Political Law Cases

Digested by: DC 2016 Members Editors: Tricia Lacuesta Lorenzo Gayya Cristopher Reyes Macky Siazon Janine Arenas Ninna Bonsol Lloyd Javier

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW First Semester Cases

Political Law Review

The Philippine Constitution General Considerations

Table of Contents 3

5

National Territory and the Archipelagic Doctrine 5 State Immunity

7

General Principles and State Policies

9

Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances 13 Delegation of Powers

15

Legislative Department

17

Membership, Election and Qualifications 17 Legislative Privileges, Inhibitions and Disqualifications 30 Discipline of Members

31

Legislative Function

32

Executive Department

36

Election, Immunity, Privileges and Inhibitions Powers and Functions Judicial Department

39 53

Constitutional Commissions Bill of Rights

36

59

62

Fundamental Powers of the State and the Bill of Rights 62 Due Process

68

Equal Protection Clause

70

Searches and Seizure

73

Privacy of Communications and Correspondence and Writ of Habeas Data Freedom of Expression

85

Freedom of Religion

100

Liberty of Abode and Freedom of Movement Right to Information

103

Right of Association

105

Eminent Domain

79

101

106

Rights of Suspects 112 Rights of the Accused

113

Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo, Data and Kalikasan

116

Self-Incrimination 120

1 | Page

Political Law Review Double Jeopardy

121

Ex-Post Fact Laws 124 Citizenship 127 Law on Public Officers The Civil Service

135

135

Accountability of Public Officers Administrative Law

142

148

Election Law 149 Local Governments

155

National Economy and Patrimony

170

Public International Law 180

THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

2 | Page

Political Law Review MANILA PRINCE HOTEL (MPH) v. GSIS, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION (MHC), COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OGCC G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, BELLOSILLO, J. Sec. 10(2), Art. XII of the Constitution, which gives preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. Facts: GSIS decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel (MPH), a Filipino corporation and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, the latter giving a higher bid than the former. MPH argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by GSIS, a gocc, the hotel business of GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy. Issue: Whether or not Sec 10, par. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution was violated. Ruling: Yes. Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable when the Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when the Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, but also to the cultural

3 | Page

Political Law Review heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. Moreover, the term qualified Filipinos as used in the Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. Where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm, the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN v. Comelec, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO & CARMEN PEDROSA, as founding members of PIRMA G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, DAVIDE, JR., J. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. While the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation. Facts: Jesus Delfin filed with a petition with Comelec to amend the Constitution so as to lift the term limits of elective officials via People's Initiative. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago and others opposed the petition on the ground that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has been passed. They also argued that RA No. 6735, which was relied upon by Delfin, contained no provision regarding amendments to the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not RA No. 6735 which intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is inadequate to cover that system. Ruling: Yes. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. While the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation. There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of a statute or 4 | Page

Political Law Review legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII. Moreover, RA No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS v. Comelec G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006, CARPIO, J. An amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. Facts: Raul Lambino commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. They filed a petition with the Comelec to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Sec 5(b) and (c) and Sec 7 of RA No. 6735, alleging that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its registered voters. Issue: Whether or not the Lambino’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Ruling: No. The framers intended that the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment should be ready and shown to the people before they sign such proposal. The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. Two essential elements must be present: (1) The people must author and sign the entire proposal; and (2) It must be embodied in a petition. These are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state such fact. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible to prove. In this case, Lambino merely submitted a copy of a signature sheet which merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the 5 | Page

Political Law Review Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the “petition” that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS NATIONAL TERRITORY AND THE ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA et al. v. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, et al. G.R. o. 187167 August 16, 2011, Carpio, J. Facts: RA No. 3046 was passed, demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic state. In 2009, Congress amended the law by enacting RA No. 9522, prompted by the need to make RA No. 3046 compliant with the terms of UNCLOS III. RA No. 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No 9522 on several grounds: first, it reduces Philippine maritime territory and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power; second, RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security; third, RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen; and fourth, the law fails to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal. Issue: Whether or not RA No. 9522 is constitutional. Ruling: Yes. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. UNCLOS III and its 6 | Page

Political Law Review ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Petitioners’ assertion of loss of “about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters” under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles. Far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121" of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any “naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide,” such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of “regime of islands,” whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. Moreover, whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution or as “archipelagic waters” under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath, as affirmed by UNCLOS III. The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest. STATE IMMUNITY UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN, RUBEN P. ASPIRAS, EMMANUEL P. BELLO, WILFREDO P. DAVID, CASIANO S. ABRIGO, and JOSEFINA R. LICUANAN v. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, STERN BUILDERS, INC., and SERVILLANO DELA CRUZ G.R. No. 171182 August 23, 2012 Bersamin, J. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable. Facts: UP entered into an agreement with Stern Builders for the construction and renovation of a building in UPLB. Stern submitted three progress billings and UP paid two of them. The third was not paid by UP. Stern Builders filed a case where the RTC decided in favor of Stern Builders. UP however, failed to file a timely notice of appeal. The motion for writ of execution of Stern 7 | Page

Political Law Review Builders was granted. The sheriff served notices of garnishment on UP’s depository banks. Issue: Whether or not the funds of UP can be subject to garnishment. Ruling: No. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of the RTC’s writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability. A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.” UP was correct in saying that the garnishment of its funds to satisfy the judgment awards of actual and moral damages (including attorney’s fees) was not validly made if there was no special appropriation by Congress to cover the liability. MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO et al v. SCOTT H. SWIFT, in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet et al G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014, Villarama, Jr., J. While the doctrine [of state immunity from suit] appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. Facts: In 2013, the USS Guardian, a US ship, was on its way to Indonesia when it ran aground the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs. Vice Admiral Scott Swift, US 7 th Fleet Commander expressed regret for the incident in a press statement. Three months later, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from the coral reef. The petitioners then filed this petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan against Swift and other officials, claiming that the grounding and salvaging operations caused and continue to cause environmental damage of 8 | Page

Political Law Review such magnitude as to affect several provinces in the Visayas and Mindanao. They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident. Only the Philippine respondents filed a comment to the petition. Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or manifestation in the case Ruling: No. Under the Constitution, the State may not be sued without its consent. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent. In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010, Del Castillo, J. At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. Facts: Ang Ladlad is an organization of people who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals or trans-genders. It filed a petition for registration with the Comelec as a party-list. The Comelec dismissed the petition on moral grounds as “the definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that 9 | Page

Political Law Review petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs”, even citing passages from the Bible and Koran. In its petition with the Supreme Court, Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. It also claimed that the assailed Comelec Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation. Issue: Whether or not Ang Ladlad’s application as a party-list should be granted Ruling: Yes. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the Comelec is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. The Court also discussed Ang Ladlad’s invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (The Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity) as a binding principle of international law. The Court said that it was not prepared to declare that the Yogyakarta Principles contain norms obligatory on the Philippines, because they are not reflective of the current state of international law and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status. Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various international law professors, are–at best–de lege ferenda–and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris. JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, et al. v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014, Mendoza, J. While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. 10 | P a g e

Political Law Review Facts: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the Reproductive Health Law (RH Law), because, among others, it violates the right to life of the unborn. Notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception; Issue: Whether or not the RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. Ruling: No. The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. Contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible. The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. However, the section of the RH-IRR allows “contraceptives” and recognizes as “abortifacient” only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb. This cannot be done. Evidently, with the addition of the word “primarily,” in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides: The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. Contrary to the OSG’s position, these provisions are self-executing. At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non11 | P a g e

Political Law Review abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination. NB: We recommend reading the full text of this case as it involves many issues aside from general principles and state policies. JESUS C. GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J. RA No. 9262 does not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection. Facts: Jesus (Petitioner) and Rosalie were married and have three children. Their relationship broke down when Rosalie discovered that her husband was having an affair. A series of fights left Rosalie physically and emotionally wounded. Petitioner also beat up their eldest daughter whom he blamed for squealing on him. Rosalie filed a petition for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order against petitioner pursuant to RA 9262 (Anti Violence Against Women and Children Act). Jesus then questioned the constitutionality of RA 9262 on equal protection grounds, claiming that it discriminates against men. Issue: Whether or not RA 9262 is constitutional. Ruling: Yes. RA 9262 is based on a valid classification and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection. Petitioner argued that “by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to “protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution” Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-1011-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows: This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which 12 | P a g e

Political Law Review parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person against whom the protection order has been sought. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY ALBIOS G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013, Mendoza, J. No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. Facts: David Lee Fringer, an American citizen, and Liberty Albios were married. Two years later, Albios filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, alleging that the marriage was one made in jest as they never really had any intention of entering into a married state, thus null and void. Fringer did not attend any proceedings. The RTC declared the marriage null and void as the marriage was to enable Albios to obtain American citizenship for $2,000. It ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from inception. Issue: Whether or not the marriage between Fringer and Albios “made in jest” is void. Ruling: No. There was real consent between the parties. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid. Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only 13 | P a g e

Political Law Review further trivialize this inviolable institution. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation. No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA, et al. v. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR., et al. G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J. The Congressional Pork Barrel violates the principles of separation of powers and checks and balances. Facts: The Pork Barrel System is the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds: (1) The Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various postenactment measures and/or practices; and (2) The Presidential Pork Barrel which is a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. Petitioners consider the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power. They argued that the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles/constitutional provisions on separation of powers and checks and balances, among others. Issue: Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system violates the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances. Ruling:

14 | P a g e

Political Law Review Yes. The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. Hence, the Legislative branch of government should not cross over the field of implementing the national budget. In this case, legislators have been consistently accorded postenactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release and realignment. Clearly, these post-enactment measures are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. It is jurisprudential that from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Thus, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, are violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional The pork barrel system also impairs the President’s item veto-power, because the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects. ROMARICO J. MENDOZA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 183891 October 19, 2011, Brion, J. To amplify the scope of a law would be tantamount to judicial legislation abjured by the principle of separation of powers. Facts: Romarico Mendoza was convicted for violating the Social Security Act of 1997 as he failed to remit the SSS premium contributions of his employees. He filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that during his appeal, he had already remitted the contributions; that during the pendency of his case before the Supreme Court, President Arroyo signed into law RA 9903 which mandated the withdrawal of all pending case against employers who would remit their contributions within six months after the law’s effectivity; and that in view of this law, the settlement of his delinquent contributions entitles him to an acquittal. Issue: Whether or not Mendoza should be acquitted. 15 | P a g e

Political Law Review Ruling: No. It is true that Mendoza’s case was pending before the SC when RA 9903 was passed. However, he paid his delinquent SSS contributions in 2007, beyond the period provided for in the law which is 6 months after its effectivity. By paying outside of the availment period, he placed himself outside the benevolent sphere of RA 9903. The Court cannot amplify the scope of RA 9903 on the ground of equal protection, and acquit Mendoza and other delinquent employers like him. It would be in essence an amendment of RA 9903, an act of judicial legislation abjured by the trias politica principle – separation of powers. BAGUAN M. MAMISCAL V. CLERK OF COURT MACALINOG S. ABDULLAH, SHARI’A CIRCUIT COURT, MARAWI CITY A.M No. SCC-13-18-J July 1, 2015, Mendoza, J. Well-settled is the rule that what controls is not the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the complaint. Facts: Baguan Mamiscal had a heated argument with his wide, Adelaidah Lomondot. In the heat of anger, Baguan decided to divorce his wife by repudiating her (talaq). The repudiation was embodied in an agreement (kapasdan) signed by Baguan and Adelaidah. A few days later however, Baguan had a change of heart and decided to make peace with his wife but efforts proved futile. Five months later, Adelaidah filed a Certificate of Divorce (COD) with the office of Macalinog Abdullah, acting as local civil registrar for muslim divorces, for registration. Abdullah issued a Certificate of Registration of Divorce (CRD) to finalize the divorce between Baguan and Adelaidah. Thereafter, Baguan filed an administrative complaint against Abdullah alleging that the latter should not have acted upon the COD because according to Muslim law, only males are allowed to file a COD. Issue: Whether or not Supreme Court has jurisdiction to impose administrative sanction against Abdullah Ruling: No. CA No. 3753 is the primary law that governs the registry of civil status of persons. With the promulgation of the Local Government Code, the power of administrative supervision over civil registrars was devolved to the municipal and city mayors of the respective local government units. While he is undoubtedly a member of the Judiciary as Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court, Abdullah is being charged pursuant to his function as local civil registrar of muslim divorces. Well-settled is the rule that what controls is not the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the complaint. 16 | P a g e

Political Law Review Verily, unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it. DELEGATION OF POWERS BAI SANDRA S.A. SEMA V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND DIDAGEN P. DILANGANEN G.R. No. 178628 July 16, 2008, Carpio, J. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise. Facts: The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created by RA 9054. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 allows ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM National Assembly, to create provinces. Thus it enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. Comelec and Didagen Dilanganen (Dilanganen) now questions the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. They alleged that such law entitles a province to have one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district. Issue: Whether or not Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM National Assembly the power to create provinces is constitutional Ruling: No. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS ASSOCIATION V. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION G.R. No. 156208, December 2, 2009, Chico-Nazario, J. Laws are not bound to be applied in slavish obedience to their language. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where

17 | P a g e

Political Law Review a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers Facts: In line with the restructuring of National Power Corporation (NPC), the NPC board issued resolutions terminating all of its employees. The resolutions were opposed by NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPCDAMA) by praying to SC to declare null and void the resolutions. NPCDAMA succeeded with their request; SC declared the resolutions null and void, issued an injunction to enjoin the implementation of the resolutions, and declared that all of the terminated employees be paid separation pay with backwages. NPC was not able to comply with the order of the SC so NPCDAMA sought to enforce the order by way of garnishment of assets of NPC including but not limited to the assets of Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM). PSALM opposed the garnishment contending that it is not bound by the judgment as they are only mandated by law to privatize the transferred NPC generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and to apply the proceeds thereof to the payment of all existing and outstanding NPC financial obligations. Nothing in law allows garnishment and levy of PSALM’s assets to satisfy a judgment against NPC. NPCDAMA opposed PSALM’s contention by saying that it can be bound to satisfy judgment against NPC since it is privy to NPC because PSALM was principally organized to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, with the objective of liquidating all NPC financial obligations. Furthermore, PSALM is now the owner of the financial obligations and liabilities of NPC and shall be considered as one with NPC and the liability of the NPC shall attach to PSALM. Issue: Whether or not PSALM can be bound by a judgment against NPC. Ruling: Yes. PSALM is mandated to take ownership of all existing NPC generation assets, liabilities, real estate and all other disposable assets. PSALM therefore acquired ownership over said properties of NPC. PSALM argued that the present judgment obligation of NPC arising from employeremployee relationship was neither an existing financial liability nor a contractual liability of NPC at the time the law allowing privatization of NPC took effect. The interpretation of the word existing should be understood in light of PSALMs purpose and objective. It would be absurd to interpret the word existing as referring to the assets and liabilities of NPC only existing at the time when the law mandating the privatization of NPC was enacted. It would be unfair and unjust if PSALM gets nearly all of NPC’s assets but will not pay for liabilities incurred by NPC during this privatization stage. A law should not be interpreted so as not to cause an injustice. There are laws which are generally valid but may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. Laws are not bound to be applied in slavish obedience to their language.The court may consider the spirit and 18 | P a g e

Political Law Review reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. Therefore, it is but reasonable for PSALM to assume the liabilities of NPC during the privatization of the NPCs assets. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MEMBERSHIP, ELECTION AND QUALIFICATIONS SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III AND MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS REPRESENTED, et al. G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010, Perez, J. While a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. Facts: Pursuant to RA 9716 (An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First and Second Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District from Such Reapportionment), the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. Petitioners (President Aquino and Secretary Jesse Robredo) sought the nullification of RA 9716, contending that it is contrary to Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution prescribing a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district. Accordingly, petitioners contend the reapportionment by RA 9716 will leave the first district of Camarines Sur with less than 250,000 in population. On its part, respondents contend that the 250,000 population requirement applies only to the creation of legislative districts in a city, and not in provinces. Issue: Whether or not RA 9716 is Constitutional. Ruling: Yes. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, provides: Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing 19 | P a g e

Political Law Review mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. The reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district is less than 250,000. Population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional district. VICTORINA B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, AND MINERVA ALDABAMORADA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 188078 March 15, 2010, Carpio, J. The passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the political power of the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it Facts: RA 9591 was enacted to create the legislative district of Malolos City. As population indicators to satisfy the constitutional requirement as provided by Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the congress relied on the Certification of Alberto Miranda, Region III Director, of the NSO, projecting that Malolos City’s population in 2010 will reach more than 250,000. The congress also used 2007 Census of Population Progress Enumeration Report and Certification of the City of Malolos Water District, dated 31 July 2008, and Certification of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008. The Comelec insists that these population indicators are reliable and authoritative and thus cannot be subject to judicial review. Issue: Whether or not the population indicators can be subject to judicial review Ruling: Yes. If laws creating legislative districts are unquestionably within the ambit of SC’s judicial review, then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions impacting on their constitutionality, such as their compliance with a specific constitutional limitation under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000 constituents are entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfill this obligation, the Court must inquire into the authoritativeness and reliability of the population indicators Congress used to comply with the constitutional limitation. It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the political power of the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into 20 | P a g e

Political Law Review their constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it. To deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review over RA 9591 is to contend that the Court has no power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government, a duty mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, RENE O. MEDINA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA G.R. No. 180050 April 12, 2011, Nachura, J. Land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province. Facts: Pursuant to RA 9355, a law creating the province of Dinagat Islands, the Comelec conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province of Dinagat under the Local Government Code. The plebiscite resulted in the approval by the people from the mother province Surigao del Norte and the province of Dinagat. Thereafter, petitioners challenged the constitutionality of RA 9355, contending that the province of Dinagat did not meet the population and land area requisite for the creation of a province under the Local Government Code. They alleged that Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, whereas, the LGC requires, among others, that the territory should atleast be 2000 square kilometers with 250,000 inhabitants. Issue: Whether or not RA 9355 is constitutional Ruling: Yes. The central policy considerations in the creation of local government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. A perusal of the congressional debate for the matter reveals that economic viability is the primordial criterion. Land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within 21 | P a g e

Political Law Review the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators. ANGEL G. NAVAL V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND NELSON B. JULIA G.R. No. 207851 July 8, 2014, Reyes, J. The three-term limit rule provided by the Constitution is inflexible. Facts: From 2004 to 2010, Angel Naval had been elected and had served as a member of Sanggunian, Second district, Camarines Sur. Sometime in 2009, RA 9716, which reapportioned the legislative districts of Camarines, was enacted. Eight out of ten towns were taken from the second district of Camarines Sur to create a third district. The second district was composed of the remaining two towns, plus the town of Gainza and Milaor from the first district. In the 2010 elections, Naval ran and won as a member of the Sanggunian of the third district. In 2013, she ran again and was re-elected for the same position. When Naval’s election was question on the ground of the three-term rule, she argued that she only served as a member of the Sanggunian for two terms. Her theory is that because of the reapportionment of the province of Camarines Sur, she was, elected by another territorial jurisdiction and by different inhabitants. Issue: Whether or not Naval’s election for the year 2013 is valid. Ruling: No. RA 9716 created a new second district for Camarines Sur, but it merely renamed the third district which elected Naval into the position. Therefore, she was elected by the same inhabitants in the same territorial jurisdiction. The three-term limit rule provided by the Constitution is inflexible. The rule answers the need to prevent the consolidation of political power in the hands of the few, while at the same time giving to the people the freedom to call back to public service those who are worthy to be called statesmen.

ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 176970 December 8, 2008, Brion, J. No plebiscite is needed for the creation of a legislative district. 22 | P a g e

Political Law Review Facts: RA 9371 was enacted to increase Cagayan De Oro’s district from one to two. However, Rogelio Bagabuyo questioned the constitutionality of such law as well as Comelec resolutions to enforce it, because it was being implemented without a plebiscited which is a requirement for the creation, division, merger or abolition of a local government unit. Issue: Whether or not a plebiscite is necessary to create a legislative district. Ruling: No. Legislative districts are different from local government units. Legislative districts are governed by Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution while local government units are governed by Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution. The concern that leaps from Article VI, Section 5 is political representation and the means to make a legislative district sufficiently represented so that the people can be effectively heard. The aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts. Article X, Section 10 expressly speaks of how local government units may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered. Its concern is the commencement, the termination, and the modification of local government units' corporate existence and territorial coverage; and it speaks of two specific standards that must be observed in implementing this concern, namely, the criteria established in the local government code and the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. RA 9371 provides for reapportionment of the legislative district of Cagayan De Oro, which is guided by Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution. No plebiscite is required for reapportionment of legislative districts. REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN G.R. No. 207264 October 22, 2013, Perez, J. A member of the House of Representatives becomes so, only upon a duly and legally based proclamation Facts: Regina Ongsiako Reyes won the elections and was proclaimed as the representative of Marinduque. However, before the elections, Comelec cancelled her certificate of candidacy for not being qualified to run for the position as she was not a Filipino citizen. Regina opposed the jurisdiction of the Comelec alleging that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that has exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon her qualifications. 23 | P a g e

Political Law Review Issue: Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction to look into Regina’s qualifications as representative of Marinduque Ruling: No. HRET’s constitutional authority opens, over the qualification of its member, who becomes so, only upon a duly and legally based proclamation. HRET has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the qualifications of its members. However, Regina’s proclamation is not valid since prior to the elections, the decision of Comelec cancelling her certificate of candidacy became final. Hence, there is no basis for her proclamation and thus she did not become a member of the House of Representatives. LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO V. HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP AND REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES G.R. No. 211140 January 12, 2016, Leonardo-De Castro, J. The decision of Supreme Court, made Reyes’ name in the ministerial duty, which

the Comelec which attained finality, and that of the the administering of oath of Velasco, and removal of roll of members of House of Representatives, a may be compelled by Mandamus.

Facts: Lord Allan Jay Velasco filed a petition for Mandamus against Hon. Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. and Secretary General Marilyn Barua-Yap to order them, respectively, to administer the oath of Velasco in the House of Representatives, and to remove the name of Regina Ongsiako Reyes in the roll of the members of the House of Representatives and replace it with Velasco’s name. Before this petition was filed, a Comelec decision was promulgated cancelling the certificate of candidacy of Reyes because she lacks the citizenship requirement to be able to qualify to run for the representative of Marinduque in the House of Representatives. Subsequently, a petition was filed by Reyes with the Suprme Court, questioning Comelec’s jurisdiction to pass upon her qualifications as a member of the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court ruled against Reyes and enunciated that her certificate of candidacy was validly cancelled and therefore there was no basis for her proclamation in the House of Representatives, thus the Comelec has jurisdiction to question her qualifications. Issue: Whether or not Speaker Belmonte and Sec Gen Yap can be compelled by mandamus. Ruling: 24 | P a g e

Political Law Review Yes. A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. The decision of the Comelec which attained finality, and that of the Supreme Court, made the administering of oath of Velasco, and removal of Reyes’ name in the roll of members of House of Representatives, a ministerial duty. The administration of oath and the registration of Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque are no longer a matter of discretion or judgment on the part of Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec Gen Yap. They are legally bound to recognize Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque in view of the ruling rendered by SC and the Comelec’s ruling, now both final and executory. MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND PHILIP ARREZA PICHAY G.R. No. 219603 January 26, 2016 CARPIO. J. Libel still involves moral turpitude even if the penalty of imprisonment imposed was reduced to a fine. Facts: Philip Pichay was convicted for libel, but in lieu of imprisonment, he was sentenced to pay fine. Later on, he was elected as a congressman. A petition for Quo Warranto was filed against him but was dismissed by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which concluded that his conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude, reasoning that Pichay was not the author of the libelous articles but the president of the publishing company. Issue: Whether or not HRET erred in concluding that his conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude. Ruling: Yes. Libel still involves moral turpitude even if the penalty of imprisonment imposed was reduced to a fine. The Revised Penal Code’s provision on libel did not distinguish or graduate the penalty according to the nature or degree of the participation of the persons involved in the crime of libel. In the present case, Pichay misrepresented his eligibility in his certificate of candidacy because he knew that he had been convicted by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Since Pichay served his sentence when he paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year period 25 | P a g e

Political Law Review shall end only on 16 February 2016. Thus, Pichay is disqualified to become a Member of the House of Representatives until then. Thus, his representation that he was eligible for elective public office constitutes false material representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office. BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009 CARPIO. J. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a partylist which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat. Facts: In July and August 2007, the Comelec, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007. In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the Comelec considered the following rules: (1) In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution); (2) Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat; (3) If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs Comelec; (4) In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case). The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution. BANAT also questioned if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which would be discuss later on). On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.

26 | P a g e

Political Law Review Issues: 1. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling. 2. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid. 3. How are party-list seats allocated. 4. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections. Ruling: 1. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled. 2. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast a requalified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. 3. First, the parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. Then, the parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. There shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 partylists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation). The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives. 3. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections. ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 27 | P a g e

Political Law Review G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013 CARPIO, J. Political parties can participate in the party-list system “for as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.” Facts: The Comelec issued in October, November and December of 2012 a resolution ruling that the party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a “marginalized and underrepresented sector,” their nominees do not come from a “marginalized and underrepresented sector,” and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress. The party-list groups filed a petition to reverse the resolution by the Comelec disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. Issue: Whether or not political parties can participate in the party-list system. Ruling: Yes. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector. Moreover, political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. The Comelec excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the Comelec because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee.

