Political law Case Digests 1

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION (CHREA) VS. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004, July 21, 2006. (CRUZ) DOCTRINE: A proper party is one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. The 1987 Constitution expressly and unambiguously grants fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman; CHR is not one of them. FACTS: On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of Article XXXIII covers the appropriations of the CHR. On the strength of these special provisions, CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September 1998, adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission. Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of ten additional plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV position, with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, four Security Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and five Process Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners. On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055 providing for the upgrading or raising of salary grade of the several positions in the Commission. To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same resolution, authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from savings under Personnel Services. By

virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998, the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification. Among the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one accounting Clerk II. The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the Department of Budget and Management [DBM] with a request for its approval, but the DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request on the following grounds:  It involved the elevation of the field units from divisions to services.  In the absence of a specific provision of law which may be used as a legal basis to elevate the level of divisions to a bureau or regional office, and the services to offices, such scheme should be denied.  Pursuant to Section 78 of the General Provisions of the General Appropriations Act (GAA) FY 1998, no organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by the President, thus, the creation of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office cannot be given favorable recommendation.  Moreover, as provided under Section 2 of RA No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation Standardization Law, the Department of Budget and Management is directed to establish and administer a unified compensation and position classification system in the government. The Supreme Court ruled in the case of Victorina Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119155, dated January 30, 1996, that DBM the sole power and discretion to administer the compensation and position classification system of the National Government.  Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law. We therefore reiterate our previous stand on the matter. In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum dated 29 March 1999 recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla reclassification. Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner Commission on Human Rights Employees’ Association [CHREA], in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSCCentral office to affirm the recommendation of the CSCRegional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions. The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution dated 16 December 1999, and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. Petitioner CHREA elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR’s fiscal autonomy. Petitioner elevated its case to the Supreme Court and successfully obtained the favorable action in its Decision dated 25 November 2004. Respondent then filed its Motion

for Reconsideration. CONTENTION: ** Supreme Court erred when it ruled that there is no legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. ** Supreme Court erred in stating that the special provision of the RA No. 8522 did not specifically mention CHR as among those offices to which the special provision to formulate and implement organizational structures apply, but merely states its coverage to include constitutional commissions and offices enjoying fiscal autonomy; ** Supreme Court erred when it ruled that the CHR although admittedly a constitutional creation is nonetheless not included in the genus of the offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat. ** Supreme Court erred in deciding to reinstate the ruling dated 29 march 1999 of the civil service commission – national capital region; ** Supreme Court erred in deciding to disallow the Commission On Human Rights Resolution No. A98-047 dated September 04, 1998, Resolution No. A98-055 dated 19 october 1998 and Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998 without the approval of the department of budget and management. ISSUES: 1. WON CHREA has the capacity to sue and/or the proper party 2. WON CHR is one of the constitutional bodies clothed with fiscal autonomy 3. WON approval of DBM is a condition precedent to the approval of the scheme HELD: 1. YES. On petitioner's personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. 13 Here, petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR, protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in the Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHR's upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails eating up the Commission's savings or that portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the employees, including those in the rank and file, are derived. Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance of the CHREA's request to affirm the recommendation of the CSCNational Capital Region Office. CHREA's personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the Court of Appeals when it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process. 2. NO. The 1987 Constitution expressly and unambiguously grants fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman. As already settled in the assailed Decision of this Court, the creation of respondent may be constitutionally mandated, but it is not, in the strict sense, a constitutional commission. The creation of respondent may be constitutionally mandated, but it is not, in the strict sense, a constitutional commission. Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, plainly entitled “Constitutional Commissions,” identifies only the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the

Commission on Audit. The mandate for the creation of the respondent is found in Section 17 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution on Human Rights. Thus, the respondent cannot invoke provisions under Article IX of the 1987 Constitution on constitutional commissions for its benefit. It must be able to present constitutional and/or statutory basis particularly pertaining to it to support its claim of fiscal autonomy. The 1987 Constitution extends to respondent a certain degree of fiscal autonomy through the privilege of having its approved annual appropriations released automatically and regularly. However, it withholds from respondent fiscal autonomy, in its broad or extensive sense, as granted to the Judiciary, constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman. The 1987 Constitution recognizes the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary in Article VIII, Section 3. Constitutional commissions are granted fiscal autonomy by the 1987 Constitution in Article IX, Part A, Section 5, a provision applied in common to all constitutional commissions. The Office of the Ombudsman enjoys fiscal autonomy by virtue of Article XI, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution. Each of the afore-quoted provisions consists of two sentences stating that: (1) The government entity shall enjoy fiscal autonomy; and (2) its approved annual appropriation shall be automatically and regularly released. The respondent anchors its claim to fiscal autonomy on the fourth paragraph of Article XIII, Section 17, which provides that the approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and regularly released. As compared to Article VIII, Section 3; Article IX, Part A, Section 5; and Article XI, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution on the Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman, respectively, Article XIII, Section 17(4) on the Commission of Human Rights (CHR) evidently does not contain the first sentence on the express grant of

