings of the trial and appellate courts. Respondent is entitled to just compensation or the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. Since the determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings is essentially a judicial function, the Supreme Court held that the amount of P450 per square meter to be just and reasonable compensation for the expropriated lands of respondent. National Power Corporation vs. Carlos Villamor, G.R. No. 160080, June 19, 2009. OMBUDSMAN; PROSECUTORIAL POWERS . Giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI provides that the Ombudsman shall “exercise such other functions or duties as may be provided by law.” The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman, was likewise upheld by the Court in Acop. The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero. More recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera, the Supreme Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling in Acop and Camanag, declared that the OSP is “merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman” and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman. The Court’s ruling in Acop that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution was also made the foundation for the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan, where it was held that the power to prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the filing of informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman. Carmelo Lazatin, et al. vs. Hon. Aniano A. Disierto, et al., G.R. No. 147097, June 5, 2009. OMBUDSMAN; REMOVAL POWERS. The Office of the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority, is vested by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 with the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Fernando J. Beltran, G.R. No. 168039, June 5, 2009. JUDICIAL REVIEW; ACTUAL CASE. This Supreme Court’s power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. The “case-or-controversy” requirement bans this court from deciding “abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions,” lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action. Atty. Oliver O. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline J. Lozano-Endriano vs. Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, Representative, Majority, House of Representatives / Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs. Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, Representative, Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187883, June 16, 2009. JUDICIAL REVIEW; RIPENESS FOR ADJUDICATION. An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of “ripeness.” In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may

not occur at all. Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An alternative road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by a branch of government before the courts may step in. Atty. Oliver O. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline J. Lozano-Endriano vs. Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, Representative, Majority, House of Representatives / Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs. Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, Representative, Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187883, June 16, 2009. JUDICIAL REVIEW; STANDING TO SUE. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought. In the cases at bar, petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that would endow them with the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. It assures adverseness and sharpens the presentation of issues for the illumination of the Court in resolving difficult constitutional questions. The lack of petitioners’ personal stake in this case is no more evident than in Lozano’sthree-page petition that is devoid of any legal or jurisprudential basis. Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayer’s suit requires that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. It is undisputed that there has been no allocation or disbursement of public funds in this case as of yet. To be sure, standing as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases where a petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance or when paramount public interest is involved. While the Court recognizes the potential far-reaching implications of the issue at hand, the possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus standi under the “transcendental importance” doctrine. The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates courts of justice to settle only “actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of “personal injury” to the broader “transcendental importance” doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. It is not an open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit. Atty. Oliver O. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline J. Lozano-Endriano vs. Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, Representative, Majority, House of Representatives/Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs. Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, Representative, Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187883, June 16, 2009. SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES. In ascertaining whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated, the following factors must be considered: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. The right to a speedy disposition of cases is considered violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to a speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. In Bernat v. Sandiganbayan, the Court denied petitioner’s claim of denial of his right to a speedy disposition of cases considering that the petitioner in that case chose to remain silent for eight years before complaining of the delay in the disposition of his case. The Court ruled that petitioner failed to seasonably assert his right and he merely sat and waited from the time his case was submitted for resolution. In this case, petitioner similarly failed to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case. He did not take any step to accelerate the disposition of his case. He only invoked his right to a speedy disposition of cases after the Sandiganbayan promulgated its decision convicting him for malversation of public funds. Petitioner’s silence may be considered as a waiver of his right. Raul S. Tello vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165781, June 5, 2009 UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER. Revenue Regulations Nos. 9-2003, 22-2003, and Revenue Memorandum Order No. 6-2003, as pertinent to cigarettes packed by machine, are invalid insofar as they grant the BIR the power to reclassify or update the classification of new brands every two years or earlier. Hon. Secretary of Finance, et al. vs. La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory, et al., G.R. No. 166498. June 11, 2009.

Local Government Code BOUNDARY DISPUTES BETWEEN CITIES. Now that Makati is already a highly urbanized city, the parties should follow Section 118(d) of the Local Government Code (LGC) and should opt to amicably settle this dispute by joint referral to the respective sanggunians of the parties. This has become imperative because, after all, no attempt had been made earlier to settle the dispute amicably under the aegis of the LGC. The specific provision of the LGC, now made applicable because of the altered status of Makati, must be complied with. In the event that no amicable settlement is reached, as envisioned under Section 118(e) of the LGC, a certification shall be issued to that effect, and the dispute shall be formally tried by the Sanggunian concerned within sixty (60) days from the date of the aforementioned certification. In this regard, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC shall govern. Municipality of Pateros vs.The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 157714, June 16, 2009 Administrative and Civil Service Law EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. The petitioners failed to appeal the decision of the Adjudication and Settlement Board (ASB) of the Commission on Audit to the Commission on Audit proper before filing the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, in derogation of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail himself of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to the court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation. It is, therefore, imperative that the Commission Proper be first given the opportunity to review the decision of the ASB. Only after the Commission shall have acted thereon may a petition for certiorari be brought to the Supreme Court by the aggrieved party. While the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of exceptions, the Supreme Court did not find any cogent reason to apply the cited exceptions to the instant case. The non-observance of the doctrine results in the petition having no cause of action, thus, justifying its dismissal. Joseph Peter Sison, et al. vs. Rogelio Tablang, G.R. No. 177011, June 5, 2009. PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION. There are two kinds of preventive suspension of government employees charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension, viz: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation; and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated. Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation, respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be reinstated. Civil Service Commission, Anicia De Lima, in her capacity as Regional Director of CSCNCR vs. Larry M. Alfonso, G.R. No. 179452, June 11, 2009. PUBLIC OFFICERS; POWER OF APPOINTMENT. Well-settled is the rule that an oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office. Since petitioner petitioner took his oath and assumed office only on February 26, it was only then that his right to enter into the position became plenary and complete. Prior to such oath, Gasgonia still had the right to exercise the functions of her office. It is also well to note that per certification issued by Raymond C. Santiago, Accountant of PCUP, Gasgonia received her last salary for the period covering February 1-25, 2001; and petitioner received his first salary for the period covering February 26 to March 7, 2001. Clearly, at the time of respondent’s appointment on February 23, Gasgonia still was the rightful occupant of the position and was, therefore, authorized to extend a valid promotional appointment. Chairman Percival C. Chavez, Chair and Chief Executive Officer, Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor vs. Lourdes R. Ronidel and Honorable Court of Appeals 9th Division, G.R. No. 180941, June 11, 2009. PUBLIC OFFICERS; HONORARIUM. An honorarium is defined as something given not as a matter of obligation but in appreciation for services rendered, a voluntary donation in consideration of services which admit of no compensation in money. Section 15 of R.A. No. 9184 uses the word “may” which signifies that the honorarium cannot be demanded as a matter of right.

The government is not unmindful of the tasks that may be required of government employees outside of their regular functions. It agrees that they ought to be compensated; thus, honoraria are given as a recompense for their efforts and performance of substantially similar duties, with substantially similar degrees of responsibility and accountability. However, the payment of honoraria to the members of the BAC and the TWG must be circumscribed by applicable rules and guidelines prescribed by the DBM, as provided by law. Section 15 of R.A. No. 9185 is explicit as it states: “For this purpose, the DBM shall promulgate the necessary guidelines.” The word “shall” has always been deemed mandatory, and not merely directory. Thus, in this case, petitioners should have first waited for the rules and guidelines of the DBM before payment of the honoraria. As the rules and guidelines were still forthcoming, petitioners could not just award themselves the straight amount of 25% of their monthly basic salaries as honoraria. This is not the intendment of the law. Joseph Peter Sison, et al. vs. Rogelio Tablang, G.R. No. 177011, June 5, 2009. Election law DISQUALIFICATION FOR PUBLIC OFFICE. R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow have lost their Philippine citizenship citizens of the Philippines who, after they are deemed to have re-acquired

re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.

In the instant case, petitioner’s Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Candidacy did not comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 which further requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections. Roseller De Guzman vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 180048, June 19, 2009. ELECTION CASE; MOOT. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Courts will not determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question, as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced. Since the present Petition is grounded on petitioner Baldo’s specific objections to the 26 ERs in the previous local elections, no practical or useful purpose would be served by still passing on the merits thereof. Even if the Court sets aside the assailed COMELEC Resolutions and orders the exclusion of the disputed ERs from the canvass of votes, and as a result thereof, petitioner Baldo would emerge as the winning candidate for municipal mayor of Camalig, Albay, in the 10 May 2004 local elections, it would be an empty victory. It is already impossible for petitioner Baldo to still assume office as municipal mayor of Camalig, Albay, elected in the 10 May 2004 local elections, since his tenure as such had ended on 30 June 2007. Petitioner Baldo himself is currently occupying the very same office as the winning candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections. Irrefragably, the Court can no longer grant to petitioner Baldo any practical relief capable of enforcement. Consequently, the Court is left with no other recourse than to dismiss the instant Petition on the ground of mootness. Carlos Irwin G. Baldo vs. Commission on Elections. et al., G.R. No. 176135, June 16, 2009. Agrarian law JURISIDICTION; DAR. Under Section 50 of Rep. Act No. 6657, the DAR is vested with “primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform.” An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture. Under Section 3(d) of Rep. Act No. 6657, an agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers’ associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. It refers to any controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture. Zosimo Octavio and Jesus Albona (substituted by his wife, Violeta Albona) vs. Enrico R. Perovano, G.R. No. 172400, June 23, 2009. JURISDICTION;

DAR. DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR. Further exception to the DAR’s original and exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657, which are within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is vested in the courts. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Rene Ralla Belista, G.R. No. 164631. June 26, 2009. JUST COMPENSATION; DETERMINATION. The procedure for the determination of compensation cases under Republic Act No. 6657, as devised by this Court, commences with the valuation by the LBP of the lands taken by the State from private owners under the land reform program. Based on the valuation of the land by the LBP, the DAR makes an offer to the landowner through a written notice. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held and, afterwards, depending on the value of the land, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD), or the DARAB, fixes the price to be paid for the said land. If the landowner still does not agree with the price so fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC, acting as Special Agrarian Court. In the process of determining the just compensation due to landowners, it is a necessity that the RTC takes into account several factors enumerated in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Kumassie Plantation Company Incorporated/Kumassie Plantation Company Incorporated vs. Land Bank of the Philippines and the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform G.R. No. 177404/G.R. No. 178097, June 25, 2009. TENANTS. Tenants are defined as persons who — in themselves and with the aid available from within their immediate farm households — cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter’s consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both under the leasehold tenancy system. Based on the foregoing definition of a tenant, entrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential elements of tenancy: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. The presence of all these elements must be proved by substantial evidence. Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure and is not covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. Joaquin Soliman, et al., vs. Pampanga Sugar Development Company (PASUDECO), Inc., and Gerry Rodriguez, G.R. No. 169589, June 16, 2009. TENANTS. The CA held that there is no tenancy relationship between the private respondents and petitioners Apolonia, Carlos, Lourdes and Rogelio Tarona due to the absence of personal cultivation of the subject landholding by the latter In arriving at such a finding, the appellate court gave full credence to the evidence proffered by private respondents showing that the aforementioned petitioners are not residents of the locality where the subject landholding is and neither are they tenants of any lot thereat. The evidence, among others, consists of the Certification dated October 9, 2003 issued by the Barangay Captain of Mauban, now Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan, stating that Apolonia, Carlos, Lourdes and Rogelio Tarona are not residents therein and that they do not personally cultivate the subject property; and the Certification of the election officer of Caloocan City showing that said persons are residents and registered voters of Caloocan City. We find no reason to disturb the aforesaid finding of the CA. Clearly, private respondents’ evidence, which significantly the petitioners failed to refute, more than substantially proved the impossibility of personal cultivation. Petitioners (intervenors) have already left the place where the subject land lies in Morong, Bataan, and now live in another locality which is in Caloocan City. Since Bataan is of a considerable distance from Caloocan City, it would undeniably be physically impossible for the petitioners to personally cultivate the landholding. Leonardo Tarona, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 170182. June 18, 2009

PRIVATE LANDS; DISBARMENT FOR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

One of the fundamental principles of Philippine constitutional law is that ownership of land is generally reserved only to Filipinos. Article XII, Section 7 of the Constitution provides: ”Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.” On the other hand, Article XII, Section 8 provides: ”Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.” To summarize: Under the Constitution, private lands may be transferred or conveyed to the following: (a)

Filipino citizens;

(b) Corporations and associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens, since they have the capacity to hold lands of the public domain; (c)

Aliens but only in cases of hereditary succession; and

(d) Natural born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship subject to limitations provided by law. (see 2 Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 917 [2004]) One would think that all Philippine lawyers know this fundamental principle but that does not appear to be the case. In Keld Stemmerik, represented by Attys. Herminio. Liwanag and Winston P.L. Esguerra vs. Atty. Leonuel N. Mas, A.C. No. 8010, June 16, 2009, Keld Stemmerik, a Danish national, expressed interest in buying land in the Philippines and Atty. Mas advised him that he can legally acquire and own land in the Philippines. Keld gave Atty. Mas PhP3.8 million as purchase price of the property and returned to Denmark. Atty. Mas then prepared a contract to sell between Keld (with Atty. Mas as representative) and a certain Bonifacio de Mesa, who allegedly owns the property. Atty. Mas then prepared and notarized a deed of sale in which de Mesa sold the property to a certain Ailyn Gonzales for PhP3.8 million. Atty. Mas also drafted an agreement between Keld and Gonzales stating that it was Keld who provided the funds for the purchase of the property. After the various agreements were signed, Keld tried to get in touch with Atty. Mas, who never replied to Keld’s calls and email messages. When Keld returned to the Philippines, he learned that he could not own land in the Philippines. In addition, a verification made at the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in Olongapo City revealed that the property was inalienable as it was situated within the former US Military Reservation. Keld tried to locate Atty. Mas but never found him. It appears that Atty. Mas abandoned his law practice in Olongapo City. Keld then filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Mas with the Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The CBD and the IBP Board of Governors recommended the disbarment of Atty. Mas. The Supreme Court agreed that Atty. Mas should be disbarred. According to the Supreme Court: This Court has interpreted [Article XII, Section 7], as early as the 1947 case Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, to mean that “under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or agricultural lands, including residential lands.” The provision is a declaration of imperative constitutional policy. Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy, showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he knew were void and illegal. By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the property to complainant and that de Mesa thereafter sold the property to Gonzales who made the purchase for and in behalf of complainant, he falsified public documents and knowingly violated the Anti-Dummy Law. Respondent’s misconduct did not end there. By advising complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the property was alienable, respondent deliberately foisted a falsehood on his client. He did not give due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant. Instead, he deceived complainant and misled him into parting with P400,000 for services that were both illegal and unprofessional. Moreover, by pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for the purchase of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in nature. The Supreme Court stated that Atty. Mas showed “gross ignorance of the law.” Based solely on the facts recounted in the ruling, it is likely that Atty. Mas knew that aliens could not own land, and for that reason, the deed of sale he prepared was between de Mesa and Gonzales. If Atty. Mas was not aware of the constitutional prohibition against alien ownership, then he

would have likely placed Keld as the purchaser in the deed of sale. In asking Gonzales to acknowledge that the funds for the purchase of the property came from Keld, it seems that Atty. Mas was using Gonzales as a “dummy” for Keld.

JULY 2009 DECISIONS Constitutional Law DOUBLE POSITIONS. The office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a governmentowned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: “No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.” Dante Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009. ILLEGAL SEARCH. Even assuming that petitioner or any lawful occupant of the house was not present when the search was conducted, the search was done in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. Manalo was the barangay chairman of the place while Velasco was petitioner’s employee. Petitioner herself signed the certification of orderly search when she arrived at her residence. Clearly, the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court were complied with by the police authorities who conducted the search. Further, petitioner failed to substantiate her allegation that she was just forced to sign the search warrant, inventory receipt, and the certificate of orderly search. In fact, the records show that she signed these documents together with three other persons, including the barangay chairman who could have duly noted if petitioner was really forced to sign the documents against her will. Articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution. However, in this case, the Supreme Court sustained the validity of the search conducted in petitioner’s residence and, thus, the articles seized during the search are admissible in evidence against petitioner. Rosario Panuncio vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165678, July 17, 2009. JUST COMPENSATION. Section 17 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 applies only if the amount of just compensation of lands acquired through Presidential Decree No. 27 remains unresolved despite the passage of RA No. 6657. It is only in such a case, and to such extent only, that this provision on the determination of just compensation in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 is made to apply retrospectively. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Josefina R. Dumlao, et al., G.R. No. 167809, July 23, 2009. LANDHOLDING LIMITATION. Section 11 of Article XIV of the governing 1973 Constitution states that “no private corporation or association may hold by lease, concession, license, or permit, timber or forest lands and other timber or forest resources in excess of one hundred thousand hectares.” Complementing this provision was Chapter I, No. 3(e) of Forestry Administrative Order (FAO) No. 11 prohibiting any individual, corporation, partnership, or association from acquiring a timber license or license agreement covering an area in excess of 100,000 hectares. Likewise, Chapter I, No. 3(d) of FAO No. 11 states that no individual corporation, partnership, or association who is already a holder of an ordinary timber license or license agreement nor any member of the family, incorporator, director, stockholder, or member of such individual, corporation, partnership, or association shall be allowed to acquire a new timber license or license agreement or any interest or participation in it. The constitutional and statutory limitations on allowable area leases and concessions were obviously meant to prevent the concentration of large tracts of public land in the hands of a single individual. Republic of the Philippines vs. Estate of Alfonso Lim, Sr., et al., G.R. No. 164800, July 22, 2009. Party List. There are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:

1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of Representatives is the maximum number of seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for every four existing legislative districts. 2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization one seat. The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two percent of the total party-list votes. 3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the party-list organizations including those that received less than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in a second round of seat allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in the Supreme Court’s Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution. 4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from dominating the party-list system. There is no violation of the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not require absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The well-settled rule is that courts will not question the wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not violative of the Constitution. BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271/G.R. No. 179295, July 8, 2009. PRIVATE CORPORATIONS. Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a general law can qualify as private corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives. The Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation. The PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. Dante Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION. It is settled that it is the allegations in the Information that determine the nature of the offense, not the technical name given by the public prosecutor in the preamble of the Information. From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. Gauging such standard against the wording of the Information in this case, the Supreme Court held that there was no violation of petitioner’s rights. The recital of facts and circumstances in the Information sufficiently constitutes the crime of qualified theft. Sheala P. Matrido vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179061, July 13, 2009. SEARCH WARRANTS. Under Section 12, Chapter V of the Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties, as embodied in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC,The Executive Judges and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court. The applications shall be endorsed by the heads of such agencies or their respective duly authorized officials and shall particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts. Re: Request of the Police Director General Avelino I. Razon for authority to delegate the endorsement of application for search warrant, A.M. No. 08-4-4-SC, July 7, 2009.

SECURITY OF TENURE. Article IX (B), Section 2(3) of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that “[n]o officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.” The aforementioned constitutional provision does not distinguish between a regular employee and a probationary employee. The constitutional guaranty of security of tenure in the civil service has two legal ramifications. In Tria v. Chairman Patricia Sto. Tomas, et al., the Supreme Court held that the prohibition against suspension or dismissal of an officer or employee of the Civil Service “except for cause provided by law” is “a guaranty of both procedural and substantive due process.” “Not only must removal or suspension be in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, but also they can only be made on the basis of a valid cause provided by law.” Procedural due process basically requires that suspension or dismissal comes only after notice and hearing. Thus, the minimum requirements of due process are: (1) that the employees or officers must be informed of the charges preferred against them, and the formal way by which the employees or officers are informed is by furnishing them with a copy of the charges made against them; and (2) that they must have a reasonable opportunity to present their side of the matter, that is to say, their defenses against the charges and to present evidence in support of their defenses Here, the ground the petitioner invoked is not sufficient basis for the respondent’s dismissal, and her dismissal was effected without the observance of both procedural and substantive due process. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Rowena O. Paden, G.R. No. 157607, July 7, 2009. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as an effective defense of personal freedom. Where the restraint of liberty is allegedly authored by the State, the very entity tasked to ensure the liberty of all persons (citizens and aliens alike) within its jurisdiction, courts must be vigilant in extending the habeas corpus remedy to one who invokes it. To strictly restrict the great writ of liberty to technicalities not only defeats the spirit that animates the writ but also waters down the precious right that the writ seeks to protect, the right to liberty. To dilute the remedy that guarantees protection to the right is to negate the right itself. Thus, the Court will not unduly confine the writ of habeas corpus in the prison walls of technicality. Otherwise, it will betray its constitutional mandate to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. Here, petitioner’s continued imprisonment is by virtue of a valid judgment and court process. Martin Gibbs Fletcher vs. The Director of Bureau of Corrections or his representative, UDK-14071, July 17, 2009. Election Law APPEAL FEE; ELECTION CASES. Considering that a year has elapsed after the issuance on July 15, 2008 of Comelec Resolution No. 8486, and to further affirm the discretion granted to the Comelec which it precisely articulated through the specific guidelines contained in said Resolution, the Supreme Court declared that for notices of appeal filed after the promulgation of its decision, errors in the matter of non-payment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in election cases are no longer excusable. Salvador Divinagracia, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Alex A. Centena, G.R. Nos. 186007 & G.R. No. 186016, July 27, 2009. APPRECIATION OF BALLOTS. Appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents involves a question of fact best left to the determination of the COMRLEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law, the factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered by the Comelec on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this Court. Salvador Divinagracia, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Alex A. Centena, G.R. Nos. 186007 & G.R. No. 186016, July 27, 2009. COMELEC; INTERLOCUTORY ORDER. Since the COMELEC’s Division issued the interlocutory Order, the same COMELEC Division should resolve the motion for reconsideration of the Order. The remedy of the aggrieved party is neither to file a motion for reconsideration for certification to the COMELEC En Banc nor to elevate the issue to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil

Procedure. Eddie T. Panlilio vs. Commission on Elections and Lilia G. Pineda, G.R. No. 181478, July 15, 2009. COMELEC; CANCELLATION OF COC. Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), a false representation of material fact in the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) is a ground for the denial or cancellation of the COC. The false representation must pertain to a material fact that affects the right of the candidate to run for the election for which he filed his COC. Such material fact refers to a candidate’s eligibility or qualification for elective office like citizenship, residence or status as a registered voter. Aside from the requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for public office. It is settled that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a petition filed under Section 78 of the OEC. In the exercise of such jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the COC. If the candidate states a material representation in the COC that is false, the COMELEC is empowered to deny due course to or cancel the COC. The person whose COC is denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 of the OEC is not treated as a candidate at all, as if such person never filed a COC. Jamela Salic Maruhom vs. Commssion on Elections and Mohammad Ali “Mericano” A. Abinal, G.R. No. 179430, July 27, 2009. COMELEC; ORDERS OF DIVISION. Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc. Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution mandates that only motions for reconsideration of final decisions shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc. It is clear from the foregoing constitutional provision that the COMELEC en banc shall decide motions for reconsideration only of “decisions” of a Division, meaning those acts having a final character. Here, the assailed Second Division order did not completely dispose of the case, as there was something more to be done, which was to decide the election protest. Being interlocutory, the assailed Second Division orders may not be resolved by the COMELEC en banc. Eddie T. Panlilio vs. Commission on Elections and Lilia G. Pineda, G.R. No. 181478, July 15, 2009. COMELEC; POWERS. The COMELEC has broad power, derived from our fundamental law, to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall; its power of supervision and control over boards of election inspectors and boards of canvassers; the concomitant need to do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections; the grant to it of broad and flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections; and its role as the guardian of the people’s sacred right of suffrage. In particular, the statutory power of supervision and control by the COMELEC over the boards of canvassers includes the power to revise or reverse the action of the boards, as well as to do what the boards should have done. Such power includes the authority to initiate motu propio such steps or actions as may be required pursuant to law, like reviewing the actions of the board; conducting an inquiry affecting the genuineness of election returns beyond the election records of the polling places involved; annulling canvass or proclamations based on incomplete returns or on incorrect or tampered returns; invalidating a canvass or proclamation made in an unauthorized meeting of the board of canvassers either because it lacked a quorum or because the board did not meet at all; or requiring the board to convene. Rafael Flauta, Jr., et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 184586, July 22, 2009. COMELEC; PROTESTS. Under Section 2(2), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials. Since the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitioner’s election protest, it has the authority to issue the assailed Orders. Eddie T. Panlilio vs. Commission on Elections and Lilia G. Pineda, G.R. No. 181478, July 15, 2009. DOUBLE REGISTRATION. Maruhom, at the time she filed her COC, could not have honestly declared therein that she was a registered voter of Marantao and an eligible candidate for mayor of the said municipality. It is incumbent upon Maruhom to truthfully state her eligibility in her COC, especially so because the COC is filled up under oath. An elective office is a public trust. He who aspires for elective office should not make a mockery of the electoral process by falsely representing himself. Jamela Salic Maruhom

vs. Commssion on Elections and Mohammad Ali “Mericano” A. Abinal, G.R. No. 179430, July 27, 2009. ESTOPPEL BY LACHES. The doctrine of estoppel by laches is not new in election cases. It has been applied in at least two cases involving the payment of filing fees. Salvador Divinagracia, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Alex A. Centena, G.R. Nos. 186007 & G.R. No. 186016, July 27, 2009. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET). The Constitution mandates that the HRET “shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of its members. By employing the word “sole,” the Constitution is emphatic that the jurisdiction of the HRET in the adjudication of election contests involving its members is exclusive and exhaustive. Its exercise of power is intended to be its own — full, complete and unimpaired. Due regard and respect for the authority of the HRET as an independent constitutional body require that any finding of grave abuse of discretion against that body should be based on firm and convincing proof, not on shaky assumptions. Any accusation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the HRET must be established by a clear showing of arbitrariness and improvidence. The Supreme Court did not find evidence of such grave abuse of discretion by the HRET. At the risk of unduly encroaching on the exclusive prerogative of the HRET as the sole judge of election contests involving its members, the Supreme Court cannot substitute its own sense or judgment for that of the HRET on the issues of whether the evidence presented during the initial revision could affect the officially proclaimed results and whether the continuation of the revision proceedings could lead to a determination of the true will of the electorate. That is what petitioner actually wants the Supreme Court to do. But in the exercise of its checking function, the Supreme Court should merely test whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or had a different view. Henry “June” Dueñas, Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Angelito “Jett” P. Reyes, G.R. No. 185401, July 21, 2009. FORFEITURE OF SENATE SEAT FOR HOLDING ANOTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICE In Dante Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009, the petitioners filed with the Supreme Court a “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate.” During Gordon’s incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads: SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected. Petitioners cite Camporedondo vs. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant to Flores vs. Drilon, which held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to another government office. The Supreme Court addressed the preliminary issue of whether the petitioners have standing to file the petition. The Supreme Court answered in the negative: . . . petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short, petitioners filed an action for usurpation of public office against respondent, a public officer who allegedly committed an act which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an action is for quo warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such an action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can bring the action in his own name. The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be

dismissed at any stage. In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present petition. On the merits, the Supreme Court ruled that PNPRC is a private organization performing public functions: “The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC member for one year upon contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the year. Even foreigners, whether residents or not, can be members of the PNRC. . . . . . the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable organization. The PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Petitioners anchor their petition on the 1999 case of Camporedondo v. NLRC, which ruled that the PNRC is a governmentowned or controlled corporation. In ruling that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation, the simple test used was whether the corporation was created by its own special charter for the exercise of a public function or by incorporation under the general corporation law. Since the PNRC was created under a special charter, the Court then ruled that it is a government corporation. However, the Camporedondo ruling failed to consider the definition of a governmentowned or controlled corporation as provided under Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987. . . A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. In the case of a non-stock corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the members must be government officials holding such membership by appointment or designation by the government. Under this criterion, and as discussed earlier, the government does not own or control PNRC. Finally, the Supreme Court held that the PNRC Charter is violative of the constitutional proscription against the creation of private corporations by special law, as provided in Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution: Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a general law can qualify as private corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives. The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled corporations through special charters. Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can create corporations with special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or controlled. . . . . . although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a government-owned or controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership and control by the government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against the creation of private corporations by special charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants it corporate powers, is void for being unconstitutional. Thus, Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, are void.

AUGUST 2009 DECISIONS Constitutional law CONGRESS; LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY. The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution. As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would

be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge’s speculation as to the motives. This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity. For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter. Antero J. Pobre vs. Sen. Miriam DefensorSantiago, A.C. No. 7399. August 25, 2009. DOUBLE JEOPARDY; JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL. Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable. It is also immediately executory and the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. The Constitution has expressly adopted the double jeopardy policy and thus bars multiple criminal trials, thereby conclusively presuming that a second trial would be unfair if the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a previous final judgment. Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only the defendant’s already established innocence at the first trial where he had been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the State. Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process where the government’s power and resources are once again employed against the defendant’s individual means. That the second opportunity comes via an appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and conscience. Thus, the absolute and inflexible rule is that the State is proscribed from appealing the judgment of acquittal through either a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, or an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules. People of the Philippines vs. Dir. Cesar P. Nazareno, Dir. Evelino Nartatez, Dir. Nicasio Ma. S. Custodio and The Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 168982, August 5, 2009. EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPEMSATION. Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as sovereign, to take private property for public use upon observance of due process of law and payment of just compensation. Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated. Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value of the property are the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax declarations thereon. The measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. To be just, the compensation must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. Just compensation is based on the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the government. However, if the government takes possession before the institution of expropriation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of the filing of the complaint. The value at the time of the filing of the complaint should be the basis for the determination of the value when the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings.

The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that “[u]pon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” However, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals that Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing of complaint for eminent domain with the appropriate court by the expropriator. If no such complaint is filed, the expropriator is considered to have violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation. In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we clarified that when there is no action for expropriation and the case involves only a complaint for damages or just compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on ascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67) are no longer applicable, and a trial before commissioners is dispensable. Republic of the Philippines through the Department of Public Works and Highways vs. Court of Appeals and Rosario Rodriguez Reyes, G.R. No. 160379, August 14, 2009. EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPENSATION . PD 27 and RA 6657 provide different factors for the computation of just compensation. The former uses average crop harvest as a consideration, whereas, the latter uses the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors as factors for consideration in determining just compensation. In the case at bar, it is undisputed by the parties that the lands were acquired under PD 27. Moreover, it is also undisputed that just compensation has not yet been settled prior to the passage of RA 6657. Thus, the issue to be determined is what law shall govern in the determination of just compensation. If just compensation was not settled prior to the passage of RA 6657, it should be computed in accordance with the said law, although the property was acquired under PD 27. Department of Agrarian Reform (etc.) vs. Carmen S. Tongson, G.R. No. 171674, August 4, 2009. EMINENT DOMAIN; TAKING. It is the date of the issuance of emancipation patents that should serve as the reckoning point for purposes of computation of just compensation. Copies of the emancipation patents issued to the farmer-beneficiaries, however, have not been attached to the records of the case. Department of Agrarian Reform (etc.) vs. Carmen S. Tongson, G.R. No. 171674, August 4, 2009. FREE ACCESS CLAUSE; COURT FILING FEES. The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution. The importance of the right to free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and to adequate legal assistance cannot be denied. A move to remove the provision on free access from the Constitution on the ground that it was already covered by the equal protection clause was defeated by the desire to give constitutional stature to such specific protection of the poor. In implementation of the right of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of Court. The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants. Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi re exemption from legal and filing fees of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC, August 19, 2009. LAWS; PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. Every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law. Those who petition the court to declare a law unconstitutional must show thta there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative or argumentative one. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Partylist represented by Salvador B. Britanico vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009. LAWS; TITLE.

Petitioner alleges that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also alleges that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9369. The constitutional requirement that “every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof” has always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. The title of a law does not have to be an index of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. Moreover, a title which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated. RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled “An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled ‘An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes.’” Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covers the amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881), Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166), and other related election laws to achieve its purpose of promoting transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the elections. The provisions of RA 9369 assailed by petitioner deal with amendments to specific provisions of RA 7166 and BP 881, specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA 7166, respectively; and (2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends Section 265 of BP 881. Therefore, the assailed provisions are germane to the subject matter of RA 9369 which is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among others. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Partylist represented by Salvador B. Britanico vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009. NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT. Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the provision which fixes the per diem of poll watchers of the dominant majority and dominant minority parties at poll election day. Petitioner argues that this violates the freedom of the parties to contract and their right to fix the terms and conditions of the contract they see as fair, equitable and just. Petitioner adds that this is a purely private contract using private funds which cannot be regulated by law. There is no violation of the non-impairment clause. First, the non- impairment clause is limited in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. As observed by the OSG, there is no existing contract yet and, therefore, no enforceable right or demandable obligation will be impaired. RA 9369 was enacted more than three months prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Hence, when the dominant majority and minority parties hired their respective poll watchers for the 14 May 2007 elections, they were deemed to have incorporated in their contracts all the provisions of RA 9369. Second, it is settled that police power is superior to the non-impairment clause. The constitutional guaranty of nonimpairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Partylist represented by Salvador B. Britanico vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL. Petitioner argues that Sections 37 and 38 of RA 9369 violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution for encroaching upon the jurisdiciton of the PET and the SET. Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of Congress and the COMELEC en banc, on one hand, and the PET and the SET, on the other, are exercised on different occasions and for different purposes. The PET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President. The SET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate. The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be invoked once the winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidates have been proclaimed. On the other hand, under Section 37, Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall determine only the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass. Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power before the proclamation of the winning presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial candidates. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Partylist represented by Salvador B. Britanico vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009. STRIKE; ILLEGAL STRIKE.

It is hornbook principle that the exercise of the right of private sector employees to strike is not absolute (see Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution). A. Soriano Aviation vs. Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation, et al., G.R. No. 166879, August 14, 2009. TAXATION; DOUBLE TAXATION. Double taxation means taxing the same property twice when it should be taxed only once; that is, “taxing the same person twice by the same jurisdiction for the same thing.” It is obnoxious when the taxpayer is taxed twice, when it should be but once. Otherwise described as “direct duplicate taxation,” the two taxes must be imposed on the same subject matter, for the same purpose, by the same taxing authority, within the same jurisdiction, during the same taxing period; and the taxes must be of the same kind or character. Using the aforementioned test, the Court finds that there is indeed double taxation if respondent is subjected to the taxes under both Sections 14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, since these are being imposed: (1) on the same subject matter – the privilege of doing business in the City of Manila; (2) for the same purpose – to make persons conducting business within the City of Manila contribute to city revenues; (3) by the same taxing authority – petitioner City of Manila; (4) within the same taxing jurisdiction – within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Manila; (5) for the same taxing periods – per calendar year; and (6) of the same kind or character – a local business tax imposed on gross sales or receipts of the business. The City of Manila, Liberty M. Toledo in her capacity as the Treasurer of Manila, et al. vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 181845, August 4, 2009. WARRANTLESS SEARCH; PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE . Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. In this case, the police authorities were in the area because that was where they caught up with petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just took place and it was reported that petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the firearms may be evidence of a crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms. Judge Felimon Abelita, III vs. P/Supt. German Doria and SPO3 Cesar Ramirez, G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009. Public Officers PRACTICE OF PROFESSION. Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of public officials and employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of their profession during their incumbency. As an exception, a public official or employee can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or her official functions. The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public official or employee’s resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except for the private practice of profession under subsection (b)(2), which can already be undertaken even within the one-year prohibition period. As an exception to this exception, the one-year prohibited period applies with respect to any matter before the office the public officer or employee used to work with. The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public trust; and serve to remove any impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government transactions between a former government official or employee and his or her former colleagues, subordinates or superiors. The prohibitions also promote the observance and the efficient use of every moment of the prescribed office hours to serve the public. Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not the only prohibition to contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel also applies. A clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law immediately after her separation from the service and without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of court’s limitation is that she cannot practice her profession within one year before the office where he or she used to work with. Query of Atty. Karen

M. Silverio-Buffe, former Clerk of Court, Branch 81, Romblon, Romblon, on the prohibition from engaging in the private practice of law, A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC, August 19, 2009. Agrarian law TENANTS. To qualify for protection under PD 1517 and avail of the rights and privileges granted by the said decree, the claimant must be: (1) a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more; (2) must have built his home on the land by contract; and, (3) has resided continuously for the last ten (10) years. The “tenant” covered by PD 1517 is, as defined under Section 3(f) thereof, “the rightful occupant of land and its structures, but does not include those whose presence on the land is merely tolerated and without the benefit of contract, those who enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose possession is under litigation.” Stated differently, those whose possession or occupation of land is devoid of any legal authority or those whose contracts of lease are already terminated, or had already expired, or whose possession is under litigation are not considered “tenants” under the decree. Conversely, a legitimate tenant is one who is not a usurper or an occupant by tolerance. The petitionersdefendants whose occupation has been merely by the owner’s tolerance obviously fall outside the coverage of PD 1517 and cannot seek its protection. Francisco Madrid and Edgardo Bernardo vs. Spouses Bonifacio Mapoy and Felicidad Martinez, G.R. No. 150887, August 14, 2009. Election Law COMELEC; POWERS. We do not agree with petitioner and the COMELEC that the Constitution gave the COMELEC the “exclusive power” to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws. Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to “investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.” This was an important innovation introduced by the Constitution because this provision was not in the 1935 or 1973] Constitutions. The phrase “[w]here appropriate” leaves to the legislature the power to determine the kind of election offenses that the COMELEC shall prosecute exclusively or concurrently with other prosecuting arms of the government. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Partylist represented by Salvador B. Britanico vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009.

PURCHASE OF LAND DURING THE ELECTION BAN The Omnibus Election Code prohibits the construction of public works and the issuance of treasury warrants during a period of 45 days prior to a regular election and 30 days prior to a special election. Section 261 (w) reads: (w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices.- During the period of forty five days preceding a regular election and thirty days before a special election, any person who: (a) undertakes the construction of any public works, except for projects or works exempted in the preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable against public funds. In Robert P. Guzman vs. Commission on Elections, Mayor Randolph S. Ting and Salvacion Garcia, G.R. No. 182380, August 28, 2009, the issue that arose is whether the purchase by the city mayor of land for use as a public cemetery and the issuance of a treasury warrant as payment for the land violate the Omnibus Election Code. On March 31, 2004, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tuguegarao City passed Resolution No. 048-2004 to authorize City Mayor Ting to acquire two parcels of land for use as a public cemetery of the City. Pursuant to the resolution, City Mayor Ting purchased the two parcels of land. As payment, City Treasurer Garcia issued and released Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514 dated April 20, 2004 in the sum of P8,486,027.00. On May 5, 2004, the City Government of Tuguegarao caused the registration of the sale and the issuance of new certificates in its name. Based on the transaction, the petitioner filed a complaint in the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Cagayan Province against City Mayor Ting and City Treasurer Garcia, charging them with a violation of Section 261,

paragraphs (v) and (w), of the Omnibus Election Code, for having undertaken to construct a public cemetery and for having released, disbursed and expended public funds within 45 days prior to the May 9, 2004 election, in disregard of the prohibitions under said provisions due to the election ban period having commenced on March 26, 2004 and ended on May 9, 2004. After investigation, the Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of Cagayan recommended the dismissal of the complaint. The COMELEC en banc adopted the foregoing recommendation in its own resolution dated February 18, 2008 issued in E.O. Case No. 06-14 and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, holding that the acquisition of the two parcels of land for a public cemetery was not considered as within the term public works; and that, consequently, the issuance of Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514 was not for public works and was thus in violation of Section 261 (w) of the Omnibus Election Code. The Supreme Court ruled that the purchase of the lots for use as a public cemetery does not constitute construction of a public work within the context of the prohibition under the Omnibus Election Code. According to the Supreme Court: We first construe the term public works − which the Omnibus Election Code does not define − with the aid of extrinsic sources. The Local Government Code of 1991 considers public works to be the fixed infrastructures and facilities owned and operated by the government for public use and enjoyment. According to the Code, cities have the responsibility of providing infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of their residents and funded out of city funds, such as, among others, roads and bridges; school buildings and other facilities for public elementary and secondary schools; and clinics, health centers and other health facilities necessary to carry out health services. Likewise, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the engineering and construction arm of the government, associates public works with fixed infrastructures for the public. . . The enumeration in Sec. 1, supra − “infrastructure facilities, especially national highways, flood control and water resources development systems, and other public works in accordance with national development objectives” − means that only the fixed public infrastructures for use of the public are regarded as public works. This construction conforms to the rule of ejusdem generis . . . Accordingly, absent an indication of any contrary legislative intention, the term public works as used in Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code is properly construed to refer to any building or structure on land or to structures (such as roads or dams) built by the Government for public use and paid for by public funds. Public works are clearly works, whether of construction or adaptation undertaken and carried out by the national, state, or municipal authorities, designed to subserve some purpose of public necessity, use or convenience, such as public buildings, roads, aqueducts, parks, etc.; or, in other words, all fixed works constructed for public use. It becomes inevitable to conclude, therefore, that the petitioner’s insistence − that the acquisition of Lots 5860 and 5881 for use as a public cemetery be considered a disbursement of the public funds for public works in violation of Section 261(v) of the Omnibus Election Code − was unfounded and unwarranted. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the issuance of the treasury warrant violated the Omnibus Election Code: The OSG posits that [Section 261(w)] is violated in either of two ways: (a) by any person who, within 45 days preceding a regular election and 30 days before a special election, undertakes the construction of any public works except those enumerated in the preceding paragraph; or (b) by any person who issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable against public funds within 45 days preceding a regular election and 30 days before a special election. We concur with the OSG’s position. Section 261 (w) covers not only one act but two, i.e., the act under subparagraph (a) above and that under subparagraph (b) above. For purposes of the prohibition, the acts are separate and distinct, considering that Section 261(w) uses the disjunctive or to separate subparagraphs (a) and (b). In legal hermeneutics, or is a disjunctive that expresses an alternative or gives a choice of one among two or more things. The word signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another thing in an enumeration. It should be construed, as a rule, in the sense that it ordinarily implies as a disjunctive word. According to Black, too, the word and can never be read as or, or vice versa, in criminal and penal statutes, where the rule of strict construction prevails. Consequently, whether or not the treasury warrant in question was intended for public works was even of no moment in determining if the legal provision was violated.