28 | P a g e

Political Law Review COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST), represented herein by its Chairperson and First Nominee, FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. Nos. 206844-45, July 23, 2013, LEONARDO DE-CASTRO. J. If the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the Comelec En Banc. There can be no disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement. Facts: In May 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled Irrevocable Covenant, which contains the list of their candidates and terms on sharing of their powers. It contained an agreement on who among the candidates will serve the terms according to the power sharing agreement. By virtue of the term-sharing agreement, the term of Kho as member of the HR was cut short to 1 yr and 6 mos. In line with this, Kho tendered his resignation to be effective on December 31, 2011. In the interim, Comelec Resolution was promulgated on February 21, 2012. Pertinently, Section 7 of Rule 4 thereof provided that filing of vacancy as a result of term sharing agreement among nominees of winning party-list groups/organizations shall not be allowed. On March 12, 2012, the Board of Trustees of SENIOR CITIZENS issued recalled the resignation of Kho and allowed him to continue to represent the party-list. Despite of the recall of resignation, Comelec found the term-sharing agreement contrary to public policy and hence resolved to CANCEL the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS under the Party-List System of Representation. Issue: Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it disqualified and cancelled the registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS solely on account of its purported violation of the prohibition against term-sharing. Ruling: Yes. There was no indication that the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less succeeded in implementing, the termsharing agreement. Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served his term as a member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the 29 | P a g e

Political Law Review Comelec En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an election law, rule, or regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no legal leg to stand on. ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC AND THE SELF-STYLED SHAM ATING KOOP PARTYLIST G.R. No. 205505 September 29, 2015 SERENO, J. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives. Facts: After Comelec proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups, Isidro Lico who was the first nominee, subsequently took his oath of office. Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning partylist organisations, Ating Koop issued a Resolution which incorporated a termsharing agreement signed by its nominees. Under the agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year of the threeyear term. Then when held its Second National Convention, it introduced amendments which would short the three-year term of the incumbent members then was replaced by the Rimas group. Almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, a petition was filed expelling him from Ating Koop for disloyalty. Apart from allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee cited petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the termsharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws. Comelec Second Division upheld the expulsion of petitioner while Comelec en banc dismissed the petition holding that it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico from the House of Representatives, considering that his expulsion from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of the House, and therefore it was the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that had jurisdiction over the petition. However, it upheld the validity of his expulsion. Issue: Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction over the expulsion of a Member of the House of Representatives from his party-list organization. Ruling: No. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of 30 | P a g e

Political Law Review Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives. In this case, the Comelec proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the Comelec, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case. ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013, REYES, J. Sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record. It is sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they represent. Facts: Comelec cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party-list group. It pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections. It further opined that ABANG LINGKOD failed to show that its nominees are themselves marginalized and underrepresented or that they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it claims to represent. Issue: Whether or not Comelec gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG LINGKOD’s registration under the party-list system for the latter’s failure to prove its track record. Ruling: Yes. Contrary to the Comelec's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they represent. There is thus no basis in law and established jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking registration under the party-list system still comply with the track record requirement. Indeed, nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is it mandated that groups seeking registration thereunder must submit evidence to show their track record as a group. 31 | P a g e

Political Law Review DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON v. THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL G.R. No. 189466 February 11, 2010 ABAD, J. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Facts: In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo. In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET. Issue: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan. Ruling:

32 | P a g e

Political Law Review Yes. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the “members” of that House are representatives of districts and party list. Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since a partylist nominees are “elected members” of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the Comelec’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGES, INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS DANTE V. LIBAN, et al. v. RICHARD J. GORDON G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009, CARPIO, J. The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Facts: Petitioners Liban, et al. were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, they filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator. Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution. Formerly, in its Decision in 2009, the Court held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Issue: Whether or not Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate. Ruling:

33 | P a g e

Political Law Review No. The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. In the case of a non-stock corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the members must be government officials holding such membership by appointment or designation by the government. Under this criterion, the government does not own or control PNRC. DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS ANTERO J. POBRE v. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, VELASCO, JR., J. Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Facts: In a complaint filed by Antero J. Pobre, he alleged that the speech delivered by Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago on the Senate floor reflected total disrespect towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. As such, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator. For her part, Senator Santiago averred that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity as the statement is aimed to expose an unjust act of the JBC which calls for future remedial legislation. Issue: Whether or not the privilege speech delivered by Senator Santiago is actionable. Ruling: No. Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution provides: A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. 34 | P a g e

Political Law Review The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to the motives. LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION ROMULO L. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure. Facts: The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions for the conduct of an investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal, a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (“ZTE”), because Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the Comelec Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege.” In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project; (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it; and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt. Neri did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the President invoking executive privilege. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. Issue: Whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the three questions are critical to the exercise of their functions. Ruling: No. The three questions are not critical to the legislature’s function. In the case at bar, we are not confronted with a court’s need for facts in order to adjudge liability in a criminal case but rather with the Senate’s need for information in relation to its legislative functions. The burden to show this is 35 | P a g e

Political Law Review on the respondent Committees, since they seek to intrude into the sphere of competence of the President in order to gather information which, according to said respondents, would "aid" them in crafting legislation. Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed that respondent Committees’ need for information in the exercise of this function is not as compelling as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature. This is because curbing graft and corruption is merely an oversight function of Congress. And if this is the primary objective of respondent Committees in asking the three (3) questions covered by privilege, it may even contradict their claim that their purpose is legislative in nature and not oversight. In any event, whether or not investigating graft and corruption is a legislative or oversight function of Congress, respondent Committees’ investigation cannot transgress bounds set by the Constitution. Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation. Investigations conducted solely to gather incriminatory evidence and "punish" those investigated are indefensible. There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure. GRECO BELGICA, et al. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., et al. G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013, J. Perlas-Bernabe The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. Facts: Starting 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF for being unconstitutional and the likely source of the congressmen’s kickbacks. Unfortunately, for lack of “any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF has been a common exercise of unscrupulous members of the congress,” the petition was dismissed. In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation began its probe into the allegations that “the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel.” After criminal investigations were filed following the Napoles controversy, the Commission on Audit released its own results of a three-year audit covering the legislators’ PDAF from 2007 to 2009. The total releases amounting to billions of pesos spurred several petitions to be lodged before the SC to declare the “Pork Barrel System” as unconstitutional. 36 | P a g e

Political Law Review Issue: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the constitutional provision on the non-delegability of legislative power. Ruling: Yes. In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in the Bengzon case, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional. MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO, et al. v. BENIGNO AQUINO III, et al. G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014, J. Bersamin Appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury. Facts: Responding to Senator Jinggoy Estrada’s revelation that some senators, including himself, had been allotted millions as an incentive for voting in favor of Chief Justice Renato Corona’s impeachment, Secretary Florencio Abad explained in a statement that the funds released to the senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to accelerate economic expansion. The DBM further listed the legal bases for the DAP’s use of savings and that it had been sourced from savings generated by the government and from unprogrammed funds. 37 | P a g e

Political Law Review Issue: Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” Ruling: No. The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAP’s adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP. Congress could appropriate but would have nothing more to do during the Budget Execution Stage. Appropriation is the act by which Congress designates a particular fund, or sets apart a specified portion of the public revenue or of the money in the public treasury, to be applied to some general object of governmental expenditure, or to some individual purchase or expense. In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to “the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors.” The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the country’s economic situation. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already set apart from the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution. NB: Notwithstanding the above discussion, certain DAP practices were declared unconstitutional based on other grounds. ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST, et al. v. CESAR PURISIMA, et al. G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, J. Corona From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.

38 | P a g e

Political Law Review Facts: The core of this issue is the enactment of R.A. 9335, a law optimizing the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. This law intends encourage the bureau officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions. The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC, and CSC were tasked to promulgate and issue IRRs of R.A. 9335, which is to be approved by a congressional oversight committee created for the purpose. The ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST, et al. invoke their rights as taxpayers in filing this petition to challenge the validity of R.A. 9335, a tax reform legislation. Among other contentions, they assail the creation of the oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the committee’s creation permits legal participation in an otherwise executive function. Issue: Whether or not the creation of a congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of separation of powers as its permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law. Ruling: Yes. Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

ELECTION, IMMUNITY, PRIVILEGES AND INHIBITIONS

39 | P a g e

Political Law Review MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES v. Comelec and ESTRELLA ELAMPARO G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016, J. Perez Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a candidate: First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections, the purpose of which is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the President and Vice President, as the case may be. Facts: A day after Senator Grace Poe-Llamanzares filed her COC for the presidency for the May 2016 elections, Estrella Elamparo filed a petition to deny due course or cancel said COC, contending that Poe committed material representation when she stated in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the May 9, 2016 elections. Issue: Whether or not the COC of Poe should be denied due course on the exclusive ground that she made a false representation in her certificate. Ruling: No. All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of Poe for her candidacy as President of the Republic, she has complied with both. As to the first consideration, Poe was legally adopted. Under R.A. No. 8552, Poe was also entitled to an amended birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue." That law also requires that "all records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the DWSD, or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential." The law therefore allows Poe to state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption records, Poewas not obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee. 40 | P a g e

Political Law Review On the issue of residence, it is standing jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person that determines residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement of residency for election as president. It ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions of residency have been decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in number, weight and substance than that presented by Poe. It ignores, above all else, what We consider as a primary reason why Poe cannot be bound by her declaration in her COC for Senator, which declaration was not even considered by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When Poe made the declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency requirements for election as Senator which was satisfied by her declared years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before us that at the time the declaration for senator was made, Poe did not have as yet any intention to vie for the presidency in 2016 and that the general public was never made aware by Poe, by word or action, that she would run for president in 2016.

ATTY. EVILLO PORMENTO v. JOSEPH ESTRADA G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010, C.J. Corona One of the requisites for the exercise of judicial power is an actual case or controversy. Facts: The petition by Atty. Evillo Pormento asks whether Estrada is covered by the ban on the president from “any reelection”. It should be noted that Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010. Atty. Pormento opposed this candidacy by Estrada and filed a petition for his disqualification. The same was denied. Thus, the instant petition for certiorari followed on May 7, 2010. Issue: Whether or not the president shall not be eligible for any reelection. Ruling: No. Estrada was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase “any reelection” will be premised on a person’s second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live 41 | P a g e

Political Law Review conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case, no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case. ATTY. ROMULO MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL G.R. No. 191618, June 7, 2011, J. Nachura The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an "awesome" task, includes the means necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication. Facts: In his petition to declare the establishment of the PET unconstitutional, Atty. Romulo Macalintal invoked the Supreme Court’s ruling on the unconstitutionality of the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC). He stated therein that if the president cannot create the PTC, the Supreme Court cannot likewise create the PET in the absence of an act of legislature. Issue: Whether or not the establishment of the PET is unconstitutional. Ruling: No. The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an "awesome" task, includes the means necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication. We cannot overemphasize that the abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of power to the Supreme Court, given our abundant experience, is not unwarranted. A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the Constitution readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court’s exercise thereof. The Supreme Court’s method of deciding presidential and vicepresidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to “promulgate its rules for the purpose.” The conferment of full 42 | P a g e

Political Law Review authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which We have affirmed on numerous occasions.

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS DENNIS FUNA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, et al. G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010, J. Villarama, Jr. The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is aimed at preventing the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials, who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. Facts: Dennis Funa argues in his petition that respondent Elena Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution, as explained in various cases. In their defense, respondents aver that Bautista was merely designated as the acting head of MARINA, and not appointed as the MARINA Administrator. Her designation as OIC in a temporary capacity is for the purpose of preventing a hiatus in the discharge of the post’s official functions. Issue: Whether or not the designation of Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violates the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants. Ruling: Yes. Since the evident purpose of the framers of the Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple 43 | P a g e

Political Law Review government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself. Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union. Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the Authority, We are hardly persuaded by respondents’ submission that respondent Bautista’s designation as OIC of MARINA was merely an imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is not even a member of the Maritime Industry Board.

DENNIS FUNA v. ALBERTO AGRA G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013, J. Bersamin The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary. Facts: Dennis Funa alleged that President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Alberto Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Agnes Devanadera. Four days after which, President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity. After two days, Funa commenced this suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations. Issue: Whether or not the designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional and void for being in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution. Ruling:

44 | P a g e

Political Law Review Yes. It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. The text of Section 13 plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in government-owned or government controlled-corporations was concerned. In this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective of Section 13, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. To construe differently is to "open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive Department and of limitations on the President’s power of appointment in the guise of temporary designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations."

ARTURO DE CASTRO v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010, J. Bersamin The prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Facts: The petitioners in these consolidated cases, as well as its intervenors, argue that the proscription against the president or acting president, under Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitute, includes the members of the Supreme Court, as a general rule. The OSG, on the other hand, argues that the same provision does not apply to the Judiciary and that the petitions should be dismissed for prematurity, because the JBC has not yet decided at the time of the petitions were filed whether or not the incumbent President has the power to appoint a new chief justice. 45 | P a g e

Political Law Review Issue: Whether or not the Constitutional Commission extended to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. Ruling: No. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had proposed to include judges and justices related to the President within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity among the persons whom the President might not appoint during his or her tenure. In the end, however, Commissioner Davide, Jr. withdrew the proposal to include the Judiciary in Section 13, Article VII "(t)o avoid any further complication.” Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

ATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA-GARAFIL, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015, CARPIO, J. The concurrence of all the elements of a valid appointment should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. Facts: Prior to the May 2010 elections, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued more than 800 appointments including the petitioners in several government offices. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides for a ban on midnight appointments. For purposes of the 2010 elections, March 10, 2010 was the cutoff date for valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the ban. An exception is provided under such provision which allows temporary appointments to executive positions when 46 | P a g e

Political Law Review continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception. President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the constitutional ban. The officers and employees who were affected by EO 2 were informed that they were terminated from service effective the next day. Several petitions were filed seeking to declare the executive order as unconstitutional and for the declaration of their appointment as legal. Issue: Whether or not petitioners' appointments are valid Ruling: No. The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The concurrence of all these elements should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. These steps in the appointment process should always concur and operate as a single process. There is no valid appointment if the process lacks even one step. In this case, petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment ban. The President's exercise of his power to appoint officials is provided for in the Constitution and laws. Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion. There should be evidence that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. Release of the appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the President's intent of its issuance. For purposes of verification of the appointment paper's existence and authenticity, the appointment paper must bear the security marks and must be accompanied by a transmittal letter from the MRO. Also, an appointment can be made only to a vacant office. An appointment cannot be made to an occupied office. The incumbent must first be legally removed, or his appointment validly terminated, before one could be validly installed to succeed him. Lastly, acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment. The appointments made by President Arroyo are void. RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT V. REYES 47 | P a g e

Political Law Review G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. The doctrine of qualified political agency states that the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Facts: The Government of the Philippines entered into a contract called GSEC102 with JAPEX involving geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. Then, they formally converted GSEC-102 into Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) which allowed the exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait. Petitioners, the "Resident Marine Mammals", are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in Tañon Strait, joined by stewards. Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Tañon Strait, petitioners aver that a study made after the seismic survey showed that the fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent. They attribute this "reduced fish catch" to the destruction of the "payao" also known as the "fish aggregating device" or "artificial reef." Respondents claim that SC-46 does not violate the 1987 Constitution and the various laws cited in the petitions. Issue: Whether or not the Service Contract No. 46 is valid. Ruling: No. As SC-46 was executed in 2004, its terms should have conformed not only to PD No. 87, but also to those of the 1987 Constitution. While PD No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence of the two other conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that Congress be notified of such contract, renders it null and void. Public respondents' implied argument that based on the "alter ego principle," their acts are also that of then President Macapagal-Arroyo's, cannot apply in this case. Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. While the requirements in executing service contracts in the 1987 Constitution seem like mere formalities, they, in reality, take on a much bigger role. As this Court has held in La Bugal, our Constitution requires that the President 48 | P a g e

Political Law Review himself be the signatory of service agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving the exploration, development, and utilization of our minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. This power cannot be taken lightly. In this case, the public respondents have failed to show that the President had any participation in SC-46. Their arguments, absent proof of her disapproval, must fail as the requirement that the President herself enter into these kinds of contracts is embodied not just in any ordinary statute, but in the Constitution itself. Service Contract No. 46 is hereby declared null and void. ALMARIO V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. The President’s discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. The faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the President, not a separate grant of power. Facts: A joint meeting of the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees was held to discuss the evaluation of the 2009 Order of National Artists and the convening of the National Artist Award Secretariat. A final list of four names was agreed upon. Then, the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from various sectors strongly endorsing private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. The Committee on Honors purportedly processed these nominations and submitted a memorandum recommending the conferment of the Order of National Artists on the four recommendees of the NCCA and the CCP Boards, as well as on private respondents. Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued declaring respondents as National Artists. Petitioners instituted the present petition alleging that by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA and CCP Boards to select those who will be conferred the award. Issue: Whether or not the respondents.

President validly conferred the award

to

Ruling: No. The CCP and NCCA Board jointly administer the said award and, upon their recommendation, the President confers the award. Thus, the advice of the NCCA and the CCP is subject to the President’s discretion. Nevertheless, the President’s discretion on the matter is not totally unfettered, nor the role of the NCCA and the CCP Boards meaningless. The President’s power must be exercised in accordance with existing laws.

49 | P a g e

Political Law Review In this case, the former President could not have properly considered respondents as their names were not recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. There was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution when the former President gave preferential treatment to respondents The former President’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws and observe the rules, guidelines and policies of the NCCA and the CCP as to the selection of the nominees for conferment of the Order of National Artists proscribed her from having a free and uninhibited hand in the conferment of the said award. The conferment of the Order of National Artists on said respondents was therefore made with grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.

SALVACION A. MONSANTO, petitioner, v. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondent. G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989, FERNAN, C.J. Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office. Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion Monsanto, then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. Monsanto appealed to this Court which subsequently affirmed the same. She filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon. By reason of said pardon, petitioner made a request that she be restored to her former post since the same was still vacant. The letter was referred to the Finance Ministry which ruled that petitioner may be reinstated. The OP, however, ruled that she is not entitled to an automatic reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon and that she is liable for the civil liability concomitant to her previous conviction. The petitioner claims that when pardon was issued before the final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal because there was no offense to speak of. In effect, the President has declared her not guilty of the crime charged and has accordingly dismissed the same. Issue: Whether or not the plenary pardon had the effect of removing the disqualifications prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. Ruling: 50 | P a g e

Political Law Review Yes. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment. The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the offender's innocence) as relieving the party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of guilt. But it relieves him from nothing more. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required. This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits. In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital point: While we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. For whatever may have been the judicial dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce such "moral changes" as to equate a pardoned convict in character and conduct with one who has constantly maintained the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen. Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and purpose of the privilege.

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner, ALFREDO S. LIM PetitionerIntervenor, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, Respondents. G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

An absolute pardon fully restores all civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office. Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder. On Oct. 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada. Then, he ran for the presidency again but lost. Afterwards, he ran for Manila City Mayor. A petition to disqualify him was filed on the theory that the

51 | P a g e

Political Law Review pardon granted to the latter failed to expressly remit his perpetual disqualification. Issue: Whether or not the pardon granted to Estrada enables him to run for mayor of Manila. Ruling: Yes. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to former President Estrada. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states that "he is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the Local Government Code in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him.

JAMAR M. KULAYAN, et al. v. v. GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, in his capacity as Governor of Sulu, et al. G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012, SERENO, J. Only the President is vested commander-in-chief of the Republic.

with

calling-out powers,

as

the

Facts: Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross were kidnapped by the Abu Sayyaf Group. In response thereto, a task force was created by the ICRC and the PNP, which organized a parallel local group later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee and convened under the leadership of respondent Governor Abdusakur Mahail Tan. Also, Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force. Governor Tan issued Proclamation 109 declaring a state of emergency using the kidnapping incident as a ground. It also invoked Section 465 of the LGC which bestows on the Provincial 52 | P a g e

Political Law Review Governor the power to carry out emergency measures. Respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. Petitioners filed the present petition contending that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent governor is authorized to declare a state of emergency, and exercise the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09, specifically the conduct of general searches and seizures. Ruling: No. It is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency and the calling-out powers. There is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. There are certain acts which, by their very nature, may only be performed by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers to which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. The President’s Emergency Powers, on the other hand, is balanced only by the legislative act of Congress. The Constitution bestows on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. In the case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, the Court had occasion to rule that the calling-out powers belong solely to the President as commander-in-chief. Respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the Local Government Code DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, et al. v. HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local 53 | P a g e

Political Law Review Government and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011, ABAD, J.

The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. Facts: The day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed the AFP and the PNP to undertake measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence. Petitioner ARMM officials claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. Petitioners contended that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation. Issue: Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City. Ruling: No. The deployment of AFP and PNP personnel is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same. Moreover, the President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly 54 | P a g e

Political Law Review to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment. PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN and ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES, Petitioners, v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, as Commander-in-Chief and President of the Republic of the Philippines, et al. G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012, ABAD, J. The President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Facts: On Nov. 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed to be led by the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried 57 innocent civilians in Maguindanao. On Dec. 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. She submitted her report to Congress stating that she acted based on her finding that lawless men have taken up arms in Maguindanao and risen against the government. The Congress, in joint session, convened to review the validity of the President’s action. However, two days later or before Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959.

Issue: Whether or not Proclamation 1959 is constitutional. Ruling: The Court deems any review of its constitutionality the equivalent of beating a dead horse. Under the 1987 Constitution, the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have. Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the 55 | P a g e

Political Law Review factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same, then the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.

ISABELITA C. VINUYA et. al., petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO et. al., respondents. G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010, DEL CASTILLO, J The propriety of what may be done in the exercise of the political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision Facts: Petitioners are members of Malaya Lolas, an organization established to provide aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War. They narrated that they civilians were publicly tortured, mutilated, and slaughtered while the women were repeatedly raped, beaten, and abused. They claimed that since 1998, they already approached the Executive Department requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the "comfort women" stations. However, the Executive declined stating that the individual claims for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Issue: Whether or not the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan. Ruling:

56 | P a g e

Political Law Review No. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan. Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions. One such category involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that "the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative, 'the political', departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision." Not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, however, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. Indeed, except as an agreement might otherwise provide, international settlements generally wipe out the underlying private claims, thereby terminating any recourse under domestic law. Moreover, the Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse petitioners’ claims. It is not within the power of the Supreme Court to order the Executive Department to take up the petitioners’ cause. Ours is only the power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take up petitioners’ cause.

ISABELITA C. VINUYA et. al., petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO et. al., respondents. G.R. No. 162230, August 13, 2014, BERSAMIN, J. The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines. Facts: Petitioners prayed that the Supreme Court reconsider its April 28, 2010 decision, and declare that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women. They also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. They argued that constitutional and jurisprudential 57 | P a g e

Political Law Review histories have rejected the Court’s ruling that the foreign policy prerogatives ofthe Executive Branch are unlimited and such prerogatives are proscribed by international human rights and international conventions of which the Philippines is a party. Moreover, the Court, in holding that the Chief Executive has the prerogative whether to bring petitioners’ claims against Japan, has read the foreign policy powers of the Office of the President in isolation from the rest of the constitutional protections that expressly textualize international human rights. Issue: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration should be granted. Ruling: No. The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner.

SAGUISAG V. OCHOA, JR. G.R. No. 212426 and G.R. No.212444, January 12, 2016, SERENO, CJ. Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress.

Facts: The Philippines and the USA entered into their first military arrangement pursuant to the Treaty of General Relations - the 1947 MBA. In view of the impending expiration of the 1947 MBA in 1991, the Philippines and the U.S. negotiated for a possible renewal of their defense and security relationship. However, the Senate rejected the proposed treaty. The expiration of the MBA led to the suspension of the large-scale joint military exercise but they agreed to hold joint exercises at a substantially reduced 58 | P a g e

Political Law Review level. The military arrangements between them were revived in 1999 when they concluded the first Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Then the two countries entered into a second counterpart agreement. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct activities within certain "Agreed Locations" in the country. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's understanding that to do so was no longer necessary. The petitioners question the constitutionality of the EDCA arguing that it should have been in the form of a treaty concurred in by the Senate, not an executive agreement.