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION fiscal autonomy, and reproduces only the second sentence on the automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations. Fiscal Autonomy defined. It means independence or freedom regarding financial matters from outside control and is characterized by self direction or self determination. It does not mean mere automatic and regular release of approved appropriations to agencies vested with such power in a very real sense, the fiscal autonomy contemplated in the constitution is enjoyed even before and, with more reasons, after the release of the appropriations. Fiscal autonomy encompasses, among others, budget preparation and implementation, flexibility in fund utilization of approved appropriations, use of savings and disposition of receipts. This Court concludes that the 1987 Constitution extends to respondent a certain degree of fiscal autonomy through the privilege of having its approved annual appropriations released automatically and regularly. However, it withholds from respondent fiscal autonomy, in its broad or extensive sense, as granted to the Judiciary, constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman. Operative herein is the rule of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, wherein the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature (or in this case, the ConCom) would not have made specific enumerations in a statute (or the Constitution) had the intention not been to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. 3. YES. This Court staunchly holds that as prescinding from the legal and jurisprudential yardsticks discussed in length in the assailed Decision, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in government.

Regardless of whether or not respondent enjoys fiscal autonomy, this Court shares the stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law. The Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision of this Court dated 25 November 2004 is hereby MODIFIED, declaring the respondent CHR as a constitutional body enjoying limited fiscal autonomy, in the sense that it is entitled to the automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations; nonetheless, it is still required to conform to the Salary Standardization Law. Accordingly, its entire reclassification scheme remains subject to the approval of the DBM. GALICIO VS. AQUINO ET AL. G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012. DOCTRINE: Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. A moot case is “one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. EO 7 is constitutional. The question as to constitutionality of EO 7 serves no useful purpose since such issue is moot in its face in light of the enactment of R.A. No. 10149. FACTS: The petitioner is a Filipino citizen and an employee of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth). He is currently holding the position of Court Attorney IV and is assigned at the PhilHealth Regional Office CARAGA.

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION On July 26, 2010, Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation Address the alleged excessive allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers and Members of the Board of Directors of the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System – a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) which has been unable to meet its standing obligations. Subsequently, the Senate of the Philippines (Senate) conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported excessive salaries, allowances, and other benefits of GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs). Based on its findings that “officials and governing boards of various [GOCCs] and [GFIs] x x x have been granting themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other benefits [as well as other] irregular and abusive practices,” the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17 “urging the President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the governing boards of [GOCCs] and [GFIs]. Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, entitled “Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification System in the [GOCCs] and [GFIs], and for Other Purposes.” EO 7 provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs. It ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President, and (2) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010. It took effect on September 25, 2010 and precluded the Board of Directors, Trustees and/or Officers of GOCCs from granting and releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the board of directors, and from increasing salary rates of

and granting new or additional benefits and allowances to their employees. CONTENTIONS: **The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO 7, which was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He contended that: 1. EO 7 is null and void for lack of legal basis. PD 985 is not applicable as its basis because the GOCCs were subsequently granted the power to fix compensation long after such power has been revoked by PD 1597 and RA 6758. GOCCs do not need to have its compensation plans, rates and policies reviewed by the DBM and approved by the President because PD 1597 requires only the GOCCs to report to the President their plans and rates but the same does not give the President the power of control over the fiscal power of the GOCCs. JR No. 4, Series of 2009 is not applicable as legal basis because it had not ripened into law. 2. EO 7 is invalid for divesting the Board of Directors of the GOCCs of their power to fix the compensation, a power which is a legislative grant and which could not be revoked or modified by an executive fiat. 3. EO 7 is by substance a law which is a derogation of congressional prerogative and is therefore unconstitutional. 4. The acts of suspending and imposing moratorium are ultra vires acts because JR No. 4 does not expressly authorize the President to exercise such powers. 5. EO 7 is an invalid issuance because it has no sufficient standards and is therefore arbitrary, unreasonable and a violaton of substantive due process. 6. EO 7 involves the determination and discretion as to what the law shall be and is therefore invalid for its usurpation of legislative power. 7. Consistent with the decision of the SC in Pimentel vs

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION Aguirre Case, mandatory.

EO

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HELD: 1. NO. Petitioner lacks locus standi.