There was a probable cause to believe that Section 261(w), subparagraph (b), of the Omnibus Election Code was violated when City Mayor Ting and City Treasurer Garcia issued Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514 during the election ban period. For this reason, our conclusion that the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion in dismissing E.O. Case No. 06-14 for lack of merit is inevitable and irrefragable.

“SUPREME COURT OF IDIOTS” After Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago was not considered for the position of Chief Justice by the Judicial and Bar Council, she delivered a speech on the Senate floor and was quoted as saying: I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots. . . In a sworn letter complaint dated December 22, 2006, a certain Antero J. Pobre asked the Supreme Court to undertake disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary action against Senator Santiago on the ground that her statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. In her comment, Senator Santiago, through counsel, did not deny making the statements. However, she explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. The Supreme Court agreed with Senator Santiago. In Antero J. Pobre vs. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, it ruled: The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: “A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.” Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, said: Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.” As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge’s speculation as to the motives. This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity. For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter.

While the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, it felt that such should not be the last word on the matter. It added: The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted “to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court,” and calling the Court a “Supreme Court of idiots”. . . The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition. We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall. It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members. The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, “offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public institution.” But as to Senator Santiago’s unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance. The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.”

SEPTEMBER 2009 DECISIONS Constitutional Law CITIZENSHIP; ELECTION. Com. Act No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention “in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.” However, the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made “upon reaching the age of majority.” The age of majority then commenced upon reaching 21 years. In the opinions of the then Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of the Supreme Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made within a “reasonable time” after attaining the age of majority. The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. It is true that we said that the 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be extended as when the person has always regarded himself as a Filipino. In hits case, not a single circumstance was sufficiently shown meriting the extension of the 3-year period. The fact that Carlos exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955 does not demonstrate such belief, considering that the acts were done after he elected Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, the mere fact that he was able to vote does not validate his irregular election of Philippine citizenship. At most, his registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not alter his real citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the rights and privileges granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this country.

It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state. Carlos T. Go., Sr., vs. Luis T. Ramos/Jimmy T. Go vs. Luis T. Ramos/Hon. Alipio F. Fernandez, etc., et al. vs. Jimmy T. Go a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano, G.R. No. 167569/G.R. No. 167570/G.R. No. 171946, September 4, 2009. CITIZENSHIP; JUS SOLI. The doctrine of jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of one’s citizenship. However, the Supreme Court abandoned the principle of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor. Since then, said doctrine only benefited those who were individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final court decision on the mistaken application of jus soli. Neither will the Philippine Bill of 1902 nor the Jones Law of 1916 make Carlos a citizen of the Philippines. His bare claim that his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the said laws, without any supporting evidence whatsoever will not suffice. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. Moreover, we have also ruled that an illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. However, it is our considered view that absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated established rule could not be applied to him. Carlos T. Go., Sr., vs. Luis T. Ramos/Jimmy T. Go vs. Luis T. Ramos/Hon. Alipio F. Fernandez, etc., et al. vs. Jimmy T. Go a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano, G.R. No. 167569/G.R. No. 167570/G.R. No. 171946, September 4, 2009. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; JURISDICTION. The CSC is the constitutional body charged with the establishment and administration of a career civil service which embraces all branches and agencies of the government. In the recent case of Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso, the Court held that special laws such as R.A. 4670 did not divest the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil service, including public school teachers. This Court has also previously held in Civil Service Commission v. Albao that the CSC has the authority to directly institute proceedings to discipline a government employee in order to protect the integrity of the civil service. Civil Service Commission vs. Fatima A. Macud, G.R. No. 177531. September 10, 2009 COMELEC: POLL AUTOMATION CONTRACT. Assayed against the provisions of the Constitution, the enabling automation law, RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, the RFP and even the Anti-Dummy Law, which petitioners invoked as an afterthought, the Court finds the project award to have complied with legal prescriptions, and the terms and conditions of the corresponding automation contract in question to be valid. No grave abuse of discretion, therefore, can be laid on the doorsteps of respondent Comelec. And surely, the winning joint venture should not be faulted for having a foreign company as partner. The Comelec is an independent constitutional body with a distinct and pivotal role in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its awesome functions as overseer of fair elections, administrator and lead implementor of laws relative to the conduct of elections, it should not be stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the case of an organization of lesser responsibility. It should be afforded ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in devising means and initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the great objective for which it was created––to promote free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections. This is as it should be for, too often, Comelec has to make decisions under difficult conditions to address unforeseen events to preserve the integrity of the election and in the process the voice of the people. Thus, in the past, the Court has steered away from interfering with the Comelec’s exercise of its power which, by law and by the nature of its office properly pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on Comelec’s part, as here, the Court should refrain from utilizing the corrective hand of certiorari to review, let alone nullify, the acts of that body. Harry L. Roque, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 188456, September 10, 2009. EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPENSATION. Section 18 of the CARL mandates that petitioner shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner, DAR, and petitioner, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land. In determining just compensation, Section 17 of the CARL enumerates the factors to be considered in the determination of just compensation, namely, the cost of acquisition of the land; the current value of like properties; its nature, actual use and income; the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations; and the assessment made by government assessors. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm workers and by the government to the property, as

well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, shall be considered as additional factors to determine its value. In the case at bar, the SAC arrived at the just compensation due respondents for their subject property by taking into account the market value of the subject property, the tax declaration of respondents, the actual use of and income from the subject property, the assessor’s valuation, and the volume and value of its produce; and factors specifically mentioned under Section 17 of the CARL. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the determination of just compensation by the SAC. There being no allegation or evidence that the determination of just compensation for the subject property by the SAC, as affirmed by the appellate court, was not in conformity with or was in violation of the provisions of the CARL, the applicable law, then we have no reason to disturb the same. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Asuncion Anonuevo Vda. Santos, et al., G.R. No. 179862, September 3, 2009. PCGG; POWER. The PCGG’s power to sequester alleged ill-gotten properties is likened to the provisional remedies of preliminary attachment or receivership which are always subject to the control of the court.” The PCGG, therefore, as the “receiver” of sequestered assets and in consonance with its duty under EO 1, Series of 1986, to protect and preserve them, has the power to exercise acts of dominion provided that those acts are approved by the proper court. From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that it is the PCGG—not COCOFED or the CIIF companies—that has the right and/or authority during sequestration to seek this Court’s approval for the proposed conversion. Consequently, the terms and conditions sought by COCOFED for the conversion are not material to the proposed conversion. At most, COCOFED’s prayer for approval of the conversion reflects its conformity to said transfiguration. After a circumspect evaluation of the incident at bar, we resolve to approve the conversion. The Court holds that respondent Republic has satisfactorily hurdled the onus of showing that the conversion is advantageous to the public interest or will result in clear and material benefit to the eventually declared stock owners, be they the coconut farmers or the government itself. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), Manuel V. Del Rosario, Domingo P. Espina, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, September 17, 2009. SEARCH; PLAIN VIEW. The “plain view doctrine” may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Sr. Inspector Jerry Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009. SEARCH; WARRANTLESS ARREST . When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase “within the area of his immediate control” means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. Sr. Inspector Jerry Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009. STATUTES; CONSTITUTIONALITY. Article 202(2) of the RPC, which penalizes any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support, is constitutional. The provision is not vague and does not violate the equal protection clause. People of the Philippines vs. Evangeline Siton y sacil, et al., G.R. No. 169364, September 18, 2009.

Administrative Law ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; LIABILITY . An administrative proceeding is different from a criminal case and may proceed independently thereof. Even if respondents would subsequently be found guilty of a crime based on the same set of facts obtaining in the present administrative complaint, the same will not automatically mean that they are also administratively liable. A finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondents’ acquittal will not necessarily exculpate them administratively. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. It must be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. To state it simply, petitioner erroneously equated criminal liability to administrative liability. Dr. Castor C. De Jesus vs. Rafael D. Guerrero III, Cesario R. Pagdilao and Fortuna B. Aquino, G.R .No. 171491, September 4, 2009. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; QUANTUM OF PROOF. In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere conjectures and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his allegations, the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit. Dr. Castor C. De Jesus vs. Rafael D. Guerrero III, Cesario R. Pagdilao and Fortuna B. Aquino, G.R .No. 171491, September 4, 2009. ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; EXHAUSTION. The doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made with the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the controversy may be elevated to a court of justice for review. A premature invocation of a court’s intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible. EO 149 transferred LLDA from the Office of the President to the DENR “for policy and program coordination and/or administrative supervision x x x.” Under EO 149, DENR only has administrative power over LLDA. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. However, Executive Order No. 192 (EO 192), which reorganized the DENR, mandates the DENR to “promulgate rules and regulations for the control of water, air and land pollution” and to “promulgate ambient and effluent standards for water and air quality including the allowable levels of other pollutants and radiations.” EO 192 created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to the adjudication of pollution cases, including NPCC’s function to “[s]erve as arbitrator for the determination of reparation, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution.” Hence, TACC has an administrative recourse before the DENR Secretary which it should have first pursued before filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Alexandra Condominium Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority, G.R. No. 169228. September 11, 2009. DISMISSAL; GROSS MISCONDUCT . Pursuant to Section 52, Rule IV of the Civil Service Rules, gross misconduct is a grave offense punishable with dismissal for the first offense, without prejudice to the Ombudsman’s right to file the appropriate criminal case against the petitioner or other responsible individuals. We are, of course, aware that in several administrative cases, this Court has refrained from strictly imposing the penalties provided by the law, in light of mitigating factors such as the offending employee’s length of service, acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, advanced age, and other equitable considerations. However, we find that petitioner’s recalcitrant refusal to explain the use (or misuse) of the more than P700,000.00 in cash placed in her possession makes her unworthy of such humanitarian consideration, and merits the most serious penalty provided by law. Gloria G. Hallasgo, Municipal Treasurer of Damulong, Bukidnon vs. Commission on Audit (COA), Regional Office No. X, G.R. No. 171340, September 11, 2009. PUBLIC OFFICER; PRIVATE SECTOR REPRESENTATIVE.

A private sector representative appointed to the National Book Development Board is a public officer for purposes of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. Carolina R. Javier vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 147026-27, September 11, 2009.

Election law BALLOTS; APPRECIATION. The neighborhood rule is a settled rule stating that where the name of a candidate is not written in the proper space in the ballot, but is preceded by the name of the office for which he is a candidate, the vote should be counted as valid for said candidate. Such rule is usually applied in consonance with the intent rule which stems from the principle that in the appreciation of the ballot, the object should be to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it could be determined with reasonable certainty. Ernesto Batalla vs. Commission on Elections and Teodoro Bataller, G.R. No. 184268, September 15, 2009. CANDIDATES; DOMICILE. In Japzon v. Commission on Elections, it was held that the term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).” In Domino v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained that domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. It is a question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time. If one wishes to successfully effect a change of domicile, he must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three requirements, the domicile of origin continues. Makil U. Pundaodaya vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 179313. September 17, 2009 CANDIDATES; PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING . The conduct of a motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political activity, falling squarely within the ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, on “[h]olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate[.]” A motorcade is a procession or parade of automobiles or other motor vehicles.[31] The conduct thereof during election periods by the candidates and their supporters is a fact that need not be belabored due to its widespread and pervasive practice. The obvious purpose of the conduct of motorcades is to introduce the candidates and the positions, to which they seek to be elected, to the voting public; or to make them more visible so as to facilitate the recognition and recollection of their names in the minds of the voters come election time. Unmistakably, motorcades are undertaken for no other purpose than to promote the election of a particular candidate or candidates. In the instant Petition, Penera never denied that she took part in the conduct of the motorcade after she filed her COC on the day before the start of the campaign period. For violating Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, proscribing election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period, Penera must be disqualified from holding the office of Mayor of Sta. Monica. Rosalinda A. Penera vs. Commission on Elections and Edgar T. Andanar, G.R. No. 181613, September 11, 2009. CANDIDATES; PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING. The Dissenting Opinion ultimately concludes that because of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, the prohibited act of premature campaigning in Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, is practically impossible to commit at any time.

We disagree. Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code remains relevant and applicable despite Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended. A close reading of the entire Republic Act No. 9369, which amended Republic Act No. 8436, would readily reveal that that it did not contain an express repeal of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. An express repeal is one wherein a statute declares, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law,identified by its number or title, is repealed.[35] Absent this specific requirement, an express repeal may not be presumed. To our mind, there is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility between Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which defines the prohibited act of premature campaigning. It is possible to harmonize and reconcile these two provisions and, thus, give effect to both. Rosalinda A. Penera vs. Commission on Elections and Edgar T. Andanar, G.R. No. 181613, September 11, 2009.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAW PENALIZING LOITERING Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support. It provides: Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. — The following are vagrants: 1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling; 2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support; 3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill fame; ruffians or pimps and those who habitually associate with prostitutes; 4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be found loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or justifiable purpose; 5.

Prostitutes.

For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes. Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this articles shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court. Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Instead of submitting their counter-affidavits as directed, they filed separate Motions to Quash on the ground that Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad. The municipal trial court declared Article 202(2) constitutional. Evangeline and Krystel filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, directly challenging the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law. They claimed that the definition of the crime of vagrancy under Article 202 (2), apart from being vague, results in an arbitrary identification of violators, since the definition of the crime includes in its coverage persons who are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts. They likewise claimed that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under the Constitution because it discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary and unreasonable classification. The Regional Trial Court agreed with Evangeline and Krystel. In declaring Article 202 (2) unconstitutional, the Regional Trial Court opined that the law is vague and violated the equal protection clause. It held that the “void for vagueness” doctrine is equally applicable in testing the validity of penal statutes. The Supreme Court reversed the Regional Trial Court and ruled that Article 202(2) is not vague:

The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature and inherent in the sovereign power of the state to maintain social order as an aspect of police power. The legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful provided that no constitutional rights have been abridged. However, in exercising its power to declare what acts constitute a crime, the legislature must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule of conduct and know what acts it is his duty to avoid. This requirement has come to be known as the void-for-vagueness doctrine which states that “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. . . ” The Regional Trial Court, in asserting the unconstitutionality of Article 202 (2), take support mainly from the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in the Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville . . . The underlying principles in Papachristou are that: 1) the assailed Jacksonville ordinance “fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute;” and 2) it encourages or promotes opportunities for the application of discriminatory law enforcement. The said underlying principle in Papachristou that the Jacksonville ordinance, or Article 202 (2) in this case, fails to give fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct, finds no application here because under our legal system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. This principle is of Spanish origin, and we adopted it to govern and limit legal conduct in this jurisdiction. Under American law, ignorance of the law is merely a traditional rule that admits of exceptions. Moreover, the Jacksonville ordinance was declared unconstitutional on account of specific provisions thereof, which are not found in Article 202 (2). . . Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jacksonville declared the ordinance unconstitutional, because such activities or habits as nightwalking, wandering or strolling around without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafing, habitual spending of time at places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, and living upon the earnings of wives or minor children, which are otherwise common and normal, were declared illegal. But these are specific acts or activities not found in Article 202 (2). The closest to Article 202 (2) – “any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support” – from the Jacksonville ordinance, would be “persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object.” But these two acts are still not the same: Article 202 (2) is qualified by “without visible means of support” while the Jacksonville ordinance prohibits wandering or strolling “without any lawful purpose or object,” which was held by the U.S. Supreme Court to constitute a “trap for innocent acts.” The Supreme Court also ruled that Article 202(2) does not violate the equal protection clause: Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct. Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive. It is a public order crime which punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and time which orderly society finds unusual, under such conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as would engender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of the community. Finally, the Supreme Court also emphasized the rule the statues are presumed constitutional: . . . we agree with the position of the State that first and foremost, Article 202 (2) should be presumed valid and constitutional. When confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary that every court must approach it with grave care and considerable caution bearing in mind that every statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied, crafted and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted. It must not be forgotten that police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and

welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. As an obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2) must therefore be viewed in a constitutional light.

PRIVATE SECTOR REPRESENTATIVE AS PUBLIC OFFICER Various laws provide for the appointment of a private sector representative in governmental bodies. For example, the Renewable Energy Act of 2008 creates the National Renewable Energy Board and provides for the appointment of private sector representatives to the board. Is a private sector representative to the board a public officer? In Carolina R. Javier vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 147026-27, September 11, 2009, Javier was charged with malversation of public funds. Javier was the private sector representative in the National Book Development Board (NBDB), which was created by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8047, otherwise known as the “Book Publishing Industry Development Act”. R.A. No. 8047 provided for the creation of the NBDB, which was placed under the administration and supervision of the Office of the President. The NBDB is composed of eleven (11) members who are appointed by the President, five (5) of whom come from the government, while the remaining six (6) are chosen from the nominees of organizations of private book publishers, printers, writers, book industry related activities, students and the private education sector. The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Javier for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and recommended the filing of the corresponding information. In an Information dated February 18, 2000, Javier was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. The Commission on Audit also charged Javier with malversation of public funds, as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, an Information dated February 29, 2000 was filed before the Sandiganbayan. On October 10, 2000, Javier filed a Motion to Quash Information, averring that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to hear the case as the information did not allege that she is a public official who is classified as Grade “27” or higher. Neither did the information charge her as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. She also averred that she is not a public officer or employee and that she belongs to the NBDB only as a private sector representative under R.A. No. 8047, hence, she may not be charged under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan or under any statute which covers public officials. Moreover, she claimed that she does not perform public functions and is without any administrative or political power to speak of – that she is serving the private book publishing industry by advancing their interest as participant in the government’s book development policy. On January 17, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying Javier’s motion. Javier filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Javier hinges her petition on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not quashing the two informations charging her with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code on malversation of public funds. She advanced the following arguments in support of her petition, to wit: first, she is not a public officer, and second, she was being charged under two (2) informations, which is in violation of her right against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court ruled that Javier was a public officer: To substantiate her claim, petitioner maintained that she is not a public officer and only a private sector representative, stressing that her only function among the eleven (11) basic purposes and objectives provided for in Section 4, R.A. No. 8047, is to obtain priority status for the book publishing industry. At the time of her appointment to the NDBD Board, she was the President of the BSAP, a book publishers association. As such, she could not be held liable for the crimes imputed against her, and in turn, she is outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The NBDB is the government agency mandated to develop and support the Philippine book publishing industry. It is a statutory government agency created by R.A. No. 8047, which was enacted into law to ensure the full development of the book publishing industry as well as for the creation of organization structures to implement the said policy. To achieve this end, the Governing Board of the NBDB was created to supervise the implementation. . .

A perusal of the above powers and functions leads us to conclude that they partake of the nature of public functions. A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB, the law invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so that the purpose of the government is achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhance the book publishing industry as it has a significant role in the national development. Hence, the fact that she was appointed from the public sector and not from the other branches or agencies of the government does not take her position outside the meaning of a public office. She was appointed to the Governing Board in order to see to it that the purposes for which the law was enacted are achieved. The Governing Board acts collectively and carries out its mandate as one body. The purpose of the law for appointing members from the private sector is to ensure that they are also properly represented in the implementation of government objectives to cultivate the book publishing industry. Moreover, the Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, which provides that a public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government. Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been elected or appointed to a public office. Petitioner was appointed by the President to the Governing Board of the NDBD. Though her term is only for a year that does not make her private person exercising a public function. The fact that she is not receiving a monthly salary is also of no moment. Section 7, R.A. No. 8047 provides that members of the Governing Board shall receive per diem and such allowances as may be authorized for every meeting actually attended and subject to pertinent laws, rules and regulations. Also, under the AntiGraft Law, the nature of one’s appointment, and whether the compensation one receives from the government is only nominal, is immaterial because the person so elected or appointed is still considered a public officer. On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines a public officer as any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer. Where, as in this case, petitioner performs public functions in pursuance of the objectives of R.A. No. 8047, verily, she is a public officer who takes part in the performance of public functions in the government whether as an employee, agent, subordinate official, of any rank or classes. In fact, during her tenure, petitioner took part in the drafting and promulgation of several rules and regulations implementing R.A. No. 8047. She was supposed to represent the country in the canceled book fair in Spain. In fine, We hold that petitioner is a public officer. On the issue of double jeopardy, the Supreme Court ruled that there was no double jeopardy. Records show that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 25867 and 25898 refer to offenses penalized by different statues, R.A. No. 3019 and RPC, respectively. It is elementary that for double jeopardy to attach, the case against the accused must have been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon valid information sufficient in form and substance and the accused pleaded to the charge. In the instant case, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the Information for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. She was not yet arraigned in the criminal case for malversation of public funds because she had filed a motion to quash the latter information. Double jeopardy could not, therefore, attach considering that the two cases remain pending before the Sandiganbayan and that herein petitioner had pleaded to only one in the criminal cases against her. It is well settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent.[38] The third and fourth requisites are not present in the case at bar.

OCTOBER 2009 DECISIONS Constitutional Law

BAIL. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that “All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.” Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, thus provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused charged with a capital offense thus depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong. The People of the Philippines vs. Luis Plaza y Bucalon, G.R. No. 176933, October 2, 2009. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; POWERS. The Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government, has statutory authority to establish rules and regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil service. Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, provides for the powers of the Commission, including the power to issue rules and regulations and to review appointments. Leah M. Nazareno, et al. vs. City of Dumaguete, et al., G.R. No. 181559, October 2, 2009. COMMISSION ON AUDIT; POWERS . Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by P.D. No. 1445, the COA, as one of the three independent constitutional commissions, is specifically vested with the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property owned or held in trust by the government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations. To ensure the effective discharge of its functions, it is vested with ample powers, subject to constitutional limitations, to define the scope of its audit and examination and establish the techniques and methods required therefor, to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties. Clearly, the matter of allowing or disallowing a money claim against petitioner is within the primary power of the COA to decide. This no doubt includes money claims arising from the implementation of R.A. No. 6758. Respondents’ claim against petitioner, although it has already been validated by the trial court’s final decision, likewise belongs to that class of claims; hence, it must first be filed with the COA before execution could proceed. And from the decision therein, the aggrieved party is afforded a remedy by elevating the matter to this Court via a petition for certiorari in accordance with Section 1 Rule XI, of the COA Rules of Procedure. National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation vs. Mario Abayari, et al., G.R. No. 166508, October 2, 2009. COMELEC; CERTIORARI. It is settled that under Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, what may be brought to this Court on certiorari is the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc. However, this rule should not apply when a division of the COMELEC arrogates unto itself and deprives the en banc of the authority to rule on a motion for reconsideration, like in this case. In this case, the First Division of the COMELEC violated the cited provisions of the Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure when it resolved petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of its final Order dated November 25, 2008, which dismissed petitioner’s appeal. By arrogating unto itself a power constitutionally lodged in the Commission en banc, the First Division of the COMELEC exercised judgment in excess of, or without, jurisdiction. Hence, the Order issued by the First Division of the COMELEC dated January 9, 2009, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is null and void. Carmelinda C. Barror vs. The Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 186201, October 9, 2009. COMELEC; POWERS . The COMELEC under our governmental structure is a constitutional administrative agency and its powers are essentially executive in nature (i.e., to enforce and administer election laws), quasi-judicial (to exercise original jurisdiction over election contests of regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over election contests of other lower ranking officials), and quasi-legislative (rulemaking on all questions affecting elections and the promulgation of its rules of procedure).

Historically, the COMELEC has always been an administrative agency whose powers have been increased from the 1935 Constitution to the present one, to reflect the country’s awareness of the need to provide greater regulation and protection to our electoral processes to ensure their integrity. The COMELEC’s adjudicative function is quasi-judicial since it is a constitutional body, other than a court, vested with authority to decide election contests, and in the course of the exercise of its jurisdiction, to hold hearings and exercise discretion of a judicial nature; it receives evidence, ascertain the facts from these submissions, determine the law and the legal rights of the parties, and on the basis of all these decides on the merits of the case and renders judgment. Despite the exercise of discretion that is essentially judicial in character, particularly with respect to election contests, COMELEC is not a tribunal within the judicial branch of government and is not a court exercising judicial power in the constitutional sense; hence, its adjudicative function, exercised as it is in the course of administration and enforcement, is quasi-judicial. The 1973 Constitution used the unique wording that the COMELEC shall “be the sole judge of all contests,” thus giving the appearance that judicial power had been conferred. This phraseology, however, was changed in the 1987 Constitution to give the COMELEC “exclusive jurisdiction over all contests,” thus removing any vestige of exercising its adjudicatory power as a court and correctly aligning it with what it is – a quasi-judicial body.Consistent with the characterization of its adjudicatory power as quasi-judicial, the judicial review of COMELEC en banc decisions (together with the review of Civil Service Commission decisions) is via the prerogative writ of certiorari, not through an appeal, as the traditional mode of review of quasi-judicial decisions of administrative tribunals in the exercise the Court’s supervisory authority. This means that the Court will not supplant the decision of the COMELEC as a quasi-judicial body except where a grave abuse of discretion or any other jurisdictional error exists. Joselito R. Mendoza vs. Commission on Elections and Roberto M. Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 188308, October 15, 2009. COMELEC; DECISIONS . Petitioners argue that the February 28, 2003 resolution of the COMELEC violates Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution, which states that “no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.” The COMELEC allegedly made generalizations without detailing the basis for its findings. The assailed resolution substantially complied with the constitutional mandate of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution. The resolution detailed the evidence presented by the parties. Thereafter, it weighed the respective pieces of evidence submitted by the prosecution and the defense and chose the one that deserved credence. It contained findings of facts as well as an application of case law. The purpose of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution is to inform the person reading the decision, especially the parties, of how it was reached by the court after a consideration of the pertinent facts and an examination of the applicable laws. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, if he believes that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. Thus, a decision is adequate if a party desiring to appeal therefrom can assign errors to it. Roberto Albaña, et al. vs. Pio Jude Belo, et al., G.R. No. 158734, October 2, 2009. COMELEC; DUE PROCESS . Based on the pleadings filed, there is no factual and legal basis for the petitioner to complain of denial of his hearing stage rights. In the first place, he does not dispute that he fully participated in the proceedings of the election protest until the case was deemed submitted for resolution; he had representation at the revision of the ballots, duly presented his evidence, and summed up his case through a memorandum. These various phases of the proceedings constitute the hearing proper of the election contest and the COMELEC has more than satisfied the opportunity to be heard that the Ang Tibay hearing stage rights require. In these proceedings, the petitioner stood head-to-head with the respondent in an adversarial contest where both sides were given their respective rights to speak, make their presentations, and controvert each other’s submission, subject only to established COMELEC rules of procedures. Under these undisputed facts, both parties had their day in court, so to speak, and neither one can complain of any denial of notice or of the right to be heard. Joselito R. Mendoza vs. Commission on Elections and Roberto M. Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 188308, October 15, 2009. EMINENT DOMAIN; DAMAGES . In taking respondents’ property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and without payment of just compensation, the City of Pasig clearly acted in utter disregard of respondents’ proprietary rights. Such conduct cannot be countenanced by the Court. For said illegal taking, the City of Pasig should definitely be held liable for damages to respondents. Again, in Manila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez, the Court held that the government agency’s illegal occupation of the owner’s property for a very long period of time surely resulted in pecuniary loss to the owner. Hon. Vicente P. Eusebio, et al. vs.. Jovito M. Luis, et al. G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009

EMINENT DOMAIN; ESTOPPEL. Just like in the Forfom case, herein respondents also failed to question the taking of their property for a long period of time (from 1980 until the early 1990’s) and, when asked during trial what action they took after their property was taken, witness Jovito Luis, one of the respondents, testified that “when we have an occasion to talk to Mayor Caruncho we always asked for compensation.” It is likewise undisputed that what was constructed by the city government on respondents’ property was a road for public use, namely, A. Sandoval Avenue in Pasig City. Clearly, as in Forfom, herein respondents are also estopped from recovering possession of their land, but are entitled to just compensation. Hon. Vicente P. Eusebio, et al. vs. Jovito M. Luis, et al., G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009. EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPENSATION. In fixing the just compensation in the present case, the trial court, adopting the market data approach on which Commissioner Chua relied, merely put premium on the location of the property and the crops planted thereon which are not among the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657. And the trial court did not apply the formula provided in DAR AO 692, as amended. This is a clear departure from the settled doctrine regarding the mandatory nature of Section 17 of RA 6657 and the DAR issuances implementing it. Not only did Commissioner Chua not consider Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR AO 6-92, as amended, in his appraisal of the property. His conclusion that the market data approach conformed with statutory and regulatory requirements is bereft of basis. Department of Agrarian Reform, rep. OIC-Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman vs. Jose Marie Rufino, et al., G.R. No. 175644/G.R. No. 175702, October 2, 2009. EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPENSATION . With regard to the time as to when just compensation should be fixed, it is settled jurisprudence that where property was taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, and its owner files an action for recovery of possession thereof before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling. Hon. Vicente P. Eusebio, et al. vs. Jovito M. Luis, et al., G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009. EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPENSATION. Petitioner’s interpretation is flawed. In the recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Chico, the Court declared in no uncertain terms that R.A. No. 6657 is the relevant law for determining just compensation after noting several decided cases where the Court found it more equitable to determine just compensation based on the value of the property at the time of payment. This was a clear departure from the Court’s earlier stance in Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines where it declared that the reckoning period for the determination of just compensation is the time when the land was taken applying P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228. P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 vis a vis R.A. No. 6657 was applied to cases involving lands placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 where payment of just compensation had not been completed. When in the interim R.A. No. 6657 was passed before the full payment of just compensation, as in the case at bar, the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 on just compensation control. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. J. L. Jocson and Sons, G.R. No. 180803, October 23, 2009. EMINENT DOMAIN; PRESCRIPTION. Where private property is taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe. Hon. Vicente P. Eusebio, et al. vs. Jovito M. Luis, et al., G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED . Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Rules of Court, in implementing the right, specifically require that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense, including the qualifying and aggravating circumstances, must be stated in ordinary and concise language, not necessarily in the language used in the statute, but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged and the attendant qualifying and aggravating circumstances present, so that the accused can properly defend himself and the court can pronounce judgment. To broaden the scope of the right, the Rules authorize the quashal, upon motion of the accused, of an Information that fails to allege the acts constituting the offense. Jurisprudence has laid down the fundamental test in appreciating a motion to quash an Information grounded on the insufficiency of the facts alleged therein. Jose C. Go vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 178429, October 23, 2009.

Public Officers MASS APPOINTMENTS. It is not difficult to see the reasons behind the prohibition on mass appointments before and after the elections. Appointments are banned prior to the elections to ensure that partisan loyalties will not be a factor in the appointment process, and to prevent incumbents from gaining any undue advantage during the elections. To this end, appointments within a certain period of time are proscribed by the Omnibus Election Code and related issuances. After the elections, appointments by defeated candidates are prohibited, except under the circumstances mentioned in CSC Resolution No. 010988, to avoid animosities between outgoing and incoming officials, to allow the incoming administration a free hand in implementing its policies, and to ensure that appointments and promotions are not used as a tool for political patronage or as a reward for services rendered to the outgoing local officials. Indeed, not all appointments issued after the elections by defeated officials are invalid. CSC Resolution No. 010988 does not purport to nullify all “mass appointments.” However, it must be shown that the appointments have undergone the regular screening process, that the appointee is qualified, that there is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately, and that the appointments are not in bulk. Leah M. Nazareno, et al. vs. City of Dumaguete, et al., G.R. No. 181559, October 2, 2009. Administrative Law CARDINAL RIGHTS; ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS. The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as the standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due process. The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision-maker decides on the evidence presented during the hearing. These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and are the material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the totality of the evidence presented which must all be found in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on substantial evidence. Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial body, further complements the hearing and decision-making due process rights and is similar in substance to the constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is based. As a component of the rule of fairness that underlies due process, this is the “duty to give reason” to enable the affected person to understand how the rule of fairness has been administered in his case, to expose the reason to public scrutiny and criticism, and to ensure that the decision will be thought through by the decision-maker. R. Mendoza vs. Commission on Elections and Roberto M. Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 188308, October 15, 2009. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. It is true that the general rule is that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. However, there are several exceptions to this rule. The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where the issue raised is a purely legal question, well within the competence; and the jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency, would clearly constitute an exception. Resolving questions of law, which involve the interpretation and application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such lower courts the Legislature may establish. Evelyn Ongsuco and Antonia Salaya vs. Hon. Mariano M.

Malones, etc., G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009. Election Law PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY. Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code limits a pre-proclamation controversy to the questions enumerated therein. The enumeration is restrictive and exclusive. Resultantly, the petition for a pre-proclamation controversy must fail in the absence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects (Section 234, Omnibus Election Code); or appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (Section 235, Omnibus Election Code); or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the difference of which affects the result of the election (Section 236, Omnibus Election Code). To be noted, too, is that in a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC is restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind the election returns and to investigate election irregularities. For as long as the election returns appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their faces, the Board of Canvassers cannot look beyond or behind the election returns in order to verify allegations of irregularities in the casting or counting of votes. Ismunlatip H. Suhuri vs. The Honorable Commssion on Elections (En Banc), The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Patikul, Sulu and Kabir E. Hayundini, G.R. No. 181869, October 2, 2009. RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT. The issue of petitioner’s disqualification for failure to comply with the one-year residency requirement has been resolved by this Court in Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v. Commission on Elections and Malik “Bobby” T. Alingan. This case stemmed from the first disqualification case filed by herein respondent against petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 07-611. Although the petitioner had withdrawn the Certificate of Candidacy subject of the disqualification case, the Comelec resolved the petition and found that petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement, and was, therefore, disqualified from running as mayor of Pantar. Norlainie Mitmug Limbona vs. Commssion on Elections and Malik “Bobby” T. Alingan, G.R. No. 186006, October 16, 2009. STATISTICAL IMPROBABILITY DOCTRINE. Under Lagumbay, the doctrine of statistical improbability is applied only where the unique uniformity of tally of all the votes cast in favor of all the candidates belonging to one party and the systematic blanking of all the candidates of all the opposing parties appear in the election return. The doctrine has no application where there is neither uniformity of tallies nor systematic blanking of the candidates of one party. Thus, the bare fact that a candidate for public office received no votes in one or two precincts, standing alone and without more, cannot adequately support a finding that the subject election returns are statistically improbable. Verily, a zero vote for a particular candidate in the election returns is but one strand in the web of circumstantial evidence that the electoral returns were prepared under duress, force and intimidation. The Court has thus warned that the doctrine of statistical improbability must be restrictively viewed, with the utmost care being taken lest in penalizing fraudulent and corrupt practices – which is truly called for – innocent voters become disenfranchised, a result that hardly commends itself. Such prudential approach makes us dismiss Suhuri’s urging that some of the electoral results had been infected with the taint of statistical improbability as to warrant their exclusion from the canvass in a pre-proclamation controversy. Specifically, his petition and the records nowhere show that his party-mates received a similar number of votes (or lack of any) by which to conclude that there were a unique uniformity of tally and a systematic blanking of other candidates belonging to one party. Ismunlatip H. Suhuri vs. The Honorable Commssion on Elections (En Banc), The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Patikul, Sulu and Kabir E. Hayundini, G.R. No. 181869, October 2, 2009.

NOVEMBER 2009 CASES Constitutional Law CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; JURISDICTION. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) Caraga has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of a possible administrative case of dishonesty against PO1 Capablanca for alleged CSP examination irregularity.

The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, is mandated to establish a career service, to strengthen the merit and rewards system, and to adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency and integrity in the civil service. The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Specifically, Section 91 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6975 (1990) or the “Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990” provides that the “Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department,” to which herein petitioner belongs. Section 12 of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 or the “Administrative Code of 1987,” enumerates the powers and functions of the CSC. In addition, Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations specifically confers upon the CSC the authority to take cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies connected with the examinations. To carry out this mandate, the CSC issued Resolution No. 991936, or the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, empowering its Regional Offices to take cognizance of cases involving CSC examination anomalies. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it initiated the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the alleged civil service examination irregularity committed by the petitioner. Eugenio S. Capablanca vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 179370, November 18, 2009.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; JURISDICTION. It has already been settled in Cruz v. Civil Service Commission that the appellate power of the CSC will only apply when the subject of the administrative cases filed against erring employees is in connection with the duties and functions of their office, and not in cases where the acts of complainant arose from cheating in the civil service examinations. Eugenio S. Capablanca vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 179370, November 18, 2009. CONSTITUTIONALITY; EQUAL PROTECTION. The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is found under its Section 2, Article III, which provides: “Nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.” Essentially, the equality guaranteed under this clause is equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly situated. It is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are different from one another on the basis of substantial distinctions related to the objective of the law; when things or persons are different in facts or circumstances, they may be treated differently in law. Appreciation of how the constitutional equality provision applies inevitably leads to the conclusion that no basis exists in the present case for an equal protection challenge. The law can treat barangay officials differently from other local elective officials because the Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between these elective officials with respect to length of term and term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution provides for a three-year term and three-term limit for local elective officials, it left the length of term and the application of the threeterm limit or any form of term limitation for determination by Congress through legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under these conditions. From another perspective, we see no reason to apply the equal protection clause as a standard because the challenged proviso did not result in any differential treatment between barangay officials and all other elective officials. This conclusion proceeds from our ruling on the retroactivity issue that the challenged proviso does not involve any retroactive application. Commission on Elections vs. Conrado Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009. CONSTITUTIONALITY; LIS MOTA. In its last-ditch effort to salvage its case, SEM contends that Proclamation No. 297, issued by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo and declaring the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area as a mineral reservation, is invalid on the ground that it lacks the concurrence of Congress as mandated by Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution; Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3092; Section 14 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987; Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 7586, and Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 6657. It is well-settled that when questions of constitutionality are raised, the court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case exists; (2) there is a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. Taking into consideration the foregoing requisites of judicial review, it is readily clear that the third requisite is absent. The general rule is that the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if it is not raised in the

pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial; and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. Apex Mining Co. Inc. Vs. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al., G.R. No. 152613/G.R. No. 152628, November 20, 2009. CONSTITUTIONALITY; ONE SUBJECT ONE TITLE RULE . Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. We find, under these settled parameters, that the challenged proviso does not violate the one subject-one title rule. First, the title of RA No. 9164, “An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataang Elections, amending Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,” states the law’s general subject matter – the amendment of the LGC to synchronize the barangay and SK elections and for other purposes. To achieve synchronization of the barangay and SK elections, the reconciliation of the varying lengths of the terms of office of barangay officials and SK officials is necessary. Closely related with length of term is term limitation which defines the total number of terms for which a barangayofficial may run for and hold office. This natural linkage demonstrates that term limitation is not foreign to the general subject expressed in the title of the law. Second, the congressional debates we cited above show that the legislators and the public they represent were fully informed of the purposes, nature and scope of the law’s provisions. Term limitation therefore received the notice, consideration, and action from both the legislators and the public. Finally, to require the inclusion of term limitation in the title of RA No. 9164 is to make the title an index of all the subject matters dealt with by law; this is not what the constitutional requirement contemplates. Commission on Elections vs. Conrado Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009. CONSTITUTIONALITY; POLITICAL QUESTION. Congress has plenary authority under the Constitution to determine by legislation not only the duration of the term of barangay officials, but also the application to them of a consecutive term limit. Congress invariably exercised this authority when it enacted no less than six (6) barangay-related laws since 1987. Through all these statutory changes, Congress had determined at its discretion both the length of the term of office of barangay officials and their term limitation. Given the textually demonstrable commitment by the 1987 Constitution to Congress of the authority to determine the term duration and limition of barangay officials under the Constitution, we consider it established that whatever Congress, in its wisdom, decides on these matters are political questions beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny, subject only to the certiorari jurisdiction of the courts provided under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution and to the judicial authority to invalidate any law contrary to the Constitution. Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government; it is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.” These questions, previously impervious to judicial scrutiny can now be inquired into under the limited window provided by Section 1, Article VIII. Other than the Section 1, Article VIII route, courts can declare a law invalid when it is contrary to any provision of the Constitution. This requires the appraisal of the challenged law against the legal standards provided by the Constitution, not on the basis of the wisdom of the enactment. To justify its nullification, the breach of the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful or equivocal one, as every law enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality. These are the hurdles that those challenging the constitutional validity of a law must overcome. Commission on Elections vs. Conrado Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009. CONSTITUTIONALITY; RETROACTIVITY. The constitutional challenge must fail for a more fundamental reason – the respondents’ retroactivity objection does not involve a violation of any constitutional standard. Retroactivity of laws is a matter of civil law, not of a constitutional law, as its governing law is the Civil Code, not the Constitution. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. The application of the Civil Code is of course self-explanatory – laws enacted by Congress may permissibly provide that they shall have retroactive effect. The Civil Code established a statutory norm, not a constitutional standard.

