Poli-comprehensive Chap 1_6

laws and statutes must conform. (Neptali Gonzales, Political Law, citing Malcolm)

CHAPTER 1. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES

Is the constitution a conferment of powers or a limitation of the same?

 What is Political Law? That branch of public law, which deals  with the organization and operations of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the State with inhabitants of its territory (People (People v. Perfecto) 

It is both a conferment of powers and a limitation of the same. The constitution allocates to the three (3) departments of the government. It also provides for limitations on the exercise of such powers, like the provisions of the Bill of Rights.

Scope /Divisions of Political Law 1.

2.

3. 4. 5.

Constitutional Law. –  The study of the maintenance of the proper balance  between authority as represented by the three inherent powers of the State and liberty as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., p 1) Administrative Law. That branch of public law which fixes the organization of government, determines the competence of the administrative authorities who execute the law, and indicates to the individual remedies for the violation of his rights. Law on Municipal Corporations Law of Public Officers Election Laws

 What is meant by the statement, Constitution is a social contract?”

“the

The Constitution as a social contract means that it  where the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, as held in Marcos vs. Manglapus  lest the officers of the government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that “sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them” (Sec.  (Sec.   1, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). History of Constitution- Comm. Sarmiento 1.Malolos 1. Malolos Congress It is known as the La Constitución política de Malolos  and  and was written in Spanish in Spanish

FROM ALBANO: Are there any distinctions Constitution and a statute?

between

a

 Yes. A  Yes.  A Constitution is a legislation direct from the people; a statute is a legislation l egislation from the people’s representatives. A Constitution states general principles; a statute provides the details of the subject of which it treats. A Constitution is intended not merely to meet existing conditions; a statute is intended primarily to meet existing conditions only. A Constitution is the fundamental law of the State to which all other

Following the declaration of independence from Spain by the Revolutionary Government, a congress was held in Malolos, in Malolos, Bulacan  Bulacan in 1899 to draw up a constitution. It was the first republican constitution in Asia. The document declares that the people have exclusive sovereignty. It states basic civil rights, the separation of church and state, and calls for the creation of an Assembly of Representatives  which would act as the legislative body. It also the president elected for a term of four years by a majority of theAssembly. The Malolos

“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient” 

Constitution established Spanish as the official language of the Philippines. The Preamble reads: "Nosotros los Representantes del Pueblo Filipino, convocados legítimamente paraestablecer la  justicia, proveer a la defensa común, promover el bien general y asegurar los beneficios de la libertad, implorando el auxilió del Soberano Legislador del Universo para alcanzar estos  fines, hemos votado, decretado y sancionado la siguiente " (We, the Representatives of the Filipino people, lawfully convened, in order to establish justice, provide for common defense, promote the general  welfare, and insure the benefits of liberty, imploring the aid of the Sovereign Legislator of the Universe for the attainment of these ends, have voted, decreed, and sanctioned the following) 2. Commonwealth and Third Republic (1935) The 1935 Constitution of the Philippines  was  written in 1934,  1934,  approved and adopted by the Commonwealth of the Philippines (1935-1946) and later used by the Third Republic of the Philippines (1946-1972). It was written with an eye to meeting the approval of the United States Government as well, so as to ensure that the U.S.  would live up to its promise to grant the Philippines independence and not have a premise to hold on to its "possession" on the grounds that it was too politically immature and hence unready for full, real independence.

The Preamble reads: “

"The Filipino people, imploring the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote

”

the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty, and democracy, do ordain and promulgate this constitution."  The original 1935 Constitution provides, inter alia, for a unicameral Legislature and a single six year term for the President. It was amended in 1940 to have a bicameral Congress composed of a Senate and House of Representatives, as well the creation of an independent Commission on Elections.  Elections.  The Constitution limited the President to a four-year term with a maximum of two consecutive terms in office.  A   Constitutional Convention  was held in 1971 to rewrite the 1935 Constitution. The convention  was stained with manifest bribery and corruption. Possibly the most controversial issue was removing the presidential term limit so that Ferdinand E. Marcos could seek election for a third term, which many felt was the true reason for which the convention was called. In any case, the 1935 Constitution was suspended in 1972  with Marcos' proclamation of martial law,  law,   the rampant corruption of the constitutional process providing him with one of his major premises for doing so. 3. Second Republic (1943) The 1943 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines  was drafted by a committee appointed by the Philippine Executive Commission, the Commission, the body established by the Japanese to administer the Philippines in lieu of the Commonwealth of the Philippines  which had established a government-in-exile.  government-in-exile.  In mid-1942,  Japanese Premier Hideki Tojo had promised the Filipinos "the honor of independence" which meant that the commission would be supplanted  by a formal republic. The Philippine Independence Committee tasked  with drafting a new constitution was composed, in large part, of members of the pre-war National

“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient” 

Constitution established Spanish as the official language of the Philippines. The Preamble reads: "Nosotros los Representantes del Pueblo Filipino, convocados legítimamente paraestablecer la  justicia, proveer a la defensa común, promover el bien general y asegurar los beneficios de la libertad, implorando el auxilió del Soberano Legislador del Universo para alcanzar estos  fines, hemos votado, decretado y sancionado la siguiente " (We, the Representatives of the Filipino people, lawfully convened, in order to establish justice, provide for common defense, promote the general  welfare, and insure the benefits of liberty, imploring the aid of the Sovereign Legislator of the Universe for the attainment of these ends, have voted, decreed, and sanctioned the following) 2. Commonwealth and Third Republic (1935) The 1935 Constitution of the Philippines  was  written in 1934,  1934,  approved and adopted by the Commonwealth of the Philippines (1935-1946) and later used by the Third Republic of the Philippines (1946-1972). It was written with an eye to meeting the approval of the United States Government as well, so as to ensure that the U.S.  would live up to its promise to grant the Philippines independence and not have a premise to hold on to its "possession" on the grounds that it was too politically immature and hence unready for full, real independence.

