Political Law CMorales Cases

Political Law MERCURY GROUP OF COMPANIES, INC. v. HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND 541 SCRA 211 (2007), SECOND DIVISION, (Carpio Morales, J.) The law of the case doctrine cannot be adhered to when the same will result in an unjust decision. P.D. No. 1752, the ―Home Development Mutual Fund Law of 1980‖ created the Pag-IBIG Fund System. Under P.D. No. 1752, coverage of the Pag-IBIG Fund is mandatory for all employees covered by the SSS and the GSIS and their employers. The law provides, however, for a waiver or suspension from coverage or participation in the Fund. Upon the effectivity of the law in 1980 up to 1995, Mercury Drug and its subsidiaries were, on their application, annually granted waiver from coverage of the Fund because their Retirement or Provident Plan was superior to it. In 1995, the Board of Trustees of Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), issued Amendment to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742. Under the Amendment and the Guidelines, an employer with a provident/retirement and housing plan superior to that provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund is entitled to execution/waiver from Fund coverage. In 1996, HDMF had once again amended the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 1752, as amended, this time limiting waiver from Fund coverage only to ―distressed employers‖. Mercury then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare null and void the 1996 amendment to the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 1752, as amended. By Order, RTC dismissed Mercury‘s petition for certiorari on the ground that it failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and that HDMU‘s questioned amendment of the implementing rules was made in the exercise of its legislative/administrative, not judicial, function. The Court of Appeals affirmed HDMF‘s denial of Mercury‘s request applying the law of the case doctrine. ISSUE: Whether or not the waiver of Fund coverage of Mercury should be granted HELD: In affirming HDMF‘s denial of Mercury‘s request for waiver from Fund coverage for the year 1996, the appellate court harped on the law of the case doctrine. Thus it held that Mercury‘s application anew for waiver/exemption from Fund coverage is anchored on the decision of the Supreme Court in the China Bank case which declared as null and void Section 1 of Rule VII of the Amendments to the RRI of R.A. No. 7742, and HDMF Circular No. 124-B prescribing the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Applications for Waiver or Suspension of Fund coverage under P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742. It is in this view that Mercury contends that HDMF should have considered its application for waiver/exemption from the coverage of the Fund. On the other hand, HDMF invoked the doctrine of the law of the case pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 132416 in denying Mercury‘s application for waiver/exemption from the Fund coverage. The doctrine of the law of the case does not apply to the present case vis a vis the decision of this Court in G.R. No. 132416. The present case is not a subsequent proceeding of the same case – G.R. No. 132416. This is an entirely new one which was commenced by Mercury‘s filing of an original petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the Court of Appeals against HDMF.

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Even assuming arguendo that the present proceeding may be considered a subsequent proceeding of G.R. No. 132416, the doctrine of the law of the case just the same does not apply because the said case was not resolved on the merits. The Order of this Court denying Mercury‘s petition for review in G.R. No. 132416 found no reversible error in the Order of the RTC dismissing Mercury‘s case primarily on a procedural ground – failure to exhaust administrative remedies. At all events, the doctrine ―is merely a rule of procedure and does not go to the power of the court, and will not be adhered to where its application will result in an unjust decision.‖ To sustain HDMF‘s refusal to grant a waiver of Fund coverage to Mercury on the basis of amendments to implementing rules which had priorly been declared null and void by this Court would certainly be unjust. CORAZON C. BALBASTRO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI 556 SCRA 729 (2008), EN BANC, (Carpio Morales, J.) A defendant who deliberately failed to attend the preliminary conference deprives himself of the right to question alleged irregularities in the proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Commission on Audit conducted an investigation relative to the letter-complaint filed by the officers of the Iloilo City National High School (ICNHS) Teachers and Employees Association against petitioner Corazon Balbastro. COA discovered irregularities which Balbastro and Lydia Ocate, the Disbursing Officer of ICNHS, has probably committed. Based on said report, Ombudsman recommended upgrading of pending inquiry against Balbastro into criminal and administrative case. During the first preliminary conference, only Ocate and her counsel were present. On the second preliminary conference, Balbastro again failed to show up despite notice. The Ombudsman was thereafter prompted the Ombudsman to consider Balbastro's and her counsel's two consecutive absences as a waiver of her right to ask for a formal hearing and to present evidence on her behalf. Thereafter, the Ombudsman rendered a Decision finding Balbastro guilty of Grave Misconduct and imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties. Balbastro filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not Balbastro was denied due process and proceedings before the Ombudsman were attended by serious irregularities

HELD: Balbastro‘s only objection, as it turns out in her Reply, is that she was not able to respond to the charges specifically enough. Balbastro has no one to blame but herself, she having had ample time to do the same. Besides, if she really wanted to be more particularly informed of the charges against her, she should have attended the two preliminary conferences set by the Ombudsman, one of the purposes of which being to allow the parties to consider, inter alia, whether they "desire a formal investigation to determine the nature of the charge, stipulation of facts, a definition of the issues."

Political Law Balbastro goes on to claim the presence of the following irregularities in the proceedings before the Ombudsman: only one hearing was held, on December 19, 2001, where only Ocate testified; the case is bereft of any record containing the testimonies of complainant and its witnesses; the Ombudsman decided the case without even requiring the complainant and its witnesses to affirm and confirm their affidavits, if any were submitted, and testify on the unsworn and unsigned COA report which was furnished petitioner; and the members of the ICNHS Teachers and Employees Association who authored the letter-complaint were not presented during the formal investigation of the administrative case. Balbastro deprived herself of standing to raise these issues, however, for failing to show up for two consecutive times at the preliminary conference which thus constrained the Ombudsman to deem her to have waived her right "to ask for a formal hearing and present evidence" and led it to consider the case "for resolution based on the evidence on record as far as she is concerned." HENRY EDQUIBAN BARRERA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 438 SCRA 221 (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, unequivocally provides that the accused public official "shall be suspended from office" while the criminal prosecution is pending in court. Henry Barrera, the Mayor of the Municipality of Candelaria, Zambales was indicted before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. An administrative case was also filed against Barrera before the Office of the Ombudsman which recommended that he be faulted for abuse of authority and be penalized with suspension from office without pay for six (6) months. Barrera filed a motion but it was denied. He thus filed a petition for review of the Ombudsman decision before Court of Appeals which denied the same. The Sandiganbayan ordered Barrerra‘s preventive suspension for a period of ninety (90) days. ISSUE : Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in placing Henry Equiban Barrera under preventive suspension for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days HELD: Henry Barrera admits in his memorandum filed before the Supreme Court that upon his receipt of the resolution directing his preventive suspension, he started serving the same. The issue has thus been rendered moot and academic. Besides, the Sandiganbayan, by Decision dismissed Criminal Cases on the ground that the elements of the offense under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 were not established beyond reasonable doubt. At this juncture then, a determination of whether the preventive suspension under Section 13 of Rule 3019 is mandatory and automatic would not have any practical effect on the existing controversy. En passant, if the administrative case filed against Barrera has been terminated also in his favor, he may invoke Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019. It is Barrera‘s contention that Section 13, R.A. 3019 should not be taken in isolation but should be viewed in light of the rationale behind the suspension, the purpose being to prevent the officer or

Political Law employee from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with the records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. And, so Barrera maintains, since the prosecution failed to prove, if not substantially allege that he is abusing the prerogatives of the office, intimidating possible witnesses and/or tampering with documentary evidence during the pendency of the cases against him, the suspension order should not have been issued. It has been long settled, however, and it bears reiteration that Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, unequivocally provides that the accused public official "shall be suspended from office" while the criminal prosecution is pending in court. The rule on the matter is specific and categorical, leaving no room for interpretation. There are no ifs and buts about it. The court has neither the discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan so teaches. GABRIEL S. CASAL et al. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 509 SCRA 138 (2006), EN BANC, (Carpio Morales, J.) Failure of an officer to observe the issuances of the President and the directives of the Commission in Audit amounts to gross negligence. The National Museum granted an incentive award to its officials and employees pursuant to Provision No. 8 of its Employees Suggestions and Incentive Awards System (ESIAS) approved by the Civil Service Commission. The Resident Auditor of the Commission on Audit at the National Museum subsequently inquired from the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) on whether it granted authority to the National Museum to use its savings from its appropriation for personal services to pay the subject incentive award. The DBM, through a letter, informed the Resident Auditor that it had not received any request for such authorization from the National Museum. The Resident Auditor thus disallowed the incentive award through Notice of Disallowance for being violative of Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 268 and Section 2 of A.O. No. 29 and also for lack of the requisite authorization from the DBM. Gabriel Casal appealed the disallowance to the COA. The appeal was denied by COA. Casal. in his capacity as Executive Director of the National Museum, filed the instant petition which prays for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. ISSUES: Whether or not COA is at fault in ordering the officials and employees of the National Museum to refund the subject award or bonuses even the absence of any bad faith or malice on the part of the museum‘s workforce HELD: In a letter dated December 21, 1992 addressed to petitioner Casal, then CSC Chairman Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, replying to Casal‘s request for approval of the Museum‘s ESIAS, stated:

Political Law ―xxx This Commission, after a careful evaluation of the said ESIAS, hereby approves the same, provided that the grant of productivity incentive award under Section 9(e) (sic) thereof be made subject to the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office of the President in coordination with the CSC and the DBM on the matter, as embodied under Section 7 of the Administrative Order No. 268 dated February 21, 1992. xxx‖ The immediately quoted proviso, it bears emphasis, was annotated on the National Museum‘s ESIAS itself, just below the name and signature of Chairman Sto. Tomas signifying the CSC‘s approval of said document. When Casal and the approving officers authorized the subject award then, they disregarded a prohibition that was not only declared by the President through A.O. 268, but also brought to their attention by the CSC by a letter specifically addressed to Casal. The imprimatur given by the approving officers on such award certainly tended to give it a color of legality from the perspective of these employees. Being in good faith, they cannot, following Blaquera, be compelled to refund the benefits already granted to them. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT 482 SCRA 233 (2005), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) “Automatic release” of approved annual appropriations to Civil Service Commission, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. The total funds appropriated by General Appropriations Act of 2002 (GAA) for Civil Service Commission (CSC) was P285,660,790.44. CSC complains that the total funds released by Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30. CSC contends that the funds were intentionally withheld by DBM on the ground of their ―no report, no release‖ policy. Hence, CSC filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the DBM to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy. ISSUE: Whether or not DBM‘s policy, ―no report, no release‖ is constitutional HELD: DBM‘s act of withholding the subject funds from CSC due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared unconstitutional. The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides that the Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and that their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

Political Law The Court held in the case of, Batangas v. Romulo, ―automatic release‖ in Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is defined as ―an automatic manner; without thought or conscious intention.‖ Being ―automatic,‖ thus, connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. As such the LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the ―just share‖ accruing to them from the national coffers. By parity of construction, ―automatic release‖ of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. This conclusion is consistent with the Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a ―no report, no release‖ policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution. Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that the CSC may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place CSC and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO TESTON 545 SCRA 422 (2008), SECOND DIVISION, (Carpio Morales J.) Due process requires that a party be given opportunity to be heard and present evidence. By virtue of a Deed of Conditional Sale, Romeo Teston purchased, on installment basis, two (2) parcels of land situated in Masbate, Teston from Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Teston defaulted in the payment of his amortizations. Consequently, DBP rescinded their contract of conditional sale. DBP thereafter transferred the two (2) parcels of land to the government. It was subsequently found out that Teston had also voluntarily offered the two parcels of land for inclusion in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under the Voluntary Offer to Sell. Teston filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a Petition against DBP alleging that under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, Republic Act No. 6657, DBP‘s right to rescind the sale was extinguished by operation of law. The DARAB Regional Adjudicator dismissed Teston‘s petition on the ground that Teston has never been the owner of the land, hence could not have validly offered the property under the Voluntary Offer to Sell scheme. On appeal, the DARAB affirmed the Regional Adjudicators decision. The Court of Appeals modified the Trial Court‘s decision by ordering DBP to return to Teston the P1,000,000 downpayment paid by Teston without requiring the latter to present evidence. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in modifying DARAB‘s decision ordering DBP to return to Teston the P1,000,000 downpayment allegedly paid by Teston

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HELD: It is elementary that a judgment must conform to, and be supported by, both the pleadings and the evidence, and must be in accordance with the theory of the action on which the pleadings are framed and the case was tried. The judgment must be secudum allegata et probata. Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant. To require DBP to return the alleged P1,000,000 without first giving it an opportunity to present evidence would violate the Constitutional provision that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,or property without due process of law. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense.

AZUCENA B. DON, et al v. RAMON H. LACSA AS ERSTWHILE PUNONG BARANGAY OF BACOLOD, JUBAN, SORSOGON 529 SCRA 327 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) The phrase “final and executory” in the Local Government Code simply mean that administrative appeals will not prevent the enforcement of decisions.

Ramon H. Lacsa, then Punong Barangay of Bacolod, Juban, Sorsogon was charged with grave threats, oppression, grave misconduct, and abuse of authority by Azucena B. Don, et al. A Special Investigating Committee (SIC) was created by the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) to investigate. A resolution was passed by the SB for the preventive suspension of Lacsa. The mayor, acting on such resolution, imposed a two-month preventive suspension. The SIC subsequently submitted its report finding the allegations to be true. On the basis of such report, the SB issued another resolution providing therein the removal of Lacsa from office. The mayor thereafter appointed Florencio H. Lacsa to replace Ramon H. Lacsa. Consequently, Lacsa filed before the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon a Petition for Certiorari with application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Don, et al, along with the Sangguniang Bayan and Mayor Ma. Theresa Guab-Frugata.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lacsa has the right to appeal despite the ―final and executory‖ phrase provided for by the Local Government Code

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HELD: An appeal shall not prevent a decision from being final and executory. Lacsa shall be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event that he wins such appeal. In the event that the appeal results in exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and other such emoluments during the pendency of the appeal. Obviously, the said Code does not preclude the taking of an appeal. On the contrary, it specifically allows a party to appeal to the Office of the President. The [phrase] ―final and executory‖ x x x in Sections 67 and 68, respectively, of the Local Government Code, are not, as erroneously ruled by the trial court, indicative of the appropriate mode of relief from the decision of the Sanggunian concerned. These phrases simply mean that the administrative appeals will not prevent the enforcement of the decisions. The decision is immediately executory but the respondent may nevertheless appeal the adverse decision to the Office of the President or to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as the case may be. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, et al. v. HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, et al 594 SCRA 743 (2009), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) Issues involving the deprivation of a seat in the Commission on Appointments should be lodged before the respective Houses of Congress and not with the Supreme Court. The Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents to the Commission on Appointments (CA). In the second week of August 2007, Franklin Drilon et al. went to respondent then Speaker Jose de Venecia to ask for one seat for the Liberal Party in the CA. However, no report or recommendation was proffered by the Legal Department, drawing Representative Tañada to request a report or recommendation on the matter within three days. Hence spawned the filing by Drilon (in representation of the Liberal Party), et al., alleging that the liberal party with at least twenty (20) members who signed herein, is constitutionally entitled to one (1) seat in the CA. Meantime, Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal of PDP-Laban wrote a letter claiming that ―the Senate contingent in the CA violated the constitutional requirement of proportional representation‖. The Senator avers that political parties PMP and KAMPI were given more seats than they were entitled to in the CA and the political party PRP and other Independents cannot be represented in the CA. The CA, speaking through its Ex-Officio Chairman Manny Villar, advised Senator Madrigal that CA ―has neither the power nor the discretion to reject a member who is elected by either House, and that any complaints about the election of a member or members should be addressed to the body that elected them.‖ Villar further explained that instructions have been given to ―transmit the original copies of Senator Madrigal‘s letters to the Senate Secretary for their immediate inclusion in the Order of Business of the Session of the Senate.‖ Madrigal, not satisfied with the CA‘s action, filed a petition with the Supreme Court for prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction against Senator Villar as Senate President and Ex-Officio Chairman of the CA.

Political Law The Court consolidated the petitions filed by Drilon et al. and Madrigal et al.

ISSUES: Whether or not the petition before the Supreme Court is proper

HELD: The first petition, G.R. No. 180055, has thus indeed been rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal Party member of the House contingent to the CA, hence, as prayed for, the petition is withdrawn. As for the second petition, G.R. No. 183055, it fails. Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained direct injury as a result of the act complained of. Her petition does not in fact allege that she or her political party PDP-Laban was deprived of a seat in the CA, or that she or PDP-Laban possesses personal and substantial interest to confer on her/it locus standi. Senator Madrigal‘s primary recourse rests with the respective Houses of Congress and not with this Court. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates that prior recourse to the House is necessary before she may bring her petition to court. Senator Villar‘s invocation of said doctrine is thus well-taken.

YOLANDA O. ALFONSO v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION, 520 SCRA 64 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) The essence of due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side. Petitioner Yolanda O. Alfonso (Alfonso), then the register of deeds of Caloocan City, was found administratively liable for allegedly ―acquiescing‖ to the change of the date of the registration of OCT No. 994 from May 3, 1917 to April 19, 1917, and for making it appear that there were two OCT Nos. 994. Consequently, she was dismissed from government service for grave misconduct and dishonesty. Alfonso was investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA) upon the request of PhilVille Development Corporation (Phil-Ville) who purchased some parts of the land. Phil-Ville‘s lettercomplaint led to the conduct of an inquiry by the Senate Committees on Justice and Human Rights, and on Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement which finds that Alfonso acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith recommending the filing of administrative cases against her and her conspirators. On the other hand, LRA finds her guilty of Grave Misconduct and recommended her dismissal. The Office of the President subsequently dismissed Alfonso. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Alfonso. Hence, this petition contending that her right to due process was violated.