**As defense of respondents, the following are procedural defects as grounds for the dismissal of the petition: 1. the petitioner lacks locus standi; 2. the petitioner failed to attach a board resolution or secretary’s certificate authorizing him to question EO 7 in behalf of PhilHealth; 3. the petitioner’s signature does not indicate his PTR Number, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance Number and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Number; 4. the jurat of the Verification and Certification of NonForum Shopping failed to indicate a valid identification card as provided under A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC; 5. the President should be dropped as a party respondent as he is immune from suit; and 6. certiorari is not applicable to this case. 7. They claim that the President exercises control over the governing boards of the GOCCs and GFIs; thus, he can fix their compensation packages. In addition, EO 7 was issued in accordance with law for the purpose of controlling the grant of excessive salaries, allowances, incentives and other benefits to GOCC and GFI employees. They also advocate the validity of Joint Resolution (J.R.) No. 4, which they point to as the authority for issuing EO 7. Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10149,[15] otherwise known as the “GOCC Governance Act of 2011.” Section 11 of RA 10149 expressly authorizes the President to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not petitioner has locus standi. 2. Whether or not EO 7 is valid.

In the present case, we are not convinced that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7. We note that while the petition raises vital constitutional and statutory questions concerning the power of the President to fix the compensation packages of GOCCs and GFIs with possible implications on their officials and employees, the same cannot “infuse” or give the petitioner locus standi under the transcendental importance or paramount public interest doctrine. Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” This requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies. Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to “raise a constitutional question” when (1) he can show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest." To support his claim that he has locus standi to file the present petition, the petitioner contends that as an employee of PhilHealth, he “stands to be prejudiced by [EO] 7, which suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of salary increases or new or increased benefits to officers and employees of GOCC[s] and x x x curtail[s] the prerogative of those officers who are to fix and determine his compensation.” The petitioner also claims that he has standing as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued and implemented. The respondents meanwhile argue that the petitioner is not a real party-in-interest since future increases in salaries and other benefits are merely contingent events or expectancies. The petitioner, too, is not asserting a public right for which he is entitled to seek judicial protection. It has been held that as to the element of injury, such aspect is not something that just anybody with some grievance or pain may assert. It has to be direct and substantial to make it worth the court’s time, as well as the effort of inquiry into the constitutionality of the acts of another department of government. If the asserted injury is more imagined than real, or is merely superficial and insubstantial, then the courts may end up being importuned to decide a matter that does not really justify such an excursion into constitutional adjudication. The rationale for this constitutional requirement

of locus standi is by no means trifle. Not only does it assure the vigorous adversary presentation of the case; more importantly, it must suffice to warrant the Judiciary’s overruling the determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of government, such as the President, and the clear approval by Congress, in this case. Indeed, the rationale goes to the very essence of representative democracies. Since the petitioner has failed to demonstrate a material and personal interest in the issue in dispute, he cannot also be considered to have filed the present case as a representative of PhilHealth. In this regard, we cannot ignore or excuse the blatant failure of the petitioner to provide a Board Resolution or a Secretary’s Certificate from PhilHealth to act as its representative. 2. YES. The issue is rendered moot. The petition was dismissed for its patent formal and procedural infirmities and for having been mooted by subsequent events. With the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, the President is now authorized to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs. The new law amended R.A. No. 7875 and other laws that enabled certain GOCCs and GFIs to fix their own compensation frameworks; the law now authorizes the President to fix the compensation and position classification system for all GOCCs and GFIs, as well as other entities covered by the law. This means that, the President can now reissue an EO containing these same provisions without any legal constraints. Congress, thru R.A. No. 10149, has expressly empowered the President to establish the compensation systems of GOCCs and GFIs. For the Court to still rule upon the supposed unconstitutionality of EO 7 will merely be an academic exercise The petition has been mooted by supervening events. Because of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed out that the present case has already been rendered moot by

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION these supervening events: (1) the lapse on December 31, 2010 of Section 10 of EO 7 that suspended the allowances and bonuses of the directors and trustees of GOCCs and GFIs; and (2) the enactment of R.A. No. 10149 amending the provisions in the charters of GOCCs and GFIs empowering their board of directors/trustees to determine their own compensation system, in favor of the grant of authority to the President to perform this act.

entertain a petition touching on an issue that has become moot because x x x there would [be] no longer x x x a ‘flesh and blood’ case for the Court to resolve.”

With the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, the President is now authorized to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.

DOCTRINE: In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered selfexecuting rather than non-self-executing. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing.