The Preamble reads: “

"The Filipino people, imploring the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote

”

the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty, and democracy, do ordain and promulgate this constitution."  The original 1935 Constitution provides, inter alia, for a unicameral Legislature and a single six year term for the President. It was amended in 1940 to have a bicameral Congress composed of a Senate and House of Representatives, as well the creation of an independent Commission on Elections.  Elections.  The Constitution limited the President to a four-year term with a maximum of two consecutive terms in office.  A   Constitutional Convention  was held in 1971 to rewrite the 1935 Constitution. The convention  was stained with manifest bribery and corruption. Possibly the most controversial issue was removing the presidential term limit so that Ferdinand E. Marcos could seek election for a third term, which many felt was the true reason for which the convention was called. In any case, the 1935 Constitution was suspended in 1972  with Marcos' proclamation of martial law,  law,   the rampant corruption of the constitutional process providing him with one of his major premises for doing so. 3. Second Republic (1943) The 1943 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines  was drafted by a committee appointed by the Philippine Executive Commission, the Commission, the body established by the Japanese to administer the Philippines in lieu of the Commonwealth of the Philippines  which had established a government-in-exile.  government-in-exile.  In mid-1942,  Japanese Premier Hideki Tojo had promised the Filipinos "the honor of independence" which meant that the commission would be supplanted  by a formal republic. The Philippine Independence Committee tasked  with drafting a new constitution was composed, in large part, of members of the pre-war National

“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient” 

 Assembly and of individuals with experience as delegates to the convention that had drafted the 1935 Constitution. Their draft for the republic to  be established under the Japanese Occupation, however, would be limited in duration, provide for indirect, instead of direct, legislative elections, and an even stronger executive branch. Upon approval of the draft by the Committee, the new charter was ratified in 1943 by an assembly of appointed, provincial representatives of the KALIBAPI,  KALIBAPI,  the organization established by the  Japanese to supplant all previous political parties. Upon ratification by the KALIBAPI assembly, the Second Republic was formally proclaimed (19431945).  1945).  José P. Laurel  was appointed as President  by the National Assembly and inaugurated into office in October of 1943. Laurel was highly regarded by the Japanese for having openly criticized the U.S. for the way they ran the Philippines and because he had a degree from Tokyo International University. The 1943 Constitution remained in force in  Japanese-controlled areas of the Philippines, but  was never recognized as legitimate or binding by the governments of the United States or of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and guerrilla organizations loyal to them. In late 1944, President Laurel declared that a state of war existed with the United States and the British Empire and proclaimed martial law, essentially ruling by decree. His government in turn went into exile in December, 1944, first to  to   Taiwan and then  Japan.   Japan.  After the announcement of Japan's surrender, Laurel formally proclaimed the Second Republic as dissolved. Until the 1960s, the Second Republic, and its officers, were not viewed as legitimate or as having any standing, with the exception of the Supreme Court  whose decisions, limited to reviews of criminal and commercial cases as part of a policy of discretion by  Chief   Chief JusticeJose Yulo continued to be part of the official records (this  was made easier by the Commonwealth never constituting a Supreme Court, and the formal  vacancy in the chief justice position for the

Commonwealth with the execution of  Jose Abad Santos  by the Japanese). It was only during the Macapagal administration that a partial, political rehabilitation of the Japanese-era republic took place, with the recognition of Laurel as a former president and the addition of his cabinet and other officials to the roster of past government officials. However, the 1943 charter was not taught in schools and the laws of the 1943-44 National Assembly never recognized as valid or relevant. The Preamble reads: “

"The Filipino people, imploring the aid of Divine Providence and desiring to lead a free national existence, do hereby proclaim their independence, and in order to establish a government that shall promote the general welfare, conserve and develop the patrimony of the Nation, and contribute to the creation of a world order based on peace, liberty, and moral justice, do ordain this Constitution." 

”

The 1943 Constitution provided strong executive powers. The Legislature consisted of a unicameral a unicameral National Assembly and only those considered as anti-US could stand for election, although in practice most legislators were appointed rather than elected. 4. Fourth Republic (1973) The 1973 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,  Philippines,  promulgated after Marcos' declaration of martial law, provides for a parliamentary form of government. Legislative power was vested in a National Assembly whose members were elected for six-year terms. The President was elected as the symbolic head of state from the Members of the National Assembly for a six-year term and could be re-elected to an unlimited number of terms. Upon election, the

“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient” 