Political Law ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding decision of the Office of the President because Alfonso‘s right to due process was violated . Held: In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, this Court laid down the cardinal primary requirements of due process in administrative proceedings. Foremost of these requisites is the right to a hearing, including the right to present one‘s case and submit evidence in support thereof. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one‘s side or to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As aptly observed by the CA, Alfonso was given every opportunity to explain her side and to present evidence in her defense during the administrative investigation conducted by the LRA. Records sufficiently show that in compliance with the ―show-cause‖ letter of the LRA Administrator, she submitted her written explanation, and that during the pre-trial conferences, she presented documentary evidence. Likewise, the quantum of proof required in an administrative proceeding is only substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that the person indicted was responsible for the alleged wrongdoing or misconduct. In the case at bar, Alfonso stood charged not for changing the date of registration of OCT No. 994 but rather, she was indicted for acquiescing to the change by (1) issuing conflicting ―certifications‖ on the date of issuance of OCT No. 994; and (2) for making it appear that there were two OCT Nos. 994. Thus, her protestations that she had no hand in the alteration are unavailing. ―Serious misconduct,‖ as a valid cause for the dismissal of an employee, is improper or wrong conduct; the transgression of some established and definite rule of action; a forbidden act or dereliction of duty, which is willful and intentional neglect and not mere error in judgment. It must be grave and aggravated in character and not merely trivial or unimportant.. In addition, it must be directly related and/or connected to the performance of official duties. Without question, all of these requisites are present in this case. Alfonso is thus administratively liable for serious misconduct. HADJA NIDA B. ARADAIS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. 428 SCRA 277 (2004), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of an election by means available to it. Petitioner Hadja Nida B. Aradais (Aradais) and respondent Abdusali Asmadun (Asmadun) were mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Lugus, Sulu. After canvassing was completed, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (BOC) proclaimed Asmadun as the mayor-elect by virtue of a Certificate of Canvass (COC). Aradais was also proclaimed as mayor-elect by virtue of a second Certificate of Canvass which is the same as the first COC issued. Asmadun took his oath of office on May 19, 2001 and subsequently assumed office. Aradais on the other hand took his oath of office on June 23, 2001. However, the Regional Election Director of

Political Law Region IX advised that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) should recognize only one proclamation, that of Asmadun, and Aradais‘s proclamation was without any legal effect. This prompted Aradais to file before the COMELEC a Petition for the Annulment of Asmadun‘s proclamation. The COMELEC then created an Ad Hoc Committee to look into cases of double proclamations wherein it directed Aradais, Asmadun, three members of the BOC, the COMELEC Regional Director, and the Provincial Election Supervisor of Sulu to submit their respective position papers or memoranda and other pertinent documents, as well as affidavits of their witnesses. In its report, the Ad Hoc Committee made recommendations and proclaimed Asmadun as the mayor-elect. Concurring with the findings and recommendations, the COMELEC affirmed the proclamation. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its power and discretion when it delegated its constitutional duty to hear and decide pre-proclamation cases to a mere ad hoc committee HELD: The findings and recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee are merely advisory in nature and do not bind the COMELEC, especially in light of petitioner‘s failure to present any evidence that the COMELEC merely relied on said findings and recommendations and did not go over the records of the case to make its own assessment. Absent any evidence to the contrary then, the presumption of regular performance of an official duty stands. It bears emphasis that the COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of an election by means available to it. In the case at bar, it was well within the COMELEC‘s discretion to avail of the means it deemed effective, such as requiring the parties to present their side through position papers and memoranda and conducting a clarificatory hearing wherein the members of the BOC were required to shed light on the two proclamations made. Besides, it is a settled rule that the COMELEC‘s judgment cannot be overturned by this Court unless it is clearly tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Since the assailed resolution is supported by substantial evidence, it cannot be considered whimsical, capricious or arbitrary warranting the Court‘s power of review. ROSARIO V. ASTUDILLO and FILIPINA M. ORELLANA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 509 SCRA 302 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) Written incriminatory statements made not in the course of custodial investigation are admissible in a criminal case filed against the confessant. Rosario Astudillo and Filipina Orellana were hired by Western Marketing Corporation (Western), as salespersons, while Roberto Benitez and Flormarie Robel were hired as floor manager and service-in-charge/cashier-reliever, respectively. In the course of preparing the monthly sales report of the branch, the Branch Accountant noticed discrepancies in the monthly sales report. The case of the missing invoices and the shortage of cash sales collection were then reported to Western‘s branch manager Lily Chan Ong (Lily). In a subsequent meeting with Lily, Filipina admitted having brought home some appliances while Benitez made a written admission asking for apology.

Political Law In an inventory of stocks conducted at the branch office of Western, several other appliances were found missing. On the basis of the complaint of Western, Astudillo and Orellana were collectively charged with Qualified Theft, along with Flormarie Robel and Roberto Benitez. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Astudillo and Orellana guilty of Qualified Theft. The Court of Appeals affirmed affirmed the RTC‘s decision. Hence, this petitions for review on certiorari. ISSUES: Whether or not the employees‘ extra-judicial admissions taken before an employer in the course of an administrative inquiry are admissible in a criminal case filed against them HELD: It bears noting, however, that when the prosecution formally offered its evidence, petitioners failed to file any objection thereto including their extra-judicial admissions. At any rate, the Court answers the issue in the affirmative. The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any statement at the investigation; that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it would be absurd to reject his statements, whether at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and presenting them, his "Miranda rights" which, to repeat, are relevant in custodial investigations. The Court of Appeals did not thus err in pronouncing that Astudillo and Orellana were not under custodial investigation to call for the presence of counsel of their own choice, hence, their written incriminatory statements are admissible in evidence. Astudillo and Orellana at all events argue that their written statements were obtained through deceit, promise, trickery and scheme, they claiming that Lily dictated to them their contents. There is nothing on record, however, buttressing Astudillo and Orellana‘s claim other than their self-serving assertion. The presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience such that it is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved thus stands. BAGONG WEST KABULUSAN 1 NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC v. JUDGE ALBERTO L. LERMA 452 SCRA 26 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) In the absence of bad faith, malice and corrupt practices on the part of the judge, he cannot be made administratively liable thereof. CST Enterprises, Inc. (CST) filed before the Muntinlupa Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) thirty eight (38) complaints for ejectment against thirty nine (39) individual-defendants who were occupying lots located at West Kabulusan, Barangay Cupang Muntinlupa City. The MeTC rendered judgment in favor of CST and ordered the defendants to vacate the lots and surrender possession thereof to CST Enterprises but they refused to vacate the lots, hence MeTC directed to demolish their respective structures within 5 days from notice thereof. Petitoner Bagong West Kabulusan Neighborhood Association (Association), claiming to represent the underprivileged and homeless residents of the lot,

Political Law filed a complaint against MeTC sheriff Armando Camacho for ―Injunction with Very Urgent Petition for Issuance of Restraining Order to Preserve and Maintain the Status Quo‖. IThe Association‘s complaint for injuction was raffled to Judge Alberto Lerma who denied their prayer for TRO and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. They thereafter filed charges for gross violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, gross neglect of duty and gross ignorance of the law with manifest bias and partiality against Judge Lerma. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Lerma can be administratively held liable HELD: The charge that Judge Alberto Lerma exhibited gross ignorance with manifest bias and partiality remains unsubstantiated. Granting arguendo that Judge Lerma may have erred in not taking a more suitable course of action, given the circumstances surrounding the case, not to mention the palpable intent of the defendants to trifle with the judicial processes, lapse on his part can be seen as a mere error of judgement, of which he may not be held administratively liable in the absence of a showing of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. FELIX BAROT v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CITY BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF TANJAN CITY, et al. 404 SCRA 352 (2003), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) The COMELEC has the discretion to suspend its rules or any portion thereof in the interest of justice. Petitioner Felix Barot and private respondent Rolando Tabaloc were candidates for councilor of Tanjay City, Negros Oriental in the May 14, 2001 elections. The Board of Canvassers (BOC) proclaimed the winning candidates for mayor, vice-mayor, and ten councilors including Barot who was proclaimed the 10th. Then, BOC Chair Nochefranca requested the COMELEC En Banc for authority to correct the erroneous entries in the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates, and to proclaim Tabaloc in place of Barot. The COMELEC En Banc granted the request and annulled the proclamation of Barot. Hence, this petition. Barot contends that COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the petition for the same has been filed beyond the reglementary period.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC En Banc has jurisdiction acquired jurisdiction over the petition

HELD:

Political Law As to the claim that the petition was not filed within the reglementary period, it should be noted that the 5-day period to file a petition for correction may be done after proclamation as provided under paragraph (b), Section 5, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules. The petition may also be made before proclamation as provided in Section 34 of Resolution No. 3848 which furnishes instructions for the Municipal, City, District and Provincial Boards of Canvassers in connection with the May 14, 2001 national and local elections. At all events, Section 4, Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules provides that in the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all the matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission. The COMELEC thus has the discretion to suspend its rules or any portion thereof in the interest of justice such that even if the petition was filed 12 days after the proclamation, the COMELEC may, in the interest of justice, disregard the reglementary periods provided by the rules and resolve the matter filed before it. SAMSON B. BEDRUZ and EMMA C. LUNA v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, YOLANDA P. LIONGSON 484 SCRA 452 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) The omission of the trial court to state the factual and legal bases of its decision is not violative of the constitutional requirement if the same can be inferred from the discussion of the decision. Petitioners Tagaytay City Engineer Samson B. Bedruz and City Administrator Emma C. Luna were held administratively liable for violation of the Constitution, the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in manifesting arrogance, bias, abuse and crystal personal interest in connection with the issuance of a permit to fence a lot. Resolving in the affirmative, the Deputy Ombudsman fined them in an amount equivalent to One (1) Month Salary. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Ombudsman. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Appeals committed grave error and mistake in denying the petition for certiorari HELD: A review of the records of the case shows that the following factual findings of the Ombudsman, upon which its decision of May 8, 1999 was based, and which were cited by the appellate court in arriving at its assailed decision, are supported by the evidence on record. Clearly, the appellate court did not err in finding that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. As for Bedruz and Luna's complaint that the Ombudsman did not express in a clear manner the law on which its decision was based, thereby violating Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that ―[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,‖ the same fails.

Political Law A trial court‘s omission to specify the offense committed, or the specific provision of law violated, ―is not in derogation of the constitutional requirement that every decision must clearly and distinctly state the factual and legal bases for the conclusions reached by the trial court‖ as long as the legal basis can be inferred from the discussion in the decision. From the Ombudsman's decision, it can be gathered that Bedruz and Luna violated Sections 19 of R.A. No. 6770 (THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989) in relation to Section 4, paragraphs A(b) & (c) of R.A. No. 6713, as amended (THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES), requiring public officials and employees to ―perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill,‖ ―act with justness and sincerity‖ and ―not [to] discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged.‖ HERMINIO BUENAVENTURA y RECTO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 529 SCRA 500 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) An objection to the validity of arrest is deemed waived when the accused voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Accused-Appellant Herminio Buenaventura was arrested and subsequently charged before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong for violation of Republic Act No. 6425 (R.A. 6425), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act for sale and possession of marijuana. He was arrested during a buy bust operation conducted in April of 2002 by the Drug Enforcement Unit of Malate. The RTC found Herminio Buenaventura guilty of both charges, it holding that as between the straightforward and positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the bare and negative testimony of Buenaventura, the former indubitably deserves greater weight and credence. Buenaventura appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), but the same affirmed the RTC‘s decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Buenaventura alleges that the warrantless arrest made by the Drug Enforcement Unit of Malate was invalid.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest is invalid

HELD: In the said case, it was also established, based on the testimonies given by witnesses that the buy bust operation performed was lawful. As correctly observed by the appellate court, Herminio failed to move for the quashal of the informations filed against him. He instead submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. With the assistance of counsel, he entered a not guilty plea, and presented evidence in his defense. He thus clearly waived his objection to the validity of his arrest.

Political Law CAPITOL STEEL CORPORATION v. PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY 510 SCRA 590 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) Upon compliance with the requirements for a valid expropriation, it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue a writ of possession. Capitol Steel Corporation (Capitol Steel) is a domestic corporation which owns 65 parcels of land located at the province of Misamis Oriental. Phividec Industrial Authority (PHIVIDEC) is a government owned and controlled corporation which is vested the power of eminent domain for the purpose of acquiring rights of way or any property for the establishment or expansion of the PHIVIDEC areas. PHIVIDEC filed an expropriation case for the properties of Capitol Steel because it was identified as the most ideal site for the project of PHIVIDEC. The trial court denied PHIVIDEC‘s issuance of a writ of possession, noting that the amount deposited was seemingly inadequate and was simply out of PHIVIDEC‘s interpretation of the prevailing zonal valuation and was not mutually agreed upon but it was finally granted by the trial court. On appeal, the appellate court ruled in favor of PHIVIDEC, ordering the RTC to issue a Writ of Possession. Hence, this present petition for review. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred in ordering the RTC to issue a writ of possession in favor of PHIVIDEC HELD: Under R.A. 8974, the requirements for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings involving real property are: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; (2) due notice to the defendant; (3) payment of an amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR including payment of the value of the improvements and/or structures if any, or if no such valuation is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the payment of the proffered value of the property to be seized; and (4) presentation to the court of a certificate of availability of funds from the proper officials. Upon compliance with the requirements, a petitioner in an expropriation case, in this case PHIVIDEC, is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right and it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to forthwith issue the writ of possession. No hearing is required and the court neither exercises its discretion or judgment in determining the amount of the provisional value of the properties to be expropriated as the legislature has fixed the amount under Section 4 of R.A. 8974. To clarify, the payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession differs from the payment of just compensation for the expropriated property. While the provisional value is based on the current relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair market value of the property.

Political Law BIENVENIDO A. CERBO, JR., et al. v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. 516 SCRA 51 (2007), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) COMELEC exercises jurisdiction over petitions for correction of manifest errors only if the same pertains to errors that could not have been discovered during the canvassing, despite the exercise of due diligence. Bienvenido A. Cerbo, Jr., Angelo O. Montilla, and Geronimo P. Arzagon were candidates for representative, governor and vice-governor, respectively of Sultan Kudarat in the May 10, 2004 elections. Suharto T. Mangudadatu, Datu Pax S. Mangudadatu and Donato A. Ligo, on the other hand, were petitioners‘ respective opponents for the same positions. Cerbo et al. filed Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors and/or to Exclude Certificates of Canvass of the Municipalities of Palimbang and Lutayan, Sultan Kudarat before the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC). The PBOC overruled the objection thus, Cerbo et al. filed with the PBOC a notice of appeal, but the appeal was not pursued. Cerbo et al. filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors and Annulment of Proclamation alleging that the proclamation of Suharto T. Mangudadatu et al. was illegal because it was made despite the filing of the notice of appeal. COMELEC dismissed the petition for correction of manifest errors prompting Cerbo et al. to file a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that it was erroneous to dispose the petition on purely procedural grounds and not to treat it as an original petition for correction of manifest errors. COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC erred in dismissing the petition for correction of manifest errors HELD: A petition for correction of manifest errors filed directly with the COMELEC should thus pertain to errors that could not have been discovered during the canvassing, despite the exercise of due diligence. Petitioner Arzagon, however, together with the other petitioners, initially filed a petition for correction of manifest errors with the PBOC, evidently showing that the errors sought to be corrected were discovered during the canvassing. On his failure to appeal the PBOCs dismissal of his petition for correction of manifest errors, Arzagon claims that the PBOC did not indicate the reasons therefor, hence, he was prevented from appealing the same. Even if, however, the Court may, in the interest of justice, treat the petition for correction of manifest errors filed with the COMELEC as an appeal from the PBOC‘s verbal ruling denying petitioners‘ similar petition filed with the latter, its dismissal by the COMELEC is in order. Specifically with respect to the Palimbang COC, since its exclusion had earlier been denied by the PBOC, and the denial was not appealed, it had become final. The subsequent filing of a petition for correction of manifest errors in the Palimbang COC with the PBOC appeared to be just an attempt to substitute the lost appeal, which is impermissible.

Political Law With respect to Cerbo‘s et al. prayer before this Court for correction of manifest errors in the Lutayan COC, the same cannot be considered as an appeal from the verbal denial by the PBOC of a similar petition they earlier filed. For the petition filed with the COMELEC does not include alleged manifest errors in the Lutayan COC, hence, the COMELEC had no jurisdiction to rule thereon.

CIVIL SERVICE COMISSION v. NELI O. TAHANLANGIT 594 SCRA 124 (2009), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) Courts have generally refrained from even expressing an opinion on cases where the issues have become moot and academic, there being no more justiciable controversy to speak of, so that a determination thereof would be of no practical use or value. As a consequence of the reorganization of the Bureau of Patents and Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT), pursuant to R.A. 8293, into what is now known as the Intellectual Property Office (IPO), 137 incumbents therein, including respondent Nelia Tahanlangit, were appointed to new positions in the approved staffing pattern of the IPO. Under the BPTTT plantilla, Tahanlangit occupied the position of Trademark Principal Exmaniner I, a position said to be comparable to the item of Intellectual Property Rights Specialist I (IPRS-I) under the new IPO plantilla to which said Tahanlangit was appointed. Petitioner Civil Service Commission‘s (CSC) NCR Office, however, disapproved Tahanlangit‘s permanent appointment on the ground that the latter, for lack of the requisite educational qualifications, did not qualify to the above-mentioned position to which she had been appointed. DTI Secretary Manuel Roxas II appealed the NCR Office decision before the Civil Service Commission which it, however, affirmed. Insofar as Tahanlangit is concerned, CSC ruled that her appointment as IPRS-I was correctly disapproved by the NCR Office. Tahanlangit thereafter filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. Pending resolution, however, she opted to retire optionally under R.A. 8291, otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997. The CA thus held that the challenged resolutions had been rendered moot and academic by Tahanlangit‘s retirement from the government service pending resolution of her appeal. Further, the CA held that ―the ends of substantial justice will be better served if herein respondent be allowed to retire from the service upholding that her permanent appointment be considered valid and subsisting at the time of her retirement.‖ To this ruling of the CA, CSC moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence this petition. ISSUE: IPRS-I

Whether or not Tahanlangit‘s optional retirement mooted the disapproval of her appointment as

HELD: When Tahanlangit retired from the service on August 31, 2003, CSC‘s Resolution No. 03-0237 of July 30, 2003 had not attained finality, as it was pending appeal before the appellate court. Section 80 of CSC‘s Resolution No. 99-1936, ―The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,‖

Political Law provide that a decision of the CSC or its Regional Office shall be immediately executory after fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. Thus, when Tahanlangit was allowed to avail herself of optional retirement under R.A. 8291, CSC‘s assailed resolutions have thus become moot and academic, at least, with respect to the former‘s case. Courts have generally refrained from even expressing an opinion on cases where the issues have become moot and academic, there being no more justiciable controversy to speak of, so that a determination thereof would be of no practical use or value. In the present case, when Tahanlangit‘s appointment was disapproved by the CSC, Tahanlangit would still have been able to retire under the applicable law, R.A. 8291, as the said law only requires that the employee concerned must have rendered at least 15 years of service and must not have been receiving disability benefits at the time of retirement. Tahanlangit, having retired on August 31, 2003, the position of IPRS I is presumed to have been already filled up and to be now occupied by one bearing the requisite qualifications. Hence, passing on the disapproval of Tahanlangit‘s appointment no longer has any practical value. IMELDA O. COJUANGCO et al. v. SANDIGANBAYAN et al. 586 SCRA 790 (2009), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) While the general rule is that the portion of a decision that becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part thereof, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, one of which is where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of the issue is found in the body of the decision. The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed before the Sandiganbayan a "Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages," of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses which have been invested in the Philippine Long Distance Telecommunication Corporation (PLDT). Ramon and Imelda Cojuangco (Spouses Cojuangco) were subsequently impleaded. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint with respect to the recovery of the PLDT shares. The Republic appealed to the Supreme Court, and the same issued a favorable ruling. The Republic thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution, praying for the cancellation of the shares of stock registered in the name of Prime Holdings and the annotation of the change of ownership on PTIC‘s Stock and Transfer Book. The Republic further prayed for the issuance of an order for PTIC to account for all cash and stock dividends declared by PLDT in favor of PTIC from 1986 up to the present including compounded interests. The Sandiganbayan granted the same, except its prayer for accounting of dividends. The Republic moved for reconsideration with respect to the denial of accounting of dividends, which the Sandiganbayan granted. The Cojuangcos protested, alleging that the SC‘s decision did not include in its dispositive portion the grant of dividends and interests accruing to the shares adjudicated in favor of the Republic. ISSUE:

Political Law Whether or not the Republic is entitled to the dividends and interests accruing to the shares despite its non-inclusion in the dispositive portion of the decision HELD: The Cojuangcos insist on a literal reading of the dispositive portion of the SC‘s Decision, excluding the dividends, interests, and earnings accruing to the shares of stock from being accounted for and remitted. The SC, in directing the reconveyance to the Republic of the 111,415 shares of PLDT stock owned by PTIC in the name of Prime Holdings, declared the Republic as the owner of said shares and, necessarily, the dividends and interests accruing thereto. Ownership is a relation in law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights of another. Its traditional elements or attributes include jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing that it produces. Contrary to the Cojuangcos‘ contention, while the general rule is that the portion of a decision that becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part thereof, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, viz: (a) where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the opinion may be referred to for purposes of construing the judgment, because the dispositive part of a decision must find support from the decision‘s ratio decidendi; and (b) where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of the issue is found in the body of the decision. In the Decision, although the inclusion of the dividends, interests, and earnings of the 111,415 PTIC shares as belonging to the Republic was not mentioned in the dispositive portion of the Court‘s Decision, it is clear from its body that what was being adjudicated in favor of the Republic was the whole block of shares and the fruits thereof, said shares having been found to be part of the Marcoses‘ illgotten wealth, and therefore, public money.

