Poli Law Digests Compiled 2012-2015 by Dean Candelaria.pdf

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS

BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

POLITICAL LAW Prepared by: Dean Sedfrey Candelaria and students of Ateneo de Manila University

Political Law Digests May 2012- May 2015

Navia v. Pardico ............................................................................................................................. .............. 2 Philcomsat Holdings Corporation v. Senate Of The Republic Of The Philippines ..................................... 3 Pimentel, Jr. v. Ochoa .................................................................................................................................. 4 Jaloslos v. Comelec ............................................................................................................................. ......... 5 Gonzales v. Ochoa ....................................................................................................................................... 6 Funa v. Agr a ............................................................................................................................. .................... 7 Atong Paglaum v. Comelec ........................................................................................................................ . 8 Alliance For Nationalism And Democracy v. Commission On Elections................................................. 10 Abang Lingkod Party-List (Abang Lingkod) v. Commission On Elections.............................................. 12 Belgica v. Ochoa ....................................................................................................................................... . 13 Disini v. Secretary Of Justice.................................................................................................................... . 16 Imbong v. Ocho a ............................................................................................................................. ........... 18 Go v. Republic ........................................................................................................................................... 20 Jardeleza v. Sereno ............................................................................................................................. ........ 22 Gma Network v. Comele c......................................................................................................................... . 24 Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College et al. ....................................................................................................... 25 Ejercito v. Comelec ............................................................................................................................. ....... 27 Goh v. Bayron ............................................................................................................................. ............... 29 Cerafica v. Comelec ................................................................................................................................... 30 The Diocese Of Bacolod v. Comelec ......................................................................................................... 31 Risos-Vidal v. Comelec ............................................................................................................................ . 33 Araullo v. Aquino ...................................................................................................................................... 35 Cudia v. PMA ............................................................................................................................. ............... 37 Bishop Broderick Pabillo v. Comelec ........................................................................................................ 39 Resident Marine Mammals Of The Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Reyes (DOE) ............................ 41

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NAVIA V. PARDICO [GR. No. 184467; June 19, 2012]

Facts: • A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore (“Lolita”) • The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolita’s son, Enrique Lapore (“Bong”), and Benhur Pardico (“Ben”), who were then both staying in her house. • When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. • One of them immediately asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong. • Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision. • Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision. • The Lapore’s and the side of Navia had different versions of what transpired after Bong and Ben were taken to the security department. o However, Ben disappeared and they did not know where he was.

o Thus, City. Virginia, Ben’s wife, filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo before the RTC of Malolos • The amparo court issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of amparo and the production of the body of Ben before it.

Issue/s: WON the Court erred in ruling that the Pardicos are entitled to the privilege of the writ of amparo?

Held: Virginia Pardico’s Writ of Amparo is defective and must be dismissed. Ben’s disappreance does not fall within the ambit of Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC. It is clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case the burden of proof proving substantial evidence theenough. indispensable elementtoofestablish government In anhas amparo petition, of by disappearance alone is not It is essential that participation. such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State participation is not present in this case. Under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation.

PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION V. SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES [GR. No. 180308; June 19, 2012]

Facts: •The Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), a government- sequestered organization in which the Republic of the Philippines holds a 35% interest in shares of stocks. • For the period from 1986 to 1996, the government, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), regularly received cash dividends from POTC.

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o In 1998, however, POTC suffered its first loss. o Similarly, in 2004, PHC sustained a P7-million loss attributable to its huge operating expenses. By 2005, PHC’s operating expenses had ballooned tremendously. o Likewise, several PHC board members established Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), a wholly-owned PHC subsidiary to which PHC funds had been allegedly advanced without the appropriate accountability reports given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT. • In view of the losses that the government continued to incur and in order to protect its interests in POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, during the Second Regular Session of the Congress, introduced Proposed Senate Resolution (PSR) No. 455 directing the conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the mismanagement committed by their respective board of directors. • Respondents, Senate Committees, submitted the assailed Committee Report No. 312, where it noted the need to examine the role of the PCGG in the management of POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC. • After due proceedings, the respondents Senate Committees found overwhelming mismanagement by the PCGG and its nominees over POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, and that PCGG was negligent in performing its mandate to preserve the government's interests in the said corporations. • Committee Report No. 312 recommended the privatization and transfer of the jurisdiction over the shares of the government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the Privatization Management Office (PMO) under the Department of Finance (DOF) and the replacement of government nominees as directors of POTC and PHILCOMSAT.

Issue/s: WON Committee Resolution No. 312 should be nullified, having proposed no piece of legislation and having been hastily approved by the respondent Senate? Held: Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution provides the Senate or the House of Representative’s power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. The respondents Senate Committees’ power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has been passed upon and upheld in the consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio, which cited Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution. The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. The Senate Committees cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the respondent Senate be faulted for doing so on the very same day that the assailed resolution was submitted. The wide latitude given to Congress with respect to these legislative inquiries has long been settled.

PIMENTEL, JR. V. OCHOA [GR. No. 195770; July 17, 2012]

Facts: • In 2007, the DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy with the poorest of the poor as target beneficiaries. • It was pre-pilot tested in various municipalities upon the release of the amount of P50 Million Pesos under a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) issued by the Department of Budget and Management. • After an assessment on the appropriate assistance package, a household beneficiary could receive from the government an annual subsidy for its basic needs up to an amount of P15,000.00. • Under A.O. No. 16, s. 2008, the DSWD also institutionalized a coordinated inter-agency network among the Department of Education (DepEd), Department of Health (DOH), Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) and the local government

units (LGUs), identifying specific roles an d functions in order to ensure effective and efficient implementation of the CCTP, the government intervention scheme.

Issue/s: WON the P21 billion CCTP budget allocation under the DSWD in the GAA violates Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 3 of the LGC by providing for the recentralization of the national government in the delivery of basic services already devolved to the LGUs.

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Held: LGUs are charged to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, the provision of the law also provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationallyfunded projects, facilities, programs and services. The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has ben provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. The national government is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national development programs especially where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.

JALOSLOS V. COMELEC [GR. No. 192474; June 26, 2012]

Facts: • In May 2007, Romeo Jalosjos, Jr. ran for Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and won. • While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he bought a residential house and lot in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay and renovated and furnished the same. o In September 2008 he began occupying the house. • After eight months or on May 6, 2009, Jalosjos applied with the Election Registration Board (ERB) of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, for the transfer of his voter’s registration record to Precinct 0051F of Barangay Veterans Village. • Dan Erasmo, Sr., respondent, opposed the application. • After due proceedings, the ERB approved Jalosjos’ application and denied Erasmo’s opposition. • Erasmo filed a petition to exclude Jalosjos from the list of registered voters of Precinct 0051F before the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Ipil. • After hearing, the MCTC rendered judgment excluding Jalosjos from the list of registered voters. • The CA reinstated in the Barangay Veterans Village’s voters list pending the resolution of the petition. • Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the Second

District of Zamboanga Sibugay to forfile theaMay 10, 2010 National Elections. • This prompted Erasmo petition to deny due course to or cancel his COC before the COMELEC claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in that COC when he indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. • While Erasmo’s motion for reconsideration was pending before the COMELEC En Banc, the May 10, 2010 elections took place, resulting in Jalosjos’ winning the elections for Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.