As may be gleaned from these provisions, the new law amended R.A. No. 7875 and other laws that enabled certain GOCCs and GFIs to fix their own compensation frameworks; the law now authorizes the President to fix the compensation and position classification system for all GOCCs and GFIs, as well as other entities covered by the law. This means that, the President can now reissue an EO containing these same provisions without any legal constraints. A moot case is “one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.” “[A]n action is considered ‘moot’ when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead[,] or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties x x x. Simply stated, there is nothing for the x x x court to resolve as [its] determination x x x has been overtaken by subsequent events.” This is the present situation here. Any further discussion of the constitutionality of EO 7 serves no useful purpose since such issue is moot in its face in light of the enactment of R.A. No. 10149. In the words of the eminent constitutional law expert, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., “the Court normally [will not]

Petition was DISMISSED. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS ET AL. G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997

Manila Hotel is part of our national patrimony. National patrimony refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. FACTS: Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated December 8, 1986, GSIS decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: (1.) Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and (2.) Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad which respondent GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm. CONTENTION: **Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. Since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.

Since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. **Respondents contended that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s). Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be existing laws “to lay down conditions under which business may be done.” Granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. While petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State. Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51%

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the provisions of the constitution is self-executing 2. Whether or not the shares of Manila Hotel is part of the national national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution. 3. Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, mandated to implement section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution 4. Whether or not the Filipino First policy should be applied HELD: 1. YES. The prevailing view is that in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing unless the contrary is clearly intended. A provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. A constitutional provision

is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is nonself-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a selfexecuting provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION constitutional enforceable.

provision

is

not,

by

itself,

fully

Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. 2. YES. As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission explained (1) The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. (2) Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930’s. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality. (3) For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. NOTE: The term “qualified Filipinos” simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and inimical to the common good. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over the former.” Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel. 3. YES. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a “state action.” When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of the State. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. In this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons

distinct from the government are considered “state action” covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a “public function;” (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of “state action.” Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command. 4. YES. The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not selfexecuting but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution. In the present case, it should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties. GSIS was directed to cease and desist from selling the shares of Manila Hotel Corporation and to accept the matching bid of petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation to purchase the subject shares. KILOSBAYAN ET AL. VS. GUINGONA ET AL. G.R. No. 113375 May 5, 1994 GATACELO DOCTRINE: A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. FACTS: PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. After learning of the same, the Berjaya Group Berhad, a multinational company and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia, became interested to

offer its services and resources to PCSO. As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad organized with some Filipino investors a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which was intended to be the medium through which the technical and management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO. Considering the Constitution’s citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that the Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors. Office of the President announced that it had given the respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate the country's online lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract would be submitted thereafter. KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to Presidential Ramos strongly opposing the setting up to the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. Nevertheless, an agreement denominated as "Contract of Lease" was finally executed by respondent PCSO and respondent PGMC. The President, per the press statement issued by the Office of the President, approved it on 20 December 1993. KILOSBAYAN, a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal, along with Senators Webb and Tañada and Representative Joker Arroyo acting in their capacities as members of Congress and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippines, want to nullify the said contract. They claim that the Office of the President, acting through Executive Secretary Guingona and/or Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Corona, and the PCSO gravely abused their discretion and/or functions tantamount to lack of jurisdiction and/or authority in respectively. Moreover, they alleged that PCSO is prohibited from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity" pursuant to its

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION charter, a Congressional franchise is required before any person may be allowed to establish and operate said telecommunications system, among others. Meanwhile, PGMC asserts that it is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work, (i.e., the building and maintenance of a lottery system to be used by PCSO in the operation of its lottery franchise) and not a co-operator of the lottery franchise with PCSO, nor is PCSO sharing its franchise, 'in collaboration, association or joint venture' with PGMC; and that the petitioners do not appear to have the legal standing or real interest in the subject contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought. Guingona, Corona, and PCSO assert similar counter-arguments. ISSUE: WON petitioners have locus standi. HELD: Yes. A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had declared that it is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained, or that it enjoys an open discretion to entertain the same or not. Several cases were cited to bolster this claim, and one of those was from Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform. It declared: With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an

immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised. In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were invoking only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objective that they were not proper parties and ruled that the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. We have since then applied this exception in many other cases. Likewise, SC finds the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral wellbeing of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of. RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED CHIEF/ ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT A.M. NO. 11-7-10-SC JULY 31, 2012 DOCTRINE: Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s own affairs. FACTS: Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA) found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court. The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc in A.M. No. 03-12-01, when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98569-A4. Atty. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property since these were issued in 1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous instances involving two retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices, the COA upheld the in-house appraisal of government property using the formula found in the CFAG guidelines. More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources. ISSUE: WON COA’s interference, in this case, violates the judiciary’s

autonomy. HELD: Yes. The COA’s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court’s fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters. The concept of the independence of the three branches of government extends from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates; lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others. Thus, judicial independence can be “broken down into two distinct concepts: decisional independence and institutional independence.” Decisional independence “refers to a judge’s ability to render decisions free from political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law.”On the other hand, institutional independence “describes the separation of the judicial branch from the executive and legislative branches of government.” While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first instance is unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is to perform its primary function of adjudication, it must be able to command adequate resources for that purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel the exercise of) legislative power over the national purse (which at first blush appears to

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION be a violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion of legislative autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial independence and is expressly provided for by the Constitution through the grant of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII.

availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s own affairs.

The Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its head, and of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative control and supervision of the courts and its personnel. As the Court En Banc’s Resolution reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary serves as the basis in allowing the sale of the Judiciary’s properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme Court and the appellate courts. The Judiciary has full flexibility to allocate and utilize (its) resources with the wisdom and dispatch that (its) needs require.

SANIDAD VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-44640 OCTOBER 12, 1976

By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward long and faithful service, the sale to the retired Justices of specifically designated properties that they used during their incumbency has been recognized both as a privilege and a benefit. This has become an established practice within the Judiciary that even the COA has previously recognized. The En Banc Resolution also deems the grant of the privilege as a form of additional retirement benefit that the Court can grant its officials and employees in the exercise of its power of administrative supervision. Under this administrative authority, the Court has the power to administer the Judiciary’s internal affairs, and this includes the authority to handle and manage the retirement applications and entitlements of its personnel as provided by law and by its own grants. In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Court’s exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and

DOCTRINE: The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. FACTS: President Marcos issued PD. No. 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his present powers. Thereafter, the President issued PD No. 1031, amending PD No. 991, by providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Soon, the President issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The questions ask, to wit: (1) Do you want martial law to be continued? (2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION And some of the proposed amendments were: 1) In lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa shall be established; 2) Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the members thereof; 3) The incumbent President shall convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall have been elected. The incumbent President shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions...; and among others. Pablo and Pablito Sanidad, father and son, commenced a suit for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. On the other hand, the Solicitor General principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization. On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of

the Constitution.3 Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on October 5, 1976 by RAUL M. GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming ReferendumPlebiscite of October 16. These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial Law, the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution; a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity; to lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above. We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit. Issues: 1. WON Pablo and Pablito Sanidad have locus standi. 2. WON the amendment process is justiciable. 3. WON President Marcos can amendments to the Constitution.

propose

Held: 1. Yes. Pablo and Pablito Sanidad possess locus standi. It is now an ancient rule that Presidential Decrees may be contested by one who will sustain direct injuries as

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION a result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries all appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes. Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. The interest of the petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not. For the present case, We deem it sound to exercise that discretion affirmatively so that the authority upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be inquired into.

1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law may shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authorities to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.

2. Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15, Transitory provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree

What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen [empty threat]. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not. 3. Yes. There are two periods contemplated in the

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normally, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of threefourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The power then to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-avis his assumption of that body's legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President

has converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments without constitutional infractions. For the President to shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would leave the governmental machineries at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a destructive vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis government "to end the crisis and restore normal times." In these parlous times, that Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete forms the constant voices of the people reigns supreme. After all, constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, are mere agents of the people. LAMP vs. SEC. OF DBM G.R. No. 164987 April 24, 2012 LAZARO DOCTRINE: In order for a court to exercise the power of judicial review, the four requisites must be present. FACTS: The GAA of 2004 provides, among others, the use and release of priority development assistance fund in the amount of ₱8,327,000,000.00. According to LAMP (LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY), the General Appropriations Act of 2004 (GAA) is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF. “In previous GAAs, said allocation and identification of projects were the main features of the ‘pork barrel’ system technically known as Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). Nothing of the sort is now seen in the present law (R.A. No. 9206 of CY 2004). “The omission of the PDAF provision to specify sums as ‘allocations’ to individual Members of Congress is a ‘casus omissus’ signifying an omission intentionally made by Congress that this Court is forbidden to supply.” Hence, LAMP is of the conclusion that “the pork barrel has become legally defunct under the present state of GAA 2004.” Respondents contend that the petition miserably lacks legal and factual grounds. Without probative value, media reports cited by the petitioner deserve scant consideration especially the accusation that corrupt legislators have allegedly proposed cuts or slashes from their pork barrel. Hence, the Court should decline the petitioner’s plea to take judicial notice of the supposed iniquity of PDAF because there is no concrete proof that PDAF, in the guise of “pork barrel,” is a source of “dirty money” for unscrupulous lawmakers and other officials who tend to misuse their allocations. ISSUE: WON the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case. RULING: Yes. Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be

raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. According to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation and release of funds to the Members of Congress and the authority given to them to propose and select projects is the core of the law’s flawed execution resulting in a serious constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of public funds. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this. A finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords “ripeness” to the present controversy. Anent locus standi, “the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person, and could be suing as a “stranger,” or as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.” Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION unconstitutional law. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue. Taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition. (ADDITIONAL INFO) The petition was dismissed by the court. The petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. Although the possibility of this unscrupulous practice cannot be entirely discounted, surmises and conjectures are not sufficient bases for the Court to strike down the practice for being offensive to the Constitution. Moreover, the authority granted the Members of Congress to propose and select projects was already upheld in Philconsa case. This remains as valid case law. The Court sees no need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