ALDO B. CORDIA v. JOEL G. MONFORTE AND COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 380 SCRA 588 (2009), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) When the intention of the voter cannot be determined with reasonable certainty, the appreciation of contested ballots and election documents, which involves a question of fact, is best left to the determination of the COMELEC. Petitioner Aldo B. Cordia (Cordia) and respondent Joel G. Monforte (Monforte) were the official candidates for Punong Barangay in Legazpi City, Albay in the 2002 Elections. The Barangay Board of Canvassers proclaimed Cordia as the winner. Monforte filed an election protest before the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCC) for lack of familiarity with the Rules on Appreciation of ballots. The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of Monforte therefore annulling and setting aside the proclamation of Cordia. On appeal, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division affirmed the decision of MTCC. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the decision of the Second Division.

Political Law Cordia questioned such decision and mentioned the alleged mistake in applying the principle of idem sonans when it counted the vote ―Mantete‖ appearing in the questioned ballot which was written on the space for the position of a kagawad and the ballot with a hole in it caused by a cigarette which Cordia alleged to be a marked ballot. ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC made a mistake in the application of the Rules on Appreciation of Ballots HELD: The object of the appreciation of ballots is to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it can be determined with reasonable certainty. When placed in issue, the appreciation of contested ballots and election documents, which involves a question of fact, is best left to the determination of the COMELEC. The COMELEC, in crediting to respondent the vote for ―Mantete‖ in Exhibit ―A,‖ following the idem sonans rule, the Court finds no grave abuse discretion. Nor does the Court find grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC‘s not rejecting Exhibit ―C17‖ or the ballot with a hole, as a marked ballot, there being no indication that the blot therein was deliberately placed to identify the voter. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. COURT OF APPEALS 508 SCRA 72 (2006), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) A municipal employee who obtains loan out of the funds of the municipality is guilty of conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Commission on Audit, in response to anonymous complaint alleging that certain municipal employees of Infanta, Pangasinan allegedly committed graft and corruption, conducted a fraud audit. The audit team found that the Municipal Treasurer granted various loans to Municipal Employees in violation of COA Circular 90-331. One of the municipal employees to whom loans were extended was Luzviminda M. Maniago (Luzviminda). A complaint against Luzviminda was then filed before the Office of the Mayor for violation of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). In her Answer, Luzviminda claimed that the loan was extended to her by the Municipal Treasurer in the latter‘s personal capacity. The then Acting Mayor Charlito M. Kho (Kho), found Luzviminda guilty of Grave Misconduct on the basis of the "Fraud Audit Report" and dismissed her from the service. On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) modified Kho‘s resolution, finding her guilty only of Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and accordingly modified the penalty to suspension of one year. Luzviminda filed a motion for reconsideration of said judgement, but the same has been denied. Hence, Luzviminda filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari. The CA reversed the CSC decision and ordered the reinstatement of Luzviminda. Hence, this petition.

Political Law

ISSUE: Whether there is substantial evidence to hold Maniago guilty of conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service HELD: It bears noting that an audit team, Luzviminda herself, following which it confirmed that the amount of loan granted, formed part of the "cash shortage" of the Municipal Treasurer. And that the decision of Kho, was based not only on the Fraud Audit Report, but also on Luzviminda‘s Answer to the complaint wherein she did not deny having secured a loan, her only defense being that the loan did not involve public funds, which defense does not deserve consideration in the absence of any iota of proof thereof. The absence of a hearing did not deprive Luzviminda of due process. She was given the opportunity to file, and she did file, an Answer to complaint against her. She was also afforded the opportunity to appeal to the CSC from the September 20, 2000 Resolution of Acting Mayor Kho. Luzviminda having obtained a loan for her personal use out of municipal funds, through the active intercession of the Municipal Treasurer, cannot be countenanced. Although already paid in full, said loan resulted in the diversion of municipal funds for purposes other than what the amount was supposed to be appropriated for in the municipality. Thus, public service was prejudiced.

THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH et al. v. PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC. 518 SCRA 240 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) Defense of state immunity does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued an Administrative Order providing for additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact business with petitioner Department of Health (DOH). Respondent Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (Pharmawealth) submitted to DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic ―Penicillin G Benzathine.‖ Petitioner DOH issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine. Despite the lack of response from DOH regarding Pharmawealth‘s request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, the latter submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract and gave the lowest bid thereof. . In view, however, of the nonaccreditation of respondent‘s Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to Cathay/YSS Laboratories‘ (YSS).

Political Law Respondent Pharmawealth filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial praying, inter alia, that the trial court ―nullify the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and direct petitioners DOH et al. to declare Pharmawealth as the lowest complying responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and that they accordingly award the same to plaintiff company‖ and ―adjudge defendants Romualdez, Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and severally to plaintiff. Petitioners DOH et al. subsequently filed a motion to dismiss praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity. The trial court, however, denied the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals (CA) denied DOH‘s petition for review which affirmed the order issued Regional Trial Court of Pasig City denying petitioners‘ motion to dismiss the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the charge against the public officers acting in their official capacity will prosper HELD: The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government. In its complaint, DOH sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit. As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State. Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in connection with their alleged act of ―illegally abusing their official positions to make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law‖ is permissible, in consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally. ROMEO M. ESTRELLA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. 429 SCRA 789 (2004), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation.

Political Law Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race in May 14, 2001 elections. His opponent, Romeo Estrella, filed before Regional Trial Court (RTC) an election protest which consequently annulled Salvador‘s proclamation and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor and eventually issued writ of execution. While Salvador filed a petition for certiorari before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), raffled to the Second Division thereof, Estrella moved for inhibition of Commissioner Ralph Lantion, but a Status Quo Ante Order was issued. However, Commissioner Lantion voluntarily inhibited himself and designated another Commissioner to substitute him. The Second Division, with the new judge, affirmed with modifications the RTC decision and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor. Salvador filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc, in which this time, Commissioner Lantion participated by virtue of Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC En Banc. He said that as agreed upon, while he may not participate in the Division deliberations, he will vote when the case is elevated to COMELEC En Banc. Hence, Estrella filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether a COMELEC Commissioner who inhibited himself in Division deliberations may participate in its En Banc deliberation

HELD: The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5, 2003 issued by the COMELEC En Banc is nullified. Commissioner Lantion‘s voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allow him to participate in the En Banc proceedings when he previously inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but legally improper and absurd. Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the questioned order, thus leaving three (3) members concurring therewith, the necessary votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC was not attained. The order thus failed to comply with the number of votes necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or order.

GREATER METROPOLITAN MANILA SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE and the METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION and JANCOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PTY. LIMITED OF AUSTRALIA 494 SCRA 280 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales J.) If the contract provides that it shall be effective until and unless it is approved by the President, the same shall first be approved to be valid and enforceable.

Political Law President Fidel Ramos issued Presidential Memorandum Order no. 202 creating an Executive Committee (EC) to oversee and develop waste-to-energy projects for the waste disposal sites in Rizal and Carmona under the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme. Respondent Jancom International Development Projects Pty. Limited of Australia was one of the bidders for the Rizal Site which subsequently entered into a partnership with its co-respondent Asea Brown Boveri under the firm name Jancom Environmental Corporation (JANCOM). Consequently, EC declared JANCOM as the sole complying bidder of the Rizal Waste Disposal Site hence a Contract for the BOT implementation of the Solid Waste Management Project for the Rizal Site was entered between Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee (GMMSWMC) and Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), and JANCOM. The contract was submitted for approval to President Ramos who subsequently endorsed it to then incoming President Joseph E. Estrada. Owing to the clamor of the residents of Rizal, the Estrada administration ordered the closure of the San Mateo landfill. GMMSWMC thereupon adopted a Resolution not to pursue the contract with JANCOM, citing as reasons therefore the passage of Republic Act 8749, otherwise known as the Clean Air Act of 1999, the non-availability of the San Mateo site, and costly tipping fees. JANCOM filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City to declare the GMMSWMC Resolution and the acts of MMDA calling for the bids for and authorizing the forging of a new contract for the Metro Manila waste management as illegal, unconstitutional and void, and to enjoin them from implementing the Resolution and making another award. The trial court ruled in favor of JANCOM which was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court declared the contract valid and perfected, albeit ineffective and unimplementable pending the approval by the President. JANCOM and MMDA later entered into negotiations to modify certain provisions of the contract which were embodied in a draft Amended Agreement which bore no signature of the parties. JANCOM then filed before the Pasig City RTC an Omnibus Motion for a writ of execution which upon its issuance, was challenged by GMMSWMC and MMDA. The Court of Appeals however affirmed the RTC Order. ISSUE: Whether or not contract is ineffective and unimplentable until and unless it is approved by the President HELD: The only question before the Court is whether or not there is a valid and perfected contract between the parties. As to necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the contract, these are outside the realm of judicial adjudication. These considerations are primarily and exclusively a matter for the President to decide. While the Court recognizes that the garbage problem is a matter of grave public concern, it can only declare that the contract in question is a valid and perfected one between the parties, but the same is still ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the President, the contract itself providing that such approval by the President is necessary for its effectivity. In issuing the alias writ of execution, the trial court in effect ordered the enforcement of the contract despite this Court‘s unequivocal pronouncement that albeit valid and perfected, the contract shall become effective only upon approval by the President.

Political Law ALFRED HILADO et al. v. JUDGE AMOR REYES 496 SCRA 282(2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) The term "judicial record" or "court record" does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict. Julita Campos Benedicto filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration for the Intestate Estate of Roberto S. Benedicto before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The case was raffled to Judge Amor Reyes, in whose court such a petition was approved. Alfred Hilado, on the other hand, filed a civil case against the estate of Roberto. For a period of time, the counsel of Hilado was allowed to examine the records of the case and secure certified true copies thereof. However, one of Hilado‘s counsels was denied access to records of the estate by Judge Reyes ratiocinating that only parties or those with authority from the parties are allowed to inquire or verify the status of the case as the counsel was not under that instance. Hilado filed before the Supreme Court a petition for mandamus to compel Judge Reyes to allow them to access, examine and obtain copies of any and all documents forming part of the record of the Hilado‘s case contending that these records are public, and which the public can freely access.

ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of mandamus is proper

RULING: The term "judicial record" or "court record" does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict of the courts. It comprises the official collection of all papers, exhibits and pleadings filed by the parties, all processes issued and returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word testimony which took place during the trial and which are in the possession, custody, or control of the judiciary or of the courts for purposes of rendering court decisions. It has also been described to include any paper, letter, map, book, other document, tape, photograph, film, audio or video recording, court reporter's notes, transcript, data compilation, or other materials, whether in physical or electronic form, made or received pursuant to law or in connection with the transaction of any official business by the court, and includes all evidence it has received in a case. Decisions and opinions of a court are of course matters of public concern or interest for these are the authorized expositions and interpretations of the laws, binding upon all citizens, of which every citizen is charged with knowledge. Justice thus requires that all should have free access to the opinions of judges and justices, and it would be against sound public policy to prevent, suppress or keep the earliest knowledge of these from the public. Thus, in Lantaco Sr. et al. v. Judge Llamas, this Court found a judge to have committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to furnish Lantaco et al. a copy of his decision in a criminal case of which they were even the therein private complainants, the decision being "already part of the public record which the citizen has a right to scrutinize."

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES v. ATTY. VICTORIA V. LOANZON 482 SCRA 533 (2006), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

Political Law

The position of Deputy Secretary General of the House of Representatives based on highly technical qualifications, hence, the holder of the position can only enjoy security of tenure if he or she possesses the qualifications and eligibility prescribed for it. Atty. Victoria V. Loanzon was appointed as Deputy Secretary General, Public Relations and Information Department (PRID) of the House of Representatives by then Speaker Manuel Villar of the Eleventh Congress. Her Civil Service Commission (CSC) appointment paper stated that her status was "PERMANENT," albeit with a caveat annotated thereon that "the appointee does not have security of tenure until she obtains a career executive service eligibility." Upon request of the Quezon City Mayor Feliciano Belmonte Jr. and with the approval of House of Representatives Secretary General Nazzareno, Loanzon was part-time detail at the Office of the Quezon City Mayor. When Jose de Venecia, Jr., assumed position as the new Speaker of the House, he appointed Emmanuel A. Albano as Deputy Secretary General, PRID on temporary status. On even date, Mayor Belmonte again requested for the detail of Loanzon to his office. Loanzon sought clarification from the Civil Service Commission about the status of her appointment in light of Albano‘s appointment to her position. The CSC holds that Loanzon was a rightful holder of the position of Deputy Secretary General up to July 31, 2001 and is entitled to the payment of her salaries and other benefits up to that period only. Accordingly, when Speaker De Venecia appointed Albano as Deputy Secretary General, PRID, on July 25, 2001, Loanzon was still detailed at the Office of Mayor Belmonte. Thus, Albano‘s appointment on July 25, 2001 is legally infirm because there was no vacancy yet at that time. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) found that the position of Deputy Secretary General, PRID pertains to the non-career service; Loanzon held a primarily confidential position and her tenure was thus coterminous with and subject to the pleasure of the appointing authority, and her termination could be justified only on the ground of loss of confidence. It declared the removal of Loanzon and the appointment of Albano in her place null and void. ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not the CA the position of Deputy Secretary General is a primarily confidential position belonging to non-career service 2.) Whether or not the termination of Loanzon as Deputy Secretary General is illegal and the appointment of Albano in her place is null and void HELD:

Whether or not the CA the position of Deputy Secretary General is a primarily confidential position belonging to non-career service Clearly, the position of Deputy Secretary General of the House of Representatives belongs to the career service which is, so the Civil Service Law provides, characterized, among other things, by entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications and security of tenure. The holder of the position can only enjoy security of tenure if he or she possesses the qualifications and eligibility prescribed for it.

Political Law In Loanzon‘s case, although Loanzon‘s appointment was denominated as "permanent," it having been "proposed as permanent," it was in reality temporary for, so her CSC appointment paper clearly stated, she did not enjoy security tenure as she lacked the eligibility requirement for the position. In fine, Loanzon‘s appointment was merely temporary, not to exceed twelve months. Since she was appointed on March 8, 1999, it was effective only for one year or up to March 8, 2000. Having continued, however, to hold on to her position up to July 25, 2001 when Albano was appointed by Speaker de Venecia, she did so in a hold-over capacity.

Whether or not the termination of Loanzon as Deputy Secretary General is illegal and the appointment of Albano in her place is null and void Even if Albano then did not possess the required eligibility, his appointment was not legally infirm. As correctly pleaded by House of Representatives before the appellate court, when Nazareno approved Mayor Belmonte‘s request for Loanzon‘s detail until July 31, 2001, Speaker de Venecia had not yet been elected and assumed office as speaker. With Speaker de Venecia‘s subsequent election and assumption of office as speaker, Nazareno‘s action as secretary-general became subject to supervision and control, hence, it could be revoked anytime. By thus appointing Albano on July 25, 2001, Speaker de Venecia impliedly revoked or modified Nazareno‘s action by shortening the period of the approved detail. As for the Speaker‘s approval on October 25, 2001 of Mayor Belmonte‘s second request for Loanzon‘s detail to his office effective August 1, 2001, the same may be taken as mere oversight on the part of the Speaker.

PRISCILA JUSTIMBASTE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RUSTICO B. BALDERIAN 572 SCRA 736 (2008), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) The use of a name other than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a material misrepresentation as the same refers to "qualifications for elective office” under the Omnibus Election Code. Priscila R. Justimbaste (Priscila) filed with the Leyte Provincial Election Supervisor a petition to disqualify respondent Rustico B. Balderian (Rustico) as a candidate for mayor of Tabontabon, Leyte for falsification and misinterpretation in his application for candidacy. Rustico denied Priscila‘s allegations. Rustico won and was proclaimed as mayor. The Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the petition for disqualification. Priscila then filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the COMELEC En Banc which subsequently denied the same. ISSUE:

Political Law Whether or not Rustico committed material misrepresentation and falsification in his certificate of candidacy HELD: Material misrepresentation as a ground to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy refers to the falsity of a statement required to be entered therein, as enumerated in Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. Concurrent with materiality is a deliberate intention to deceive the electorate as to one‘s qualifications. Priscila asserts that private Balderian committed material misrepresentation when he stated in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen and that his name is Rustico Besa Balderian, instead of Chu Teck Siao. At all events, the use of a name other than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a material misrepresentation, as "material misrepresentation" under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code refers to "qualifications for elective office." It need not be emphasized that there is no showing that there was intent to deceive the electorate as to private respondent‘s identity, nor that by using his Filipino name the voting public was thereby deceived. Priscila is reminded that a petition for disqualification based on material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy is different from an election protest. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is really the lawful choice of the electorate.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LUZ LIM AND PURITA LIM CABOCHAN 529 SCRA 129 (2007), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in their favor a presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue. Pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) compulsorily acquired lands owned by Luz Lim and Purita Lim Caochan. The Land Bank computed the value of the property. Lim however rejected Land Bank‘s valuation. A summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the property. Dissatisfied with the PARAD‘s decision, Lim and Cabochan filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court. The RTC adopted the valuation submitted by the appointed commissioner. Both parties moved for reconsideration. The RTC then reconsidered its earlier decision and increased the valuation. Landbank, not satisfied, filed a petition for review on certiorari for fixing the valuation of Lim‘s property.