Issue/s: WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the question of Jalosjos’ residency qualification for running for the position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay considering that he has been proclaimed winner in the election and has assumed the discharge of that office.

Held: While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions affecting elections, such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET. Consequently, the Court holds in G.R. 192474 that the COMELEC En Banc exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the position of representative for the Second District of Zamboanga

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Sibugay, which he won in the elections, since it had ceased to have jurisdiction over his case. The Court cannot usurp the power vested by the Constitution solely on the HRET.

GONZALES V. OCHOA [GR. No. 196231/196232; September 4, 2012]

Facts: • The case is a consolidation of two cases involving the same issue. • The first case involves the dismissal of Gonzales as Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices upon a finding of guilt on the administrative charges of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust. o On August 2010, former Police Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza attempted to secure his reinstatement by taking hostage a bus filled with foreign nationals. o A formal charge for Grave Misconduct was filed against Mendoza et al. The Ombudsman ruled guilty against Mendoza. o A motion for reconsideration was filed, which was held by Gonzales for 9 months (longer than the allowable time to decide upon the MR of 5 days as per Ombudsman Act). o Gonzales was charged with Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct due to such inaction. • The second case involves the dismissal of Barreras-Sulit as Special Prosecutor upon a finding of guilt

forOn culpable violations the Constitution andcaught betrayal public o December 2003,oftwo brothers were in of the US trust. smuggling $100,000 from Manila. o Upon investigation, it was found that the money was amassed wealth through military corruption by the boys’ father, Retired Major G eneral Carlos F. Garcia. o A formal charge for Plunder and Money Laundering was filed against Garcia and his family. o Barreras-Sulit initiated a backdoor plea-bargaining deal in favor of Garcia, such acts being tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust

Issue: WON the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman?

Held: YES, Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove. As a general rule, all officers appointed byAct theinPresident stipulated by therefore, the Congress in the Ombudsman order to are fill aalso gapremovable in the law.by him. Such was expressly In terms of the Ombudsman being an independent body, what is afforded to them is political independence in terms of office, salary, and appointments among others thus the President may exercise its power of removal on other aspects. The President may only exercise such authority provided it is within the two restrictions: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process. Both of which were satisfied in the case.

FUNA V. AGRA [GR. No. 191644; February 19, 2013]

Facts: • Funa alleges that on March 1, 2010, Pres. Arroyo appointed Agra as acting DOJ Secretary after Secretary Devanadera resigned in order to run for Congress. • Funa also alleges that on March 5, 2010, Pres. Arroyo designated Agra as acting Solicitor General • Agra states that on January 12, 2010, when he was the Government Corporate Counsel, Pres. Arroyo designated him as acting Solicitor General and on March 5, 2010, he was appointed as acting DOJ Secretary

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• The Court, in appreciating the facts, stated that despite the conflicting statements of Funa and Agra, Agra has already admitted holding two offices concurrently in acting capacities, and this is sufficient for the Court to resolve the constitutional question raised in the case at bar

Issue: Whether or not Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations is unconstitutional for falling under the prohibition under Section 1 3, Article VII of the 1 987 Constitution?

Held: In ruling against the constitutionality of the assailed appointments, the Court primarily anchored on the provisions of Section 13, Article VII of the 1 987 Constitution which expressly prohibits the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure unless otherwise provided in the Constitution. Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. In the language of Section 13, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary. The Court ruled that being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General, Agra was undoubtedly covered by the prohibition laid in Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution. Neither does the concurrent appointments fall under the two exceptions against the holding of multiple offices namely, express Constitutional provision allowing the holding of multiple offices and occupying posts in ex-officio capacities. The Court, however, clarified that notwithstanding the main ruling in this case, Agra is considered a de facto officer. Therefore, all official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of Justice were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office. This clarification is deemed necessary in order to protect the sanctity of the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State.

ATONG PAGLAUM V. COMELEC [GR. No. 203766; April 2, 2013]

Facts: • These cases constitute 54 petitions filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the COMELEC disqualifying them from participating in the May 2013 party-list elections. • The disqualification of the party-list groups was either due to denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations • The party-list groups and organizations basically want the COMELEC to allow them to participate in the party-list elections contending that they are qualified to be registered and recognized as a party-list group/organization.

Issue/s: 1) Whether or not the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the May 2013 party-list elections? 2) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying the party-list groups from participating in the May 2013 party-list elections?

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Held: 1) NO. The criteria laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT should not be applied by the COMELEC anymore. In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list elections, abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1 987 Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list elections. The Court, in its ruling, elaborated on the intent of the framers of the Constitution regarding party-list and sectoral representation in the Congress. It was concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. Therefore, the party-list system must not be strictly composed of sectors enumerated under the Constitution, but rather, other groups, as long as not disqualified under the law, may be allowed to participate in the party-list elections. 2) NO. The Court said that it cannot fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the May 2013 party-list elections, the Court imposes and mandates the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 (Party-List System Act ).

The Courtthe stated that in shall determining may participate in the May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, COMELEC adhere towho the following parameters: 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. 2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "welldefined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, urban indigenous cultural handicapped, veterans, the andelderly, overseas workers. fisherfolk, The sectors that poor, lack "well-defined politicalcommunities, constituencies" include professionals, women, and the youth. 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations. 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

ALLIANCE FORSeptember NATIONALISM [G.R. No. 206987; 10, 2013]AND DEMOCRACY V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Facts: • The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ANAD’s Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation and disqualified it from participating in the 2013 Elections.

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• The COMELEC held that while ANAD can be classified as a sectoral party lacking in welldefined political constituencies, it must be disqualified due to the following: o Violation of election laws and regulations, particularly for its failure to submit at least five nominees; and o Failure to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 Elections as required by Section 14 of RA No. 71661.

Issues: 1.) Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in promulgating the assailed Resolution without a benefit of a summary evidentiary hearing mandated by the due process clause 2.) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in finding that petitioner submitted only three nominees and that it failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures in the 2007 Elections

Held: 1.) NO. ABAD was already afforded a summary hearing on August 23, 2013, during which ANAD’s president authenticated documents and answered questions from the members of the COMELEC pertinent to ANAD’s ANAD’s qualifications. re-evaluating qualifications accordance with the parameters down in Atong Paglaum,In Inc. v. COMELEC, the COMELEC needinnot have called another summarylaid hearing. It already readily resort to documents and other pieces of evidence previously submitted by petitioners in re-appraising ANAD’s qualifications. After all, it can be presumed that the qualifications, or lack thereof, which were established during the August 23, 2012 hearing continued until election day and even thereafter.