Issue: Whether or not the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in entering into EDCA in the form of an executive agreement. Ruling: No. The duty to faithfully execute the laws of the land is inherent in executive power and is intimately related to the other executive functions which is also self-executory. In light of this constitutional duty, it is the President's prerogative to do whatever is legal and necessary for Philippine defense interests. Despite the President's roles as defender of the State and sole authority in foreign relations, the 1987 Constitution expressly limits his ability in instances when it involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities. However, a plain textual reading of Article XIII, Section 25, inevitably leads to the conclusion that it applies only to a proposed agreement between our government and a foreign government, whereby military bases, troops, or facilities of such foreign government would be "allowed" or would "gain entry" Philippine territory. It is evident that the constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only to the limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine law, and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity through a treaty. The VFA has already allowed the entry of troops in the Philippines. The power of the President to enter into binding executive agreements without Senate concurrence is already well-established in this jurisdiction. One of the distinguishing features of executive agreements is that their validity and effectivity are not affected by a lack of Senate concurrence. This distinctive feature was recognized as early as in Eastern Sea Trading (1961) which states that Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress. Thus, no court can tell the President to desist from choosing an executive agreement over a treaty to embody an international agreement, unless the case falls squarely within Article VIII, Section 25. 59 | P a g e

Political Law Review EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose, and framework of the MDT and the VFA. The admission and presence of U.S. military and civilian personnel in Philippine territory are already allowed under the VFA, the treaty supposedly being implemented by EDCA. What EDCA has effectively done, in fact, is merely provide the mechanism to identify the locations in which U.S. personnel may perform allowed activities pursuant to the VF A. As the implementing agreement, it regulates and limits the presence of U.S. personnel in the country. Moreover, EDCA does not allow the presence of U.S.-owned or -controlled military facilities and bases in the Philippines. As it is, EDCA is not constitutionally infirm. As an executive agreement, it remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to implement. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED CHIEF/ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, 31 July 2012, En Banc, Per Curiam Under the guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide who, what, where, when and how the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the Court’s granted power. Facts: The COA found that an underpayment resulted when five retired Supreme Court Justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal property assigned to them during their incumbency. The COA attributed the underpayment to the use of the Supreme Court of the formula by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 rather than the formula found in COA Memorandum No 98-569-A. Issue: Whether the use of the CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 formula was correct. Ruling: Yes. Under the guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide who, what, where, when and how the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the Court’s granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor. 60 | P a g e

Political Law Review The use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is part of the Court’s exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s own affairs. RE: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE/CLARIFICATION ON SECTION 7, RULE III OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10154 REQUIIRING RETIRING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO SECURE A CLEARANCE OF PENDENCY/NON-PENDENCY OF CASE/S FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION A.M. NO. 13-09-08-SC, 1 October 2013, En Banc, Perlas-Bernabe, J. Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel. Facts: Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, requested the guidance/clarification on the applicability to the Judiciary of Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 10154. Issue: Whether or not Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 10154 is applicable to the Judiciary Ruling: No. The Rules should not be made to apply to employees of the Judiciary. To deem it otherwise would disregard the Court’s constitutionallyenshrined power of administrative supervision over its personnel. Besides, retiring court personnel are already required to secure a prior clearance of the pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Court which makes the CSC clearance a superfluous and non-expeditious requirement contrary to the declared state policy of RA 10154. IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT VS. ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL AUTONOMY UDK-145143, 21 January 2015, En Banc, Leonen, J. There can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. 61 | P a g e

Political Law Review Facts: Rolly Mijares prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel the Supreme Court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of Congress which was raised through a letter addressed to the Supreme Court. The letter implied that certain acts of members of Congress and the President shows a threat to judicial independence. Two house bills were filed which would require the court to remit its Judiciary Development Fund to the national treasury and one to create a Judicial Support Fund under the National Treasury to repeal PD 1949. Issue: Whether or not the court should exercise its powers to revoke/abrogate and expunge whatever irreconcilable contravention of existing laws affecting the judicial independence and fiscal autonomy as mandated under the Constitution to better serve public interest and general welfare of the people. Ruling: No. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review before the Supreme Court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Petitioner’s failure to comply with the first two requisites warrants the outright dismissal of the petition. Before the court may exercise its power of judicial review, there must be an existing case or controversy that is ripe for determination. There can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before. Even assuming that there is an actual controversy that the Court must resolve, petitioner has no legal standing to question the validity of the proposed bill. Petitioner has not shown that he has or will sustain a direct injury if the proposed bill is passed into law. While his concern for judicial independence is laudable, it does not, by itself, clothe him with the requisite standing to question the constitutionality of a proposed bill that may only affect the judiciary. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO AND REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR. G.R. No. 202242, 16 April 2013, En Banc, Mendoza, J.

62 | P a g e

Political Law Review It is clear that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote of half of its, goes against that mandate. Facts: From the creation of the JBC under the 1987 Constitution, Congress designated one representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members. The House of Representatives and the Senate would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC, one from each house, with each having one-half of a vote. In 2000 and 2001, the JBC decided to allow the representatives from both houses one full vote each. Issue: Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress is valid. Ruling: No. Under the Constitution, “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.” It is clear that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote of half of its, goes against that mandate. By allowing both houses of Congress to have a representative in the JBC and by giving each representative one (1) vote in the Council, Congress, as compared to the other members of the JBC, is accorded greater and unwarranted influence in the appointment of judges. It is clear that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote of half of its, goes against that mandate. FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA v. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. G.R. No. 213181, 19 August 2014, En Banc, Mendoza, J. Due process is the right to explain oneself, not to ensnare by surprise, but to provide the person a reasonable opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently muster his response. Otherwise, the occasion becomes an idle and futile exercise. 63 | P a g e

Political Law Review Facts: Francis Jardeleza was nominated as one of the candidates for the vacated position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Jardeleza was informed that Chief Justice Sereno was invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 (regarding integrity) against him. He was directed to make himself available on June 30, 2014 before the JBC during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity. Jardeleza filed a petition asking the Supreme Court to direct the JBC to give him 5 working days written notice of any hearing with the JBC. During the hearing, Jardeleza asked Chief Justice Sereno to execute a sworn statement specifying her objections and that the JBC defer its meeting since the Court would meet to act on his petition. Later that afternoon, the JBC proceeded to vote for the nominees to be included in the shortlist. Jardeleza was not included due to the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of the JBC rules. Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Jardeleza may be included in the shortlist of nominees submitted to the President Ruling: Yes. This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se, but from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. The Supreme Court refuses to turn a blind eye on the palpable defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment that Jardeleza received before the Council. Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process. What set off the lack of due process was the circumstance of requiring Jardeleza to appear before the Council and to instantaneously provide those who are willing to listen an intelligent defense. However, he was not given a reasonable chance to muster his defense. He was merely asked to appear in a meeting where he would be subjected to an inquiry. Due process is the right to explain oneself, not to ensnare by surprise, but to provide the person a reasonable opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently muster his response. Otherwise, the occasion becomes an idle and futile exercise. FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELANEW BATAAN, COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL G.R. No. 211833, 7 April 2015, En Banc, Reyes, J. The JBC is the only constitutional body bestowed with the mandate and competency to set criteria for applicants that refer to the more general categories of probity, integrity and independence. 64 | P a g e

Political Law Review Facts: MCTC Judge Ferdinand Villanueva assailed a JBC policy which requires five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts on the ground that it is unconstitutional. The JBC did not include him in the list of candidates for the vacant position of RTC judge since he had been a judge only for more than a year. Issue: Whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to secondlevel courts is constitutional. Ruling: Yes. JBC’s ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply fill up judicial vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient administration of justice. Given this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to establish a set uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an applicant meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-year requirement policy applied by the JBC to the petitioner’s case is necessary and incidental to the function conferred by the Constitution to the JBC. Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended appointees does not constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate when it employs number of years of service to screen and differentiate applicants from the competition. The number of years of service provides a relevant basis to determine proven competence which may be measured by experience, among other factors. The JBC is the only constitutional body bestowed with the mandate and competency to set criteria for applicants that refer to the more general categories of probity, integrity and independence. RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, 11 February 2010, En Banc, Corona, J. The payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. Facts: The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on government-owned or controlled corporations under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, invoking Section 39 of its charter. 65 | P a g e

Political Law Review Issue: Whether or not the legislature may exempt the GSIS from legal fees imposed by the Court on government-owned and controlled corporations and local government units. Ruling: No. The payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an integral part of the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rulemaking power under Section 5(5) Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal fees is a jurisdictional requirement. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Appellate docket and other lawful fees are required to be paid within the same period for taking an appeal. Payment of docket fees in full within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court's institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court's exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REYNALDO A. VILLAR G.R. No. 192791, 24 April 2012, En Banc, Velasco Jr., J. A COA commissioner who serves for a period less than seven years cannot be appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the seven-year term of the predecessor. Such appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve more than seven years under the constitutional ban. Facts: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Guillermo Carague as Chairman of the COA, his term starting from Feb. 2, 2001 to end on Feb. 2, 2008. President Arroyo then appointed Reynaldo Villar as the third member of the COA, his term starting from Feb. 2, 2004 until Feb. 2, 2011. From the retirement of Carague in 2008, Villar was designated Acting Chairman and was subsequently nominated and appointed as such. The appointment 66 | P a g e

Political Law Review papers stated that his term shall be until February 2, 2011, the same as his original term as commissioner. Villar contested the appointment, arguing that he is entitled to a fresh seven-year term. Although Villar was already replaced by a new appointee of President Aquino after his resignation, the Court still acted upon the case since the situation calls for the promulgation of principles that will guide the bench, the bar and the public should like circumstances arise. Issue: Whether or not Villar’s appointment as COA chairman, after having served four years of his seven-year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed under the Constitution Ruling: No. At the outset, the Constitution does not prohibit a promotional appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term of seven years, further qualified that the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In addition, such promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the staggering terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be appointed to the position must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed in the Constitution. In this case, Villar’s proposition that his promotional appointment as COA chairman gave him a completely fresh seven-year term cannot be sustained. No one can be a COA member, either as chairman of commissioner, or mix of both positions, for an aggregate term of more than seven years. A contrary view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate seven-year service limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of succession. A COA commissioner like Villar who serves for a period less than 7 years cannot be appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor. Such appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve more than seven years under the constitutional ban. DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT G.R. No. 191672, 25 November 2014, En Banc, Bersamin, J. The CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the control of the President without impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution. Facts: 67 | P a g e

Political Law Review President Arroyo appointed Francisco Duque as Chairman of the CSC. She then issued EO 864 which orders that the CSC Chairman shall sit as an ex-officio member of the Board of Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Petitioner filed the petition challenging the constitutionality of EO 864 and the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Trustees of these entities for being clear violations of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the Duque’s designation impairs the independence of the CSC and violates the constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Constitutional Commissions. Ruling: Yes. The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their respective charters with various powers and functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created. While powers and functions associated with appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also tasked to perform other corporate powers and functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and functions, whether personnelrelated or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may exercise these powers and functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman. Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duque’s designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. The PHILHEALTH and ECC are attached to the DOH and DOLE while GSIS and HDMF fall under the Office of the President. The corporate powers of these entities are exercised through their governing Boards, members of which are under the control of the President. As such the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the control of the President without impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution. GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA v. THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND THE NATIONAL TREASURER G.R. No. 180989, 7 February 2012, En Banc, Sereno, J. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies.

68 | P a g e

Political Law Review Facts: The COA issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the system of pre-audit of government financial transactions. After the change of administration due to the People Power in 1986, COA reinstated the pre-audit of selected government transactions. When the political system and government operations stabilized, COA again lifted the pre-audit of government transactions. In 2006, petitioner Gualberto Dela Llana wrote to COA regarding internal pre-audit service of the Department of Agriculture. The COA informed petitioner of the lifting of the pre-audit. Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court alleging that the pre-audit duty of the COA cannot be lifted by mere circular since pre-audit is a constitutional mandate in Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the COA is obliged to conduct a pre-audit for all government transactions for all government agencies Ruling: No. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only when the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or special preaudit, to correct the deficiencies. Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that the Supreme Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination. When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only application. Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by the Court. BILL OF RIGHTS FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP., et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT (DSWD), et al. G.R. NO. 166494, June 29, 2007, J. Azcuna While the Constitution protects property rights, the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process. 69 | P a g e

Political Law Review Facts: Petitioners, as domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines, assailed the constitutionality of Sec. 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act which grants a 20% discount in the purchase of medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens. They argued that the law is confiscatory because it infringes Art. III, Sec. 9 of the Constitution which provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. They maintained that the reduction in their total revenues resulting from the grant of discount is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit, for which they should be entitled to a just compensation, but the law failed to provide a scheme whereby they will be justly compensated. Issue: Whether the State’s imposition upon private establishments of the burden of partly subsidizing a government program violates Art. III, Sec. 9 of the Constitution. Ruling: No. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which has general welfare for its object. For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. While the Constitution protects property rights, the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. Thus, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business, because they have not been able to show properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their disadvantage. HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, IN HER CAPACITY AS CITY MAYOR OF MARIKINA CITY, et al. v. ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE AND ST. SCHOLASTICA'S ACADEMY-MARIKINA, INC. G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013, J. Mendoza Absent any reasonable relation between the purpose of the police power measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded even under the guise of protecting the public interest. Facts:

70 | P a g e

Political Law Review The City Government of Marikina enacted ordinances which required the fences on the front yard of educational institutions to be of an open fence type at 80% see-thru, and a five-meter setback of the fence to provide for a parking area. In enforcing the ordinances, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to St. Scholastica’s College and St. Scholastica’s AcademyMarikina, Inc. ordering them to comply with the aforesaid ordinances. Without complying with the demand, the schools filed a petition for prohibition. Issue: Whether the assailed ordinances are valid exercise of police power. Ruling: No. The five-meter setback of the fence to provide for a parking area would tantamount to taking of private property for public use without just compensation, in contravention to the Constitution, considering that it would no longer be for the exclusive use of the respondents as it would also be available for use by the general public on non-school days. Furthermore, the ordinances are unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes. The State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community. With respect to the 80% see-thru fence requirement, the enforcement of the assailed ordinance would result in an undue interference with the school’s right to privacy and right to property, which necessarily includes their right to decide how best to protect their property. Requiring the exposure of the property via a see-thru fence is violative of the right to privacy, considering that the property also served as a residence of the Benedictine sisters, who were entitled to some sense of privacy in their affairs. More importantly, such exposed premises could entice and tempt would-be criminals to the property, and that a see-thru fence would be easier to bypass and breach. Finally, there is no reasonable relation between the purpose of the police power measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO v. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, REPRESENTED BY HON. MAYOR JOHN P. YAP, et al. G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014, J. Velasco, Jr. The mayor is empowered to order the closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits. Pursuant to the general welfare clause, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare. 71 | P a g e

Political Law Review Facts: Boracay West Cove applied for the issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a hotel over a parcel of land. However, its application was denied on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the “no build zone.” Meanwhile, it continued with the construction of the resort hotel. Subsequently, the Office of the Mayor of Malay issued an Executive Order, ordering the closure and demolition of the hotel. Issue: Whether the mayor can order the demolition of illegally constructed establishments without resorting to judicial remedy. Ruling: Yes. Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the Local Government Code empowers the mayor to order the closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits. However, under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can order their closure and demolition only after satisfying the requirement of due notice and hearing. In this case at bar, Boracay West Cove admittedly failed to secure the necessary permits before the construction of the hotel; and, the due process requirement is deemed to have been sufficiently complied with since the company received notices to comply with the ordinance and yet it failed to do so. In the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare. JOSE J. FERRER, JR. v. CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, AND CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015, J. Peralta The levy of Socialized Housing Tax is primarily for urban development and housing program; thus, for the general welfare of the entire city. It is therefore in the exercise of police power implemented through taxation. In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Facts: The Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance which imposes upon real properties a Socialized Housing Tax which shall accrue to the Socialized Housing Programs of the Quezon City Government. Jose Ferrer, a registered owner of a residential property in Quezon City filed the instant petition for 72 | P a g e

Political Law Review certiorari, assailing the subject ordinance. He asserts that it does not find basis in the social justice principle enshrined in the Constitution. For him, the SHT cannot be viewed as a “charity” from real property owners since it is forced, not voluntary; thereby burdening them with the expenses to provide funds for housing of informal settlers. Issue: Whether the imposition of SHT shall be struck down for arbitrary intrusion into private rights of real property owners. Ruling: NO. The Constitution explicitly espouses the view that the use of property bears a social function and that all economic agents shall contribute to the common good. In this case, the imposition of SHT on real property is primarily for urban development and housing program; thus, for the general welfare. Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the underprivileged and homeless constituents but advantageous to the real property owners as well. The situation will improve the value of the their property investments, fully enjoying the same in view of an orderly, secure, and safe community, and will enhance the quality of life of the poor, making them law-abiding constituents and better consumers of business products. Consequently, the levy of SHT is primarily in the exercise of police power for the general welfare of the entire city. In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. In this case, it is taxation that made the implement of the state’s police power. PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G.R. No. 167330, September 18, 2009, J. Corona While the power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is, as a general rule, unlimited in its range, it must be exercised fairly, equally and uniformly, lest the tax collector kill the "hen that lays the golden egg." Facts: Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. is a domestic corporation with a net worth of P259 million. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue sent PHCPI a final assessment notice demanding the payment of deficiency documentary stamp taxes (DST) amounting to P376 million. PHCPI claimed that the assessed DST to date which amounts to P376 million is way beyond its net worth of P259 million. Issue:

73 | P a g e

Political Law Review Whether the exercise of the power of taxation in this case would be oppressive. Ruling: Yes. As a general rule, the power to tax and is unlimited in its range. However, it is exercised with caution to minimize injury to taxpayer. It must be exercised fairly, equally collector kill the "hen that lays the golden egg."

is an incident of sovereignty so potent that it should be the proprietary rights of a and uniformly, lest the tax

Applying the aforesaid principle, imposing the DST on PHCPI would be highly oppressive, given the reality that the DST is way beyond the company’s net worth. It is not the purpose of the government to throttle private business. On the contrary, the government ought to encourage private enterprise. PHCPI, just like any concern organized for a lawful economic activity, has a right to maintain a legitimate business. Legitimate enterprises enjoy the constitutional protection not to be taxed out of existence. Incurring losses because of a tax imposition may be an acceptable consequence but killing the business of an entity is another matter and should not be allowed. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. CITY OF CABANATUAN, REPRESENTED BY ITS CITY MAYOR, HON. HONORATO PEREZ G.R. No. 177332, October 01, 2014, J. Leonen Taxes are not and should not be construed to drive businesses into insolvency. A reasonable surcharge will provide incentive to pay; an unreasonable one delays payment and engages government in unnecessary litigation and expense. Facts: The City of Cabanatuan assessed the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) of franchise tax. NAPOCOR refused to pay, arguing that it is exempt from paying the franchise tax. So, the City filed a complaint demanding NAPOCOR to pay the assessed tax due plus 25% surcharge and interest. On appeal, the CA held that since the franchise tax due was computed yearly, the 25% surcharge should also be computed yearly, that means, the computation of the surcharge would be based on the total unpaid tax for each year (proper tax for the year + unpaid tax of the previous year/s). Hence, the instant petition for certiorari. NAPOCOR insisted on a onetime application of the 25% surcharge based on the total franchise tax due and unpaid, not cumulative. Issue: Whether the yearly accrual of the 25% surcharge is unconscionable. Ruling: 74 | P a g e

Political Law Review Yes. The imposition of the 25% surcharge in this case resulted in an aggregate penalty that is way higher than NAPOCOR’s basic tax liabilities. Furthermore, it effectively exceeded the prescribed 72% ceiling for interest under Section 168 of the Local Government Code. The law allows the local government to collect an interest at the rate not exceeding 2% per month of the unpaid taxes, fees, or charges including surcharges, but in no case shall the total interest on the unpaid amount or portion thereof should not exceed thirty-six months or three years. In other words, the CIR cannot collect a total interest on the unpaid tax including surcharge that is effectively higher than 72%. Here, the CIR applied the 25% cumulative surcharge for more than three years. Its computation undoubtedly exceeded the 72% ceiling imposed under Section 168 of the Local Government Code. Hence, CIR's computation of the surcharge is oppressive and unconscionable. Taxes and its surcharges and penalties cannot be construed in such a way as to become oppressive and confiscatory. A healthy balance should be maintained such that laws are interpreted in a way that these burdens do not amount to a confiscatory outcome. Taxes are not and should not be construed to drive businesses into insolvency. To a certain extent, a reasonable surcharge will provide incentive to pay; an unreasonable one delays payment and engages government in unnecessary litigation and expense. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANDRE MARTI G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991, J. Bidin The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. The constitutional proscription could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. Facts: Andre Marti carried four gift wrapped packages to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders. He informed the clerk therein that he was sending the packages to a friend. He also assured that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend. Before delivery to the Customs, the proprietor of Forwarders, following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened the box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. So, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Thereafter, he took samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the NBI to his place of business. Upon inspection, the NBI agents found dried marijuana leaves inside the packages. Subsequently, an Information was filed against Marti for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. On the other hand, Marti contended that the evidence against him had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure, therefore inadmissible in evidence. 75 | P a g e

Political Law Review Issue: Whether the evidence obtained by a private person, allegedly in violation of constitutional rights may be invoked against the State. Ruling: No. The contraband in the case at bar came into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing Marti's rights against unreasonable search and seizure. It was the proprietor of the forwarding agency who made the search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one. Furthermore, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by the proprietor into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search. In view of the foregoing, the evidence against Marti is admissible. In conclusion, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. DUE PROCESS JENNY M. AGABON AND VIRGILIO C. AGABON v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), RIVIERA HOME IMPROVEMENTS, INC. AND VICENTE ANGELES G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004, J. Ynares-Santiago Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; while statutory due process found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing. Facts: Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon were dismissed for abandonment of work. They filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, alleging that their employer refused to give them assignments unless they agreed to work on a “pakyaw” basis. On the other hand, the employer maintained that both Agabons were not dismissed but had abandoned their work. After trial and on appeal, it was established that the terminations were for a just and valid cause. However, 76 | P a g e

Political Law Review the employer did not send the requisite notices to the last known address of the employees. It argued that the notices would be useless because the employees did not reside there anymore. Issue: Whether the failure to render due notice and hearing prior to dismissal for just cause constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to due process. Ruling: No. The Due Process Clause embodied in the Constitution is a constitutional restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the government provided by the Bill of Rights. Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; while statutory due process found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing. Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due process, has two aspects: substantive, i.e., the valid and authorized causes of employment termination under the Labor Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of dismissal. Procedural due process requirements for dismissal are found in the Implementing Rules of P.D. 442 of the Labor Code. Breaches of these due process requirements violate the Labor Code. Therefore, statutory due process should be differentiated from failure to comply with constitutional due process. SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., et al. v. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, et al. G.R. No. 178552, October 05, 2010, J. Carpio-Morales A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution because it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid. Statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular defendant. Thus, absent an actual or imminent charge against the petitioner, a vagueness analysis of the assailed statute is legally impermissible. Facts: Petitioners herein challenge the constitutionality of the Human Security Act of 2007. They assailed the said law for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism under the said law in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand" 77 | P a g e

Political Law Review are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts. Respondents, through the OSG, countered that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech. Issue: Whether the vagueness doctrine is an applicable ground to assail a penal statute. Ruling: Yes, but only in an as-applied challenge. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution because it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid. In this jurisdiction, penal statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated only “as applied” to a particular defendant. This means that in determining the constitutionality of a statute, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged. Absent an actual or imminent charge against the petitioner, a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed statute is legally impermissible. Therefore, in this case, since the petitioners have not been charged with violation of the assailed law, the vagueness doctrine is not applicable. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE JESUS C. GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-BRANCH 41, BACOLOD CITY, AND ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, FOR HERSELF IN BEHALF OF MINOR CHILDREN, NAMELY: JO-ANN, JOSEPH AND EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, ALL SURNAMED GARCIA G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, J. Perlas-Bernabe Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Facts: The Congress enacted RA 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” A husband, Jesus Garcia, is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 78 | P a g e

Political Law Review 9262 as being violative of the equal protection for being discriminative against men. Issue: Whether R.A. No. 9262 violates the equal protection clause enshrined in the Constitution. Ruling: No. The Constitution allows classification. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. In this case, RA 9262 is based on a valid classification. The fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. Furthermore, the distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children. Also, the classification is not limited to existing conditions only, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse. Lastly, the law applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. All told, the assailed statute is constitutional. ANTONIO M. SERRANO v. Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC. G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. Facts: Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per month. On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines, serving only two months and seven days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-three days. Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared illegal. On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA 8042, which provides: “In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the 79 | P a g e

Political Law Review workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.” Serrano questioned the constitutionality of the aforecited provision of RA 8042. Issues: 1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment of contracts; 2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector. Ruling: 1. No. The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed. 2. Yes. To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity. Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels: First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more; Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment; The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage. Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection, hence it is unconstitutional. SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., v. JOY C. CABILES G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014, LEONEN, J. The Court is possessed with the constitutional duty to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. Facts: Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency. Joy Cabiles was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. to work as quality control for one year. Thereafter, without prior notice, that she was terminated. This prompted Joy to sue Sameer for illegal dismissal, asking for the return of her placement fee, the withheld amount for 80 | P a g e

Political Law Review repatriation costs, payment of her salary for 23 months as well as moral and exemplary damages. When the case reached the CA, it applied RA 10022, which reinstated the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” and awarded Cabiles NT$46,080.00 or the three month equivalent of her salary, attorney’s fees of NT$300.00, and the reimbursement of the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary, which answered for her repatriation. Issue: Whether or not there is violation of equal protection clause. Ruling: Yes. Reiterating the Serrano case, the Court held that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process. In Serrano, the Court identified the classifications made by the reinstated clause. It distinguished between fixed-period overseas workers and fixed-period local workers. It also distinguished between overseas workers with employment contracts of less than one year and overseas workers with employment contracts of at least one year. Within the class of overseas workers with at least one-year employment contracts, there was a distinction between those with at least a year left in their contracts and those with less than a year left in their contracts when they were illegally dismissed. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES AAA v. HON. ANTONIO A. CARBONELL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City, La Union and ENGR. JAIME O. ARZADON G.R. No. 171465, June 8, 2007, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. What the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. Facts: Judge Carbonell dismissed a criminal case of rape for lack of probable cause on the ground that the complainant and her witnesses failed to take the witness stand to convince him that there was probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, citing Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause “to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.” Issue: 81 | P a g e

Political Law Review Whether or not Judge Carbonell committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal case. Ruling: Yes. The constitutional provision cited by Judge Carbonell does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses. What the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. There is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper—whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged—is the function of the investigating prosecutor. True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judge’s personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses. But it must be emphasized that such personal examination is not mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause. Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor, provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof. RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 199032, November 19, 2014, PER CURIAM Human remains can be a proper subject of a search warrant. Facts: PS/Supt. Fajardo applied with the RTC Manila for a warrant to search caves located inside the Bienbenido Laud’s compound in Davao City where the alleged remains of the victims summarily executed by the Davao Death Squad was buried. Applicant presented a witness who testified that he personally witnessed the said killing. The RTC issued the warrant. Laud filed an urgent motion to quash and suppress illegally seized evidence, claiming that human remains sought to be seized are not proper subject of a search warrant. Issues: 82 | P a g e

Political Law Review Whether or not human remains are personal property thus subject of a search warrant. Ruling: Yes. Under section 3 rule 126, a search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property: (a) Subject of the offense; (b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense or used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense. Considering that human remains can generally be transported from place to place and considering further that they qualify under the phrase “subject of the offense” (given that they prove the crime’s corpus delicti), it follows that they may be valid subjects of a search warrant under the criminal procedure provision. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), respondents. G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J. The right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police power. Facts: Sec. 36 of RA 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses. Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party challenges the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that it violates the constitutional right of a person against unreasonable searches.