Political Law ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in adopting the calculations of the LBP instead of the Administrative Order of DAR

HELD: In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Banal, the Court underscored the mandatory nature of Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR AO 6-92, as amended by DAR AO 11-94 which provides that in determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.‖ It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in their favor a presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue. Unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply the same.

MANUEL LECAYCO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 482 SCRA 215 (2006), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) While a person, in his capacity as member of the Inspectorate Team, is not an accountable officer as contemplated by law, he may, nonetheless, be held liable by the COA under the broad jurisdiction vested on it by the Constitution. Petitioner Manuel Lecayco, Jr. (Lecayco) was the Provincial Treasurer of Oriental Mindoro and at the same time an appointed member of Inspectorate Team of the Provincial School Board (PSB). The Special Audit Team of the Commission on Audit (COA) Regional Office allegedly found deficiencies on the checks issued by the PSB of Oriental Mindoro. The funds are covered by the Special Education‘s Fund (SEF). The COA then issued Notices of Disallowance holding Lecayco and other members of Sangguniang Panlalawigan liable for signing the Certificates of Inspection and falsely attesting to its 100% completion. Lecayco appealed to the COA maintaining that he is not liable, since as a member of the Inspectorate Team, his duty is limited to "monitoring the progress of PSB projects". However, the COA denied such appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the COA has the authority to hold Lecayco liable as a member of the Inspectorate Team HELD:

Political Law

In light of this function of the Inspectorate Team, its members may be held liable by the COA for any irregular expenditure of the SEF if their participation in such irregularity can be established. While Lecayno, in his capacity as member of the Inspectorate Team, is not an accountable officer as contemplated in Section 101 of P.D. No. 1445, he may, nonetheless, be held liable by the COA under the broad jurisdiction vested on it by the Constitution ―to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government.‖ In addition, the authority of the COA to hold Lecayno liable is also implied in its duty to ―promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.‖ Since, as earlier noted, payment should not be made to a contractor without the prior inspection of the project by the Inspectorate Team, the members thereof who sign the certificate of inspection participate in the use and application of local government funds (in this case, the Special Education Fund of the Province of Oriental Mindoro). Thus, if there is an irregularity in the performance of this duty, they may be held liable for any loss that is incurred by the government as a consequence thereof. In this case, there was such irregularity when Lecayco and other members of the Team attested to the 100% completion of the projects notwithstanding their undisputed deficiencies.

SALLY A. LEE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LEOVIC R. DIONEDA 405 SCRA 363 (2003), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) The doctrine that COMELEC is restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go behind them and investigate election irregularities presupposes that the returns “appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face” hence, if there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine, several entries having been omitted in the questioned election return, the doctrine does not apply.

Petitioner Sally A. Lee (Lee) and respondent Leovic R. Dioneda (Dioneda) were candidates for Mayor of Sorsogon City. During the canvassing of the election returns, counsel for Dioneda moved for the exclusion of Election Return No. 41150266 for Precinct No. 28A2 from Barangay Bucalbucalan, Sorsogon City on the ground that no entries were made for the position of congressman and that Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) watchers were utilized to fill up election returns. The Board of Canvassers (BOC) ruled in favor of Lee on the ground that the questioned election return was clear and regular on its face, the BOC then proclaimed Lee as the winning candidate for Mayor of Sorsogon City. Dioneda then filed a petition to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for annulment of Lee‘s proclamation and the exclusion of the questioned election return. The COMELEC Second Division granted Dioneda‘s petition and accordingly excluded the questioned return from the canvass and nullified the proclamation of Lee. Lee filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC En Banc.

Political Law ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in annulling Lee‘s proclamation and excluded the questioned election return

HELD: Lee argues that as the case at bar is a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC is ―restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go [beyond] or behind them and investigate election irregularities,‖ citing the case of Loong v. Commission on Elections. The doctrine cited by Lee presupposes that the returns ―appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face.‖ Where, as in the case at bar, there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine, several entries having been omitted in the questioned election return, the doctrine does not apply. The COMELEC is thus not powerless to determine if there is basis for the exclusion of the questioned election return.

MUNICIPALITY OF LA LIBERTAD, NEGROS ORIENTAL v. JUDITH C PENAFLOR 453 SCRA 833 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) A mayor need not secure the concurrence of the Sangguniang Bayan in terminating a person’s services who is not claimed to be a head of department in the Mayor’s office. Judith Penaflor (Penaflor) had been employed in the office of the Municipality of La Libertad, Negros Oriental as a rural midwife for about twenty years. She filed an application for a fifteen day leave of absence which was recommended for approval by her superior. Unaware if her application for leave had been approved, Penaflor began availing of it. Subsequently by Memorandum, then Municipal Mayor Napoleon Camero (Mayor Camero) notified Penaflor that she had been terminated. Penaflor appealed for a reconsideration of Mayor Camero‘s notice of termination but the same was denied prompting her to appeal to the Civil Service Commission(CSC) which set aside Mayor Camero‘s decision to drop her from the rolls. The CSC also ordered the reinstatement of Penaflor to her position. Mayor Camero filed a motion for reconsideration of the CSC Resolution which was denied and on appeal, the said Resolution was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. As Penaflor was reinstated to her former position by Mayor Limkaichong, Jr. who won the local elections, she filed a petition to CSC to direct the municipality of La Libertad (municipality) to pay her back salaries due her which granted her petition. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the municipality but it was denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed the CSC Resolution. The municipality insists that Mayor Camero should be liable since the Penaflor was dismissed due to the erring act of the former Mayor as the dismissal is without authority. ISSUE: Whether or not Mayor Camero acted without in terminating Penaflor from the service

Political Law HELD: Generally the power to appoint includes the power to remove except in instances where it does not include the power to remove, e.g.: 1.) The Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman who are appointed by the President may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. 2.) The Judges of lower court are subject to discipline by the Supreme Court en banc which can order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. Since it is not claimed that Penaflor was a head of department or office in the office of petitioner, then following Sec. 444(5) of the Local Government Code, under which a mayor is empowered to ―appoint all officials whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid out of municipal funds and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in this Code, as well as those he may be authorized by law to appoint,‖ former Mayor Camero did not have to secure the concurrence of the Sangguniang Bayan to terminate Penaflor‘s services. MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. BENJAMIN TUDTUD, et al. 571 SCRA 165 (2008), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) The former owner reacquires the property expropriated if the expropriation of the same was subject to condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned, it shall be returned to the owner. The National Airports Corporation (NAC) filed a complaint for expropriation in order to expand the Cebu Lahug Airport. It sought to acquire, by negotiated sale or expropriation, several lots adjoining the then existing airport which included the parcels of land owned by the predecessors-ininterest of respondents Benjamin Tudtud et al. NAC assured the owners that they would reacquire the land if it is no longer needed by the airport. The Court of First Instance of Cebu granted the expropriation. No structures related to the operation of the Cebu Lahug Airport were constructed on the land expropriated. Respondent Lydia Adlawan (Lydia), acting as attorney-in-fact of the original owners, sent a letter to the general manager of the petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA), the new owner of the lot and demanded to repurchase the lot at the same price paid at the time of the taking, without interest. Lydia filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City for reconveyance and damages against the MCIAA. The RTC of Cebu rendered judgment in favor of Tudtud et al. MCIAA appealed to the Court of Appeals but it affirmed the RTC decision. MCIAA then filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not Tudtud et al. are entitled for the reconveyance of the land expropriated HELD:

Political Law

Tudtud et al.’s witness respondent Justiniano Borga declared that the original owners did not oppose the expropriation of the lot upon the assurance of the NAC that they would reacquire it if it is no longer needed by the airport. The rights and duties between the MCIAA and Tudtud et al are governed by Article 1190 of the Civil Code which provides: When the conditions have for their purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to give, the parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions, shall return to each other what they have received. In case of the loss, deterioration, or improvement of the thing, the provisions which, with respect to the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article [Article 1189] shall be applied to the party who is bound to return. While the MCIAA is obliged to reconvey Lot No. 988 to Tudtud et al., they must return to the MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the expropriation of Lot No. 988, plus legal interest to be computed from default, which in this case runs from the time the MCIAA complies with its obligation to the respondents. Tudtud et al., must likewise pay the MCIAA the necessary expenses it may have incurred in sustaining Lot No. 988 and the monetary value of its services in managing it to the extent that Tudtud et al., were benefited thereby. Following Article 1187 of the Civil Code, the MCIAA may keep whatever income or fruits it may have obtained from Lot No. 988, and Tudtud et al., need not account for the interests that the amounts they received as just compensation may have earned in the meantime. MANUEL MILLA v. REGINA BALMORES-LAXA 406 SCRA 679 (2003), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

A pre-proclamation controversy have to be first heard and decided by a division of the COMELEC and then by the En Banc if a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the division were filed. If COMELEC sitting en banc acted on said petition which was not first passed upon by a division, it acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner Manuel Milla (Milla) and respondent Regina Balmores-Laxa (Balmores-Laxa) were candidates for councilor of Gerona, Tarlac. Milla won, took his oath and assumed office as councilor. Balmores-Laxa filed an action with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for correction of entries in the statements of votes based on alleged irregularities in the canvassing of votes and prayed for the annulment of Milla‘s proclamation. She prayed that she be proclaimed as the real winner since she ranked ninth in the previous election while Milla only placed number eight. In its resolution, the COMELEC En Banc decided in favor of Balmores-Laxa and annulled Milla‘s proclamation as duly elected councilor of Gerona, Tarlac.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the pre-proclamation controversy between Milla and Balmores-Laxa

HELD:

Political Law As the petition then of Balmores-Laxa involves a pre-proclamation controversy, Sec. 3 of Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. It should have first been heard and decided by a division of the COMELEC, and then by the En Banc if a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the division were filed. Since, as reflected above, the COMELEC sitting en banc acted on Balmores-Laxa‘s petition which was not first passed upon by a division, it acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 451 SCRA 570 (2005), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) To classify the position of Graft Investigation Officer II as belonging to the Career Executive Service and require an appointee thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure would be absurd as it would result either in 1) vesting the appointing power for said position in the President, in violation of the Constitution; or 2) including in the CES a position not occupied by a presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code. Melchor Carandang, Paul Elmer Clemente and Jose Tereso De Jesus, Jr., were appointed Graft Investigation Officers III of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) approved the appointments on the condition that for the appointees to acquire security of tenure, they must first obtain a Career Executive Service (CES). The Ombudsman requested to the CSC for the change of status from temporary to permanent, of the appointments of Carandang, Clemente and De Jesus, emphasizing that since the Office of the Ombudsman is not governed by the Career Executive Service Board, security of tenure can be granted despite the absence of CES eligibility. CSC changed the status of Carandang‘s and Clemente‘s appointments to permanent but not with respect to De Jesus on the ground that he "has not met the eligibility requirements. Hence, this petition for ceritiorari filed by the Office of the Ombudsman seeking to nullify the CSC Resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not the general power of the Civil Service Commission to administer civil service cannot validly curtail the specific discretionary power of appointment including the grant of security of tenure by the Office of the Ombudsman HELD: Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides persons occupying positions in the CES are presidential appointees. A person occupying the position of Graft Investigation Officer III is not, however, appointed by the President but by the Ombudsman as provided in Article IX of the Constitution.

Political Law To classify the position of Graft Investigation Officer III as belonging to the CES and require an appointee thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure would be absurd as it would result either in 1) vesting the appointing power for said position in the President, in violation of the Constitution; or 2) including in the CES a position not occupied by a presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code. It bears emphasis that that under P.D. No 807, Sec. 9(h) which authorizes the CSC to approve appointments to positions in the civil service, except those specified therein, its authority is limited "only to [determine] whether or not the appointees possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate eligibility, nothing else."11 It is not disputed that, except for his lack of CES or CSE eligibility, De Jesus possesses the basic qualifications of a Graft Investigation Officer III, as provided in the earlier quoted Qualification Standards. Such being the case, the CSC has the ministerial duty to grant the request of the Ombudsman that appointment be made permanent effective December 18, 2002. To refuse to heed the request is a clear encroachment on the discretion vested solely on the Ombudsman as appointing authority. It goes without saying that the status of the appointments of Carandang and Clemente, who were conferred CSE eligibility pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 03-0665 dated June 6, 2003, should be changed to permanent effective December 18, 2002 too.

MENELIETO A. OLANDA v. LEONARDO G. BUGAYONG et al. 413 SCRA 255 (2003), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) Disciplinary cases and other cases relating to the civil services are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and not of any other courts. Twelve officers and employees of the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA) including petitioner Manelieto A. Olanda (Olanda), then Dean of the College of Marine Engineering and former PMMA Complex Project Officer, filed a verified complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against respondent Leonardo G. Bugayong (Bugayong), President of the PMMA, charging him with violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for entering into a grossly disadvantageous contract with the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) on behalf of PMMA. Respondent Pedro S. Dulay, Jr. (Dulay), chief security officer of the PMMA, by a letter addressed to Bugayong, stated that he heard the radio interview of Olanda and that in discussing publicly without any clearance from Bugayong the Memorandum of Agreement between PMMA and PNCC, Olanda violated the PMMA Faculty Handbook and other civil service rules. Bugayong relieved Olanda as the dean of the PMMA by a special order and designated him as an acting executive assistant in the Graduate School Program at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Makati (PLM). Bugayong, by decision, suspended petitioner for three months for violation of the PMMA Faculty Handbook and the civil service rules. Olanda filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales for quo warranto, mandamus and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and damages, claiming that there was no valid cause to deprive him of his position as Dean and that Bugayong was usurping his position. However, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of cause of action and that Olanda has not exhausted all administrative remedies.

Political Law ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the case against Bugayong is proper

HELD: As a rule, the Court reviews only the specific issues or errors raised by the parties. However, even if not raised, an error in jurisdiction may be taken up.

Disciplinary cases and cases involving ‗personal actions‘ affecting employees in the civil service including ―appointment through certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion and separation‖ are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission which is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil services. It was thus error for the trial court, which does not have jurisdiction, to, in the first place, take cognizance of the petition of Menelieto Olanda assailing relief as Dean and his designation to another position. This leaves it unnecessary to dwell on the issues herein raised by Olanda.

MAYOR MARCEL S. PAN v. YOLANDA O. PEÑA et al. 579 SCRA 314 (2009), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) A reorganization must be undertaken in the interest of efficiency and austerity and should not be marred by other considerations that circumvent security of tenure. Petitioner Mayor Marcel Pan, after winning the mayoralty post, initiated a reorganization of the local government, allegedly due to the large budgetary deficit of the municipality. The Sangguniang Bayan (Sanggunian) passed a resolution giving the mayor full authority to restructure the local government unit (LGU). The Sanggunian thereafter created a Placement Committee to oversee the LGU reorganization in terms of selection and placement of personnel, in consonance with the procedures laid down in R.A. 6656, the Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization of 1988. Respondents Yolanda Peña et al. were permanent employees assigned at the various departments of the LGU but whose positions were abolished. They applied for the newly created positions in the LGU‘s new organization and staffing pattern but placement committee did not approve Peña et al.’s applications. The mayor appointed other employees to fill up the ranks. Peña et al. filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC affirmed the decision. The Court of Appeals (CA) sustained the CSC‘s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mayor Pan complied with the provisions of R.A. 6656 in effecting Peña et al.‘s separation from service

Political Law HELD: Reorganization ―involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.‖ It alters the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them to make the bureaucracy more responsive to the needs of the public clientele as authorized by law. It could result in the loss of one‘s position through removal or abolition of an office. For reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, however, it must pass the test of good faith otherwise it is void ab initio. In the case at bar, Mayor Pan claims that there has been a drastic reduction of plantilla positions in the new staffing pattern in order to address the LGU‘s gaping budgetary deficit. Thus, he states that in the municipal treasurer‘s office and waterworks operations unit where respondents were previously assigned, only 11 new positions were created out of the previous 35 which had been abolished; and that the new staffing pattern had 98 positions only, as compared with the old which had 129. The CSC, however, highlighted the recreation of six (6) casual positions for clerk II and utility worker I, which positions were previously held by respondents Marivic, Cantor, Asor and Enciso. Mayor Pan inexplicably never disputed this finding nor proffered any proof that the new positions do not perform the same or substantially the same functions as those of the abolished. And nowhere in the records does it appear that these recreated positions were first offered to respondents. While the CSC never found the new appointees to be unqualified, and never disapproved nor recalled their appointments as they presumably met all the minimum requirements therefor, there is nothing contradictory in the CSC‘s course of action as it is limited only to the non-discretionary authority of determining whether the personnel appointed meet all the required conditions laid down by law. Congruently, the CSC can very well order Mayor Pan to reinstate Peña et al. to their former positions (as these were never actually abolished) or to appoint them to comparable positions in the new staffing pattern. In fine, the reorganization of the government of the Municipality of Goa was not entirely undertaken in the interest of efficiency and austerity but appears to have been marred by other considerations in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees like respondents.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPINES v. BENNY GO 411 SCRA 81 (2003), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) The search and seizure of articles must be limited to those which are particularly described in the search warrant. A raiding team armed with a warrant entered the home of appelant Benny Go in search of evidence for the violation of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), otherwise know as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 . Upon their entry, they met Jack Go, son of the Go and restrained him. As the former was the only one present at the time they then called on two baranggay kagawads to act as witnesses on the said search. They then siezed properties and objects even those which were not included in the warrant. When they were almost finished with their search Go arrived and immediately together with the two witnesses was made to sign the inventory reciept.