2.) NO. COMELEC is a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country, its factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by the Court in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law. Factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by the courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings. Such rule should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC as the framers of the Constitution intended to place it on a level higher than statutory administrative organs.

_____________________________________ 1 An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations therefor, and for Other Purposes; November 26, 1991

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a. ANAD submitted only three nominees in violation of Sec. 8 of RA No. 79412. Such finding was based on the Certificate of Nomination presented and marked by ANAD during the summary hearings. Compliance of the said law is essential. A party-list organization does not have the prerogative to substitute and replace its nominees, or even to switch the order of the nominees, after submission of the list to COMELEC.

b. ANAD failed to comply with COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 which requires the submission of a proper Statement of Contributions and Expenditures. The exhibits submitted by ANAD consisted mainly of a list of total contributions from other persons, a list of official receipts and amounts without corresponding receipts, and a list of expenditures based on order slips and donations without distinction as to whether the amounts listed were advanced subject to reimbursement or donated.

___________________________ 2 Sec. 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. — Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the Commission not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.

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ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST (ABANG LINGKOD) V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS [G.R. No. 206952; October 22, 2013]

Facts: • ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant farmers and fisher folks, and was registered under the party-list system on December 22, 2009. o It participated in the May 2010 elections, but failed to obtain the number of votes needed for a seat in the House of Representatives. • After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Banc cancelled ABANG LINGKOD’s registration as a party-list group. • The COMELEC pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD: failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of marginalized and underrepresented and failed to show that its nominees are themselves marginalized and underrepresented or that they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.

Issues: 1.) Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD’s registration sans a summary evidentiary hearing for that purpose 2.) Whether or not there was no valid justification for the COMELEC to cancel its registration considering that it complied with the six-point parameters in screening party-list groups laid down in Atong Paglaum

Held: 1) NO. Court finds that the COMELEC had afforded ABANG LINGKOD sufficient opportunity to present evidence establishing its qualification as a party-list group. ABANG LINGKOD was able to file its Manifestation of Intent and other pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941, which the COMELEC set for summary hearing on three separate dates belies its claim that it was denied due process. Atong Paglaum did not require the COMELEC to conduct a hearing de novo in reassessing the qualifications of said party-list groups. The Court only gave the COMELEC the option to conduct further summary evidentiary hearing should it deem appropriate to do so. 2) YES. The flaw in COMELEC’s disposition lies in the fact that it insists on requiring party-list groups to present evidence showing that they have a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented. As a requirement imposed by Ang Bagong Bayani for groups intending to participate in the party-list elections, track record pertains to record the actual activities was undertaken by groups uplift theheld cause of the sector/s, which they represent. The track requirement only imposed wheretothe Court that national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations seeking registration under the party-list system must prove through their track record that they truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented. Sectoral parties or organizations are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. It is sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they represent.

BELGICA V. OCHOA [G.R. No. 208566; November 19, 2013]

Facts: • Several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) for being unconstitutional. Petition was dismissed for lack of pertinent evidence. • The NBI began its probe into allegations that the gov’t has been defrauded of s ome P10B over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various gov’t agencies. • COA released results of a 3-year audit investigation to determine the propriety of funds under PDAF and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VLP). The pertinent findings are the ff: o Amounts released to legislators significantly exceed their respective allocations o Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members

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o Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots which have yet to be turned over to the gov’t o Implementation of projects was not undertaken by implementing agencies themselves, but by NGO’s endorsed by legislators o Selection of NGO’s were not compliant with law • As for the Presidential Pork Barrel, whistle blowers allege that P900M of the gas project from Palawan went into a dummy NGO. • Several petitions declaring the PDAF unconstitutional were filed.

Issues: 1. W/N the 2013 PDAF Article violate the principles of: a. Separation of powers b. Non-delegability of legislative power c. Checks and balances d. Accountability e. Political Dynasties f. Local Autonomy 2. W/N the phrases (a) “and for such other pruposes as may be hereafter directed by the President relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance restoration of damanged facilities… as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President” are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegation of legislative power

Held: 1. PDAF a. Separation of Powers Yes. Legislators are given project identification powers wherein they can identify PDAF projects for as long as the project falls under a general program listed in the program menu. They are also given powers of fund release and fund realignment. These post-enactment measures are not related to functions of congressional oversight and hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the Executive branch. From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power Yes. The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual violates of non-delegability they areThe allowed individuallylegislators, exercise the powerthe of principle appropriation which is lodgedsince in Congress. powerto to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation (Sec. 29, Art. VI). They are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they determine. c. Checks and Balances Yes. A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s veto power (Sec. 27, Art. VI). For him to exercise his item-veto power, it is necessary that there exists a proper “item” w/c may be object of the veto. It is concluded that an appropriation bill must contain “specific appropriations of money” and not only “general provisions” w/c provide for parameters of appropriation. Appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose (line-item). d. Accountability Yes. Insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional. Allowing the legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a matter before another office of the government – renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office. However, while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator’s use thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.

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e. Political Dynasties Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” It does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. f. Local Autonomy Yes. The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. Moreover, it runs in conflict with the functions of the various Local Development Councils which are already mandated to assist in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction. 2. Presidential Pork Barrel a. Approriation No. An appropriation law may be detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same (Philconsa). The Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the “primary and specific” purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. Ifpurpose, a legal provision designatesintent a determinate amount of money and allocates the same for a particular then the legislative to appropriate becomes apparent and sufficient to satisfy the Constitutional requirement. b. Undue Delegation Yes. The appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation. The completeness test and the sufficient standard test must be employed. Sec. 8 of PD 910 constitutions an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority w/ respect to the purpose for w/c the Malampaya Funds may be used. As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice that Sec. 12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993 w/c thus moots the petitioner’s submissions.

DISINI V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE [GR. No. 203335; February 18, 2014]

Facts: • Consolidated petition questioning the constitutionality of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 • Petitioners argue that 21 sections of the Act violate their constitutional rights o Particularly, freedom of expression and access to information

Issue/s: WON the sections of the Cybercime Prevention Act of 2012 is constitutional

Held: The court held that Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 are unconstitutional. Section 4(c)(3) prohibits transmission of unsolicited commercial electronic communications (or SPAM). Though spam is commercial speech (not afforded the same protection as other forms of expression), it is

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nonetheless entitled to protection. Prohibition of unsolicited communication would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited ones adressed to him.