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 36(c) and (d) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 violates the constitutional right against unreasonable searches, and therefore unconstitutional. Ruling: No. The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees, 83 | P a g e

Political Law Review while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well-being of the citizenry. The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. US jurisprudence is persuasive. What can be deduced from the US cases of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al. and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. Guided by such jurisprudence, the Court holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements. Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police power. As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held, "reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. The employee’s privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld. Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional. Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed 84 | P a g e

Political Law Review by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. Sec. 36 par. c and d are declared constitutional.

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014, SERENO, CJ. The drug test in Sec. 15, Art. II of RA 9165 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165 Facts: According to the prosecution, the agents of NBI received a complaint from Corazon and Charito that Ariel Escobido was picked up by several unknown male persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to them and they were instructed to go to the Police where they met “James” who demanded from them P100,000, later lowered to P40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel. The complainants reported it to the NBI-CEVRO which verified the text messages received by the complainants. A team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation. The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a pre-marked 500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder, which was made part of the amount demanded by "James" and handed by Corazon. Petitioner underwent forensic examination and was required to submit his urine for drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs. The petitioner denied the charges and he said he was required to extract urine for drug examination, but he refused. He was convicted for violating Sec. 15, Art. II of RA 9165 because the following were established: (1) the accused was arrested; (2) the accused was subjected to drug test; and (3) the confirmatory test shows that he used a dangerous drug. Issue: Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal. Ruling: No. The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of RA 9165. Note that accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion. Making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in 85 | P a g e

Political Law Review Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under RA 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. To overextend the application of this provision would run counter to our pronouncement in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, which states that mandatory drug testing can never be random and suspicionless. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195. Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy. The court cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made. Petitioner is acquitted.

BRICCIO Ricky A. POLLO v. CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINODAVID G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011, Villarama, Jr., J. Government employee’s constitutional protection to privacy as to the computers they used in the work place may vary on a case to case basis. And in cases that there is reduced privacy expectation search incidental to workrelated investigations must comply with the reasonableness and scope test. Facts: This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was charged administratively and eventually dismissed from the service. The employees personal files stored in the computer were used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct. Pollo is a government employee whose computer was searched pursuant to the anonymous letter complaint to the office of Chairperson David. Pollo now assailed the validity of the search and resulting evidence thereby being the fruit of the poisonous tree. Issue: Whether the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files without his knowledge and consent was reasonable Ruling: No. In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance the invasion of the employee’s legitimate expectations of privacy against the governments need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace. In our view, therefore, a probable cause 86 | P a g e

Political Law Review requirement for searches of the type at issue here would impose intolerable burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting the employee misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the agency’s work, and ultimately to the public interest. Thus, public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for no investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable. Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a two-fold inquiry: first, one must consider whether the action was justified at its inception; and second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a non-investigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. The search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the misconduct. This to test was found to be fulfilled in the case at bar, considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the complaint was received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned regional office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the search was justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and store documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-related investigation. JESSE U. LUCAS v. JESUS S. LUCA G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011, Nachura, J. Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable. Facts: Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the RTC, alleging that he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus Lucas in Manila. The RTC dismissed his petition, because he failed to establish 87 | P a g e

Political Law Review compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely: (1) a prima facie case; (2) affirmative defences; (3) presumption of legitimacy; and (4) physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. Issue: Whether a prima facie showing of legitimacy is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing. Ruling: Yes. But it is not yet time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-àvis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained: “Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.” The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE AND WRIT OF HABEAS DATA TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994, J. PADILLA Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under RA 4200. Facts:

88 | P a g e

Political Law Review Rafael Ortanez filed a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez on the ground of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons. Issue: Whether the tape recordings are admissible as evidence? Ruling: No. RA 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping andOther Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under RA 4200. CECILIA ZULUETA v. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996. Mendoza, J. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Facts: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. One time, she entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin’s passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband. Issue: Whether the documents seized may be used against the respondent in the case filed against her husband.

89 | P a g e

Political Law Review Ruling: No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other. BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, et al. G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, Puno, J. Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from these guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees in our Constitution and laws create zones of privacy. Facts: Senator Blas Ople assailed the constitutionality of the AO 308 entitled “Adoption of Computerized Identification Reference System” on the following grounds: (1) The administrative order issued by the executive is deemed to be a law and not a mere administrative order thus it is a usurpation of legislative power of the congress to make laws; and (2) It impermissibly intrudes the citizen’s constitutional right of privacy. Issue: Whether or not AO 308 is constitutional. Ruling:

90 | P a g e

Political Law Review No. The Administrative Order violates the constitutional right to privacy because its scope is too broad and vague that will put people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger if implemented. It also lacks of proper safeguards for protecting the information that will be gathered from people through biometrics and other means. Thus, AO 308 may interfere with the individual’s liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for “fishing expeditions” by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats emanate from various sources — governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an inerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its recordkeeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget." KILUSANG MAYO UNO v. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY G.R. No. 167798, APRIL 19, 2006, Carpio, J. The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities. Facts: President Arroyo issued EO 420 that directs a unified ID system among government agencies and GOCCs in order to have a uniform ID for all government agencies. Kilusang Mayo Uno and others assailed this executive order for being a “usurpation of legislative powers by the president” and it infringes the citizens’ right to privacy. Issue: Whether EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy 91 | P a g e

Political Law Review Ruling: No. All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to privacy. There have also been no complaints of abuse by these government entities in the collection and recording of personal identification data. With the exception of eight specific data shown on the ID card, the personal data collected and recorded under EO 420 are treated as strictly confidential under Sec. 6(d) of EO 420. These data are not only strictly confidential but also personal matters. Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution grants the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Personal matters are exempt or outside the coverage of the people’s right to information on matters of public concern. The data treated as strictly confidential under EO 420 being private matters and not matters of public concern, these data cannot be released to the public or the press. Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy. Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection, recording and exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards. Moreover, EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any power that they do not already possess under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople v. Torres sought to establish a National Computerized Identification Reference System, a national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system where none existed before. RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA v. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, AND JOHN DOES G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014, VELASCO, J. A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself. (US v. Gines-Perez) Facts: Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments. The photos 92 | P a g e

Political Law Review reached the STC administration who found Tan and her classmates to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from the graduation ceremonies. The parents of the girls filed a petition for the issuance of habeas data. They also prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy. Issue: Whether there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case. Ruling: No. The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy, where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about themselves. Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Networking (OSN) activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. Thus, Thus, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her post or profile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice. Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at “Only Me” or a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their function but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or information within the confines of his or her private space. Unfortunately, in the case at bar, this safety measures were not utilized. DR. JOY MARGATE LEE v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

93 | P a g e

Political Law Review In order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Facts: Neri Ilagan and Joy Margate Lee are common law partners. When Ilagan visited Lee at her condominium unit, he accidentally left his digital camera therein. As Lee found the said camera, she discovered that a sex video of Ilagan with another woman was recorded therein, hence she confronted Ilagan about it which the latter denied. Lee further alleged that during the their confrontation, Ilagan slammed her head against a wall inside his office and walked away. Thereafter, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing criminal and administrative complaints against Ilagan. Thereafter, Ilagan filed a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data on the ground that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman. The RTC issued the writ of habeas data. Issue: Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan. Ruling: No. In order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful. In this case, that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule.

94 | P a g e

Political Law Review FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION Francisco Chavez V. Raul M. Gonzales G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, Puno, C.J. A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media. Facts: On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (Comelec). The conversation was audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. These persons included Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if the crime was committed or was being committed in their presence. On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued a press release giving fair warning to radio and television owners/operators to observe anti-wiretapping law and pertinent circulars on program standards. Alleging that the acts of respondents are violations of the freedom on expression and of the press, and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Respondents denied that the acts transgress the Constitution, and questioned petitioners legal standing to file the petition. Among the arguments they raised as to the validity of the fair warning issued by respondent NTC, is that broadcast media enjoy lesser constitutional guarantees compared to print media, and the warning was issued pursuant to the NTCs mandate to regulate the telecommunications industry.It was also stressed that most of the [television] and radio stations continue, even to this date, to air the tapes, but of late within the parameters agreed upon between the NTC and KBP. Issue: Whether the official statements made by respondents on June 8, and 11, 2005 warning the media on airing the alleged wiretapped conversation between the President and other personalities constitute unconstitutional prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Ruling: 95 | P a g e

Political Law Review Yes. The Court applied the Content-based restriction test and ruled that respondents’ evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must show the type of harm the speech sought to be restrained would bring about especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, but only by showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a reality already on ground. As formulated, the question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media. This outlines the procedural map to follow in cases like the one at bar as it spells out the following: (a) the test; (b) the presumption; (c) the burden of proof; (d) the party to discharge the burden; and (e) the quantum of evidence necessary. On the basis of the records of the case at bar, respondents who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. It appears that the great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the antiwiretapping law. The records of the case at bar, however, are confused and confusing, and respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a complete version and the other, an altered version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the whos and the hows of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the tapes different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State. JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, et. al. v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, et. al. G.R. No. 203335, G.R. No. 203299, G.R. No. 203306, G.R. No. 203359, G.R. No. 203378, G.R. No. 203391, G.R. No. 203440, G.R. No. 203453, 96 | P a g e

Political Law Review G.R. No. 203454, G.R. No. 203469, G.R. No. 203501, G.R. No. 203509, G.R. No. 203515, G.R. No. 203518, February 11, 2014, Abad, J. The cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of communication. It is inevitable that any government threat of punishment regarding certain uses of the medium creates a chilling effect on the constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of the great masses that use it. In this case, the particularly complex web of interaction on social media websites would give law enforcers such latitude that they could arbitrarily or selectively enforce the law. Facts: The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater information and facility of communication. But all is not well with the system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. For this reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings. But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. Hence, Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the certain provisions of the cybercrime law. Issue: Whether or not certain provisions of the Cyber Crime Law is unconstitutional as it poses restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech. Ruling: Yes. The Court declared void for being unconstitutional the following provisions of the Cyber Crime Law: Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of unsolicited commercial communications Reason: The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as "spam." xxx The government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads reduce the "efficiency of computers." These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such ads. (2) Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time; Reason: xxx The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these technologies be written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the Constitution guarantees.

97 | P a g e

Political Law Review (3)Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data. Reason: xxx Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in one’s papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control and disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant. Further, the Court DECLARES: A. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original author of the post; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it. Reason: Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel. But the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. B. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes as VA L I D and CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a) (3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System. Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b) (1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel. Reason: Unless the legislature crafts a cyber libel law that takes into account its unique circumstances and culture, such law will tend to create a chilling effect on the millions that use this new medium of communication in violation of their constitutionally-guaranteed right to freedom of expression. EMILIO M. R. OSMEA and PABLO P. GARCIA v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998, MENDOZA, J. Any restriction on speech is only incidental, and it is no more than is necessary to achieve its purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the use of mass media for political advertising. Facts: Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition, seeking a re-examination of the validity of 11(b) of RA 6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which 98 | P a g e

Political Law Review prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commission on Elections. They contended that when the Court upheld in NPC v. Comelec the validity of Section 11(b) against claims that it abridged freedom of speech and of the press, the said law exhibited undesirable effects because the ban on political advertising has not only failed to level the playing field, but actually worked to the grave disadvantage of the poor candidates by depriving them of a medium which they can afford to pay for while their more affluent rivals can always resort to other means of reaching voters like airplanes, boats, rallies, parades, and handbills. Issue: Whether or not Section 11(b) is unconstitutional as it poses restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech. Ruling: No. The main purpose of Section 11(b) is regulatory. Any restriction on speech is only incidental, and it is no more than is necessary to achieve its purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the use of mass media for political advertising. The restriction on speech, as pointed out in NPC, is limited both as to time and as to scope. There is no total ban on political ads, much less restriction on the content of the speech. Given the fact that print space and air time can be controlled or dominated by rich candidates to the disadvantage of poor candidates, there is a substantial or legitimate governmental interest justifying exercise of the regulatory power of the Comelec under Art. IX-C, 4 of the Constitution, which provides that the commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. The provisions in question involve no suppression of political ads. They only prohibit the sale or donation of print space and air time to candidates but require the Comelec instead to procure space and time in the mass media for allocation, free of charge, to the candidates. In effect, during the election period, the Comelec takes over the advertising page of newspapers or the commercial time of radio and TV stations and allocates these to the candidates.

99 | P a g e

Political Law Review SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, doing business as MANILA STANDARD v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, Mendoza, J. Under the O’Brien test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Facts: Comelec sought to enforce Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides: “Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election.” Petitioners brought an action for prohibition to enjoin Comelec from enforcing such provision, claiming that it constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraints. Issue: Whether or not Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression and the press. Ruling: Yes. The Court applied the O’Brien Test under, under which even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question. Applying the O’Brien Test in this case, the Court ruled that Section 5.4 is invalid, because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression. Contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the prohibition imposed by Section 5.4 cannot be justified on the ground that it is only for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a period of fifteen (15) days immediately before a national election and seven (7) days immediately before a local election. GMA NETWORK, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014, PERALTA, J. 100 | P a g e

Political Law Review The adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits —leveling the playing field—does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of speech of the candidates. Facts: Petitioners GMA Network, Incorporated (GMA), ABS-CBN Corporation (ABS-CBN), ABC Development Corporation (ABC), et. al. are owners/operators of radio and television networks in the Philippines, while petitioner Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) is the national organization of broadcasting companies in the Philippines representing operators of radio and television stations and said stations themselves. They sent their respective letters to Comelec questioning the constitutionality of Section 9 (a) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution) limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. During the previous May 2007 and 2010, Comelec issued Resolutions implementing and interpreting the airtime limitations, to mean that a candidate is entitled to the aforestated number of minutes "per station.” For the May 2013 elections, however, respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 9615, changing the interpretation of said candidates' and political parties' airtime limitation for political campaigns or advertisements from a “per station” basis, to a “total aggregate” basis. Petitioners contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people's right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections. However, Comelec contended that its issuance of the assailed Resolution is pursuant to Section 4, Article IX (C) of the Constitution which vests on the Comelec the power to supervise and regulate, during election periods, transportation and other public utilities, as well as mass media Issue: Whether or not Section 9 (a) of the assailed Comelec resolution violates freedom of speech and of the press. Ruling: Yes. Section 9 (a) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the “aggregate-based” airtime limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press. It is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits—leveling the playing field— does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a 101 | P a g e

Political Law Review substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure. In this particular instance, what the Comelec has done is analogous to letting a bird fly after one has clipped its wings. It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself - a form of suppression of his political speech. THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, LEONEN, J. At the heart of democracy is every advocate’s right to make known what the people need to know, while the meaningful exercise of one’s right of suffrage includes the right of every voter to know what they need to know in order to make their choice. Facts: Bishop Vicente M. Navarra posted two (2) tarpaulins, each with approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size, for public viewing within the vicinity of San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. One of the tarpaulins stated: "Conscience Vote" and lists of candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team Buhay. When the said tarpaulin came to the attention of Comelec, it sent a letter to Bishop Navarra ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin because it was in violation of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 as the lawful size for election propaganda material is only two feet (2’) by three feet (3’); otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against the latter. Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech, Bishop Navarra, et al. prayed for the Court to declare the questioned orders of Comelec as unconstitutional, and permanently restraining the latter from enforcing them after notice and hearing. Issue: 102 | P a g e

Political Law Review Whether or not the controversial tarpaulin is an election propaganda which the Comelec has the power to regulate; otherwise its prohibition shall constitute an abridgment of freedom of speech. Ruling: No. It is not election propaganda. While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or partylist group. Personal opinions, unlike sponsored messages, are not covered by the second paragraph of Sec. 1(4) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 defining “political advertisement” or “election propaganda.” The caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech. That petitioners chose to categorize them as purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a single issue—and a complex piece of legislation at that—can easily be interpreted as an attempt to stereotype the candidates and partylist organizations. Not all may agree to the way their thoughts were expressed, as in fact there are other Catholic dioceses that chose not to follow the example of petitioners. But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is an enumeration of our fundamental liberties. It is not a detailed code that prescribes good conduct. It provides space for all to be guided by their conscience, not only in the act that they do to others but also in judgment of the acts of others. 1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015, J. Reyes A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible if certain requisites are met. Facts: In 2013, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and subsequent elections. One of the sections enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda including the posting of any election campaign or propaganda material in public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether motorized or not, and within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the like. Issue: 103 | P a g e

Political Law Review Whether or not the provisions which prohibit the posting of any election campaign or propaganda material in PUVs and public transport terminals are constitutional. Ruling:

No. Such prohibitions unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of election campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with them. The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate. A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur: first, the government regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government; second, it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; third, the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and fourth, the incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations since they merely control the place where election campaign materials may be posted. However, the prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation. The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a practical matter, escape from intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted. The "captive-audience" doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right not to be exposed to an unwanted message in circumstances in which the communication cannot be avoided. Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be justified if the supposed "captive audience" may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. The prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under the captive-audience doctrine; the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive. SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC. AND PULSE ASIA, INC., v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 208062, April 07, 2015, J. Leonen 104 | P a g e

Political Law Review Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. Facts: Comelec Resolution No. 9674 (Resolution) directed SWS, Pulse Asia and other survey firms of similar circumstance to submit to Comelec the names of all commissioners and payors of all surveys published from Feb. 12, 2013 to April 23, 2013, including those of their “subscribers.” SWS and Pulse Asia assailed the Resolution as having been issued ultra vires. They contended that the Resolution is in excess of what the Fair Election Act requires. Issue: Whether or not the rights of petitioners to free speech will be curtailed by the requirement to submit the names of their subscribers Ruling: No. The names of those who commission or pay for election surveys, including subscribers of survey firms, must be disclosed pursuant to Sec. 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act. This requirement is a valid regulation in the exercise of police power and effects the constitutional policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service. The nature of the speech involved, as well as the Fair Election Act's purpose of ensuring political equality, calls into operation the equality-based approach to weighing liberty to express vis-a-vis equality of opportunities. In an equality-based approach, politically disadvantaged speech prevails over regulation but regulation promoting political equality prevails over speech. Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made with or on private property. SWS and Pulse Asia’s free speech rights must be weighed in relation to the Fair Election Act's purpose of ensuring political equality and, therefore, 105 | P a g e

Political Law Review the speech of others who want to participate unencumbered in our political spaces. On one hand, there are petitioners' right to publish and publications which are attended by the interests of those who can employ published data to their partisan ends. On the other, there is regulation that may affect equality and, thus, strengthen the capacity of those on society's margins or those who grope for resources to engage in the democratic dialogue. The latter fosters the ideals of deliberative democracy. It does not trump the former; rather, it provides the environment where the survey group's free speech rights should reside. PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, et al. G.R. NO. 173034, October 09, 2007, J. Austria-Martinez The advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes properly falls within the ambit of the term commercial speech. Facts: Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. The DOH issued the assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. Petitioner, representing its members that are manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Issue: Whether or not the absolute ban on the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes found under Sections 4(f) and 11 of A.O. No. 20060012 (RIRR) should be struck down Ruling: Yes. The advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes properly falls within the ambit of the term commercial speech-that is, speech that proposes an economic transaction. This is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. An American jurisprudence provided a four-part analysis for evaluating the validity of regulations of commercial speech: (1) The commercial speech must concern lawful acitivity and not be misleading; (2) The asserted governmental interest must be substantial. If both of these requirements are met, it must next be determined whether the state 106 | P a g e

Political Law Review regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. Applying the test in the case at bar, first, it is not claimed that the advertisement at issue is an unlawful activity or is inaccurate. In fact, both the International Code and the Milk Code recognize and concede that there are instances when breastmilk substitutes may be necessary. Second, there is no doubt that the government interest in providing safe and adequate nutrition to infants and young children is substantial. This interest is expressed as a national policy in no less than the fundamental law of our land and is also embodied in various international agreements where we are a party. Third, there is an undeniable causal relationship between the interest of government and the advertising ban. Unquestionably, breastfeeding is the tested and proven method of providing optimal nutrition to infants and young children. The rationale of the absolute ban is to prevent mothers from succumbing to suggestive and misleading marketing and propaganda which may be contained in advertisements of breastmilk substitutes. Fourth, prescinding from these predicates, the critical inquiry is: whether the complete suppression of the advertisement and promotion of breastmilk substitutes is no more than necessary to further the interest of the state in the protection and promotion of the right to health of infants and young children. The absolute ban on advertising is unduly restrictive and is more than necessary to further the avowed governmental interest of promoting the health of infants and young children. It ought to be self-evident, for instance, that the advertisement of such products which are strictly informative cuts too deep on free speech. The laudable concern of the respondent for the promotion of the health of infants and young children cannot justify the absolute, overarching ban. BAYAN, et al v. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al. G.R. NO. 169838, April 25, 2006, J. Azcuna It is a settled principle that the exercise of the right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances are not absolute and may be regulated. Facts: Petitioners assailed BP 880 which required a permit for staging a rally, contending that it is a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argued that the law requires a permit regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. Moreover, they said that the law is not content-neutral, because it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. Issue: Whether or not BP 880 is constitutional. 107 | P a g e

Political Law Review Ruling: Yes. It does not curtail or unduly restrict freedom, it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, “maximum tolerance” is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign “police power,” which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. Also, BP 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. However, the so-called “calibrated preemptive response policy” has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT, JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, AND JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN v. HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE "LITO" ATIENZA G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010, J. Carpio Morales The freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. Facts: The IBP, through its then National President Jose Cadiz, filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and multisectoral organizations. Mayor Atienza issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006. The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge. IBP alleged that the participants voluntarily dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program. The Manila Police District (MPD) thereupon instituted a criminal action against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit. Issue: 108 | P a g e

Political Law Review Whether or not the modification by Mayor Atienza of the venue indicated in the application violates IBP’s constitutional right to freedom of expression and public assembly Ruling: Yes. Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If the Mayor is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. In modifying the permit outright, Mayor Atienza gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which “blank” denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof. RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED “RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT” A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 08, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro The right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Facts: Thirty-seven (37) UP law professor were directed to show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The letter written by such professors made known to the Supreme Court their view that the plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct 109 | P a g e

Political Law Review and judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court, and that in light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and to save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, Justice Del Castillo, to resign his position, without prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate. The professors alleged that with the issuance of the Show Cause Resolution, the Supreme Court has interfered with respondents' constitutionally mandated right to free speech and expression. They contended that the Supreme Court is denying them the right to criticize the Court's decisions and actions, and that it seeks to “silence” respondent law professors' dissenting view on what they characterize as a “legitimate public issue.” Issue: Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution deny the professors their freedom of expression. Ruling: No. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for the “proper disposition” and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution made no objections to the portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be "constructive" but only asked respondents to explain those portions of the said Statement that by no stretch of the imagination could be considered as fair or constructive. The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Court's alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners in the Vinuya case, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect. The right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. Moreover, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech. Freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interest. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression 110 | P a g e