Political Law Based on the evidence taken from the search Go was charged for violation of R.A. 6425. Upon hearing, testimonies as well as evidences were presented by the prosecution against Go. However, the two witnesses questioned the validity of some of the evidence presented such as the inventory receipt as well as the illegal drugs said to have been seized from the search. The Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Go for violation of the offense cahrged. On appeal, Go assails the decision of the RTC as well the validity of the search performed by the raiding team and the admissibility of the evidence taken therefrom. Go also asks for the return of the properties seized that were not included in the search warrant. ISSUE: Whether or not the properties not included in the search warrant may be returned to Go HELD: It bears reiterating that the purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant – to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. At the same time, the raiding team characterized the seizure of the assorted documents, passports, bankbooks, checks, check writer, typewriter, dry seals and stamp pads as ―seizure of evidence in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the ―plain view‖ of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. To be sure, the policemen also filed a complaint against Go for alleged possession of instruments or implements intended for the commission of falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of dry seals and rubber stamps also found in appellant‘s residence. The counterfeit nature of the seals and stamps was in fact not established until after they had been turned over to the Chinese embassy and Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for verification. It is, therefore, incredible that SPO1 Fernandez could make such determination from a ―plain view‖ of the items from his vantage point in the sala. In sum, the circumstances attendant to the case at bar do not warrant the application of the ―plain view‖ doctrine to justify the seizure and retention of the questioned seized items. The things belonging to appellant not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not particularly described, must thus be ordered returned to him. Be that as it may, considering that the two (2) dry seals and eight (8) of the rubber stamps have been certified to be counterfeit by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, they may not be returned and are hereby declared confiscated in favor of the State to be disposed of according to law. Moreover, the various bankbooks and passports not belonging to appellant may not be ordered returned in the instant proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

Political Law PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO, et al. 420 SCRA 280 (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) Vehicles may be stopped and extensively searched when there is probable cause that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. On the night of April 10, 1995, as about fifteen police officers were manning a checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735, otherwise known as the COMELEC gun ban, a motorcycle with three men on board namely appellant Victor Vinecario (Vinecario), Arnold Roble (Roble) Gerlyn Wates (Wates) sped past of the police officers. When they were ordered to return to the checkpoint, a police officer asked what the backpack contains which the appellants answered that it was only a mat. The police officers suspected that it was a bomb and when appellant opened the bag it turns out that its contents were marijuana. The three were then brought to the police station and later to Camp Catitipan and there they were investigated by police officials without the assistance of counsel, following which they were made to sign some documents which they were not allowed to read. The Regional Trial Court rendered them guilty for transporting, possessing and delivering prohibited drugs under Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659), and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua. ISSUE: Whether or not the search upon the appellants and the seizure of the alleged 1,700 grams of marijuana violated there constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure HELD: Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorist. Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may be stopped and extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by the Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.

In light then of Vineracion et al.‘s speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and even after having been flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures when interrogated on the contents of the backpack which they passed to one another, and the reply of Vinecario, when asked why he and his co-appellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was a member of the Philippine Army, apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with their inspection, there

Political Law existed probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that appellants were offenders of the law or that the contents of the backpack were instruments of some offense.

PRUDENCIO QUIMBO v. ACTING OMBUDSMAN MARGARITO GERVACIO et al. 466 SCRA 277 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation, not a penalty or punishment. Petitioner Prudencio C. Quimbo, Provincial Engineer of Samar, was administratively charged for harassment and oppression by Elmo V. Padaon (Padaon), a general foreman. During the pendency of the case, he was placed under preventive suspension without pay. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found Quimbo guilty of oppression and recommended that he be ―suspended from office for a period of eight (8) months without pay. This was approved by the Ombudsman. The Court of Appeals (CA) found Quimbo guilty of simple misconduct only and penalized him with suspension from office for a period of two (2) months without pay. Quimbo filed a Motion for Modification/Reconsideration calling attention to the fact that he had been on preventive suspension from March 18, 1998 to June 1, 1998 and praying that the order under reconsideration be modified ―to take into account the period of his PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION of 2 MONTHS and 17 DAYS WITHOUT PAY as part of the final penalty imposed.‖ The Ombudsman clarified that ―preventive suspension is not a penalty but a preliminary step in an investigation; and that if after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated upon is found guilty warranting the imposition of penalty, then he shall accordingly be penalized.‖ Such was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the preventive suspension pending the investigation is a penalty HELD: Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved. Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.

Political Law That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws. As stated in Sec. 24, preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive measure. Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. So Section 25 of the same Rule XIV provides that the period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed under preventive suspension shall not be considered part of the actual penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee found guilty. Clearly, service of the preventive suspension cannot be credited as service of penalty. To rule otherwise is to disregard above-quoted Sections 24 and 25 of the Administrative Code of 1987 and render nugatory the substantial distinction between, and purposes of imposing preventive suspension and suspension as penalty. JOY LEE RECUERDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS 395 SCRA 117 (2003), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) B.P. 22 punishes the act of making and issuing a worthless check and not the non-payment of the obligation. Yolanda Floro sold a loose diamond stone valued at P420,000.00 to Joy Lee Recuerdo. As payment for the diamond, Recuerdo gave P40,000 as downpayment and issued 9 postdated checks. When Floro tried to deposit eight checks, only three were cleared and the other five were dishonored due to the closure of Recuerdo‘s account. Recuerdo promised to convert the checks into cash but she welshed on it A demand letter was sent to Recuerdo but she still failed to comply with her obligation. This prompted Floro to file at the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) five informations against Recuerdo for violation of B.P. 22. Recuerdo was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of B.P. 22 and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 30 days for each count and to restitute the amount of P200,000 to Floro. The decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and later on, by the Court of Appeals (CA). ISSUE: Whether or not Recuerdo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of B.P. 22 HELD: Recuerdo contends that since banks are not damaged by the presentment of dishonored checks as they impose a penalty for each, only creditors/payees are unduly favored by the law; that the law ―is in essence a resurrected form of 19th century ‗imprisonment for debt‘ since the drawer is coerced to pay his debt on threat of imprisonment even if his failure to pay does not arise from malice or fraud or from any criminal intent to cause damage; and that the law is a bill of attainder as it does not leave much room for judicial determination, the guilt of the accused having already been decided by the legislature. These matters subject of Recuerdo‘s contention have long been settled in the landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez where the Court upheld the constitutionality of B. P. 22: the gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the

Political Law law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The contention that B. P. 22 is a bill of attainder, one which inflicts punishment without trial and the essence of which is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt, fails. For under B. P. 22, every element of the crime is still to be proven before the trial court to warrant a conviction for violation thereof. Recuerdo argues that as no bank representative testified as to ―whether the questioned checks were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds (sic),‖ such element was not clearly and convincingly proven, hence, the trial court failed to uphold her right to presumption of innocence when she was convicted based on the sole testimony of Yolanda. Yolanda‘s testimony that when she deposited the checks to her depository bank they were dishonored due to ―Account Closed‖ sufficed. In fact, even Recuerdo‘s counsel during trial admitted the dishonor, and on that ground. In fine, the affirmance of Recuerdo‘s conviction is in order. In the case at bar, the Court notes that no proof, nay allegation, was proffered that Recuerdo was not a first time offender. Considering this and the correctness of the case, it would best serve the interests of justice if Recuerdo is just fined to enable her to continue her dental practice so as not to deprive her of her income, thus insuring the early settlement of the civil aspect of the case, not to mention the FINE.

ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ v. VICENTE P. APOSAGA, JR., A.M. No. P-03-1671, 31 January 2005, (CARPIO MORALES, J.) It bears emphasis that high standards are expected of sheriffs, they being agents of the law. They are mandated to perform the duties of their office earnestly, faithfully and honestly. By 1st Indorsement of February 8, 2002, the Department of Justice (DOJ) referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action a letter of herein complainant Antonio Rodriguez (Rodriguez) requesting assistance in the execution of the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga in his favor. It was alleged that Vicente P. Aposaga, Jr., Sheriff IV of the said court, asked for P10,000.00 for the execution of the said decision. Rodriguez, however, paid no heed to Aposaga‘s request. Consequently, Aposaga could not implement the writ of execution. With the help of a "common friend" who was aware of his predicament, Aposaga proceeded to cause the registration of the Notice of Levy on the judgment debtor‘s property. The Court arrived to the conclusion that what Aposaga was doing is a violation of Section 9, Rule 141 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. ISSUE: Whether or not Sheriff Aposaga violated Section 9 of Rule 141 HELD: Based on the foregoing, Aposaga has clearly shown a grave disregard of pertinent provisions of the rules with respect to the collection of legal fees or expenses to which a sheriff is entitled. He

Political Law committed a serious infraction of the above-mentioned provision by demanding directly from complainant the amount of P10,000.00 (which fact Sheriff Aposaga, Jr. admitted) for the annotation of the levy on execution of the property of the judgment debtor, without the requisite authority of the court. As sheriff he is duty bound to know at least these very basic rules relative to the implementation of writs of execution. What is worthy of note is that Aposaga has been a deputy sheriff for more than twelve years. Surely, Aposaga ought to have known the correct/proper procedure to be followed in requesting for expenses from a judgment creditor in order to ensure proper administration of justice especially in its concluding stage. In sum, the gravamen of Aposaga‘s shortcoming is in his failure to observe Sec. 9 of Rule 141. The party requesting the process of any court, preliminary, incidental, or final, shall pay the sheriff‘s expenses in serving or executing the process, or safeguarding the property levied upon, attached or seized, including kilometrage for each kilometer of travel, guards‘ fees, warehousing and similar charges, in an amount estimated by the sheriff, subject to the approval of the court. Upon approval of said estimated expenses, the interested party shall deposit such amount with the clerk of court and exoficio sheriff, who shall disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to effect the process, subject to liquidation within the same period for rendering a return on the process. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party making the deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the deputy sheriff assigned with his return, and the sheriff‘s expenses shall be taxed as costs against the judgment debtor. In Aposaga‘s case, instead of preparing an estimate of expenses to be incurred in implementing the writ of execution and thereafter securing the court‘s approval thereof, he verbally estimated the expenses and directly conveyed the same to the judgment creditor-complainant. ROMONAFE CORPORATION v. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, et al. 513 SCRA 424 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) Just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint whichever comes first. National Power Corporation (NPC), a government owned and controlled corporation filed a complaint for expropriation with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Romonafe Corporation (Romonafe) and Vine Development Corporation (Vine). The complaint covered 48, 103.12 square meters of property to Romonafe and 96,963.38 square meters of property belonging to Vine. RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of NPC and the trial court designated commissioners to determine the just compensation for the properties. The trial court ordered the fair market value of the property at 3,500.00 per square meter for Romonafe and Vine. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), questioned the agreement to pay Romonafe on the basis of the 1997 valuation of its property at 3,500.00 per square meter as ―contrary to decisional law‖. In lieu thereof, it further decreed by the Court that the fair market value of the fair market value of the land be fixed at 1,500.00 per square meter. Thus, this present petition filed by Romonafe. ISSUE: Whether or not the agreement between NPC and Romonafe is valid considering the compensation given to Romonafe by NPC

Political Law HELD: Just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint whichever comes first. In the case at bar, just compensation should be determined as of July 12, 1995 when the expropriation case was filed before the trial court. The Provincial Appraisal Committee has established the fair market value on the subject parcels of land a value which is not too high on the part of the government and not too low on the part of property owners. The Court notes that the appellate court failed to pass on NPC‘s appeal with respect to the property of Vine. And, as NPV and even Romonafe manifest, the appellate court failed to consider the Partial Compromise Agreement between NPC and Vine in its assailed Decision. A remand of the case to the appellate court is thus in order.

SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO v. ROGELIO S. SOLUTA et al. 482 SCRA 660 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) To constitute waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, there must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish it. Petitioner Jose Marcel Panlilio, Vice President for Finance of petitioner Silahis International Hotel, Inc. (Silahis), with his personal secretary, a Bulletin reporter, and a security guard entered the union office located at the hotel basement. The same is with the permission of union officer Henry Babay. Babay was apprised about the suspected illegal activities. During the search they discovered marijuana flowering tops in the union office. An Information indicting the union officers was then filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for violation of Republic Act 6425, as amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179 (The Dangerous Drugs Act). The RTC acquitted the accused on the ground that the marijuana tops are inadmissible as evidence. Soluta and his fellow union officers including the union thereafter filed before the RTC a complaint against Silahis, Panlilio and those who cooperated for malicious prosecution and violation of their constitutional right against illegal search. The RTC granted such petition. It ruled that Silahis and Panlilio are jointly and severally liable to pay for damages in favor of Soluta et al. Silahis and Panlilio appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court‘s decision. ISSUE: Whether or not Silahis and Panlilio violated the constitutional right of Soluta et al. HELD: As constitutional rights, like the right to be secure in one‘s person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, occupy a lofty position in every civilized and democratic community and not infrequently susceptible to abuse, their violation, whether constituting a penal offense or not, must be guarded against.

Political Law

The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for violation of rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. That is why it is not even necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff. In the present case, as priorly stated, Silahis and Panlilio had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities allegedly undertaken in the union office and Maniego conducted surveillance of the union officers. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, Silahis, Panlilio and their companions barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one, and notwithstanding the objection of Babay. The course taken by Silahis and company stinks in illegality, it not falling under any of the exceptional instances when a warrantless search is allowed by law. Silahis and Panlilio‘s violation of individual Soluta et al.‘s constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. As for Silahis et al.‘s contention that property rights justified the search of the union office, the same does not lie. For Soluta et al., being the lawful occupants of the office, had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure. Neither does Silahis et al.‘s claim that they were allowed by union officer Babay to enter the union office lie. Babay‘s account of why Silahis and company went to the union office – to consider Panlilio‘s suggestion to settle the mauling incident is more credible, as is his claim that he protested the search, and even asked if they were armed with a search warrant. While it is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly, a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish it to constitute a waiver thereof. There must be proof of the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. In other words, the waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. The evidence shows otherwise, however. JOSEPH VICTOR G. EJERCITO v. SANDIGANBAYAN 509 SCRA 190 (2006), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) The Ombudsman has the power to issue subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum in relation to cases pending before it. The Office of the Ombudsman requested the Sandiganbayan to issue subpoena duces tecum against the Urban Bank relative to the case against President Joseph Estrada. Ms. Dela Paz, receiver of the Urban Bank, furnished the Office of the Ombudsman certified copies of manager checks detailed in the subpoena duces tecum. The Sandiganbayan granted the same. However, Ejercito claims that the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan are invalid and may not be enforced because the information found therein, given their ―extremely detailed‖ character and could only have been obtained by the Special Prosecution Panel through an illegal disclosure by the bank officials. Ejercito thus contended that, following the ―fruit of the poisonous tree‖ doctrine, the subpoenas must be quashed. Moreover, the ―extremely-detailed‖ information obtained by the

Political Law Ombudsman from the bank officials concerned during a previous investigation of the charges against him, such inquiry into his bank accounts would itself be illegal. ISSUE: Whether or not subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum may be issued to order the production of statement of bank accounts even before a case for plunder is filed in court HELD: The Supreme Court held that plunder is analogous to bribery, and therefore, the exception to R.A. 1405 must also apply to cases of plunder. The court also reiterated the ruling in Marquez v. Desierto that before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. As no plunder case against then President Estrada had yet been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction at the time the Ombudsman conducted an investigation, he concludes that the information about his bank accounts were acquired illegally, hence, it may not be lawfully used to facilitate a subsequent inquiry into the same bank accounts. Thus, his attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable to the instant case fails. The high Court, however, rejected the arguments of the petitioner Ejercito that the bank accounts which where demanded from certain banks even before the case was filed before the proper court is inadmissible in evidence being fruits of poisonous tree. This is because the Ombudsman issued the subpoenas bearing on the bank accounts of Ejercito about four months before Marquez was promulgated on June 27, 2001. While judicial interpretations of statutes, such as that made in Marquez with respect to R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, are deemed part of the statute as of the date it was originally passed, the rule is not absolute. Thus, the Court referred to the teaching of Columbia Pictures Inc., v. Court of Appeals, that: It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. ERNESTO FRANCISCO, JR., et al. v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al. G.R. No. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, 160310, 160318, 160342, 160343, 160360, 160365, 160370, 160376, 160392, 160397, 160403, 160405, 10 November 2003, EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) The power of judicial review extends to the rule making power of the Congress where said rule contravenes the mandate of the Constitution. Pursuant to the mandate of Section 3 (8) of Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, the 12 th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Rules). Section 16 Rule V of the House Rule provides that ―impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General‖ while Section 17 Rule V states, ―Within a period

Political Law of one (1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same official‖. A House Resolution was subsequently issued directing the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation on the manner of disbursements and expenditures of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) by the Chief Justice. Then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first complaint), endorsed by some of the members of the House of Representatives against then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. (Davide, Jr.) and seven other associate justices, in accordance with Section 3 (2) Article IX. The first complaint was dismissed for being insufficient in substance, hence, the Committee Report was never sent to the House in plenary. A second impeachment complaint (second complaint) signed by at least one third (1/3) of the members of the House of Representatives was filed with the Secretary General of the House of Representatives by Gilbert Teodoro et al., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry. Hence, the filing of this petition. Petitioners Ernesto Francisco, Jr., et al. (Francisco) prays that the House of Representatives be prevented from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment of the second complaint to the Senate, that the House Rules be declared null and void for being unconstitutional. Likewise, it prayed that the House Resolution infringes the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary. On the other hand, Respondent-members of the House of Representatives claims that the second complaint will prosper since the term, ―initiate‖ is different from ―filing‖ under Section 16 Rule V of the House Rule, hence, the first complaint was not really ―filed‖. Respondent-intervenors Senator Franklin Drilon (Drilon) and Atty. Jaime Soriano, et. al. filed filed a Manifestation and Petitions for Intervention, respectively, asserting that the Court has no jurisdiction to hear, prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, a co-equal and independent branch from performing its mandate of intiating impeachment cases and that there is no justiciable issue and the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination. The Manifestations and Petitions for Intervention were admitted by the Court. ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings 2.) Whether or not the Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings adopted by the 12 th Congress is constitutional 3.) Whether or not the second impeachment complaint may be validly filed HELD:

Judicial Review Includes the Power to Correct any Grave Abuse of Discretion on the part of any Government Branch or Instrumentality This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion

Political Law amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Respondent-members of the Congress‘ and intervenors Atty. Romulo Macalintal, et al.‘s reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings. Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. While the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.

The Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings adopted by the 12th Congress is Unconstitutional Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file‖. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it. Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. On the other hand, proceeding takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." Thus,

Political Law the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding." Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced. Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would, by necessary implication, have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum. Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral. The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing." Therefore, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional

The Second Impeachment Complaint is barred by Par. 5 Section 3 Article XI of the 1987 Constitution Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

Political Law In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE RAYMOND V. PALATINO, et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 189868, 15 December 2009, EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) governed.

Preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrage ensures that the State derives its power from the consent of the

On February 12, 2009 the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8585 adjusting the deadline of voter registration for the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections to October 31, 2009, instead of December 15, 2009 as fixed by their prior Resolution No. 8514 pursuant to R.A. 8189 or the Voter‘s Registration Act of 1996. The public clamored for an extension but the COMELEC argued that they need more time to prepare for the automated elections. It contends that the Omnibus Election Code confer upon it the power to promulgate rules ad regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and honest elections. It also cited the case of Akbayan-Youth v. Commission on Elections where the court denied a similar prayer for an extension of the deadline of voter registration for the May 14, 2001 elections. Raymond V. Palatino, representative of Kabataan Party-list assailed the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 and seeks declaration of its nullity. Palatino contends that this would be considered an encroachment of the legislative power of Congress as it amends the system of continuing voter registration under Section 8 of The Voter‘s Registration Act of 1996. It was prayed that Resolution No. 8585 be declared null and void and to extend the registration until January 9, 2010. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 8585, adjusting the deadline of voter registration to October 31, 2009 instead of December 15, 2009, is null and void HELD: Preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrage ensures that the State derives its power from the consent of the governed. The paramount importance of this right is also a function of the State policy of people empowerment articulated in the constitutional declaration that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them, bolstered by the recognition of the vital role of the youth in nation-building and directive to the State to encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

Political Law The clear text of the law thus decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during regular offices hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election. In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the mandate of continuing voter registration cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by R.A. 8189, Sec. 8 – daily during office hours, except during the period starting 120 days before the May 10, 2010 regular elections. There is thus no occasion for the COMELEC to exercise its power to fix other dates or deadlines therefor. COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is declared null and void insofar as it set the deadline of voter registration for the May 10, 2010 elections on October 31, 2009. The COMELEC is directed to proceed with dispatch in reopening the registration of voters and holding the same until January 9, 2010. LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. v. JAC LINER, INC. 452 SCRA 174 (2005), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) The true role of Constitutional law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. Two ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena with the objective of alleviating the traffic congestion said to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city. City Ordinance 1631 grants franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. to construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus- jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena. City Ordinance 1778, on the other hand, strips out all the temporary terminals in the City of Lucena the right to operate which as a result favors only the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City Ordinance 1631 as a valid excercise of police power while declaring City Ordinance 1778 as null and void for being invalid. Petitioner Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. filed its Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Lucena then elevated it via petition for review under Rule 45 before the Court. The Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) with which it has concurrent jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged orders of the trial court. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, Lucena now comes to the Court via petition for review to assail the Decision and Resolution of the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the means employed by the Lucena Sannguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not duly oppressive upon individuals HELD: With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single location, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those already existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal located outside the city proper, the franchise for which was granted to Lucena. The common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of Lucena.

Political Law The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems. From the memorandum filed before the Court by Lucena, it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets. Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to Lucena, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, the Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications. In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all. The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena City supporting the establishment of a common terminal, and similar expressions of support from the private sector, copies of which were submitted to this Court by Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The weight of popular opinion, however, must be balanced with that of an individual‘s rights.

METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT (MCWD) v. MARGARITA A. ADALA 526 SCRA 465 (2007), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) Franchises cannot be strictly understood to mean an authorization issued directly from the legislature. The Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD), a public corporation, appealed the decision rendered in favor of Margarita A. Adala (Adala) by the National Water Resources Board (NWRB), granting her a franchise permit to supply water to three sitios in Bulacao. MCWD was the exclusive distributor of water in the district. MCWD contended that the proposed waterworks would interfere with their water supply which it has the right to protect, and the water needs of the residents in the subject area was already being well served by petitioner. They also contend that they were granted by Section 47 of Presidential Decree 198, granting exclusive franchise only to public utilities. Engineer Paredes, the general manager of MCWD, filed Certificate of Public Convenience by the National Water Resources Board (NWRB), which permitted the company to operate and maintain waterworks supply services. MCWD alleged that the Board of Directors of MCWD did not give consent to the issuance of the franchise applied for.

Political Law ISSUES: utilities

Whether or not Section 47 of Presidential Decree 198 grants exclusive franchise to public

HELD: MWCD‘s position that an overly strict construction of the term ―franchise‖ as used in Section 47 of P.D. 198 would lead to an absurd result impresses. If franchises, in this context, were strictly understood to mean an authorization issuing directly from the legislature, it would follow that, while Congress cannot issue franchises for operating waterworks systems without the water district‘s consent, the NWRB may keep on issuing CPCs authorizing the very same act even without such consent. In effect, not only would the NWRB be subject to less constraints than Congress in issuing franchises. The exclusive character of the franchise provided for by Section 47 would be illusory. While the prohibition in Section 47 of P.D. 198 applies to the issuance of CPCs for the reasons discussed above, the same provision must be deemed void ab initio for being irreconcilable with Article XIV Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which was ratified on January 17, 1973 – the constitution in force when P.D. 198 was issued on May 25, 1973. That the legislative authority – in this instance, then President Marcos – intended to delegate its power to issue franchises in the case of water districts is clear from the fact that, pursuant to the procedure outlined in P.D. 198, it no longer plays a direct role in authorizing the formation and maintenance of water districts, it having vested the same to local legislative bodies and the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA).

MERCURY GROUP OF COMPANIES, INC. v. HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND 541 SCRA 211 (2007), SECOND DIVISION, (Carpio Morales, J.) The law of the case doctrine is merely a rule of procedure and does not go to the power of the court, and will not be adhered to where its application will result in an unjust decision. P.D. No. 1752, the ―Home Development Mutual Fund Law of 1980‖ created the Pag-IBIG Fund System. Under P.D. No. 1752, coverage of the Pag-IBIG Fund is mandatory for all employees covered by the SSS and the GSIS and their employers. The law provides, however, for a waiver or suspension from coverage or participation in the Fund. Upon the effectivity of the law in 1980 up to 1995, Mercury and its subsidiaries were, on their application, annually granted waiver from coverage of the Fund because their Retirement or Provident Plan was superior to it. In 1995, the Board of Trustees of Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), issued Amendment to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742. Under the Amendment and the Guidelines, an employer with a provident/retirement and housing plan superior to that provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund is entitled to execution/waiver from Fund coverage. In 1996, HDMF had once again amended the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 1752, as amended, this time limiting waiver from Fund coverage only to ―distressed employers‖.

Political Law

Mercury filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare null and void the 1996 amendment to the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 1752, as amended. By Order, RTC dismissed Mercury‘s petition for certiorari on the ground that it failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and that HDMF‘s questioned amendment of the implementing rules was made in the exercise of its legislative/administrative, not judicial, function. The Court of Appeals, by Decision, granted in part Mercury‘s petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The denial of the appeallate court of Mercury‘s waiver from coverage was based on the law of the case doctrine. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in applying the law of the case doctrine HELD: In affirming HDMF‘s denial of Mercury‘s request for waiver from Fund coverage for the year 1996, the appellate court harped on the law of the case doctrine. Thus it held that Mercury‘s application anew for waiver/exemption from Fund coverage is anchored on the decision of the Supreme Court in the China Bank case which declared as null and void Section 1 of Rule VII of the Amendments to the RRI of R.A. No. 7742, and HDMF Circular No. 124-B prescribing the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Applications for Waiver or Suspension of Fund coverage under P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742. It is in this view that Mercury contends that HDMF should have considered its application for waiver/exemption from the coverage of the Fund. On the other hand, HDMF invoked the doctrine of the law of the case pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 132416 in denying Mercury‘s application for waiver/exemption from the Fund coverage. The doctrine of the law of the case does not apply to the present case vis a vis the decision of this Court in G.R. No. 132416. The present case is not a subsequent proceeding of the same case – G.R. No. 132416. This is an entirely new one which was commenced by Mercury‘s filing of an original petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the Court of Appeals against HDMF. Even assuming arguendo that the present proceeding may be considered a subsequent proceeding of G.R. No. 132416, the doctrine of the law of the case just the same does not apply because the said case was not resolved on the merits. The Order of this Court denying Mercury‘s petition for review in G.R. No. 132416 found no reversible error in the Order of the RTC dismissing Mercury‘s case primarily on a procedural ground – failure to exhaust administrative remedies. At all events, the doctrine ―is merely a rule of procedure and does not go to the power of the court, and will not be adhered to where its application will result in an unjust decision.‖ To sustain HDMF‘s refusal to grant a waiver of Fund coverage to Mercury on the basis of amendments to implementing rules which had priorly been declared null and void by this Court would certainly be unjust. In fine, the doctrine of the law of the case cannot be made to apply to the case at bar, hence, Mercury‘s application for waiver from Fund coverage for the year 1996 must be processed by HDMF. THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, et al. v. VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., et al. 530 SCRA 341 (2007), EN BANC, (CARPIO MORALES, J.)

Political Law It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the mass transport system. To solve the worsening traffic congestions problem in Metro Manila the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 179, ―Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transportation System.‖ As determined in E.O. 179, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets that impede the flow of vehicles and commuters and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes. To decongest traffic, petitioner Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) came up with a recommendation, proposing the elimination of bus terminals located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares, and the construction of mass transport terminal facilties to provide a more convenient access to mass transport system to the commuting public. The project provided for under this E.O. was called ―Greater Manila Transport System‖ (Project) wherein the MMDA was designated as the implementing agency. Accordingly, the Metro Manila Council the governing board of the MMDA issued a resolution, expressing full support of the project. The respondents, which are engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial bus operation, Viron Transport Co., Inc. and Mencorp Transportation System, Inc., assailed the constitutionality of E.O. 179 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They alleged that the E.O., insofar as it permitted the closure of existing bus terminal, constituted a deprivation of property without due process; that it contravened the Public Service Act which mandates public utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals as a requisite for the privilege of operating as common carriers; and that Republic Act 7924, which created MMDA, did not authorize the latter to order the closure of bus terminals. The trial court declared the E.O. unconstitutional. The MMDA argued before the Court that there was no justiciable controversy in the case for declaratory relief filed by the respondents; that E.O. 179 was only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA, and as such did not bind third persons; that the President has the authority to implement the Project pursuant to E.O. 125; and that E.O. 179 was a valid exercise of police power. ISSUE: Whether or not E.O, 179 is constitutional HELD:

By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the “Greater Manila Transport System,” the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires Executive Order 125, invoked by the MMDA, was issued by former President Aquino in her exercise of legislative powers. This executive order reorganized the Ministry (now Department) of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), and defined its powers and functions. It mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC includes the power to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications. Accordingly, it is the DOTC Secretary who is authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the law. The President may also exercise the same power and authority to order the implementation of the mass transport system project, which admittedly is one for

Political Law transportation. Such authority springs from the President‘s power of control over all executive departments as well as for the faithful execution of the laws under the Constitution. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC, which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation. It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the mass transport system. By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires.

In the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. 7924, MMDA cannot issue order for the closure of existing bus terminals Republic Act (R.A.) 7924 authorizes the MMDA to perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercises regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services, including transport and traffic management. While traffic decongestion has been recognized as a valid ground in the exercise of police power, MMDA is not granted police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or the Metro Manila Council to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Greater Manila Transport System as envisioned by E.O. 179; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents‘ terminals. Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two sets of a valid police power measure: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In various cases, the Court has recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private concern. Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the felt need to address the worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the MMDA so determined, is caused by the increasing volume of buses plying the major thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of existing transport system. With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in Metro Manila the E.O. seeks to eliminate the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and provide more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities. Common carriers with terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila would thus be compelled to close down their existing bus terminals and use the MMDA-designated common parking areas. The Court fails to see how the prohibition against respondents‘ terminals can be considered a reasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of respondents‘ bus terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of transference from one site to another. Moreover, an order for the closure of bus terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act. The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or passenger

Political Law terminals, is generally considered a necessary service by provincial bus operators, hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition or lease of suitable terminal sites. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. HON. SYLVA G. AGUIRRE PADERANGA, et al. 464 SCRA 481 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) The determination of just compensation is a judicial function and the recommendation of the commissioners is given weight and consideration if the same is reasonable and just. National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a case for expropriation against Petrona O. Dilao, et al. before Regional Trial Court of Cebu, involving parcels of land located in Cebu. Expropriation was instituted to implement Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project. A day after the complaint was filed, NPC filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of writ of possession of the lands. The RTC issued an order granting NPC‘s motion. It appointed 3 Board of Commissioners to determine just compensation. The board recommended appraisal of parcel of land co-owned by Dilao, et al. at P516.66 per square meter. However, NPC filed an opposition assailing the correctness of the appraisal for failing to take into account Republic Act No. 6395 which provides that the just compensation for right-of-way easement shall be equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the market value of the property. NPC asserted that Digao, et al. could still use the traversed land for agricultural purposes, subject only to its easement. It added that the lots were of no use to its operations except for its transmission lines. The RTC rendered its decision ordering NPC to pay fair market value at P516.66 per square meter. NPC appealed but the same was denied due to failure to file and perfect its appeal within the prescribed period. A motion for execution of judgment was subsequently filed by Dilao, et al. which was granted by the lower court. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court‘s decision. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not RTC abused its authority by misapplying the rules governing fair valuation HELD: In finding that the trial court did not abuse its authority in evaluating the evidence and the reports placed before it nor did it misapply the rules governing fair valuation, the Court of Appeals found the majority report‘s valuation of P500 per square meter to be fair. Said factual finding of the Court of Appeals, absent any showing that the valuation is exorbitant or otherwise unjustified, is binding on the parties as well as this Court. Indeed, expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls within the ambit of the term ―expropriation‖.

Political Law From the Commissioner‘s report it cannot be gainsaid that NPC‘s complaint merely involves a simple case of mere passage of transmission lines over Dilao et al.‘s property. Aside from the actual damage done to the property traversed by the transmission lines, the agricultural and economic activity normally undertaken on the entire property is unquestionably restricted and perpetually hampered as the environment is made dangerous to the occupant‘s life and limb. The determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings being a judicial function, the Court finds the commissioners‘ recommendation of P516.66 per square meter, which was approved by the trial court, to be just and reasonable compensation for the expropriated property of Dilao and her siblings. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. COURT OF APPEALS and DR. MERCEDITA J. MACABULOS G.R. No. 159395, 07 May 2008, FIRST DIVISION, (Carpio Morales, J.) The use of the word “may” is ordinarily construed as permissive or directory, indicating that a matter of discretion is involved. Dr. Minda Virtudes (Dr. Virtudes) charged Dr. Mercedita J. Macabulos (Dr. Macabulos) who was then holding the position of Medical Officer V at the Department of Education, Culture and Sports – National Capital Region (DECS-NCR) or the Chief of the School Health and Nutrition Unit with dishonesty, grave misconduct, oppression, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service and acts unbecoming a public official in violation of the Civil Service Laws and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Dr. Virtudes alleged that Dr. Macabulos incurred a cash advance of P45,000 and she was required by the latter to produce dental and medical receipts for the liquidation of the cash advance. Taking into account that Dr. Virtudes was not yet assigned at School Health and Nutrition Unit, DECS-NCR, she did not submit the receipts and invoices. Upon failure to submit the receipts, Dr. Macabulos allegedly subjected her to several forms of harassment. Dr. Macabulos denied the accusations and claimed that it was Dr. Antonia Lopez-Dee (Dr. Dee), the Supervising Dentist, who used the money to purchase medical and dental supplies. In support of her claim, she attached an unnotarized affidavit of Dr. Dee admitting said purchase using the cash advance of Dr. Macabulos. Dr. Virtudes asserted that it was Dr. Macabulos who used the cash advance by improperly spending it and that she tried to liquidate the same by submitting a tampered invoice in conformity with the amount of the cash advance. Graft Investigation Officer I Ulysis S. Calumpad rendered a decision absolving Dr. Macabulos from the administrative charge. However, Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. disapproved the decision. He found out that Dr. Dee signed an unnotarized affidavit but the contents of the first page were entirely different from the affidavit submitted by Dr. Macabulos in her counteraffidavit. A new memorandum by the Ombudsman was released finding Dr. Macabulos guilty imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal from the government service. Thereafter, Dr. Macabulos filed a motion for consideration before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reversed the decision of the Ombudsman ratiocinating that the Ombudsman can no longer investigate the complaint since the acts complained of were committed one year from the filing of the complaint and that the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman is not immediately executory. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not CA‘s interpretation of Section 20(5) of Republic Act No. 6670 (The

Political Law Ombudsman Act of 1989) as a prescriptive period on the Ombudsman administrative disciplinary cases is correct 2) Whether or not the penalty of dismissal from the service meted on the private respondent is immediately executory in accordance with the valid rule of execution pending appeal uniformly observed in administrative disciplinary cases HELD: The Court of Appeals should have granted the motion for intervention filed by the Ombudsman. In its decision, the appellate court not only reversed the order of the Ombudsman but also delved into the investigatory power of the Ombudsman. Since the Ombudsman was not impleaded as a party when the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman had no other recourse but to move for intervention and reconsideration of the decision in order to prevent the undue restriction of its constitutionally mandated investigatory power. The Court of Appeals held that under Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman is already barred by prescription from investigating the complaint since it was filed more than one year from the occurrence of the complained act. The Court found this interpretation by the appellate court unduly restrictive of the duty of the Ombudsman as provided under the Constitution to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The use of the word ―may‖ is ordinarily construed as permissive or directory, indicating that a matter of discretion is involved. Thus, the word ―may,‖ when used in a statute, does not generally suggest compulsion. The use of the word ―may‖ in Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 indicates that it is within the discretion of the Ombudsman whether to conduct an investigation when a complaint is filed after one year from the occurrence of the complained act or omission. The Court of Appeals held that the order of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of dismissal is not immediately executory. The Court of Appeals applied the ruling in Lapid v. Court of Appeals, that all other decisions of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in Section 27 of RA 6770 are neither final nor immediately executory. In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require. An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and

Political Law properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be ground for disciplinary action against said officer. Hence, in the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, the Court noted that Section 7 of A.O. 17 provides for execution of the decisions pending appeal, which provision is similar to Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. More recently, in the 2007 case of Buencamino v. Court of Appeals, the primary issue was whether the decision of the Ombudsman suspending petitioner therein from office for six months without pay was immediately executory even pending appeal in the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the pertinent ruling in Lapid v. Court of Appeals has already been superseded by the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, which clearly held that decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. GERTRUDES MADRIAGA and ANA MARIE BERNARDO 503 SCRA 631 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) The Ombudsman’s authority to impose administrative penalty and enforce compliance therewith is not merely recommendatory but mandatory within the bounds of the law. The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman charging Gertrudes Madriaga, school principal of San Juan Elementary School and Ana Marie Bernardo, Canteen Manager of the same school, with violation of Section 1 of Rule IV and Section 1 of Rule VI of the Rules Implementing Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. They were subsequently found guilty of the offense charged. Consequently, they were meted out the penalty of six (6) months imprisonment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared that the six-month suspension meted out by the Office of the Ombudsman to Madriaga and Bernardo (Gertrudes) is merely recommendatory to the Department of Education, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose administrative sanctions over public officials HELD: Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution grants the Ombudsman administrative disciplinary power to direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

Political Law Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the constitutional grant to the Ombudsman of the power to ―recommend‖ the imposition of penalty on erring public officials and employees and ensure compliance therewith. The Court notes that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee — akin to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's "recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in R.A. 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID. The word "recommend" in Sec. 15(3) must thus be read in conjunction with the phrases "ensure compliance therewith" or "enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21" of R.A. No. 6770. In fine, the Ombudsman's authority to impose administrative penalty and enforce compliance therewith is not merely recommendatory. It is mandatory within the bounds of the law. The implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.