The closest the issue of retroactivity of laws can get to a genuine constitutional issue is if a law’s retroactive application will impair vested rights. Otherwise stated, if a right has already vested in an individual and a subsequent law effectively takes it away, a genuine due process issue may arise. What should be involved, however, is a vested right to life, liberty or property, as these are the ones that may be considered protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. In the present case, the respondents never raised due process as an issue. But even assuming that they did, the respondents themselves concede that there is no vested right to public office. As the COMELEC correctly pointed out, too, there is no vested right to an elective post in view of the uncertainty inherent in electoral exercises. Commission on Elections vs. Conrado Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009. Election law BALLOTS; APPRECIATION. Although as a rule, the appreciation of contested ballots and election documents involves a question of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, still when it can be shown that, as in this case, it grossly misread evidence of such nature that compels a different conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse that body’s factual findings. It is by now a settled truth that no two persons write alike. Even if two handwritings have a common general outlook, they are apt to be at variance in some basic characteristics that set them apart. Every person uses his own style for forming letters, technically called personal characteristics. Whatever features two specimens of handwriting may have in common, they cannot be regarded as written by one person if they show even but one consistent dissimilarity in any feature which is fundamental to the structure of the handwriting. Here, the Court did not find, after examining 93 of the excluded ballots pertaining to petitioner Torres, any two or more of ballots that were filled in by a single hand. Of the 47 pairs of ballots that the En Banc excluded, only two pairs were correctly excluded because they were written by one person for each pair. 45 pairs turned out to have been filled up by different hands. While the general outlook of the handwritings on each of the two ballots in any given pair is the same, such handwritings have distinct personal characteristics. In the same way, the three ballots that were supposedly written on by one person turned out to have been the work of three different hands. Ramon P. Torres vs. Commission on Elections and Josephine “Joy” H. Gaviola, G.R. No. 187956, November 19, 2009. CANDIDATES; LIABILITY FOR ELECTION OFFENSES . Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that “any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.” Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.” Rosalinda A. Penera vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009. Note: The Supreme Court reversed its earlier decision dated September 11, 2009. PRESIDENT’S REFUSAL TO REVIEW DOJ DECISIONS Can the President legally refuse to review the decisions of the Secretary of Justice except under certain circumstances? Does that diminish the power of control of the President and bestow upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, unfettered power? In Judge Adoracion G. Angeles vs. Hon. Manuel B. Gaite, et al., G.R. No. 165276, November 25, 2009, the Provincial Prosecutor denied the recommendation of the Investigating Prosecutor that Michael Vistan be indicted for violation RA 7610. He also approved the recommendation for the dismissal of the charge of violation of PD 1829. The petitioner filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice, which eventually dismissed the petition. The petitioner then filed a Petition for Review before the Office of President. The Office of the President dismissed the petition, citing Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review of decisions, orders, and resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death. The petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition. The petitioner argued before the Supreme Court that Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation because it diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument. It ruled: This argument is absurd. The President’s act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been established in our jurisdiction. Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.” The CA cannot be deemed to have committed any error in upholding the Office of the President’s reliance on the Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted and applied the law as it should be.” . . . the President himself set the limits of his power to review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite the disposition of cases. Petitioner’s argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to the extent of rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses the former may commit in the exercise of his discretion is purely speculative to say the least. Petitioner cannot second- guess the President’s power and the President’s own judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy administration of justice, especially that such delegation is upon a cabinet secretary – his own alter ego. The Supreme Court observed that the President cannot delegate certain of her powers: . . . the power of the President to delegate is not without limits. No less than the Constitution provides for restrictions. . . These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental law. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import. In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the Secretary of Justice dealing with the preliminary investigation of cases cannot be considered as falling within the same exceptional class which cannot be delegated. Besides, the President has not fully abdicated his power of control as Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher. Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose upon the President the task of reviewing all preliminary investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly hamper the other important duties of the President by having to scrutinize each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the latter’s expertise in said matter. Finally, the Court ruled that the memorandum circular do not deprive the President of her power of control: Petitioner’s contention that Memorandum Circular No. 58 violates both the Constitution and Section 1, Chapter 1, Book III of EO No. 292, for depriving the President of his power of control over the executive departments deserves scant consideration. In the first place, Memorandum Circular No. 58 was promulgated by the Office of the President and it is settled that the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Memorandum Circular No. 58 has not been reprobated by the President; therefore, it goes without saying that the said Memorandum Circular has the approval of the President. REHABILITATION PROCEEDINGS AND THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE Can a rehabilitation court compel a lender to accept a 50% reduction in the borrower’s principal obligation? Would that violate the non-impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution?

In Pacific Wide Realty and Development Corporation vs. Puerto Azul Land, Inc./Pacific Wide Realty and Development Corporation Vs. Puerto Azul Land, Inc., G.R. No. 178768/G.R. No. 180893, November 25, 2009, the borrower, Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI) is the owner and developer of the Puerto Azul Complex situated in Ternate, Cavite. Its business involves the development of Puerto Azul into a satellite city with residential areas, resort, tourism and retail commercial centers with recreational areas. In order to finance its operations, it obtained loans from various banks, the principal amount of which amounted to aroundPhP640 million. Because of financial difficulties, PALI subsequently filed a petition for rehabilitation. After trial, the rehabilitation court issued a decision which reads, in part: The rehabilitation of the petitioner, therefore, shall proceed as follows. . . 2. Creditors who will not opt for dacion shall be paid in accordance with the restructuring of the obligations as recommended by the Receiver as follows: a) The obligations to secured creditors will be subject to a 50% haircut of the principal, and repayment shall be semiannually over a period of 10 years, with 3-year grace period. Accrued interests and penalties shall be condoned. Interest shall be paid at the rate of 2% p.a. for the first 5 years and 5% p.a. thereafter until the obligations are fully paid. The petitioner shall allot 50% of its cash flow available for debt service for secured creditors. Upon completion of payments to government and employee accounts, the petitioner’s cash flow available for debt service shall be used until the obligations are fully paid. b) One half (1/2) of the principal of the petitioner’s unsecured loan obligations to other creditors shall be settled through non-cash offsetting arrangements, with the balance payable semi-annually over a period of 10 years, with 3-year grace period, with interest at the rate of 2% p.a. for the first 5 years and 5% p.a. from the 6th year onwards until the obligations are settled in full. Accrued interest and penalties shall be condoned. (underscoring supplied) One of the lenders, Export and Industry Bank (EIB), filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA affirmed the decision of the rehabilitation court. In its petition before the Supreme Court, EIB argues that the rehabilitation plan was unreasonable and in violation of the non-impairment clause. The Supreme Court disagreed. The court first explained the nature of rehabilitation proceedings: Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency. The purpose of rehabilitation proceedings is to enable the company to gain a new lease on life and thereby allow creditors to be paid their claims from its earnings. The rehabilitation of a financially distressed corporation benefits its employees, creditors, stockholders and, in a larger sense, the general public. Under the Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, “rehabilitation” is defined as the restoration of the debtor to a position of successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments projected in the plan, more if the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated. An indispensable requirement in the rehabilitation of a distressed corporation is the rehabilitation plan . . . On EIB’s argument that the rehabilitation plan violates the non-impairment clause, the court ruled: In G.R. No. 180893, the rehabilitation plan is contested on the ground that the same is unreasonable and results in the impairment of the obligations of contract.PWRDC contests the following stipulations in PALI’s rehabilitation plan: fifty percent (50%) reduction of the principal obligation; condonation of the accrued and substantial interests and penalty charges; repayment over a period of ten years, with minimal interest of two percent (2%) for the first five years and five percent (5%) for the next five years until fully paid, and only upon availability of cash flow for debt service. We find nothing onerous in the terms of PALI’s rehabilitation plan. The Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation provides for means of execution of the rehabilitation plan, which may include, among others, the conversion of the debts or any portion thereof to equity, restructuring of the debts, dacion en pago, or sale of assets or of the controlling interest. The restructuring of the debts of PALI is part and parcel of its rehabilitation. Moreover, per findings of fact of the RTC and as affirmed by the CA, the restructuring of the debts of PALI would not be prejudicial to the interest of PWRDC as a secured creditor. Enlightening is the observation of the CA in this regard,viz.:

There is nothing unreasonable or onerous about the 50% reduction of the principal amount when, as found by the court a quo, a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) acquired the credits of PALI from its creditors at deep discounts of as much as 85%. Meaning, PALI’s creditors accepted only 15% of their credit’s value. Stated otherwise, if PALI’s creditors are in a position to accept 15% of their credit’s value, with more reason that they should be able to accept 50% thereof as full settlement by their debtor. x x x. We also find no merit in PWRDC’s contention that there is a violation of the impairment clause. Section 10, Article III of the Constitution mandates that no law impairing the obligations of contract shall be passed. This case does not involve a law or an executive issuance declaring the modification of the contract among debtorPALI, its creditors and its accommodation mortgagors. Thus, the non-impairment clause may not be invoked. Furthermore, as held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. even assuming that the same may be invoked, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State. Property rights and contractual rights are not absolute. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State for the common good of the general public. Successful rehabilitation of a distressed corporation will benefit its debtors, creditors, employees, and the economy in general. The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable. The rehabilitation plan, once approved, is binding upon the debtor and all persons who may be affected by it, including the creditors, whether or not such persons have participated in the proceedings or have opposed the plan or whether or not their claims have been scheduled.”

DECEMBER 2009 CASES Constitutional Law BILL OF RIGHTS; EMINENT DOMAIN. Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The rightof-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term expropriation. National Power Corporation vs. Hon. Amer Ibrahim, etc., et al., G.R. No. 183297, December 23, 2009. BILL OF RIGHTS; EMINENT DOMAIN. In computing for the value of the land subject to acquisition, the formula provided in DAO No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended, requires that figures pertaining to the Capitalized Net Income (CNI) and Market Value (MV) of the property be used as inputs in arriving at the correct land valuation. Thus, the applicable formula, as correctly used by the LBP in its valuation, is LV (Land Value) = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1). To arrive at the figure for the CNI of lands planted to a combination of crops, Item II B.5 of the said administrative order provides that the same should be computed based on the combination of actual crops produced on the covered land. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Kumassie Plantation Company Incorporated/Kumassie Plantation Company Incorporated vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, et al. G.R. No. 177404/G.R. No. 178097. December 4, 2009. BILL OF RIGHTS; EMINENT DOMAIN; INTEREST. The taking of property under CARL is an exercise by the State of the power of eminent domain. A basic limitation on the State’s power of eminent domain is the constitutional directive that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Just compensation refers to the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between one who receives and one who desires to sell. It is fixed at the time of the actual taking by the State. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value, to be computed from the time the property is taken up to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. National Power Corporation vs. Hon. Amer Ibrahim, etc., et al., G.R. No. 183297, December 23, 2009. BILL OF RIGHTS; EMINENT DOMAIN; INTEREST. In Philippine Railway Company v. Solon, decided in 1909, the Court treated interest as part of just compensation when the payment to the owner was delayed. Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, and Land

Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195. December 4, 2009. BILL OF RIGHTS; EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPENSATION. The term just compensation had been defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. In Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, the Court sustained the award of just compensation equivalent to the fair and full value of the property even if petitioners only sought the continuation of the exercise of their right-of-way easement and not the ownership over the land. There is simply no basis for NPC to claim that the payment of fair market value without the concomitant transfer of title constitutes an unjust enrichment. BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION. In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal—a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle. Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirement—if it is not germane to the purpose of the law. The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009. BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION. To the petitioners, the cityhood laws, by granting special treatment to respondent municipalities/LGUs by way of exemption from the standard PhP 100 million minimum income requirement, violate Sec.1, Art. III of the Constitution, which in part provides that no person shall “be denied the equal protection of the laws.” The equal protection guarantee is embraced in the broader and elastic concept of due process, every unfair discrimination being an offense against the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless come as a separate clause in Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution to provide for a more specific protection against any undue discrimination or antagonism from government. Arbitrariness in general may be assailed on the basis of the due process clause. But if a particular challenged act partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. This constitutional protection extends to all persons, natural or artificial, within the territorial jurisdiction. Artificial persons, as the respondent LGUs herein, are, however, entitled to protection only insofar as their property is concerned.

In the proceedings at bar, petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the equal protection clause, precisely because no deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The LCP’s claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be substantially reduced on account of the conversion into cities of the respondent LGUs would not suffice to bring it within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is presumptuous on the part of the LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same reason, the municipalities that are not covered by the uniform exemption clause in the cityhood laws cannot validly invoke constitutional protection. For, at this point, the conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such. As a matter of settled legal principle, the fundamental right of equal protection does not require absolute equality. It is enough that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights or privileges conferred and responsibilities or obligations imposed. The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing and acting upon factual differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to classify,necessarily implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the laws challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal protection clause. League of Cities of the Philippines, et al. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499 & G.R. No. 178056. December 21, 2009. BILL OF RIGHTS; NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE . PICOP’c cause of action consists in the allegation that the DENR Secretary, in not issuing an IFMA, violated its constitutional right against non-impairment of contracts. The 1969 document signed by President Marcos is not a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause. The conclusion that the 1969 Document is not a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause has even been disposed of in another case decided by another division of this Court, PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation, the Decision in which case has become final and executory. Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc./PICOP Resources, Inc. vs. Hon. Heherson T. Alavarez/Hon. Angelo T. Reyes vs. Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP), G.R. No. 162243/G.R. No. 164516/G.R. No. 171875. December 3, 2009 BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL. The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not preclude justifiable postponements and delays when so warranted by the situation. The reasons for the postponements and delays attendant to the present case reflected above are not unreasonable. While the records indicate that neither petitioner nor his counsel was notified of the resetting of the pre-trial to October 23, 2003, the same appears to have been occasioned by oversight or simple negligence which, standing alone, does not prove fatal to the prosecution’s case. The faux pas was acknowledged and corrected when the MeTC recalled the arrest warrant it had issued against petitioner under the mistaken belief that petitioner had been duly notified of the October 23, 2003 pre-trial setting. Reiterating the Court’s pronouncement in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. that “speedy trial” is a relative and flexible term, Lumanlaw v. Peralta, Jr. summons the courts to maintain a delicate balance between the demands of due process and the strictures of speedy trial on the one hand, and the right of the State to prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals on the other. Applying the balancing test for determining whether an accused has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of his case, taking into account several factors such as the length and reason of the delay, the accused’s assertion or non-assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the accused resulting from the delay, the Court does not find petitioner to have been unduly and excessively prejudiced by the “delay” in the proceedings, especially given that he had posted bail. Federico Miguel Olbes vs. Hon. Danilo A. Buemio, etc. et al., G.R. No. 173319. December 4, 2009. BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO TRAVEL. Petitioner invokes the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of his right to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo because the Hold Departure Order is a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. The Court is thus called upon to rule whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security. The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. As stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, “xxx a person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a

matter of the court’s sound discretion.” Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy. Rev. Father Robert P. Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; JURISDICTION OVER COURT PERSONNEL . The CSC’s authority and power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases are not in dispute. The question is whether the CSC’s disciplinary jurisdiction extends to court personnel in view of Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. In the Julaton and Sta. Ana cases, the CSC recognized the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over court personnel. This is consonant with Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s administrative compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. This we have ruled in Maceda v. Vasquez and have reiterated in the case of Ampong v. Civil Service Commission. In Ampong, we also emphasized that in case of violation of the Civil Service Law by a court personnel, the standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee before the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court. Civil Service Commission vs. Herminigildo L. Andal, G.R. No. 185749, December 16, 2009. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; JURISDICTION. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, has jurisdiction over disputes involving the removal and separation of all employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service. In this case, petitioners are former local government employees whose services were terminated due to the reorganization of the municipal government under Resolution Nos. 27 and 80 of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Considering that they belong to the civil service, the CSC has jurisdiction over their separation from office. Evelyn S. Cabungcal, et al. vs. Sonia R. Lorenzo, et al., G.R. No. 160367, December 18, 2009. COMELEC; CONTEMPT. The main thrust of petitioner’s argument is that the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in initiating the contempt proceedings when it was performing its administrative and not its quasi-judicial functions as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of senators. According to petitioner, the COMELEC may only punish contemptuous acts while exercising its quasijudicial functions. The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to argue and support their respective positions. To withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who refuse to appear during a fact-finding investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend, would render nugatory the COMELEC’s investigative power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible elections. In this case, the purpose of the investigation was however derailed when petitioner obstinately refused to appear during said hearings and to answer questions regarding the various election documents which, he claimed, were stolen while they were in his possession and custody. Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force hearings. Lintang Bedol vs. Commssion on Elections, G.R. No. 179830, December 3, 2009. CONSTITUTIONALITY; LOCUS STANDI. Central to the determination of locus standi is the question of whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. In this case, petitioners allege that they will be

directly affected by COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 for they intend, and they all have the qualifications, to run in the 2010 elections. The OSG, for its part, contends that since petitioners have not yet filed their CoCs, they are not yet candidates; hence, they are not yet directly affected by the assailed provision in the COMELEC resolution. The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the standing to raise the constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged measure herein, affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials. The rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters. The Court believes that both candidates and voters may challenge, on grounds of equal protection, the assailed measure because of its impact on voting rights. In any event, in recent cases, this Court has relaxed the stringent direct injury test and has observed a liberal policy allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civil organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009. CONSTITUTIONALITY; LOCUS STANDI. A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that the public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. A person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. He must also prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury because of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. In other words, for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met: (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act. In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that contrary to the view of the RTC, a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. As long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts entered into by the government. In this case, although the construction of the town center would be primarily sourced from the proceeds of the bonds, which respondents insist are not taxpayer’s money, a government support in the amount of P187 million would still be spent for paying the interest of the bonds. In fact, a Deed of Assignment was executed by the governor in favor of respondent RCBC over the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) and other revenues of the provincial government as payment and/or security for the obligations of the provincial government under the Trust Indenture Agreement dated September 17, 2003. Records also show that on March 4, 2004, the governor requested the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to appropriate an amount of P25 million for the interest of the bond. Clearly, the first requisite has been met. As to the second requisite, the court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent “direct injury test” bearing in mind that locus standi is a procedural technicality. By invoking “transcendental importance”, “paramount public interest”, or “far-reaching implications”, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to sue even if they failed to show direct injury. In cases where serious legal issues were raised or where public expenditures of millions of pesos were involved, the court did not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers. Manuel Mamba, et al. vs. Edgar R. Lara, et al., G.R. No. 165109, December 14, 2009. CONSTITUTIONALITY; JUSTICIABILITY. A political question is a question of policy, which is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or by the legislative or the executive branch of the government to which full discretionary authority has been delegated. In filing the instant case before the RTC, petitioners seek to restrain public respondents from implementing the bond flotation and to declare null and void all contracts related to the bond flotation and construction of the town center. In the petition before the RTC, they alleged grave abuse of discretion and clear violations of law by public respondents. They put in issue the overpriced construction of the town center; the grossly disadvantageous bond flotation; the irrevocable assignment of the provincial government’s annual regular income, including the IRA, to respondent RCBC to cover and secure the payment of the bonds floated; and the lack of consultation and discussion with the community regarding the proposed project, as well as a proper and legitimate bidding for the construction of the town center. Obviously, the issues raised in the petition do not refer to the wisdom but to the legality of the acts complained of. Thus, we find the instant controversy within the ambit of judicial review. Besides, even if the issues were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. Manuel Mamba, et al. vs. Edgar R.

Lara, et al., G.R. No. 165109, December 14, 2009. CONSTITUTIONALITY; OVERBROAD . The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad. First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC for the 2010 elections. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world. While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public elective office are those who occupy relatively high positions in government, laws cannot be legislated for them alone, or with them alone in mind. For the right to seek public elective office is universal, open and unrestrained, subject only to the qualification standards prescribed in the Constitution and in the laws. These qualifications are, as we all know, general and basic so as to allow the widest participation of the citizenry and to give free rein for the pursuit of one’s highest aspirations to public office. Such is the essence of democracy. Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale. Specific evils require specific treatments, not through overly broad measures that unduly restrict guaranteed freedoms of the citizenry. After all, sovereignty resides in the people, and all governmental power emanates from them. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009. HRET; JURISDICTION. The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17 thereof that the HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals, which is conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections and the proclamation of the winning candidates. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives. Thus, private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if, as in this case, the COMELEC had already passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives while the latter was still a candidate. Representative Danila Ramon S. Fernandez vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Jesus L. Vicente, G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009. NATURAL RESOURCES; LAND OWNERSHIP. Radstock is a private corporation incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. Its office address is at Suite 14021 Duddell Street, Central Hongkong. As a foreign corporation, with unknown owners whose nationalities are also unknown, Radstock is not qualified to own land in the Philippines pursuant to Section 7, in relation to Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution. Consequently, Radstock is also disqualified to own the rights to ownership of lands in the Philippines. Contrary to the OGCC’s claim, Radstock cannot own the rights to ownership of any land in the Philippines because Radstock cannot lawfully own the land itself. Otherwise, there will be a blatant circumvention of the Constitution, which prohibits a foreign private corporation from owning land in the Philippines. In addition, Radstock cannot transfer the rights to ownership of land in the Philippines if it cannot own the land itself. It is basic that an assignor or seller cannot assign or sell something he does not own at the time the ownership, or the rights to the ownership, are to be transferred to the assignee or buyer. Strategic Alliance Development Corporation vs. Radstock Securities Limited and Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 178158/G.R. No. 180428, December 4, 2009. POLICE POWER; MMDA. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA’s powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and

administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs.. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc., G.R. No. 179554, December 16, 2009. PUBLIC FUNDS; APPROPRIATION. Applying Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution, as implanted in Sections 84 and 85 of the Government Auditing Code, a law must first be enacted by Congress appropriating P6.185 billion as compromise money before payment to Radstock can be made. Otherwise, such payment violates a prohibitory law and thus void under Article 5 of the Civil Code which states that “[a]cts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.” Indisputably, without an appropriation law, PNCC cannot lawfully pay P6.185 billion to Radstock. Any contract allowing such payment, like the Compromise Agreement, “shall be void” as provided in Section 87 of the Government Auditing Code. PNCC cannot use public funds, like toll fees that indisputably form part of the General Fund, to pay a private debt of CDCP Mining to Radstock. Such payment cannot qualify as expenditure for a public purpose. The toll fees are merely held in trust by PNCC for the National Government, which is the owner of the toll fees. Considering that there is no appropriation law passed by Congress for the P6.185 billion compromise amount, the Compromise Agreement is void for being contrary to law, specifically Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 87 of PD 1445. And since the payment of the P6.185 billion pertains to CDCP Mining’s private debt to Radstock, the Compromise Agreement is also void for being contrary to the fundamental public policy that government funds or property shall be spent or used solely for public purposes, as provided in Section 4(2) of the Government Auditing Code. Strategic Alliance Development Corporation vs. Radstock Securities Limited and Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 178158/G.R. No. 180428, December 4, 2009. SUFFRAGE; EXTENSION OF VOTER REGISTRATION. Section 8 of RA 8189 decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during regular offices hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election. By the above provision, Congress itself has determined that the period of 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election is enough time for the COMELEC to make ALL the necessary preparations with respect to the coming elections. The COMELEC’s rule-making power should be exercised in accordance with the prevailing law. Respecting the authority of the COMELEC under RA 6646 and RA 8436 to fix other dates for pre-election acts, the same is not in conflict with the mandate of continuing voter registration under RA 8189. Both R.A. No. 6646, Section 29 and R.A. No. 8436, Section 28 grant the COMELEC the power to fix other periods and dates for pre-election activities only if the same cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by law. This grant of power, however, is for the purpose of enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage – the common underlying policy of RA 8189, RA 6646 and RA 8436. In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the mandate of continuing voter registration cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by RA 8189, Sec. 8 – daily during office hours, except during the period starting 120 days before the May 10, 2010 regular elections. There is thus no occasion for the COMELEC to exercise its power to fix other dates or deadlines therefor. The present case differs significantly from Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC. In said case, the Court held that the COMELEC did not commit abuse of discretion in denying the request of the therein petitioners for an extension of the December 27, 2000 deadline of voter registration for the May 14, 2001 elections. For the therein petitioners filed their petition with the Court within the 120-day prohibitive period for the conduct of voter registration under Section 8 of RA 8189, and sought the conduct of a two-day registration on February 17 and 18, 2001, clearly within the 120-day prohibitive period. In the present case, as reflected earlier, both the dates of filing of the petition (October 30, 2009) and the extension sought (until January 9, 2010) are prior to the 120-day prohibitive period. The Court, therefore, finds no legal impediment to the extension prayed for. Kabataan Party List vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189868, December 15, 2009.

Administrative Law

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; DUE PROCESS. It is settled that in administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side suffices to meet the requirements of due process. The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. In the present case, since PCMC was properly informed of the supposed discrepancy in its import and export liquidations, that it was given ample opportunity by the PEZA management to be heard or to explain its side in relation to its unaccounted imported materials and that it was subsequently informed of the decision of the PEZA Board to cancel its registration on the basis of its assessment of the evidence presented or lack thereof, petitioners cannot claim that they were denied their right to due process of law. Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), et al. Vs. Pearl City Manufacturing Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 168668, December 16, 2009. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; DUE PROCESS. The CA correctly concluded that petitioner’s right to due process was not violated. Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always, and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding. Litigants may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, filing charges against the person and giving reasonable opportunity to the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard; or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman. She was given every opportunity to submit various pleadings and documents in support of her claim, which she, in fact, did through her counter-affidavit and documentary evidence, manifestation and motion, memorandum on appeal, etc. In her Manifestation and Motion, petitioner moved and submitted the case for resolution based on the arguments and evidentiary records that were submitted before the Ombudsman. These were all duly acted upon by the Ombudsman. Petitioner was given all the opportunity to present her side. Due process was, therefore, properly observed. Lily O. Orbase Vs. Office of the Ombudsman and Adoracion MendozaBolos, G.R. No. 175115. December 23, 2009 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES . The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter and to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts. This, however, is not an ironclad rule as it admits of exceptions, viz: 1.

when there is a violation of due process;

2.

when the issue involved is purely a legal question;

3.

when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;

4.

when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;

5.

when there is irreparable injury;

6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; 7.

when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;

8.

when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;

9.

when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;

10.

when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and

11.

when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Petitioners’ filing of a petition for mandamus and prohibition with the CA was premature. It bears stressing that the remedies of mandamus and prohibition may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, being extraordinary remedies, resort may be had only in cases of extreme necessity where the ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief. Thus, instead of immediately filing a petition with the CA, petitioners should have first brought the matter to the CSC which has primary jurisdiction over the case. Evelyn S. Cabungcal, et al. vs. Sonia R. Lorenzo, et al., G.R. No. 160367, December 18, 2009. EO 259; LACK OF IMPLEMENTING RULES. Carabeo impugns the validity of EO 259 for lack of implementing rules and regulations. Indeed, EO 259 lacks any implementing guidelines. However, such fact is immaterial and does not affect, in any manner, the validity of the criminal and administrative charges against Carabeo. While the DOF-RIPS derived from EO 259 its power and authority to gather evidence against DOF officials and employees suspected of graft and corruption, the DOF-RIPS need not be vested with such power in order to validly file criminal and administrative charges against Carabeo. In fact, any concerned ordinary citizen can file criminal and administrative charges against any corrupt government official or employee if there exists sufficient evidence of culpability. Hence, the DOF-RIPS, even without EO 259 and whether as subordinates of the Secretary of Finance or as private citizens, can validly file criminal and administrative charges against Carabeo. At any rate, the Court finds that EO 259 is basically internal in nature needing no implementing rules and regulations in order to be enforceable. Principally aimed at curbing graft and corruption in the DOF and its attached agencies,[14] EO 259 covers only officers and employees. Liberato M. Carabeo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 178000 & G.R. No. 178003, December 4, 2009. LLDA; FINES. The Laguna Lake Development Authority has the power to impose fines. Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority G.R. No. 165299. December 18, 2009 Ombudsman; jurisdiction. At the time of the filing of the case against petitioner, she was the Assistant Director of the National Library; as such, as an appointive employee of the government, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman to take cognizance of the action against the petitioner was beyond contestation. Moreover, petitioner’s claim that the Ombudsman does not have jurisdiction over the action, since the act complained of was committed before her entering government service, cannot be sustained. Under Section 46 (18), Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 198, even if the dishonest act was committed by the employee prior to entering government service, such act is still a ground for disciplinary action. Lily O. Orbase vs. Office of the Ombudsman and Adoracion MendozaBolos, G.R. No. 175115. December 23, 2009 OMBUDSMAN; PRESCRIPTION. Petitioner insists that Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770 proscribes the investigation of any administrative act or omission if the complaint was filed one year after the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. In Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun, the Court held that the period stated in Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770 does not refer to the prescription of the offense, but to the discretion given to the Office of the Ombudsman on whether it would investigate a particular administrative offense. The use of the word “may” in the provision is construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, they must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is, therefore, discretionary upon the Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an investigation of a complaint filed before it even if it was filed one year after the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. Thus, while the complaint herein was filed three years after the occurrence of the act imputed to petitioner, it was within the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to act, to proceed with and conduct an investigation of the subject complaint. Lily O. Orbase vs. Office of the Ombudsman and Adoracion Mendoza-Bolos, G.R. No. 175115. December 23, 2009 OSG. Only the OSG can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic or represent the People or the State in criminal proceedings pending in this Court and the CA.

While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf, as when there is a denial of due process, this exceptional circumstance does not obtain in the instant case. Elvira O. Ong vs. Jose Casim Genio, G.R. No. 182336, December 23, 2009.

Election Law APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS; RESIGNATION. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009. CANDIDATES; RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT. The qualifications of a member of the House of Representatives are found in Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. The evidence presented by private respondent before the HRET hardly suffices to prove that petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under the Constitution. Private respondent’s documentary evidence to disqualify petitioner mainly consisted of (a) petitioner’s certificates of candidacy (COCs) for various positions in 1998, 2001 and 2004, which all indicated his residence as Pagsanjan, Laguna within the Fourth District of said province; (b) his application for a driver’s license in August 2005 that indicated Pagsanjan, Laguna as his residence; and (c) the statement in his COCs including his 2007 COC for Congressman for the First District of Laguna that his place of birth was Pagsanjan, Laguna. The HRET puts undue emphasis on the fact that petitioner is only leasing a townhouse in Sta. Rosa while he owns houses in Pagsanjan and Cabuyao. His ownership of properties in other places has been taken to mean that petitioner did not intend to make Sta. Rosa his permanent residence or that he had not abandoned his domicile of origin. Although it is true that the latest acquired abode is not necessarily the domicile of choice of a candidate, there is nothing in the Constitution or our election laws which require a congressional candidate to sell a previously acquired home in one district and buy a new one in the place where he seeks to run in order to qualify for a congressional seat in that other district. Neither do we see the fact that petitioner was only leasing a residence in Sta. Rosa at the time of his candidacy as a barrier for him to run in that district. Certainly, the Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a property owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at least a year prior to election day. To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office, which property requirement would be unconstitutional. This case must be distinguished from Aquino v. COMELEC and Domino v. COMELEC, where the disqualified candidate was shown to be merely leasing a residence in the place where he sought to run for office. In Aquino and Domino, there appeared to be no other material reason for the candidate to lease residential property in the place where he filed his COC, except to fulfill the residency requirement under election laws. In the case at bar, there are real and substantial reasons for petitioner to establish Sta. Rosa as his domicile of choice and abandon his domicile of origin and/or any other previous domicile. Representative Danila Ramon S. Fernandez vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Jesus L. Vicente, G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009. TERM LIMIT; PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION. The preventive suspension of an elected public official does not interrupt of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160. Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller and Ferdinand N. Talabong vs. Commission on Elections and Wilfredo F. Asilo, G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009. Local Government Code CREATION OF CITIES.

When Article X, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution speaks of the LGC, the reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the LGC of 1991. At the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337, the then LGC, was still in effect. Accordingly, had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, then they would have actually referred to BP 337. Also, they would then not have provided for the enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Art. X, Sec. 3 of the Constitution. Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be embodied in the local government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible, the element of uniformity. Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding to the existing layers of indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same. In this case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified income requirement from PhP 20 million toPhP 100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws is no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already codified indicators. League of Cities of the Philippines, et al. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499 & G.R. No. 178056. December 21, 2009. SANGGUNIAN APPROVAL. PICOP had claimed that it complied with Sections 2(c), 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code (which requires the prior approval of the Sanggunian concerned) by submitting a purported resolution of the Province of Surigao del Sur indorsing the approval of PICOP’s application for IFMA conversion. This cannot be deemed sufficient compliance with the foregoing provision. Surigao del Sur is not the only province affected by the area covered by the proposed IFMA. Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc./PICOP Resources, Inc. vs. Hon. Heherson T. Alavarez/Hon. Angelo T. Reyes vs. Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP), G.R. No. 162243/G.R. No. 164516/G.R. No. 171875. December 3, 2009 Other laws PUBLIC BIDDING; DACION EN PAGO. Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code, the disposition of government lands to private parties requires public bidding. COA Circular No. 89-926, issued on 27 January 1989, sets forth the guidelines on the disposal of property and other assets of the government. Under the Compromise Agreement, PNCC shall dispose of substantial parcels of land, by way of dacion en pago, in favor of Radstock. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan, PNCC argues that a dacion en pago is an exception to the requirement of a public bidding. PNCC’s reliance on Uy is misplaced. There is nothing in Uy declaring that public bidding is dispensed with in a dacion en pago transaction. Suffice it to state that in Uy, neither PIEDRAS nor the government suffered any loss in the dacion en pago transactions, unlike here where the government stands to lose at least P6.185 billion worth of assets. Besides, a dacion en pago is in essence a form of sale, which basically involves a disposition of a property. Strategic Alliance Development Corporation vs. Radstock Securities Limited and Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 178158/G.R. No. 180428, December 4, 2009.

JANUARY 2010 CASES Constitutional Law EMINENT DOMAIN; PROMPT PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION. The concept of just compensation contemplates just and timely payment; it embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the landowner, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot, as Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals instructs, be considered “just,” for the owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for years before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Department of

Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and Heirs of Vicente Adaza, Heirs of Romeo Adaza, Heirs of Cesar Adaza, represented by Russel Adaza, G.R. No. 183279, January 25, 2010. JUDICIAL REVIEW; CREATION OF CITY. On the OSG’s contention that Congress’ choice of means to comply with the population requirement in the creation of a legislative district is non-justiciable, suffice it to say that questions calling for judicial determination of compliance with constitutional standards by other branches of the government are fundamentally justiciable. The resolution of such questions falls within the checking function of this Court under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Even under the 1935 Constitution, this Court had already ruled, “The overwhelming weight of authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts.” Compliance with constitutional standards on the creation of legislative districts is important because the “aim of legislative apportionment is ‘to equalize population and voting power among districts.’” Victorino Aldaba, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT; CREATION OF CITY. RA 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have “a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.” The only issue here is whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional. There is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected, prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately following election after the supposed attainment of such population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislative district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. Victorino Aldaba, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010.

Administrative Law ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES; FINDINGS OF FACT. The findings of fact of administrative bodies, such as the SEC, will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial evidence. These factual findings carry even more weight when affirmed by the CA. They are accorded not only great respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body had arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon. A review of the petition does not show any reversible error committed by the appellate court; hence, the petition must be denied. Petitioner failed to present any argument that would convince the Court that the SEC and the CA made any misappreciation of the facts and the applicable laws such that their decisions should be overturned. Catmon Sales International Corporation vs. Atty. Manuel D. Yngson, Jr. as Liquidator of Catmon Sales International Corporation, G.R. No. 179761, January 15, 2010. Election Law BALLOTS; NUISANCE CANDIDATES . Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to

dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative. The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the case at bar, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed. We therefore hold that ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same position may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray, even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment after the elections. Accordingly, the 5,401 votes for “MARTINEZ” or “C. MARTINEZ” should be credited to petitioner giving him a total of 72,056 votes as against 67,108 total votes of private respondent. Petitioner thus garnered more votes than private respondent with a winning margin of 4,948 votes. Celestino A. Martinez III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Benhur L. Salimbangon, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010. ELECTION CONTEST; APPEAL. For the sake of laying down clearly the rules regarding the payment of the appeal fee, a discussion of the application of the recent Divinagracia v. COMELEC to election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials is necessary. Divinagracia explained the purpose of Resolution No. 8486 which, as earlier stated, the COMELEC issued to clarify existing rules and address the resulting confusion caused by the two appeal fees required, for the perfection of appeals, by the two different jurisdictions: the court and COMELEC. Divinagracia stressed that if the appellants had already paid the amount of PhP 1,000 to the lower courts within the five-day reglementary period, they are further required to pay the COMELEC, through its Cash Division, the appeal fee of PhP 3,200 within fifteen (15) days from the time of the filing of the notice of appeal with the lower court. If the appellants failed to pay the PhP 3,200 within the prescribed period, then the appeal should be dismissed. The Court went on to state in Divinagracia that Aguilar did not “dilute the force of COMELEC Resolution No. 8486 on the matter of compliance with the COMELEC-required appeal fees.” The resolution, to reiterate, was mainly issued to clarify the confusion caused by the requirement of payment of two appeal fees. Divinagracia, however, contained the following final caveat: that “for notice of appeal filed after the promulgation of this decision, errors in the matter ofnon-payment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in election cases are no longer excusable.” Mateo R. Nollen, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Susana M. Caballes, G.R. No. 187635, January 11, 2010. ELECTION PROTEST; NUISANCE CANDIDATES. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is the correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate. Election contests, therefore, involve the adjudication not only of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also of paramount public interest considering the need to dispel uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate. In controversies pertaining to nuisance candidates as in the case at bar, the law contemplates the likelihood of confusion which the similarity of surnames of two (2) candidates may generate. A nuisance candidate is thus defined as one who, based on the attendant circumstances, has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed, his sole purpose being the reduction of the votes of a strong candidate, upon the expectation that ballots with only the surname of such candidate will be considered stray and not counted for either of them. In elections for national positions such as President, Vice-President and Senator, the sheer logistical challenge posed by nuisance candidates gives compelling reason for the Commission to exercise its authority to eliminate nuisance candidates who obviously have no financial capacity or serious intention to mount a nationwide campaign. Celestino A. Martinez III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Benhur L. Salimbangon, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; JUDICIAL REVIEW. The judgments of the Electoral Tribunals are beyond judicial interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The power of judicial review may be invoked in exceptional cases upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a clear denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of direction that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.

Respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion in affirming the proclamation of respondent Salimbangon as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu despite the final outcome of revision showing 5,401 ballots with only “MARTINEZ” or “C. “MARTINEZ” written on the line for Representative, votes which should have been properly counted in favor of petitioner and not nullified as stray votes, after considering all relevant circumstances clearly establishing that such votes could not have been intended for “Edilito C. Martinez” who was declared a nuisance candidate in a final judgment. Celestino A. Martinez III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Benhur L. Salimbangon, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010.

FEBRUARY 2010 CASES Constitutional Law EQUAL PROTECTION; REQUISITES . The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. The assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010. EXPROPRIATION; PRIVATE USE. It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Government’s power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated. More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owner’s right to justice, fairness, and equity. In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent to the Government’s exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and Air Transportation Office (ATO) vs. Bernardo Lozada, et al., G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010. GERRYMANDERING; MEANING. “Gerrymandering” is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, defined “gerrymandering” as the formation of one legislative district out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a

candidate or a party. The Constitution proscribes gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to comprise, as far as practicable, a contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Province of Dinagat Islands consists of one island and about 47 islets closely situated together, without the inclusion of separate territories. It is an unsubstantiated allegation that the province was created to favor Congresswoman Glenda Ecleo-Villaroman. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET); JURISDICTION. The HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections. Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Electoral Tribunal, et al. /Congressman Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), et al., G.R. No. 189466/G.R. No. 189506,. February 11, 2010. JUDICIAL REVIEW; REQUISITES. The courts’ power of judicial review, like almost all other powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Respondents assert that the second requisite is absent in this case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. The question on standing is whether such parties have “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, summarizing the rules culled from jurisprudence, the Supreme Court held that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1) cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the fact that he filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of such illegal act by public officials. Dennis B. Funa vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Office of the President, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010. JUDICIAL REVIEW; STANDING TO SUE.