DOCTRINE: RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. FACTS: Private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition). The Delfin Petition alleged, among others, that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the following proposition: “DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?” After complying with the order of the COMELEC, the petition was set for hearing. After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. The petitioners herein (Santiago, Padilla, Ongpin) filed a special civil action for prohibition for the ff. reasons: (1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III; (3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This indicates that the Act

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication; (4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 adopted to govern "the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law; (5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative; (6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose. ISSUE: WON RA 6735 is sufficient insofar as amendments to the Constitution is concerned.

initiative

on

RULING: No. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides for the exercise of the right of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative.The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. This provision is not self-executory. The Court agrees that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. However, it is not in full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right.” First, contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads: Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly

propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied). The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." Second, unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Third, while the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on amendments to the Constitution. As to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition. There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. 5 SALONGA vs. PAÑO 134 SCRA 438 G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985 DOCTRINE: The Court exercised the power of judicial review even if the issue had become moot and academic since it has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. FACTS: A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. One

Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killed himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building in Manila. Found in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were several pictures taken sometime in May, 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures together with other guests, including Lovely. Mr. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely were charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property. On September 20, 1980, the President's anniversary television radio press conference was broadcast. The younger brother of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was presented during the conference. In his interview, Romeo stated that he had driven his elder brother, Victor, to the petitioner's house in Greenhills on two occasions. The first time was on August 20, 1980. Romeo stated that Victor did not bring any bag with him on that day when he went to the petitioner's residence and did not carry a bag when he left. The second time was in the afternoon of August 31, 1980 when he brought Victor only to the gate of the petitioner's house. Romeo did not enter the petitioner's residence. Neither did he return that day to pick up his brother. The next day, newspapers came out with almost Identical headlines stating in effect that petitioner had been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila. Arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. One of them was herein petitioner. Elements of the military went to the hospital room of the petitioner at the Manila Medical Center where he was confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest. The petitioner was transferred against his objections from his hospital arrest to an isolation room without windows in an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio, Makati. The petitioner states that he was not informed why

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION he was transferred and detained, nor was he ever investigated or questioned by any military or civil authority. Subsequently, the petitioner was released for humanitarian reasons from military custody and placed "under house arrest in the custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga" still without the benefit of any investigation or charges. The counsel for petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges against petitioner for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. The respondent judge denied the motion. He issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against forty (40) people, including herein petitioner. The resolutions of the respondent judge are now the subject of the petition. It is the contention of the petitioner that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. ISSUE: WON the Court in this case may still exercise the power of judicial review even if the issue has become moot and academic. RULING: Yes. This case falls under the exception that the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court's judgment had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution. We were constrained by this action of the prosecution and

the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Court's crowded agenda for further deliberations. Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution. Recent developments in this case serve to focus attention on a not too well known aspect of the Supreme Court's functions. The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions. The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. In this case, the respondents agree with the Court’s earlier finding that the prosecution evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie case against the petitioner, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of any subversive organization. They have taken the initiative of dropping the charges against the petitioner. The Court reiterates the rule, however, that this Court will not validate the filing of an information based on the kind of evidence against the petitioner found in the records. TANADA VS ANGARA G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997. MUÑEZ DOCTRINE:

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The duty to adjudicate remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. FACTS: This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement. On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry, Rizalino Navarro, signed the Final Act binding the Philippine Government to submit to its respective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreements to seek approval for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the WTO Agreement. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO. Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19, Article II, providing for the development of a self reliant and

independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII, providing for the “Filipino first” policy. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention. ISSUE/S: (1) WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION INVOLVES A POLITICAL QUESTION. (2) WHETHER OR NOT THE WTO AGREEMENT CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION. HELD: (1) NO. The petition raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The duty to adjudicate remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. In deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the government’s economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty “to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes. (2) NO. Article II of the Constitution, “declaration of principles and state policies”, are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.” Broad constitutional principles need legislative enactments to implement them. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and to the legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the article, the available remedy was not judicial but political. On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof. With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos “in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony” and in the use of “Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods”; (2) by mandating the State to “adopt measures that help make them competitive; and (3) by requiring the State to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.” It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et al., this Court held that “Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.” However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to “the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony” and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here whether, as a rule, there are

enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are. The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. NO. 159085 February 3, 2004 MUÑEZ DOCTRINE: Only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, §5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decision making in the courts from decisionmaking in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party. Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief.