ZENAIDA ORTEGA v. THE QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT, et al. 469 SCRA 388 (2005), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) There must be a final judgment rendered by an inferior court before the Supreme Court can assume jurisdiction over a case. Zenaida Ortega comes directly to the Supreme Court assailing the validity of a Quezon City Ordinance which reclassified ―as residential or converted from its original classification to residential for distribution or for sale to its informal settlers‖ a ―parcel of land which may be considered as accretion/excess lot‖ and to those lots previously referred to when the ordinance has just been proposed. Ortega, the rightful owner of the land subject of the ordinance, alleges that in enacting the ordinance, her various letter-protests which contains all her claims, were not heeded in the City Council, thus violating her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law. The Quezon City government alleges that the present petition raises a question of fact which entails reception of evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case at bar HELD: Under Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court shall have the power to ―review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may

Political Law provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question‖. The Supreme Court can thus only review, revise, reverse, modify on appeal or certiorari final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of, among other things, an ordinance is in question. Foremost, therefore, is that there must be first a final judgment rendered by an inferior court before the Supreme Court can assume jurisdiction over a case of this nature. It does not analyze or weigh evidence brought before it at the first instance, otherwise, it would preempt the primary function of the lower court to try the case on the merits, receive evidence, and decide the case definitively. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DONEL GO and VAL DE LOS REYES G.R. Nos. 130714, 139634, 139331, 140845, 140846, 27 December 2002, EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) An accused must be afforded with ample opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Donel Go (Donel) and Val de los Reyes (Val) were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Albay for two and three counts of rape, respectively. Donel was apprehended but jumped bail, hence, he was tried in absentia while Val initially remained unapprehended. Five witnesses were presented and testified against Donel. He was subsequently sentenced to death. Hence, the automatic review of the Court. Val was later on apprehended and the two of the witnesses who testified against Donel were presented during Val‘s trial. However, the private prosecutor merely reread the questions and answers as recorded in the transcript of the witnesses‘ testimony at Donel‘s trial. On the other hand, the remaining two witnesses never appeared in court and only the transcript of their testimonies during Donel‘s trial was used as evidence. Val was convicted by RTC and was sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua. ISSUE: full trial

Whether or not RTC abused its discretion when it allowed a summary proceeding instead of a

HELD: Accused-appellant Val questions the regularity of the procedure adopted by the trial court by allowing prosecution witnesses to merely affirm on direct examination their previous testimonies taken during the trial of accused-appellant Donel. Such proceeding, he contends, violated his right to confront and cross-examine said witnesses. This Court held that such procedure violated Sections 1 and 2, Rule 132 and Section 1, Rule 133 of the then Revised Rules of Court, which required that the testimonies of witnesses be given orally. Those provisions are substantially reproduced in the Revised Rules of Court. This Court held that the witness "should have been examined directly on the statements in her affidavit." The same rule applies in the present cases against accused-appellant Val where the prosecution witnesses were merely asked to confirm their testimonies given at the trial of another in which he took no part.

Political Law The apprehensions of the prosecution that the lapse of time may have compromised the memory of the witnesses are understandable. But in any event, lapse of time is a matter that the trial court would consider in weighing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies; it does not justify the abbreviated procedure adopted by the trial court, especially considering that the case against accusedappellant Donel was tried before another branch of the RTC. MICHAEL F. PLANAS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. 484 SCRA 529 (2006), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) The COMELEC has no jurisdiction over a case where there is already a valid proclamation of a candidate. A Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of Congressional Candidate Anna Liza C. Cabochan was filed by a registered voter of Quezon City before the Commission on Elections National Capital Region (COMELEC NCR), alleging that Cabochan's certificate suffered from a serious and material defect as it was notarized by a Notary Public whose commission had already expired. Consequently, Cabochan withdrew her certificate of candidacy and Matias V. Defensor, Jr. filed his in substitution of Cabochan. Herein petitioner Michael F. Planas (Planas), also a candidate for the same position, filed before the Quezon City Board of Canvassers a Petition for the Suspension of the Canvassing of Votes in favor of Defensor who appeared to be leading the congressional race, citing the memorandumrecommendation of the NCR Acting Director directing that the certificate of Cabochan be denied due course and that the substitution of Defensor for Cabochan be accordingly declared invalid. Defensor was proclaimed as the winning candidate for the congressional seat of the Third District of Quezon City. On March 11, 2005, the COMELEC En Banc issued the challenged Resolution ruling that the COMELEC is already ousted with jurisdiction over the case thus, the same is already under the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and that the certificate of candidacy of Cabonchan is valid, and the subsequent substitution by Defensor is legal. Hence, the present petition of Planas. ISSUES: Whether or not the COMELEC was divested of its jurisdiction by virtue of Defensor's proclamation and assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives HELD: The general rule is that the proclamation of a congressional candidate divests COMELEC of jurisdiction in favor of the HRET. This rule, however, is not without exception. As held in Mutuc, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., the usual remedy of any party aggrieved in an election is to be found in an election protest. But that is so only on the assumption that there has been a valid proclamation. Where the proclamation itself is illegal, the assumption of office cannot in any way affect the basic issues. In the case at bar, at the time of the proclamation of Defensor who garnered the highest number of votes, the Division Resolution invalidating his certificate of candidacy was not yet final, hence, he had at that point in time remained qualified. Therefore, his proclamation was valid or legal.

Political Law Following Mutuc then, as at the time of Defensor‘s proclamation the denial of his COC due course was not yet final, his proclamation was valid or legal and as he in fact had taken his oath of office and assumed his duties as representative, the COMELEC had been effectively divested of jurisdiction over the case. THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, et al. v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962, 14 October 2008, EN BANC, (Carpio Morales, J.) While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law, the government’s act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy of pursuing peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to convince the MILF to continue negotiating with the government. MILF, thereafter, convened its Central Committee and decided to meet with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks were held in Libya which resulted to the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which consists of three (3) aspects: a.) security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral domain aspect. Various negotiations were held which led to the finalization of the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. In its body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro‖ to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition, has the freedom to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relation with foreign countries. ―The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE.‖ The MOA-AD further provides for the extent of the territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.‖ With regard to governance, on the other hand, a shared responsibility and authority between the Central Government and BJE was provided. The relationship was described as ―associative‖. With the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and finalization of the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation, as mandated by Executive Order No. 3, and right to information. They further contend that it violates the Constitution and laws. Hence, the filing of the petition. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and right to information 2) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws

Political Law HELD:

The MOA-AD is a public concern and should comply with the constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and right to information The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Intended as a ―splendid symmetry‖ to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution which provides that subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. Moreover, the policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people‘s right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people. Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for ―reasonable safeguards.‖ The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the broader right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy. An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people‘s will. Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms. The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the ―marching orders‖ to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people‘s participation. One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it ―should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos‖ and ―shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community.‖ Included as a component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which includes ―continuing consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people‘s participation in the peace process.‖

Political Law Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate “continuing” consultations, contrary to respondents’ position that plebiscite is “more than sufficient consultation.‖ Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to ―[c]onduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace process.‖ E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be ―the principal forum for the Presidential Adviser on Peace Progress (PAPP) to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives.‖ In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners’ right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure.

The M OA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government. 4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. The nature of the ―associative‖ relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of ―association‖ in international law, and the MOA-AD – by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR– placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term ―associative‖ in the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE‘s capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE‘s participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE‘s right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection,

Political Law and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.

These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an ―associative‖ relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD‘s provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X: SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the M OA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that ―[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.‖ The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term ―autonomous region‖ in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010

inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite – Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal – are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE. Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: ―The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development.‖ An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity. Besides being irreconcilable with the constitution, the MOA-AD is also inconsistent with prevailing statutory law, among which are R.A. 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

FERDINAND S. TOPACIO v. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY SANTOS ONG and THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, 541 SCRA 211 (2008), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. It cannot be assailed collaterally, even through mandamus or a motion to annul or set aside order.

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Petitioner Ferdinand Topacio implored the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to initiate post-haste a quo warranto proceeding against Gregory Santos Ong. He points out that natural-born citizenship is also a qualification for appointment as member of the Sandiganbayan and that Ong has failed to meet the citizenship requirement. Ong, on the other hand, avers that the RTC already granted his petition and recognized him as a natural-born citizen. The decision having become final, he caused the corresponding annotation thereof in his Certificate of Birth. The OSG informed Topacio that it cannot favorably act on request for the filing of a quo warranto petition until the RTC case shall have been terminated with finality. Topacio assails this position of the OSG as being tainted with grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE: Whether or not the OSG committed grave abuse of discretion in deferring the filing of a petition for quo warranto HELD: The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion, much less, a grave one, on the part of the OSG in deferring action on the filing of a quo warranto case until after the RTC case has been terminated with finality. A decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply because the affected party disagrees with it. The Solicitor General is the counsel of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials or agents. In the discharge of its task, the Solicitor General must see to it that the best interest of the government is upheld within the limits set by law. In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor General may suspend or turn down the institution of an action for quo warranto where there are just and valid reasons. Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the management of the case. He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file the case at all. He may do everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the national interest and the policy of the government on the matter at hand. It appears that after studying the case, the Solicitor General saw the folly of re-litigating the same issue of Ong‘s citizenship in the quo warranto case simultaneously with the RTC case, not to mention the consequent risk of forum-shopping. In any event, the OSG did not totally write finis to the issue as it merely advised petitioner to await the outcome of the RTC case. ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY, et al. 556 SCRA 471 (2008), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.

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On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series of negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening. In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests. Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as senator. The RTC however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside orders of the RTC.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Trillanes‘ case is different from that of the Jalosjos case 2. Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work and serve his mandate as senator 3. Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of detention prisoners who are held without bail

HELD:

No distinction between Trillanes’ case and that of Jalosjos case The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged. In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010

Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.

Trillanes’ election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him to serve his mandate

The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.

It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations. WILFREDO M. TRINIDAD v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al. 539 SCRA 415 (2007), EN BANC, (Carpio Morales, J.)

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A judicial order issued pursuant to the court’s discretionary authority is not subject to reversal on review unless it constitutes grave abuse of discretion, a trace of which is wanting herein. Wilfredo Trinidad is charged with two criminal cases by the Office of the Ombudsman. The first case is for knowingly pre-qualifying PIATCO despite its failure to meet the financial capability standards set by law. The second is for granting PIATCO undue benefit and advantage through the execution Third Supplement to the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement covering the NAIA IPT III Project. During the pendency of the petition, the Sandiganbayan found no probable cause to proceed with the trial in, and thus dismissed the second charge and denied the prosecution‘s motion for reconsideration by. The petition insofar as the second case is concern is effectively mooted. Trinidad argues that res judicata should apply since the Office of the Ombudsman twice found no sufficient basis to indict him in similar cases earlier filed against him. Thus, it should be interpreted in the concept of double jeopardy in criminal law. He posits that repeated investigations are oppressive and particularly points out that no new evidence was presented at the reinvestigation. ISSUE: Whether or not the order dismissing the civil case does not bar Trinidad‘s criminal prosecution HELD: As for the issue of prejudicial question, the Court finds nothing that warrants the suspension of the criminal action. The essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. A prejudicial question arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent to the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. In other words, the jurisdiction to try and resolve the prejudicial question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. As reflected in the elements of a prejudicial question, the concept involves a civil and a criminal case. There is here no prejudicial question to speak of for, technically, no civil case pends. Trinidad cites, however, Quiambao v. Osorio. In that case, this Court held that the more prudent course for the trial court to have taken was to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a determination was made by the Land Authority in an administrative case pending before it which involved the same parties and the same parcel of land. The suggested move was based on the following rule: The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes [sic] on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled the second action should be stayed. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010

Although the rule is properly applicable to instances involving two court actions, the peculiar circumstances in Quiambao warranted the application of the rule by analogy. The principle was reiterated in Abacan, Jr. v. Northwestern University, Inc. where the Court held that the presence or absence of liability for allowing the withdrawal of money from the university‘s bank account is reliant on the findings of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as to which of the two factions is the de jure board of directors. In sum, while there have been instances where suspension of proceedings was effectively obtained in pending cases which technically were not criminal and civil in nature, such action was based on the court‘s discretionary power to stay proceedings. A judicial order issued pursuant to the court‘s discretionary authority is not subject to reversal on review unless it constitutes grave abuse of discretion, a trace of which is wanting herein. The Ombudsman thus correctly found no justification to stay the proceedings. Even if the Court takes cognizance of the criminal case subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan, application by analogy may not be made. Unlike in Quiambao and Abacan, the arbitration tribunal is not an administrative agency that could assume primary jurisdiction over matters within a particular sphere of competence, particularly over any issue the resolution of which is determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of petitioner.

LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. VICTOR O. RAMOS, Secretary Department of Environment and Natural Resources; HORACIO RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); RUBEN TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC. G.R. No. 127882, 27 January 2004, En Banc (Carpio-Morales, J.) The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.

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Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter. In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals. EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of Australian investments. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources. 2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a ―service contract‖ that permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources. HELD:

First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional

RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources. Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that ―All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.‖ The same section also states that, ―the exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.‖ Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution. Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country‘s natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.

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The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or other forms of assistance‖ in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only ―technical and financial assistance.‖ The management and the operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid. The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in the nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase ―financial and technical agreements‖ in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law. The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation‘s mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto. The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine natural resources. When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with them. Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a service contract. Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract area.‖ Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.‖ These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down.

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****** LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. VICTOR O. RAMOS, Secretary Department of Environment and Natural Resources; HORACIO RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); RUBEN TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC. G.R. No. 127882, 01 December 2004, En Banc (Panganiban, J.) A verba legis scrutiny of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution discloses not even a hint f a desire to prohibit foreign involvement in the management or operation of mining activities, or to eradicate service contracts. Such moves would necessarily imply an underlying drastic shift in fundamental economic and developmental policies of the State. That change requires a much more definite and irrefutable basis than mere omission of the words “service contract” from the new Constitution . In a decision dated January 27, 2004, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, its implementing rules (DENR Department Administrative Order 9640) and the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into by the government and Western Mining Corp. Philippines, an Australian corporation. The Court said RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and its implementing rules are unconstitutional for allowing ―service contracts‖ now prohibited by the 1987 Charter. The Court said the FTAA is a service contract that grants control or beneficial ownership over the nation‘s mineral resources to foreign contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto. It was also on this ground that the Court struck down as constitutionally infirm the FTAA between the government and WMCP. Respondents Chamber of Mines of the Philippines (CMP) and the Environment Secretary filed motions for reconsideration. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the case has been rendered moot by the sale of WMC shares in WMCP to Sagittarius (60% of Sagittarius‘ equity is owned by Filipinos and/or Filipino-owned corporations while 40% is owned by Indophil Resources NL, an Australian company) and by the subsequent transfer and registration of the FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius. 2. Whether or not the phrase ―Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance‖ contained in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution was properly interpreted. HELD: The Philippine Mining Act, its rules and the FTAA entered into by the Government and private respondents are valid. First Issue: Mootness The record shows that WMC had already sold its shareholdings in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, a 60% Filipino-owned corporation. This acquisition, no longer makes it possible for the Court to declare the FTAA unconstitutional.