Political Law Review and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. FREEDOM OF RELIGION ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS CHAIR, DANTON REMOTO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 190582, April 08, 2010, J. Del Castillo Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. Facts: Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Ang Ladlad applied for registration with the Comelec but it was was denied on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration. Comelec also ruled that Ang Ladlad tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. Furthermore, Comelec held that should it grant the petition, it will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Issue: Whether or not religion is a valid basis for the refusal of Comelec to accept Ang Ladlad's Petition for Registration Ruling: No. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters." Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. Hence, it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the Comelec to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the Comelec is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. A law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification 111 | P a g e

Political Law Review to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE IGNACIO B. MACARINE, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, GEN. LUNA, SURIGAO DEL NORTE A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770, July 18, 2012, J. Brion OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. Facts: OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires that all foreign travels of judges and court personnel, regardless of the number of days, must be with prior permission from the Cuurt. A travel authority must be secured from the OCA. The complete requirements should be submitted to and received by the OCA at least two weeks before the intended time of travel. Judges and personnel who shall leave the country without travel authority issued by the OCA shall be subject to disciplinary action. Judge Macarine wrote the Court Administrator requesting for authority to travel to Hongkong with his family for the period of September 10 - 14, 2009 where he would celebrate his 65th birthday. He stated that his travel abroad shall be charged to his annual forced leave. However, he did not submit the corresponding application for leave. For his failure to submit the complete requirements, his request for authority to travel remained unacted upon. He proceeded with his travel abroad without the required travel authority from the OCA. He was then informed by the OCA that his leave of absence for the period of September 915, 2009 had been disapproved and his travel considered unauthorized by the Court. His absences shall not be deducted from his leave credits but from his salary corresponding to the seven (7) days that he was absent, pursuant to Section 50 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave. Issue: Whether or not the said OCA Circular restricts the right to travel Ruling:

112 | P a g e

Political Law Review No. Although the right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution, the exercise of such right is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one’s right to travel provided that such restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law. This, however, should by no means be construed as limiting the Court’s inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To “restrict” is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to “regulate” is to govern or direct according to rule. To ensure management of court dockets and to avoid disruption in the administration of justice, OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires a judge who wishes to travel abroad to submit, together with his application for leave of absence duly recommended for approval by his Executive Judge, a certification from the Statistics Division, Court Management Office of the OCA, as to the condition of his docket, based on his Certificate of Service for the month immediately preceding the date of his intended travel, that he has decided and resolved all cases or incidents within three (3) months from date of submission, pursuant to Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, ET AL. VS. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, ET AL. G.R. NO. 88211, SEPTEMBER 15, 1989, CORTES, J. The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. to issue travel documents to former President Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President may impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They further assert that 113 | P a g e

Political Law Review under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Ruling: Yes. It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. RIGHT TO INFORMATION FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. PCGG, ET AL. G.R. No. 130716, DECEMBER 9, 1998, PANGANIBAN, J. The state policy of full public disclosure extends only to transactions involving public interest and may also be subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. The following are some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information. Facts: 114 | P a g e

Political Law Review Francisco Chavez, in invoking his constitutional right to information, demanded that the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to the PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claimed that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of paramount public interest since it has a debilitating effect on the country’s economy that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. The PCGG, while admitting that a compromise is in the works, claimed that Chavez’s action is premature, since the proposed terms and conditions of the agreements have not become effective and binding. Issue: May the PCGG be required to reveal the proposed terms of compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth? Ruling: Yes. The recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. Ill-gotten wealth, by its very nature, assumes a public character. The assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. Thus, there is no question that Chavez has a right to PCGG's disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at concerning the Marcoses' purported ill-gotten wealth. The question that remains is whether the constitutional provision likewise guarantee access to information regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the final agreement. Reviewing the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the Court held that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the “exploratory” stage. RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY. A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012, MENDOZA, J. The Constitution itself, under Section 17, Article XI, has classified the information disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public concern and interest. Facts: 115 | P a g e

Political Law Review Rowena Paraan and Karol Ilagan sought copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth (SALN), Personal Data Sheet (PDS) or the Curriculum Vitae(CV) of the Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the year 2008 for the purpose of updating their database of information on government officials. In response to such request, the Court created the Committee on Public Disclosure that would, in essence, take over the functions of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) with respect to requests for copies of, or access to, SALN, and other personal documents of members of the Judiciary. Meanwhile, several requests for the copies of the SALN and other personal circumstances of the justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Sandiganbayan were filed. Issue: Whether or not the Justices of the Supreme Court are mandated by law to release their SALN to the public. Ruling: Yes. The Constitution itself, under Section 17, Article XI, has classified the information disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public concern and interest. In other words, a duty to disclose sprang from the right to know. Both of constitutional origin, the former is a command while the latter is a permission. Hence, the duty on the part of members of the government to disclose their SALNs to the public in the manner provided by law. Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information, with its companion right of access to official records, is not absolute. While providing guaranty for that right, the Constitution also provides that the peoples’ right to know is limited to matters of public concern and is further subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. This could only mean that while no prohibition could stand against access to official records, such as the SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation. RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION IN THE MATTER OF THE IBP MEMBERSHIP DUES DELINQUENCY OF ATTY. MARCIAL A. EDILLON A.M. NO. 1928 AUGUST 3, 1978, CASTRO, C.J. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program—the lawyers. Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.

Facts: 116 | P a g e

Political Law Review The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of Marcial Edillo’s name from the Roll of Attorneys for his stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues. Edillon questioned the constitutionality of the provisions of the Rules of Court and IBP By-Laws requiring membership dues, claiming that they constitute an invasionof his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support to the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP. Ruling: Yes. The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognized then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities. Thus, the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues. Marcial Edillon was disbarred and his name was stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court. EMINENT DOMAIN HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, ET AL. G.R. No. 171101, APRIL 24, 2012, VELASCO, JR. J. 117 | P a g e

Political Law Review In determining just compensation, the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the government shall be the basis. If the government takes possession of the land before the institution of expropriation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of the filing of the complaint. Facts: The Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously to dismiss or deny the petition filed by Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) and affirm with modifications the resolutions of the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. The Court however did not order outright land distribution. The Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or choose actual land distribution. The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision. Issue: Whether or not, for the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s stock distribution plan (SDP). Ruling: Yes. When the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita were transferred by Tadeco (former owner thereof) to HLI in order to comply with CARP through the stock distribution option scheme, sealed with the imprimatur of PARC under PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989, Tadeco was consequently dispossessed of the afore-mentioned attributes of ownership. Notably, Tadeco and HLI are two different entities with separate and distinct legal personalities. Ownership by one cannot be considered as ownership by the other. Corollarily, it is the official act by the government, that is, the PARC’s approval of the Stock distributionProgram (SDP), which should be considered as the reckoning point for the taking of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita. Although the transfer of ownership over the agricultural lands was made prior to the SDP’s approval, it is this Court’s consistent view that these lands officially became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. By a vote of 8-6, the Court affirmed its ruling that the date of taking in determining just compensation is November 21, 1989 when PARC approved HLI’s stock option plan. 118 | P a g e

Political Law Review

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS v. SPOUSES TECSON G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013 PERALTA, J. Just compensation is the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Facts: Spouses Tecson were the owners of a certain land which was among the properties taken by the government sometime in 1940 to be used for the construction of the MacArthur Highway. The land was taken without their consent and without the necessary expropriation proceedings. The spouses demanded the payment of the fair market value of the same but the DPWH offered to pay at the rate of P0.70 per square meter only which was the value of the property at the time of taking. Consequently, the spouses filed a Complaint for recovery of possession of the disputed land with damages. The RTC dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the RTC ruling and remanded the case to the trial court for the purpose of determining the just compensation to be awarded to the spouses. The RTC found the amount of P1,500.00 per square meter as the just compensation for the subject property which was based on its current market value. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the determination made by the RTC. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the just compensation to be awarded is based on the current market value of the property. Ruling: No. Just compensation is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation. Thus, the just compensation due the Spouses Tecson in this case should, therefore, be fixed not as of the time of payment but at the time of taking, that is, in 1940. The value of the property should be fixed as of the date when it was taken and not the date of the filing of the proceedings. For where property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is 119 | P a g e

Political Law Review not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken x x x. The fair market value of the subject property in 1940 was P0.70/sq m. Hence, it should, therefore, be used in determining the amount due respondents instead of the higher value which is P1,500.00.

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS v. SPOUSES TECSON G.R. No. 179334, April 21, 2015, PERALTA, J. The true measure of just compensation is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word “just” is used to modify the meaning of the word “compensation” to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. Facts: For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the spouses Tecson imploring the Supreme Court to take a second look at its Decision in their complaint for recovery of possession of the disputed property with damages in which the said court ordered that the valuation of the subject property owned by them shall be P0.70 instead of P1,500.00 per square meter, with interest at six percent (6%) per annum from the date of taking in 1940 instead of March 17, 1995, until full payment. The spouses insist that gross injustice will result if the amount that will be awarded today will be based simply on the value of the property at the time of the actual taking. Hence, they suggest that a happy middle ground be achieved by meeting the need for doctrinal precision and the thirst for substantial justice. Issue: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses should be granted. Ruling: No. The assailed decision is maintained. The fair market value of the property at the time of taking is controlling for purposes of computing just compensation. Just compensation due respondents-movants in this case should, therefore, be fixed not as of the time of payment but at the time of taking in 1940 which is Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square meter, and not One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) per square meter, as valued by the RTC and CA. While disparity in the above amounts is obvious and may appear inequitable to respondents-movants as they would be receiving such outdated valuation after a very long period, it should be noted that the purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property 120 | P a g e

Political Law Review taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the property, as upheld by a plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of the taking, when the loss resulted.

MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY and AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE vs BERNARDO L. LOZADA, SR., ET AL. G.R. No. 176625, FEBRUARY 25, 2010, NACHURA, J. The requirements of (1) public use and (2) just compensation in eminent domain partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated. Facts: Bernardo Lozada was the registered owner of Lot No. 88 located in Lahug, Cebu City. In the early 1960s, the Republic sought to acquire by expropriation said lot, among others, in connection with its program for the improvement and expansion of the Lahug Airport. The CFI rendered a decision against the land owners, among whom was Lozada. During the pendency of the latter’s appeal to the CA, the parties entered into a compromise settlement to the effect that the subject property would be resold to the original owner in the event that the Government abandons the Lahug Airport. Thus, Lozada did not pursue his appeal. The projected expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport, however, failed to materialize because former President Aquino directed the transfer of general aviation operations at the Lahug Airport to the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority. This prompted Lozada, et al. to repurchase their property from the Republic. Issue: Whether or not Lozada and the other land owners may repurchase the disputed property after the purpose for which the same was expropriated has been abandoned. Ruling: Yes. The decision in the expropriation case provides that the acquisition by the Republic of the expropriated lots was subject to the condition that the Lahug Airport would continue its operation. The condition not having materialized because the airport had been abandoned, the former owner should then be allowed to reacquire the expropriated property. It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Governments power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of implied 121 | P a g e

Political Law Review conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated. More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owners right to justice, fairness, and equity.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015, BERSAMIN, J. The very moment that it appears at any stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use, the action must necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot be maintained at all except when the expropriation is for some public use. That must be true even during the pendency of the appeal or at any other stage of the proceedings. Facts: In 1993, the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) entered a property owned by the heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon in order to construct and maintain transmission lines for the 230 KV Mahabang Parang-Pinamucan Power Transmission Project. The entry to the said property was allegedly made without the respondent heirs’ consent. In 1995, NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way over a portion of the disputed land. The RTC determined the price payable as just compensation using the date of filing of the complaint, which is May 5, 1995, as its reference point because the evidence was bereft as to the actual date of the taking. Accordingly, NAPOCOR was made to pay just compensation for the whole area at the rate of P550.00/square meter. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. During the pendency of NAPOCOR’s appeal before the SC, it filed a Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings on the ground that the property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary for public purpose because of the intervening retirement of the transmission lines installed on the respondents’ property. Accordingly, NAPOCOR contends that the expropriation has become without basis for lack of public purpose as a result of the retirement of the transmission lines;.

122 | P a g e

Political Law Review Issue: Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal. Ruling: Yes. The fundamental basis then of all actions brought for the expropriation of lands, under the power of eminent domain, is public use. That being true, the very moment that it appears at any stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use, the action must necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot be maintained at all except when the expropriation is for some public use. That must be true even during the pendency of the appeal or at any other stage of the proceedings. In this case, NAPOCOR admitted that the expropriation of the land in question is no longer necessary for public use. Had that admission been made in the trial court the case should have been dismissed there. It now appearing positively, by resolution of the plaintiff, that the expropriation is not necessary for public use, the action should be dismissed even without a motion on the part of the plaintiff. The moment it appears in whatever stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use the complaint should be dismissed and all the parties thereto should be relieved from further annoyance or litigation. However, expropriator who has taken possession of the property subject of expropriation is obliged to pay reasonable compensation to the landowner for the period of such possession.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT SANGKAY, namely: CEBU, BATOWA-AN, SAYANA, NASSER, MANTA, EDGAR, PUTRI, MONGKOY*, and AMIR, all surnamed MACABANGKIT G.R. No. 165828 August 24, 2011 BERSAMIN, J. It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. Facts: NPC undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project to generate electricity for Mindanao. The project included the construction of several underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants. Cebu, Bangowa-an, Sayana, Nasser, Manta, Edgar, Putri, Mongkoy and Amir, all surnamed Macabangkit (Heirs of Macabangkit), as the owners of land situated in Ditucalan, Iligan City, sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the property, with the alternative prayer for the payment of just compensation. They alleged, 123 | P a g e

Political Law Review among others, that they belatedly discovered that one of the underground tunnels of NPC traversed their land; that the underground tunnel had been constructed without their knowledge and consent; and that the presence of the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of their land. RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. On appeal, CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Issue: Whether there was taking of land as to entitle the owners to just compensation. Ruling: Yes. The Court held in National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim that NPC was liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land traversed by the underground tunnels: “Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Respondents, as the owner of the property thus expropriated, are entitled to a just compensation which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property.” In this case, there was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. Indeed, the expropriators action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands. RIGHTS OF SUSPECTS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO G.R. No. 186228 March 15, 2010 PEREZ, J. Any inquiry he (Bantay Bayan) makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. Facts: 124 | P a g e

Political Law Review Antonio Lauga raped his 13-year-old daughter, AAA. Thereafter, AAA relayed her harrowing experience to her grandmother. The two sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan. Banting found Lauga in his house wearing only his underwear. He invited Lauga to the police station, to which the latter obliged. At the police outpost, Lauga admitted to Banting that he raped AAA because he was unable to control himself. RTC found him guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority. The decision of the trial court was affirmed with modifications by the CA. Issue: Whether or not Lauga’s extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting without the assistance of a counsel was in violation of his constitutional right. Ruling: Yes. The bantay bayan is a group of male residents living in a certain area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community. It is an accredited auxiliary of the PNP. Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay level. The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative well-known in his community. Thus, any inquiry a Bantay Bayan makes has the color of a staterelated function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession of Laug, for being made without the assistance of a counsel, is inadmissible in evidence. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED JUAN PONCE ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015 BERSAMIN, J. For purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into consideration. Facts: The Ombudsman charged Juan Ponce Enrile and several others with 125 | P a g e

Political Law Review plunder with the Sandiganbayan. On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police General Hospital. Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital , and his Motion to Fix Bail, claiming that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be seriously considered. The Sandiganbyan denied the motion. Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s motion. Ruling: No. For purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into consideration. These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense charged. Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the factors that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong. RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL., A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC June 14, 2011 CARPIO MORALES, J. The right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Facts: Fifty-seven (57) people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. The tragic incident which came to be known as the Maguindanao Massacre spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and an additional charge of rebellion against 197 accused. Almost a year later, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media entities, and members of the academe filed a petition before the SC praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices. 126 | P a g e

Political Law Review Issue: Whether the petition should be granted. Ruling: Yes. Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial. Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may challenge the validity of an adverse judgment arising from a proceeding that transgressed a constitutional right. As pointed out by petitioners, an aggrieved party may early on move for a change of venue, for continuance until the prejudice from publicity is abated, for disqualification of the judge, and for closure of portions of the trial when necessary. The trial court may likewise exercise its power of contempt and issue gag orders. One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from the earlier cases is the impossibility of accommodating even the parties to the cases the private complainants/families of the victims and other witnesses inside the courtroom. Thus, the Court partially granted pro hac vice the request for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines herein outlined.

HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL., G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012 PERLAS-BERNABE, J. The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses. Facts: Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go (petitioners) were charged before the MeTC of Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. The private prosecutor filed a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, an old frail businessman from Laos, Cambodia who is the prosecution’s complaining witness. It was alleged that Li Luen Ping was being 127 | P a g e

Political Law Review treated for lung infection in Laos, Cambodia and that he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health. Petitioners opposed the motion, invoking their constitutional right of confrontation. Issue: Whether or not the motion should be granted. Ruling: No. There is a great deal of difference between the face-to- face confrontation in a public criminal trial in the presence of the presiding judge and the cross-examination of a witness in a foreign place outside the courtroom in the absence of a trial judge. The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. “The opponent,” according to an eminent authority, demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross examination which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers. There is also the advantage of the witness before the judge, and it is this – it enables the judge as trier of facts to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly, the physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory, and his deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. These can only be observed by the judge if the witness testifies orally in court. The right of confrontation is held to apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses. The constitutional requirement "insures that the witness will give his testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, a valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to observe the demeanor of the witness and assess his credibility. REYNALDO H. JAYLO, WILLIAM VALENZONA AND ANTONIO G. HABALO, Petitioners, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HEIRS OF COL. ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, FRANCO CALANOG AND AVELINO MANGUERA G.R. Nos. 183152-54 January 21, 2015 SERENO, C.J. As a statutory right, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be exercised in accordance with and in the manner provided by law. 128 | P a g e

Political Law Review Facts: The Sandiganbayan found Reynaldo Jaylo, Edgardo Castro, William Valenzona, and Antonio Habalo (petitioners) guilty of homicide. During the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan’s judgment, none of the accused appeared despite notice. Counsel for the three petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan took no action on the motion and ordered the implementation of the warrants for the arrest of the convicted accused. In an Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration, counsel for the three urged the Sandiganbayan to give due course to and resolve the Motion for Partial Reconsideration but to no avail. They argued that the right to file a Motion for Reconsideration is a statutory grant and not merely a remedy available in the Rules, as provided under Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Thus, according to them, their absence at the promulgation of judgment before the Sandiganbayan cannot be deemed to have resulted in the loss of their right to file a motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether the petitioners lost their right to file a motion for reconsideration. Ruling: Yes. Like an appeal, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant or privilege. As a statutory right, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be exercised in accordance with and in the manner provided by law. Thus, a party filing a motion for reconsideration must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS, AMPARO, DATA AND KALIKASAN MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA v. P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte GR No. 193636 July 24, 2012 SERENO, J. The fact that the PNP released information to the Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation. Facts: Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), creating a body which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission. It was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 129 | P a g e

Political Law Review 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the future. It was broadcasted that Marynette R. Gamboa, the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, was one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, she filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte. She alleged, among others, that the PNP Ilocos Norte conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report. The RTC dismissed the petition. Issue: Whether the petition for issuance of writ of habeas data must be granted. Ruling: No. Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter. The fact that the PNP released information to the Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation. Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the field. Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS and DEPUTY DIRECTOR REYNALDO 0. ESMERALDA v. MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013 LEONEN, J. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is rendered. 130 | P a g e

Political Law Review Facts: Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo against Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the NBI (DE LIMA, ET AL. for brevity) in the RTC of Manila. The judge issued summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer and also set the case for hearing. Even without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda within five (5) working days after hearing. Later, the RTC rendered a "Decision" granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and the interim reliefs prayed for. The MR filed by De Lima, et al was denied. Thus, they filed before the SC a Petition for Review on Certiorari (With Very Urgent Application for the Issuance of a TRO/Writ of Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45. Issue: Whether Rule 45 is the proper remedy. Ruling: No. The “Decision” dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ of Amparo is not the judgment or final order contemplated under this rule. Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at this time. This “Decision” pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, not the judgment under Section 18. The "Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given together with the decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is rendered. The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order denominated as “Decision” dated 20 March 2012. A Petition for Certiorari, on the other hand, is prohibited. Simply dismissing the present petition, however, will cause grave injustice to the parties involved. It undermines the salutary purposes for which the Rule on the Writ of Amparo were promulgated. Thus, the Court nullified all orders that issued by Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. after Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo; determine within forty-eight (48) hours from whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo petition and its attached affidavits.

are subject of this Resolution respondent Gatdula filed the and directed Judge Pampilo to his receipt of this Resolution is proper on the basis of the

Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM v. Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA C. YANGCO 131 | P a g e

Political Law Review G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014 VILLARAMA, JR., J. The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings”and “enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. Facts: Ma. Christina Yusay Caram gave birth to Baby Julian out of an amorous relationship without the benefit of marriage. Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD in order to avoid placing her family in a potentially embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son. Christina changed her mind about the adoption and filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC of Quezon City. RTC issued a Writ of Amparo commanding the four respondents to produce the body of Baby Julian at a hearing scheduled and to file their verified written return to the writ. In one of its orders, it acknowledged that Baby Julian was brought before the court and the Christina was allowed to see him and take photographs of him. RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ of amparo without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action in court since Christina availed of the wrong remedy to regain custody of her child Baby Julian. Issue: Whether a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child. Ruling: No. The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings”and “enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. “Extralegal killings” are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, “enforced disappearances” are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law. In this case, DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010. There is therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing. 132 | P a g e

Political Law Review SELF-INCRIMINTION JAIME DELA CRUZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014, Sereno, C.J. In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made. Facts: The agents of NBI received a complaint from Corazon Absin and Charito Escobido claiming Ariel Escobido, the live-in partner of Corazon and son of Charito, was picked up by several unknown male persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the complainants, and when the latter gave the number a ring, they were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Office. In the police office, they met “James” who demanded from them P100,000 later lowered to P40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel. After the meeting, the complainants proceeded to the NBI to file a complaint and narrate the circumstances of the meeting to the authorities. While at the NBI, Charito received calls supposedly from “James” instructing her to bring the money as soon as possible. The investigators at the NBI verified the text messages received by the complainants. A team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation. The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a pre-marked P500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder, which was made part of the amount demanded by “James” and handed by Corazon. Dela Cruz was brought to the forensic laboratory of the NBI where forensic examination was done. He was required to submit his urine for drug testing which yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the confirmatory test result. Dela Cruz, a Police Officer 2 of the PNP assigned in the Security Service Group, was charged with a violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Issue: Whether or not the drug test conducted upon Dela Cruz is a violation of his right against self-incrimination. Ruling: Yes. We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable exceptions to such proscription. Cases where nontestimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the principal cause of the arrest. In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material to the charge of extortion. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing 133 | P a g e

Political Law Review was “merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation.” It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances. In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made. DOUBLE JEOPARDY PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. TIRSO VELSCO AND HONORATO GALVEZ G.R. No. 127444, September 13, 2000, Bellosillo, J. The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) before a competent court before which the same is filed; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Facts: A shooting took place and claimed the life of Alex Vinculado and seriously injured his brother Levi who permanently lost his left vision. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was also shot. A slug tunneled through his right arm, pierced the right side of his body and burrowed in his stomach where it remained until extracted by surgical procedure. Thus, three informations one for homicide and two for frustrated homicide - were filed against Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, a municipal employee and alleged bodyguard of the mayor. However, the charges were withdrawn and a new set filed against the accused upgrading the crimes to murder and frustrated murder. Mayor Galvez was also charged with violation of PD 1866 for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his residence; hence, a fourth information had to be filed. The court found Diego guilty of murder and double frustrated murder. However, Mayor Galvez was acquitted of the crimes charged against him for insufficiency of evidence and finding that the act of carrying of firearm was not a violation of law. The acquittal of Galvez is now challenged by the Government in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and Sec. 1, Art. VIII, of the Constitution that the exculpation of Galvez from all criminal responsibility by Judge Velasco constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Allegedly, the judge deliberately and wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if judiciously considered, would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner proposes that this patently gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness should be rectified by a re-examination of the evidence by the Court upon a determination that a review of the case will not transgress the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. Issue: 134 | P a g e

Political Law Review Whether or not elevating the issue of criminal culpability of Galvez despite acquittal should be considered violative of the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy. Ruling: Yes. A remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 72670, 12 September 1986). Thus, the doctrine that “double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial” may apply only when the Court finds that the “criminal trial was a sham” because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due process. In such case, the remand remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.” Philippine jurisprudence has been consistent in its application of the Double Jeopardy Clause such that it has viewed with suspicion, and not without good reason, applications for the extraordinary writ questioning decisions acquitting an accused on ground of grave abuse of discretion. In this case, the petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent judge acquitting the accused Honorato Galvez goes deeply into the trial court's appreciation and evaluation in esse of the evidence adduced by the parties. A reading of the questioned decision shows that respondent judge considered the evidence received at trial. These consisted among others of the testimonies relative to the positions of the victims vis-à-vis the accused and the trajectory, location and nature of the gunshot wounds, and the opinion of the expert witness for the prosecution. While the appreciation thereof may have resulted in possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it nevertheless does not detract from the fact that the evidence was considered and passed upon. This consequently exempts the act from the writ’s limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an improper object of and therefore non-reviewable by certiorari. To reiterate, errors of judgment are not to be confused with errors in the exercise of jurisdiction. JASON IVLER v. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO AND EVANGELINE PONCE G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010, Carpio, J. Reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court's unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365. Facts: 135 | P a g e