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued. In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.

Issues: (1) WON Petitioners have legal standing. (2) Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional? Held: (1) No. Petitioners Sanlakas and PM assert that: a. As a basic principle of the organizations and as an important plank in their programs, petitioners are committed to assert, defend, protect, uphold, and promote the rights, interests, and welfare of the people, especially the poor and marginalized classes and sectors of Philippine society. Petitioners are committed to defend and assert human rights, including political and civil rights, of the citizens. b. Members of the petitioner organizations resort to mass actions and mobilizations in the exercise of their Constitutional rights to peaceably assemble and their freedom of speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly ventilate their grievances and legitimate demands and to mobilize public opinion to support the same. Even assuming that petitioners are "people's organizations," this status would not vest them with the requisite personality to question the validity of the presidential issuances Only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, §5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decisionmaking in the courts from decisionmaking in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party. That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and citizens does not necessarily endow them with standing. A

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. No such illegal disbursement is alleged. On the other hand, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Again, no such injury is alleged in this case. (2) Yes. The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.

The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present. DAVID VS. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO G.R. NO. 171396 May 3, 2006 MUÑEZ DOCTRINE: The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review Facts: PGMA, declaring that Communist insurgents as well as political opponents have conspired in order to bring down her government, issued Proclamation 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress lawless violence and rebellion and enforce obedience to laws and decrees. She issued General Order 5 to implement the said PP, instructing the armed forces to carry out the necessary measures to prevent and suppress terrorism and violence. One week later, she issued PP 1021 lifting the declaration of the state of national emergency. Seven suits were filed contesting the validity of the said proclamations. Issues: 1) Are PP 1017 and GO 5 unconstitutional? 2) Did the issuance of PP 1021 render PP1017 and GO 5 moot and academic?

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION Held: 1) Partly. While the Constitution grants the President the “take care” power under §17, Art. VII, which provides that “The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed”, this does not grant the President the authority to make decrees, which is essentially a legislative function. Thus, the assailed PP is PARTLY CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it calls out the Armed Forces, and PARTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it allows the President to promulgate decrees, thereby encroaching on a legislative function. 2) A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.

the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review. An otherwise "moot" case may still be decided "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance." The present case falls right within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice. Additional Info: By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1) the cases involve constitutional issues;

The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public’s interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION the "liberality doctrine" on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the "transcendental importance" doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the "PP 1017 cases." FORTUN VS MACAPAGAL ARROYO GR NO. 190293 MARCH 20, 2012 MURILLO DOCTRINE: Impose martial law for flimsy reasons and revoke the same before the Congress acts on it. You’ll be off the hook. Joke. Kidding aside, the existence of an actual case/controversy is an essential requisite of judicial review. The issues raised must not be moot and academic.

Liberation Front. Two days later (December 6, 2009), President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which required her, within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to submit to that body a report of her action. On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the validity of the President’s action. However, two days later (December 12) before Congress could even act on the issue, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. Petitioners Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun and the other petitioners in G.R. 190293, 190294, 190301,190302, 190307, 190356, and 190380 brought the present actions to still challenge the constitutionality of President Arroyo’s Proclamation 1959 affecting Maguindanao. ISSUE:

FACTS: These cases are about the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus in 2009 in a province in Mindanao which were withdrawn after just eight days. On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, allegedly led by the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In response to this, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946 on November 24, declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless violence. On December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic

W/N the courts can still pass upon the constitutionality of the Presidential Proclamation HELD: NO. Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that removed any justiciable controversy. The court dismissed the consolidated petitions on the ground that the same have become moot and academic.

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION P.S. There’s a lengthy dissenting opinion from Justice Antonio Carpio, which seems, personally, to be more sound and logical. Basically, he argued that the case must not be considered moot and academic just because the President already lifted the proclamation before the Congress can even have the chance to act on it. And I quote: “I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petitions as moot. I find Proclamation No. 1959 unconstitutional for lack of factual basis as required in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ. Moreover, given the transcendental importance of the issues raised in the present petitions, the Court may relax the standing requirement and allow a suit to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In David v. Arroyo, this Court held that the "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case. Courts are not prevented from deciding cases, otherwise moot and academic, if (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the situation is of exceptional character and of paramount public interest; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Failing to determine the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1959 by dismissing the cases on the ground of mootness sets a very dangerous precedent to the leaders of this country that they could easily impose martial law or suspend the writ without any factual or legal basis at all, and before this Court could review such declaration, they would simply lift the same and escape possible judicial rebuke.”