President ceased to be a member of the National  Assembly. During his term, the President was not allowed to be a member of a political party or hold any other office. Executive power was exercised  by the Prime Minister who was also elected from the Members of the National Assembly. The Prime The Prime Minister  was the head of government and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. This constitution was subsequently amended three times. On 22 September 1976, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1033 proposing amendments to the Constitution, which was later on ratified and included in the 1973 Constitution. The amendments provide, among other things, for the replacement of the National Assembly by the Batasang Pambansa .  It also states that the incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister, and shall continue to exercise legislative powers until Martial Law has been lifted. Amendments were done again in 1981  which re-established a parliamentary form of government with a president elected by direct vote of the people. In reality, these amendments had little effect at the time due to the ongoing Marcos dictatorship; however, Marcos did, at least in name, dissolve martial law at about this time and conduct (highly questionable) elections, which he unsurprisingly "won". Presidential Proclamation No. 3, popularly known as the 1986  1986   Provisional Freedom Constitution,  was the most far reaching set of amendments to the 1973 constitution that it  was almost a constitution in its own right. However, it is really a large set of amendments  which superseded and abolished certain provisions from the constitution. It granted the President certain powers to remove officials from office, reorganize the government and hold a new constitutional convention to draft a new constitution. Following the EDSA People Power Revolution that removed President Ferdinand E. Marcos from office, the new President, Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 and the adoption of a provisional constitution that would prepare for

the next constitution which became the 1987 constitution. 5. The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines  Philippines  (In Filipino:  Ang Konstitusyon ng Republika ng Pilipinas ),), ratified on February 2, 1987, is the fourth fundamental law to govern the Philippines since it became independent on July 4, 1946. First, the 1935 Constitution, which became fully operational after the Inauguration of the Third Philippine Republic.  Republic.  Second, the 1973 Constitution, which was promulgated during Martial Law and became fully operational only after the lifting of Martial Law in 1981. Third, the 1986 Provisional "Freedom" Constitution,  Constitution,  which  was promulgated on March 25 by President Corazon C. Aquino after the successful People Power Revolution in 1986. History of Constitution- Atty. Gabriel 7 constitutions in the Philippines after Spanish colonization



a.

Biak-na-bato –  first revolutionary constitution in Asia (unicameral)

 b.

Malolos –  first democratic constitution in Asia (uni/parl)

c.

1935 – Unicameral, Presidental -- May 14, 1935 changed to  bicameral

d.

1943 –  Japanese constitution during belligerent occupation (uni/pres)

e.

1973 – uni/parl

f.

Freedom – bicam

g.

1987 – bicam, revision of 1935

The 1897 Constitution of Biak-na-Bato, Biak-na-Bato, or Constituciong Halal sa Biak-na-Bato ,

“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient” 

promulgated by the Philippine Revolutionary Government on November 1, 1897, is the provisionary Constitution of the Philippine Republic during the Revolution against Spain. It provides that the Supreme Council, vested  with the supreme power of government, shall conduct foreign relations, war, the interior, and the treasury. 



The 1899 Political Constitution of the Republic, known as the Malolos Constitution ,  was approved by President Emilio Aguinaldo on January 21, 1899 and served as the Constitution of the  First Philippine Republic. It provides for a parliamentary form of government, but the President, and not a Prime Minister, acts as the head of government. Legislative power is exercised by the Assembly of Representatives of the Nation, and judicial power is lodge in a Supreme Court. The 1935 Constitution of the Philippines, ratified on May 17, 1935, establishes the Commonwealth of the Philippines, defining its powers, composition and organization as it function as the Government of the Philippine Islands. It is based on the principle of separation of powers among the three  branches of government. Executive power is  vested in the President and shall serve for a single-six year term. Legislative power is  vested in a unicameral National Assembly, and judicial power is exercised by the Supreme Court. It also provides that upon proclamation of Philippine Independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall be known as the Republic of the Philippines.

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The 1939 Amendment —  The amendments liberalized all laws and made few changes on the economic provisions of the TydingsMcduffie Law.



The 1940 Amendments —  The amendments,  by virtue of Resolution No. 73, provide for the

establishment of a bicameral Congress, composed of a Senate and a House of Representatives,  and limits the term of office of the President to four years, but may continue to serve for a maximum of eight  years. The amendment also provides for the creation of a Commission on Elections. 

The 1947 Amendment — known as the Parity  Amendment, gave Americans equal rights with Filipinos in the exploitation of Philippine Natural resources.



The 1943 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,  or the Constitution of the Second Philippine Republic, was ratified by the general assembly of the KALIBAPI.  It is  based on the system of separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and the judiciary. It served as a temporary constitution, for it stipulated that one year after the end of the  World War II,  it shall be replaced by a new constitution.



The 1973 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, or  Ang Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas , ratified by the Citizens Assemblies on January 17, 1973, provides for a shift from a presidential form of government to a parliamentary system. The President serves as a symbolic head of State, executive power is exercised by the Prime Minister with the assistance of the Cabinet, and legislative power is vested in a unicameral National  Assembly. In 1976, the National Assembly was replaced by the Batasang Pambansa ,  by  virtue of PD 1033 issued by President Ferdinand Marcos.



The 1973 Constitution as amended (amended in 1981 and 1984) provides for a semi-parliamentary form of government,  where the President, no longer acts as a symbolic head, but acts as the head of state and the chief executive. The Office of the President has been restored to its original

“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient” 

status under the 1935 Constitution. Legislative power is vested in a unicameral Batasang Pambansa . The Prime Minister, who is subordinated to the President, acts as the Head of the Cabinet. 

The 1986 Provisional Constitution, popularly known as the Freedom Constitution, promulgated by President  Corazon C. Aquino on March 25, 1986, was a provisional constitution after a successful People Power Revolution.  Under the Freedom Constitution, executive and legislative powers are exercised  by the President, and shall continue to exercise legislative powers until a legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution. Furthermore, the President is mandated to convene a Constitutional Commission tasked to draft a new charter.