Political Law Review Following a vehicular collision, Jason Ivler was charged before with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by Evangeline Ponce; and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of Evangeline's husband Nestor Ponce and damage to the Spouses Ponce's vehicle. Ivler posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge in the first case and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, Ivler moved to quash the Information in the second case for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. Issue: Whether or not Ivler’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in the criminal case. Ruling: Yes. Reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court's unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365. Hence, Ivler’s prior conviction of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries bars a subsequent prosecution for the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide as it arises from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. BENJAMIN RELOVA AND MANUEL OPULENCIA G.R. No. L-45129, March 6, 1987, Feliciano, J. For the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. Facts: The police and personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by Manuel Opulencia. They discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city government, and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. These electric devices and contraptions were designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said ice and cold storage plant. Opulencia admitted in a written statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter. An information against Opulencia was filed for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. Opulencia 136 | P a g e

Political Law Review pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. The court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof, and that the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense. Then, the city fiscal filed another information against Opulencia for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309(1), of the RPC. Before Opulencia could be arraigned, he filed a Motion to Quash, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. Issue: Whether or not the filing of the second information was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. Ruling: Yes. Where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute. For the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find. It remains to point out that In this case, the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. EX-POST FACTO LAWS 137 | P a g e

Political Law Review SR. INSP. JERRY VALEROSO v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 164815, February 22, 2008, Reyes, J. As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused. Facts: Jerry Valeroso was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under P.D. 1866 in which he pleaded not guilty. The trial court found Valeroso guilty sentencing him to suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period or from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum and to pay the fine in the amount of P15,000. The CA affirmed with modification the RTC’s decision stating that “Verily, the penalty imposed by the trial court upon the accused-appellant is modified to 4 years and 2 months as minimum up to 6 years as maximum.” Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly modified the penalty imposed. Ruling: Yes. P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time petitioner committed the offense on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial court. The present law now states that the of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low-powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused. Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, prision correccional maximum which ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, is the prescribed penalty and will form the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum term shall be one degree lower, which is prision correccional in its medium period (two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to four [4] years and 138 | P a g e

Political Law Review two [2] months). Hence, the penalty imposed by the CA is correct. The penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum term, to six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as maximum term. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) v. HON. OMBUDSMAN CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES, et al. G.R. No. 206357, November 25, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J. In the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted. Facts: President Ramos issued A.O. 13 creating a Presidential Ad-Hoc FactFinding Committee on Behest Loans. The Ad Hoc Committee investigated the loans of Resorts Hotel Corporation (RHC). RHC was incorporated in 1968 with a paid-up capital of P1 million, was 37.2% owned by Rodolfo Cuenca, a Marcos business associate. RHC obtained loans to finance its projects from DBP. RHC offered as collaterals the assets that were acquired by these loans. 40% of the amount were converted into DBP's common shareholding in RHC, and the balance was restructured. The properties were foreclosed in 1983 with arrearages of P1.97 million. The Ad Hoc Committee found that DBP's total exposure as of 1986 amounted to P99.1 million. The Ad Hoc Committee submitted a report to the President where it concluded that the RHC account qualifies as behest in character. Hence, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the PCGG, filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondent directors and officers of RHC and the directors of DBP for violation of Sections 3(e) and 3(g) of R.A. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act but was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. PCGG filed a MR but was again dismissed by the Ombudsman on the ground of prescription stating that “In as much as the record indicates that the instant complaint was filed with this office only on 6 January 2003, or more than ten years from the time the crimes were discovered on 4 January 1993, the offenses charged herein had already prescribed.” Aggrieved, PCGG appealed claiming that the prescriptive period should only commence to run it filed the Affidavit-Complaint Moreover, Section 11 of RA 3019 sets the prescription of offenses under said law at fifteen years and not ten years. Issue: Whether or not the prescriptive period for the filing of the case has already prescribed. Ruling: Yes. RA 3019, Section 11 provides that all offenses punishable under said law shall prescribe in ten (10) years. This period was later increased to fifteen (15) years with the passage of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 195, which took effect on March 16, 1982. In the interpretation of the law on prescription 139 | P a g e

Political Law Review of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted. As such, the longer prescriptive period of 15 years pursuant to BP Blg. 195 cannot be applied to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of the said amending law on March 16, 1982. Considering that the crimes were committed in 1969, 1970, 1973, 1975, and 1977, the applicable prescriptive period thereon is the ten-year period set in RA 3019, the law in force at that time. What is, then, left for determination is the reckoning point for the 10year period. As a general rule, prescription begins to run from the date of the commission of the offense. If the date of the commission of the violation is not known, it shall be counted form the date of discovery thereof. In determining whether it is the general rule or the exception that should apply in a particular case, the availability or suppression of the information relative to the crime should first be determined. If the necessary information, data, or records based on which the crime could be discovered is readily available to the public, the general rule applies. Prescription shall, therefore, run from the date of the commission of the crime. Otherwise, should martial law prevent the filing thereof or should information about the violation be suppressed, possibly through connivance, then the exception applies and the period of prescription shall be reckoned from the date of discovery thereof. In the case at bar, involving as it does the grant of behest loans which We have recognized as a violation that, by their nature, could be concealed from the public eye by the simple expedient of suppressing their documentation, the second mode applies. We, therefore, count the running of the prescriptive period from the date of discovery thereof on January 4, 1993, when the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee reported to the President its findings and conclusions anent RHC's loans. This being the case, the filing by the PCGG of its Affidavit-Complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman on January 6, 2003, a little over ten (10) years from the date of discovery of the crimes, is clearly belated. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, et al. v. HON. MARGARITO TEVES, et al. G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011, Villarama, Jr., J. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Facts: Congress enacted RA 9335 which imposed a revenue collection quota for BOC employees. It also provided a penalty of removal in case of failure to meet the said quota. The Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) question the constitutionality of the law, saying that its members and other BOC employees are in great danger of losing their jobs should they fail to meet the required quota provided under the law, in clear violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure, and at their and their respective families' prejudice. 140 | P a g e

Political Law Review Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9335 is a bill of attainder and hence, unconstitutional because it inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of officials and employees without trial. Ruling: No. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. In this case, RA 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. It merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are amply protected. CITIZENSHIP ERNESTO MERCADO v. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO AND THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999, Mendoza, J. Dual citizenship is not the same as dual allegiance. Facts: Mercado, Manzano and Daza III were candidates for vice mayor in Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano garnered the highest votes however the proclamation of Manzano was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that Manzano was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the US which was later granted and the cancellation of the CoC on the ground that he is a dual citizen was ordered. The Comelec's Second Division said that the petition is based on the ground that Manzano is an American citizen based on the record and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen. Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the US and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship. Issue: 141 | P a g e

Political Law Review Whether or not Manzano is disqualified from the position of vice-mayor. Ruling: No. To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition. With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, Manzano has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, Manzano’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR VICENTE D. CHING B.M. No. 914, October 1, 1999, Kapunan, J. Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. Facts: Vicente Ching, son of a Chinese father and Filipino mother, was born in La Union in 1964. Since birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. Ching passed the Bar Examinations but was not allowed to take his oath and was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. The OSG commented that Ching, being the legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship in strict compliance with the provisions of CA No. 625. The OSG also pointed out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the “reasonable time” 142 | P a g e

Political Law Review allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase “reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar. Issue: Whether or not Ching has elected Philippine citizenship within a “reasonable time.” Ruling: No. The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three years from reaching the age of majority. However, jurisprudence states that the three-year period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.” However, such extension is not indefinite. In this case, Ching was already 35 years old (or over 14 years after reaching the age of majority) when he elected Filipino citizenship. Based on the interpretation of the phrase “upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election. Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp. ANTONIO BENGSON III v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ G.R. No. 142840, 7 May 2001, J. Kapunan The act of repatriation allows one to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship. Facts. Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1985, he enlisted in the US Marine Corps, took an oath of allegiance to the 143 | P a g e

Political Law Review US, and as a consequence lost his Filipino citizenship. In 1990, Cruz became a naturalized US citizen in connection with his service in the US Marine Corps. In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Filipino citizenship through repatriation under RA No. 2630. Thereafter, he ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan. Antonio Bengson, his opponent, filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam before the HRET, claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. Issue. Whether or not a natural-born citizen who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Held. Yes. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the law, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship. RENATO M. DAVID v. EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 199113, 18 March 2015, J. Villarama, Jr. The law makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. The authors of the law intentionally employed the terms “re-acquire” and “retain” to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Facts: In 1974, petitioner Renato M. David migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon retirement, David and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot where they constructed a 144 | P a g e

Political Law Review residential house, a part of which is a public land. Renato David filed a Miscellaneous Lease Agreement (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR and CENRO. In the said application, David indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that David, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents against David. Meanwhile, David reacquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in disregarding the fact that petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that by reacquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction “deemed not to have lost” it. Ruling: No. The law makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is “Retention of Philippine Citizenship”, the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms “re-acquire” and “retain” to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the law using both reacquisition and retention. In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends C.A. No. 63 by doing away with the provision in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from naturalborn Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual citizenship, and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law. Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA 145 | P a g e

Political Law Review G.R. No. 195649, 16 April 2013, CJ. Sereno The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position. Facts: Rommel Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Filipino citizenship as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a US citizen. Arnado applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. Thereafter, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Linog Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition seeking Arnado’s disqualification and/or cancellation of Arnado’s CoC contending that Arnado is a foreigner. To bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented evidence indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport in entering and departing the Philippines even after his repatriation and execution of affidavit of renunciation. Petitioner Casan Maquiling intervened in the instant case after having garnered the second highest number of votes during the elections. Issue: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made and affects one’s qualifications to run for public office. Ruling: Yes. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of America. The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship. While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in C.A. No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position. In this case, when Arnado used his US passport just eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation 146 | P a g e

Political Law Review that he “absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” and that he “divest(s) [him]self of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of America.” This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position. MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ESTRELLA ELAMPARO G.R. No. 221697 MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO S. TATAD and AMADO V. VALDEZ G.R. Nos. 221698-221700, 8 March 2016, J. Perez Foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. Facts. Petitioner Grace Poe was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo, by a certain Edgardo Militar, who took custody of her. When Poe reached the age of five, celebrity spouses Fernando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces formally adopted her via a petition for adoption with the MTC of San Juan. Poe became a naturalized American citizen and obtained a US passport after marrying her husband who was a citizen of both the Philippines and the US. Poe eventually resettled in the Philippines after the untimely demise of her father and took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic pursuant to R.A. No. 9225. Poe filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections where she declared that she is a natural-born citizen. Private respondents filed these cases against her for the alleged misrepresentation Poe made in stating that she is a natural-born Filipino on account of being a foundling. Issue. Whether or not a foundling like Grace Poe is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Held. Yes. The fact is that petitioner’s blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is demonstrable. There is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that her parents were aliens. Poe’s admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.

147 | P a g e

Political Law Review As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. Deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any objection to the notion that persons of unknown parentage are not citizens but only because their number was not enough to merit specific mention. In international law, foundlings are likewise presumed to have the nationality of the country of birth. While international conventions providing this principle are yet unratified by the Philippines, they are nevertheless generally accepted principles of international law. THE REPUBLIC THE PHILIPPINES v. NORA FE SAGUN G.R. No. 187567, 15 February 2012, J. Villarama, Jr. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election of Filipino citizenship should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. Facts. Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. It was only after she married Alex Sagun, at the age of 33, did she execute an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This document was, however, not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar. Respondent thereafter applied for a Philippine passport but the same was denied due to her father’s citizenship and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on her birth certificate. Issue. Whether or not an election of Philippine citizenship, made twelve years after reaching the age of majority, is considered to have been made within a reasonable time as interpreted by jurisprudence. Held. No. Respondent failed to valid election. Specifically, the election of Philippine citizenship. by respondent in support of her

comply with the legal requirements for a execution of a sworn statement of her The only documentary evidence submitted claim of alleged election was her oath of 148 | P a g e

Political Law Review allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondents oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of CA No. 625. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made generally within three years from reaching the age of majority. Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local civil registry. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS THE CIVIL SERVICE PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR. v. ODESLA-IAD, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, and as an exofficio member of the Monetary Board G.R. No. 196425, 24 July 2012, J. Perlas-Bernabe The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under EO 292 in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. Facts: President Benigno Aquino III issued EO 13 abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD). Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of EO 13, alleging that the President is not authorized under any existing law to create the IAD-ODESLA, and that by creating a new, additional and distinct office tasked with quasi-judicial functions, the President has not only usurped the powers of congress to create a public office, appropriate funds and delegate quasi-judicial functions to administrative agencies but has also encroached upon the powers of the Ombudsman. Issue: Whether or not EO 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of the legislature to create a public office. Ruling: No. The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department or the offices under him as stated in Section 31 of EO 292 in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective 149 | P a g e

Political Law Review and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing “delegated legislative authority to reorganize” his own office pursuant to EO 292. The Reorganization did not entail the creation of a new, separate and distinct Office. The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office of the President Proper. The reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of the administrative structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a third division (the IAD) through which ODESLA could take on the additional functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13. Neither did the President delegate quasijudicial functions to administrative agency by the creation of IAD-ODESLA. The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with quasi-judicial powers. Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY G.R. No. 135805, 29 April 1999, J. Pardo To constitute nepotism, where the official is the chief of the bureau or the person exercising immediate supervision, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the said official. Facts: George Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice President, filed with the CSC Quezon City a complaint against Pedro Dacoycoy for habitual drunkenness, misconduct, and nepotism. The CSC conducted a formal investigation and promulgated its resolution finding no substantial evidence to support the charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. Dacoycoy was, however, found guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service. After his MR was denied, Dacoycoy filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction. The CA reversed and set aside the CSC’s resolution, ruling that respondent did not appoint or recommend his two sons Rito and Ped, and, hence, was not guilty of nepotism. The Court further held that it is the person who recommends or appoints who should be sanctioned, as it is he who performs the prohibited act. 150 | P a g e

Political Law Review Issue: Whether or not the CSC correctly found the respondent guilty of nepotism and correctly meted out the penalty of dismissal from service. Ruling: Yes. One is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: a) appointing authority; b) recommending authority; c) chief of the bureau or office, and d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. Clearly, there are four situations covered. In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. It is true that he did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of driver and utility worker in Balicuatro. It was Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended the appointment of Rito. However, Mr. Daclag's authority to recommend the appointment of first level positions for short durations of three to six months was recommended by respondent Dacoycoy and approved by DECS Regional Director. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondents two sons and placed them under respondents’ immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Both positions are career positions. To our mind, the unseen but obvious hand of respondent Dacoycoy was behind the appointing or recommending authority in the appointment of his two sons. Clearly, he is guilty of nepotism. PRUDENCIO QUIMBO v. ACTING OMBUDSMAN MARGARITO GERVACIO and DIRECTRESS MARY SUSAN S. GUILLERMO OF THE OMBUDSMAN OFFICE G.R. No. 155620, 9 August 2005, J. Carpio-Morales Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. It is not a penalty as such it is not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. Facts: Provincial Engineer Prudencio Quimbo was administratively charged for harassment and oppression by Elmo Padaon, a general foreman detailed to the Motor Pool Division, Provincial Engineering. During the pendency of the administrative case before the Ombudsman, Quimbo was placed under preventive suspension without pay to commence upon receipt of the order and until such time that it is lifted but in no case beyond 6 months. The 151 | P a g e

Political Law Review Ombudsman lifted the preventive suspension after Quimbo presented on direct examination his last two witnesses. Thereafter, the Ombudsman in its decision found Quimbo guilty of oppression; this decision was later on modified to simple misconduct only and he was suspended from office for a period of two months without pay. Quimbo filed a Motion for Reconsideration, pointing out that he was already preventively suspended and praying that the period be taken into consideration as part of the final penalty imposed. The Ombudsman found this contention untenable and clarified that preventive suspension is not a penalty but a preliminary step in an investigation; [and that] [i]f after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated upon is found guilty warranting the imposition of penalty, then he shall accordingly be penalized. Likewise, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by Quimbo. Issue: Whether or not CA committed reversible error when it dismissed his petition. Ruling: No. Petitioner’s argument that the dismissal of his petition is in violation of the doctrine enunciated in Gloria v. Court of Appeals and the rule on equity that a person should not be punished twice nor be made to suffer the suspension penalty after [he] had [served] the same is untenable. Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved. Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws. Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension as provided under Section 25 of the same Rule XIV. RE: APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT OF RETIRED JUDGE MOSLEMEN T. MACARAMBON UNDER R.A. No. 910 as amended by R.A. No. 9946 A.M. No. 14061, 19 June 2012, J. Brion 152 | P a g e

Political Law Review Resignation under RA 910 to discharge the duties of the office.

must

be

by

reason

of

incapacity

Facts: Judge Moslemen Macarambon was an RTC Judge who was appointed as Comelec Commissioner before reaching the optional retirement age of 60. He requested that he be allowed to retire under Sec. 1 of RA 910. The Judge asserts that Section 1 allows the payment of retirement benefits to a judge of the RTC who resigns by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of his office. Citing the case of Re: Associate Justice Britanico, he posits that his appointment as Comelec Commissioner incapacitated him to discharge his duties as an RTC judge on account of his submission to the will of the political authority and appointing power. As an alternative, he appeals that he be allowed to retire under the second sentence of Section 1 considering that he has rendered a total of 18 years, 1 month and 16 days of judicial service and a total of 35 years of government service. Judge Macarabon claims that while he was short of the minimum age requirement of 60, he believes that the Court’s ruling in Re: Pineda is applicable to his case where the Court brushed aside such requirement and considered the retirees career which was marked with competence, integrity, and dedication to public service. Issue: Whether or not the Court can allow a judge who voluntarily resigned from his judicial office before reaching the optional retirement age to receive retirement benefits under RA 910. Ruling: No. Resignation and retirement are two distinct concepts carrying different meanings and legal consequences in our jurisdiction. While an employee can resign at any time, retirement entails the compliance with certain age and service requirements specified by law and jurisprudence. Resignation stems from the employees own intent and volition to resign and relinquish his/her post. Retirement takes effect by operation of law. Strict compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is the rule and the grant of exception remains to be on a case to case basis. We have ruled that the Court allows seeming exceptions to these fixed rules for certain judges and justices only and whenever there are ample reasons to grant such exception. On the other hand, resignation under RA 910, as amended must be by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. Resignation contemplated under the law must have the element of involuntariness on the part of the justice or judge. More than physical or mental disability to discharge the judicial office, the involuntariness must spring from the intent of the justice or judge who would not have parted with his/her judicial employment were it not for the presence of circumstances and/or factors

153 | P a g e

Political Law Review beyond his/her control. In either of the two instances, Judge Macarambon’s case does not render him eligible to retire under RA 910. RE: LETTER OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE VICENTE S.E. VELOSO FOR ENTITLEMENT TO LONGEVITY PAY FOR HIS SERVICES AS COMMISSION MEMBER III OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, June 16, 2015, BRION, J. Longevity pay should be given to the Justices and Judges of courts for each five years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the judiciary. However, the service outside of the judiciary is considered continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the judiciary, if a judge or justice left the judiciary to served in a single non-judicial governmental post and then he returned to the judiciary. Facts: This case involves the letter-requests of CA Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando, CA Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan and CA Associate Justice Vicente Veloso for their claim of longevity pay for services rendered within and outside the Judiciary as part of their compensation package. They anchored their claim under Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 and the Court's ruling in In Re: Request of Justice Bernardo P. Pardo. In such case, Justice Pardo was an incumbent CA Justice when he was appointed COMELEC Chairman, and was appointed to the Supreme Court after his service with the COMELEC, without any interruption in his service. Accordingly, the court considered Justice Pardo’s one-time service outside of the judiciary as part of his service in the judiciary for purposes of determining his longevity pay. Issue: Whether or not they are entitled to longevity pay for their services rendered outside the judiciary. Ruling: No. Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that longevity pay should be given to the Justices and Judges of courts for each five years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the judiciary. However, the service outside of the judiciary is considered continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the judiciary, if a judge or justice left the judiciary to served in a single nonjudicial governmental post and then he returned to the judiciary. Hence, in this case, Associate Justice Salazar-Fernando was an incumbent MTC Judge, then she served as Chairman of LTFRB, LRTA, and OTC, then she was appointed as Commissioner of COMELEC, then as a consultant of COMELEC, and only then that she was appointed as Associate Justice of CA. Thus, significant gaps in her judicial service intervened which did not comply 154 | P a g e

Political Law Review with the requirement of service in a single non-judicial position. On the other hand, Associate Justices Gacutan and Veloso served as Commissioners of NLRC before they were appointed in the CA. However, NLRC is an agency attached to the DOLE, an Executive Department, and hence such is not considered as continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the Judiciary for the purpose of longevity pay. EVALYN I. FETALINO and AMADO M. CALDERON, MANUEL A. BARCELONA, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 191890, December 04, 2012, BRION, J. An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. Facts: President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to the petitioners Fetalino and Calderon as Comelec Commissioners, each for a term of seven (7) years. Eleven days later, Pres. Ramos renewed the their ad interim appointments for the same position. Congress, however, adjourned before the CA could act on their appointments. The constitutional ban on presidential appointments later took effect and the petitioners were no longer re-appointed as Comelec Commissioners. Thus, they merely served as Comelec Commissioners for more than four months. Subsequently, they applied for their retirement benefits and monthly pension with the Comelec, pursuant to R.A. No. 1568. Accordingly, the Comelec granted their pro-rated gratuity and pension. The petitioners asked for a re-computation of their retirement pay on the ground that they are entitled to lump sum benefit and not a pro-rated one. But Comelec disapproved on the ground that one whose ad interim appointment expires cannot be said to have completed his term of office so as to entitle him to a lump sum benefit. Issue: Whether the petitioners are entitled to the lump sum gratuity provided for by R.A. No. 1568. Ruling: No. Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of retirement benefits to the Chairman or any Member of the Comelec who has retired from the service after having completed his term of office. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is 155 | P a g e

Political Law Review neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral action could start and complete the running of a term of office in the Comelec without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of the Commission on Appointments. Therefore, in this case, the petitioners can never be considered to have retired from the service not only because they did not complete the full term, but, more importantly, because they did not serve a "term of office" as required by Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568. MELINDA L. OCAMPO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G. R. No. 188716, June 10, 2013, PEREZ, J. Claims for double retirement benefits fall under the prohibition against the receipt of double compensation when they are based on exactly the same services and on the same creditable period. However, in this case, RA 1568, only allows payment of only a single gratuity and a single annuity out of a single compensable retirement from any one of the covered agencies. Facts: Petitioner Melinda Ocampo was appointed as Board Member of the Energy Regulatory After serving for two years and four months, she tendered her retirement. She then availed of the five year lump sum benefit and monthly pension under R.A.1568. After that, she was again appointed as Chairman of ERB with a term of four years. However, she was only able to serve two years of such term following the abolishment of ERB. She sought the same retirement payment and monthly pension. The Commission on Audit approved her first lump sum benefit and monthly pension for the position of Board Member. However, as to her second retirement as Chairman, COA opined that she was only entitled to pro-rated benefits in accordance to the service period she actually have served. This decision of COA is anchored on the prohibition against double pension. Issues: 1. Whether or not the retirement claims of Ocampo amount to double pension. 2. Whether or not Ocampo is entitled to the payment of two lump sum payments, and payment thereafter of two monthly pensions. Rulings: 1. No. Claims for double retirement benefits fall under the prohibition against the receipt of double compensation when they are based on exactly the same services and on the same creditable period. In this case, Ocampo is not claiming two sets of retirement benefits for one and the same creditable period. Rather, Ocampo is claiming a set of retirement benefits for each of 156 | P a g e

Political Law Review her two retirements from the ERB. In other words, each set of retirement benefits claimed by Ocampo is based on distinct creditable periods, one for her term as member of the ERB and another for her term as chairman of the same agency. 2. No. Section 1 of Executive Order No. 172 extends to members and chairmen of the ERB similar retirement benefits that retiring members and chairmen of the COA and COMELEC are entitled to under the law. Accordingly, R.A. No. 1568 provides that a retiring chairmen and members of COA and of COMELEC are entitled to five year lump sum benefit and monthly pension. However, It is worth stressing that R.A.No. 1568 is a law that, first and foremost, was intended to cover the retirement benefits of the chairmen and members of the COA and of the COMELEC and that it has been the consistent policy of the State to prohibit any appointment of more than one term in the said constitutional bodies. Hence, R.A. No. 1568 cannot be said to have sanctioned the payment of more than one set of retirement benefits to a retiree as a consequence of multiple retirements in one agency. The mere circumstance that members and chairmen of the ERB may be appointed to serve therein for more than one term does not mean that they would be entitled a set of retirement benefits under R.A. No. 1568 for each of their completed term. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORMER DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS ARTURO C. MOJICA G.R. No. 146486, March 4, 2005, CHICO-NAZARIO, J. When Sec. 2, Article XI of the Constitution includes Ombudsman as one of the impeachable officers, it refers to the rank or title and not the office. Therefore, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. Facts: A complaint was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation for allegations of extortion, sexual harassment and oppression against Deputy Ombudsman Arturo Mojica. Consequently, the Office of Ombudsman ordered that a separate criminal and administrative case be filed against Mojica. Aggrieved, Mojica filed a petition before the CA. The CA dismissed the complaints against Mojica, holding that Deputy Ombudsman is a public officer whose membership in the Philippine Bar is a qualification for the office held by him and removable only by impeachment, therefore he cannot be charged with disbarment during his incumbency. Instead, he should be impeached first before he may be held answerable to disbarment proceedings. Issue: Whether or not a Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable officer. 157 | P a g e