In her Memorandum, respondent Governor Geraldine B. Ecleo-Villaroman of the Province of Dinagat Islands raises procedural issues. She contends that petitioners do not have the legal standing to question the constitutionality of the creation of the Province of Dinagat, since they have not been directly injured by its creation and are without substantial interest over the matter in controversy. Moreover, she alleges that the petition is moot and academic because the existence of the Province of Dinagat Islands has already commenced; hence, the petition should be dismissed. The contention is without merit. In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the same vein, with respect to other alleged procedural flaws, even assuming the existence of such defects, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, brushes aside these technicalities and takes cognizance of the petition considering its importance and in keeping with the duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution. Further, supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. The courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010. LOCAL GOVERNMENT; CREATION OF PROVINCE. The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code. Any derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. R.A. No. 9355 (creating the province of Dinagat Islands) is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the criteria for the creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code. The provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, “The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands,” is null and void. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010. PRESIDENT; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. Petitioners first take issue on the President’s purported lack of immunity from suit during her term of office. The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed such immunity heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure. The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency. And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners’ protected rights. Lourdes D. Rubrico, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010. OVERBREADTH. In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained only where, in the judgment of the court, the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and perceived grievances left to fester (due to the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes) outweighs the possible harm to society in allowing some unprotected speech or conduct to go unpunished. Facial overbreadth has likewise not been invoked where a limiting construction could be placed on the challenged statute, and where there are readily apparent constructions that would cure, or at least substantially reduce, the alleged overbreadth of the statute. In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain in office, even as they actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably protected candidacies blocked by the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute.

In this light, the conceivably impermissible applications of the challenged statutes – which are, at best, bold predictions – cannot justify invalidating these statutes in toto and prohibiting the State from enforcing them against conduct that is, and has for more than 100 years been, unquestionably within its power and interest to proscribe. Instead, the more prudent approach would be to deal with these conceivably impermissible applications through case-by-case adjudication rather than through a total invalidation of the statute itself. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010. PUBLIC ASSEMBLY; MODIFICATION OF PERMIT. In modifying the permit outright, respondent Mayor of Manila gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit. Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which “blank” denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof. Intergrated Bar of the Philippines, represented by its National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, H. Harry L. Roque, et al. vs. Honorable Manila Mayor Jose “Lito” Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010. PUBLIC OFFICIALS; MULTIPLE OFFICE. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein, without additional compensation in an exofficio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise “any other office” within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. Apart from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any compensation when she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her designation as such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary functions of her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the MARINA, we are hardly persuaded by respondents’ submission that respondent Bautista’s designation as OIC of MARINA was merely an imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is not even a member of the Maritime Industry Board, which includes the DOTC Secretary as Chairman, the MARINA Administrator as Vice-Chairman, and the following as members: Executive Secretary (Office of the President), Philippine Ports Authority General Manager, Department of National Defense Secretary, Development Bank of the Philippines General Manager, and the Department of Trade and Industry Secretary. It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the words “hold the office” were employed. Such holding of office pertains to both appointment and designation because the appointee or designate performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To “hold” an office means to “possess or occupy” the same, or “to be in possession and administration,” which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is aimed at preventing the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. Civil Liberties Union traced the history of the times and the conditions under which the Constitution was framed, and construed the Constitution consistent with the object sought to be accomplished by adoption of such provision, and the evils sought to be avoided or remedied. We recalled the practice, during the Marcos regime, of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of the governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations. This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials, who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission would draft into the proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration, which were envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices and employment. Dennis B. Funa vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Office of the President, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010.

Administrative Law PROCEEDINGS; EVIDENCE. In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only substantial evidence, “that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.” In the present case, petitioner’s Order of May 18, 2004 finding respondent administratively liable for neglect of duty, which “implies the failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee arising from either carelessness or indifference,” was adequately established by substantial evidence. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) vs. Asteria E. Cruzabra, G.R. No. 183507, February 24, 2010.

Election Law APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS; FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. On the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act, which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are running, an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another position without forfeiting his seat. Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution and does not suffer from overbreadth. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010. (Note: The Supreme Court reconsidered its earlier decision of December 1, 2009.) AUTOMATION PROJECT; VALIDITY. The contract-award of the 2010 Election Automation Project to the joint venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic) is valid. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., Joel R. Butuyan, Romel R. Bagares, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, represented by Hon. Chaiman Jose Melo, et al., Pete Quirino-Qaudra (Petitioner-in-intervention) Senate of the Philippines, represented by its President Juan Ponce Enrili (Movant-Intervenor), G.R. No. 188456, February 10, 2010. (Note: The Supreme Court denied the motion to reconsider its earlier decision of September 10, 2009.) BALLOT; TAMPERING. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring Peñano, based on the results of the revision of ballots, the winner in the mayoralty contest for the Municipality of Alfonso, Cavite. The ballots, after proof of tampering, cannot be considered reflective of the will of the people of Alfonso. Mayor Virgilio P. Varias vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 189078, February 11, 2010. COMELEC; BALLOT APPRECIATION. The records of the case indicate that the COMELEC en banc proceeded to conduct a fresh appreciation of the contested ballots without first ascertaining whether the ballots to be recounted had been kept inviolate. The COMELEC cannot proceed to conduct a fresh appreciation of ballots without first ascertaining the integrity thereof. Sandra Y Eriguel vs. Commission on Elections and Ma. Theresa Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. No. 190526, February 26, 2010. COMELEC; ELEVATION TO EN BANC WITHOUT DIVISION DECISION. The COMELEC, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, is bound to follow the provision set forth in Section 3, Article IXC of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: “SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation

controversies.All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.” It therefore follows that when the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers such as in the present case, the Commission is constitutionally mandated to decide the case first in division, and en banc only upon motion for reconsideration. Indeed, it is a basic doctrine in procedural law that the jurisdiction of a court or an agency exercising quasi-judicial functions (such as the COMELEC) over the subject-matter of an action is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. Jurisdiction cannot be fixed by the agreement of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties. Neither can it be conferred by the acquiescence of the court, more particularly so in election cases where the interest involved transcends those of the contending parties. This being so, the Special Second Division of the COMELEC clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion when it immediately transferred to the Commission en banc a case that ought to be heard and decided by a division. Such action cannot be done without running afoul of Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. Instead of peremptorily transferring the case to the Commission en banc, the Special Second Division of COMELEC, should have instead assigned another Commissioner as additional member of its Special Second Division, not only to fill in the seat temporarily vacated by Commissioner Ferrer, but more importantly so that the required quorum may be attained. Sandra Y Eriguel vs. Commission on Elections and Ma. Theresa Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. No. 190526, February 26, 2010. COMELEC; FAILURE OF ELECTIONS. The 1987 Constitution vests in the COMELEC the broad power to enforce all the laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, as well as the plenary authority to decide all questions affecting elections except the question as to the right to vote. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides for the instances when the COMELEC may declare failure of elections. The COMELEC en banc based its decision to declare a failure of elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A on the second instance stated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, that is, the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. The COMELEC en banc ruled that since both parties agreed that the elections were suspended before the hour fixed by law due to violence caused by undetermined persons, there was obviously a failure of elections in the aforementioned precinct. The findings of fact of the COMELEC en banc are binding on this Court. The grounds for failure of election (i.e., force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous cases) involve questions of fact, which can only be determined by the COMELEC en banc after due notice to and hearing of the parties. An application for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. TheCOMELEC, as the administrative agency and specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has the expertise in its field so that its findings and conclusions are generally respected by and conclusive on the Court. Petitioner’s allegation of grave abuse of discretion by public respondent COMELEC en banc implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, the exercise of the power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is not present in this case, as public respondent issued the COMELEC Resolution dated October 17, 2005 based on the evidence on record and the law on the matter. Abdul Gaffar P.M. Dibaratun vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 170365, February 2, 2010. COMELEC; INJUNCTION. If instead of issuing a preliminary injunction in place of a TRO, a court opts to decide the case on its merits with the result that it also enjoins the same acts covered by its TRO, it stands to reason that the decision amounts to a grant of preliminary injunction. Such injunction should be deemed in force pending any appeal from the decision. The view of petitioner Panlilio— that execution pending appeal should still continue notwithstanding a decision of the higher court enjoining such execution— does not make sense. It will render quite inutile the proceedings before such court. Mayor Jose Marquez Lisboa Panlilio vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 184286. February 26, 2010 COMELEC JURISDICTION OVER INTRA-PARTY LEADERSHIP DISPUTES.

The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC’s powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, “include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts.” The Court also declared in another case that the COMELEC’s power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties. The validity of respondent Roxas’ election as LP president is a leadership issue that the COMELEC had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national elective positions. It is also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of nomination for candidates to local elective posts. In simple terms, it is the LP president who certifies the official standard bearer of the party. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010. COMELEC; TAMPERED VOTES. We find the manner in which the COMELEC excluded the subject returns to be fatally flawed. In the absence of clearly convincing evidence, the validity of election returns must be upheld. A conclusion that an election return is obviously manufactured or false and consequently should be disregarded in the canvass must be approached with extreme caution and only upon the most convincing proof. Corrolarily, any plausible explanation, one which is acceptable to a reasonable man in the light of experience and of the probabilities of the situation, should suffice to avoid outright nullification, which results in disenfranchisement of those who exercised their right of suffrage. As will be discussed shortly, there is a patent lack of basis for the COMELEC’s findings that the subject returns were tampered. In disregard of the principle requiring “extreme caution” before rejecting election returns, the COMELEC proceeded with undue haste in concluding that the subject returns were tampered. This is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In sum, it was highly irregular for the COMELEC to outrightly exclude the subject returns resulting in the disenfranchisement of some 1,127 voters as per the records of this case. The proper procedure in case of discrepancy in the other authentic copies of the election returns is clearly spelled out in Section 236 of the OEC. For contravening this legal provision, the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rose Marie D. Doromal vs. Hernan G. Biron and Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 181809, February 17, 2010. DISQUALIFICATION; VOTER INCLUSION/EXCLUSION PROCEEDINGS. Voters’ inclusion/exclusion proceedings, on the one hand, essentially involve the issue of whether a petitioner shall be included in or excluded from the list of voters based on the qualifications required by law and the facts presented to show possession of these qualifications. On the other hand, COC denial/cancellation proceedings involve the issue of whether there is a false representation of a material fact. The false representation must necessarily pertain not to a mere innocuous mistake but to a material fact or those that refer to a candidate’s qualifications for elective office. Apart from the requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible or, otherwise stated, with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for public office. In Velasco, the Court rejected Velasco’s contention that the Comelec improperly ruled on the right to vote when it cancelled his COC. The Court stated that the Comelec merely relied on or recognized the RTC’s final and executory decision on the matter of the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction. In the present petition, it is Panlaqui’s turn to proffer the novel interpretation that the RTC properly cancelled Velasco’s COC when it ruled on his right to vote. The Court rejects the same. It is not within the province of the RTC in a voter’s inclusion/exclusion proceedings to take cognizance of and determine the presence of a false representation of a material fact. It has no jurisdiction to try the issues of whether the misrepresentation relates to material fact and whether there was an intention to deceive the electorate in terms of one’s qualifications for public office. The finding that Velasco was not qualified to vote due to lack of residency requirement does not translate into a finding of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible. Mozart P. Panlaqui vs. Commission on Elections and Nardo M. Velasco, G.R. No. 188671, February 24, 2010. PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY; CONTESTED RETURNS. It is settled that a pre-proclamation controversy is summary in character; indeed, it is the policy of the law that preproclamation controversies be promptly decided, so as not to delay canvass and proclamation. The Board of Canvassers

(BOC) will not look into allegations of irregularity that are not apparent on the face of ERs that appear otherwise authentic and duly accomplished. Consistent with the summary character and limited scope of a pre-proclamation controversy, Section 20 of RA 7166 lays down the procedure to be followed when ERs are contested before the BOC. Compliance with this procedure is mandatory, so as to permit the BOC to resolve the objections as quickly as possible. Section 20 of RA 7166 and Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution 2962 provide that any candidate may contest the inclusion of an ER by making an oral objection at the time the questioned return is submitted for canvass; the objecting party shall also submit his objections in writing simultaneously with the oral objections. The BOC shall consider the written objections and opposition, if any, and summarily rule on the petition for exclusion. Any party adversely affected by such ruling must immediately inform the BOC if he intends to appeal such ruling. After the BOC rules on the contested returns and canvasses all the uncontested returns, it shall suspend the canvass. Any party adversely affected by the ruling has 48 hours to file a Notice of Appeal; the appeal shall be filed within five days. Upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the BOC will make its report to the COMELEC, and elevate the records and evidence. Moreover, pursuant to Section 235 of the Omnibus Election Code, in cases where the ERs appear to have been tampered with, altered or falsified, the COMELEC shall examine the other copies of the questioned returns and, if the other copies are likewise tampered with, altered, falsified, or otherwise spurious, after having given notice to all candidates and satisfied itself that the integrity of the ballot box and of the ballots therein have been duly preserved, shall order a recount of the votes cast, prepare a new return which shall be used by the BOC as basis for the canvass, and direct the proclamation of the winner accordingly. Based on the records of this case, we find that petitioner failed to timely make his objections to the contested ERs. Themistocles A. Saño, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 182221, February 3, 2010. Local Government SUCCESSION; SANNGGUNIAN. Sec. 45(b) of RA 7160 provides for the rule on succession in cases of permanent vacancies in the Sanggunian. The law provides for conditions for the rule of succession to apply: First, the appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy. Second, the appointee must have a nomination and a Certificate of Membership from the highest official of the political party concerned. Atty. Lucky M. Damasen vs. Oscar G. Tumamao, G.R. No. 173165, February 17, 2010. Public officers APPOINTMENT; SUBMISSION TO CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. The deliberate failure of the appointing authority (or other responsible officials) to submit respondent’s appointment paper to the CSC within 30 days from its issuance did not make her appointment ineffective and incomplete. Under Article 1186 of the Civil Code, “[t]he condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment.” Applying this to the appointment process in the civil service, unless the appointee himself is negligent in following up the submission of his appointment to the CSC for approval, he should not be prejudiced by any willful act done in bad faith by the appointing authority to prevent the timely submission of his appointment to the CSC. While it may be argued that the submission of respondent’s appointment to the CSC within 30 days was one of the conditions for the approval of respondent’s appointment, however, deliberately and with bad faith, the officials responsible for the submission of respondent’s appointment to the CSC prevented the fulfillment of the said condition. Thus, the said condition should be deemed fulfilled. The Court has already had the occasion to rule that an appointment remains valid in certain instances despite noncompliance of the proper officials with the pertinent CSC rules. Arlin B. Obiasca vs. Jeane O. Basallote, G.R. No. 176707, February 17, 2010.

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIMINAL ACTS OF SUBORDINATES

Can a military commander be held liable for the criminal acts of his subordinates? The Supreme Court touched on that issue in Lourdes D. Rubrico, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010. However, that case did not provide a venue for the Supreme Court to provide a definitive ruling on the matter. The case involved a petition for a writ of amparo filed against the President, the Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), among others. The petition was originally filed with the Supreme Court, which referred the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals eventually dropped the President as a respondent (based on presidential immunity from suit during her term). The Court of Appeals also ordered the dismissal of the case against the AFP Chief and the PNP Chief. According to the Court of Appeals, AFP Chief Gen. Esperon and PNP Chief P/Dir. Gen. Razon were included as respondents on the theory that they, as commanders, were responsible for the unlawful acts allegedly committed by their subordinates against petitioners. According to the Court of Appeals, “the privilege of the writ of amparo must be denied as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon for the simple reason that petitioners have not presented evidence showing that those who allegedly abducted and illegally detained Lourdes and later threatened her and her family were, in fact, members of the military or the police force.” The Court of Appeals hinted that the two generals would have been accountable for the abduction and threats if the actual malefactors were members of the AFP or PNP. The Supreme Court discussed the current status of Philippine law regarding command responsibility for criminal acts of subordinates: The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, “command responsibility,” in its simplest terms, means the “responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict.” In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is “an omission mode of individual criminal liability,” whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to which the Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes individual responsibility on military commanders for crimes committed by forces under their control. The country is, however, not yet formally bound by the terms and provisions embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet to extend concurrence in its ratification. While there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine. It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. While the Supreme Court left open the possibility that command responsibility for criminal acts is part of international law and is deemed incorporated into Philippine law pursuant to the “incorporation” clause of the Constitution, the Supreme Court held that command responsibility “as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings.” According to the Supreme Court: Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents’ criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, “is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring substantial evidence that will require full and

exhaustive proceedings.” . . . If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any.

MARCH 2010 CASES Constitutional Law CONSTITUTIONALITY; JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY . Courts will not assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question unless the following requisites are satisfied: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review; (2) the question before the court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to do so; (4) the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity and (5) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Respondents aver that the first three requisites are absent in this case. According to them, there is no actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power and it is not yet ripe for adjudication. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims which is susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. On the other hand, a question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. Contrary to respondents’ assertion, we do not have to wait until petitioner’s members have shut down their operations as a result of the MCIT or CWT. The assailed provisions are already being implemented. As we stated in Didipio Earth-Savers’ Multi-Purpose Association, Incorporated (DESAMA) v. Gozun: “By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.” If the assailed provisions are indeed unconstitutional, there is no better time than the present to settle such question once and for all. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Associations, Inc. Vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 160756, March 9, 2010. CONSTITUTIONALITY; JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY . We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the “interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.” A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The ripeness of the controversy for judicial determination may not be doubted. The challenges to the authority of the JBC to open the process of nomination and to continue the process until the submission of the list of nominees; the insistence of some of the petitioners to compel the JBC through mandamus to submit the short list to the incumbent President; the counter-insistence of the intervenors to prohibit the JBC from submitting the short list to the incumbent President on the ground that said list should be submitted instead to the next President; the strong position that the incumbent President is

already prohibited under Section 15, Article VII from making any appointments, including those to the Judiciary, starting on May 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010; and the contrary position that the incumbent President is not so prohibited are only some of the real issues for determination. All such issues establish the ripeness of the controversy, considering that for some the short list must be submitted before the vacancy actually occurs by May 17, 2010. The outcome will not be an abstraction, or a merely hypothetical exercise. The resolution of the controversy will surely settle – with finality – the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process. Arturo M. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, G.R. No. 191032, G.R. No. 191057, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, G.R. No. 191149, G.R. No. 191342, March 17, 2010. CONSTITUTIONALITY; JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY . It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and authoritativeness of the population indicators Congress used in enacting RA 9591 are non-justiciable. If laws creating legislative districts are unquestionably within the ambit of this Court’s judicial review power, then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions impacting on their constitutionality, such as their compliance with a specific constitutional limitation under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000 constituents are entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfill this obligation, the Court, of necessity, must inquire into the authoritativeness and reliability of the population indicators Congress used to comply with the constitutional limitation. Victorino B. Aldaba, et al. Vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188078, March 15, 2010. CONSTITUTIONALITY; STANDING TO SUE. The Court rules that the petitioners have each demonstrated adequate interest in the outcome of the controversy as to vest them with the requisite locus standi.The issues before us are of transcendental importance to the people as a whole, and to the petitioners in particular. Indeed, the issues affect everyone (including the petitioners), regardless of one’s personal interest in life, because they concern that great doubt about the authority of the incumbent President to appoint not only the successor of the retiring incumbent Chief Justice, but also others who may serve in the Judiciary, which already suffers from a far too great number of vacancies in the ranks of trial judges throughout the country. In any event, the Court retains the broad discretion to waive the requirement of legal standing in favor of any petitioner when the matter involved has transcendental importance, or otherwise requires a liberalization of the requirement. Yet, if any doubt still lingers about the locus standi of any petitioner, we dispel the doubt now in order to remove any obstacle or obstruction to the resolution of the essential issue squarely presented herein. We are not to shirk from discharging our solemn duty by reason alone of an obstacle more technical than otherwise. In Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., we pointed out: “Standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.” But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners “are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.” Arturo M. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, G.R. No. 191032, G.R. No. 191057, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, G.R. No. 191149, G.R. No. 191342, March 17, 2010. CONSTITUTIONALITY; STANDING TO SUE. Respondents next argue that petitioner has no legal standing to sue: “Petitioner is an association of some of the real estate developers and builders in the Philippines. Petitioners did not allege that [it] itself is in the real estate business. It did not allege any material interest or any wrong that it may suffer from the enforcement of [the assailed provisions].” Legal standing or locus standi is a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case such that it has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged. In Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor, we held that the association had legal standing because its members stood to be injured by the enforcement of the assailed provisions. In any event, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case, ripeness or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. The questioned MCIT and CWT affect not only petitioners but practically all domestic corporate taxpayers in our country. The transcendental importance of the issues raised and their overreaching significance to society make it proper for us to take cognizance of this petition. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Associations, Inc. Vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 160756, March 9, 2010. DUE PROCESS; MINIMUM CORPORATE INCOME TAX.

Petitioner claims that the MCIT under Section 27(E) of RA 8424 is unconstitutional because it is highly oppressive, arbitrary and confiscatory which amounts to deprivation of property without due process of law. It explains that gross income as defined under said provision only considers the cost of goods sold and other direct expenses; other major expenditures, such as administrative and interest expenses which are equally necessary to produce gross income, were not taken into account. Thus, pegging the tax base of the MCIT to a corporation’s gross income is tantamount to a confiscation of capital because gross income, unlike net income, is not “realized gain.” Petitioner failed to support, by any factual or legal basis, its allegation that the MCIT is arbitrary and confiscatory. The Court cannot strike down a law as unconstitutional simply because of its yokes. Taxation is necessarily burdensome because, by its nature, it adversely affects property rights. The party alleging the law’s unconstitutionality has the burden to demonstrate the supposed violations in understandable terms. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Associations, Inc. Vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 160756, March 9, 2010. EQUAL PROTECTION; CREDITABLE WITHHOLDING TAX. Petitioner claims that the revenue regulations are violative of the equal protection clause because the CWT is being levied only on real estate enterprises. Specifically, petitioner points out that manufacturing enterprises are not similarly imposed a CWT on their sales, even if their manner of doing business is not much different from that of a real estate enterprise. Like a manufacturing concern, a real estate business is involved in a continuous process of production and it incurs costs and expenditures on a regular basis. The only difference is that “goods” produced by the real estate business are house and lot units. The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.” Stated differently, all persons belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike. It follows that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable classifications for purposes of taxation. Inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation. The real estate industry is, by itself, a class and can be validly treated differently from other business enterprises. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Associations, Inc. Vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 160756, March 9, 2010. EQUAL PROTECTION; NPC REGULATION. The equal protection clause means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.” The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification. The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary. Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the equal protection clause as these were based on a reasonable classification intended to protect, not the right of any business or trade but the integrity of government property, as well as promote the objectives of RA 7832. Traders like Pinatubo could not claim similar treatment as direct manufacturers/processors especially in the light of their failure to negate the rationale behind the distinction. National Power Corporation vs. Pinatubo Commercial, represented by Alfredo A. Dy, G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010. FREEDOM OF SPEECH; PRIOR RESTRAINT. Petitioner’s threshold posture that the suspension thus imposed constitutes prior restraint and an abridgement of his exercise of religion and freedom of expression is a mere rehash of the position he articulated in the underlying petitions for certiorari and expounded in his memorandum. So are the supportive arguments and some of the citations of decisional law, Philippine and American, holding it together. They have been considered, sufficiently discussed in some detail, and found to be without merit in our Decision. It would, thus, make little sense to embark on another lengthy discussion of the same issues and arguments. Suffice it to reiterate that the sanction imposed on the TV program in question does not, under the factual milieu of the case, constitute prior restraint, but partakes of the nature of subsequent punishment for past violation committed by petitioner in the course of the broadcast of the program on August 10, 2004. Eliseo F. Soriano Vs. Ma. Consoliza P. Laguardia, etc. et al./Eliseo F. Soriano Vs. Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, et al., G.R. No. 164785/G.R. No. 165636, March 15, 2010.

HRET; PROCEDURE . It is quite clear that the Tribunal acted in the best interest of the electorate, ensuring the determination of the latter’s will within a reasonable time. In sum, there is absolutely nothing in this case that would justify a finding that the HRET gravely abused its discretion by not granting petitioner an extension of time to present additional evidence and formally offer the same. Representative Alvin S. Sandoval vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Josephine Veronique R. Lacson-Noel and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. No. 190067, March 9, 2010. LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS; CONTIGUOUS REQUIREMENT. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution on the population requirement, the creation by RA 9591 of a legislative district for Malolos City, carving the city from the former First Legislative District, leaves the town of Bulacan isolated from the rest of the geographic mass of that district. This contravenes the requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI that each legislative district shall “comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.” It is no argument to say, as the OSG does, that it was impracticable for Congress to create a district with contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory because Malolos city lies at the center of the First Legislative District. The geographic lay-out of the First Legislative District is not an insuperable condition making compliance with Section 5(3) impracticable. To adhere to the constitutional mandate, and thus maintain fidelity to its purpose of ensuring efficient representation, the practicable alternative for Congress was to include the municipality of Bulacan in Malolos City’s legislative district. Although unorthodox, the resulting contiguous and compact district fulfills the constitutional requirements of geographic unity and population floor, ensuring efficient representation of the minimum mass of constituents. Victorino B. Aldaba, et al. Vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188078, March 15, 2010. PRESIDENT; POWER OF APPOINTMENT . The incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010 as the prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary. Arturo M. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, G.R. No. 191032, G.R. No. 191057, A.M. No. 10-25-SC, G.R. No. 191149, G.R. No. 191342, March 17, 2010. SPEEDY TRIAL. The constitutional right to a “speedy disposition of cases” is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action by all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. Applying the doctrinal ruling vis-a-vis the factual milieu of this case, the violation of the right to a speedy disposition of the case against petitioner is clear for the following reasons: (1) the delay of almost five (5) years on the part of ADT in resolving the motion of petitioner, which resolution petitioner reasonably found necessary before he could present his defense; (2) the unreasonableness of the delay; and (3) the timely assertions by petitioner of the right to an early disposition which he did through a motion to dismiss. Over and above this, the delay was prejudicial to petitioner’s cause as he was under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days, and during the interregnum of almost five years, the trial of the accusation against him remained stagnant at the prosecution stage. The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals. The adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the established rules of procedure but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile. Capt. Wilferdo G. Roquero vs. The

Chancellor of UP Manila, et al., G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010. UNFAIR COMPETITION; BIDDING. The provision imposed the precondition that the contracting parties should be eligible and qualified. It should be emphasized that the bidding process was not a “free-for-all” where any and all interested parties, qualified or not, could take part. Section 5(e) of RA 9184 defines competitive bidding as a “method of procurement which is open to participation by any interested party and which consists of the following processes: advertisement, pre-bid conference, eligibility screening of prospective bidders, receipt and opening of bids, evaluation of bids, post-qualification, and award of contract x x x.” The law categorically mandates that prospective bidders are subject to eligibility screening, and as earlier stated, bidding rules may specify other conditions or order that the bidding process be subjected to certain reservations or qualifications. Thus, in its pre-qualification guidelines issued for the sale of scrap ACSRs, the NPC reserved the right to pre-disqualify any applicant who did not meet the requirements for pre-qualification. Clearly, the competitiveness policy of a bidding process presupposes the eligibility and qualification of a contestant; otherwise, it defeats the principle that only “responsible” and “qualified” bidders can bid and be awarded government contracts. Our free enterprise system is not based on a market of pure and unadulterated competition where the State pursues a strict hands-off policy and follows the let-the-devil-devour-thehindmost rule. Moreover, the mere fact that incentives and privileges are granted to certain enterprises to the exclusion of others does not render the issuance unconstitutional for espousing unfair competition. While the Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. In the present case, the unregulated disposal and sale of scrap ACSR wires will hamper the government’s effort of curtailing the pernicious practice of trafficking stolen government property. This is an evil sought to be prevented by RA 7832 and certainly, it was well within the authority of the NPC to prescribe conditions in order to prevent it. National Power Corporation vs. Pinatubo Commercial, represented by Alfredo A. Dy, G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010. Administrative Law ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS. Petitioner’s allegation of improper venue and the fact that the complaint was not under oath are not sufficient grounds for the dismissal of the complaint. Well to remember, the case was an administrative case and as such, technical rules of procedure are liberally applied. In administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. The intention is to resolve disputes brought before such bodies in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner possible. Petitioner was likewise amply afforded administrative due process the essence of which is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The records show that petitioner filed the following: (1) Compliance-Answer to the Complaint; (2) Rejoinder; (3) Position paper; (4) Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the Board of Professional Teachers finding him guilty as charged; and (5) Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. He attended the preliminary conference and hearing where he was able to adduce his evidence. With the opportunities he had, he cannot claim he was denied due process. Rene Ventenilla Puse Vs. Ligaya delos Santos-Puse, G.R. No. 183678, March 15, 2010 EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of petitioner NEA, the failure of respondent to undertake such an appeal bars him from resorting to a judicial suit. It is settled that under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court action cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies have first been exhausted. If remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before recourse can be made to courts. The party with an administrative remedy must not only initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court. The non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies results in lack of cause of action, which is one of the grounds in the Rules of Court justifying the dismissal of the complaint. In the present case, respondent failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he filed a case with the RTC without appealing the decision of the NEA to the Office of the President. As such, his petition filed with the RTC must necessarily fail. National Electrification Administration vs. Val L. Villanueva, G.R. No. 168203, March 9, 2010 REGULATIONS; PUBLICATION.

NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published since it was merely an internal rule or regulation. It did not purport to enforce or implement an existing law but was merely a directive issued by the NPC President to his subordinates to regulate the proper and efficient disposal of scrap ACSRs to qualified bidders. Thus, NPC Circular No. 99-75 defined the responsibilities of the different NPC personnel in the disposal, pre-qualification, bidding and award of scrap ACSRS. It also provided for the deposit of a proposal bond to be submitted by bidders, the approval of the award, mode of payment and release of awarded scrap ACSRs. All these guidelines were addressed to the NPC personnel involved in the bidding and award of scrap ACSRs. It did not, in any way, affect the rights of the public in general or of any other person not involved in the bidding process. Assuming it affected individual rights, it did so only remotely, indirectly and incidentally. National Power Corporation vs. Pinatubo Commercial, represented by Alfredo A. Dy, G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010. Agrarian law CARL; COVERAGE. Resolution No. 5, passed on March 12, 1981 by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, showed that the limits of the poblacion area of the municipality included Barangay Bibincahan, where the respondents’ landholdings were situated. The significance of this fact cannot be overstated, for, thereby, the respondents’ landholdings were presumed to be industrial and residential lands. Jurisprudence has been clear about the presumption. In Hilario v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court said: “The presumption assumed by the appellate court that a parcel of land which is located in a poblacion is not necessarily devoted to residential purposes is wrong. It should be the other way around. A lot inside the poblacion should be presumed residential, or commercial, or non-agricultural unless there is a clearly preponderant evidence to show that it is agricultural.” To the same effect was Natalia Realty Corporation v. DAR, thus: “We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall “cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands.” As to what constitutes “agricultural land,” it is referred to as “land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.” The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. “Agricultural lands” are only those lands which are “arable and suitable agricultural lands” and “do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands.” There is no dispute that as early as 1981, the respondents’ landholdings have been part of the poblacion of Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Consistent with Hilario andNatalia, holding that the respondents’ landholdings were non-agricultural, and, consequently, outside the coverage of the CARL, was fully warranted. In fact, the excerpt from the Comprehensive Development Plan of Sorsogon, Sorsogon showed that Barangay Bibincahan was within the Central Business District of the municipality. Department of Agrarian Reform, represented by Secretary Hernani A. Braganza vs. Pablo Berenguer, et al., G.R. No. 154094, March 9, 2010. CARP; COVERAGE. Petitioner insists on exemption of the Alangilan landholding from CARP coverage. It argues that the subject landholding had already been converted into non-agricultural use long before the advent of the CARP. The passage of the 1982 Ordinance, classifying the property as reserved for residential, it asserts, effectively transformed the land into non-agricultural use, and thus, outside the ambit of the CARL. It cites Natalia, wherein it was ruled that lands intended for residential use are outside the coverage of the CARL. Indeed, lands devoted to non-agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted into non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to convince us that the Alangilan landholding ceased to be agricultural at the time of the effectivity of the CARL. It is beyond cavil that the Alangilan landholding was classified as agricultural, reserved for residential in 1982, and was reclassified as residential-1 in 1994. However, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the term reserved for residential does not change the nature of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural. As aptly explained by the DAR Secretary, the term reserved for residential simply reflects the intended land use. It does not denote that the property has already been reclassified as residential, because the phrase reserved for residential is not a land classification category. Indubitably, at the time of the effectivity of the CARL in 1988, the subject landholding was still agricultural. This was bolstered by the fact that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had to pass an Ordinance in 1994, reclassifying the landholding as residential-1. If, indeed, the landholding had already been earmarked for residential use in 1982, as petitioner claims, then there would have been no necessity for the passage of the 1994 Ordinance. Alangilan Realty & Development Corporation vs. Office of the President, represented by Alberto Romulo, as Executive Secretary and Arthur P. Autea, as Deputy Secretary and Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 180471, March 26, 2010. Election law

COMELEC; FINDINGS. The appreciation of election documents involves a question of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country. The findings of fact of administrative bodies, when supported by substantial evidence, are final and nonreviewable by courts of justice. This principle is applied with greater force when the case concerns the COMELEC, because the framers of the Constitution intended to place the poll body —created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself—on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. Jesus O. Typoco vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 186359. March 5, 2010. COMELEC; MAJORITY VOTE. The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the required majority vote even after the 15 February 2010 re-hearing should have caused the dismissal of respondent’s Election Protest. Promulgated on 15 February 1993 pursuant to Section 6, Article IX-A and Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is clear on this matter. Without any trace of ambiguity, Section 6, Rule 18 of said Rule categorically provides as follows: ”Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. – When the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.” Joselito R. Mendoza vs. Commission on Elections and Roberto M. Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 191084, March 25, 2010. COMELEC; FIREARMS BAN. The main issue is whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in including airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the term “firearm” in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 8714. The Court finds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in this case. Atty. Reynante B. Orceo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190779, March 26, 2010. HRET; VOTE COUNT. What petitioner questions is the Tribunal’s reliance on election returns and/or tally sheets and other election documents to arrive at the number of votes for each of the parties. However, jurisprudence has established that such action of the HRET was well within its discretion and jurisdiction. Indeed, the general rule is, if what is being questioned is the correctness of the number of votes for each candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence is the ballots themselves. However, this rule applies only if the ballots are available and their integrity has been preserved from the day of elections until revision. When the ballots are unavailable or cannot be produced, then recourse can be made to untampered and unaltered election returns or other election documents as evidence. Bai Sandra S.A. Sema vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Didagen P. Dilangalen, G.R. No. 190734, March 26, 2010. Local Government CITY; POPULATION REQUIREMENT . Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population indicators Congress used to measure Malolos City’s compliance with the constitutional limitation are unreliable and non-authoritative. Victorino B. Aldaba, et al. Vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188078, March 15, 2010.

Public officers APPOINTMENT. Section 27 (1), of the Civil Service Law provides: “(1) Permanent status. – A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)” In the CES under which the position of PEZA Deputy Director General for Policy and Planning is classified, the acquisition of security of tenure which presupposes a permanent appointment is governed by the Rules and Regulations promulgated by

the CES Board. Clearly, for an examinee or an incumbent to be a member of the CES and be entitled to security of tenure, she/he must pass the CES examinations, be conferred CES eligibility, comply with the other requirements prescribed by the CES Board, and be appointed to a CES rank by the President. Admittedly, before and up to the time of the termination of her appointment, respondent did not go through the four stages of CES eligibility examinations. The appellate court’s ruling that respondent became CES eligible upon earning the MNSA degree, purportedly in accordance with Executive Order No. 696, as amended by Executive Order No. 771, does not lie. By respondent’s attainment of an MNSA degree, she was not conferred automatic CES eligibility. It was, as above-quoted portions of CESB Resolution No. 204 state, merely accredited as “equivalent to passing the Management Aptitude Test Battery.” For respondent to acquire CES eligibility and CES rank, she could “proceed to the second stage of the eligibility examination process . . . and the other stages of the examination . . . in accordance with existing policies and regulations”; and that if respondent as MNSA degree holder passed the three other stages of the CES eligibility examinations and is conferred CES eligibility, she could “qualify for appointment to CES ranks,” PROVIDED that she meets and complies “with other requirements of the CES Board and the Office of the President to qualify for rank appointment.” Since, it is admitted that respondent, who acquired an MNSA degree in 1993, had not undergone the second, third and fourth stages of the CES eligibility examinations prior to her appointment or during her incumbency as Deputy Director General up to the time her appointment was terminated, she was not a CES eligible, as indeed certified to by the CES Board. Not being a CES eligible, she had no security of tenure, hence, the termination by the PEZA Board on June 1, 2000 of her appointment, as well as the appointment in her stead of CES eligible by Ortaliz, were not illegal. PEZA Board of Directors and Lilia D. De Lima vs. Gloria J. Mercado, G.R. No. 172144, March 9, 2010. LEAVE. Section 49, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave requires that an application for leave should be acted upon within 5 working days from receipt, otherwise, such application is deemed approved. The CSC interpreted said provision in this wise” ”It is explicit from the aforequoted rule that an application for leave of absence which had not been acted upon – either by approving or disapproving – by the head of agency or his/her authorized representative within five (5) working days from the date of its filing shall be deemed approved.” The CSC also ruled that “Section 49 calls for a specific action to be done by the head of the agency or his duly authorized representative on the application for leave filed which is either to approve or to deny the same.” Being the central agency mandated to “prescribe, amend, and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws,” the CSC has the power to interpret its own rules and any phrase contained in them, with its interpretation significantly becoming part of the rules themselves. The Court has consistently yielded and accorded great respect to the interpretation by administrative agencies of their own rules unless there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law. Clearly, Atty. Nghuatco’s memorandum did not cover the action contemplated by Section 49. For one, it did not bear the imprimatur of the Commission Chairman (or his duly authorized representative) who was the proper party to grant or deny the application, as dictated by Section 52 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave. For another, it only submitted to the Commission Secretary Atty. Nghuatco’s comments and/or recommendations on Paler’s application. It was merely preliminary and did not propose any definitive action (i.e., approval or disapproval) on Paler’s application, and simply recommended what action to take. It was obviously not controlling and the Chairman could have agreed or disagreed with the recommended action. In fact, the memorandum clearly provided that Paler’s request was still to be referred to the Legal Service for comment, and that the application “(could) be acted upon depending on the completion of his work load and submission of the medical certificate.” These circumstances plainly meant that further action was yet to be made on the application. And since there was no final approval or disapproval of Paler’s application within 5 working days from receipt as required by Section 49, the application was deemed approved. Paler, therefore, could not be considered on AWOL. Commission on Appointments, represented herein by its Secretary Hon. Arturo L. Tiu vs. Celso M. Paler, G.R. No. 172623. March 3, 2010. Misconduct. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.

Respondent’s acts of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss her were, no doubt, intentional. Worse, the incident occurred months after he had made similar but subtler overtures to De la Cruz, who made it clear that his sexual advances were not welcome. Considering that the acts respondent committed against petitioner were much more aggressive, it was impossible that the offensive nature of his actions could have escaped him. It does not appear that petitioner and respondent were carrying on an amorous relationship that might have justified his attempt to kiss petitioner while they were separated from their companions. Worse, as petitioner and respondent were both married (to other persons), respondent not only took his marital status lightly, he also ignored petitioner’s married state, and good character and reputation. Teresita G. Narvasa vs. Benjamin A. Sanchez, Jr., G.R. No. 169449, March 26, 2010.

CAN THE PRESIDENT LEGALLY APPOINT THE NEXT CHIEF JUSTICE? After months of heated debate all over the country, the Supreme Court has finally spoken – President Arroyo is not prohibited by the Constitution to appoint the next Chief Justice of the Philippines (see Arturo M. De Castro Vs. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, G.R. No. 191032, G.R. No. 191057, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, G.R. No. 191149, G.R. No. 191342, March 17, 2010). According to the Supreme Court, President Arroyo can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010 since the constitutional prohibition against presidential appointments during the two month period before a presidential election does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary. Many of our readers will likely be surprised with the ruling. In the poll we conducted among Lexoterica readers during the past several weeks, 78% believe that the President cannot legally appoint the next Chief Justice. Only 19% believe that the President can legally do so. For the rest, they “don’t know”. Have your views changed given the Supreme Court’s ruling? Let us know by voting at our new poll. To help you decide, here is a link to the majority opinion penned by Justice Bersamin, the dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio Morales, the separate opinion of Justice Brion and the separate opinion of Justice Nachura.