BAYAN VS SECRETARY ERMITA GR NO. 169838 APRIL 25, 2006 DOCTRINE: In a judicial review, a proper party is one who has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining injury as a result of the act/law complained of. FACTS: The case concerns the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880, which regulates the rights of people to peaceably assemble and organize. The first petitioners (Bayan, et al.) allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing BP 880. The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners (Jess del Prado, et al.) who allege that they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. The third group (Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al.) alleges that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their individual members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by BP 880 and the policy of "Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to implement it. All petitioners assail BP 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced. Respondents, on the other hand, argue that petitioners have no standing because they have not presented any evidence that they had been "injured, arrested or detained because of BP 880 and the CPR," and that "those arrested stand to be charged with violating BP 880 and other offenses." ISSUE:

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION W/N petitioners have legal standing to file the case in court HELD: YES. Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nation’s streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents, on the other hand, have challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit. the petitions are granted in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are directed to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of BP 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. The petitions are dismissed in all other respects, and the constitutionality of BP 880 is sustained. ROQUE VS COMELEC GR NO. 188456 SEPTEMBER 10, 2009 DOCTRINE: The existence of an actual case or controversy is essential for judicial review. Mere speculations and conjectures cannot be the basis of a sound judgment. FACTS: This case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners of the September 10, 2009 ruling of the Supreme Court, denying the petition of H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al. for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to nullify the contractaward of the 2010 Election Automation Project to the joint venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic).

Petitioners aver that the contract was made in violation of the Constitution, statutes, and jurisprudence. Intervening petitioner also interposed a similar motion, but only to pray that the Board of Election Inspectors be ordered to manually count the ballots after the printing and electronic transmission of the election returns. Petitioners seek a reconsideration of the September 10, 2009 Decision on many issues or grounds, one of which is: 1. The Comelec’s public pronouncements show that there is a "high probability" that there will be failure of automated elections; X X X Both public and private respondents, upon the other hand, insist that petitioners’ motion for reconsideration should be held devoid of merit, because the motion, for the most part, either advances issues or theories not raised in the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, and argues along speculative and conjectural lines. ISSUE: W/N the Court reconsideration

should

grant

the

said

motion

for

HELD: NO. Petitioners’ threshold argument delves on possibilities, on matters that may or may not occur. The conjectural and speculative nature of the first issue raised is reflected in the very manner of its formulation and by statements, such as "the public pronouncements of public respondent COMELEC x x x clearly show that there is a high probability that there will be automated failure of elections"; "there is a high probability that the use of PCOS machines in the May 2010 elections will result in failure of elections"; "the unaddressed logistical nightmares—and the lack of contingency plans that should have been crafted as a result of a pilot test—make an automated failure of elections very probable"; and "COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it signed x x x the

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION contract for full automation x x x despite the likelihood of a failure of elections." Speculations and conjectures are not equivalent to proof; they have little, if any, probative value and, surely, cannot be the basis of a sound judgment. While a motion for reconsideration may tend to dwell on issues already resolved in the decision sought to be reconsidered—and this should not be an obstacle for a reconsideration—the hard reality is that petitioners have failed to raise matters substantially plausible or compellingly persuasive to warrant the desired course of action. Moving still to another issue, petitioners claim that "there are very strong indications that Private Respondents will not be able to provide for telecommunication facilities for areas without these facilities." This argument, being again highly speculative, is without evidentiary value and hardly provides a ground for the Court to nullify the automation contract. Surely, a possible breach of a contractual stipulation is not a legal reason to prematurely rescind, much less annul, the contract. Motion for reconsideration was, therefore, denied. GONZALES III VS OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT GR NO. 196231-32 SEPTEMBER 4, 2012 DOCTRINE: Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The laws have to be interpreted as a whole. Ration legis et anima. The laws have to be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers. FACTS: G.R. No. 196231: The case deals with the Manila hostage crisis committed by Manila Police District Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza - foreigners and tourists as his victims. Apparently, the hostage drama was ignited by Mendoza’s frustration regarding the case filed against him which warranted his removal from office. Mendoza has a pending

motion for reconsideration before Deputy Ombudsman Gozales III (petitioner) which dragged on for nine months (without any justifiable reason for the long delay). This was seen by the IIRC as one of the main reasons why Mendoza became motivated to hostage innocent tourists. In a way, Gonzales’ negligence was blamed. Due to this, the Office of the President recommended his removal from office as Deputy Ombudsman. G.R. No. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia, and several unknown persons, with Plunder and Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. At the conclusion of these public hearings, the Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3, recommending to the President the dismissal of petitioner from the service and the filing of appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate government office for having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act. The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232 primarily seek to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman. They aver that only the Ombudsman has the power to impose sanctions on them. ISSUE: W/N the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionallycreated Office of the Ombudsman

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION HELD: YES. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a DeputyOmbudsman and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by impeachment such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in

the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities. By granting express statutorypower to the President to removea Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap inthe law. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is, thus, denied.

CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015