Section 12 authorizes law enforcement without a court warrant “to collect or record traffic data in real- time associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system.” “Traffic data” includes srcin, destination, route, size, date, and duration of the communication, but not its content nor the identity of users. As to whether Section 12 violated the right to privacy, the Court first recognized that the right at stake concerned informational privacy, defined as “the right not to have private information disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.” In determining whether a communication is entitled to the right of privacy, the Court applied a two-part test: (1) Whether the person claiming the right has a legitimate expectation of privacy over the communication, and (2) whether his expectation of privacy can be regarded as objectively reasonable in the society. Internet users have subjective reasonable expectation of privacy over their communications transmitted online. However, it did not find the expectation as objectively reasonable because traffic data sent through internet “does not disclose the actual names and addresses (residential or office) of the sender and the recipient, only their coded Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.” Even though the Court ruled that real-time traffic data under Section 12 does not enjoy the objective reasonable expectation of privacy, the existence of enough data may reveal the personal information of its sender or recipient, against which the fails toauthorities provide sufficient safeguard. The Court viewed the law as “virtually limitless, enabling lawSection enforcement to engage in “fishing expedition,” choosing whatever specified communication they want.” Accordingly, the Court struck down Section 12 for lack of specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the right to privacy.

Section 19 authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to a computer data found to be in violation of the Act. The Petitioners argued that this section also violated the right to freedom of expression, as well as the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court first recognized that computer data constitutes a personal property, entitled to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Also, the Philippines’ Constitution requires the government to secure a valid judicial warrant when it seeks to seize a personal property or to block a form of expression. Because Section 19 precluded any judicial intervention, the Court found it unconstitutional.

IMBONG V. OCHOA [GR. No. 203335; February 18, 2014]

Facts: • Various rights groups brought actions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Reproductive Health Law • Their claim is based on the following grounds (among others): o RH law violates the right to life of the unborn o Violates the right to health and right to protection against hazardous products o Violates right to religious freedom o Violates equal protection claus

Issue/s: WON the RH Law is constitutional

Held: The court held that Sections 7, 23-A-1, 23-A-2-I, 23-A-3, 23-B, 17, 23-A-2-ii, and Section 3.01-A and J of the IRR are unconstitutional.

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• Section 7 was declared unconstitutional only insofar as it: (a) requires private health facilities, nonmaternity specialty hospitals, and hospitals owned by religious groups to refer patients not in an emergency or life-threatening situation to another health facility which is conveniently accessible (b) provides access to family planning and RH services to minors who have been pregnant or had a miscarriage without a parental consent • Section 23-A-1, punishes RH providers, regardless of their religious belief, who fail or refuse to dissiminate information regarding RH services and programs. • Section 23-A-2-i, allows a married individual not in a life-threatening case to access RH procedures without the consent of the spouse. • Section 23-A-3, insofar as it punishes an RH provider who fails to refer any non-life-threatening case to another RH provider. • Section 23-B, insofar as it punishes any public officer who refuses to support RH programs • Section 17, which mandates a 40-hour pro bono service by private and nongovernment RH service providers, including gynecologists and obstetricians, as a prerequisite for PhilHealth accreditation. • Section 3.01-A and J of the RH law Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), which defines abortifacients as "primarily" inducing abortion instead of simply inducing abortion • Section 23-A-2-ii, which prohibits RH service providers from refusing to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on minors in non-life-threatening situations without parental consent

Constitution affords protection toban the all unborn from conception (life unconstitutional. begins at fertilization). Right to Lifeof- the The Framers Constitution did not intend to contraceptives from being The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting measures that legalized abortion.

Right to Health – Unless provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory.

Religious Freedom – Constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Under the Free Exercise Clause, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering wit the outside manifestation of one’s belief and faith. The obligation to refer under the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector.

Family Planning Seminars -- The requirement of attendance to a family planning seminar as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license is a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The religious freedom of theseminars petitioners not at all violated. anyninformation duringare their attendancefree in the required areis not compelled to Those acceptwho the receive informatio given to them, completely to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.

Right to Marital Privacy -- Reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy, by their very nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife. The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision making by giving absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision. Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide. - The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the Parental care and Consent custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. There must be a differentiation between access to information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. By way of exception, insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor even without parental consent. Moreover, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of

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emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) 249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child, the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority.

GO V. REPUBLIC [GR. No. 202809; July 2, 2014]

Facts: • Dennis L. Go filed a petition for naturalization under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, the Revised Naturalization Law.

• In the said petition, Go alleged the following:

1) That he was born on May 7, 1982 in Manila to spouses Felix and Emma Go, both Chinese nationals; 2) that he was of legal age, Chinese national, single, with residence address at No. 13081310 Oroquieta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, where he had been residing since birth; 3) that he spoke English and Tagalog and has spent his elementary, secondary and tertiary education in Philippine schools where subjects on Philippine history, government and civics were taught as part of the school curriculum; 4) that he believed in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, was of good moral character and had conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relations with the constituted government as well as with the community; 5) that he is not opposed to organized government or is affiliated with any association or group that uphold doctrines opposing organized governments; 6) that heof didpersons not defend or teachand theteach necessity or propriety of all violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of men’s ideas; 7) that he was neither a polygamist nor a believer in polygamy; 8) that he had never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude and was not suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases; 9) that he was not a citizen or subject of a nation at war with the Philippines; 10) that it was his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign state or sovereignty, particularly to China of which he was a citizen; 11) that he would reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship; and 12) that he was exempt from the filing of the Declaration of Intention with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)under C.A. No. 473, Section 5, as he was born in the Philippines and received his primary, secondary and tertiary education in the country.”

• During the hearings, Go testified to prove his compliance with all the requirements and presented, as witnesses i.e. Dr. Joseph Anlacan, Dr. Edward C. Tordesillas, Silvino J. Ong, Teresita M. Go,and Juan C. Go. Dr. Anlacan testified that Go had no psychiatric abnormality. Dr. Tordesillas testified that Go’s medical examination results were normal. Ong, being a friend and neighbor of Go’s family, said that he had known Go since childhood through family celebration. Teresita claimed that since birth, she had personally known Go because he was the son of her brother-in-law and described Go as a peace-loving

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person who participated in activities sponsored by his school and the barangay. Juan, testified that he personally knew Go and that he had executed an Affidavit of Support in his favor.

Issue: WON Go’s petition for naturalization should be granted? Held: NO. The court held that the joint affidavits executed by petitioner’s witnesses did not establish their own qualification to stand as such in a naturalization proceeding. Also Go did not present evidence to prove that these witnesses were credible. No evidence was presented to prove the witnesses’ good standing in the community, honesty, moral uprightness, and most importantly, reliability. Thus, the witnesses ’statements about Go do not possess the measure of "credibility" demanded by naturalization cases. Also, Go’s witnesses only averred general statements failing to specify acts or events that would exhibit Go’s traits worthy of the grant of Philippine citizenship. Go’s witnesses only proved that he mingled socially with Filipinos. Even though almost all of the witnesses testified that they knew Go since birth and that they had interacted with his family in some events, these did not satisfy the requirement of genuine desire to learn and embrace the Filipino ideals and traditions as set by law. Moreover, the NBI and BOI reports cast doubt on Go’s alleged social interaction with Filipinos as shown during the background checks wherein the members of his household were uncooperative.