Political Law Review Ruling: No. As enumerated in Sec. 2 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, only the following are impeachable officers: the President, the Vice President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. When it includes Ombudsman as one of the impeachable officers, it refers to the rank or title and not the office. Therefore, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ v. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, et. al G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011, CARPIO MORALES, J. The act of initiating the complaint means the filing of the impeachment complaint and the referral by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Facts: Two impeachment complaints were filed against Ombudsman Gutierrez, both were based betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. The House Plenary referred the two complaints to the House of Representative Committee on Justice. After hearing, the House of Representative Committee on Justice issued a Resolution finding both complaints sufficient in form and substance. Consequently, Ombudsman Gutierrez contended that the issued the Resolution violated the one-year bar provision under Article XI, Section 3, paragraph 5 of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not HR Committee on Justice violated the one-year bar provision when it issued the Resolution Ruling: No. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution provides that, no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. The act of initiating the complaint means the filing of the impeachment complaint and the referral by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. Therefore, the one-year period ban is reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date it is referred to the House Committee on Justice. Hence, in this case, the HR Committee did not violate the one-year bar provision of the Constitution when it accepted the second impeachment complaint after the first impeachment complaint was filed. Also, it was held that the HR committee did not abuse its discretion in finding the complaints sufficient in form in substance. The Impeachment 158 | P a g e

Political Law Review Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a verified complaint or resolution, and that the substance requirement is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee. EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, et. al. G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J. The President has concurrent authority with respect to removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor. Facts: This case involves two consolidated petitions filed by Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III and Special Prosecutor Wendell BarrerasSulit. The petition of Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales involves the Decision of the Office of the President finding him guilty of inexcusable negligence and gross violation of rules of procedure by allowing PSI Rolando Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification. He was then dismissed from his office. On the other hand, the petition of Special Prosecutor Sulit involves the order of the Office of the President initiating a Preliminary Investigation and requiring him to submit a written explanation with respect to alleged acts or omissions constituting serious/grave. Consequently, they filed their separate petitions assailing the act of the President of removing them from their office. They both claim that the President has no disciplinary jurisdiction over them considering that the Office of the Ombudsman to which they belong is clothed with constitutional independence and that they, as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor therein, necessarily bear the constitutional attributes of said office. Issue: Whether or not the Office of the President has the power to remove and disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor. Ruling: Yes. Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own people and mete out administrative sanctions upon them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service. However, it is equally without question that the President has concurrent authority with respect to removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit under specified conditions. For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. 159 | P a g e

Political Law Review The manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions, Section 8(2) and Section 21, was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Moreover, following the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him. The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise. Therefore, in giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman. EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, et. al. G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014, BRION, J. Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. Facts: This is a motion for reconsideration for the decision of the Supreme Court in the consolidated case of Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales III and Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit. In such case, Gonzales and Barreras Sulit assailed the power to remove and disciplinary jurisdiction of the Office of the President. In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. Issue: Whether or not Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 which grants President disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is constitutional. Ruling: No. In this case, the Supreme Court reversed its prior pronouncement and votes to declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman. However, this conclusion does not apply to Sulit as the grant of independence is solely with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman which does not include the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Constitution. 160 | P a g e

Political Law Review Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. However, the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR. G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J. Facts: A complaint was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati, accusing them of Plunder and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019. Pursuant to this, the Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay. Consequently, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. The CA granted the application for TRO, and subsequently issued a WPI. Hence, the Ombudsman filed this present petition assailing the issuance of the TRO on the ground that of lack of jurisdiction. First, the Ombudsman argues that Section 14 of RA 6770, or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," states that no injunctive writ could be issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction. Second, it contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have considered the condonation doctrine in the 161 | P a g e

Political Law Review issuance of the injunctive writ since it was a matter of defense which should have been raised and passed upon by her office during the administrative disciplinary proceedings. Issues: 1. Whether or not R.A. 6770 aims to shield Ombudsman from judicial intervention as to secure its independence. 2. Whether or not CA gravely abused its jurisdiction in issuing the injunctive order against the preventive suspension order. Ruling: 1. No. The independent constitutional commissions have been consistently intended by the framers to be independent from executive control or supervision or any form of political influence. Evidently, its independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman from political harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the insidious tentacles of politics. That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from political harassment or pressure. 2. No. The CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. Thus, by merely following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly remained good law, it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was correctly issued. On preventive suspension By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure. Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order, under Section 24, RA 6770 are as follows: (1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and (2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. 162 | P a g e

Political Law Review On the Condonation Doctrine The condonation doctrine is a jurisprudential creation, which states that if it were established the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed during the officials prior term, then he can no longer be administratively charged for such act. The reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people. However, in this case, the Court simply finds that it is high time to abandon the condonation doctrine. It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA v. THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and THE NATIONAL TREASURER G.R. No. 180989, February 7, 2012, SERENO, J. The conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination. Facts: COA issued a Circular order which lifted the pre-audit of government transactions. With that, Petitioner dela Llana, in his capacity as taxpayer, wrote to the COA regarding the recommendation of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food that the Department of Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit service. However, the COA replied informing him of the circular order which listed the pre-audit system. Consequently, dela Llana this Petition for Certiorari alleging that that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. Issue: Whether or not pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular. Ruling:

163 | P a g e

Political Law Review No. There is nothing in the Constitution provision that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only when the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or special preaudit, to correct the deficiencies. Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination. ELECTION LAW KABATAAN PARTY-LIST, et. al. v. COMMISSION ELECTIONS G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election. Facts: President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law RA 10367 which mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters. RA 10367 was duly published on February 22, 2013, and took effect fifteen (15) days after. Pursuant to that, the COMELEC issued resolutions which commenced the mandatory biometric system of registration and implemented the NoBio-NoBoto policy. Consequently, herein petitioners filed the instant petition assailing the constitutionality of the biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolutions related thereto. They contend that the said law violates the right to suffrage on grounds that it rises to the level of an additional, substantial qualification where there is penalty of deactivation and biometrics deactivation is not the disqualification by law contemplated by the 1987 Constitution. Issue: Whether or not RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution related thereto, unconstitutional. Ruling: Yes. The right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. The State may therefore regulate said right by imposing statutory disqualifications, with the restriction, however, that the same do not amount 164 | P a g e

Political Law Review to a literacy, property or other substantive requirement. Moreover, the concept of a "qualification" should be distinguished from the concept of "registration", which is jurisprudentially regarded as only the means by which a person's qualifications to vote is determined. The act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter and one may be a qualified voter without exercising the right to vote. Registration is a form of regulation and not as a qualification for the right of suffrage. Therefore, the State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election. Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy, property or other substantive requirement, the same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional, as in this case. MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012, Sereno, J. Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means shall be denied registration. Facts: Magdalo Sa Pagbabago (Magdalo) filed a petition with Comelec, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party. However, Comelec denied the petition for registration by taking judicial notice that the party organizer and Chairman of Magdalo, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and some members participated in the Oakwood Mutiny thereby employing violence and unlawful means to achieve the goals of the party. Issue: Whether or not the Comelec acted in grave abuse of discretion in denying the registration of Magdalo. Ruling: No. At the outset, the Court held that Comelec properly took judicial notice of the Oakwood incident, because I was widely known and extensively covered by the media made it a proper subject of judicial notice. Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation. Moreover, the finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence or unlawful means did not operate as a prejudgment of the criminal proceedings against several member of Magdalo. The power vested by Article 165 | P a g e

Political Law Review IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the Comelec to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. In exercising this authority, the Comelec only has to assess whether the party or organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature. In the case at bar, the challenged Comelec Resolutions were issued pursuant to its administrative power to evaluate the eligibility of groups to join the elections as political parties, for which the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence is applicable. In arriving at its assailed ruling, the Comelec only had to assess whether there was substantial evidence adequate to support this conclusion. ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DAN ERASMO, SR., G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012, ABAD, J. A candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. Facts: After 26 years of being an Australian Citizen, Rommel Jalosjos returned to the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the Republic and renounced his Australian citizenship. He then filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay. However, Dan Erasmo moved to cancel the COC of Jalosjos on the ground of material misrepresentation since the latter failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement of the Local Government Code. Apparently, Jalosjos had been a mere guest or transient visitor in his brother’s house and, for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil, Zamboanga as his domicile. Issue: Whether or not Jalosjos has complied with the residency requirement. Ruling: Yes. There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate’s compliance with residency requirement since the question of residence is a question of intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time. When Jalosjos came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that he did so with intent to 166 | P a g e

Political Law Review change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The Comelec concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIA ISABELLE G. CLIMACO-SALAZAR, ROEL B. NATIVIDAD, ARTURO N. ONRUBIA, AHMAD NARZAD K. SAMPANG, JOSE L. LOBREGAT, ADELANTE ZAMBOANGA PARTY, AND ELBERT C. ATILANO G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J. As petitioner’s disqualification to run for public office had already been settled in a previous case and now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the Comelec En Banc to cancel his CoC as a matter of course, or else it be remiss in fulfilling its duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. Facts: Romeo Jalosjos was convicted of two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness. His conviction carried with it the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Thereafter, his prison term was commuted by the President to 16 years. After serving the same, he was discharged from prison. Jalosjos then filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) for mayor. In response thereto, five petitions to cancel his CoC were filed with the Comelec. Pending resolution of the petitions, the Comelec En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613, resolving "to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections" due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration requirement. Issue: 167 | P a g e

Political Law Review Whether the Comelec En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing, violated petitioner’s right to due process. Ruling: No. Comelec En Banc did not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any pending petition or resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions. Rather, it merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling petitioner’s CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by his final conviction. In this regard, the Comelec En Banc was exercising its administrative functions, dispensing with the need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial proceedings. In this light, there is also no violation of procedural due process since the Comelec En Banc would be acting in a purely administrative manner. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. As petitioner’s disqualification to run for public office had already been settled in a previous case and now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the Comelec En Banc to cancel his CoC as a matter of course, or else it be remiss in fulfilling its duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.

Also, it was held that Jalosjos’ perpetual absolute disqualification had not been removed by the Local Government Code (LGC), because Sec. 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a penal provision—such as Article 41 in this case—directly and specifically prohibits the convict from running for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from petitioner’s service of his commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City. ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JONATHAN ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR. G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015, PERALTA, J. Naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. Facts: 168 | P a g e

Political Law Review Enrique Nanud filed a petition to cancel Rogelio Caballero’s certificate of candidacy (COC) on the ground of false representation. It was alleged that Caballero was actually a Canadian citizen, hence ineligible to run for mayor. Caballero argued that he already took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and has renounced his Canadian citizenship. Comelec nevertheless cancelled the Caballero’s COC for failure to comply with the one year residency requirement, reasoning that Caballero’s naturalization as a Canadian citizen resulted in the abandonment of his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. Caballero insisted that the requirement of the law in fixing the residence qualification of a candidate running for public office is not strictly on the period of residence in the place where he seeks to be elected but on the acquaintance by the candidate on his constituents' vital needs for their common welfare; and that his nine months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election is a substantial compliance with the law. Issue: Whether or not Caballero abandoned his domicile. Ruling: Yes. The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child's parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). It consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. In this case, Caballero was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. Naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in Caballero's case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence, Caballero had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment. Moreover, it was held that Caballero’s retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan,

169 | P a g e

Political Law Review Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as such. ALROBEN J. GOH, v. HON. LUCILO R. BAYRON and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 212584, November 25, 2014, CARPIO, J. When the Comelec receives a budgetary appropriation for its “Current Operating Expenditures,” such appropriation includes expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions, including the conduct of recall elections. Facts: Alroben Goh filed a recall petition against Mayor Lucilo Bayron due to loss of trust and confidence anchored on the alleged violations of Bayron of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials. The Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 9864 finding the petition sufficient in form and substance. However, the Comelec resolved not to continue with any proceedings relative to recall as it does not have a line item budget or legal authority to commit public funds for the purpose. According to Comelec, until a law is passed by Congress appropriating funds for recall elections, any proceeding relative to the petition should be suspended. Issue: Whether or not the 2014 GAA provided the line item appropriation to allow the Comelec to perform its constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections. Ruling: Yes. The 1987 Constitution expressly provides the Comelec with the power to “[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.” The 1987 Constitution not only guaranteed the Comelec's fiscal autonomy, but also granted its head, as authorized by law, to augment items in its appropriations from its savings. The 2014 GAA provides such authorization to the Comelec Chairman, contrary to what Resolution No. 9882 said. This is found in the Programs category of its 2014 budget, which the Comelec admits in its Resolution No. 9882 is a “line item for the 'Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites.” In addition, one of the specific constitutional functions of the Comelec is to conduct recall elections. When the Comelec receives a budgetary appropriation for its "Current Operating Expenditures," such appropriation includes expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions, including the conduct of recall elections. Thus, in Socrates v. Comelec, recall elections were conducted even without a specific appropriation for recall elections in the 2002 GAA. Considering that there is an existing line item appropriation for the conduct of recall elections in the 2014 GAA, there is no reason why the 170 | P a g e

Political Law Review Comelec is unable to perform its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of recall.. Should the funds appropriated in the 2014 GAA be deemed insufficient, then the Comelec Chairman may exercise his authority to augment such line item appropriation from the Comelec's existing savings, as this augmentation is expressly authorized in the 2014 GAA. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, v. CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989, SARMIENTO, J. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Facts: Sultan Limbona was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly of Central Mindanao. The Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs invited Limbona to attend the dialogues regarding the issues affecting the region. Consistent with the said invitation, Limbona announced that there will be no session for that day as their presence is required by the Committee. However, the Assembly held session in defiance of Limbona's advice. After declaring the presence of a quorum, all assemblymen moved to declare the seat of Speaker Limbona vacant. Issue: Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII? Ruling: An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that “[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions.” In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services. 171 | P a g e

Political Law Review It was also held that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook," but it provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals." Of course, there is disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short intervals" referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that "recess" as used by their Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally and obviate dissenssion [sic] and disunity. The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of "short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the Speaker could not have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on November 1, the date session opens under the same Rules. Hence, there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any session. But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could. do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith. CITY OF LAPU-LAPU v. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY G.R. No. 184203, November 26, 2014, LEONEN, J. Being an instrumentality of the national government, the PEZA cannot be taxed by local government units. Facts: PEZA was created to manage economic zones in the country. The City of Lapu-Lapu demanded real property taxes from PEZA’s properties in Mactan Economic Zone. The City anchors its demand on the Local Government Code which withdrew the real property tax exemptions previously granted to entities. Characterizing the PEZA as an agency of the National Government, the trial court ruled that the City had no authority to tax the PEZA under the Local Government Code. Issue: 172 | P a g e

Political Law Review Whether or not the PEZA is an instrumentality of the national government, hence, exempt from payment of real property taxes. Ruling: Yes. An instrumentality is “any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter.” As an instrumentality of the national government, the PEZA is vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law. Congress created the PEZA to operate, administer, manage and develop special economic zones in the Philippines. Special economic zones are areas with highly developed or which have the potential to be developed into agro-industrial, industrial tourist/recreational, commercial, banking, investment and financial centers. By operating, administering, managing, and developing special economic zones which attract investments and promote use of domestic labor, the PEZA carries out the policy of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the national government, the PEZA cannot be taxed by local government units. Although a body corporate vested with some corporate powers, the PEZA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation taxable for real property taxes. BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. v. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN, REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR CARLITO S. MARQUEZ, THE PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION AUTHORITY, AND THE DENR-EMB (REGION VI) G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. Two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Facts: Respondent Province decided to build a Jetty Port and Passenger Terminal at Barangay Caticlan to be the main gateway to Boracay in the Malay Municipality. However, Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, Malay Municipality, issued a Resolution manifesting its strong opposition to said application. Consequently, Sangguniang Panlalawigan of respondent Province approved a resolution formally authorizing Governor Marquez to represent the renovation/rehabilitation of the Caticlan/Cagban Passenger Terminal Buildings and Jetty Ports; and (b) reclamation of a portion of Caticlan foreshore for commercial purposes. During the course of the negotiation, respondent Province deliberated on the possible expansion from its original proposed reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to forty (40) hectares in order to maximize the utilization of its resources and as a response to the findings of the Preliminary Geohazard Assessment study which showed that the 173 | P a g e

Political Law Review recession and retreat of the shoreline caused by coastal erosion and scouring should be the first major concern in the project site and nearby coastal area. But still, the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay refused to give the favourable endorsement to the Province of Aklan. As a result, the petitioner contends that the respondent province failed to conduct the required consultation procedures as required by the Local Government Code. Issue: Whether or not the prior consultation is a requirement before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented. Ruling: Yes. Two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal. Based on the above, therefore, prior consultations and prior approval are required by law to have been conducted and secured by the respondent Province. The project in this case can be classified as a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities, because the commercial establishments to be built on phase 1, as described in the EPRMP quoted above, could cause pollution as it could generate garbage, sewage, and possible toxic fuel discharge. Hence, it is covered by the requirements found in Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code provisions that are quoted below: SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON v. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, G.R. No. 156052, March 7, 2007, CORONA, J. The Mayor has the ministerial duty under the Local Government Code to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. Facts: Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel Manila Mayor Jose Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassified a certain area from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area and would be adversely affected are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies.

174 | P a g e

Political Law Review Later on, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies. They agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing the mayor of Manila to issue special business permits to the oil companies. Issue: Whether or not the petition for mandamus was proper. Ruling: Yes. Respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local Government Code (LGC) to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city, including Ordinance No. 8027. The court also held that the court need not resolve the issue of whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian could amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027 since the resolutions which ratified the MOU and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. In a later case (Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, Feb. 13, 2008), the validity of Ordinance No. 8027 was questioned by the oil companies. But the Supreme Court held that it was a valid exercise of police power, because it was enacted for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial. The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it there is such a target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS, NAMELY, SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, and VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO v. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as mayor of the City of Manila G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014, PEREZ, J. There is truly no such thing as “the will of Manila” insofar as the general welfare of the people is concerned. 175 | P a g e

Political Law Review Facts: The present case is a sequel of the Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr. (2008). During the incumbency of former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim), who succeeded Mayor Atienza, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 8187 which repealed Ordinance No. 8027, thus allowing, once again, the operation of the oil companies in the Pandacan area. Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 8187 is valid and constitutional. Ruling: No. Notwithstanding that the conditions with respect to the operations of the oil depots existing prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not substantially differ to this day, as would later be discussed, the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod on the matter has thrice changed, largely depending on the new composition of the council and/or political affiliations. The foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the “general welfare” of the city does not after all gear towards the protection of the people in its true sense and meaning, but is, one way or another, dependent on the personal preference of the members who sit in the council as to which particular sector among its constituents it wishes to favor. Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor and the city councilors, has changed its view on the matter, favoring the city’s economic related benefits, through the continued stay of the oil terminals, over the protection of the very lives and safety of its constituents, it is imperative for this Court to make a final determination on the basis of the facts on the table as to which specific right of the inhabitants of Manila should prevail. For, in this present controversy, history reveals that there is truly no such thing as “the will of Manila” insofar as the general welfare of the people is concerned. If in sacrilege, in free translation of Angara by Justice Laurel, we say when the judiciary mediates we do not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Manila Sangguniang Panlungsod, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to the Court by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. In a later case (Social Justice Society v. Lim, G.R. No. 187836, March 10, 2015), the Supreme Court denied the oil companies’ motion for reconsideration, ruling in this wise: “There are overwhelming reasons stated in the Decision to support the Court’s pronouncement that the very nature of depots has no place in a densely populated area, among others, the very history of the Pandacan terminals where flames spread over the entire City of Manila when fuel storage dumps were set on fire in December 194114 and the other incident of explosion, which were both considered in G.R. No. 156052.” 176 | P a g e

Political Law Review SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, et. al. v. HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et. al. G.R. No. 118303. January 31, 1996, HERMOSISIMA, JR., The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. Facts: Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago claiming that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its average annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls below the required annual income of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00). They contend that in the computation of the average annual income of Santiago, the IRAs should be excluded. The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance, which indicates Santiagos average annual income to be P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not excluded from the computation. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and! or budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing. Issue: Whether or not annual income of a local government unit includes IRAs. Ruling: Yes. The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the general fund of the local government and are used to finance its operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided for in the Local Government Code and its implementing rules and regulations. For instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs must be set aside for local development projects. As such, for purposes of budget preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the local government unit, among others, the IRAs and the share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This is as it should be, since income is defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the local government unit. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which 177 | P a g e

Political Law Review the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds. AURELIO M. UMALI v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V. VERGARA, and THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CABANATUAN G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014, VELASCO, JR., J. The Court treats the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 under the Local Government Code to mean the qualified voters not only in the city proposed to be converted to an HUC but also the voters of the political units directly affected by such conversion in order to harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. Facts: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed a resolution requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the President issued a Presidential Proclamation proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Comelec issued a proclamation resolving that registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite. The governor of Nueva Ecija filed a motion for reconsideration maintaining that the qualified voters of the province should be included in the said plebiscite. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly affected by the conversion and not just those in the component city proposed to be upgraded. Issue: Whether or not only the qualified registered voters of Cabanatuan City can participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into an HUC. Ruling: No. While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries. Creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator—material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people “in the political units directly affected.” The entire province of Nueva Ecija will be directly affected by Cabanatuan City’s conversion. As a consequence, all the qualified registered 178 | P a g e

Political Law Review voters of Nueva Ecija should then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that purpose. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT, et. al. G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011, NACHURA, J. The exemption from the land area requirement of local government units composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC. Facts: The President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). After complying with the required plebiscite, the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007. The former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 arguing that Dinagat failed to comply with the required land area based on Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC. Issue: Whether or not RA 9355 is valid and constitutional. Ruling: Yes. The exemption from the land area requirement of local government units composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC, with respect to the creation of municipalities and cities, but inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with respect to the creation of provinces. Hence, the void or missing detail was filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR. With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative construction of the LGC, the many details to implement the LGC had already been put in place, which Congress understood to be impractical and not too urgent to immediately translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat. 179 | P a g e

Political Law Review ARNOLD D. VICENCIO VS. HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR AND HON. JUANITO G. ESPINO JR. G.R. No. 182069, July 3, 2012, SERENO, J. There is no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor. Facts: A city ordinance Ordinance No. 15-2003 was passed granting the Vice Mayor of Malabon, Jay Jay Yambao, to negotiate and enter into contract for consultancy services for consultants in the Sanggunian Secretariat tasked to function in their respective areas of concern. Later on, petitioner Arnold Vicencio was elected as Vice Mayor of Malabon, and he deemed it necessary to hire the services of consultants with the end view of augmenting and upgrading its performance capability for the effective operation of the legislative machinery of the city. After the funds were appropriated, an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) was issued disallowing the amount of three hundred eighty-four thousand nine hundred eighty pesos (₱384,980) for being an improper disbursement. The Petitioner appealed to the Adjudication and Settlement Board (ASB) of the COA, but the latter denied the petition. The COA affirmed the decision of the ASB. Issue: Whether or not the contracts entered into by Vice Mayor Arnold Vicencio are valid. Ruling: No. Under Section 456 of the Local Government Code, there is no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor. Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the city was strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting it. Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into contracts for consultancy services. As this is not a power or duty given under the law to the Office of the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be construed as a “continuing authority” for any person who enters the Office of the Vice- Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts. ROMEO J. GAMBOA JR. VS. MARCELO AGUIRRE, JR., AND JUAN Y ARANETA G.R. No. 134213, July 20, 1999, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the 180 | P a g e

Political Law Review duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them. Facts: Petitioner Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr. was elected as the Vice Governor of Negros Occidental while respondents Marcelo Aguirre, Jr., and Juan Y. Araneta were elected as Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) members. The governor had an official trip abroad and designated petitioner as acting governor until his return. However, during the regular session, the respondents questioned the authority of the petitioner and subsequently filed a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition. The trial court rendered a decision and declared petitioner as temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP during the period that he is the Acting Governor. Issue: Whether or not the Vice Governor has the authority to preside over SP sessions while he is exercising the powers and duties of the Office of the Governor. Ruling: No. It has been held that if a Mayor who is out of the country is considered effectively absent, the Vice-Mayor should discharge the duties of the mayor during the latter’s absence. This doctrine should equally apply to the Vice-Governor since he is similarly situated as the Vice-Mayor. Although it is difficult to lay down a definite rule as to what constitutes absence, yet this term should be reasonably construed to mean effective absence, that is, one that renders the officer concerned powerless, for the time being, to discharge the powers and prerogatives of his office. There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office. By virtue of the foregoing definition, it can be said that the designation, appointment or assumption of the Vice-Governor as the Acting Governor creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor during such contingency. Considering the silence of the law on the matter, the mode of succession provided for permanent vacancies, under the new Code, in the office of the Vice-Governor may likewise be observed in the event of temporary vacancy occurring in the same office. This is so because in the eyes of the law, the office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor. Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them. Such is not only consistent with but also appears to be the clear rationale of the new Code wherein the policy of performing dual functions in both offices has already been abandoned. To repeat, the creation of a 181 | P a g e

Political Law Review temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This event constitutes an inability on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice Governor) to preside during the SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of the remedy set in Article 49(b) of the Local Government Code concerning the election of a temporary presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting Governors (Vice-Governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. Under Section 49(b), (i)n the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian session, the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense. Facts: A complaint for plunder and violation of RA 3019 was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City. Therafter, the Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order and copy of the preventive suspension order was received by Maricon Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s staff. Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic. The CA issued a TRO he CA held that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, i.e., the nullification of the preventive suspension order, finding that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013. Issue: Whether or not the condonation doctrine is applicable. 182 | P a g e

Political Law Review Ruling: No. the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. Further, Nothing in Section 66 (b) of the Local Government Code states that the elective local official's administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually supports the theory that the liability is condoned. It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 79956, January 29, 1990, CORTES, J. The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Facts: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220 which created the Cordillera Administrative Region which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio on the primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of' the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a plebiscite. During the pendency of this case, RA 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region” was enacted and signed into law. It recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its transitory nature is reinforced in Art. XXI of RA 6766. Issue: Whether or not the CAR is a territorial and political subdivision. Ruling:

183 | P a g e

Political Law Review No. The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas. DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, et al. v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012, BRION, J. RA No. 10153 was passed in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. In the course of synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections, Congress had to grant the President the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM. Facts: Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the President’s power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials. Datu Michael Abas Kida, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration assailing constitutionality of R.A. 10153 on the ground that the constitution gave ARMM a special status and is separate and distinct from the ordinary local government units. Issue: 1. Whether or not the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national and local elections. 2. Whether or not by granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and representative nature of ARMM regional legislative and executive offices. 3. Whether or not ARMM regional officials should be allowed to remain in their respective positions until the May 2013 elections since there is no specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits regional elective officials from performing their duties in a holdover capacity. Ruling: 1. Yes. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local elections, the intention can be inferred from the following provisions of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which states that the first elections of Members of the Congress 184 | P a g e

Political Law Review under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987. The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area. The framers of the Constitution during the deliberation, through Davide could not have expressed their objective more clearly that there will be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials – from the President down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate. 2. No. Section 3 of RA No. 10153, which mandates the President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. The above-quoted provision did not change the basic structure of the ARMM regional government. On the contrary, this provision clearly preserves the basic structure of the ARMM regional government when it recognizes the offices of the ARMM regional government and directs the OICs who shall temporarily assume these offices to perform the functions pertaining to the said offices. 3. No. The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can occupy their offices. It is established that elective ARMM officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the threeyear term limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress. SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N. TALABONG, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009, BRION, J.