APRIL 2010 CASES Constitutional Law COA; POWERS. The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Section 11, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 echoes this constitutional mandate given to COA. In light of these express provisions of law granting respondent COA its power and authority, we have previously ruled that its exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that give life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government. Furthermore, we have also declared that COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. Based on the foregoing discussion and due to the lack or absence of any law or jurisprudence saying otherwise, we rule that, in resolving cases brought before it on appeal, respondent COA is not required to limit its review only to the grounds relied upon by a government agency’s auditor with respect to disallowing certain disbursements of public funds. In consonance with its general audit power, respondent COA is not merely legally permitted, but is also duty-bound to make its own assessment of the merits of the disallowed disbursement and not simply restrict itself to reviewing the validity of the ground relied upon by the auditor of the government agency concerned. To hold otherwise would render COA’s vital constitutional power unduly limited and thereby useless and ineffective. Ramon R. Yap vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION; LGBT GROUP.

Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and – as advanced by the OSG itself – the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC’s action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner’s fundamental rights. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010. LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT; POPULATION REQUIREMENT . Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.” Petitioners contend, citing Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.” The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010. PARTY LIST; ACCREDITATION. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010. PARTY LIST; MORAL DISAPPROVAL AS GROUND FOR ACCREDITATION. Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause. It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG’s position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause. We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made “an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case.” Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010. PARTY LIST; SECTORS QUALIFIED.

The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration. Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010. PRESIDENT; EXECUTIVE PREROGATIVE. The Executive Department did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan. From a domestic law perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan. Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al. vs. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010. PRESIDENT; POWER OF APPOINTMENT . The incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010 as the prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary. Arturo M. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010. PRESIDENT; POWER TO REORGANIZE . It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the President’s constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to reorganize and redefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the said Code, is explicit. It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President. Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 quoted above authorizes the President (a) to restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another, and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency in the Executive Branch, and vice versa. There is a view that the reorganization actions that the President may take with respect to agencies in the Office of the President are strictly limited to transfer of functions and offices as seemingly provided in Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987. However, Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of the same Code significantly provides: ”Sec. 20. Residual Powers. – Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law. “ Pursuant to Section 20, the power of the President to reorganize the Executive Branch under Section 31 includes such powers and functions that may be provided for under other laws. To be sure, an inclusive and broad interpretation of the President’s power to reorganize executive offices has been consistently supported by specific provisions in general appropriations laws. Atty. Sylvia Banda, et al. vs.. Eduardo R. Ermita etc., et al. G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010. PUBLIC FUNDS; DISBURSEMENT. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 lays out the basic guidelines that government entities must follow in disbursing public funds. Any disbursement of public funds, which includes payment of salaries and benefits to government employees

and officials, must (a) be authorized by law, and (b) serve a public purpose. In this regard, it is necessary for this Court to elaborate on the nature and meaning of the term “public purpose,” in relation to disbursement of public funds. As understood in the traditional sense, public purpose or public use means any purpose or use directly available to the general public as a matter of right. Thus, it has also been defined as “an activity as will serve as benefit to [the] community as a body and which at the same time is directly related function of government.” However, the concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere, the idea that “public use” is strictly limited to clear cases of “use by the public” has been discarded. In fact, this Court has already categorically stated that the term “public purpose” is not defined, since it is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit modern standards. It should be given a broad interpretation; therefore, it does not only pertain to those purposes that which are traditionally viewed as essentially government functions, such as building roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes designed to promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform. In short, public use is now equated with public interest, and that it is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. To our mind, in view of the public purpose requirement, the disbursement of public funds, salaries and benefits of government officers and employees should be granted to compensate them for valuable public services rendered, and the salaries or benefits paid to such officers or employees must be commensurate with services rendered. In the same vein, additional allowances and benefits must be shown to be necessary or relevant to the fulfillment of the official duties and functions of the government officers and employees. We cannot accept petitioner’s theory that the compensation and benefits of public officers are intended purely for the personal benefit of such officers, or that the mere payment of salaries and benefits to a public officer satisfies the public purpose requirement. That theory would lead to the anomalous conclusion that government officers and employees may be paid enormous sums without limit or without any justification necessary other than that such sums are being paid to someone employed by the government. Public funds are the property of the people and must be used prudently at all times with a view to prevent dissipation and waste. Ramon R. Yap vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010. Administrative Law ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; DUE PROCESS. On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBI’s right to due process was not violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. We find it obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint on due process grounds. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), etc. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010 PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS; REQUIREMENTS. The Ang Tibay formulation was overlapping and repetitious. Hence, in Air Manila, Inc. v. Balatbat, the formulation was simplified into four basic rights, as follows: 1. The right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person’s legal right; 2. The right to a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor; 3. The right to a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and 4. The right to a finding or decision of that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties. Gauged upon the foregoing guidelines, Tolentino’s gripe was unwarranted. He was not denied procedural due process. The Division had required him to provide the names of his revisors whose tasks included the raising of objections, the claiming votes for him, or the contesting of the votes in favor of his opponent. He has neither alleged being deprived of this opportunity, nor indicated any situation in which his revisors were denied access to the revision proceedings. He could not

also insist that the COMELEC did not consider his legal and factual arguments; besides, he could still raise them in his memorandum should he chose to. During the revision stage, he should raise all objections, present his evidence and witnesses, and file his memorandum before the case would be submitted for resolution. Mayor Abraham N. Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Vice-Mayor Celso P. De Castro vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 187958, G.R. No. 187961 & 187962/G.R. No. 187966, G.R. No. 187967 & 187968. April 7, 2010. REORGANIZATION; GOOD FAITH. The presidential power to reorganize agencies and offices in the executive branch of government is subject to the condition that such reorganization is carried out in good faith. If the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of positions, which results in loss of security of tenure of affected government employees, would be valid. In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, we even observed that there was no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except those who hold constitutional offices, which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right to an office or salary. Atty. Sylvia Banda, et al. vs.. Eduardo R. Ermita etc., et al. G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010. Election Law BALLOTS; REVISION. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it order the revision of 44 ballots with the Senate Electoral Tribunal without first reolsivng whether 16 of those 44 ballots should be included in the revision. In regular election contests, the general averment of fraud or irregularities in the counting of votes justifies the examination of the ballots and recounting of votes. This process of examination is the revision of the ballots pursuant to Section 6, Rule 20 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The protests involved herein assailed the authenticity of the election returns and the veracity of the counting of the ballots. In that regard, the ballots themselves are the best evidence. The only means to overcome the presumption of legitimacy of the election returns is to examine and determine first whether the ballot boxes have been substantially preserved in the manner mandated by law. Hence, the necessity to issue the order of revision. No ruling could be handed down against the integrity of the ballot boxes that would effectively render naught the evidentiary value of the ballots they contained unless a full blown trial on the merits was first conducted. Tolentino should accept the legal impossibility for the Division to rule on the issue of inclusion or exclusion of the set-aside ballot boxes except after the revision process. Mayor Abraham N. Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Vice-Mayor Celso P. De Castro vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 187958, G.R. No. 187961 & 187962/G.R. No. 187966, G.R. No. 187967 & 187968. April 7, 2010. PARTY LIST; DELISTING. Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is clear – the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. The word “or” is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show. Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the partylist votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretation of the law, given the law’s clear and categorical language and the legislative intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law – in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not

within the contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law. What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay Association for Advancement and National Transparency v. COMELEC (Banat) where we partly invalidated the 2% party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941 as follows: ”We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.” The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should therefore be understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats. We need not extensively discuss Banat’s significance, except to state that a party-list group or organization which qualified in the second round of seat allocation cannot now validly be delisted for the reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in the last two elections. In other words, the application of this disqualification should henceforth be contingent on the percentage of party-list votes garnered by the last party-list organization that qualified for a seat in the House of Representatives, a percentage that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat. The disqualification should now necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or organizations that did not qualify for a seat in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it registered. To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied. We do so under our authority to state what the law is, and as an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), etc. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010. VOTER; RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT. The the residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the Philippines and at least six (6) months in the place where the person proposes or intends to vote. “Residence,” as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, is doctrinally settled to mean “domicile,” importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a person’s acts, activities, and utterances. “Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence where, when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In the consideration of circumstances obtaining in each particular case, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) that a person can have but one residence or domicile at a time. Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years. His family is known to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as Caloocan City Second District representative in the House of Representatives, having been elected as such in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In 2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking these circumstances into consideration, gauged in the light of the doctrines above enunciated, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has established domicile elsewhere, or that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. He should, therefore, remain in the list of permanent registered voters of Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City. That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor, both for the 2007 and 2010 elections, a non-existent or false address, or that he could not be physically found in the address he indicated when he registered as a voter, should not operate to exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City. These purported misrepresentations in Asistio’s COC, if true, might serve as basis for an election offense under the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), or an action to deny due course to the COC. But to our mind, they do not serve as proof that Asistio has abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City, or that he has established residence outside of Caloocan City. Luis A. Asistio vs. Hon. Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre, etc. et al., G.R. No. 191124. April 27, 2010.

International Law INTERNATIONAL LAW; BINDING EFFECT. Although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines’ international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioner’s invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity), which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law. At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010. Public Officers CONDONATION DOCTRINE; APPLICABILITY TO APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS . Petitioners urge this Court to expand the settled doctrine of condonation to cover coterminous appointive officials who were administratively charged along with the reelected official/appointing authority with infractions allegedly committed during their preceding term. The Court rejects petitioners’ thesis. More than 60 years ago, the Court in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija issued the landmark ruling that prohibits the disciplining of an elective official for a wrongful act committed during his immediately preceding term of office. The Court explained that “[t]he underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.” The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people elect[e]d a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct[,] to practically overrule the will of the people. (underscoring supplied) Lizares v. Hechanova, et al. replicated the doctrine. The Court dismissed the petition in that case for being moot, the therein petitioner “having been duly reelected, is no longer amenable to administrative sanctions.” Ingco v. Sanchez, et al. clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case. Luciano v. The Provincial Governor, et al., Olivarez v. Judge Villaluz, and Aguinaldo v. Santos echoed the qualified rule that reelection of a public official does not bar prosecution for crimes committed by him prior thereto. Consistently, the Court has reiterated the doctrine in a string of recent jurisprudence including two cases involving a Senator and a Member of the House of Representatives. Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was applied even if the administrative complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged misconduct occurred four days before the elections, respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing of the administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was committed during the prior term, the precise timing or period of which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the public official’s culpability was committed prior to the date of reelection. Petitioners’ theory is not novel. A parallel question was involved in Civil Service Commission v. Sojor where the Court found no basis to broaden the scope of the doctrine of condonation.

Contrary to petitioners’ asseveration, the non-application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not violate the right to equal protection of the law. In the recent case of Quinto v. Commission on Elections, the Court applied the four-fold test in an equal protection challenge against the resign-to-run provision, wherein it discussed the material and substantive distinctions between elective and appointive officials that could well apply to the doctrine of condonation. The electorate’s condonation of the previous administrative infractions of the reelected official cannot be extended to that of the reappointed coterminous employees, the underlying basis of the rule being to uphold the will of the people expressed through the ballot. In other words, there is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of, in the case of reappointed coterminous employees. It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person who happens to be the appointing authority, that could extinguish an administrative liability. Since petitioners hold appointive positions, they cannot claim the mandate of the electorate. The people cannot be charged with the presumption of full knowledge of the life and character of each and every probable appointee of the elective official ahead of the latter’s actual reelection. Moreover, the unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine would set a dangerous precedent as it would, as respondents posit, provide civil servants, particularly local government employees, with blanket immunity from administrative liability that would spawn and breed abuse in the bureaucracy. Atty. Vicente E. Salumbides, Jr., et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010. PUBLIC OFFICE; PUBLIC TRUST. Unlike private offices which are held largely on the dictates of market forces, public offices are public trust. Public officers are tasked to serve the public interest, thus the excessive burden for their retention in the form of numerous prohibitions. The liberal evidentiary standard of substantial evidence and the freedom of administrative proceedings from technical niceties effectuate the fiduciary nature of public office: they are procedural mechanisms assuring ease in maintaining an efficient bureaucracy, free of rent-seeking officials who exploit government processes to raise easy money. Respondent’s hold on his item at the Mandaue City revenue office, which, like our customs offices, is a common situs for corrupt activities, is no more lasting than his fidelity to his trust. Although no criminal verdict deprives respondent of his liberty, adequate evidence justifies his removal from the bureaucracy for forfeiting the public trust. Hon. Primo C. Miro, etc. vs. Reynaldo M. Dosono, G.R. No. 170697, April 30, 2010.

SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON POLITICAL LAW* APRIL 2010-MARCH 2011

APRIL 2010 CASES Constitutional Law COA; powers. The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Section 11, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 echoes this constitutional mandate given to COA. In light of these express provisions of law granting respondent COA its power and authority, we have previously ruled that its exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that give life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government. Furthermore, we have also declared that COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. Based on the foregoing discussion and due to the lack or absence of any law or jurisprudence saying otherwise, we rule that, in resolving cases brought before it on appeal, respondent COA is not required to limit its review only to the grounds relied upon by a government agency’s auditor with respect to disallowing certain disbursements of public funds. In consonance with its general audit power, respondent COA is not merely legally permitted, but is also duty-bound to make its own assessment of the merits of the disallowed disbursement and not simply restrict itself to reviewing the validity of the ground relied upon by the auditor of the government agency concerned. To hold otherwise would render COA’s vital constitutional power unduly limited and thereby useless and ineffective. Ramon R. Yap vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010. ________________ * Sourced from http://lexoterica.wordpress.com by Vicente D. Gerochi IV

Freedom of expression; LGBT group. Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and – as advanced by the OSG itself – the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC’s action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner’s fundamental rights. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010. Legislative district; population requirement. Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.” Petitioners contend, citing Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No.

9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.” The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010. Party list; accreditation . Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010. Party list; moral disapproval as ground for accreditation . Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause. It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG’s position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause. We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made “an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case.” Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010. Party list; sectors qualified. The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration. Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010. President; executive prerogative. The Executive Department did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan. From a domestic law perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan. Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al. vs. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010. President; power of appointment. The incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010 as the prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary. Arturo M. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010.

President; power to reorganize. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the President’s constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to reorganize and redefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the said Code, is explicit. It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President. Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 quoted above authorizes the President (a) to restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another, and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency in the Executive Branch, and vice versa. There is a view that the reorganization actions that the President may take with respect to agencies in the Office of the President are strictly limited to transfer of functions and offices as seemingly provided in Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987. However, Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of the same Code significantly provides: ”Sec. 20. Residual Powers. – Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law. “ Pursuant to Section 20, the power of the President to reorganize the Executive Branch under Section 31 includes such powers and functions that may be provided for under other laws. To be sure, an inclusive and broad interpretation of the President’s power to reorganize executive offices has been consistently supported by specific provisions in general appropriations laws. Atty. Sylvia Banda, et al. vs.. Eduardo R. Ermita etc., et al. G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010. Public funds; disbursement. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 lays out the basic guidelines that government entities must follow in disbursing public funds. Any disbursement of public funds, which includes payment of salaries and benefits to government employees and officials, must (a) be authorized by law, and (b) serve a public purpose. In this regard, it is necessary for this Court to elaborate on the nature and meaning of the term “public purpose,” in relation to disbursement of public funds. As understood in the traditional sense, public purpose or public use means any purpose or use directly available to the general public as a matter of right. Thus, it has also been defined as “an activity as will serve as benefit to [the] community as a body and which at the same time is directly related function of government.” However, the concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere, the idea that “public use” is strictly limited to clear cases of “use by the public” has been discarded. In fact, this Court has already categorically stated that the term “public purpose” is not defined, since it is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit modern standards. It should be given a broad interpretation; therefore, it does not only pertain to those purposes that which are traditionally viewed as essentially government functions, such as building roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes designed to promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform. In short, public use is now equated with public interest, and that it is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. To our mind, in view of the public purpose requirement, the disbursement of public funds, salaries and benefits of government officers and employees should be granted to compensate them for valuable public services rendered, and the salaries or benefits paid to such officers or employees must be commensurate with services rendered. In the same vein, additional allowances and benefits must be shown to be necessary or relevant to the fulfillment of the official duties and functions of the government officers and employees. We cannot accept petitioner’s theory that the compensation and benefits of public officers are intended purely for the personal benefit of such officers, or that the mere payment of salaries and benefits to a public officer satisfies the public purpose requirement. That theory would lead to the anomalous conclusion that government officers and employees may be paid enormous sums without limit or without any justification necessary other than that such sums are being paid to someone employed by the government. Public funds are the property of the people and must be used prudently at all times with a view to prevent dissipation and waste. Ramon R. Yap vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010.

Administrative Law Administrative proceedings; due process. On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBI’s right to due process was not violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. We find it obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint on due process grounds. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), etc. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010 Procedural due process; requirements. The Ang Tibay formulation was overlapping and repetitious. Hence, in Air Manila, Inc. v. Balatbat, the formulation was simplified into four basic rights, as follows: 1. The right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person’s legal right; 2. The right to a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor; 3. The right to a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and 4. The right to a finding or decision of that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties. Gauged upon the foregoing guidelines, Tolentino’s gripe was unwarranted. He was not denied procedural due process. The Division had required him to provide the names of his revisors whose tasks included the raising of objections, the claiming votes for him, or the contesting of the votes in favor of his opponent. He has neither alleged being deprived of this opportunity, nor indicated any situation in which his revisors were denied access to the revision proceedings. He could not also insist that the COMELEC did not consider his legal and factual arguments; besides, he could still raise them in his memorandum should he chose to. During the revision stage, he should raise all objections, present his evidence and witnesses, and file his memorandum before the case would be submitted for resolution. Mayor Abraham N. Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Vice-Mayor Celso P. De Castro vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 187958, G.R. No. 187961 & 187962/G.R. No. 187966, G.R. No. 187967 & 187968. April 7, 2010. Reorganization; good faith. The presidential power to reorganize agencies and offices in the executive branch of government is subject to the condition that such reorganization is carried out in good faith. If the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of positions, which results in loss of security of tenure of affected government employees, would be valid. In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, we even observed that there was no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except those who hold constitutional offices, which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right to an office or salary. Atty. Sylvia Banda, et al. vs.. Eduardo R. Ermita etc., et al. G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010.

Election Law Ballots; revision.

The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it order the revision of 44 ballots with the Senate Electoral Tribunal without first reolsivng whether 16 of those 44 ballots should be included in the revision. In regular election contests, the general averment of fraud or irregularities in the counting of votes justifies the examination of the ballots and recounting of votes. This process of examination is the revision of the ballots pursuant to Section 6, Rule 20 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The protests involved herein assailed the authenticity of the election returns and the veracity of the counting of the ballots. In that regard, the ballots themselves are the best evidence. The only means to overcome the presumption of legitimacy of the election returns is to examine and determine first whether the ballot boxes have been substantially preserved in the manner mandated by law. Hence, the necessity to issue the order of revision. No ruling could be handed down against the integrity of the ballot boxes that would effectively render naught the evidentiary value of the ballots they contained unless a full blown trial on the merits was first conducted. Tolentino should accept the legal impossibility for the Division to rule on the issue of inclusion or exclusion of the set-aside ballot boxes except after the revision process. Mayor Abraham N. Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Vice-Mayor Celso P. De Castro vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 187958, G.R. No. 187961 & 187962/G.R. No. 187966, G.R. No. 187967 & 187968. April 7, 2010. Party list; delisting. Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is clear – the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. The word “or” is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show. Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the partylist votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretation of the law, given the law’s clear and categorical language and the legislative intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law – in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law. What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay Association for Advancement and National Transparency v. COMELEC (Banat) where we partly invalidated the 2% party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941 as follows: ”We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.” The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should therefore be understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats. We need not extensively discuss Banat’s significance, except to state that a party-list group or organization which qualified in the second round of seat allocation cannot now validly be delisted for the reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in the last two elections. In other words, the application of this disqualification should henceforth be contingent on the percentage of party-list votes garnered by the last party-list organization that qualified for a seat in the House of Representatives, a percentage that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat. The disqualification should now necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or organizations that did not qualify for a seat in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it registered.

To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied. We do so under our authority to state what the law is, and as an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), etc. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010. Voter; residency requirement. The the residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the Philippines and at least six (6) months in the place where the person proposes or intends to vote. “Residence,” as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, is doctrinally settled to mean “domicile,” importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a person’s acts, activities, and utterances. “Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence where, when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In the consideration of circumstances obtaining in each particular case, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) that a person can have but one residence or domicile at a time. Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years. His family is known to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as Caloocan City Second District representative in the House of Representatives, having been elected as such in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In 2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking these circumstances into consideration, gauged in the light of the doctrines above enunciated, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has established domicile elsewhere, or that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. He should, therefore, remain in the list of permanent registered voters of Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City. That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor, both for the 2007 and 2010 elections, a non-existent or false address, or that he could not be physically found in the address he indicated when he registered as a voter, should not operate to exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City. These purported misrepresentations in Asistio’s COC, if true, might serve as basis for an election offense under the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), or an action to deny due course to the COC. But to our mind, they do not serve as proof that Asistio has abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City, or that he has established residence outside of Caloocan City. Luis A. Asistio vs. Hon. Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre, etc. et al., G.R. No. 191124. April 27, 2010. International Law International law; binding effect. Although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines’ international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioner’s invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity), which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law. At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.

Public Officers

Condonation doctrine; applicability to appointive officials. Petitioners urge this Court to expand the settled doctrine of condonation to cover coterminous appointive officials who were administratively charged along with the reelected official/appointing authority with infractions allegedly committed during their preceding term. The Court rejects petitioners’ thesis. More than 60 years ago, the Court in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija issued the landmark ruling that prohibits the disciplining of an elective official for a wrongful act committed during his immediately preceding term of office. The Court explained that “[t]he underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.” The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people elect[e]d a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct[,] to practically overrule the will of the people. (underscoring supplied) Lizares v. Hechanova, et al. replicated the doctrine. The Court dismissed the petition in that case for being moot, the therein petitioner “having been duly reelected, is no longer amenable to administrative sanctions.” Ingco v. Sanchez, et al. clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case. Luciano v. The Provincial Governor, et al., Olivarez v. Judge Villaluz, and Aguinaldo v. Santos echoed the qualified rule that reelection of a public official does not bar prosecution for crimes committed by him prior thereto. Consistently, the Court has reiterated the doctrine in a string of recent jurisprudence including two cases involving a Senator and a Member of the House of Representatives. Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was applied even if the administrative complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged misconduct occurred four days before the elections, respectively. Salalimadid not distinguish as to the date of filing of the administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was committed during the prior term, the precise timing or period of which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the public official’s culpability was committed prior to the date of reelection. Petitioners’ theory is not novel. A parallel question was involved in Civil Service Commission v. Sojor where the Court found no basis to broaden the scope of the doctrine of condonation. Contrary to petitioners’ asseveration, the non-application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not violate the right to equal protection of the law. In the recent case of Quinto v. Commission on Elections, the Court applied the four-fold test in an equal protection challenge against the resign-to-run provision, wherein it discussed the material and substantive distinctions between elective and appointive officials that could well apply to the doctrine of condonation. The electorate’s condonation of the previous administrative infractions of the reelected official cannot be extended to that of the reappointed coterminous employees, the underlying basis of the rule being to uphold the will of the people expressed through the ballot. In other words, there is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of, in the case of reappointed coterminous employees. It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person who happens to be the appointing authority, that could extinguish an administrative liability. Since petitioners hold appointive positions, they cannot claim the mandate of the electorate. The people cannot be charged with the presumption of full knowledge of the life and character of each and every probable appointee of the elective official ahead of the latter’s actual reelection. Moreover, the unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine would set a dangerous precedent as it would, as respondents posit, provide civil servants, particularly local government employees, with blanket immunity from administrative liability that

would spawn and breed abuse in the bureaucracy. Atty. Vicente E. Salumbides, Jr., et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010. Public office; public trust. Unlike private offices which are held largely on the dictates of market forces, public offices are public trust. Public officers are tasked to serve the public interest, thus the excessive burden for their retention in the form of numerous prohibitions. The liberal evidentiary standard of substantial evidence and the freedom of administrative proceedings from technical niceties effectuate the fiduciary nature of public office: they are procedural mechanisms assuring ease in maintaining an efficient bureaucracy, free of rent-seeking officials who exploit government processes to raise easy money. Respondent’s hold on his item at the Mandaue City revenue office, which, like our customs offices, is a common situs for corrupt activities, is no more lasting than his fidelity to his trust. Although no criminal verdict deprives respondent of his liberty, adequate evidence justifies his removal from the bureaucracy for forfeiting the public trust. Hon. Primo C. Miro, etc. vs. Reynaldo M. Dosono, G.R. No. 170697, April 30, 2010.

May 2010 CASES Agrarian reform; coverage. Lands acquired by the National Housing Authority for resettlement purposes or housing development are exempt from the coverage of agrarian reform laws. Such acquisition converts the land by operation of law from agricultural to residential. The National Housing Authority is not bound to pay disturbance compensation to any tenant in possession of the purchased land. National Housing Authority vs. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, et al., G.R. No. 175200, May 4, 2010. Agrarian reform; just compensation. In computing just compensation for rice lands tenanted as of October 21, 1972, the grant of 6% yearly interest under DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994, as amended, must be reckoned from October 21, 1972 up to the time of actual payment of the compensation, and not only up to the time the Land Bank of the Philippines approves payment of the compensation and deposits the amount in the name of the landowner, considering that release of such deposit is still subject to compliance with documentary requirements. The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land, but also payment within a reasonable time from its taking. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Domingo and Mamerto Soriano, G.R. No. 180772 & G.R. No. 180776, May 6, 2010. Commission on Elections; registration of party coalition. Comelec may not, through a resolution setting the deadline for registration of political parties, differentiate between political parties, on the one hand, and political organizations and coalitions, on the other. There is no substantial distinction among these entities germane to the act of registration that would justify creating distinctions among them in terms of deadlines. Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 8646, dated July 14, 2009, which sets August 17, 2009 as the deadline for filing petitions for registration of political parties, without mentioning political organizations and coalitions, should be understood as covering the latter entities as well. A petition for registration as a political coalition filed beyond that deadline is time-barred, and the Comelec resolution granting that petition constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Political coalitions, even if composed of registered political parties, need to register separately in accordance with established norms and procedures, if they are to be recognized as such and be given the benefits accorded by law to registered coalitions. Registered political parties carry a different legal personality from that of the coalition they may wish to establish with other registered parties. If parties want to coalesce with one another without the formal registration of their coalition, they can do so on their own in the exercise of their and their members’ democratic freedom of choice, but they cannot receive official recognition for their coalition. Liberal Party, etc. et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 191771, May 6, 2010. Electoral tribunals; grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal; otherwise, the Court will not interfere with the tribunal’s exercise of its discretion and jurisdiction. There was no grave abuse of discretion when the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ordered to continue the revision and appreciation of ballots after the case had been submitted for resolution and when it issued its decisions without the participation of any of the Justices of the Court who were members of

that tribunal. Henry “Jun” Dueñas, Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, et al., G.R. No. 191550, May 4, 2010. Province; requirements for creation. Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution mandates that the criteria in the Local Government Code must be followed in the creation of a province. Any derogation of or deviation from those criteria violates the Constitution. Thus, a law creating a province, which failed to comply with either the population or territorial requirement of the Local Government Code, is unconstitutional. The Court can pass upon the validity of such law even if the province it created has begun its existence. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050, May 12, 2010. Right to information; duty to disclose. Comelec has the duty and can be compelled to explain fully its preparations for the May 10, 2010 elections under Section 7 of Article III of the Constitution on the people’s right to information and Section 28 of Article II on the State’s corresponding duty of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. Any citizen can file a petition for mandamus if the same is anchored on the people’s right to information. Teofisto Guingona, Jr. et al. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191846, May 6, 2010.

JUNE 2010 CASES Administrative cases; quantum of evidence. In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual administratively liable is substantial evidence. Substantial evidence does not necessarily mean preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil cases, but such kind of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion or evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. The evidence upon which respondent’s administrative liability would be anchored lacked that degree of certainty required in administrative cases, because the two separate audits conducted by the Commission on Audit yielded conflicting results. Evidence of shortage in respondent’s cash and accounts, as alleged in the first audit report, is imperative to hold him liable. In this case, the evidence against respondent could not be relied upon, because the second audit report, which was favorable to him, necessarily puts into question the reliability of the initial audit findings. Whether the zero balance as appearing in the second audit report was correct or inadvertently indicated, the credibility and accuracy of the two audit reports were already tarnished. Even in administrative cases, a degree of moral certainty is necessary to support a finding of liability. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) vs. Rodolfo Zaldarriaga, G.R. No. 175349, June 22, 2010. Agrarian cases; just compensation. The taking of property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) is a government exercise of the power of eminent domain. Since the determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is a judicial function, a court proceeding to fix just compensation cannot be made to depend on the existence of, and is considered separate and independent from, an administrative case of a similar nature. Thus, the filing by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) of a new petition for judicial determination of just compensation after the dismissal without prejudice of another LBP-initiated court proceeding on the same issue cannot be regarded as barred by the filing of the latter proceeding beyond the 15-day period prescribed under Rule XIII, Section 11 of the Rules of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Although the formula for fixing just compensation found in Section 17 of the CARL may be justly adopted in certain cases, it is by no means the only formula that the court may adopt in determining just compensation. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Fortune Savings and Loan Association, Inc., represented by Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 177511, June 29, 2010. Due process; local autonomy; police power. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order No. 01-02, as amended, which sets out rules on land use conversion, does not violate the due process clause, because in providing administrative and criminal penalties, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform simply implements the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act, both of which provide penalties for illegal land conversion. Contrary to petitioner’s assertions, the penalties provided under DAR AO No. 01-02 are imposed upon the illegal or premature conversion of lands within DAR’s

jurisdiction. In providing that reclassification of agricultural lands by local government units (LGUs) shall be subject to the requirements of, and procedures for, land use conversion, including DAR approval or clearance, DAR AO No. 01-02 did not violate the autonomy of the LGUs. The power of LGUs to reclassify agricultural lands is not absolute, and the Local Government Code recognizes the authority of DAR to approve conversion of agricultural lands. DAR Memorandum No. 88, which temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications, is a valid exercise of police power, as it was issued upon the instruction of the President in order to address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development because of the worsening rice shortage in the country at that time. Such measure was made in order to ensure that there are enough agricultural lands in which rice cultivation and production may be carried into. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. vs. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 183409, June 18, 2010. Jurisdiction over election cases; administrative regulation; substitution of party-list nominees. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over a controversy in which the petitioner is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of a party-list group on the basis that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued a resolution approving that group’s withdrawal of his nomination and substitution by another nominee. Such controversy is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, both of which are within the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Petitioner correctly brought before the Supreme Court this special civil action for certiorari under Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the proclamation of, and assumption of office by, the substitute nominee. The COMELEC exceeded its authority when it issued an implementing regulation allowing a party-list nominee to be substituted when his nomination is withdrawn by his party, because the statutory provision (Section 8 of the Party-List System Act) that such regulation seeks to implement provides an exclusive list of instances in which a party-list organization can substitute its nominees, and the above ground for substitution is not one of those instances. It is basic that implementing rules and regulations should remain consistent with, and cannot override or modify, the law they intend to carry out. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis K. Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. Nos. 179431-32/G.R. No. 180443. June 22, 2010. Party list; Qualifications of party-list nominees. The provision in Section 9 of Republic Act No. 7941 (The Party-List System Act) that a nominee of the youth sector must be at least 25 but not more than 30 years of age on the day of the election applies to all youth sector nominees of any party-list group. Public respondent erroneously interpreted that provision as applying only to those nominated during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth sector. Section 15 of RA 7941 provides that a nominee of a sectoral party who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party is not eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation unless such change occurred at least six months before the elections. There is no textual support in the law for public respondent’s argument that Section 15 does not apply to private respondent’s shift of affiliation from his party’s youth sector to its sector representing overseas Filipino workers and their families on the basis that there was no resultant change in party affiliation. Section 15 clearly covers changes in both political party and sectoral affiliation within the same party. Milagros E. Amores vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva. G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010. Philippine Economic Zone Authority; jurisdiction over building and fencing permits. By specific provision of law, it is the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), through its building officials, which has authority to issue building permits for the construction of structures within the areas owned or administered by it, whether on public or private lands. Corollary to this, PEZA, through its director general, may require owners of structures built without said permit to remove such structures within 60 days. Otherwise, PEZA may summarily remove them at the expense of the owner of the houses, buildings or structures. Considering that, in this case, a fencing permit is issued complementary to a building permit and that, within its premises, PEZA may properly issue a building permit, it is only fitting that fencing permits be issued by PEZA within such premises. Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs. Joseph Jude Carantes, et al., G.R. No. 181274, June 23, 2010. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation; power to grant casino licenses in economic zones. The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) draws its authority and power to operate, license and regulate casinos from its charter, Presidential Decree No. 1869, and not from Section 5 of Executive Order No. 80, dated April 3, 1993 (which extended to the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ) all applicable incentives granted to the Subic Bay Special Economic Zone), in relation to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7227, which created the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority and empowered it to license tourism related activities except casinos which shall continue to be licensed by PAGCOR. Thus, PAGCOR did not lose its power to license and regulate casinos when the Supreme Court nullified Section 5 of EO 80. It incorrectly argued that such nullification automatically invalidated its memorandum of agreement with respondent for the operation of a casino inside the CSEZ. It cannot therefore, on the basis of that position, revoke such memorandum of

agreement and replace it with its new Standard Authority to Operate. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation vs. Fontana Development Corporation, G.R. No. 187972, June 29, 2010. Presidential Commission on Good Government; power to grant immunity. The scope of immunity that the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) may offer to witnesses under Section 5 of Executive Order No. 14 may vary. It has discretion to grant appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending on the situation of the witness and his relative importance to the prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. It can even agree to conditions expressed by the witness as sufficient to induce cooperation. In petitioner’s case, respondent Republic of the Philippines, acting through the PCGG, offered him not only criminal and civil immunity but also immunity against being compelled to testify in any domestic or foreign proceeding, other than the civil and arbitration cases identified in the Immunity Agreement, just so he would agree to testify. Trusting in the Government’s honesty and fidelity, petitioner agreed and fulfilled his part of the bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play, which is the essence of due process, should hold the Republic on to its promise. The immunity from criminal or civil prosecution that Section 5 of EO 14 authorizes covers immunity from giving evidence in a case before a court of law, because in reality the guarantee given to a witness against being compelled to testify constitutes a grant of immunity from civil or criminal prosecution. Jesus P. Disini vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 180564, June 22, 2010. Standing to sue. Petitioner’s citizenship and taxpayer status do not automatically clothe him with standing to bring suit. The Supreme Court will grant access to citizen’s suits on the narrowest of ground: when they raise issues of transcendental importance calling for urgent resolution. Three factors are relevant in the Court’s determination to allow third party suits so it can resolve the merits of the crucial issues raised – the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy; a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition; and the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit. Petitioner’s suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction falls within the proscribed conduct. Allan F. Paguia vs. Office of the President, et al., G.R. No. 176278, June 25, 2010. Warrantless search; arrest without warrant. The search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause. In the instances the Supreme Court has recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the seizure must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless search can be lawfully conducted. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. The searching officer had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances. He only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination. Given the above, and the fact that the officer had probable cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal drugs, the search in this case was valid. A search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. Given that the search was valid, appellant’s arrest based on that search was also valid. People of the Philippines vs. Belen Mariacos, G.R. No. 188611, June 16, 2010.

JULY 2010 CASES

Agrarian reform; coverage. Lands that are not directly, actually and exclusively used for pasture nor devoted to commercial livestock raising are not excluded from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. vs. Office of the President. G.R. No. 170623, July 7, 2010. Certificate of candidacy; residency requirement.

The Omnibus Election Code provides that a certificate of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled if there is any false representation of a material fact. The critical material facts are those that refer to a candidate’s qualifications for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. The false representation must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The foregoing are the legal standards by which the COMELEC must act on a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. Thus, in considering the residency of a candidate as stated in the certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC must determine whether or not the candidate deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact about his or her residency that would otherwise render him or her ineligible for the position sought. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in this case when, in considering the residency issue, it based its decision solely on very personal and subjective assessment standards, such as the nature or design and furnishings of the dwelling place in relation to the stature of the candidate. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010. Citizenship; election and constructive registration. The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are the following: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry. Here, petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. However, registration of the documents of election with the civil registry was done belatedly. Under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election. Their exercise of suffrage, being elected to public office, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship do not on their own take the place of election of citizenship. But where, as here, the election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe, registration of the documents of election beyond the timeframe should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have been done publicly, consistently and continuously. These acts constitute constructive registration. In other words, the actual exercise of Philippine citizenship for over half a century by the petitioners is actual notice to the Philippine public, which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship. It is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed. Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat that election and negate the permanent fact that petitioners have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any. The documents petitioners submitted supporting their allegations that they have registered with the civil registry, although belatedly, should be examined for validation purposes by the appropriate agency, in this case the Bureau of Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the administrative orders and other issuances of the Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Justice must be complied with within a reasonable time. Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, et al. vs. Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr., et al. G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010. Double jeopardy; elements. Following are the elements of double jeopardy: (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent. These elements are present in this case. The information filed in each of the criminal cases against respondent was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. The regional trial court had jurisdiction over these cases. The respondent was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. The court dismissed both cases on a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, which amounts to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had as that would place respondent in double jeopardy. People of the Philippines vs. Dante Tan. G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010. Double jeopardy; exceptions. The rule on double jeopardy is not without exceptions. Double jeopardy will not attach when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion, or when the prosecution was denied due process. Here, the prosecution was given more than ample opportunity to present its case. No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the trial court simply because it chose not to hold in abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused. While it would have been ideal for the trial court to hold in abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to evidence, nowhere in the rules is it mandated to do so. Furthermore, even if the Supreme Court were to consider the same as an error on the part of the trial court, the same would merely constitute an error of procedure or of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction. Errors or irregularities, which do not render the proceedings a nullity, will not defeat a plea of double jeopardy. People of the Philippines vs. Dante Tan. G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010. Due process; administrative proceedings.

Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always, and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding. Litigants may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable for violating due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties. Even if no formal hearing took place, it is not sufficient ground for petitioner to claim that due process was not afforded it. In this case, petitioner was given all the opportunity to prove and establish its claim that the properties were excluded from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings by submitting various pleadings and documentary evidence. It filed motions for reconsideration of every unfavorable outcome in all tiers of the administrative and judicial processes. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. vs. Office of the President. G.R. No. 170623, July 7, 2010. Exhaustion of administrative remedies. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where a remedy before an administrative agency is provided, the administrative agency concerned must be given the opportunity to decide a matter within its jurisdiction before an action is brought before the courts. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a ground for dismissal of the action. In this case, however, the doctrine does not apply because petitioners failed to demonstrate that recourse to the Commission on Higher Education is mandatory – or even possible – in an action such as that brought by the respondent, which is essentially one for mandamus and damages. The doctrine admits of numerous exceptions, one of which is where the issues are purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court, as in the present case. Petitioners’ liability, if any, for damages will have to be decided by the courts, since any judgment inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code. As such, exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with. University of Santo Tomas, et al. vs. Danes B. Sanchez. G.R. No. 165569. July 29, 2010. Freedom of speech. Government workers, whatever their rank, have as much right as any person in the land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away. Thus, Section 5 of Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 02-1316, which regulates the political rights of those in the government service, provides that the concerted activity or mass action proscribed must be coupled with the “intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession.” Such limitation or qualification in the above rule is intended to temper and focus the application of the prohibition, as not all collective activity or mass undertaking of government employees is prohibited. Otherwise, government employees would be deprived of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. Respondents’ act of wearing similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing for just over an hour at the office of the GSIS Investigation Unit, bringing with them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, and some even badmouthing the GSIS guards and GSIS President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia, are not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force concession. These actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass action. Government Service Insurance System and Winston F. Garcia vs. Dinnah Villaviza, et al. G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010. Government agencies; reorganization. Reorganization in a government agency is valid provided that it is done in good faith. As a general rule, the test of good faith is whether or not the purpose of the reorganization is for economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient. Removal from office as a result of reorganization must pass the test of good faith. A demotion in office, i.e., the movement from one position to another involving the issuance of an appointment with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or rank, which may or may not involve a reduction in salary, is tantamount to removal, if no cause is shown for it. Consequently, before a demotion may be effected pursuant to reorganization, the observance of the rules on bona fide abolition of public office is essential. There was no demotion in this case because petitioner was appointed to a position comparable to her former position. In fact, her new position entailed an increase in her salary grade from 20 to 24. There is, thus, no evidence to suggest that the Development Bank of the Philippines acted in bad faith. Virginia D. Bautista vs. Civil Service Commission and Development Bank of the Philippines. G.R. No. 185215, July 22, 2010. Government contracts; perfection. Contracts to which the government is a party are generally subject to the same laws and regulations that govern the validity and sufficiency of contracts between private individuals. A government contract, however, is perfected only upon approval of competent authority, where such approval is required. With respect to contracts of government-owned and controlled

corporations, the provisions of existing laws are clear in requiring the governing board’s approval thereof. For the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), its charter (Presidential Decree 857) vests the general manager with power to sign contracts and to perform such other duties as the Board of Directors may assign. Therefore, unless the Board validly authorizes the general manager, the latter cannot bind PPA to a contract. The authority of government officials to represent the government in any contract must proceed from an express provision of law or valid delegation of authority. Without such actual authority being possessed by PPA’s general manager, there could be no real consent, much less a perfected contract, to speak of. A notice of award signed by the general manager does not embody a perfected contract without the PPA Board’s prior approval of the contract. Sargasso Construction & Development Corporation, et al. vs. Philippine Ports Authority. G.R. No. 170530, July 5, 2010. Local governments; authority of local chief executive. Under Section 444(b)(1)(iv) of the Local Government Code, a municipal mayor is required to secure the prior authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan (municipal council) before entering into a contract on behalf of the municipality. In this case, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi unanimously passed Resolution No. 15-92 authorizing the Mayor to hire a lawyer of her choice to represent the interest of Tiwi in the execution of this Court’s Decision in another case. Such authority necessarily carried with it the power to negotiate, execute and sign on behalf of Tiwi the Contract of Legal Services. That the authorization did not set the terms and conditions of the compensation of the lawyer signifies that the council empowered the Mayor to reach a mutually agreeable arrangement with the lawyer of her choice subject to the general limitation that the contractual stipulations should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, and, considering that this is a contract of legal services, to the added restriction that the agreed attorney’s fees must not be unreasonable and unconscionable. On its face, and there is no allegation to the contrary, the prior authorization given under Resolution No. 15-92 appears to have been given by the council in good faith in order to expeditiously safeguard the rights of Tiwi. Thus, there is nothing objectionable to this manner of prior authorization, and the Mayor was sufficiently authorized to enter into said Contract of Legal Services. Such contract need not be ratified first by the Sangguniang Bayan to be enforceable against Tiwi. The law speaks of prior authorization and not ratification with respect to the power of the local chief executive to enter into a contract on behalf of the local government unit. That authority was granted by the Sangguniang Bayan to the Mayor under Resolution No. 15-92. Municipality of Tiwi, represented by Hon. Mayor Jiame C. Villanueva and Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi Vs. Antonio B. Betito, G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010. Municipal ordinance; deed of restrictions. While a zoning ordinance can override the deed of restrictions on the use of a property on the basis of the municipality’s exercise of police power, the Court will reconcile seemingly opposing provisions in the deed of restrictions and the zoning ordinance rather than nullify one or the other, particularly where, as here, the continued enforcement of the deed of restrictions is reasonable and the municipality was not asserting any interest or zoning purpose contrary to the interest of the subdivision developer that is seeking to enforce the deed of restrictions. The Learning Child, Inc., et al. vs. Ayala Alabang Village Association, et al./Jose Marie V. Aquino, minor and represented by his parents Dr. Errol Aquino and Atty. Marilyn Aquino, et al. vs. Ayala Alabang Village Association, et al./Ayala Alabang Village Association, et al. vs. Municipality of Muntinlupa, et al. G.R. No. 134269/G.R. No. 134440/G.R. No. 144518, July 7, 2010. Ombudsman; jurisdiction. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee applies only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In cases cognizable by regular courts, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with other investigative agencies of government. Republic Act No. 8249 (Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan) limits the cases that are cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to public officials occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over private respondent who, as punong barangay, is occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 14. Under the Local Government Code, the sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority over any elective barangay official. Clearly, therefore, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the sangguniang bayan over administrative cases against elective barangay officials occupying positions below salary grade 27, such as private respondent in this case. In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body in which the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. In this case, since the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the Ombudsman’s exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan exercising concurrent jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. When complainants first filed the complaint in the Ombudsman, jurisdiction was already vested on the latter. Jurisdiction could no longer be transferred to the sangguniang bayan by virtue of a subsequent complaint filed by the same complainants. As a final note, under Section 60 of the Local Government Code, the sangguniang bayan has no power to remove an elective barangay official. Apart from the Ombudsman, only a proper court may do so. Unlike the sangguniang bayan, the Ombudsman’s powers are not merely recommendatory. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to directly remove an erring public official other than officials who may be removed only by impeachment. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Rolson Rodriquez. G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010.

Primary jurisdiction; Commission on Higher Education. The rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions. Petitioners have not shown that the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) has power to “investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions.” Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7722 (the Higher Education Act of 1994), which enumerates the powers and functions of CHED) does not contain any express grant to CHED of judicial or quasi-judicial power. In any event, CHED has no authority to adjudicate an action for damages. University of Santo Tomas, et al. vs. Danes B. Sanchez. G.R. No. 165569. July 29, 2010. Public lands; registration. All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the State. Public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant. A notation on the advanced survey plan stating in effect that the subject property is alienable and disposable is not sufficient to establish the actual legal classification of the disputed lot. It is not the kind of evidence required by law to establish that the land is alienable and disposable. The approved survey plan merely identifies the property preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of title. Republic of the Philippines vs. Domingo Espinosa. G.R. No. 176885, July 5, 2010. Public officers; demotion. There is demotion when an employee is appointed to a position resulting in diminution of duties, responsibilities, status or rank, which may or may not involve a reduction in salary. Where an employee is appointed to a position with the same duties and responsibilities but with rank and salary higher than those enjoyed in his previous position, there is no demotion and the appointment is valid. In this case, the appointment of petitioner to Bank Executive Officer II did not constitute a demotion. Her duties and responsibilities as Account Officer (her previous position) and as BEO II are practically the same. Rather than lowering her rank and salary, petitioner’s appointment as BEO II had, in fact, resulted in an increase thereof from salary grade 20 to 24. Further, her appointment to BEO II was done in good faith and pursuant to a valid reorganization. Virginia D. Bautista vs. Civil Service Commission and Development Bank of the Philippines. G.R. No. 185215, July 22, 2010. Review of COMELEC Decision. In light of the Supreme Court’s limited authority to review findings of fact, it does not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, are final and non-reviewable. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction. In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC’s action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Supreme Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010. Right to information. Like all constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The people’s right to information is limited to matters of public concern, and is further subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Similarly, the State’s policy of full disclosure is limited to transactions involving public interest, and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. National board examinations, such as the certified public accountant board examinations, are matters of public concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of these examinations in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely quantitative means of assessment, but also means to further improve the teaching and learning of the art and science of accounting. On the other hand, there may be valid reasons to limit access to the examination papers in order to properly administer the tests. More than the mere convenience of the examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding, administration, and checking of the multiple choice examinations that require that the questions and answers remain confidential for a limited duration. However, the Professional Regulation Commission is not a party to the proceedings. It has not been given an opportunity to explain the reasons behind the regulations or articulate the justification for keeping the examination documents confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications of the cases, which may impact on every board examination administered by the Professional Regulation Commission, and in order that all relevant issues may be ventilated, the Court remanded the cases to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings. Hazel Ma. C. Antolin vs. Abelardo R. Domondon, et al./Hazel Ma. C. Antolin vs. Antonieta Fortuna-Ibe. G.R. No. 165036/G.R. No. 175705, July 5, 2010.

Sanggunian resolution; validity. A municipal resolution correcting an alleged typographical error in a zoning ordinance does not have to comply with the requirements of notice and hearing, which are required for the validity and effectiveness of zoning ordinances. The Learning Child, Inc., et al. vs. Ayala Alabang Village Association, et al./Jose Marie V. Aquino, minor and represented by his parents Dr. Errol Aquino and Atty. Marilyn Aquino, et al. vs. Ayala Alabang Village Association, et al./Ayala Alabang Village Association, et al. vs. Municipality of Muntinlupa, et al. G.R. No. 134269/G.R. No. 134440/G.R. No. 144518, July 7, 2010.

Standing to sue. Legal standing refers to a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case, arising from the direct injury it has sustained or will sustain as a result of the challenged governmental action. Legal standing calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The term “interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the governmental action, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless a person’s constitutional rights are adversely affected by a statute or governmental action, he has no legal standing to challenge the same. In this case, petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Section 2.6 of the Distribution Services and Open Access Rules (DSOAR) of the Energy Regulatory Commission, which obligates residential end-users to advance the cost of extending power distribution lines and installing additional facilities. However, petitioner’s members consist of developers, brokers, appraisers, contractors, manufacturers, suppliers, engineers, architects, and other persons or entities engaged in the housing and real estate business. It does not question the challenged DSOAR provision as a residential end-user, and it cannot do so because the challenged provision refers only to the rights and obligations of distribution utilities and residential end-users; neither the petitioner nor its members are residential end-users. Thus, neither the petitioner nor its members can claim any injury, as residential end-users, arising from Section 2.6 of the DSOAR; neither can they cite any benefit accruing to them as residential end-users that would result from the invalidation of the assailed provision. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Association, Inc. Vs. Energy Regulatory Commission, et al. G.R. No. 174697, July 8, 2010. Waiver of locus standi rule. The Court can waive the procedural rule on standing in cases that raise issues of transcendental importance. Following are the guidelines in determining whether or not a matter is of transcendental importance: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised. In this case, the three determinants are absent. Public funds are not involved. The allegations of constitutional and statutory violations of the public respondent agency are unsubstantiated by facts and are mere challenges on the wisdom of the rules. Parties with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised – the residential end-users – undoubtedly exist and are not included as parties to the petition. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Association, Inc. Vs. Energy Regulatory Commission, et al. G.R. No. 174697, July 8, 2010.

AUGUST 2010 CASES Constitutional Law

Civil Service Commission; jurisdiction. The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, like the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), or those created by special law. Thus, GSIS employees are part of the civil service system and are subject to the law and to the circulars, rules and regulations issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on discipline, attendance and general terms and conditions of employment. The CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary cases against erring employees. Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al./Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al., G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No. 174137, August 18, 2010. Double compensation.

Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution provides that no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any present emolument, office or title of any kind from any foreign government. Pensions and gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation. This provision, however, does not apply to the present case as there was no double compensation to the petitioners. The questioned resolutions of the Monetary Board are valid corporate acts of petitioners that became the bases for granting them additional monthly representation and transportation allowance (RATA), as members of the Board of Directors of Philippine International Convention Center Inc. (PICCI), a government corporation whose sole stockholder is the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). RATA is distinct from salary as a form of compensation. Unlike salary which is paid for services rendered, RATA is a form of allowance intended to defray expenses deemed unavoidable in the discharge of office. Hence, RATA is paid only to certain officials who, by the nature of their offices, incur representation and transportation expenses. Indeed, aside from the RATA that they have been receiving from the BSP, the grant of RATA to each of the petitioners for every board meeting they attended, in their capacity as members of the Board of Directors of PICCI, in addition to their per diem, does not violate the constitutional proscription against double compensation. Gabriel C. Singson, et al. vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 159355, August 9, 2010. Eminent domain; voluntary agreement by landowner. Where the landowner agrees voluntarily to the taking of his property by the government for public use, he thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal expropriation proceeding covering such property. Failure for a long time of the owner to question the lack of expropriation proceedings covering a property that the government had taken constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back possession. The landowner’s remedy in such case is an action for the payment of just compensation, not ejectment. Here, the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the eviction of petitioner from the property that it has held as government school site for more than 50 years. The evidence on record shows that the respondents intended to cede the property to the City Government of Lipa permanently. In fact, they allowed the city to declare the property in its name for tax purposes. And when they sought to have the bigger lot subdivided, the respondents earmarked a specific portion for the City Government of Lipa. Under the circumstances, it may be assumed that the respondents had agreed to transfer ownership of the land to the government, whether to the City Government of Lipa or to the Republic of the Philippines, but the parties never formalized and documented such transfer. Consequently, petitioner should be deemed entitled to possession pending the respondents’ formal transfer of ownership to it upon payment of just compensation. Republic of the Philippines vs. Primo Mendoza and Maria Lucero, G.R. No. 185091, August 8, 2010. Equal protection clause. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in Congress and municipalities that did not have similar pending bills for purposes of the income requirement for converting a municipality into a city under Republic Act No. 9009. The pendency of such a bill does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. Thus, the classification criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of RA 9009, which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities. Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in Congress limits the exemption (from the income requirement) to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. Also, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 respondent municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date − the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress – as against all other municipalities that may want to convert into cities after the effectiveness of RA 9009. Lastly, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the Constitutional requirement that the classification must apply to all those who are similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while those 16 municipalities can. Clearly, as worded, the exemption found in the Cityhood Laws would be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. League of Cities of the Philippines represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, August 24, 2010. Judicial review; justiciable controversy; moot case. Private respondent was not elected President in the May 10, 2010 election. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase “any reelection” in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution will be premised on a person’s second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by the Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case. As a rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. It is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. When a case is moot, it becomes nonjusticiable. An action is considered “moot” when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the Court to resolve

as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events. Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 election, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that election, private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his “reelection” will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose. Atty. Evillo C. Pormento vs. Joseph “Erap” Ejercito Estrada and Commission on Elections. G.R. No. 191988. August 31, 2010. Operative fact doctrine. Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. However, in this case, the minority’s novel theory, invoking the operative fact doctrine, is that the enactment of the Cityhood Laws and the functioning of the 16 municipalities as new cities with new sets of officials and employees operate to constitutionalize the unconstitutional Cityhood Laws. This novel theory misapplies the operative fact doctrine and sets a gravely dangerous precedent. Under the minority’s view, an unconstitutional law, if already implemented prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court, can no longer be revoked and its implementation must be continued despite being unconstitutional. This view will open the floodgates to the wanton enactment of unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their immediate implementation before the Court can declare them unconstitutional. This view is an open invitation to serially violate the Constitution, and be quick about it, lest the violation be stopped by the Court. The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law produces no effects. It can never be invoked to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act. The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. The unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but its effects, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. The doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself. Applying the doctrine to this case, the Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the concerned local government units or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective. League of Cities of the Philippines represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, August 24, 2010. Search warrant; requirements for validity. The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. On the first requisite, a magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched. On the last requirement, a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. People of the Philippines vs. Estela Tuan y Baludda. G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010. Warrantless arrest. Appellant was arrested during an entrapment operation where he was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu. When an arrest is made during an entrapment operation, it is not required that a warrant be secured in line with Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation, such as the one involving appellant, deserves judicial sanction. Consequently, the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure conducted on the person of appellant were allowed under the circumstances. The search, incident to his lawful arrest, needed no warrant to sustain its validity. Thus, there is no doubt that the sachets of shabu recovered during the legitimate buy-bust operation are admissible and were properly admitted in evidence against him. People of the Philippines vs. Michael Sembrano y Castro. G.R. No. 185848, August 16, 2010.

Administrative Law Administrative agencies; findings. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, like the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded respect. In this case, there is no ground to disturb the DARAB’s findings, which affirmed those of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board after due hearing and appreciation of the evidence submitted by both parties. Heirs of Jose M. Cervantes, et al. vs. Jesus G. Miranda. G.R. No. 183352, August 9, 2010.

Administrative cases; preliminary investigation; due process. Section 45 of the Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997 gives the President and General Manager of GSIS the authority and responsibility to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause. However, this power is not without limitations for it must be exercised in accordance with civil service rules. While the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Civil Service Rules) do not specifically provide that a formal charge issued against a government employee without the requisite preliminary investigation is null and void, it is required that, upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining authority shall require the person complained of to submit a counteraffidavit or comment under oath within three days from receipt. The use of the word “shall” quite obviously indicates that it is mandatory for the disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or at least give the respondent the opportunity to comment and explain his side. This must be done prior to the issuance of the formal charge, and the comment required is different from the answer that may later be filed by respondents. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, no exception is provided for in the Civil Service Rules, not even an indictment in flagranti as claimed by petitioner. The above rules apply even if the complainant is the disciplining authority himself, as in this case. To comply with such requirement, petitioner could have issued a memorandum requiring respondents to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against them instead of immediately issuing formal charges. With respondents’ comments, petitioner should have properly evaluated both sides of the controversy before making a conclusion that there was a prima facie case against respondents, leading to the issuance of the questioned formal charges. It is noteworthy that the very acts subject of the administrative cases stemmed from an event that took place the day before the formal charges were issued. It appears, therefore, that the formal charges were issued after the sole determination by the petitioner as the disciplining authority that there was a prima facie case against respondents. To condone this would give the disciplining authority an unrestricted power to judge by himself the nature of the act complained of as well as the gravity of the charges. Thus, respondents here were denied due process of law. Not even the fact that the charges against them are serious and evidence of their guilt is – in the opinion of their superior – strong can compensate for the procedural shortcut taken by petitioner. The filing by petitioner of formal charges against the respondents without complying with the mandated preliminary investigation or at least giving the respondents the opportunity to comment violated their right to due process. Accordingly, the formal charges are void ab initio and may be assailed directly or indirectly at anytime. Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al./Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al. .G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No. 174137, August 18, 2010. Administrative cases; decision rendered without due process. The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) where he stands to lose the same. Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied more liberally, administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al./Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al., G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No. 174137, August 18, 2010. Administrative cases; quantum of evidence. In administrative cases, the requisite proof is substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. In this case, substantial evidence consisted of the uniform findings of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and the Court of Appeals that petitioner connived with his co-defendants to destroy the improvements introduced by respondent on the subject property so they could construct their own cottages thereon. Josephil C. Bien vs. Pedro B. Bo, G.R. No. 179333, August 3, 2010. Public officers; statement of assets and liabilities.

Even an asset that was acquired through chattel mortgage must be declared and included in the Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL). The law requires that the SSAL be accomplished truthfully and in detail without distinction as to how the property was acquired. Respondent, therefore, cannot escape liability by arguing that the ownership of the vehicle has not yet passed to him on the basis that it was acquired only on installment basis. The requirement to file the SSAL not later than the first 15 days of April at the close of every calendar year must not be treated as a simple and trivial routine, but as an obligation that is part and parcel of every civil servant’s duty to the people. It serves as the basis of the government and the people in monitoring the income and lifestyle of officials and employees in the government in compliance with the Constitutional policy to eradicate corruption, promote transparency in government, and ensure that all government employees and officials lead just and modest lives. It is for this reason that the SSAL must be sworn to and is made accessible to the public, subject to reasonable administrative regulations. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al. vs. Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor. G.R. No. 170146, August 25, 2010.

Local Government Abuse of authority. Addressing the argument of petitioner, a barangay official, that there was no abuse of authority because the incident complained of occurred in another barangay over which he has no authority and jurisdiction, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable for abuse of authority on the basis that he participated in the unlawful act as a higher authority that gave a semblance of legality over that act and influenced the actions of his co-defendants. Here, petitioner was president of the organization of barangay officials in his municipality and sat as ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan, which has power to review barangay ordinances and authority to discipline barangay officials. His codefendants were officials in the barangay where the incident occurred. Josephil C. Bien vs. Pedro B. Bo, G.R. No. 179333, August 3, 2010. Creation of local government unit. The Constitution states that the creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Republic Act No. 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from Php20 million to Php100 million for the creation of a city. This law took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the Php100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement. In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The laws converting these municipalities into cities, all enacted after the RA 9009 became effective, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. League of Cities of the Philippines represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, August 24, 2010.

Special Laws Agrarian reform; deposit of provisional compensation. The amount of provisional compensation that the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is required to deposit in the name of the landowner if the latter rejects the offer of compensation of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657 should be the LBP’s initial valuation of the land and not, as respondent argues, the sum awarded by DAR’s adjudication bodies as compensation in a summary administrative proceeding. The deposit of such provisional compensation must be made even before the summary administrative proceeding commences, or at least simultaneously with it, once the landowner rejects the initial valuation of the LBP. Such deposit results from the landowner’s rejection of the

DAR offer (based on the LBP’s initial valuation). Both the conduct of summary administrative proceeding and deposit of provisional compensation follow as a consequence of the landowner’s rejection. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heir of Trinidad S. Vda. De Arieta. G.R. No. 161834, August 11, 2010. Agrarian reform; just compensation. Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 is the principal basis for computing just compensation, and the factors set forth therein have been translated into a formula outlined in DAR Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998 (DAR AO 5). While the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function vested in the Regional Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, a judge cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into full consideration the factors specifically identified by law and its implementing rules. Special Agrarian Courts are not at liberty to disregard the formula laid down in DAR AO 5, because unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply it. Courts cannot ignore, without violating the agrarian reform law, the formula provided by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for determining just compensation. In this case, the court adopted a different formula in determining the land value by considering the average between the findings of DAR using the formula laid down in Executive Order No. 228 and the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration. This is obviously a departure from the mandate of the law and DAR AO 5. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Rizalina Gustilo Barrido, et al., G.R. No. 183688, August 18, 2010. Agrarian reform; sale of land. Petitioners’ title shows on its face that the government granted title to them on January 9, 1990, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. This law explicitly prohibits any form of transfer of the land granted under it except to the government or by hereditary succession to the successors of the farmer beneficiary. Upon the enactment of Executive Order No. 228 in 1987, however, the restriction ceased to be absolute. Land reform beneficiaries were allowed to transfer ownership of their lands provided that their amortizations with the Land Bank of the Philippines have been paid in full. In this case, petitioners’ title categorically states that they have fully complied with the requirements for the final grant of title under PD 27. This means that they have completed payment of their amortizations with Land Bank. Consequently, they could already legally transfer their title to another. Heirs of Paulino Atienza vs. Domingo P. Espidol, G.R. No. 180665, August 11, 2010. Agricultural land; conversion. Conversion of the subject landholding under the 1980 Kasunduan is not the conversion of landholding that is contemplated by Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844, which governs the dispossession of an agricultural lessee and the termination of his rights to enjoy and possess the landholding. Conversion here has been defined as the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform. More to the point is that for conversion to avail as a ground for dispossession, Section 36 implies the necessity of prior court proceedings in which the issue of conversion has been determined and a final order issued directing dispossession upon that ground. In this case, however, respondent does not profess that there had been at any tine such proceedings or that there was such court order. Neither does he assert that the lot in question had undergone conversion with authority from the Department of Agrarian Reform. Emilia Micking Vda. De Coronel, et al. Vs. Miguel Tanjangco, Jr., G.R. No. 170693, August 8, 2010. Presidential Anti-Graft Commission; powers. The Court rejected respondent’s contention that he was deprived of his right to due process when the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) proceeded to investigate him on the basis of an anonymous complaint in the absence of any documents supporting the complainant’s assertions. Section 4(c) of Executive Order No. 12 states that the PAGC has the power to give due course to anonymous complaints against presidential appointees if there appears on the face of the complaint or based on the supporting documents attached to the anonymous complaint a probable cause to engender a belief that the allegations may be true. The use of the conjunctive word “or” in the said provision is determinative since it empowers the PAGC to exercise discretion in giving due course to anonymous complaints. Because of the said provision, an anonymous complaint may be given due course even if the same is without supporting documents, so long as it appears from the face of the complaint that there is probable cause. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al. vs. Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor. G.R. No. 170146, August 25, 2010. Water districts; government-owned and controlled corporations. A local water district is a government-owned and controlled corporation with special charter since it is created pursuant to a special law, Presidential Decree No. 198 (1973). PD 198 constitutes the special charter by virtue of which local water districts exist. Unlike private corporations that derive their legal existence and power from the Corporation Code, water districts derive their legal existence and power from P.D. No. 198. Section 6 of the decree in fact provides that water districts “shall exercise the powers, rights and privileges given to private corporations under existing laws, in addition to the powers granted in, and subject to such restrictions imposed under this Act.” Therefore, water districts would not have corporate powers without PD 198. Engr. Ranulfo C. Feliciano vs. Hon. Cornelio C. Gison. G.R. No. 165641, August 25, 2010.

SEPTEMBER 2010 CASES

Constitutional Law

Constitutionality; Presidential Proclamation 310; inalienable lands. The Court declared as unconstitutional Presidential Proclamation 310, which took 670 hectares from petitioner’s registered lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities, on the basis that such lands are inalienable, being part of the functions of an educational institution. It did not matter that it was President Arroyo who, in this case, attempted by proclamation to appropriate the lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities. The lands by their character have become inalienable from the moment President Garcia dedicated them for petitioner’s use in scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture. They have ceased to be alienable public lands. Central Mindanao University, etc. vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 184869, September 21, 2010. Constitutionality; Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. The Court dismissed petitioners’ argument that Republic Act No. 8762, known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 200, violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution for the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. The provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts. Further, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development. The 1987 Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity; and speaks of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. Thus, while the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, it also recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services. While it does not encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. The key, as in all economies in the world, is to strike a balance between protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign investments and services. More important, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority and when the national interest requires. Thus, Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The control and regulation of trade in the interest of the public welfare is of course an exercise of the police power of the State. A person’s right to property, whether he is a Filipino citizen or foreign national, cannot be taken from him without due process of law. In 1954, Congress enacted the Retail Trade Nationalization Act (RA 1180) that restricts the retail business to Filipino citizens. In denying the petition assailing the validity of such Act for violation of the foreigner’s right to substantive due process of law, the Supreme Court held that the law constituted a valid exercise of police power. The State had an interest in preventing alien control of the retail trade and R.A. 1180 was reasonably related to that purpose. That law is not arbitrary. Here, to the extent that RA 8762 lessens the restraint on the foreigners’ right to property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos’ right to property and to due process of law. Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to which the law in question has permitted the entry of foreign investors. Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of RA 8762 save when it blatantly violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said, there is no showing that the law has contravened any constitutional mandate. The Court is not convinced that the implementation of RA 8762 would eventually lead to alien control of the retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself has provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that business. Representatives Gerardo S. Espina, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., et al. G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010.

Constitutionality; standing to sue. The long settled rule is that he who challenges the validity of a law must have a standing to do so. Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come to a court of justice and make such a challenge. More particularly, standing refers to his personal and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer direct injury as a result of the passage of that law. The party must show that he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the law he complains of. In this case, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000 prejudices petitioners or inflicts damages on them, either as taxpayers or as legislators. Still the Court will resolve the question they raise since the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when, as here, the public interest so requires or the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. Representatives Gerardo S. Espina, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., et al. G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010.

Court decisions; statement of fact and law. The Constitution commands that “[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.” Judges are expected to make complete findings of fact in their decisions and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced. The Court has sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantially or sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction, notwithstanding the laconic and terse manner in which they were written; and even if “there (was left) much to be desired in terms of (their) clarity, coherence and comprehensibility,” provided that they eventually set out the facts and the law on which they were based, as when they stated the legal qualifications of the offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty imposed and the civil liability; or discussed the facts comprising the elements of the offense that was charged in the information, and accordingly rendered a verdict and imposed the corresponding penalty; or quoted the facts narrated in the prosecution’s memorandum, but made their own findings and assessment of evidence, before finally agreeing with the prosecution’s evaluation of the case. On the other hand, the Court has expressed concern over the possible denial of due process when an appellate court failed to provide the appeal the attention it rightfully deserved, thus depriving the appellant of a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible magistrate. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the trial court. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. The Court of Appeals (CA) decision in this case cannot be deemed constitutionally infirm, as it clearly stated the facts and law on which the ruling was based, and while it did not specifically address each and every assigned error raised by appellants, it cannot be said that the appellants were left in the dark as to how the CA reached its ruling affirming the trial court’s judgment of conviction. The principal arguments raised in their Memorandum submitted before the Supreme Court actually referred to the main points of the CA rulings, such as the alleged sufficiency of prosecution evidence, their common defense of alibi, allegations of torture, probative value of ballistic and fingerprint test results, circumstances qualifying the offense and modification of penalty imposed by the trial court. Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the Philippines/Cesar Fortuna vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo, et al. G.R. Nos. 182555/G.R. No. 185123/G.R. No. 187745, September 7, 2010. Custodial investigation; right to counsel. Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect. The police officers here claimed that upon arresting one of the accused and before questioning him, they informed him of his constitutional rights to remain silent, that any information he would give could be used against him, and that he had the right to a competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, and if he cannot afford the services of counsel he will be provided with one. However, since these rights can only be waived in writing and with the assistance of counsel, there could not have been such a valid waiver by the accused, who was presented by the police investigators to the lawyer of the IBP Office, Quezon City Hall, for the taking of his formal statement only the following day and stayed overnight at the police station before he was brought to said counsel. Thus, the constitutional requirement had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel.

However, the Court rejected the appellants’ contention that the accused was not given a counsel of his own choice, as he never objected to the IBP lawyer when the latter was presented to him to be his counsel for the taking down of his statement. The phrase “preferably of his own choice” does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede or obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. Thus, while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel – or where the preferred lawyer is not available – is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection against the counsel’s appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer. The Constitution gives the person under custodial investigation the right to a competent and independent counsel. The modifier “competent and independent” is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer. An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent. The right to counsel has been written into the Constitution in order to prevent the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. The lawyer’s role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused. The accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and independent counsel. Where the prosecution failed to discharge the State’s burden of proving with clear and convincing evidence that the accused had enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he extrajudicially admitted his guilt, the extrajudicial confession cannot be given any probative value. Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the Philippines/Cesar Fortuna vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo, et al., G.R. Nos. 182555/G.R. No. 185123/G.R. No. 187745, September 7, 2010. Immunity from suit. Petitioner here claimed that it could not be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state immunity without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, on the basis that under Service Contract 38, it served merely as an agent of the Philippine government in the development of the Malampaya gas reserves. The Court ruled that petitioner cannot claim immunity from suit because it is not an agent of the Republic of the Philippines, but the latter’s service contractor for the exploration and development of one of the country’s natural gas reserves. While the Republic of the Philippines appointed petitioner as the exclusive party to conduct petroleum operations in the Camago-Malampayo area under the State’s full control and supervision, it does not follow that petitioner has become the State’s “agent” within the meaning of the law. An agent is a person who binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. The essence of an agency is the agent’s ability to represent his principal and bring about business relations between the latter and third persons. An agent’s ultimate undertaking is to execute juridical acts that would create, modify or extinguish relations between his principal and third persons. It is this power to affect the principal’s contractual relations with third persons that differentiates the agent from a service contractor. Petitioner’s main undertaking under Service Contract 38 is to “[p]erform all petroleum operations and provide all necessary technology and finance” as well as other connected services to the Philippine government. As defined under the contract, petroleum operation means the “searching for and obtaining Petroleum within the Philippines”, including the “transportation, storage, handling and sale” of petroleum whether for export or domestic consumption. Petitioner’s primary obligation under the contract is not to represent the Philippine government for the purpose of transacting business with third persons. Rather, its contractual commitment is to develop and manage petroleum operations on behalf of the State. Consequently, it is not an agent of the Philippine government, but a provider of services, technology and financing for the Malampaya Natural Gas Project. Notably, the Philippine government itself recognized that petitioner could be sued in relation to the project. This is evident in the stipulations agreed upon by the parties under Service Contract 38. Shell Philippines Exploration B. V. vs. Efren Jalos, et al., G.R. No. 179918, September 8, 2010. Judiciary; seniority in appointment of Court of Appeals justices. An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act, of one who has the authority, of designating or selecting an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. Where the power of appointment is absolute and the appointee has been determined upon, no further consent or approval is necessary and the formal evidence of the appointment, the commission, may issue at once. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with. A written memorial that can render title to public office indubitable is required. This written memorial is known as the commission. For purposes of completion of the appointment process, the

appointment is complete when the commission is signed by the executive, and sealed if necessary, and is ready to be delivered or transmitted to the appointee. Thus, transmittal of the commission is an act which is done after the appointment has already been completed. It is not required to complete the appointment but only to facilitate the effectiveness of the appointment by the appointee’s receipt and acceptance thereof. For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, therefore, the date the commission has been signed by the President (which is the date appearing on the face of such document) is the date of the appointment. Such date will determine the seniority of the members of the Court of Appeals in connection with Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246. In other words, the earlier the date of the commission of an appointee, the more senior he is over the other subsequent appointees. It is only when the appointments of two or more appointees bear the same date that the order of issuance of the appointments by the President becomes material. This provision of statutory law (Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246) controls over the provisions of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, which gives premium to the order of appointments as transmitted to this Court. Rules implementing a particular law cannot override but must give way to the law they seek to implement. Re: Seniority among the four most recent appointments to the position of Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals. A.M. No. 10-4-22-SC, September 28, 2010. Police power; taxation versus regulation. In distinguishing tax and regulation as a form of police power, the determining factor is the purpose of the implemented measure. If the purpose is primarily to raise revenue, then it will be deemed a tax even though the measure results in some form of regulation. On the other hand, if the purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is deemed a regulation and an exercise of the police power of the state, even though incidentally, revenue is generated. In this case, the royalty fees were imposed by the Clark Development Corporation (CDC) primarily for regulatory purposes, and not for the generation of income or profits as petitioner claims. These fees form part of the regulatory mandate of CDC to ensure “free flow or movement” of petroleum fuel to and from the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). Being the administrator of CSEZ, CDC is responsible for ensuring the safe, efficient and orderly distribution of fuel products within the CSEZ. Addressing specific concerns demanded by the nature of goods or products involved is encompassed in the range of services which respondent CDC is expected to provide under the law, pursuant to its general power of supervision and control over the movement of all supplies and equipment into the CSEZ. Chevron Philippines, Inc. vs. Bases conversion Development Authority and Clark Development Corporation. G.R. No. 173863, September 15, 2010. Right to speedy disposition of cases. Section 16, Article III of the Constitution provides that “all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.” This protection extends to all citizens and covers the periods before, during and after trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2), which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. However, just like the constitutional guarantee of “speedy trial,” “speedy disposition of cases” is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays, which render rights nugatory. The determination of whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court held that the delay of four years during which the case remained pending with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court was not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive. Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the Philippines/Cesar Fortuna vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo, et al. G.R. Nos. 182555/G.R. No. 185123/G.R. No. 187745, September 7, 2010.

Administrative Law

Administrative agencies; findings of fact. Findings of facts and conclusions of law of the Securities and Exchange Commission are controlling on the reviewing authority. The rule is that findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing authority. It is not for the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence and the credibility of witnesses presented before the lower court, tribunal, or office, as we are not a trier of facts. Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to the lower court, the latter’s findings of fact being conclusive and not reviewable by this Court. The SEC Hearing Officer had the optimum opportunity to review the pieces of evidence presented before him and to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. Administrative decisions on matters within his jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion,

fraud, or error of law, which has not been shown by petitioner in this case. Queensland-Tokyo Commodities, Inc., et al. vs. Thomas George. G.R. No. 172727, September 8, 2010. Administrative investigation; right to counsel; admission. The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. The exclusionary rule under paragraph 2, Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the rule under existing laws is that a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioner’s capacity to represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the admissions made by petitioner during the investigation may be used as evidence to justify her dismissal. Clarita J. Carbonel vs. Civil Service Commission. G.R. No. 187689, September 7, 2010. Administrative remedies; exhaustion. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that when an administrative remedy is provided by law, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before judicial intervention may be availed of. No recourse can be had until all such remedies have been exhausted, and the special civil actions against administrative officers should not be entertained if there are superior administrative officers who could grant relief. This doctrine is a judicial recognition of certain matters that are peculiarly within the competence of the administrative agency to address. It operates as a shield that prevents the overarching use of judicial power and thus hinders courts from intervening in matters of policy infused with administrative character. Dimson (Manila), Inc. and Phesco, Inc. vs. Local Water Utilities Administration. G.R. No. 168656, September 22, 2010. Administrative remedies; exhaustion. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. Resort to administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to several exceptions, the Court finds that the instant case does not fall under any of them. Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, et al. vs. SM Prime Holdings, Inc. G.R. No. 170599, September 22, 2010. Laguna Lake Development Authority; powers. The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) has power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region. Adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except where a special law, such as the LLDA Charter, provides for another forum. Although the PAB assumed the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases, this does not preclude the LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of pollution cases within its area of responsibility and to impose fines as penalty. Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, et al. vs. SM Prime Holdings, Inc. G.R. No. 170599, September 22, 2010.

Election Law Automated election system; source code. The pertinent portion of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9369 is clear in that “once an [automated election system] technology is selected for implementation, the [COMELEC] shall promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof.” The COMELEC has offered no reason

not to comply with this requirement of the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the source code was that it was not yet available when petitioner asked for it and, subsequently, that the review had to be done, apparently for security reason, under a controlled environment. The elections had passed and that reason is already stale. The Court here ruled on the petition notwithstanding the fact that the elections for which the subject source code was to be used had already been held. It accepted petitioner’s claim that the source code remained important and relevant not only for compliance with the law, and the purpose thereof, but especially in the backdrop of numerous admissions of errors and claims of fraud in the May 2010 elections. Center for People Empowerment in Governance vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189546, September 21, 2010.

Local Government Salary standardization; President’s power over local governments. The Court here reversed the ruling of the Commission on Audit (COA), which disallowed the premium payment for hospitalization and health care insurance benefits granted by petitioner to its officials and employees. COA held that such benefits disregarded Section 2 of Administrative Order No. 103, series of 1994 (AO 103), which prohibits all heads of government offices and agencies from granting productivity incentive benefits or any and all similar forms of allowances and benefits without the President’s prior approval. The Court ruled that petitioner did not violate the rule of prior Presidential approval since Section 2 of AO 103 states that the prohibition applies only to “government offices/agencies, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations, as well as their respective governing boards.” Nowhere is it indicated in Section 2 that the prohibition also applies to local government units. The approval requirement must be observed by government offices under the President’s control, i.e., departments, bureaus, offices and government-owned and controlled corporations under the Executive branch. Being an LGU, petitioner is merely under the President’s general supervision pursuant to Section 4, Article X of the Constitution. The President’s power of general supervision means the power of a superior officer to see to it that subordinates perform their functions according to law. This is distinguished from the President’s power of control which is the power to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the President over that of the subordinate officer. The power of control gives the President the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion. Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President, the President’s authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are faithfully executed. The President may only point out that rules have not been followed but the President cannot lay down the rules, neither does he have the discretion to modify or replace the rules. Thus, the grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in this case does not need the approval of the President to be valid. The Province of Negros Occidental vs. The Commissioners, Commission on Audit, et al. G.R. No. 182574, September 28, 2010. Special Laws Agrarian reform; just compensation. The Supreme Court here reiterated its previous rulings that the factors for determining just compensation under Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law), which have been translated into a formula through DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, series of 1994, are mandatory and should be strictly complied with. In this case, Land Bank’s valuation correctly reflected the actual use and produce of the subject properties and did not factor in potential use as what respondent’s appraiser did. (Note that DAR AO No. 6, as amended by DAR A.O. No. 11, has been superseded by DAR Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998.) Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Conrado O. Colarina, G.R. No. 176410, September 1, 2010. Agrarian reform; just compensation. For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking. There are three important concepts in this definition – the character of the property, its price, and the time of actual taking. The time of taking is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic. The property’s character refers to its actual use at the time of taking, not its potential uses. Where, as here, it has been conclusively decided by final judgment in the earlier cases filed by respondent that his property was validly acquired under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657) and validly distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries, the property should be conclusively treated as an agricultural land and valued as such. The lower courts erred in ruling that the character or use of the property has changed from agricultural to residential, because there is no allegation or proof that the property was approved for conversion to other uses by the Department of Agrarian Reform. In the absence of such approval, it

cannot be said that the character or use of the property has changed from agricultural to residential. Respondent’s property remains agricultural and should be valued as such. Respondent’s evidence of the value of his land as residential property (which the lower courts found to be preponderant) could, at most, refer to the potential use of the property. While the potential use of an expropriated property is sometimes considered in cases where there is a great improvement in the general vicinity of the expropriated property, it should never control the determination of just compensation. The potential use of a property should not be the principal criterion for determining just compensation for this will be contrary to the wellsettled doctrine that the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, not its potential uses. The proper approach should have been to value respondent’s property as an agricultural land, which value may be adjusted in light of the improvements in the locality where it is situated. As to the price, the factors and requirements set out in Section 17 of RA 6657 must be applied. Here, the Land Bank’s authority to value the land is only preliminary and the landowner who disagrees with petitioner’s valuation may bring the matter to court for a judicial determination of just compensation. The Regional Trial Courts, organized as special agrarian courts, are the final adjudicators on the issue of just compensation. Land Bank must substantiate its valuation. It is not enough that the landowner fails to prove a higher valuation for the property; Land Bank must still prove the correctness of its claims. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Enrique Livioco, G.R. No. 170685, September 22, 2010. Agrarian reform; retention rights. The right of retention, as protected and enshrined in the Constitution, balances the effect of compulsory land acquisition by granting the landowner the right to choose the area to be retained subject to legislative standards. Thus, landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under Presidential Decree No. 27 are entitled to new retention rights provided for by Republic Act No. 6657. However, the limitations under Letter of Instruction No. 474 still apply to a landowner who filed an application for retention under RA 6657. LOI 474 amended PD 27 by removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares, or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purpose from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families. Section 9 (d) of DAR Administrative Order No. 05 is inconsistent with PD No. 27, as amended by LOI 474, insofar as it removed the limitations to a landowner’s retention rights. It is well-settled that administrative officials are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations in order to implement a statute. The power, however, is restricted such that an administrative regulation cannot go beyond what is provided in the legislative enactment. It must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law; hence, any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the statute. Celestio Santiago substituted by Lauro Santiago and Isidro Gutierrez substituted by Rogelio Gutierez vs. Amada R. Ortiz-Luis substituted by Juan Ortiz-Luiz, Jr. G.R. No. 186184 & G.R. No. 186988, September 20, 2010. Government Procurement Reform Act; jurisdiction; appeal from decisions of bids and awards committee. Under Republic Act No. 9184, or the Government Procurement Reform Act (GPRA), the proper recourse to a court action from decisions of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) is to file a certiorari not before the Supreme Court but before the regional trial court, which is vested by the GPRA with jurisdiction to entertain the same. Compliance with the mandatory protest mechanisms of the GPRA is jurisdictional in character. Section 58 of that law requires that there be exhaustion of the statutorily available remedies at the administrative level as a precondition to the filing of a certiorari petition. This requirement points to the mechanisms for protest against decisions of the BAC in all stages of the procurement process that are outlined in both the provisions of Section 55 of the GPRA as well in Section 55 of the implementing rules. Under these relevant sections of the law and the rules, resort to the judicial remedy of certiorari must be made only after the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the BAC’s decision before the said body. Subsequently, from the final denial of the motion for reconsideration, the aggrieved party must then lodge a protest before the head of the procuring entity through a verified position paper that formally complies with requirements in Section 55.2 of the GPRA’s Implementing Rules and Regulations – Part A. Only upon the final resolution of the protest can the aggrieved party be said to have exhausted the available remedies at the administrative level. In other words, only then can he viably avail of the remedy of certiorari before the proper courts. Non-compliance with this statutory requirement, under Section 58 of the GPRA, constitutes a ground for the dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction. Dimson (Manila), Inc. and Phesco, Inc. vs. Local Water Utilities Administration. G.R. No. 168656, September 22, 2010. Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act; vested property rights. When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) or Republic Act 8371 in 1997, it provided in Section 56 that “property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested” upon its effectiveness “shall be recognized and respected.” In this case, ownership over the subject lands had been vested in petitioner as early as 1958. Consequently, a Presidential proclamation transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples around the area is not in accord with the IPRA. Central Mindanao University, etc. vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 184869, September 21, 2010. Republic Act No. 8975; government ICT projects.