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The crux of this issue for mootness is the fact that WMCP, at the time it entered into the FTAA, happened to be wholly owned by WMC Resources International Pty., Ltd. (WMC), which in turn was a wholly owned subsidiary of Western Mining Corporation Holdings Ltd., a publicly listed major Australian mining and exploration company. The contention that an FTAA could be entered into by the government only with a foreign corporation, never with a Filipino enterprise is completely outlandish. The nationalistic provisions of the Constitution are all anchored on the protection of Filipino interests, that what the Constitution grants to foreigners should be equally available to Filipinos. The claim that the FTAA was intended to apply solely to a foreign corporation citing Section 12, which provides for international commercial arbitration under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce, after local remedies are exhausted. This provision, however, does not necessarily imply that the WMCP FTAA cannot be transferred to and assumed by a Filipino corporation like Sagittarius, in which event, the said provision should simply be disregarded as a superfluity. Section 40 of RA 7942 (The Mining Law) allegedly requires the President‘s prior approval of a transfer, requiring the ‗suspicious‘ sale of shares from WMC to Sagittarius the need to be litigated in a separate case. A re-reading of the said provision, however, leads to a different conclusion. Section 40 expressly applies to the assignment or transfer of the FTAA, not to the sale and transfer of shares of stock in WMCP. The controversy should be resolved notwithstanding its mootness to determine once and for all the constitutionality of RA 7942, its implementing rules and other future FTAAs which may be the subject of other similar suits. Such a ruling, should remove the cloud of uncertainty that has discouraged investments into the Philippine mining industry. The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest involved, as well as the necessity for a ruling to put an end to the uncertainties plaguing the mining industry and the affected communities as a result of doubts cast upon the constitutionality and validity of the Mining Act, the subject FTAA and future FTAAs, and the need to avert a multiplicity of suits makes it necessary to resolve the controversy. The entry of the Chamber of Mines of the Philippines (CMP) as respondents bars objections arising from the standing or legal interest of the original parties. Moreover, the entry of CMP – the local industry association of mining companies – likewise puts into focus the real issue in this case, which is whether paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is contravened by RA 7942 and DAO 96-40, not whether it was violated by specific acts implementing RA 7942 and DAO 96-40. When an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Second Issue: The Proper Interpretation of the Constitutional Phrase “Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance” The application of the familiar principles of statutory construction in the scrutiny of Section 2 Article XII does not reveal any intention to proscribe foreign involvement in the management or operation of mining activities or to eliminate service contracts. Section 2 Article XII containes no express prohibition to this effect. Had the framers intended to prohibit direct participation of alien Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010

corporations in the exploitation of the country‘s natural resources, they would have employed clearly restrictive language barring foreign corporations from directly engaging in the exploitation of the country‘s natural resources. Foreign corporations may indeed participate in the exploitation, development and use of the Philippine natural resources but subject to the full control and supervision of the State. RA 7942, its implementing rules (DAO 96-40) and the FTAA entered into by the Government and WMCP grant the Government full control and supervision over all aspects of planned exploration, development and utilization activities. Sections 7.8 and 7.9 of the FTAA however are objectionable and void for being contrary to public policy. Section 7.8 permits the sums spend by the government for the benefit of the contractor to be deductible from the State‘s share in the net mining revenues since it constitutes unjust enrichment on the part of the contractor at the government‘s expense. Section 7.9, meanwhile, deprives the Government of its share in the net mining revenues in the event the foreign stockholders of a foreign mining company sell 60% or more of their equity to a Filipino citizen or corporation. Thus, with the exception of Sections 7.8 and 7.9 of the subject FTAA, the FTAA, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 are declared constitutional. The meaning of “Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance” A constitutional provision specifically allowing foreign-owned corporations to render financial or technical assistance in respect of mining or any other commercial activity was clearly unnecessary; the provision was meant to refer to more than mere financial or technical assistance. The framers of the Constitution during its deliberation regarding foreign investment in and management of an enterprise for large-scale explorations, development and utilization of minerals, spoke about service contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973 Constitution. It is obvious from their discussions that they did not intend to ban or eradicate service contracts. Instead, they were intent on crafting provisions to put in place safeguards that would eliminate or minimize abuses prevalent during the martial law regime. They were going to permit service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors – but with safety measures to prevent abuses – as an exception to the general norm established in the first paragraph of Section 2 Article XII, which reserves or limits to Filipino citizens and corporations that are at least 60 percent owned by such citizens, the exploration, development and utilization of mineral or petroleum resources. This was prompted by the perceived insufficiency of Filipino capital and the felt need for foreign expertise in the EDU of mineral resources. The drafters, by specifying such agreements involving assistance, necessarily gave implied assent to everything that these agreements entailed or that could reasonably be deemed necessary to make them tenable and effective – including management authority with respect to the day-to-day operations of the enterprise, and measures for the protection of interests of the foreign corporation, at least to the extent they are consistent with Philippine sovereignty over natural resources, the constitutional requirement of State control, and beneficial ownership of natural resources remains vested in the State. It is clear that agreements involving wither technical or financial assistance referred to in paragraph 4 are in fact service contracts, but such new service contracts are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on one hand, and on the other hand, government as principal or ―owner‖ (of the works), whereby the foreign contractor provides the capital, technology, and technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of the large-scale mining / extractive Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010

enterprise, and government through its agencies (DENR, MGB) actively exercises full control and supervision over the entire enterprise. Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant of such service contracts is subject to several safeguards, among them: (1) that the service contract be crafted in accordance with a general law setting standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements; (2) the President be the signatory for the government; and (3) the President report the executed agreement to Congress within thirty days. Ultimate Test: Full State Control The primacy of the principle of the State‘s sovereign ownership of all mineral resources, and its full control and supervision over all aspects of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources must be upheld. But ―full control and supervision‖ cannot be taken literally to mean that the State controls and supervises everything down to the minutest details and makes all required actions, as this would render impossible the legitimate exercise by the contractor of a reasonable degree of management prerogative and authority, indispensable to the proper functioning of the mining enterprise. Also, government need not micro-manage mining operations and day-to-day affairs of the enterprise in order to be considered as exercising full control and supervision. ―Control,‖ as utilized in Section 2 of Article XII, must be taken to mean a degree of control sufficient to enable the State to direct, restrain, regulate and govern the affairs of the extractive enterprises. Control by the State may be on a macro level, through the establishment of policies, guidelines, regulations, industry standards and similar measures that would enable the government to regulate the conduct of affairs in various enterprises, and restrain activties deemed not desirable or beneficial, with the end view of ensuring that these enterprises contribute to the economic development and general welfare of the country, conserve the environment, and uplift the well-being of the local affected communities. Such a degree of control would be compatible with permitting the foreign contractor sufficient and reasonable management authority over the enterprise it has invested in, to ensure efficient and profitable operation. The State‘s full control and supervision over mining operations are ensured through the different provisions in RA 7942. The government agencies concerned are empowered to approve or disapprove – hence, in a position to influence, direct, and change – the various work programs and the corresponding minimum expenditure commitments for each of the exploration, development and utilization phases of the enterprise. Once they have been approved, the contractor‘s full compliance with its commitments therein will be monitored. Figures for mineral production and sales are regularly monitored and subjected to government review, to ensure that the products and by-products are disposed of at the best prices; copies of sales agreements have to be submitted to and registered with MGB. The contractor is mandated to open its books of accounts and records for scrutiny, to enable the State to determine that the government share has been fully paid. The State may likewise compel compliance by the contractor with mandatory requirements on mine safety, health and environmental protection, and the use of anti-pollution technology and facilities. The contractor is also obligated to assist in the development of the mining community, and pay royalties to the indigenous peoples concerned. And violation of any of the FTAA‘s terms and conditions, and/or non-compliance with statutes or regulations, may be penalized by cancellation of the FTAA. Such sanction is significant to a contractor who may have yet to recover the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars sunk into a mining project.

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Overall, the State definitely has a pivotal say in the operation of the individual enterprises, and can set directions and objectives, detect deviations and non-compliance by the contractor, and enforce compliance and impose sanctions should the occasion arise. Hence, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 vest in government more than a sufficient degree of control and supervision over the conduct of the mining operations. Section 3 (aq) of RA 7942 was objected to as being unconstitutional for allowing a foreign contractor to apply for and to hold an exploration permit. During the exploration phase, the permit grantee (and prospective contractor) is spending and investing heavily in exploration activities without yet being able to extract minerals and generate revenues. The exploration permit issued under Section 3 (aq), 20 and 23 of RA 7942, which allows exploration but not extraction, serves to protect the interests and rights of the exploration permit grantee (and would-be contractor), foreign or local. Otherwise, the exploration works already conducted, and expenditures already made, may end up only benefitting claimjumpers. Thus, section 3 (aq) of RA 7942 is not unconstitutional. The provisions of the EMCP FTAA far from constituting a surrender of control and a grant of beneficial ownership of natural resources to the contractor in question, vest the State with control and supervision over practically all aspects of the operations of the FTAA contractor, including the charging of pre-operating and operating expenses, and the disposition of mineral products. There is likewise no relinquishment of control on account of specific provisions of the WMCP FTAA. Clause 8.2 provides a mechanism to prevent the mining operations from grinding to a complete halt as a result of possible delays of more than 60 days in the government‘s processing and approval of submitted work programs and budgets. Clause 8.3 seeks to provide a temporary, stop-gap solution in case a disagreement between the State and the contractor (over the proposed work program or budget submitted by the contractor) should result in a deadlock or impasse, to avoid unreasonably long delays in the performance of the works. Clause 8.5, which allows the contractor to make changes to approved work programs and budgets without the prior approval of the DENR secretary, subject to certain limitations with respect to the variance/s, merely provides the contractor a certain amount of flexibility to meet unexpected situations, while still guaranteeing that the approved work programs are not abandoned altogether. And if the secretary disagrees with the actions taken by the contractor in this instance, he may also resort to the cancellation / termination of the FTAA as the ultimate sanction. Clause 4.6 of the WMCP FTAA gives the contractor discretion to select parts of the contract area to be relinquished. The State is not in a position to substitute its judgment for that of the contractor, who knows exactly which portion of the contract area do not contain minerals in commercial quantities and should be relinquished. Also, since the annual occupation fees paid to government are based on the total hectarage of the contract area, net of the areas relinquished, the contractor‘s self-interest will assure proper and efficient relinquishment. Clause 10.2 (e) of the WMCP FTAA does not mean that the contractor can compel government to use its power of eminent domain. It contemplates a situation in which the contractor is a foreignowned corporation, hence, not qualified to own land. The contractor identifies the surface areas needed for it to construct the infrastructure for mining operations, and the State then acquires the surface rights on behalf of the former. The provision does not call for the exercise of the power of eminent domain (or determination of just compensation); it seeks to avoid a violation of the anti-dummy law.

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Clause 10.2 (l) of the WMCP FTAA giving the contractor the right to mortgage and encumber the mineral products extracted may have been a result of conditions imposed by creditor-banks to secure the loan obligations of WMCP. Banks lend also upon the security of encumbrances on goods produced, which can be easily sold and converted into cash and applied to the repayment of loans. Thus, Clause 10.2(l) is not something out of the ordinary. Neither is it objectionable, because even though the contractor is allowed to mortgage or encumber the mineral endproducts themselves, the contractor is not thereby relieved of its obligation to pay the government its basic and additional shares in the net mining revenue. The contractor‘s ability to mortgage the minerals does not negate the State‘s rights to receive its share of net mining revenues. Clause 10.2(k) which gives the contractor authority ―to change its equity structure at any time,‖ means that WMCP, which was then 100 percent foreign owned, could not permit Filipino equity ownership. Moreover, what is important is that the contractor, regardless of its ownership, is always in a position to render the services required under the FTAA, under the direction and control of the government. Clauses 10.4 (e) and (i) bind the government to allow amendments to the FTAA if required by banks and other financial institutions as part of the conditions of new lendings. There is nothing objectionable here, since Clause 10.4(e) also provides that such financing arrangements should in no event reduce the contractor‘s obligations or the government‘s rights under the FTAA. Clause 10.4 provides that government shall ―favourably consider‖ any request for amendments of this agreement necessary for the contractor to successfully obtain financing. There is no renunciation of control, as the provisio does not say that government shall automatically grant any such request. Also, it is up to the contractor to prove the need for the requested changes. The government always has the final say on whether to approve or disapprove such requests. The FTAA provisions do not reduce or abdicate State control. No Surrender of Financial Benefits The second paragraph of Section 81 of RA 7942 has been denounced for allegedly limiting the State‘s share in FTAAs with foreign contractors to just taxes, fees and duties, and depriving the State of a share in the after-tax income of the enterprise. However, the inclusion of the phrase ―among other things‖ in the second paragraph of Section 81 clearly and unmistakably reveals the legislative intent to have the State collect more than just the usual taxes, duties and fees. Thus DAO 99-56, the ―Guidelines Establishing the Fiscal Regime of Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements,‖ spells out the financial benefits government will receive from an FTAA, as consisting of not only a basic government share, comprised of all direct taxes, fees and royalties, as well as other payments made by the contractor during the term of the FTAA, but also an additional government share, being a share in the earnings or cash flows of the mining enterprise, so as to achieve a fifty-fifty sharing of net benefits from mining between the government and the contractor. The basic government share and the additional government share do not yet take into account the indirect taxes and other financial contributions of mining projects, which are real and actual benefits enjoyed by the Filipino people; if these are taken into account, total government share increases to 60 percent or higher (as much as 77 percent, and 89 percent in one instance) of the net present value of total benefits from the project.

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The third or last paragraph of Section 81 of RA 7942 is slammed for deferring the payment of the government share in FTAAs until after the contractor shall have recovered its pre-operating expenses, exploration and development expenditures. Allegedly, the collection of the State‘s share is rendered uncertain, as there is no time limit in RA 7942 for this grace period or recovery period. But although RA 7942 did not limit the grace period, the concerned agencies (DENR and MGB) in formulating the 1995 and 1996 Implementing Rules and Regulations provided that the period of recovery, reckoned from the date of commercial operation, shall be for a period not exceeding five years, or until the date of actual recovery, whichever comes earlier. Since RA 7942 allegedly does not require government approval for the pre-operating, exploration and development expenses of the foreign contractors, it is feared that such expenses could be bloated to wipe out mining revenues anticipated for 10 years, with the result that the State‘s share is zero for the first 10 years. The argument is based on incorrect information. Under Section 23 of RA 7942, the applicant for exploration permit is required to submit a proposed work program for exploration, containing a yearly budget of proposed expenditures, which the State passes upon and either approves or rejects; if approved, the same will subsequently be recorded as pre-operating expenses that the contractor will have to recoup over the grace period. The Government is able to know ahead of time the amounts of pre-operating and other expenses to be recovered, and the approximate period of time needed therefore because under Section 24, when an exploration permittee files with the MGB a declaration of mining project feasibility, it must submit a work program for development, with corresponding budget, for approval by the Bureau, before government may grant an FTAA or MPSA or other mineral agreements; again, government has the opportunity to approve or reject the proposed work program and budgeted expenditures for development works, which will become the pre-operating and development costs that will have to be recovered. Moreover, there is no concrete basis for the view that, in FTAAs with a foreign contractor, the State must receive at least 60 percent of the after-tax income from the exploitation of its mineral resources, and that such share is the equivalent of the constitutional requirement that at least 60 percent of the capital, and hence 60 percent of the income, of mining companies should remain in Filipino hands. Even if the State is entitled to a 60 percent share from other mineral agreements (CPA, JVA and MPSA), that would not create a parallel or analogous situation for FTAAs. The Charter did not intend to fix an iron-clad rule of 60 percent share, applicable to all situations, regardless of circumstances. There is no indication of such an intention on the part of the framers. Moreover, the terms and conditions of petroleum FTAAs cannot serve as standards for mineral mining FTAAs, because the technical and operational requirements, cost structures and investment needs of off-shore petroleum exploration and drilling companies do not have the remotest resemblance to those of on-shore mining companies. To take the position that government‘s share must be not less than 60 percent of after-tax income of FTAA contractors is nothing short of this Court dictating upon the government. The State resultantly ends up losing control. To avoid compromising the State‘s full control and supervision over the exploitation of mineral resources, there must be no attempt to impose a ―minimum 60 percent‖ rule. It is sufficient that the State has the power and means, should it so decide, to get a 60 percent share (or greater); and it is not necessary that the State does so in every case. Invalid Provisions of the WMCP FTAA Section 7.9 of the WMCP FTAA clearly renders illusory the State‘s 60 percent share of WMCP‘s revenues. Under Section 7.9, should WMCP‘s foreign stockholders (who originally owned 100 percent Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010

of the equity) sell 60 percent or more of their equity to a Filipino citizen or corporation, the State loses its right to receive its share in net mining revenues under Section 7.7, without any offsetting compensation to the State. And what is given to the State in Section 7.7 is by mere tolerance of WMCP‘s foreign stockholders, who can at any time cut off the government‘s entire share by simply selling 60 percent of WMCP‘s equity to a Philippine citizen or corporation. In fact, the sale by WMCP‘s foreign stockholder on January 23, 2001 of the entire outstanding equity in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, Inc., a domestic corporation at least 60 percent Filipino owned, can be deemed to have automatically triggered the operation of Section 7.9 and removed the State‘s right to receive its 60 percent share. Section 7.9 of the WMCP FTAA has effectively given away the State‘s share without anything in exchange. Moreover, it constitutes unjust enrichment on the part of the local and foreign stockholders in WMCP, because by the mere act of divestment, the local and foreign stockholders get a windfall, as their share in the net mining revenues of WMCP is automatically increased, without having to pay anything for it. Being grossly disadvantageous to government and detrimental to the Filipino people, as well as violative of public policy, Section 7.9 must therefore be stricken off as invalid. The FTAA in question does not involve mere contractual rights but, being impressed as it is with public interest, the contractual provisions and stipulations must yield to the common good and the national interest. Since the offending provision is very much separable from the rest of the FTAA, the deletion of Section 7.9 can be done without affecting or requiring the invalidation of the entire WMCP FTAA itself. Section 7.8(e) of the WMCP FTAA likewise is invalid, since by allowing the sums spent by government for the benefit of the contractor to be deductible from the State‘s share in net mining revenues, it results in benefiting the contractor twice over. This constitutes unjust enrichment on the part of the contractor, at the expense of government. For being grossly disadvantageous and prejudicial to government and contrary to public policy, Section 7.8(e) must also be declared without effect. It may likewise be stricken off without affecting the rest of the FTAA. Dissenting Opinion of J. Carpio-Morales RA 7942 aside from depriving the State of its just share in the net profits of the contractor‘s mining operations and again permitting the direct exploitation of resources by foreigners, also violates Section 2 Article XII by permitting the contractor to mortgage minerals it extracts. Under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, only the absolute owner of the property can mortgage the same and because it is the State that owns the country‘s mineral resources, a contractor under FTAA cannot mortgage the minerals it extracts or produces. While the foreign FTAA contractor may have an interest in the proceeds of the minerals, it does not acquire ownership over the minerals themselves. the act of mortgaging the minerals is an act of ownership, which, under the Constitution, is reserved solely to the State. In purporting to grant such power to a foreign FTAA contractor, Section 10.2 (l) of the WMCP FTAA clearly runs afoul of the Constitution. The 1987 Charter‘s omission of the words ―license‖, ―lease‖ and ―concession‖ which previously described service contracts under the 1973 Charter evinces a clear intention to prohibit the direct exploitation of natural resources by aliens. The fact that the terms in ―service contracts‖ and ―FTAAs‖ had been used interchangeably merely showed that the framers used them in their loose sense and not in their strict technical or legal sense.

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The law, its implementing rules and the WMCP FTAA do not give government full control and supervision of its operations and are hence, contrary to Section 2 Article XII of the Constitution. The mere fact that the Act requires the submission of work programs and minimum expenditure commitments does not provide adequate protection. These were also required under the old concession and service contract systems, but did not serve to place full control and supervision of the country's natural resources in the hands of the Government. Conspicuously absent from the Mining Act are effective means by which the Government can protect the beneficial interest of the Filipino people in the exploration, development and utilization of their resources. It appears from the provisions of the Mining Act that the Government, once it has determined that a foreign corporation is eligible for an FTAA and enters into such an agreement, has very little say in the corporation's actual operations. Thus, when pressed to identify the mechanism by which the Government can administratively compel compliance with the foregoing requirements as well as the other terms and conditions of the Mining Act, DAO 96-40 and DAO 99-56, the majority can only point to the cancellation of the agreement(s) and/or the incentives concerned under Section 95 to 99 of the Mining Act. The enforcement provisions of the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules are scarcely effective, and, worse, perceptibly less than the analogous provisions of other Government Regulatory Agencies. The provisions of the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules give scarcely more than lip service to the constitutional mandate for the State to exercise full control and supervision over the exploration, development and utilization of Philippine Natural Resources. Evaluated as a whole and in comparison with other government agencies, the provisions of the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules fail to meet even the reduced standard of effective regulatory control over mining operations. In effect, they abdicate control over mining operations in favor of the foreign FTAA contractor. For this reason, the provisions of the Mining Act, insofar as they pertain to FTAA contracts, must be declared unconstitutional and void. The Mining Act gives the foreign-owned corporation virtually complete control, not mere "incidental" participation in management, over the entire operations. The law is thus at its core a retention of the concession system. It still grants beneficial ownership of the natural resources to the foreign contractor and does little to affirm the State's ownership over them, and its supervision and control over their exploration, development and utilization.

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