 What is a Constitution? –  Atty. Gabriel, *you may also answer the definition in Manila Prince Hotel Case Cooley- That body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised. Definition Context?

of

Constitution

in

Philippine

It is not the beginning of a community. It is not the origin of private rights. It is not the fountain of law nor the incipient state of government. It is not the cause, but the consequence of personal and political freedom; it confers no rights to the people; it is the creature of their power, the instrument of their convenience. (Cooley) 

Can the constitution be wrong? No, the constitution can never be  wrong because it is the direct act of the people according to Justice Malcolm. 

*also cite the doctrine in case of Marcos vs. Manglapus  below. The Constitution is the work or will of the People themselves, in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity. Law is the  work of the Creator, and the other of the Creature. The Constitution fixes limits to the exercise of legislative authority, and prescribes the orbit within which it must move. In short, gentlemen, the Constitution is the sun of the political system, around which all Legislative, Executive and Judicial bodies must revolve.  Whatever may be the case in other countries, yet is this there can be no doubt that every act of the Legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, as absolutely void. (Justice Malcolm)

Malcolm – That written instrument enacted by direct action of the people by which the fundamental powers of the government are established, limited and defined, and by which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic.



*memorize the two definition by heart he will ask these



Constitution will always prevail! Why so special? enacted by the people surrendered sovereign powers in favor of governmental organs sovereignty = direct act of the people  



The Constitution is the source of all rights. T or F? False. There are rights which do not need constitutional conferment 

GABBY PRE-WEEK: *useful during exams and recits

“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient” 





Oposa case: right to balanced and healthful ecology –  emanates from  being a human being. NOT origin of private rights.

power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to State for the common good.” 



 Which comes first, Constitution or Government? (by analogy to chicken and eggs) Constitution because it provides for organization of the government. 



But without a government, who will enact a constitution? There must be a government first for it precedes the promulgation of the constitution. 



But can we not argue that it’s the constitution that lays down the powers of the government? The Constitution of a State is stable and permanent, not to be worked upon by the temper of the times, nor to rise and fall with the tide of events: notwithstanding the competition of opposing interests, and the violence of contending parties, it remains firm and immovable, as a mountain amidst the strife of storms, or a rock in the ocean amidst the raging of the waves (Vanhorne vs. Dorrance)  

A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates ( Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS )

 What is the Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy?

That fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. (Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS) 

Constitution is immutable, it will always prevail. Why? Direct act of the people.

It reflects the people’s sovereignty (the power to do anything without any accountability).  What are the rights independent of the Constitution? The right to life, liberty and security are examples of the rights independent of the Constitution. These are rights are inherent from the time immemorial  when man exists. (Suggested answer lang paki rephrase or paki correct n lng) 





Is the Constitution a social contract?  Yes, in Marcos vs. Manglapus …

Purpose of the Constitution- Atty. Gabriel and Comm. Sarmiento

In Marcos vs. Manglapus , the Supreme Court held that “it must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of

1. To prescribe the permanent framework of a system of government;





“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient” 

Evolved (Cumulative) — it is the result of political evolution, not inaugurated at any specific time  but changing by accretion rather than by any systematic method.

2. To assign to the several departments their respective powers and duties and; 3. To establish certain first principles on  which the government is founded (Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS) 

3. RIGID OR FLEXIBLE a. Rigid- is one that can be amended only by a formal and usually difficult process;  b. Flexible- one that can be changed by ordinary legislation.

CLASSIFICATION- Atty. Gabriel (memorize by heart) 1.  WRITTEN OR UNWRITTEN a.  Written — one whose precepts are embodied in one document or set of documents;  b. Unwritten — consist of rules  which have not been integrated into a single, concrete form but are scattered in various sources, such as statutes of a fundamental character, judicial decisions, commentaries of publicists, customs and tradition, and certain common law principles. 

Is it correct to say that the classification of a constitution as written/ unwritten depends on form?  No, both are in writing. Distinction is recognized as to sources in unwritten constitution have scattered sources unlike written constitution. 2. ENACTED (CONVENTIONAL) EVOLVED (CUMULATIVE)



So what then Constitution? 

the

Philippine

The Philippine Constitution is a written, enacted and rigid type of constitution.

HOW?  It is embodied in a single document, enacted by the Congress acting as Constitutional Convention or Constitutional Assembly ratified by the Filipino people in a plebiscite called for such purpose. QUALITIES OF CONSTITUTION:

A

GOOD

WRITTEN

a.

BROAD- Not just because it provides for the organization of the entire government and covers all persons and things within the territory of the State but because it must be comprehensive enough to provide for every contingency.

 b.

BRIEF- It must confine itself to basic principles to be implemented with legislative details more adjustable to change and easier to amend. DEFINITE- To prevent ambiguity in its provisions which could result in confusion and divisiveness among the people.

OR

Enacted (Conventional) — a conventional constitution is enacted, formally struck off at a definite time and place following a conscious or deliberate effort taken by a constituent body or ruler;

is

c.

“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient” 

ESSENTIAL PARTS CONSTITUTION: a.

OF

A

GOOD

WRITTEN

Constitution of Liberty – The series of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the citizens and imposing limitations on the powers of government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights. E.g. Art. III

Representatives   go first to the case of Manila Prince Hotel 1.

Determine Self-Executing vs. Non SelfExecuting Provisions (Manila Prince Hotel Case Doctrine)

-By analogy to essential parts of a human body: absence of one will not negate its supremacy, only that it is lacking an essential part. -A constitution can include parts not essential, e.g. Article I –  The National Territory.

 Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision  which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is selfexecuting if the nature and extent of the right conferred and liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

Preamble is not part of Constitution -to walk before, to introduce -prefatory statement

2. In Case of Doubt, Constitutional Provisions are Self- Executing (Manila Prince Hotel Case Doctrine)

 b. Constitution of Government – The series of provisions outlining the organization of the government, enumerating its powers, laying down certain rules relative to its administration, and defining the electorate, E.g. Arts. VI, VII, VIII and IX  c.

Constitution of Sovereignty – The provisions pointing out the mode or procedure in accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought, E.g., Art. XVII

INTERPRETATION/CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONSTITUTION Rules of Construction of the Constitution: *do not mention directly the tools of construction cited in Francisco v. House of

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing.  Why? If the constitutional provisions are

“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient” 

treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing  view is, as it has always been, that-X x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered selfexecuting, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or  whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the  will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”  ISSUE/S: 1. Whether §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect; 2. Assuming §10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation; 3.  Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2,  Article XII of the Constitution; and 4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation. RULING:

DECISION (En Banc)

[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED  the petition.] 

BELLOSILLO, J.: FACTS:Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match the  bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy  enshrined in §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions

1. YES, §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect. Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-selfexecuting but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may  be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.  xxx

xxx

xxx

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is

“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient” 

implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a  fortiori , by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.  xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command  which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se  judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

2.

YES, the controlling shares of the Manila

Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very  well used the term natural resources , but also to the cultural heritage  of the Filipinos.  xxx

xxx

xxx

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has  bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on  which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents’ claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. 3. YES, GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, it is mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a “state action.” In constitutional jurisprudence, the

“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient” 

acts of persons distinct from the government are considered “state action ” covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a “public function; ” (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of “state action.”  Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into  by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.  When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation. It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning  bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the  winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos  the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning

 bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.  xxx

xxx

xxx

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason  the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.  Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if  we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

3. Specific Tools of Constitutional Construction (Francisco vs. House of Representatives Case Doctrines)

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*use of the tools must be one after the other in short the three must be used successively To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction. First, verba legis that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. It is to be assumed that the  words in which constitutional provisions are couched expressed the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except  where technical terms are employed in  which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it  being essential for the rule of law to be obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use.  WHY is that verbal legis is used as a tool for construction?-not a lawyer’s document- people must understand since it is created by and for the people Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima.  The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.  A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the

evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. Ratio legis est anima -may courts of justice use extraneous mats?? NO- only if all 3 tools failed ‘yong history, what’s going on in society at that time lang?  When ratified, they did deliberations of consti commission

not

have

-must inform themselves in 4 corners of Consti lang Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted as a whole. The members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted [provisions of the Constitution], they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not  by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. (Francisco vs. House of Representatives, GR No. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003) 4. Extraneous Materials Can ONLY be used if the Above-Mentioned Rules Fail

“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient” 

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court affirmed that: It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together. In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. (Emphasis supplied) If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:  While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional conve ntion “are of values

as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons  for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our  fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of  fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.” The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the  framers’ understanding Francisco vs. House of Representatives (GR 160261, 10 November 2003) En Banc, Carpio Morales (J): 1 concurs, 3 wrote separate concurring opinions to which 4 concur, 2 wrote concurring and dissenting separate opinions to which 2 concur. FACTS: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief  Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven  Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first

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impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"  but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed  with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." ISSUE: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings HELD: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in  Angara v. Electoral Commission , judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation

of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as

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embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year  bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to  be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. Francisco vs. House of Representatives G.R. No. 160261 FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for  by law. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question —  h; as resulted in a political crisis.

HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which  were approved by the House of Representatives are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. REASONING: In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.  At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated  by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect  without destroying their indispensable coequality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it  by the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the  vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.

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Having concluded that the initiation takes place  by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI  becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one year time bar rule. Beyond this , it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.

the plebiscite.” The record of the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission fully supports the Court’s judgment. It shows that the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Commission in unanimously approving (by thirty-five (35) votes in favor and none against) the aforequoted Section 27 of Transitory Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution was that “the act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the ratification” and that “the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act  which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite.”  (De Leon vs. Esguerra) De Leon vs. Esguerra 153 SCRA 602 G.R. No. L-78059, August 31, 1987 

 When did the 1987 Constitution take ef fect? It took effect on February 2, 1987. De Leon vs. Esguerra Case Doctrine: The main issue revolved in the judgment at bar whether the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date the plebiscite for its ratification was held or whether it took effect on February 11, 1987, the date its ratification was proclaimed per Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino. The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution should be deemed to “take effect on the date its ratification shall have been ascertained and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or reject it.” This view was actually proposed at the Constitutional Commission deliberations, but was  withdrawn by its proponent in the face of the “overwhelming” contrary view that the Constitution “will be effective on the very day of

FACTS: On May 17, 1982, Alfredo De Leon won as Brgy. Captain and other petitioners won as Councilmen of Brgy. Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. Under the Barangay Election Act of 1982, their terms of office shall be six years, which commenced on  June 7, 1982 up to June 7, 1988. On Feb. 8, 1987,  while the petitioners still have one year and four months, Gov. Benjamin Esguerra of Rizal Province, issued a memorandum designating Florentino Magno as the new Brgy. Captain and other respondents as the new Councilmen of the said barangay. The respondents relied on the Provisional Constitution of 1986, which grants the governor to appoint or designate new successors within the one year period which ended on Feb. 25 1987. They also contended that the terms of office of the petitioners were already  been abolished and that they continued in office simply because no new successors were appointed yet; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of