Go himself disobliged when asked for an interview by BOI agents.

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JARDELEZA V. SERENO [GR. No. 213181; August 19, 2014]

Facts: • Due to compulsory retirement of Associate Justice Roberto Abad, the Judicial and Bar Council announced the opening for the vacated position. Francis H. Jardeleza, incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was nominated for the said position. • On June 16 and 17, 2014, Jardeleza received telephone calls informing him that during the meetings held on June 5 and 16, 2014, Chief Justice and JBC ex-officio Chairperson, Maria Lourdes P.A.Sereno manifested that she would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-0093 against him. Jardeleza was directed to "make himself available" on June 30, 2014 as he would be informed of the objections as to his integrity. • In a letter-petition, Jardeleza prayed that the Court issue an order: “1) directing the JBC to give him at least five (5) working days written notice of any hearing of the JBC to which he would be summoned; and the said notice to contain the sworn specifications of the charges against him by his oppositors, the sworn statements of supporting witnesses, if any, and copies of documents in support of the charges; and notice and sworn statements shall be made part of the public record of the JBC; 2) allowing him to cross-examine his oppositors and supporting witnesses, if any, and the cross-examination to be conducted in public, under the same conditions that

attend the public interviews for all date; applicants; directing to reset Chief the hearing scheduled on June 30, 2014held to another and 4) 3) directing the the JBCJBC to disallow Justice Sereno from participating in the voting on June 30, 2014 or at any adjournment thereof where such vote would be taken for the nominees for the position vacated by Associate Justice Abad.” • On June 30, 2014, Jardeleza was directed to one of the Court’s ante-rooms. Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima informed him that Associate Justice Carpio appeared before the JBC and disclosed confidential information to which Sereno characterized his integrity as dubious. After the briefing, Jardeleza was summoned by the JBC. • Jardeleza alleged that Sereno asked him if he wanted to defend himself against the integrity issues raised against him. He replied in the affirmative provided that due process would be observed. Jardeleza demanded that Sereno executes a sworn statement specifying her objections and that in a public hearing, he be afforded the right to cross-examine her. He requested that the same be imposed on Carpio. • Jardeleza in a written statement expressed his views on the situation and requested the JBC to defer its meeting since the Court en banc would meet the next day to act on a pending letter-petition submitted by him. Jardeleza was then excused.

3_________________________

Section 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. – In every case when the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of all the members of the Council must be obtained for the favourable consideration of his nomination.

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• Later in the afternoon of the same day, denying Jardeleza’s request for deferment of the proceedings, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the nominees to be included in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC released the shortlist to which Jardeleza was not included.

Issues: 1. WON the court has power of supervision over the JBC. 2. WON the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in cases where an objection or opposition to an application is raised.

Held: 1. YES. The court has power of supervision over the JBC as stated in Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

Section 8. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. Baseddo onnot previous rulings, heldrules that supervising task to see them. to it that rulesfind are that followed. They have the powerthe to court prescribe or the powerofficials’ to modify or is replace If they the rules are not observed, they may order that the work be done or redone but only inorder to conform to the rules. They have no power to prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. Thus, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC covers the overseeing of compliance with its rules. In the present case, Jardeleza’s principal allegations in his petition merit the exercise of a supervisory authority. 2. YES. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers involve investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers, not the trial of an action or a suit. There is no complainant or prosecutor to speak of. Thus, JBC proceedings are unique and special in nature. However, notwithstanding being "a class of itsown," the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing. Thus the court ruled that, “… where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of JBC to recommend. “ In the present case, Jardeleza’s right to due process was violated when he was neither formally informed of the questions on his integrity nor was provided a reasonable chance to muster a defense. He was asked to appear in a meeting where he would be, right then and there, subjected to an inquiry. Jardeleza was not given the idea that he should prepare to affirm or deny his past behavior.

GMA NETWORK V. COMELEC [GR. No. 205357; September 2, 2014]

Facts: • Consolidated petitions brought by various radio and television networks against Comelec during the May 2013 elections. • Petitioners question the constitutionality of the limitations placed on aggregate airtime allowed to candidates and political parties, as well as the requirements incident thereto, such as the need to report the

same, and the sanctions imposed for violations. • They raise the constitutionality of Sec. 9(a) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of 120 and 180 minutes, respectively. • They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forthcoming elections.

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• Prior to the May 2013 elections, candidates’ and political parties’ airtime limitation for political campaigns or advertisements were on a “per station” basis. • Comelec argued that the per candidate rule or total aggregate airtime limit was in accordance with RA 9006 (Fair Elections Act) as to give life to the constitutional objective to equalize access to media during elections.

Issue/s: WON Sec. 9(a) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 is unconstitutional. Held: Yes, it is unconstitutional. • Comelec Resolution 9615 effected a drastic reduction of the allowable minutes within which candidates and political parties would be able to campaign through the air, which was not within the power of the Comelec to do so. The authority of the Comelec to impose airtime limits directly flows from the Fair Election Act – 120 minutes of tv ads and 180 minutes for radio ads. • For the 2004 elections, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 6520 implementing the airtime limits by applying the said limitation on a per station basis. • There was no basis for Comelec to come up with a new manner of determining allowable time limits except its own idea as to what should be the maximum number of minutes based on its exercise of discretion as to how to level the playing field. • Comelec cannot exercise its powers without limitation or reasonable basis. It could not simply adopt

or regulations justtobecause feels that it is the right thing do,consistently in so far as interpreted it might be aconcerned. •measures Comelec is not free simply it change the rules especially if ittohas legal provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever it has to change the rules, the same must be properly explained with sufficient basis. • Congress intended to provide a more expansive and liberal means by which the candidates, political parties, citizens and other stake holders in the periodic electoral exercise may be given a chance to fully explain and expound on their candidacies and platforms of governance, and for the electorate to be given a chance to know better the personalities behind the candidates.

VIVARES V. ST. THERESA’SCOLLEGE ET AL. [GR. No. 202666; September 29, 2014]

Facts: • Minors who were senior students of St. Theresa’s College (STC) in Cebu posted pictures of themselves clad only in their garments, drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes on Facebook. • The matter was brought to the attention of STC’s Discipline in Charge, who found the students to have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook. • The students were called to the principal’s office where they claim to have been castigated and verbally abused by the STC officials. o They were also told that as penalty, they were barred from joining the commencement exercises. • The parents of the students filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC against STC et al. • The RTC issued a TRO allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony. • STC filed an MR. • Despite the issuance of the TRO, STC still barred the sanctioned students from participating in the graduation rites since the MR to the RTO remained unresolved. • Petitioners then filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Habeas Data, contending that the privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only” and thus they had a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected. • The RTC denied the petition for habeas data, finding that the petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threated violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. • It also held that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way.