An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs during an office holder’s term when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions for reasons established by law. Facts:

185 | P a g e

Political Law Review Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. This prompted Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160. Commission on Elections (Comelec) ruled that preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the full term. Issue: Whether or not the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under RA 7160, or the Local Government Code. Ruling: No. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states that the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. The "interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office and elective official must have involuntarily left his office. Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective interruption of service within a term, while on the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office. The office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law. In cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office since loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability. Thus. Asilo’s 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayanimposed preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective official’s term.

186 | P a g e

Political Law Review MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.

To be considered as interruption of service, the law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit. Facts: For four successive regular elections, Abelardo Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In the 2004 electoral derby, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Torres, who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested and was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest. Then came the 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other and Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run, predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule. Comelec First Division ruled in favor of Abundo. Vega commenced a quo warranto action before the RTCto unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised. The RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor because he has already served three consecutive terms. Comelec’s second division and en banc affirmed. Issue: Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms. Ruling: No. Pursuant to Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC, voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official for any length of time shall not, in determining service for three consecutive terms, be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. During the period of one year and ten months, title to hold such office and the corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate for only a little over one year and one month. The reality on the ground is that Abundo actually served less. The almost two-year period during which Abundo’s opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary 187 | P a g e

Political Law Review interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold. It cannot be overemphasized that pending the favorable resolution of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. Hence, even if declared later as having the right to serve the elective position such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no legal right to said position. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER, v. HELMUT MULLER G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J

Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Facts: Elena Buenaventura Muller and Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines. The spouses bought a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of Elena Muller. However, due to incompatibilities and Helmut Muller’s alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. Helmut Muller filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between them. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the Helmut Muller and he cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution. Helmut Muller appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming that he is not praying for transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property but merely reimbursement, that the funds were given to Elena in trust that the funds paid by him for the said property were in consideration of his marriage, and that equity demands that respondent should be reimbursed of his personal funds. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Helmut Muller. Issue: Whether or not respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property. Ruling:

188 | P a g e

Political Law Review No. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, Helmut Muller’s disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute under the Constitution. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law.

JACOBUS BERNHARD HULST, v. PR BUILDERS, INC., G.R. NO. 156364, September 25, 2008, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. While the intent to circumvent the constitutional proscription on aliens owning real property was evident by virtue of the execution of the Contract to Sell, such violation of the law did not materialize because petitioner caused the rescission of the contract before the execution of the final deed transferring ownership. Facts: Jacobus Bernhard Hulst and his spouse, Dutch nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell with PR Builders, Inc. for the purchase of a 210-sq m residential unit in respondent's townhouse project in Barangay Niyugan, Laurel, Batangas. When PR Builders failed to comply with its verbal promise to complete the project, the spouses Hulst filed before the HLURB a complaint for rescission of contract. HLURB Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of spouses Hulst and order to reimburse the purchase price paid by the complainants to P.R. Builders with damages and attorney’s fees. HLURB Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution and the Sheriff levied on PR Buikder's 15 parcels of land and sold it to an auction sale. CA reversed the decision and set aside the levy on the ground that the subject properties cannot be owned by Hulst being a foreign national. Issues: 1. Whether or not the Contract to Sell is valid. 2. Whether or not Hulst is entitled to reimbursement. 3. Whether or not Hulst is entitled to recover damages and attorney’s fees. Ruling: 1. No. Sec. 7 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Since petitioner and his wife, 189 | P a g e

Political Law Review being Dutch nationals, are proscribed under the Constitution from acquiring and owning real property, it is unequivocal that the Contract to Sell entered into by petitioner together with his wife and respondent is void. 2. Yes. Generally, parties to a void agreement cannot expect the aid of the because they are deemed in pari delicto or "in equal fault. In pari delicto is "a universal doctrine which holds that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract. No suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation and where the parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the other. This rule, however, is subject to exceptions one of which is Uuder Article 1414 which states that,one who repudiates the agreement and demands his money before the illegal act has taken place is entitled to recover. Petitioner is therefore entitled to recover what he has paid. 3. No. Hulst is entitled to the recovery only of the amount of P3,187,500.00, representing the purchase price paid to respondent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect. It does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation. No damages may be recovered on the basis of a void contract. Being nonexistent, the agreement produces no juridical tie between the parties involved. Further, petitioner is not entitled to actual as well as interests thereon, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. WILSON P. GAMBOA, v. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES, et al. G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011, CARPIO, J. The term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares. The 40% foreign ownership limitation should be interpreted to apply to both the beneficial ownership and the controlling interest. Facts: General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE), an American company and a major PLDT stockholder, sold 26% of the outstanding common shares of PLDT to PTIC. Subsequently, First Pacific, a Bermudaregistered, Hong Kong-based investment firm, acquired the remaining 54% of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC. Aside from that, Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC) of the Philippine Government announced that it would sell the 111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125% of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, through a public bidding. First Pacific, through its subsidiary, MPAH, entered into a Conditional Sale and Purchase Agreement of the 111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125% of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, 190 | P a g e

Political Law Review with the Philippine Government. With the sale, First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 %to 3 %, thereby increasing the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. This allegedly violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%. Gamboa submits that the 40% foreign equity limitation in domestic public utilities refers only to common shares because such shares are entitled to vote and it is through voting that control over a corporation is exercised. Gamboa posits that the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to “the ownership of common capital stock subscribed and outstanding, which class of shares alone, under the corporate set-up of PLDT, can vote and elect members of the board of directors.” It is undisputed that PLDT’s non-voting preferred shares are held mostly by Filipino citizens. This arose from Presidential Decree No. 217, issued on 16 June 1973 by then President Ferdinand Marcos, requiring every applicant of a PLDT telephone line to subscribe to non-voting preferred shares to pay for the investment cost of installing the telephone line. Secretary Teves, on the other hand, do not offer any definition of the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. More importantly, private respondents Nazareno and Pangilinan of PLDT do not dispute that more than 40 % of the common shares of PLDT are held by foreigners. Issue: Whether the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to the total common shares only or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares) of PLDT, a public utility. Ruling: The term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors. Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution mandates the Filipinization of public utilities, it explicitly reserves to Filipino citizens control of public utilities, pursuant to an overriding economic goal of the 1987 Constitution, to conserve and develop our patrimony and ensure a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. Thus the 40% foreign equity limitation in public utilities prescribed by the Constitution refers to ownership of shares of stock entitled to vote, which are common shares, considering that it is through voting that control is being exercised. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term “capital” shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. PLDT’s holders of common shares are granted the exclusive right to vote in the election of directors. PLDT’s Articles of Incorporation state that 191 | P a g e

Political Law Review "each holder of Common Capital Stock shall have one vote in respect of each share of such stock held by him on all matters voted upon by the stockholders, and the holders of Common Capital Stock shall have the exclusive right to vote for the election of directors and for all other purposes." In short, only holders of common shares can vote in the election of directors, meaning only common shareholders exercise control over PLDT. Conversely, holders of preferred shares, who have no voting rights in the election of directors, do not have any control over PLDT. INITIATIVES FOR DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICES, INC. (IDEALS, INC.), et al. v. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM), et al. G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012, VILLARAMA, J. Once water is removed from its natural source, it ceases to be a part of the natural resources of the country and may be subject of ordinary commerce and may even be acquired by foreigners. Facts: PSALM, otherwise known as the "Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA) manages the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets. Thereafter, PSALM commenced the privatization of the 246-megawatt (MW) AHEPP located in San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan, a portion of which is co-owned by NPC. After the post-bid evaluation, PSALM’s Board of Directors approved and confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award to the highest bidder, K-Water. Petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction was filed by the Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. (IDEALS) et al. alleging that K-Water which is a foreign corporation, thus PSALM clearly violated the constitutional provisions on the appropriation and utilization of water as a natural resource, as implemented by the Water Code of the Philippines limiting water rights to Filipino citizens and corporations which are at least 60% Filipino-owned. PSALM countered the nationality issue raised, citing previous opinions rendered by the Department of Justice (DOJ) consistently holding that the utilization of water by a hydroelectric power plant does not constitute appropriation of water from its natural source considering that the source of water (dam) that enters the intake gate of the power plant is an artificial structure. Issue: Whether the utilization of water by the power plant to be owned and operated by a foreign-owned corporation will violate the provisions of the Constitution and Water Code. Ruling: 192 | P a g e

Political Law Review No. Art. 15 of The Water Code of the Philippines states that only citizens of the Philippines, of legal age, as well as juridical persons, who are duly qualified by law to exploit and develop water resources, may apply for water permits. It is clear that the law limits the grant of water rights only to Filipino citizens and juridical entities duly qualified by law to exploit and develop water resources, including private corporations with sixty percent of their capital owned by Filipinos. The nationality requirement imposed by the Water Code refers to the privilege “to appropriate and use water” and has interpreted this phrase to mean the extraction of water directly from its natural source (Secretary of Justice Opinion No. 14, s. 1995). “Natural” is defined as that which is produced without aid of stop, valves, slides, or other supplementary means. The water that is used by the power plant could not enter the intake gate without the dam, which is a man-made structure. Such being the case, the source of the water that enters the power plant is of artificial character rather than natural. Once water is removed from its natural source, it ceases to be a part of the natural resources of the country and may be the subject of ordinary commerce and may even be acquired by foreigners. NPC’s water rights remain an integral aspect of its jurisdiction and control over the dam and reservoir. That the EPIRA itself did not ordain any transfer of water rights leads us to infer that Congress intended NPC to continue exercising full supervision over the dam, reservoir and, more importantly, to remain in complete control of the extraction or diversion of water from the Angat River. In this way, the State’s full supervision and control over the country’s water resources is also assured notwithstanding the privatized power generation business NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., TESORO MINING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., AND MCARTHUR MINING, INC. v. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP. G.R. No. 195580, January 28, 2015, VELASCO JR., J. Facts: Redmont alleged that at least 60% of the capital stock of McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are owned and controlled by MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI), a 100% Canadian corporation. In addition to that since Nara et al.’ capital stocks were mostly owned by MBMI, they were likewise disqualified from engaging in mining activities through MPSAs, which are reserved only for Filipino citizens. In their answer Nara et al. averred that they were qualified persons under Section 3(aq) of R.A. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 which provides that any citizen of the Philippines with capacity to contract, or a corporation, partnership, association, or cooperative organized or authorized for the purpose of engaging in mining, with technical and financial capability to undertake mineral resources development and duly registered in accordance with law at least sixty per cent (60%) of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines. Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for purposes of granting an exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or 193 | P a g e

Political Law Review mineral processing permit. Additionally, they stated that their nationality as applicants is immaterial because they also applied for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements, which are granted to foreign-owned corporations. Nevertheless, they asserted that though MBMI owns 40% of the shares of PLMC (which owns 5,997 shares of Narra), 40% of the shares of MMC (which owns 5,997 shares of McArthur) and 40% of the shares of SLMC (which, in turn, owns 5,997 shares of Tesoro), the shares of MBMI will not make it the owner of at least 60% of the capital stock of each of corporations. They added that the best tool used in determining the nationality of a corporation is the "control test. Mining Adjudication Board ruled in favor of Narra et al. However, RTC and CA reversed the said ruling. In reaching the conclusion, the court applied the Grandfather Rule as a supplement to the Control Test. Issue: Whether or not the Grandfather Rule can be applied in determining the nationality of the corporation. Ruling: Yes. The use of the Grandfather Rule as a “supplement” to the Control Test is not proscribed by the Constitution or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. The Grandfather Rule was originally conceived to look into the citizenship of the individuals who ultimately own and control the shares of stock of a corporation for purposes of determining compliance with the constitutional requirement of Filipino ownership. From the excerpts in the Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it was shown that the framers of the Constitution have not foreclosed the Grandfather Rule as a tool in verifying the nationality of corporations for purposes of ascertaining their right to participate in nationalized or partly nationalized activities. However, it is only when the Control Test is first complied with that the Grandfather Rule may be applied. Put in another manner, if the subject corporation’s Filipino equity falls below the threshold 60%, the corporation is immediately considered foreign-owned, in which case, the need to resort to the Grandfather Rule disappears. As a corollary rule, even if the 60-40 Filipino to foreign equity ratio is apparently met by the subject or investee corporation, a resort to the Grandfather Rule is necessary if doubt exists as to the locus of the “beneficial ownership” and “control.” On the case at hand, the fact that MBMI had practically provided all the funds in Tesoro, McArthur and Narra creates serious doubt as to the true extent of its control and ownership over the said corporations. RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT V. REYES G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. Foreign-owned corporations may participate in the exploration, development, and use of natural resources, but only through either financial agreements or technical ones. 194 | P a g e

Political Law Review Facts: “Resident Marine Mammals” are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in Tañon Strait, joined by stewards. Initially, the Government of the Philippines entered into a contract with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX) involving geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. Then, they converted it into a Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) which allowed the exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait. Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Tañon Strait, Resident Marine and Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center et al. assert that SC-46 violated Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution because JAPEX is 100% Japanese-owned. It further asserts that SC-46 cannot be validly classified as a technical and financial assistance agreement executed under Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 4 of the 1987 Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the Service Contract No. 46 is constitutional. Ruling: No. Under Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. Foreign-owned corporations may participate in the exploration, development, and use of natural resources, but only through either financial agreements or technical ones. SC-46 suffers from the lack of a special law allowing its activities. SC-46 did not merely involve exploratory activities, but also provided the rights and obligations of the parties should it be discovered that there is oil in commercial quantities in the area. The Tañon Strait being a protected seascape under Presidential Decree No. 1234 requires that the exploitation and utilization of energy resources from that area are explicitly covered by a law passed by Congress specifically for that purpose. No law was passed by Congress specifically providing the standards, terms, and conditions of an oil exploration, extraction, and/or utilization for Tañon Strait and, therefore, no such activities could have been validly undertaken under SC-46. The National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 is clear that exploitation and utilization of energy resources in a protected seascape such as Tañon Strait shall only be allowed through a specific law. MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. 195 | P a g e

Political Law Review G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006, CARPIO, J. Land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion and thus cannot be the subject of levy and auction sale. Facts: Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is the operator of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) located in Paranaque City. The Offi cers of the City of Paranaque sent notices to MIAA due to real estate tax delinquency. When MIAA failed to settle the entire amount, the said offi cers threatened to levy and subject to auction the land and buildings of MIAA which they did. MIAA sought for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) from the CA but failed to do so within the 60 days reglementary period, so the petition was dismissed. MIAA then sought for a TRO with the Supreme Court a day before the public auction which the court granted but the TRO was received by the Paranaque City officers 3 hours after the public auction. MIAA claims that although the charter provides that the title of the land and building are with MIAA, still, the ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines. That as the said properties are of public dominion, they cannot be subjected to levy and auction sale. Issue: Whether or not the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion and thus cannot be the subject of levy and auction sale. Ruling: Yes. Art 420 of the Civil Code provides, to wit: Art 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;. No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code are owned by the State. The term "ports" includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a "port" constructed by the State. Hence, the same are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is of public dominion or not. As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are outside the commerce of man. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the Airport Lands and Buildings from public use, these properties remain properties of public dominion and are inalienable. Since the disputed properties are of public dominion, they are not subject to levy on execution or foreclosure sale. 196 | P a g e

Political Law Review DANTE LIBAN, ET AL. V. RICHARD GORDON G.R. NO. 175352, JANUARY 18, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. The PNRC’s structure is sui generis. Facts: Liban, et al. filed with the Supreme Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate for having been elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator in violation of Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution. It was advanced by Liban, et al. that the PNRC is a GOCC. Formerly, the Court held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat. The Court, however, held further that the PNRC Charter (R.A 95) is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation which the Congress cannot create. Hence, it directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Issue: What is the nature of PNRC? Ruling: The PNRC’s structure is sui generis. Although the PNRC is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private corporation” within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution that must be organized under the Corporation Code. In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 177131, JUNE 7, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. The Boy Scouts of the Philippines is a public corporation created by law for a public purpose, attached to the Department of Education Culture and Sports pursuant to its Charter and the Administrative Code of 1987. Facts: In 1999, the Commission on Audit (COA) issued a resolution stating that the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) is a GOCC subject to auditing jurisdiction of COA. The BSP argued that the provisions of RA 7278 suggest 197 | P a g e

Political Law Review that governance of BSP has come to be overwhelmingly a private affair or nature, with government participation restricted to the seat of the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports. Issue: Whether or not the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (“BSP”) fall under the auditing jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. Ruling: Yes. Not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exists another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as “public corporations.” These corporations are treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to a different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its departments or offices. As presently constituted, the BSP is a public corporation created by law for a public purpose, attached to the Department of Education Culture and Sports pursuant to its Charter and the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not a private corporation which is required to be owned or controlled by the government and be economically viable to justify its existence under a special law. The economic viability test would only apply if the corporation is engaged in some economic activity or business function for the government, which is not the case for BSP. Therefore, being a public corporation, the funds of the BSP fall under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA VS HON. EDUARDO ERMITA G.R No. 187167, JULY 16, 2011, CARPIO, J. Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77). Facts:

198 | P a g e

Political Law Review In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was enacted (Baselines Law). This law was meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984. Professor Merlin Magallona, et al. questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Issue: Whether or not RA 9522 is constitutional. Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.

ISABELITA C. VINUYA et al. v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO et al. G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010, DEL CASTILLO, J. The question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. Facts: As a result of the atrocities committed by the Japanese during the Second World War, Vinuya et al, all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, sought 199 | P a g e

Political Law Review the assistance of the respondent in filing their claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who are responsible for the so called "comfort women" system. However, the officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners and stated that compensation for the victims have already been complied with by virtue of the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Dissatisfied, Vinuya et al., filed this present petition for certiorari with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the respondents. Issues: Whether or not the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them. Ruling: No. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan. Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions. One such category involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that “the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative —'the political'—departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” The question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari. The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For us to overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed. Moreover, the Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse petitioners’ claims. Since the exercise of diplomatic protection is the right of the State, reliance on the right is within the absolute discretion of states, and the decision whether to exercise the discretion may invariably be 200 | P a g e

Political Law Review influenced by political considerations other than the legal merits of the particular claim. The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease. It retains, in this respect, a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case. SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., et al. v. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY et al. G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005, PUNO J. Under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate and the role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Facts: In this petition, Senator Pimentel et al, sought to compel the officials of the executive branch to transmit the text of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the Senate for ratification for the Statute specifically requires that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Senator Pimentel et al., contends that it is the function of the Senate to ratify treaties pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and that the executive branch is obliged to transmit the signed copy of the Statute to the Senate. It further alleged that since the provision of the Rome Statute forms part of the customary international law, the Senate has the ministerial duty to ratify the same. Issue: Whether or not the executive branch has a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute even without the signature of the President. Ruling: No. It should be emphasized that under the Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction 201 | P a g e

Political Law Review to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, v. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents. G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000, Melo, J. Facts: The Philippines has an extradition treaty with the USA. In 1999, the DOJ received from US a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez. Pending evaluation of the extradition docuements, Jimenez requested copies of the extradition request, but the DOJ denied such request on the ground that the extradition treaty states that the formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and documents obtained through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law. According to the DOJ, such denial is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. Issue: Whether or not granting Jimenez the rights of notice and hearing would be considered a breach of the extradition treaty with the US. are granted to the prospective extraditee despite the silence of the extradition treaty. Ruling: No. US. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision. In this case, there is no such conflict between international law and municipal law. Instead, there is a void in the provisions of the treaty as regards the basic due process of the prospective extraditee. In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Petitioner contends that 202 | P a g e

Political Law Review the United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable during trial. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even during trial. PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008, CARPIO MORALES, J. The Presidents power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. Facts: Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners sought to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD. Petitioners alleged that respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Issue: Whether the President, in the course of peace negotiations may agree to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments. Ruling: Yes. That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. The Presidents power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence. The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to them have, to the credit of their drafters, been partly successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino people are still faced with the reality of an on-going conflict between the Government and the MILF. If the President is to be expected to find means for bringing this conflict to an end and to achieve lasting peace in Mindanao, then she must be given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. Being uniquely vested with the power to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups, the 203 | P a g e

Political Law Review President is in a singular position to know the precise nature of their grievances which, if resolved, may bring an end to hostilities. The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable, but she may not be prevented from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and revision. In particular, Congress would have the option, pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution, to propose the recommended amendments or revision to the people, call a constitutional convention, or submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention. WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, et al. v. EDGARDO ANGARA, et al. G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997, Panganiban, J. Facts: The Senate ratified the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement, which improves the country’s access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. The WTO is said to provide new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. Petitioners, however, assailed the ratification, contending that the WTO agreement impairs the Philippine economic sovereignty, legislative power and the “Filipino First” policy under the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the Senate gravely abused its discretion in ratifying the WTO agreement. Held: No. The Philippine Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. Applying the Doctrine of Incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda – international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. Moreover, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its charter members, it consented to restrict its sovereign rights under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation.”

204 | P a g e

Political Law Review What the Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice. JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 125865, January 28, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. Facts:

Jeffrey Liang is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). He was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal. Thereafter, MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that Liang is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. As a result, MeTc judge dismissed the two criminal cases. However, RTC set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest. Liang elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement. Issue: Whether or not Liang is covered by the immunity under the agreement. Ruling: No. Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB provides that Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity. The immunity mentioned therein 205 | P a g e

Political Law Review is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts was done in "official capacity”. Slandering a person is not covered by the immunity agreement because Philippines laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.

MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO et al v. SCOTT H. SWIFT, in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet et al G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014, Villarama, Jr., J. While the doctrine [of state immunity from suit] appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. Facts: In 2013, the USS Guardian, a US ship, was on its way to Indonesia when it ran aground the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs. Vice Admiral Scott Swift, US 7 th Fleet Commander expressed regret for the incident in a press statement. Three months later, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from the coral reef. The petitioners then filed this petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan against Swift and other officials, claiming that the grounding and salvaging operations caused and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect several provinces in the Visayas and Mindanao. They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident. Only the Philippine respondents filed a comment to the petition. Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or manifestation in the case Ruling: No. Under the Constitution, the State may not be sued without its consent. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.

206 | P a g e

Political Law Review In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

207 | P a g e