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Barangay officials up to six years must have been deemed repealed for being inconsistent with the Provisional Constitution. Petitioners instituted an original action for prohibition to review the order of the governor. ISSUE:  Whether

the

designation

was

valid

HELD:  The Supreme Court held that the memoranda issued by Gov. Esguerra has no legal effect. Though the designation was within the one  year period which ended on Feb. 25, 1987, however, it was cut short when the 1987 Constitution took effect on Feb. 2, 1987. When the 1987 Constitution was in effect, the governor no longer had the authority to designate successors under the Provisional Constitution which was deemed to have been superseded. There has been no proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials; and the Barangay Election Act is not inconsistent with the Constitution. The writ of prohibition was granted and the petitioners have acquired the security of tenure. Notes: When did the 1987 Constitution take effect?  The Supreme Court, with only one dissent, ruled in  De leon vs. Esguerra   that the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987  which is the date of its ratification in the plebiscite, by virtue of its provision under Article  XVIII, Section 27 that it “shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose.” (This provision was unanimously approved by thirty-five votes in favor and none against in the Con Com of 1986) The effectivity of the Constitution should commence on the date of the ratification that is the date the people have cast their votes in favor of the Constitution. The act of voting by the people is the act of ratification. It should not be

on the date of the proclamation of the President since it is the act of the people. In fact, there should be no need to wait for any proclamation on the part of the President, if there is, it is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act done by the people. The COMELEC, on the other hand, should make the official announcement that the votes show that the Constitution was ratified,  but the canvass is merely a mathematical confirmation of what was done during the plebiscite. DISSENT OF J. SARMIENTO The Constitution should be deemed to take effect on the date its ratification shall have  been ascertained. (in this case, Feb. 11, 1987) and not at the time the people cast the votes to approve or reject it. This view was actually proposed at the Constitutional Commission deliberations but was withdrawn by its proponent in the face of the overwhelming contrary view that the Constitution will be effective on the very day of the plebiscite. Atty. Gabriel: Is the Decision not violative of Due Process, in the sense that during the PLEBISCITE the people still does not know if the Constitution will be ratified? No. It is the Constitution itself that provides for its effectivity. The Constitution,  being the fundamental law of the land, it is to  be upheld, unless later amended or revised. Moreover, it is the people themselves that participated in the plebiscite. Hence, unlike in the case of ordinary legislative enactments, it cannot be said that they were deprived of due process, considering that during the plebiscite, they already know of the contents/ possible contents of the “would be Constitution.” 

 Why is the Constitution likened to a traveler?

“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient” 



A good constitution must provide a mechanism for change.

AMENDMENTS AND REVISION 

Permanence of the Constitution

Are the procedures for amendment & revision in 1935 and 1987 identical?  Yes (except that in 1987 –  voting separately) initiative vs. referendum? election vs. plebiscite? 

-explain this concept but it cannot “stand still”



The Constitution is permanent in a sense that unless the people change the constitution through amendment or revision it remains to be the constitution. It cannot “stand still” it must cater the exigencies that may arise (not sure eh ) 

 What are the two changes? Amendment and Revision

Amendment implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and- balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended. 

Is it necessary to determine the character of change? 

 Yes, it is necessary to determine the character of the proposed change  because different procedure applies and initiative by people can only propose amendments.



Election (1935) “simultaneously” with general election

Plebiscite (1987) Pertains to process, not the day. It can be held on a general or a special election day.

 What really happened during the 1973 plebiscite was a showing of hands during  barangay consultative assemblies. The people  were asked: “do you want to bring home one sack of rice?” then someone took photos.  Javellana vs. Executive Secretary -procedure in 1935 constitution was not followed, but no more obstacle to its force and effect. (nandyan na yan e!) Proposal Gonzales vs. COMELEC case doctrine: 

Atty. Gabriel: Is the power to propose amendment included in the general legislative power? No.

The Power to Propose Amendments or Revisions to the Constitution is not included in the General Legislative Power NATURE OF POWER TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION. The power to amend the Constitution or to propose, amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress (Sec. 1, Art, VI, Const.) It is part of the inherent powers of the people - as the

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repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours (Sec. 1, Art. II, Const.) — to make and hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power (Sec. 1, Art. XV, Const.). Hence,  when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people,  when performing the same function, for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution - they are the very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself. POWER OF THE COURT TO REVIEW THE EXERCISE OF THIS POWER BY THE CONGRESS. In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress —  acting as a constituent assembly —  violates the Constitution, is essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito , the latter should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point. 