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Issue/s: WON there was an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty or security of the minors involved which would entitle petitioners to the issuance of a writ of habeas data

Held: • The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. • It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. • It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. • The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person. • Without an actionable entitlement to the right to informational privacy, a habeas data petition will not

prosper. • The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. • It was designed “to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.” • Nothing in the rule suggests that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data. • To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavor. • With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays, not to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that every individual’s right to control said flow of information should be protected and that each individual should have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace. • Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Network (OSN) activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. •profile Adetail Facebook user to make use of a privacyprivacy tool to grant deny necessarily access to hisaccompanies or her post or should notwho be opts denied the informational right or which said choice. • Not one of petitioners disputed a STC teacher’s sworn account that her students, who are the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by the students, and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large. • Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. • If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. • As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was

the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to the Discipline In Charge. • Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts.

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EJERCITO V. COMELEC [GR. No. 212398; November 25, 2014]

Facts: • Three days prior to the May 2013 Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by respondent San Luis before the Comelec against E.R. Ejercito, who was a fellow gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of Laguna. • Ejercito allegedly distributed so-called “Orange Cards” which could be used in any public hospital in Laguna for medical needs, with an intent to influence, induce or corrupt the voters in voting for his favor, an act which is prohibited under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. • He also allegedly exceeded the allowable expenditures in relation to his campaign. • San Luis subsequently filed a Petition to Issue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Ejercito. • However, Comelec did not act upon the petition and the next day, Ejercito was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Governor. • Ejercito then filed his Answer and prayed for the dismissal of the petition due to procedural ad substantive irregularities and taking into account his proclamation as Governor. • He claimed that the petition questioning his qualifications was rendered moot and academic by his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor. • The Comelec First Division promulgated a resolution granting the petition for disqualification

ER Ejercito pursuant to constitutional Sec. 68 of theright OEC.to due process was violated as he was deprived of his right •againstEjercito alleged that his to notice and hearing and was not informed of the true nature of the case filed against him when San Luis was allegedly allowed in his memorandum to make as substantial amendment in the reliefs prayed for in his petition. • San Luis was allegedly allowed to seek for Ejercito’s disqualification instead of the filing of an election offense against him.

Issue/s: 1) WON the petition filed by San Luis against Ejercito was for the latter’s disqualification and prosecution for election offense 2) WON the conduct of preliminary investigation is required in the resolution of the electoral aspect of a disqualification case 3) WON Ejercito should be disqualified for overspending in his election campaign

Held: 1) YES. The purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running, or if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. • A petition to disqualify a candidate may be filed pursuant to Sec. 68 of the OEC, which states: o SEC. 68. Disqualifications.-- Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having: a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. • All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the OEC, not to violations of other penal laws. Thus, offenses that are punished in laws other than in the OEC cannot be ground for a Section 68 petition. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the OEC.

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• All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature. 2) NO. Comelec Resolution No. 9523 is silent on the conduct of preliminary investigation because it merely amended, among others, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, which deals with disqualification of candidates. • In DQ cases, the Comelec may designate any of its officials, who are members of the Philippine Bar, to hear the case and to receive evidence only in cases involving barangay officials o Under Resolution 9386, all lawyers in the COMELEC who are Election Officers in the National Capital Region (NCR), Provincial Election Supervisors, Regional Election Attorneys, Assistant Regional Election Directors, Regional Election Directors and lawyers of the Law Department are authorized to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under the election laws which may be filed directly with them, or which may be indorsed to them by the COMELEC. • An election offense has its criminal and electoral aspects. o While its criminal aspect to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be the subject of summary hearing, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the offender should be disqualified from office can be determined in an administrative proceeding that is summary in character. 3) YES. R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements donated to the candidate shall not be broadcasted without the written acceptance of the candidate, which shall be attached to the advertising contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC, and that, in every case, advertising contracts shall be signed by the donor, the candidate concerned or by the duly- authorized representative of the political

party.

GOH V. BAYRON [GR. No. 212584; November 25, 2014]

Facts: • Alroben Goh filed before the Comelec a recall petition against Mayor Bayron of Puerto Princesa City due to loss of trust and confidence. • Comelec found the recall petition sufficient in form and substance but suspended the funding of any and all recall elections until the resolution of the funding issue. • Comelec contended that while there is a law authorizing the Chairman to augment a deficient appropriation, there was no existing line item in the Commission’s budget for the actual conduct of a recall

elections. o The Commission also posited that granting arguendo that the line item for the “conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites” under the Program category of the Commission’s 2014 budget is also a line item for the conduct of recall elections, still augmentation cannot be made within the bounds of the law. Under Sec. 69 of the General Provisions of the 2014 GAA, there are priorities in the use of savings, and the conduct of recall elections is not one of them. • Goh submits that, notwithstanding its finding that the recall petition was sufficient in form and substance, Comelec’s decision to nevertheless suspend the holding of a recall election supposedly through lack of funding constituted grave abdication and wanton betrayal of the Constitutional mandate and a grievous violation of the sovereign power of the people.

Issue/s: WON the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending the funding of recall elections

Held: YES. • The 2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the Comelec to perform its constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections. • There is no need for supplemental legislation to authorize the Comelec to conduct recall elections for 2014. • The 1987 Constitution expressly provides the Comelec with the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.

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• The Constitution not only guaranteed the Comelec’s fiscal autonomy, but also granted its head, as authorized by law, to augment items in its appropriations from its savings. • The 2014 GAA provided such authorization to the Comelec Chairman. • When the COMELEC receives a budgetary appropriation for its "Current Operating Expenditures," such appropriation includes expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions, including the conduct of recall elections.

CERAFICA V. COMELEC [GR. No. 205136; December 2, 2014]

Facts: • Kimberly Cerafica filed her COC for Counciler of Taguig for the 2013 Elections. • Her COC stated that she was born on October 29, 1992, or that she will be 20 years of age on the day of the elections, in contravention of the requirements that one must be at least 23 years old on the day of the elections as set out in Sec. 9(c) of RA 8487 (Charter of Taguig City). • Instead of attending the clarificatory hearing, Kimberly filed a sworn Statement of Withdrawal of COC on December 17, 2012. • Simultaneously, Olivia Cerafica filed her own COC as a substitute of Kimberly. • Director Amora-Ladra of the Law Dept. recommended the cancellation of Kimberly’swas COC and consequently, the denial of Comelec the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia, and such recommendation adopted by Comelec. o Dir. Amora Ladra opined that it was as if no COC was filed by Kimberly; thus, she cannot be substituted. • Olivia filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO.