This is the first time that the Court is confronted with the question of whether a government information and communication technology project is covered by Republic Act No. 8975, which prohibits trial courts from issuing a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or mandatory injunction against the bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the national government. The term “national government projects” means (i) national government infrastructure projects, engineering works and service contracts, (ii) all projects covered by the Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) Law, and (iii) other related and necessary activities, such as site acquisition, supply and/or installation of equipment and materials, implementation, construction, completion, operation, maintenance, improvement repair and rehabilitation. The purpose of RA 8975 is to ensure the expeditious implementation and completion of government infrastructure projects. Undeniably, under the BOT Law, the entire information technology project, including the civil works component and the technological aspect thereof, is considered an infrastructure or development project and treated similarly as traditional infrastructure projects. Such information technology project is therefore covered by RA 8975. On the other hand, under Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act (GPRA), which contemplates projects to be funded by public funds, the term “infrastructure project” is limited to the “civil works component” of information technology projects. The non-civil works component of information technology projects is treated as an acquisition of goods or consulting services. Thus, the civil works component of information technology projects are subject to the provisions of the GPRA and its implementing regulations on infrastructure projects, while the technological and other components would be covered by the provisions on procurement of goods or consulting services as the circumstances may warrant. When Congress adopted a limited definition of what is to be considered “infrastructure” in relation to information technology projects under the GPRA, legislators are presumed to have taken into account previous laws concerning infrastructure projects, including the BOT Law and RA 8975, and deliberately adopted the limited definition. Taking into account the different treatment of information technology projects under the BOT Law and the GPRA, petitioners’ contention the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction (because of the prohibition under RA 8975) would have been correct if the e-Passport Project was pursued under the BOT Law. However, petitioners presented no proof that the e-Passport Project was a BOT project. On the contrary, evidence adduced by both sides tended to show that the e-Passport Project was a procurement contract under the GPRA. Accordingly, only the civil works component of the ePassport Project would be considered an infrastructure project that may not be the subject of a lower court-issued writ of injunction under RA 8975. Could the e-Passport Project be considered as “engineering works or a service contract” or as “related and necessary activities” under RA 8975. The Court ruled in the negative. Under that law, a “service contract” refers to “infrastructure contracts entered into by any department, office or agency of the national government with private entities and nongovernment organizations for services related or incidental to the functions and operations of the department, office or agency concerned.” On the other hand, the phrase “other related and necessary activities” refers to activities related to a government infrastructure, engineering works, service contract or project under the BOT Law. In other words, to be considered a service contract or related activity, petitioners must show that the e-Passport Project is an infrastructure project or necessarily related to an infrastructure project. This, petitioners failed to do as they saw fit not to present any evidence on the details of the e-Passport Project before the trial court and this Court. There is nothing on record to indicate that the e-Passport Project has a civil works component or is necessarily related to an infrastructure project. In fact, the BSP’s request for interest and to bid confirms that the e-Passport Project is a procurement of goods and not an infrastructure project. Thus, within the context of the GPRA – which is the governing law for the e-Passport Project – the said Project is not an infrastructure project that is protected from lower court issued injunctions. Department of Foreign Affairs and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Hon. Franco T. Falcon, G.R. No. 176657, September 1, 2010.

OCTOBER 2010 CASES Constitutional Law

Bill of Rights; Presumption of Innocence . In this case, the so-called frame-up was virtually pure allegation bereft of credible proof. The narration of the police officer who implemented the search warrant was found, after trial and appellate review, as the true story. It is on firmer ground than the self-serving statement of the accused-appellant of frame-up.  The defense cannot solely rely upon the constitutional presumption of innocence for, while it is constitutional, the presumption is not conclusive.  Notably, the accused-appellant herself stated in her brief that “no proof was proffered by the accused-appellant of the police officers’

alleged ill motive.” Stated otherwise, the narration of the incident by law enforcers, buttressed by the presumption that they have regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary, must be given weight. People of the Philippines vs. Olive Rubio Mamaril. G.R. No. 171980, October 6, 2010. Bill of Rights; Probable Cause. There is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the findings or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a showing to the contrary. The defense’s reliance of the quoted testimony of the police officer alone, without any other evidence to show that there was indeed lack of personal knowledge, is insufficient to overturn the finding of the trial court.  The accusedappellant, having failed to present substantial rebuttal evidence to defeat the presumption of regularity of duty of the issuing judge, cannot not be sustained by the Court. People of the Philippines vs. Olive Rubio Mamaril. G.R. No. 171980, October 6, 2010. Constitutionality; Actual Controversy; Standing to Sue. The power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy involving a statute, its implementation or a government action.  Without such controversy, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions.  The limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse judicial review unless the constitutional question or the assailed illegal government act is brought before it by a party who possesses locus standi or the standing to challenge it.  To have standing, one must establish that he has a “personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.”  Particularly, he must show that (1) he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are, as here, appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials.  The present petitions allege that then President Ramos had exercised vis-à-vis an assignment of franchise, a function legislative in character. As alleged, too, the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), in the guise of entering into contracts or agreements with the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) and other juridical entities, virtually enlarged, modified and/or extended the statutory franchise of PNCC, thereby usurping a legislative prerogative. The usurpation came in the form of executing the assailed Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements and the issuance of Toll Operation Certificates. Grave abuse of discretion is also laid on the doorstep of the TRB for its act of entering into these same contracts or agreements without the required public bidding mandated by law. In fine, the certiorari petitions impute on then President Ramos and the TRB, the commission of acts that translate inter alia into usurpation of the congressional authority to grant franchises and violation of extant statutes.  The petitions make a prima facie case for certiorari and prohibition; an actual case or controversy ripe for judicial review exists.  Verily, when an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.  In doing so, the judiciary merely defends the sanctity of its duties and powers under the Constitution. In any case, the rule on standing is a matter of procedural technicality, which may be relaxed when the subject in issue or the legal question to be resolved is of transcendental importance to the public. Hence, even absent any direct injury to the suitor, the Court can relax the application of legal standing or altogether set it aside for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, when the public interest so requires. There is no doubt that individual petitioners, Marcos,et al., in G.R. No. 169917, as then members of the House of Representatives, possess the requisite legal standing since they assail acts of the executive they perceive to injure the institution of Congress. On the other hand, petitioners Francisco, Hizon, and the other petitioning associations, as taxpayers and/or users of the tollways or representatives of such users, would ordinarily not be clothed with the requisite standing. While this is so, the Court is wont to presently relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount public interest involved in the implementation of the laws on the Luzon tollways, a roadway complex used daily by hundreds of thousands of motorists. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./The Republic of the Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, 183599, October 19, 2010. Constitutionality; Locus Standi . A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.  None of them faces any charge under RA 9372. Petitioners in G.R.

No. 178890, allege that they have been subjected to “close security surveillance by state security forces,” their members followed by “suspicious persons” and “vehicles with dark windshields,” and their offices monitored by “men with military build.”  They likewise claim that they have been branded as “enemies of the State.” Even conceding such allegations, petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported “surveillance” and the implementation of RA 9372. On the other hand, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581 would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents’ alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National People’s Army (NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law. Petitioners’ apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its effectiveness, belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging. The same is true with petitioners in G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed “link” to the CPP and NPA.  They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their organization and members. RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.  Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157, on the other hand, base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render assistance to those arrested or detained under the law. The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law, however, does not suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing. The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and duties.  Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372. Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the subject of “political surveillance,” also lacks locus standi.   Prescinding from the veracity, let alone legal basis, of the claim of “political surveillance,” the Court finds that she has not shown even the slightest threat of being charged under RA 9372.  Similarly lacking in locus standi are former Senator Wigberto Tañada and Senator Sergio Osmeña III, who cite their being respectively a human rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage of RA 9372.  Outside these statements, no concrete injury to them has been pinpointed. Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that the issues they raise are of transcendental importance, “which must be settled early” and are of “far-reaching implications,” without mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which they have been charged, or may be charged.  Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi.  Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of the law’s enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public. Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers and citizens.  A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress, whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.  In sum, it bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et al. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al./Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. Vs. Hon. Eduardo Ermita., et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), et al.  vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./Karapatan, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. G.R. No. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890, 179157, 179461, October 5, 2010. Constitutionality; Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy. The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the requirement that there must be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues. Prevailing American jurisprudence allows adjudication on the merits when an anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a justiciable controversy. Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show that the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they seek to do.  No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a real and existing one. Petitioners’ obscure allegations of sporadic “surveillance” and supposedly being tagged as “communist fronts” in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution.  From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its function. Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.  Then again, declaratory actions characterized by “double contingency,” where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc, et al. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al./Kilusang Mayo Uno etc., et al. Vs. Hon. Eduardo Ermita., et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), et al.  vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./Karapatan, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890, 179157, 179461, October 5, 2010.

Constitutionality; Void for Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrine .

A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted. To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.  The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected. A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as-applied” challenge. Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities. The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. On the other hand, the allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases  is justified by the aim to avert the “chilling effect” on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged.  This rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an “in terrorem effect” in deterring socially harmful conduct.  In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. Under no case, therefore, may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered.  No prosecution would be possible. It is settled, furthermore, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases. By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation.  Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants. In this case, since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of “terrorism” in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them. In fine, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372.  Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of “terrorism” is thus legally impermissible. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et al. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al./Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. Vs. Hon. Eduardo Ermita., et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), et al.  vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./Karapatan, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890, 179157, 179461, October 5, 2010.

Eminent Domain; Just Compensation. Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, compensation should be just. The public, through the State, must balance the injury that the taking of property causes through compensation for what is taken, value for value.  The owner’s loss is not only his property but also its income-generating potential. While the LBP immediately paid the remaining balance on the just compensation due to the petitioners after the Supreme Court had fixed the value of the expropriated properties, it overlooks one essential fact – from the time that the State took the petitioners’ properties until the time that the petitioners were fully paid, almost 12 long years passed.   This is the rationale for imposing the 12% interest – in order to compensate the petitioners for the income they would have made had they been properly compensated for their properties at the time of the taking. Furthermore, while the SC has equitably reduced the amount of interest awarded in numerous cases in the past, those cases involved interest that was essentially consensual in nature, i.e., interest stipulated in signed agreements between the contracting parties. In contrast, the interest involved in the present case “runs as a matter of law and follows as a matter of course from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good a position as money can accomplish, as of the date of taking.” Thus, the interest due in the present case cannot be reduced. Apo Fruits Corporation, et al. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines. G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010. Fiscal Autonomy of the Judiciary; GSIS; Exemption from Legal Fees. In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees, the Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291, which exempts it from “all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds,” cannot operate to exempt it from the payment of legal fees. This was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which empowered Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed this power from Congress.  Hence, the Supreme Court now has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court’s guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence. In the instant case, therefore, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction to try and decide the permissive counterclaim considering that petitioner is not exempted from the payment of legal fees. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of

Fernando P. Caballero, et al. G.R. No. 158090, October 4, 2010. Ombudsman; Disciplinary Authority over Public School Teachers. The administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper committee of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). However, while petitioner has such concurrent authority, Section 23 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that the Ombudsman may refer a complaint to the proper disciplinary authority. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case, it would have been more prudent for petitioner to have referred the complaint to the DECS given that it would have been in a better position to serve the interest of justice considering the nature of the controversy. Respondent is a public school teacher and is covered by RA 4670, therefore, the proceedings before the DECS would have been the more appropriate venue to resolve the dispute. In any case, the foregoing pronouncement does not automatically mean that the Supreme Court is nullifying the proceedings before the Ombudsman as estoppel has already set in. Respondent actively participated in the proceedings before the Ombudsman. He submitted his counter-affidavit, an affidavit of his witness, and attached annexes. Respondent even filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking for affirmative relief from the Ombudsman. Finally, as to the power to impose administrative liability, the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to determine the administrative liability of an erring public official or employee, and to direct and compel the head of the concerned officer or agency to implement the penalty imposed. This power to impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Pedro Delijero, Jr. G.R. No. 172635, October 20, 2010. Office of the Ombudsman; Powers. The Ombudsman’s decision imposing the penalty of suspension for one year is immediately executory pending appeal. It cannot be stayed by the mere filing of an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA). Clearly, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supersedes the discretion given to the CA in Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case is appealed to the CA. The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman that a decision is immediately executory is a special rule that prevails over the provisions of the Rules of Court. Moreover, Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules of procedure. In this connection, Sections 18 and 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 also provide that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to “promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions and duties” and to amend or modify its rules as the interest of justice may require. For the CA to issue a preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman in an administrative case would be to encroach on the rule-making powers of the Office of the Ombudsman under the Constitution and RA 6770 as the injunctive writ will render nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Joel S. Samaniego. G.R. No. 175573, October 5, 2010. Preliminary Investigation; Decision; Applicability of Constitutional Requirements to DOJ. A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding since “the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.”  Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial. While the prosecutor makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the prosecutor. A preliminary investigation thus partakes of an investigative or inquisitorial power for the sole purpose of obtaining information on what future action of a judicial nature may be taken. Balangauan v. Court of Appeals in fact iterates that even the action of the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutor’s order or resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the “DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body.”  Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary. Atty. Alice Odchique-Bondoc vs. Tan Tiong Bio a.k.a. Henry Tan. G.R. No. 186652, October 6, 2010. Validity of Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements. (a)

Public Utility Franchise; Substitution of Grantee.

The Court rejected petitioners’ contention that contractual provisions on substitution of the franchise holder violated the Constitution. Relying on Clause 17.4.1 of the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA) for the North Luzon Expressway that the lenders have the unrestricted right to appoint a substitute entity in case of default of Manila North Tollways Corporation (MNTC) or the occurrence of an event of default in respect of MNTC’s loans, petitioners argue that since MNTC is the assignee or transferee of the franchise of Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), then it steps into the shoes of PNCC.  They contend that the act of replacing MNTC as grantee is tantamount to an amendment or alteration of PNCC’s original franchise and hence unconstitutional, considering that the constitutional power to appoint a new franchise holder is reserved to Congress. The Court disagreed. Petitioners’ presupposition that only Congress has the power to directly grant franchises is misplaced.  The Court has held that administrative agencies may be empowered by the Legislature by means of a law to grant franchises or similar authorizations. In this case, the Court ruled that the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) is empowered to grant a franchise for toll road projects.

Petitioners also contend that substituting MNTC as the grantee in case of default with respect to its loans is tantamount to an amendment of PNCC’s original franchise and is therefore unconstitutional.  The Court also found this assertion to be without merit.  Besides holding that the Legislature may properly empower administrative agencies to grant franchises pursuant to a law, the Court explained in this case that Presidential Decree No. 1113 and the amendatory Presidential Decree No. 1894 both vested the TRB with the power to impose conditions on PNCC’s franchise in an appropriate contract and may therefore amend or alter the same when public interest so requires, save for the conditions stated in Sections 1 and 2 of PD 1894, which relate to the coverage area of the tollways and the expiration of PNCC’s original franchise.  Presidential Decree No. 1112 provided further that the TRB has the power to amend or modify a Toll Operation Certificate that it issued when public interest so requires.  Accordingly, there is nothing infirm much less questionable about the provision in the MNTC STOA allowing the substitution of MNTC in case it defaults in its loans. Furthermore, the “unrestricted right” of the lender in Clause 17.4.1 of the MNTC STOA to appoint a substituted entity is never intended to afford such lender the plenary power to do so. It is clear that the lenders do not actually have an absolute or “unrestricted” right to appoint the substituted entity in view of TRB’s right to accept or reject the substitution within one month from notice, and such right to appoint comes into force only if and when the TRB decides to effectuate the substitution of MNTC as allowed in Clause 17.2 of the MNTC STOA. (b)

Public Utility Franchise; Extension .

The Court agreed with petitioners’ contention that the option in the MNTC STOA to extend the concession for the stated period is unconstitutional. Clause 17.5 of the MNTC STOA grants MNTC’s lenders the power to extend the concession in case the Grantor (Republic of the Philippines) takes over the same, for a period not exceeding 50 years, until full payment of the loans.  At the outset, Clause 17.5 does not grant the lenders the power to unilaterally extend the concession for a period not exceeding 50 years. The afore-quoted provision should be read in conjunction with Clause 20.12, which expressly provides that the MNTC STOA is “made under and shall be governed by and construed in accordance with” the laws of the Philippines, and particularly, by the provisions of PD 1112, PD 1113 and PD 1894.  Under the applicable laws, the TRB may amend, modify, alter or revoke the authority/franchise “whenever the public interest so requires.”  In a word, the power to determine whether or not to continue or extend the authority granted to a concessionaire to operate and maintain a tollway is vested in the TRB by the applicable laws.  The necessity of whether or not to extend the concession or the authority to construct, operate and maintain a tollway rests, by operation of law, with the TRB.  As such, the lenders cannot unilaterally extend the concession period, or, with like effect, demand that the TRB agree to extend the concession. It must be noted, however, that while the TRB is vested by law with the power to extend the administrative franchise or authority that it granted, it cannot do so for an accumulated period exceeding 50 years. Otherwise, it would violate   the proscription under Article XII, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that no public utility franchise shall be for a longer period than 50 years. In this case, the MNTC STOA has an original stipulated period of 30 years.  Clause 17.5 allows the extension of this period if necessary to fully repay the loans of MNTC. If the maximum extension as provided in Clause 17.5, i.e., 50 years, is used, the accumulated concession period granted in this case would effectively be 80 years.  This is a clear violation of the 50-year franchise threshold set by the Constitution.  It is on this basis that the Court struck down the provision in Clause 17.5 allowing extension of the concession for up to 50 years.  However, the nullity is only with respect to any extension beyond the 50-year constitutional limit. (c)

Government Guarantee.

The Court declared as unconstitutional and grossly disadvantageous to the Government Clause 11.7 of the MNTC STOA (and a similar provision in the STOA for the South Luzon Expressway rehabilitation and extension project), which guarantees the financial viability of tollway project. Under Clause 11.7 of the MNTC STOA, the TRB agreed to pay monthly the difference in the toll fees actually collected by MNTC and that which it could have realized under the STOA.  Article VI, Section 29(1) of the Constitution mandates that “[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” In this case, the TRB, by warranting to compensate MNTC for loss of revenue resulting from the nonimplementation of the periodic and interim toll fee adjustments, violates the constitutionally guaranteed and exclusive power of the Legislature to appropriate money for public purpose from the General Funds of the Government. Further, Section 3(e)(5) of PD 1112 explicitly states that no guarantee, Certificate of Indebtedness, collateral securities, or bonds shall be issued by any government agency or government-owned or controlled corporation on any financing program of the toll operator in connection with his undertaking under the Toll Operation Certificate. What the law here seeks to prevent is the eventuality that the Government, through any of its agencies, could be obligated to pay or secure, whether directly or indirectly, the financing by the private investor of the project.    In this case, under Clause 11.7 of the MNTC STOA, the Republic of the Philippines (through the TRB) guaranteed the security of the project against revenue losses that could result in case the TRB, based on its determination of a just and reasonable toll fee, decides not to effect a toll fee adjustment under the STOA’s periodic/interim adjustment formula.

(d)

Toll Rate Adjustments.

The Court rejected petitioners’ contention that the toll rate adjustment mechanisms in the STOAs violated the Constitution. Petitioners argue that the STOAs for the North Luzon Expressway, South Luzon Expressway and South Metro Manila Skyway (SMMS) projects tie the hands of the TRB, as it is bound by the stipulated periodic and interim toll rate adjustments provided therein.  Petitioners contend that the provisions on initial toll rates and periodic/interim toll rate adjustments, by using a built-in automatic toll rate adjustment formula, guaranteed fixed returns for the investors and negated the public hearing requirement. The Court held that the requisite public hearings under Section 3(d) of PD 1112 and Section 8(b) of PD 1894 are not negated by the fixing of the initial toll rates and the periodic adjustments under the STOAs. A clear distinction must be made between the statutory prescription on the fixing of initial toll rates, on the one hand, and of periodic/interim or subsequent toll rates, on the other.  First, the hearing required under the said provisos refers to notice and hearing for the approval or denial of petitions for toll rate adjustments – or the subsequent toll rates, not to the fixing of initial toll rates.  By express legal provision, the TRB is authorized to approve the initial toll rates without the necessity of a hearing.  It is only when a challenge on the initial toll rates fixed ensues that public hearings are required. In determining the reasonableness of subsequent toll rate increases, the TRB must seek out the Commission on Audit for assistance in examining and auditing the financial books of the public utilities concerned. Furthermore, while the periodic, interim and other toll rate adjustment formulas are indicated in the STOAs, it does not mean that the TRB should accept a rate adjustment predicated on the economic data, references or assumptions adopted by the toll operator.  The final figures should be determined by the TRB based on its appreciation of the relevant rate-influencing data.  The TRB should exercise its rate-fixing powers within the context of the agreed formula, but always having in mind that the rates should be just and reasonable.  Conversely, it is very well within the power of the TRB under the law to approve a change in the current toll fees.  Section 3(d) of PD 1112 grants the TRB the power to “issue, modify and promulgate from time to time the rates of toll that will be charged the direct users of toll facilities.”  But the reasonableness of a possible increase in the fees must first be clearly and convincingly established by the petitioning entities, i.e., the toll operators. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./The Republic of the Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, 183599, October 19, 2010.

Administrative Law Administrative Agencies; Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction. Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. Undeniably, supervening events have substantially changed the factual backdrop of the case while it was pending before the Court.  The Supreme Court thus deferred to the competence and expertise of the Securities and Exchange Commission to determine whether, given the supervening events, the Second Amendment to the Rehabilitation Plan is no longer capable of implementation and whether the rehabilitation case should be terminated as a consequence. Nestle Philippines, Inc. et al. vs. Uniwide Sales, Inc., et al. G.R. No. 174674, October 20, 2010. Government Contracts; Public Bidding. The Court held that public bidding is not required with respect to the procurement of the South Metro Manila Skyway, North Luzon Expressway and South Luzon Expressway projects. Private petitioners maintain that public bidding is required for these projects on the basis that they are in the nature of a build-operate-transfer infrastructure undertaking under the BOT Law. The Court said that the BOT Law does not squarely apply to Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), which exercised its prerogatives and obligations under its franchise to pursue the construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the above toll roads with chosen partners. These tollway projects may very well qualify as a build-operate-transfer undertaking.  However, given that the projects have been undertaken by PNCC in the exercise of its franchise under Presidential Decree No. 1113 and Presidential Decree No. 1894, in joint venture with its chosen partners at the time when it was held valid to do so by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel and the Department of Justice, the public bidding provisions under the BOT Law do not strictly apply. The above projects are not ordinary contracts for the construction of government infrastructure projects, which require, under the Government Procurement Reform Act or the now-repealed Presidential Decree No. 1594, public bidding as the preferred mode of contract award.  Neither are these contracts where financing or financial guarantees for the

project are obtained from the government. Rather, the Supplemental Toll Operating Agreements (pursuant to which PNCC is undertaking the projects together with its chosen partners) actually constitute a statutorily-authorized transfer or assignment of usufruct of PNCC’s existing franchise to construct, maintain and operate expressways. The conclusion would perhaps be different if the tollway projects were to be prosecuted by an outfit completely different from, and not related to, PNCC. In such a scenario, the entity awarded the winning bid in a BOT-scheme infrastructure project will have to construct, operate and maintain the tollways through an automatic grant of a franchise or TOC, in which case, public bidding is required under the law. Where, as here, a franchisee (PNCC) undertakes the construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the tollways under its franchise, there is no need for a public bidding.  In pursuing the projects with the vast resource requirements, the franchisee can partner with other investors, which it may choose in the exercise of its management prerogatives.  In this case, no public bidding is required upon the franchisee in choosing its partners, as such process was done in the exercise of management prerogatives and in pursuit of its right of delectus personae.  Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./The Republic of the Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, 183599, October 19, 2010.

Election Laws Candidate; Residency Requirement. While it is undisputed that Mitra’s domicile of origin is Puerto Princesa City, Mitra adequately proved by substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008, and concluded his transfer in early 2009.  Given this proof, the burden of evidence lies with the private respondents to establish the contrary, which the latter failed to do. On the other hand, the COMELEC based its ruling that Mitra did not take up residence in Aborlan largely on the photographs of Mitra’s Aborlan premises; it concluded that the photographed premises could not have been a residence because of its assessment of the interior design and furnishings of the room.  Thus, the COMELEC Second Division’s Resolution (which the COMELEC en banc fully supported) did not merely conclude that Mitra does not live in the photographed premises; more than this, it ruled that these premises cannot be considered a home or a residence, for lack of the qualities of a home that the Second Division wanted to see. The COMELEC not only grossly misread the evidence but even used personal and subjective standards in its assessment of Mitra’s dwelling when, in fact, the law is replete with standards, i.e., the dwelling must be where a person permanently intends to return and to remain. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010.

Special Laws Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation. Although the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is vested with primary jurisdiction under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation for lands taken under the CARP, such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.  The CARL vests in the RTCs, sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation.  The jurisdiction of the RTCs is not any less “original and exclusive” because the question is first passed upon by the DAR.  The proceedings before the RTC are not a continuation of the administrative determination. Additionally, the administrative orders providing for the guidelines in determining just compensation are mandatory and not mere guides that the RTC may disregard. Finally, although in some expropriation cases, the Court allowed the imposition of said interest, the same was in the nature of damages for delay in payment which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance. In this case, respondents are not entitled to interest on the final compensation considering that petitioner promptly deposited the compensation for their lands after they rejected petitioner’s initial valuation. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Glenn Y. Escandor, et al. G.R. No. 171685, October 11, 2010. Energy Regulatory Commission; Implementation of RA 7832. SURNECO cannot insist on using the multiplier scheme even after the imposition of the system loss caps under Section 10 of R.A. No. 7832.  Indeed, under National Electrification Administration Memorandum No. 1-A, the use of the multiplier scheme allows the recovery of system losses even beyond the caps mandated in R.A. No. 7832, which is intended to gradually phase out pilferage losses as a component of the recoverable system losses by the distributing utilities such as SURNECO.  However, it is totally repugnant to and incompatible with the system loss caps established in R.A. No. 7832, and

is repealed by Section 16 of the law.  As between NEA Memorandum No. 1-A, a mere administrative issuance, and R.A. No. 7832, a legislative enactment, the latter must prevail. Additionally, the PPA formula provided in the IRR of R.A. No. 7832 was only a model to be used as a guide by the electric cooperatives in proposing their own PPA formula for approval by the then Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).  Sections 4 and 5, Rule IX of the IRR directed the electric cooperatives to apply for approval of such formula with the ERB so that the system loss caps under the law would be incorporated in their computation of power cost adjustments.  The IRR did not provide for a specific formula; therefore, there was nothing in the IRR that was amended or could have been amended relative to the PPA formula.  The IRR left to the ERB, now the Energy Regulatory Commission, the authority to approve and oversee the implementation of the electric cooperatives’ PPA formula in the exercise of its rate-making power over them. Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SURNECO) vs. Energy Regulatory Commission. G.R. No. 183626, October 4, 2010. PNCC; Authority After Expiration of Franchise. In this case, petitioners assume and harp on the lack of authority of the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) to continue, in joint venture with private investors, with its North Luzon Expressway (NLEX), South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) and Metro Manila Expressway (MMEX) operations after the lapse of its franchise (granted under Presidential Decree No. 1113) on May 1, 2007. However, this expiration did not carry with it the cancellation of PNCC’s authority and that of its joint venture partners granted under Presidential Decree No. 1112 in relation to Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1894 to construct, operate and maintain “any and all such extensions, linkages or stretches, together with the toll facilities appurtenant thereto, from any part of [NLEX], [SLEX] and/or [MMEX] and/or to divert the original route and change the original end-points of the [NLEX] and/or [SLEX] as may be approved by the [TRB].” To highlight the point, Section 2 of PD 1894 specifically provides that the franchise for the extension and toll road projects constructed after the approval of PD 1894 shall be 30 years, counted from project completion. Indeed, prior to the expiration of PNCC’s original franchise in May 2007, the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), in the exercise of its special powers under PD 1112, signed Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements (STOAs) with PNCC and its private joint venture partners. These STOAs covered the expansion and rehabilitation of NLEX and SLEX, as the case may be, and/or the construction, operation and maintenance of toll road projects contemplated in PD 1894. Further, corresponding Toll Operation Certificates (TOCs) have been issued for the toll road projects. The STOAs TRB entered into with PNCC and its joint venture partners had the effect of granting authorities to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities, but with the injection of additional private sector investments consistent with the intent of PD 1112, PD 1113 and PD 1894.  The execution of these STOAs came in 1995, 1998 and 2006, or before the expiration of PNCC’s original franchise on May 1, 2007.  Upon the expiration of PNCC’s legislative franchise on May 1, 2007, the new authorities to construct, maintain and operate the subject tollways and toll facilities granted by the TRB pursuant to the validly executed STOAs and TOCs, shall begin to operate and be treated as administrative franchises or authorities. After May 1, 2007, the operation and maintenance of the NLEX and the other subject tollways are no longer be founded on PNCC’s original franchise but on entirely new authorizations, i.e. the TOCs, granted by the TRB pursuant to its statutory franchising authority under Sections 3(a) and (e) of PD 1112. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./The Republic of the Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, 183599, October 19, 2010. President’s Power to Approve TRB Contracts. Petitioners here assert that the grant to the President of the power to peremptorily authorize the assignment by Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), as franchise holder, of its franchise or the usufruct in its franchise is unconstitutional for being an encroachment of legislative power. The Court rejected this claim. Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree No. 1112 requires approval by the President of any contract the Toll Regulatory Board may have entered into or effected for the construction and operation of toll facilities.  Complementing Section 3(a) is 3(e)(3) of PD 1112 enjoining the transfer of the usufruct of PNCC’s franchise without the President’s prior approval. The President’s approving authority is therefore of statutory origin.  There is nothing illegal, let alone unconstitutional, with the delegation to the President of the authority to approve the assignment by PNCC of its rights and interest in its franchise, the assignment and delegation being circumscribed by restrictions in the delegating law itself. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./The Republic of the Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, 183599, October 19, 2010. Public Land; Alienability. Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person, that piece of land remains part of the public domain, and its occupation in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. It is only after the property has been declared alienable and disposable that private persons can legally claim possessory rights over it. This does not mean, however, that neither of the parties has the right to possess the property. While the Modestos claim to have been in possession of Lot 356 for almost 33 years, this occupation could not give rise to possessory rights while the property being occupied remain government land that had not yet been declared alienable and disposable. It was the Modestos, however, who were the actual possessors of the property when it was declared alienable and disposable on October 16, 1987, and continued to possess the property until the present time.

Pio Modesto and Cirila Rivera-Modesto vs. Carlos Urbina, substituted by the heirs of Olympia Miguel Vda. de Urbina, et al. G.R. No. 189859, October 18, 2010. Public land; Foreshore. To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that the land lies between the high and low water marks and is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. The land’s proximity to the waters alone does not automatically make it a foreshore land. Thus, in Republic of the Philippines v. Lensico, the Court held that although the two corners of the subject lot adjoins the sea, the lot cannot be considered as foreshore land since it has not been proven that the lot was covered by water during high tide. Similarly in this case, it was clearly proven that the disputed land remained dry even during high tide. Indeed, all the evidence supports the conclusion that the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is not foreshore land but remains private land owned by respondents. Manuel Almagro, joined by his spouse, Elizabeth Almagro vs. Salvacion C. Kwan, et al. / Margarita Pachoro, et al. vs. William C. Kwan, et al. G.R. Nos. 175806, 175810 and G.R. No. 175849. October 20, 2010. Toll Regulatory Board; Franchising Powers. The Court dismissed petitioners’ argument that only Congress has, under the 1987 Constitution, the exclusive prerogative to grant franchise to operate public utilities. With respect to the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), Sections 3(a) and (e) of Presidential Decree No. 1112 in relation to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1894 have invested the TRB with sufficient power to grant a qualified person or entity with authority to construct, maintain, and operate a toll facility and to issue the corresponding toll operating permit or Toll Operation Certificate.  By explicit provision of law, therefore, the TRB was given the power to grant administrative franchise for toll facility projects. The power to authorize and control a public utility is admittedly a prerogative that stems from the Legislature.  Any suggestion, however, that only Congress has the authority to grant a public utility franchise is less than accurate.  As  stressed in Albano v. Reyes — a case decided under the 1987 Constitution — there is nothing in the Constitution remotely indicating the necessity of a congressional franchise before each and every public utility may operate. A special franchise directly emanating from Congress is not necessary if the law already specifically authorizes an administrative body to grant a franchise or to award a contract. Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress has an explicit authority to grant a public utility franchise.  However, it may validly delegate its legislative authority, under the power of subordinate legislation, to issue franchises of certain public utilities to some administrative agencies. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./The Republic of the Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, 183599, October 19, 2010. Toll Regulatory Board; Quasi-Legislative and Quasi-Judicial Functions. Petitioners in the special civil actions cases would have the Court declare as invalid (i) Sections 3(a) and (d) of Presidential Decree No. 1112 (which accord the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) the power to enter into contracts for the construction and operation of toll facilities, and, at the same time, grant it the power to issue and promulgate toll rates) and (ii) Section 8(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1894 (which grant the TRB adjudicatory jurisdiction over matters involving toll rate movements). As submitted by petitioners, granting the TRB the power to award toll contracts is inconsistent with its quasi-judicial function of adjudicating petitions for initial toll and periodic toll rate adjustments. There cannot, so petitioners would postulate, be impartiality in such a situation. The Court rejected these arguments. It does not perceive an irreconcilable clash in the enumerated statutory powers of the TRB, such that the exercise of one negates the other. The ascription of impartiality on the part of the TRB cannot, under the premises, be accorded cogency. Petitioners have not shown that the TRB lacks the expertise, competence and capacity to implement its mandate of balancing the interests of the toll-paying motoring public and the imperative of allowing the concessionaires to recoup their investment with reasonable profits. The fact that an administrative agency is exercising its administrative or executive functions (such as the granting of franchises or awarding of contracts) and at the same time exercising its quasi-legislative (e.g., rule-making) and/or quasijudicial functions (e.g., rate-fixing), does not support a finding of a violation of due process or the Constitution. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./The Republic of the Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, 183599, October 19, 2010.

NOVEMBER 2010 CASES Constitutional Law

Bill of Rights; Right to Speedy Trial. The right to speedy trial is considered violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. In this case, far from being vexatious, capricious and oppressive, the delays entailed by the postponements of the hearings were, to a great extent, attributable to petitioner Francisco’s extraordinary remedies against the interlocutory orders issued by the lower court and the assignment of at least three public prosecutors to the case. Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate commencement of trial within 30 days from receipt of the pre-trial order, and the continuous conduct thereof for a period not exceeding 180 days, Section 3(a)(1) of Rule 119 provides that delays resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence. In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case and to give particular regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Based on the foregoing, the Court rejected petitioner Francisco’s claim that the postponements of the pre-trial conferences before the lower court violated his right to a speedy trial. Nelson Imperial, et al. vs. Maricel M. Joson, et al./Santos O. Francisco vs. Spouses Gerard and Maricel Joson Nelson/Imperial, et al. vs.. Hilarion C. Felix, et al., G.R. No. 160067/G.R. Mo. 170410/G.R. No. 171622, November 17, 2010. Bill of Rights; Right to Speedy Trial. In determining whether the right of the accused to a speedy trial was violated, any delay should be considered in relation to the entirety of the proceedings. Here, there had been an undue and inordinate delay in the reinvestigation of the cases by the Office of the Ombudsman, which failed to submit its reinvestigation report despite the lapse of the 60-day period set by the Sandiganbayan, and did so only after more than a year thereafter. However, while such reinvestigation delayed the proceedings, the Court held that said process could not have been dispensed with as it was undertaken for the protection of the rights of petitioners and their co-accused. These rights should not be compromised at the expense of expediency. Thus, even though the Court acknowledged the delay in the criminal proceedings, as well as the prejudice suffered by petitioners and their co-accused by reason thereof, the Court held that petitioners’ right to speedy trial and disposition of the cases involving them do not justify the dismissal of the criminal cases. The Court further held that the State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Office of the Ombudsman. Monico V. Jacob, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2010. Constitutionality; Legal Standing. Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). The Court held that he has no legal standing. The issue of legal standing is derived from the following requisites of a judicial inquiry: (1) There must be an actual case or controversy; (2) The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. The Court said that even if the petitioner’s claim that he is a proper party on the basis that the creation and operation of the PET involves the use of public funds and the issue he raised is of transcendental importance, his standing was still imperiled by his appearance as counsel to then presidential candidate Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the 2004 election protest filed by her opponent before the PET. A constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. That appearance would have been the first opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the PET’s constitution. Instead, petitioner ubiquitously entered his appearance before the PET and acknowledged its jurisdiction. His failure to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his unconditional acceptance of the PET’s authority, meant that he did not meet the third condition and therefore has no standing to file the petition. Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010.

Constitutionality; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Creation. Petitioner here claimed that the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) is unconstitutional as it violates Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.” He contends that the provision, as worded, does not authorize the constitution of the PET. The Court said that, while the above provision does not specify the establishment of the PET, neither does it preclude, much less prohibit, the same. The Court further said that its constitutional mandate to act as sole judge of election contests involving the President or Vice-President, and its rule-making authority in connection therewith (granted by the provision of Section 4 that the Court “may promulgate its rules for the purpose”), are not restricted but include all necessary powers implicit in the exercise of such mandate and authority. These powers are plenary and the authority of the Court to decide presidential and vice-presidential election contests through the PET are derived from the unequivocal grant of jurisdiction under Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the creation of the PET implements Section 4 and faithfully complies with the constitutional directive. The discussions of the Constitutional Commission clearly support the foregoing conclusion. Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010.

Constitutionality; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Exercise of Quasi-Judicial Function. The Court here rejected petitioner’s claim that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) exercises quasi-judicial functions contrary to Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which states that “The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.” The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.” Consistent with the presidential system of government, the function of “dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable” is apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” Judicial power was thus expanded, but it remained absolute. The Court held that set up embodied in the 1987 Constitution characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as the PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. The present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010. Eminent Domain; Interest. If property is taken for public use before compensation is paid or deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interest on its just value to be computed from the time the property was taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interest accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) that he was in before the taking occurred. As in previous cases, the Supreme Court affirmed the award of 12% interest on just compensation payable to the landowner. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Esther Anson Rivera, et al., G.R. No. 182431, November 17, 2010.