Can the Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, may directly propose amendments or revisions and at the same time, calls a constitutional convention? Yes

 As a Constituent Assembly, Congress May Directly Propose Amendments or Revisions AND at the same time, Calls a Constitutional Convention. THE CONGRESS, ACTING AS A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY MAY DIRECTLY PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, AND SIMULTANEOUSLY CALL A CONSITUTIONAL CONVENTION TO PROPOSE THE NEEDED AMMENDMENTS.  Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae   maintains that Congress may either

propose amendments to the Constitution or call a convention for that purpose, but it cannot do  both, at the same time. This theory is based upon the fact that the two (2) alternatives are connected in the Constitution by the disjunctive "or." Such  basis is, however, a weak one, in the absence of other circumstances —  and none has been  brought to our attention —  supporting the conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae. In fact, the term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or vice-versa, when the spirit or context of the law warrants it. It is, also, noteworthy that R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to the constitutional provisions on Congress, to be submitted to the people for ratification on November 14, 1967,  whereas R.B.H. No. 2 calls for a convention in 1971, to consider proposals for amendment to the Constitution, in general. In other words, the subject- matter of R.B.H. No. 2 is different from that of R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3. Moreover, the amendments proposed under R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3,  will be submitted for ratification several years  before those that may be proposed by the constitutional convention called in R.B.H. No. 2.  Again, although the three (3) resolutions were passed on the same date, they were taken up and put to a vote separately, or one after the other. In other words, they were not passed at the same time. In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history thereof, anything that would negate the contested of different Congresses to approve the contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the same in different sessions or different days of the same congressional session. And, neither has any plausible reason been advanced to justify the denial of authority to adopt said resolutions on the same day. Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to call a constitutional convention to propose amendments, why not let the whole thing be

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submitted to said convention, instead of, likewise, proposing some specific amendments, to be submitted for ratification before said convention is held? The force of this argument must be conceded, but the same impugns the wisdom of the action taken by Congress, not its authority to take it. One seeming purpose thereof is to permit Members of Congress to run for election as delegates to the constitutional convention and participate in the proceedings therein, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. Whether or nothing should be done is a political question, not subject to review by the courts of justice. 

Is it necessary that ratification must be held at a special election? No.

Ratification of the Constitution may be held simultaneously in a general election. The proposed Constitutional Amendments may be submitted at a plebiscite scheduled on the SAME DAY as the regular elections. RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION MAY BE HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY IN A GENERAL ELECTION.  There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to is a "special," not a general election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of the proposed amendments, that the same be submitted to the people's approval independently of the election of public officials. And there is no denying the fact that an adequate appraisal of the merits and demerits of proposed amendments is likely to be overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded by the choice of personalities involved in general elections, particularly when

provincial and municipal officials are to be chosen. But, then, these considerations are addressed to the wisdom of holding a plebiscite simultaneously with the election of public officers. They do not deny the authority of Congress to choose either alternative, as implied in the term "election" used, without qualification, in the above-quoted provision of the Constitution. Such authority becomes even more patent when  we consider: (1) that the term "election," normally refers to the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote; and (2) that the  word used in Article V of the Constitution concerning the grant of suffrage to women is, not "election," but "plebiscite." Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1 of Art. XV of the Constitution, should be construed as meaning a special election. Some members of the Court even feel that said term ("election") refers to a "plebiscite,"  without any "election," general or special, of public officers. They opine that constitutional amendments are, in general, if not always, of such importance, if not transcendental and vital nature as to demand that the attention of the people be focused exclusively on the subject-matter thereof, so that their votes thereon may reflect no more than their intelligent, impartial and considered  view on the merits of the proposed amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted by extraneous, if not insidious factors, let alone the partisan political considerations that are likely to affect th e selection of elective officials. This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is a goal the attainment of which should be promoted. The ideal conditions, are, however, one thing. The question whether the Constitution forbids the submission of proposals for amendment to the people except under such conditions, is another thing. Much as the writer and those who concur in this opinion admire the contrary view, they find themselves unable to subscribe thereto without, in effect, reading into the Constitution what they believe is not written

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thereon and cannot fairly be deduced from the letter thereof, since the spirit of the law should not be a matter of sheer speculation. 

Can the congress propose amendment through ordinary legislation? 

No. The Congress, CANNOT through ordinary legislative process, have the power to amend or propose amendment to the Constitution.

Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people —   as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours —  to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same  function, for their authority does not emanate  from the Constitution —   they are the very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself. GONZALES VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GR. NO L-28196, NOVEMBER 9, 1967 CONCEPCION, C.J.: FACTS: The Congress passed 3 resolutions simultaneously. The first, proposing amendments to the Constitution so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present

Constitution, to a maximum of 180. The second, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be elected in the general elections. And the third, proposing that the same Constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention,  without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill,  which, upon approval by the President, became Republic Act No. 4913 providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned resolutions be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections. The petitioner assails the constitutionality of the said law contending that the Congress cannot simultaneously propose amendments to the Constitution and call for the holding of a constitutional convention. ISSUES: (1) Is Republic Act No. 4913 constitutional? (2) WON Congress can simultaneously propose amendments to the Constitution and call for the holding of a constitutional convention? HELD:  YES as to both issues. The constituent power or the power to amend or revise the Constitution, is different from the law-making power of Congress. Congress can directly propose amendments to the Constitution and at the same time call for a Constitutional Convention to propose amendments. The Congress, CANNOT through ordinary legislative process, have the power to amend or propose amendment to the Constitution. Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to

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propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people —   as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours —  to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same  function, for their authority does not emanate  from the Constitution —   they are the very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself. Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional, despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power.

the Constitution (Section 16, Article VI) so they can become delegates themselves to the Convention. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967,  became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967. Two cases were filed against this act of Congress: One is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction by Ramon A. Gonzales, in L-28196, a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated. Another one is by PHILCONSA, in L-28224, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and nonpartisan organization the objective of which is to uphold the rule of law in the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against erosions or onslaughts from whatever source. ISSUE/S: 1.  Whether or not a Resolution of Congress —  acting as a constituent assembly —  violates the Constitution? 2. May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General Election?