Issue/s: WON there was a valid substitution Held: YES. • Subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due course to or cancel COCs under Sec. 77 of BP 881, the Comelec has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. • Under the express provision of Sec. 77, not just any person, but only “an official candidate of a party” registered or was accredited political be substituted. • Kimberly an official nominee ofmay the Liberal Part; thus, she can be validly substituted. • There was a valid withdrawal of Kimberly’s COC after the last day for the filing of COCs and Olivia belongs to and is certified to by the same political party to which Kimberly belongs. Olivia filed her COC not later than mid-day of election day. • In simply relying on the Memorandum of Dir. Amora-Ladra in cancelling Kimberly’s COC and denying the latter’s substitution by Olivia, and absent any petition to deny due course to or cancel said COC, the Comelec gravely abused its discretion. • The Comelec, in the exercise of its adjudicatory and quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution mandates it to hear and decide cases first by Division and, upon motion for reconsideration, by the En Banc. • As cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of quasi-judicial functions of the Comelec, the Comelec in Division should have first decided the case. • The determination of whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions.

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THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD V. COMELEC [GR. No. 205758; January 21, 2015]

Facts: • The Diocese of Bacolod posted two tarpaulins (6x10 feet each) on the front wall of the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod (private property). o The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA ANG RH Law.” o The second tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote,” and provides for a list of those who are either Anti-RH (TEAM BUHAY), or Pro-RH (TEAM PATAY). • In this case, the Diocese of Bacolod is seeking to nullify the following orders for being unconstitutional: o The order of Election Officer Atty. Majarucon, directing them to remove the supposed over-sized tarpaulins; and o The order issued by COMELEC, directing them to immediately remove such tarpaulins, and threatening them with the filing of an election offense • The Supreme Court En Banc issued a TRO, enjoining the COMELEC from removing the tarpaulins.

Issue/s: 1) WON COMELEC the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated the Diocese’s fundamental right to freedom of expression. 2) WON the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral regulation. 3) WON there was violation of petitioners’ right to property. 4) WON the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

Held: 1) YES. These orders of COMELEC infringe on the right to freedom of expression of the petitioners. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate. Every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. Moreover, the COMELEC’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being the Diocese’s way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water. The Court held that the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of tarpaulin the named candidates andor political parties, thiswhile does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The was not paid for posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group. 2) The restriction imposed by the COMELEC is a content-based regulation. Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, contentneutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech. Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and the clear and present danger test must be applied. In this case, COMELEC failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights. 3) YES. The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of the Diocese. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.

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4) NO. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech. With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion. The lemon test is applied to determine if a regulation is constitutional. Thus, a regulation is constitutional when: 1. It has a secular legislative purpose; 2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and 3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

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RISOS-VIDAL V. COMELEC [GR. No. 206666; January 21, 2015]

Facts: • In 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. o In the same year, PGMA extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to Estrada, which explicitly states that he is hereby restored to his civil and political rights. • Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President for the 2010 elections. There were three petitions seeking for his disqualification but none of these cases prospered and MRs were denied by Comelec En Banc. Estrada managed to garner the second highest number of votes for the 2010 elections. • For the 2013 elections, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of the City of Manila. • Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the COMELEC because of Estrada’s Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. o Risos-Vidal relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code4 in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. 5 o The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by PGMA. • Estrada won the mayoralty race in the 2013 elections.

Issue: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.

_________________________ 4 Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; (c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic; (d) Those with dual citizenship; (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad; (f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and (g) The insane or feeble-minded. 5 Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.

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Held: NO. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a “whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law” or were so “patent and gross” as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position.

ARAULLO V. AQUINO [GR. No. 209287; February 3, 2015]

Facts: • The 2015 case is a motion for reconsideration regarding the SC ruling on the Disbursement Acceleration Program. • In that case, it was held that: o The transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies. o Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there

is an excess in theGAA funding of anot certain once it isascompleted, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The does referproject to “savings” funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. • In this motion for reconsideration, the respondents have the following arguments: o The Executive has not violated the GAA because savings as a concept is an ordinary species of interpretation that calls for legislative, instead of judicial, determination. o There is no constitutional requirement for Congress to create allotment classes within an item. What is required is for Congress to create items to comply with the line-item veto of the President. o The Court should extend the presumption of good faith in favor of the President and his officials who co-authored, proposed or implemented the DAP.

Issue/s: 1) WON the interpretation of the GAA and its definition of savings is a legislative function. 2) WON there is a constitiutional requirement for Congress to create allotment classes within an item. 3) WON the presumption of good faith should be applied.

Held: 1) NO. The interpretation of the GAA and its definition of savings is a foremost judicial function. This is because the power of judicial review vested in the Court is exclusive. The interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution.

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The exercise of the power to augment shall be strictly construed by virtue of its being an exception to the general rule that the funding of PAPs shall be limited to the amount fixed by Congress for the purpose. Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their management will also be strictly construed against expanding the scope of the power to augment. Such a strict interpretation is essential in order to keep the Executive and other budget implementors within the limits of their prerogatives during budget execution, and to prevent them from unduly transgressing Congress’ power of the purse. 2) NO. The term “item” referred to by Section 25(5) of the Constitution6 is the last and indivisible purpose of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object of augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class. It was clarified in previous cases that there must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. However, so long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set aside a

specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation purposes. 3) YES. A public officer is presumed to have acted in good faith in the performance of his duties. Mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. "Bad faith" or does not simply moral judgment or negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose some moral connote obliquitybad and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes. Relevantly, the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP, being public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions. This presumption is necessary because

they are clothed with some part of the sovereignty of the State, and because they act in the interest of the public as required by law. However, the presumption may be disputed.

___________________________ Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution states that: No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. 6

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CUDIA V. PMA [GR. No. 211362; February 24, 2015]

Facts: • Cadet 1CL Cudia was a member of the class of 2014 in the PMA and was supposed to graduate as the class salutatorian. o In November of 2013, he was 2 minutes late for his English class. o He told the professor that the previous professor dismissed the class early. The previous professor denied this and claimed he dismissed the class 10-15 minutes before the bell (as was standard). o He was found to be lying and after which, he claimed instead he was waiting for a report from the professor for his grades. • The Honor Committee conducted a preliminary investigation for violation of the honor code. Cudia plead not guilty. A vote occurred wherein 8 voted guilty and 1 voted not guilty (one vote of not guilty is enough to find the accused not guilty), but after this vote, the committee met in a closed door session wherein they clarified the reasons for the not guilty vote, after which the member changed his vote to guilty. o He was dismissed from the PMA, but his sister had posted on social media the situation which went viral. He appealed his case to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB) with PAO preparing his appeal memorandum.

with CHR,for CHR declaredwith thatthe he SC wasafter denied process.Noynoy Aquino accepted the •o On consultation He filed this petition mandamus thedue president, ruling of the CRAB denying his appeal.