Administrative Law

Due Process; Administrative Due Process. Petitioners here assailed the credibility of a witness’s statement because it was not made under oath and he was not presented as witness during the hearing. The Court rejected this claim. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. In administrative proceedings, due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The measure of due process to be observed by administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not compromised. Irene K. Nacu, etc. vs. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 187752, November 23, 2010. Other Laws

Land Bank of the Philippines; Costs of Suit. Since Land Bank of the Philippines is performing a governmental function in agrarian reform proceedings, it is exempt from the payment of costs of suit under Rule 142, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which provides that “No costs shall be allowed against the Republic of the Philippines, unless otherwise provided by law.” Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Esther Anson Rivera, et al., G.R. No. 182431, November 17, 2010

DECEMBER 2010 CASES

Emancipation patent; issuance. Following are the steps in transferring land to a tenant-tiller under Presidential Decree No. 27: (a) identification of tenant, landowner, and the land covered; (b) land survey and sketching of portion actually cultivated by the tenant to determine parcel size, boundaries, and possible land use; (c) issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer; (d) valuation of the land for purposes of computing the amortization; (e) amortization payments of the tenant-tiller over a 15-year period; and (f) issuance of Emancipation Patent. In this case, there is no evidence that these steps were followed. There are several supporting documents that the tenant-farmer must submit before he can receive the Emancipation Patent. The Supreme Court found that majority of these supporting documents is lacking. Hence, it was improper for the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board to order the issuance of the Emancipation Patent in favor of respondent. There was also no sufficient evidence to prove that respondent has fully paid the value of the land. Full payment of just compensation is required prior to issuance of Emancipation Patents. Renato Reyes, represented by Ramon Reyes vs Leopoldo Barrios, G.R. No. 172841, December 15, 2010. Equal protection clause; concept. The Court here struck down Executive Order No. 1 (which created the Truth Commission) for violating the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the Truth Commission is to investigate and find out the truth “concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration” only. The intent to single out the previous administration was plain, patent and manifest. According to the Court, the Arroyo administration is a member of a class, that is, the class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include in the Commission’s mandate past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness, which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Although Section 17 gives the President discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the Commission so as to include acts of graft and corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee that they would be covered in the future. This expanded mandate of the Commission will still depend on the discretion of the President. If he decides not to include them, the provision would be meaningless. Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 19303, December 7, 2010.

Judicial review; requisites. Judicial review requires the following: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the act or issuance; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very subject matter of the case. As to standing, the Court here held that petitioners, who are legislators, met the requirement as they are questioning the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 creating the Truth Commission on the basis that the latter’s mandate constitutes usurpation of the power of the Congress. However, with regard to the petitioner who is questioning EO No. 1 as a taxpayer, the Court held that he had no standing since he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of that EO. The Court took cognizance of the case as the matter involved was of transcendental importance. Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 19303, December 7, 2010. President; creation of Truth Commission; power to reorganize. The creation of the Truth Commission does not fall within the President’s power to reorganize. Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code contemplates “reorganization” as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other department or agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency or vice versa. This provision, according to the Court, refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These refer to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 19303, December 7, 2010.

President; creation of Truth Commission; power of control. The creation of the Commission is not justified by the President’s power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or the Executive’s inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws. Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 19303, December 7, 2010.

President; creation of Truth Commission; power to conduct investigations. The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws – in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof. One of the recognized powers of the President is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed or guide the President in performing his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of laws. Contrary to petitioners’ apprehension, the Truth Commission will not supplant the Ombudsman or the Department of Justice or erode their respective powers. The investigative function of the Commission will complement those of the two offices. The recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the Commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation. The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, is certainly not a function given to the Commission. Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 19303, December 7, 2010. Tenancy relationship; elements. For purposes of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, there is tenancy relationship between parties if the following elements concur: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. All the foregoing requisites must be proved by substantial evidence. In this case, the continued stay of the purported tenant in the premises of the company was the result of an amicable settlement in a labor dispute and not because there was a landlord-tenant relationship. The fact that the stay was free of charge only proves the absence of such a relationship. Even assuming that the employer was receiving a share of the produce, the fact of receipt, without an agreed system of sharing, does not ipso facto create a tenancy. There was no evidence to indicate that the parties agreed to any system of sharing. The employee’s activities in the property cannot be classified as one for agricultural production. There was no record showed that he was engaged in any planting or other agricultural activity. Heirs of Jose Barredo, namely, Lolita Barredo, et al. vs. Lavoiser Besañes, G.R. No. 164695, December 13, 2010. Warrantless arrest. The Supreme Court here found that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused, as (a) the evidence against them is inadmissible and (b) granting the same to be admissible, the chain of custody has not been duly established. The police went to the house of one of the accused based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot session was going on. Sole reliance on such a tip does not constitute probable cause. The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the identity and address of one of the accused had earlier been ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause, a search warrant should have been secured prior to effecting the arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal, the ensuing search is likewise illegal. The items seized during the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible. People of the Philippines vs. Arnold Martinez y Angeles, et al., G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010.

JANUARY 2011 CASES

Constitutional Law

Bill of Rights; Rights under custodial investigation. As found by the Court of Appeals, (1) there is no evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on the person of Nagares; (2) Nagares did not complain to the officers administering the oath during the taking of his sworn statement; (3) he did not file any criminal or administrative complaint against his alleged malefactors for maltreatment; (4) no marks of violence were observed on his body; and (5) he did not have himself examined by a physician to support his claim. Moreover, appellant’s confession is replete with details, which, according to the SC, made it highly improbable that it was not voluntarily given. Further, the records show that Nagares was duly assisted by an effective and independent counsel during the custodial investigation in the NBI. As found by the Court of Appeals, after Nagares was informed of his constitutional rights, he was asked by Atty. Esmeralda E. Galang whether he accepts her as counsel. During the trial, Atty. Galang testified on the extent of her assistance. According to her, she thoroughly explained to Nagares his constitutional rights, advised him not to answer matters he did not know, and if he did not want to answer any question, he may inform Atty. Galang who would be the one to relay his refusal to the NBI agents. She was also present during the entire investigation. Thus, the SC held that there was no duress or violence imposed on the person of Nagares during the custodial investigation and that Nagares was duly assisted by an independent counsel during such investigation in the NBI. People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Capitle and Arutor Nagares, G.R. No. 175330, January 12, 2010. Bill of Rights; Double jeopardy. As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double jeopardy. On occasions, however, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65. Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he was not able to bring his pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions. Complainant Vizconde cited the decision in Galman v. Sandiganbayan as authority that the Court can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the present case. But the Court observed that the government proved in Galman that the prosecution was deprived of due process since the judgment of acquittal in that case was “dictated, coerced and scripted.” It was a sham trial. In this case, however, Vizconde does not allege that the Court held a sham review of the decision of the CA. He has made out no case that the Court held a phony deliberation such that the seven Justices who voted to acquit the accused, the four who dissented, and the four who inhibited themselves did not really go through the process. Antonio Lejano vs. People of the Philippines / People of the Philippines vs. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et al., G.R. No. 176389/G.R. No. 176864. January 18, 2011. Bill of Rights; Unreasonable searches and seizures. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the “plain view” of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. In this case, the SC found that the seizure of the two receivers of the .45 caliber pistol outside petitioner’s house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine. First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the house and of the other law enforcers around the premises was justified by the fact that petitioner and Valerio were earlier seen respectively holding .45 caliber pistols before they ran inside the structure and sought refuge. The attendant circumstances and the evasive actions of petitioner and Valerio when the law enforcers arrived engendered a reasonable ground for the latter to believe that a crime was being committed. Secondly, from where he was situated, SPO2 Nava clearly saw, on two different instances, Valerio emerge on top of the subject dwelling and throw suspicious objects. Lastly, considering the earlier sighting of Valerio holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had reasonable ground to believe that the things thrown might be contraband items, or evidence of the offense they were then suspected of committing. The ensuing recovery of the receivers may have been deliberate; nonetheless, their initial discovery was indubitably inadvertent. It is not crucial that at initial sighting the seized contraband be identified and known to be so. The law merely requires that the law enforcer observes that the seized item may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. Hence, the two receivers were admissible as evidence. Elenita C. Fajardo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2010. Bill of rights; Unreasonable searches and seizures. In this case, there was a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto. The following are the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants: (1) the police officers received information from an operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused-appellants loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300 van. The crime was committed in the presence of the police officers with the contraband, inside transparent plastic containers, in plain view and duly observed by the arresting officers. Furthermore, accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their objections to

their arrest for not raising the issue before entering their plea. People of the Philippines vs. Ng Yik bun, et al., G.R. No. 180452. January 10, 2010. Constitutionality; Lis mota. The SC observed that the issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 (Philippine National Red Cross charter) was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the previous decision of the SC; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. The SC reminded that it will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. A court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties. Under this rule, the SC held that it should not have declared void certain sections of R.A. No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on the matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Dante V. Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011. Congress; Creation of private corporations. The SC observed that the purpose of the constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations was to prevent the granting of special privileges to certain individuals, families, or groups, which were denied to other groups. The SC found the Philippine National Red Cross Charter is not covered by the constitutional provision, as it does not grant special privileges to a particular individual, family, or group, but creates an entity that strives to serve the common good. Dante V. Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011.

Eminent domain; Just compensation. It is the nature and character of the land at the time of its taking that is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner. Prior to the NPC’s introduction of improvements in the area where the subject parcel of land is located, the properties therein, including the disputed lot, remained agricultural and residential. The SC found that it was only upon entry of the NPC in Barangay San Roque, and after constructing buildings and other facilities and bringing in various equipment for its multi-purpose project, that the lands in the said locality were later classified as commercial or industrial. Moises Tinio, Jr. and Francis Tinio vs. National Power Corporation/National Power Corporation vs. Moises Tinio, Jr. and Francis Tinio, G.R. No. 160923/G.R. No. 161093, January 24, 2011. Government contracts; Payment based on quantum meruit for illegal contracts. The government project involved in this case, the construction of a dike, was completed way back on 9 July 1992. For almost two decades, the public and the government benefitted from the work done by respondent. According to the SC, public interest and equity dictate that the contractor should be compensated for services rendered and work done. To deny the payment to the contractor would be to allow the government to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another. Justice and equity demand compensation on the basis of quantum meruit. Gregorio R. Vigilar, et al. vs. Arnulfo D. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011. Philippine National Red Cross; Status. The SC found merit in Philippine National Red Cross’s contention that its structure is sui generis. National Societies such as the PNRC act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian field and provide a range of services including disaster relief and health and social programmes. National societies were held to be organizations that are directly regulated by international humanitarian law, in contrast to other ordinary private entities, including NGOs. The auxiliary status of a Red Cross Society means that it is at one and the same time a private institution and a public service organization because the very nature of its work implies cooperation with the authorities, a link with the State. The SC further noted that the creation of the PNRC was a result of the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention which has the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither “be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality” as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State. Dante V. Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011.

State; Immunity from suit.

The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. It would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable to defeat respondent’s right to be duly compensated for actual work performed and services rendered, where both the government and the public have for years received and accepted benefits from the project and reaped the fruits of respondent’s honest toil and labor. The rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. Gregorio R. Vigilar, et al. vs. Arnulfo D. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011.

Agrarian Law Agrarian reform; Coverage. The main issue for resolution by the Court is whether the Lopez and Limot lands of SNLABC can be considered grazing lands for its livestock business and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Court declared unconstitutional the CARL provisions that included lands devoted to livestock under the coverage of the CARP. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word “agricultural” showed that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include the livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the government. Thus, lands devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, and thus exempt from agrarian reform. In the instant case, the MARO in its ocular inspection found on the Lopez lands several heads of cattle, carabaos, horses, goats and pigs. There were likewise structures on the Lopez lands used for its livestock business. Hence, the Court found that the Lopez lands were in fact actually, directly and exclusively being used as industrial lands for livestock-raising. The Court affirmed the findings of the DAR Regional Director and the Court of Appeals that the Lopez lands were actually, directly and exclusively being used for SNLABC’s livestock business and, thus, are exempt from CARP coverage. In contrast, however, the Limot lands were found to be agricultural lands devoted to coconut trees and rubber and as such, are thus not subject to exemption from CARP coverage. Republic of the Philippines, rep. by Dept. Agrarian Reform vs. Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corp./Agri-Business Corp. vs. Dept. Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 178895, January 10, 2011.

Administrative Law

Administrative remedies; Exhaustion. Respondent in this case filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against petitioners since, according to him, a large amount of money was still due him under the “Contract of Agreement” involving the construction of a dike, executed between him and petitioners. On the other hand, petitioners aver that respondent should have first filed a claim before the Commission on Audit (COA) before going to the courts. The SC held that there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. The exceptions to these rules are the following: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings. In the present case, the SC found conditions (c) and (e) as present. The government project contracted out to respondent was completed almost two decades ago. To delay the proceedings by remanding the case to the relevant government office or agency will definitely prejudice respondent. More importantly, the issues in the present case involved the validity and the enforceability of the “Contract of Agreement” entered into by the parties. These, according to the SC, are questions purely of law and clearly beyond the expertise of the Commission on Audit or the DPWH. Gregorio R. Vigilar, et al. vs. Arnulfo D. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011. Career Executive Service; Coverage. The Career Executive Service covers presidential appointees only. Corollarily, as the position of Department Manager II of the PEZA does not require appointment by the President of the Philippines, it does not fall under the CES. The Third Level of Career Service covers only the positions in the CES as enumerated in the Administrative Code of 1987 and those identified by

the Career Executive Service Board as of equivalent rank, all of whom are appointed by the President of the Philippines. Modesto Agyao, Jr. vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 182591. January 18, 2011.

Election Law

Candidate; Disqualification. A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate. Apart from the qualifications provided for in the Constitution, the power to prescribe additional qualifications for elective office and grounds for disqualification therefrom, consistent with the constitutional provisions, is vested in Congress. However, laws prescribing qualifications for and disqualifications from office are liberally construed in favor of eligibility since the privilege of holding an office is a valuable one. Sergio G. Amora, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Arnielo S. Olandria, G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011. Certificate of Candidacy; Requirement of being sworn. According to the SC, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandria’s claim that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification. This was held not to be a ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 40 of the Local Government Code. Nowhere therein does it specify that a defective notarization is a ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Sergio G. Amora, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Arnielo S. Olandria, G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011.

Local Government Code

Local government officials; Suspension pending appeal. Respondent Barriga was held administratively liable by the Office of the Ombudsman as a result of anomalous transactions pertaining to the handling of the trust fund of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu in the Central Visayas Water and Sanitation Project. This decision was appealed to the CA but was not implemented immediately. According to the SC, it is clear from Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, that when a public official has been found guilty of an administrative charge by the Office of the Ombudsman and the penalty imposed is suspension for more than a month, just like in the present case, an appeal may be made to the CA. However, such appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory and the implementation of the decision follows as a matter of course. The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman is clear that an appeal by a public official from a decision meted out by the Ombudsman shall not stop the decision from being executory. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals and Dinah C. Barriga, G.R. No. 172224, January 26, 2011.

February 2011 CASES Constitutional Law Administrative cases; right to be presumed innocent.

The trial court was correct in declaring that respondents had the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. This means that an employee who has a pending administrative case filed against him is given the benefit of the doubt and is considered innocent until the contrary is proven. In this case, respondents were placed under preventive suspension for 90 days from 23 May 2002 to 21 August 2002. After serving the period of their preventive suspension and without the administrative case being finally resolved, respondents should have been reinstated and entitled to the grant of step increment. The Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System, et al. v. Albert M. Velasco, et al. G.R. No. 170463, February 2, 2011. Equal Protection; valid classification. Petitioners argue that there is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills, such that the mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The SC held that the purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009 was merely to stop the “mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities” and the apprehension that before long the country will be a country of cities and without municipalities. It found that the imposition of the P100 million average annual income requirement for the creation of component cities was arbitrarily made as there was no evidence or empirical data, such as inflation rates, to support the choice of this amount. The imposition of a very high income requirement of P100 million, increased from P20 million, was simply to make it extremely difficult for municipalities to become component cities. The SC also found that substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present. League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, February 15, 2011. Expropriation; abandonment of public purpose. In this case, the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by the government, i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug Airport. In fact, the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. Also, in this case, it was preponderantly established by evidence that the National Airport Corporation, MCIAA’s predecessor, through its team of negotiators, had given assurance to the affected landowners that they would be entitled to repurchase their respective lots in the event they are no longer used for airport purposes. The SC held that the government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties. This means that in the event the particular public use for which a parcel of land is expropriated is abandoned, the owner shall not be entitled to recover or repurchase it as a matter of right, unless such recovery or repurchase is expressed in or irresistibly deducible from the condemnation judgment. The SC held that the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 enjoined MCIAA, as a condition of approving expropriation, to allow recovery or repurchase upon abandonment of the Lahug airport project. In effect, the government merely held the properties condemned in trust until the proposed public use or purpose for which the lots were condemned was actually consummated by the government. Since the government failed to perform the obligation that is the basis of the transfer of the property, then the lot owners can demand the reconveyance of their old properties after the payment of the condemnation price. A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines, et al./Mactan-Cebu International Airport [MCIAA] v. Ricardo L. Inocian, in his personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Olympia E. Esteves, et al. and Aletha Suico Magat in her personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Philip M. Suico, et al. G.R. Nos. 168770 & 168812, February 9, 2011. Expropriation; reconveyance of expropriated property. In accordance with Art. 1187 of the Civil Code on mutual compensation, MCIAA may keep whatever income or fruits it may have obtained from the parcels of land expropriated. In turn, the landowners need not require the accounting of interests earned by the amounts they received as just compensation. Following Art. 1189 of the Civil Code providing that if the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor, the landowners do not have to settle the appreciation of the values of their respective lots as part of the reconveyance process, since the value increase is merely the natural effect of nature and time. Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines, et al./MactanCebu International Airport [MCIAA] v. Ricardo L. Inocian, in his personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Olympia E. Esteves, et al. and Aletha Suico Magat in her personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Philip M. Suico, et al. G.R. Nos. 168770 & 168812, February 9, 2011. Impeachment; narration of facts.

Petitioner urged the Court to look into the narration of facts constituting the offenses vis-à-vis her submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints. The SC denied this as that would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question, which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.

Impeachment; publication requirement. Petitioner contended that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacked her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that “Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” While “promulgation” would seem synonymous to “publication,” there is a statutory difference in their usage. Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understood, that is, to make known. What is generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between the restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used. Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict “promulgation” to “publication,” the former should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. It is not for the Supreme Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The SC observed that it is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution. Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so as categorically as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries. Even assuming that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectiveness of the Impeachment Rules, which faithfully comply with the relevant selfexecuting provisions of the Constitution. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011. Impeachment; One-Year Bar Rule. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.” Petitioner reckoned the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posited that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the SC found that the previous case of Francisco v. House of Representatives was applicable to this case. There the SC held that the term “initiate” means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchstick light the candle at the same time. According to the SC, what is important is that there should only be one candle that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011. Impeachment; sufficiency of form and substance. Petitioner claimed that Congress failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints on the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules. The SC found this claim to be untenable. The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of Representatives which committed such determinative function to public respondent. Contrary to petitioner’s position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible standards in determining the sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a “verified complaint or resolution,” and that the substance requirement is met if there is “a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.” Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution basically merely requires a “hearing.” Prudential considerations behooved the Supreme Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011. Internal Revenue Allotment; just share.

Congress, who holds the power of the purse, in enacting the Cityhood Laws, only sought the well-being of respondent municipalities, having seen their respective capacities to become component cities of their provinces, temporarily stunted by the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. By allowing respondent municipalities to convert into component cities, Congress desired only to uphold the very purpose of the LGC, i.e., to make the local government units “enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals,” which is the very mandate of the Constitution. League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, February 15, 2011. International Agreements; limitations on sovereignty. The RP, by entering into the Agreement, does thereby abdicate its sovereignty, abdication being done by its waiving or abandoning its right to seek recourse through the Rome Statute of the ICC for erring Americans committing international crimes in the country. As it were, the Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirmation of the Philippines’ national criminal jurisdiction. National criminal jurisdiction being primary, it is always the responsibility and within the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide to try “persons” of the US, as the term is understood in the Agreement, under our national criminal justice system; or it may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US “persons” committing high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them. In the same breath, the US must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with respect to “persons” of the RP committing high crimes within US territorial jurisdiction. By their nature, treaties and international agreements actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and absolute jurisdiction. The usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the other. Bayan Muna, as represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011. International Agreements; treaties and executive agreements. Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. However, a treaty has greater “dignity” than an executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment. Petitioner, in this case, argues that the Non-Surrender Agreement between the Philippines and the US is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must be duly concurred in by the Senate. Petitioner relies on the case, Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, in which the Court stated: international agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties; while those embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executive agreements. According to petitioner, the subject of the Agreement does not fall under any of the subject-categories that are enumerated in the Eastern Sea Trading case that may be covered by an executive agreement, such as commercial/consular relations, most-favored nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and settlement of claims. The Supreme Court held, however, that the categorization of subject matters that may be covered by international agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone. There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or an executive agreement as an instrument of international relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties’ intent and desire to craft an international agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests. The matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the parties in either international agreement each labor under the pacta sunt servanda principle. Bayan Muna, as represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011. Judicial Review; expanded certiorari jurisdiction . Respondents raised the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argued that public respondent (the Congress) was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature, and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation. The case of Francisco v. House of Representatives characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court reflects, includes the power to “determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” The SC found it well-within its power to determine whether Congress committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.

Judicial Review; ripeness. An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of ripeness. The question of ripeness is especially relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by the challenged conduct. In the present petition, the SC found no doubt that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation. The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner was, therefore, found not to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011. Legal Standing; requirements. When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. In this case, as citizens, petitioners’ interest in the subject matter of the petition is direct and personal. At the very least, their assertions questioning the Non-Surrender Agreement between the Philippines and the US are made of a public right, i.e., to ascertain that the Agreement did not go against established national policies, practices, and obligations bearing on the State’s obligation to the community of nations. Bayan Muna, as represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011. Stare Decisis; nature. The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by the Supreme Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. The previous case of Lubrica and the present case involve two different issues. The relief prayed for in the previous case of Lubrica is that the amount for deposit in favor of the landowner be determined on the basis of the time of payment and not of the time of taking. But in the present case, the prayer of the LBP is for the deposit of the valuation of the Land Bank of the Philippines and Department of Agrarian Reform and not that of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator. The principle of stare decisis, therefore, does not apply. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan, Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and Josefina S. Lubrica, in her capacity as Assignee of Federico Suntay, et al., G.R. No. 177190, February 23, 2011.

Sovereign Immunity; expropriation. The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property. The SC cited the previous case of De los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court where it ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a citizen. In exercising the right of eminent domain, the State exercised its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights, or jus gestionis; yet, even in that area, where private property had been taken in expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit could not be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owners. Air Transportation Office v. Spouses David and Elisea Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011. Sovereign Immunity; sovereign function and proprietary function. The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a sovereign, can do no wrong. Practical considerations dictate the establishment of immunity from suit in favor of the State. Otherwise, and the State is suable at the instance of every other individual, government service may be severely obstructed and public safety endangered because of the number of suits that the State has to defend against. An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose

function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business. In this case, the juridical character of the Air Transportation Office (“ATO”) as an agency of the Government was not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit. Air Transportation Office v. Spouses David and Elisea Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011. Supreme Court; modification of doctrines and principles. The doctrine of immutability of decisions applies only to final and executory decisions. Since the present cases may involve a modification or reversal of a Court-ordained doctrine or principle, the judgment rendered by the Special Third Division may be considered unconstitutional, hence, it can never become final. A decision rendered by a Division of the SC in violation of the constitutional provision, that only the SC En Banc may modify or reverse a SC doctrine and principle, would be in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid. Any entry of judgment may thus be said to be “inefficacious” since the decision is void for being unconstitutional. That a judgment must become final at some definite point at the risk of occasional error cannot be appreciated in a case that embroils not only a general allegation of “occasional error” but also a serious accusation of a violation of the Constitution, viz., that doctrines or principles of law were modified or reversed by the Court’s Special Third Division August 4, 2009 Resolution. David Lu v. Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et al./Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et al. v. David Lu/John Lu Ym, et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals of Ceby City, et al. G.R. No. 153690/G.R. No. 157381/G.R. No. 170889. February 15, 2011. Administrative Law Administrative Proceedings; findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies. Petitioners argue that the Commission on Audit (COA) committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in declaring the prepayment stipulation in the contract between Land Bank and Remad Livestock Corporation (REMAD) proscribed by the State Audit Code of the Philippines. The Supreme Court did not give merit to petitioner’s argument. It emphasized that the COA Auditor noted that “nowhere in the documents reviewed disclosed about prepayment scheme with REMAD.” It is well settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their jurisdiction. If the prepayment scheme was in fact authorized, petitioners should have produced the document to prove such fact as alleged by them in the present petition. However, the Supreme Court was at a loss as to whether the prepayment scheme was authorized as its review of “Annex I,” the document to which petitioners base their authority to make advance payments, does not contain such a stipulation or provision. In addition, the Supreme Court noted that much reliance was made by petitioners on their allegation that the terms of the Credit Facility Proposal allowed for prepayments or advancement of the payments prior to the delivery of the cattle by the supplier REMAD. It appears, however, that a CFP, even if admittedly a pro forma contract and emanating from the Land Bank main office, is merely a facility proposal and not the contract of loan between Land Bank and the cooperatives. It is in the loan contract that the parties embody the terms and conditions of a transaction. If there is any agreement to release the loan in advance to REMAD as a form of prepayment scheme, such a stipulation should exist in the loan contract. There is, nevertheless, no proof of such stipulation as petitioners had failed to attach the CFPs or the loan contracts relating to the present petition. Based on the foregoing, the COA was not faulted for finding that petitioners facilitated the commission of the irregular transaction. Ruben Reyna, et al. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 167219, February 8, 2011. Agrarian Law Agrarian Reform; exclusion and exemption from coverage. The deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Petitioner’s admission that, since 2001, it leased another ranch for its own livestock is fatal to its cause. The SC, in this case, accorded respect to the CA’s observation that the assailed MARO reports and the Investigating Team’s Report do not actually contradict one another, finding that the 43 cows, while owned by petitioner, were actually pastured outside the subject property. Milestone Farms, Inc. v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 182332, February 23, 2011.

Agrarian Reform; just compensation. The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that RA 6657, rather than P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, is the law that should apply in the determination of just compensation for the subject agricultural land. The LBP and the DAR argue that P.D. No. 27, as reaffirmed by E.O. No. 228, should be applied in determining the just compensation for the

subject property of the case. They contend that P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 prescribe the formula in determining the just compensation of rice and corn lands tenanted as of October 21, 1972. As the subject property was tenanted and devoted to rice production in 1972, the just value should be fixed at the prevailing rate at that time, when the emancipation of the tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil was declared in P.D. No. 27. As to R.A. No. 6657, both the LBP and the DAR insist that it applies only to ricelands and cornlands not tenanted as of October 21, 1972. According to them, the government’s OLT program on tenanted privately-owned rice and corn lands pursuant to P.D. No. 27 continues separately and distinctly from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) acquisition and distribution program under R.A. No. 6657. The SC held that RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect. This is so since the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 are also applicable to the agrarian reform process of lands placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, which has not been completed upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657. It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR’s failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Magin V. Ferrer, et al./Department of Agrarian Reform, represented by Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman v. Antonio V. Ferrer and Ramon V. Ferrer. G.R. No. 172230, February 2, 2011. Agrarian Reform; initial valuation and just compensation. It is the initial valuation made by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Land Bank of the Philippines that must be released to the landowner in order for DAR to take possession of the property. Otherwise stated, Sec. 16 of RA 6657 does not authorize the release of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator’s determination of just compensation for the land which has not yet become final and executory. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan, Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and Josefina S. Lubrica, in her capacity as Assignee of Federico Suntay, et al., G.R. No. 177190, February 23, 2011. Civil Service Law Regulations; Civil Service. Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP Law Center. Only those of general or of permanent character are to be filed. Resolution No. 372 was about the new GSIS salary structure, Resolution No. 306 was about the authority to pay the 2002 Christmas Package, and Resolution No. 197 was about the GSIS merit selection and promotion plan. Clearly, the assailed resolutions pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the personnel of the GSIS. There was no need for the publication or filing of these resolutions with the UP Law Center. The Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System, et al. v. Albert M. Velasco, et al. G.R. No. 170463, February 2, 2011.

Local Government Code

Cityhood; criteria for conversion. The cases involved here were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws. In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the SC En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause. Then, in another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the SC En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, declared the Cityhood Laws as constitutional. Thereafter, on August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, reinstated the November 18, 2008 Decision. The SC held that the Cityhood laws were constitutional. Based on the deliberations by Congress on R.A. No. 9009, Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress would not be covered by the new and higher income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. Notwithstanding that both the 11th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the pending cityhood bills, both the letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A. No. 9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress, when the Cityhood Laws were enacted. The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that intent to exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, February 15, 2011.

Legislative power; amendment. R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But the SC also held that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself. League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, February 15, 2011.

MARCH 2011 CASE

Constitutional Law COMELEC; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held in this case that despite recourse to it, it cannot rule on the issue of citizenship of petitioner Gonzalez. Subsequent events showed that Gonzalez had not only been duly proclaimed, he had also taken his oath of office and assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to the candidate’s election and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Fernando V. Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011. Equal Protection. The main issue in this case is whether or not PAGCOR is still exempt from corporate income tax and VAT with the enactment of R.A. No. 9337. The Supreme Court held that under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, petitioner is no longer exempt from corporate income tax as it has been effectively omitted from the list of GOCCs that are exempt from it. The burden of proof rests upon the party claiming exemption to prove that it is, in fact, covered by the exemption so claimed. In this case, PAGCOR failed to prove that it is still exempt from the payment of corporate income tax, considering that Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337 amended Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 by omitting PAGCOR from the exemption. PAGCOR cannot find support in the equal protection clause of the Constitution, as the legislative records of the Bicameral Conference Meeting dated October 27, 1997, of the Committee on Ways and Means, show that PAGCOR’s exemption from payment of corporate income tax, as provided in Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424, or the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, was not made pursuant to a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and the other requirements of a reasonable classification by legislative bodies, so that the law may operate only on some, and not all, without violating the equal protection clause. The legislative records show that the basis of the grant of exemption to PAGCOR from corporate income tax was PAGCOR’s own request to be exempted. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011. Impeachment; Initiation. The Supreme Court reiterated its previous ruling that the term “initiate” as used in Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action on said complaint. The initial action of the House of Representatives on the complaint is the referral of the same to the Committee on Justice. Ma. Merceditas C. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al., G.R. No. 193459, March 8, 2011. Impeachment; Promulgation of Rules. When the Constitution uses the word “promulgate,” it does not necessarily mean to publish in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Promulgation, as used in Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution, suitably takes the meaning of “to make known” as it should be generally understood. Ma. Merceditas C. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al., G.R. No. 193459, March 8, 2011. Non-impairment Clause.

Petitioner PAGCOR, in this case, states that the private parties/investors transacting with it considered the tax exemptions, which inure to their benefit, as the main consideration and inducement for their decision to transact/invest with it. Petitioner argues that the withdrawal of its exemption from corporate income tax by R.A. No. 9337 has the effect of changing the main consideration and inducement for the transactions of private parties with it; thus, the amendatory provision is violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. The SC held that a franchise partakes of the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, PAGCOR’s franchise is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress such as the amendment under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9377. Hence, the provision in Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424 by withdrawing the exemption of PAGCOR from corporate income tax, which may affect any benefits to PAGCOR’s transactions with private parties, is not violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011. Senate Ethics Committee; Due Process. This case refers to the ethics complaint filed against Sen. Manny Villar on the alleged double insertion of Php200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act. Petitioners allege that the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process. The SC did not agree. The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court. The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance of quorum, voting, and publication when required. As long as these requirements are complied with, according to the SC, the Court will not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011. Senate Ethics Committee; Equal Protection. Petitioners allege that the Senate Committee of the Whole was constituted solely for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction over the complaint against Senator Villar. Petitioners further allege that the act was discriminatory and removed Senator Villar’s recourse against any adverse report of the Ethics Committee to the Senate as a body. The SC did not agree with this. The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that “all matters relating to the conduct, rights, privileges, safety, dignity, integrity and reputation of the Senate and its Members shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges.” However, in this case, the refusal of the Minority to name its members to the Ethics Committee stalled the investigation. In short, while ordinarily an investigation about one of its members’ alleged irregular or unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. Even Senator Villar called the Ethics Committee a kangaroo court and declared that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. Given the circumstances, the referral of the investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the members of the Senate. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011. Senate; Publication of Rules Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. Respondent counters that publication is not necessary because the Senate Committee of the Whole merely adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee which had been published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009. Respondent alleges that there is only one set of Rules that governs both the Ethics Committee and the Senate Committee of the Whole. The SC held that the Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect. In this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. To comply with due process requirements, the Senate must follow its own internal rules if the rights of its own members are affected. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011. Senate; Quorum and Voting. If the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole, a majority of the Senate is required to constitute a quorum to do business pursuant to Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Otherwise, there will be a circumvention of this express provision of the Constitution on quorum requirement. Obviously, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole require modification to comply with requirements of quorum and voting which the Senate must have overlooked in this case. In any event, in case of conflict between the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole and the Constitution, the latter will of course prevail. . Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.

Unlawful Expenditure for being Excessive; Factors. Price is considered “excessive” if it is more than the 10% allowable price variance between the price paid for the item bought and the price of the same item per canvass of the auditor. In determining whether or not the price is excessive, the following factors may be considered: (a) supply and demand forces in the market; (b) government price quotations; (c) warranty of products or special features; (d) brand of products. In this case, the issue was whether the computer units bought by Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) from Tetra were overpriced. The records showed that while the respondents found nothing wrong per se with the criteria adopted by the CDA in the overall evaluation of the bids, the technical aspect was seriously questioned. The final technical evaluation report was apparently manipulated to favor Tetra, which offered a Korean-made brand as against Microcircuits which offered a US-made brand said to be more durable, at a lower price. The SC concluded that the price per item of the PC units, laptop and UPS were overpriced by almost 50%. This comparison was based on the initial purchase of 23 PC units with the bid price by Tetra of Php1,269,630.00 (23 PC units, 1 unit 386 Tower and 1 unit 386 Notebook) under Disbursement Voucher No. 01-92-12-2399. There was an additional (repeat) purchase of 21 PC units for Php929,649.00 (same price per item of Php44,269.00) and one unit UPS for Php86,000.00. The total contract price obtained by Tetra was Php2,285,279.00, of which COA disallowed the amount of Php881,819.00 representing the overprice per the auditor’s findings. Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. v. Guillermo N. Carague, et al., G.R. No. 157838, March 8, 2011. Unlawful Expenditure; Liability of Public Officers. The SC held the petitioner liable personally and solidarily for the disallowed amount of Php881,819.00. The doctrine of separate personality of a corporation finds no application because the Cooperative Development Authority is not a private entity but a government agency created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6939 in compliance with the provisions of Section 15, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, respondents satisfactorily established that petitioner acted in bad faith when he prevailed upon the Development Academy of the Philippines-Technical Evaluation Committee (DAP-TEC) to modify the initial result of the technical evaluation of the computers by imposing an irrelevant grading system that was intended to favor one of the bidders, after the bids had been opened. Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. v. Guillermo N. Carague, et al., G.R. No. 157838, March 8, 2011.

Administrative Law

Administrative Proceeding; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction. This case refers to the ethics complaint filed against Sen. Manny Villar on the alleged double insertion of Php200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act. Respondent avers that primary recourse of petitioners should have been to the Senate and that the Supreme Court must uphold the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches of the government. The SC held that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not for an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.

Agrarian Law Agrarian Reform; Qualifications of Beneficiary. DAR Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1990, enumerated the qualifications of a beneficiary: (1) Landless; (2) Filipino citizen; (3) Actual occupant/tiller who is at least 15 years of age or head of the family at the time of filing application; and (4) Has the willingness, ability and aptitude to cultivate and make the land productive. The SC found that petitioner Lebrudo does not qualify as a beneficiary because of (1) and (3). First, Lebrudo is not landless. According to the records, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Amelia Sangalang issued a certification dated 28 February 1996 attesting that Lebrudo was awarded by the DAR with a home lot consisting of an area of 236 square meters situated at Japtinchay Estate, Bo. Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite. Next, Lebrudo is not the actual occupant or tiller of the lot at the time of the filing of the application. Loyola and her family were the actual occupants of the lot at the time Loyola applied to be a beneficiary under the CARP. Julian S. Lebrudo and Reynaldo L. Lebrudo v. Remedios Loyola, G.R. No. 181370, March 9, 2011.

Agrarian Reform; Role of Land Bank of the Philippines. In this case, the issue was whether the Land Bank of the Philippines has the personality to file a petition for determination of just compensation before the Special Agrarian Court. The SC held that LBP did. The LBP is an agency created primarily to provide financial support in all phases of agrarian reform pursuant to Section 74 of RA 3844 or the Agricultural Reform Code and Section 64 of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. In the previous case of Heirs of Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad v. Land Bank of the Philippines, the SC held that LBP is not merely a nominal party in the determination of just compensation, but an indispensable participant in such proceedings. It is primarily responsible for the valuation and determination of compensation for all private lands. It has the discretion to approve or reject the land valuation and just compensation for a private agricultural land placed under the CARP. In case the LBP disagrees with the valuation of land and determination of just compensation by a party, the DAR, or even the courts, the LBP not only has the right, but the duty, to challenge the same, by appeal to the Court of Appeals or to this Court, if appropriate. Davao Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 181566 & 181570. March 9, 2011. Agrarian Reform; Sale or Conveyance of Land. It is clear from Section 27 of RA 6657 that lands awarded to beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) may not be sold, transferred or conveyed for a period of 10 years. The law enumerated four exceptions: (1) through hereditary succession; (2) to the government; (3) to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); or (4) to other qualified beneficiaries. In short, during the prohibitory 10-year period, any sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights is void, except as allowed by law, in order to prevent a circumvention of agrarian reform laws. In this case, petitioner Lebrudo insists that he is entitled to one-half portion of the lot awarded to Loyola under the CARP as payment for shouldering all the expenses for the transfer of the title of the lot from respondent Loyola’s mother, Cristina Hugo, to Loyola’s name. Lebrudo used the two Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Loyola alloting to him the one-half portion of the lot as basis for his claim. In other words, waiver of rights and interests over landholdings awarded by the government is invalid for being violative of agrarian reform laws. Julian S. Lebrudo and Reynaldo L. Lebrudo v. Remedios Loyola, G.R. No. 181370, March 9, 2011.

Election Law Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Disqualification of Candidate; Period for Filing Petition. Petitioner Fernando V. Gonzalez and private respondent Reno G. Lim both filed certificates of candidacy for the position of Representative of the 3rd congressional district of the Province of Albay in the May 10, 2010 elections. On March 30, 2010, a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy (COC) was filed by Stephen Bichara [SPA No. 10-074 (DC)] on the ground that Gonzalez is a Spanish national, being the legitimate child of a Spanish father and a Filipino mother, and that he failed to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625. The SC explained the difference between Cancellation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code and Disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC. A petition to cancel a candidate’s COC may be filed under Section 78 of the OEC exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required by law is false. On the other hand, a petition for disqualification of a candidate may also be filed pursuant to Section 68 for committing prohibited acts referred to in said section. As to the ground of false representation in the COC under Section 78, the Court in a previous case elaborated that the misrepresentation must be material, i.e. misrepresentation regarding age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status. In this case, the petition in SPA No. 10-074 (DC) based on the allegation that Gonzalez was not a natural-born Filipino which was filed before the elections is in the nature of a petition filed under Section 78. The recitals in the petition in said case, however, state that it was filed pursuant to Section 4 (b) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 and Section 68 of the OEC to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification. The COMELEC treated the petition as one filed both for disqualification and cancellation of COC, with the effect that Section 68, in relation to Section 3, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, is applicable insofar as determining the period for filing the petition. This Rule provides the prescriptive period of filing to be not later than the date of proclamation. On the other hand, the procedure for filing a petition for cancellation of COC is covered by Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides as the prescriptive period to be within five (5) days following the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy. Section 4(B) of Resolution No. 8696 represents another attempt to modify by a mere procedural rule the statutory period for filing a petition to cancel COC on the ground of false representation therein regarding a candidate’s qualifications. Section 4(B) of Resolution No. 8696 would supplant the prescribed period of filing of petition under Section 78 with that provided in Section 68 even if the latter provision does not at all cover the false representation regarding age, residence and citizenship which may be raised in a petition under Section 78. If the purpose behind this rule promulgated by the COMELEC – allowing a petition to cancel COC based on the candidate’s non-compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements for elective office, such as citizenship, to be filed even beyond the period provided in Section 78 – was simply to remedy a perceived “procedural gap” though not expressly stated in Resolution No. 8696, the Court, in a previous case, had already rejected such justification. Fernando V. Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011.