Issue/s: 1.) 2.) 3.) 4.)

WON the Cudia relinquished certain civil liberties upon entering the PMA. WON the honor code can cause the termination of a cadet. WON procedural due process was violated. WON findings of the CHR are binding.

Held: Cudia is not entitled to reinstatement and cannot graduate. 1.) Cudia did not relinquish civil liberties upon entering the PMA. It has been held that a cadet facing dismissal protected private inteof rests, procedural due process is required. has The constitutionally PMA is not immune from the structure due hence process. 2.) The school-student relationship is contractual in nature. Academic freedom is enshrined in our constitution, providing for the right to decide on academic freedoms the following: • Who may teach • What may be taught • How it shall be taught • Who may be admitted to study

Academic freedom subsumes the school’sright to discipline students. The honor code is a primary means of achieving the cadets’ character development and as ways by which the academy has chosen to identify those who are deficient in conduct. 3.) NO. Procedural due process was followed. Based on jurisprudence, the minimum requirements are: • • • • •

Student must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired. They shall be informed of the evidence against them. They shall have the right to adduce evidence. The evidence must be duly considered.

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All the above were followed by the honor code committee. Changing the vote from 8-1 to 9-0, causing his dismissal was not a deviation of the standard procedure, as it has been done in the past to clarify the reasons behind a not guilty vote in case of 8-1 or 7-2 votes, so no bad faith can be attributed. Cudia was allowed to have counsel assist him in preparing the appeal memoranda, even if he was not allowed to be represented by counsel (PAO in a non-intervening role), counsel assisted in preparing his defense, and that satisfies due process. The court in this case also held that due to the stature of Cudia, he was aware of the possible ramifications of his actions and need not be represented by counsel since he was assisted by one. 4.) The CHR is merely a recommendatory body and binds no one.

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BISHOP BRODERICK PABILLO V. COMELEC [GR. No. 216098; April 21, 2015]

Facts: • Pabillo filed a case for certiorari and prohibition against COMELEC resolution (No. 9222) approving a direct contract with Smartmatic for the PCOS machines and extended warranty program dated January 30, 2015. o Pabillo contends that it is violative of the GPRA (Procurement Law) • Under R.A. No. 9369, the COMELEC is authorized to use an Automated Election System. o May 10, 2010 – beginning of 10 year warranty for parts, labor, technical support and maintenance. o Nov. 11, 2013 – Smartmatic proposed to “extend” the warranty of PCOS machines for 3 years (for 2014-2016 elections) including diagnostics of all existing PCOS machines and preparations for the elections. • On Dec. 23, 2014, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9222 which approved the extended warranty for P300M via direct contract. o After negotiations, it was reduced to P240M.

Issue: WON the resolution adopting the extended warranty is valid. Held: NO. Resolution No. 9222 is void for being violative of the GPRA. Alternative methods of procurement are allowed when (GPRA IRR): 1.) There is prior approval of the head of the procuring entity on the use of alternative methods of procurement. 2.) The conditions required by law for the use of alternative methods are present. 3.) Procuring entity must ensure that the method chosen promotes economy and efficiency. 4.) The most advantageous price is obtained.

The conditions required by law are not present (requisite 2). The parameters for valid direct contracting are found in Section 50, Article XVI of the GPRA. 7 Here, the 10 year warranty by Smartmatic only provides for a warranty on availability and access to purchase of parts and services (Smartmatic only

______________________________ 7 SEC. 50. Direct Contracting. - Direct Contracting may be resorted to only in any of the following conditions: 1.) Procurement of Goods of proprietary nature, which can be obtained only from the proprietary source – in this case, the “goods” sought are refurbishment, maintenance and repair of PCOS machines, this repair is not covered by Smartmatic’s intellectual property rights. 2.) When the Procurement of critical components from a specific manufacturer, supplier or distributor is a condition precedent to hold a contractor to guarantee its project performance, in accordance with the provisions of this contract – in this case, the repair is not a “critical component” Those sold by an exclusive dealer or manufacturer, which does not have sub-dealers selling at lower prices and for which no suitable substitute can be obtained at more advantageous terms to the Government – in this case, there was no showing that a pre-procurement conference was held, nor was there an initial industry service that would have determined the exclusivity of the goods and could have justified direct contracting as per the GPRB manual.

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warranted a 1 year replacement). Part of the AES procurement project is that Smartmatic must train COMELEC personnel to service the machines. This, coupled with the availability of parts (10 years) should mean that COMELEC already has the means to service the machines. The extended warranty is premature. Lastly, it is not a continuing contract (extension), it is a new contract, with a new offer and consideration with a new payment.

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RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT V. REYES (DOE) [GR. No. 180771; April 21, 2015]

Facts: • On June 13, 2002, the GRP, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract 102 (GSEC-102) with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX). o JAPEX (100% Japanese owned) was allowed to drill one exploration well along the Tañon straight. • The petitioners in this case filed a petition for injunction, certiorari and prohibition to prevent the implementation of Service Contract-46 (drilling) for being violative of the Constitution due to JAPEX being 100% Japanese-owned. o Petitioners claim that the fish catch in the area was reduced by 50-70% (as per a study) due to the destruction of the artificial reef by the seismic survey. o Petitioners also claim no public consultation and non-compliance with the Environmental Imapct Assessment system, the Fisheries Code and their IRR’s.

Issue: WON the service contract (SC-46) with JAPEX is valid.

Held: NO. The contract is null and void. The prohibition in the constitution as to service contract have safeguards as established in the La Bugal case, to wit, • Service contracts shall be crafted in accordance with a general law not disadvantageous to the

country. • The president shall be the signatory for the government. • Within 30 days, the President shall report it to Congress to give opportunity for objections. SC-46 meets the first requirement. According to the transitory provision in the 1987 Constitution, all existing laws are deemed valid until repealed. This includes PD 87 (Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972), which has not been repealed expressly. However, SC-46 fails thetosecond and Thus, third requirements. wasalso notthe signatory to SC-46 and same was not submitted Congress. it violates notThe onlypresident PD 87, but 1987 Constitution forthe being contrary to law. SC-46 was entered into and signed only by the DOE (not the president). The alter ego doctrince cannot apply since this doctrine has the exception that says “except in cases where the Chief executive is required by the constitution or law to act in person.” Neither was the DOE expressly authorized by the president to enter into such a contract. SC-46 likewise violates laws like Proclamation 1234, declaring the Tañon straight a protected area. Without a new law changing this, no energy exploration may be done in said protected seascape.

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