GONZALES VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GR. NO L-28196, NOVEMBER 9, 1967

HELD: The issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress —  acting as a constituent assembly —  violates the Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review.

FACTS: On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed resolutions No. 1, 2 and 3 –  i.e. to increase the seats of the Lower House from 120 to 180; to convoke a Constitutional Convention of 1971; and to amend

In the cases at bar, notwithstanding that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, said resolutions are null and void

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 because Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de facto Congressmen (based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution, no apportionment has been made  been made by Congress within three (3) years since 1960. Thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of its Members  became illegal; that Congress and its Members, likewise, became a de facto Congress and/or de  facto congressmen); However, As a consequence, the title of a de  facto  officer cannot be assailed collaterally. Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the sufficiency or insufficiency, from a constitutional angle, of the submission thereof for ratification to the people on November 14, 1967, depends —  in the view of those who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this phase of the case, constitute the minority — upon  whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to fairly apprise the people of the gist, the main idea or the substance of said proposals,  which is — under R. B. H. No. 1 — the increase of the maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives, from 120 to 180, and — under R. B. H. No. 3 — the authority given to the members of Congress to run for delegates to the Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto, to discharge the duties of such delegates, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. We —  who constitute the minority —  believe that Republic  Act No. 4913 satisfies such requirement and that said Act is, accordingly, constitutional. One of the issues raised in this case was the  validity of the submission of certain proposed constitutional amendments at a plebiscite scheduled on the same day as the regular elections. Petitioners argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposal to the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the election.

HELD: Pursuant to Art 15 of the ’35 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this provision to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. DISSENT OF JUSTICE SANCHEZ: The people must be afforded opportunity to mull over the original provisions compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious influences., There must  be a fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection **J Reyes dissented. “Plebiscite should be scheduled on a special date so as to facilitate “Fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection”. They should be able to compare the original proposition with the amended proposition Atty. Gabriel: In this case, the Congress made  both the PROPOSAL and the CALL FOR A CONVENTION. Is this Legally Possible? Yes. See the doctrine above Suppose there is no Art. XVII. Who may now propose amendments or revision? The people. The people’s authority does not come from the Constitution- they are the very source of all powers of the government, including the Constitution itself. The 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XVII is but a limitation to the people’s authority or power. SANIDAD vs. COMELEC CASE DOCTRINES: 

Is the power to propose amendment or revision a political question or justiciable question?

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

 JUSTICIABLE but once it is ratified it ceases to be justiciable.

THE POWER TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION IS A PURELY JUSTICEABLE CONTROVERSY . The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one, lying outside the domain of judicial review.  We disagree. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National  Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National  Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National  Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent  words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the

concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has  been discharged within its limits. Political questions are neatly associated with the  wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly.  Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely he a brutum fulmen . If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.  We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of nonjusticiability, that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposals to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter. A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has been followed or not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves —  of course —  who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves

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 vested that power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a priori not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people. SINCE THE PRESIDENT, UNDER THE 1973 CONSTITUTION, MAY EXERCISE LEGISLATIVE POWER, HE MAY LIKEWISE THEREFORE, PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that  Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim National  Assembly upon special call by the President (Sec. 15 of the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National Assembly.  Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to assume that constituent power of the interim  Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is  but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically,

 by its very constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments  without constitutional infractions. For the President to shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would leave the governmental machinery at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a destructive  vacuum, thereby impeding the ob jective of a crisis government "to end the crisis and restore normal times." In these parlous times, that Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete forms the constant voices of the people reigns supreme.  After all, constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, are mere agents of the people. 

Atty. Gabriel: Does proposal to amend and/or to revise the Constitution need the Approval of the President? No.

In sensu strictiore , when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental character itself. While, ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional contentment amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional contents of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the president to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do  with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution. (Sanidad vs. COMELEC ) SANIDAD VS. COMELEC 73 SCRA 333 (1976) President Marcos issued P.D. 991 calling for a

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national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (“Barangay”) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Thereafter, P.D.1031 was issued, amending P.D. 991 by declaring the provisions of P.D. 229 applicable as to the manner of voting and canvassing of votes in barangays for the national referendum- plebiscite of October 16, 1976. P.D. 1033 was also issued, declaring therein that the question of the continuance of martial law will be submitted for referendum at the same time as the submission of his (President) proposed amendments to the Constitution through a plebiscite on October 16, 1976. Petitioner Sanidad filed suit for Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction, seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting said Referendum-Plebiscite on the basis that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitution, there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution, hence, the ReferendumPlebiscite on October 16 has no legal basis. Petitioner Guzman filed another action asserting that the power to propose amendments to or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred to the interim National Assembly under sec.16, Art. XVII of the Constitution.  A similar action was instituted by petitioners Gonzales and Salapantan arguing that: 1. Even granting him legislative powers under the martial law, the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution 2. A referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973,

3. The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity, 4. To lift martial law, the President need not consult the people via referendum, and 5. Allowing 15-year-olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above. The Solicitor General, in his comment for respondent COMELEC, maintains that: 1. Petitioners have no standing to sue 2. The issue raised is political in nature,  beyond judicial cognizance of the court 3. At this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power 4. The referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization. ISSUE/S: Do the petitioners have the standing to sue? 1. Is the question of the constitutionality of the Presidential Decrees 991, 1031, and 1033 political or judicial? 2. Does the President possess the power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposal, in the absence of an interim National Assembly? 3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefore a sufficient and proper submission?

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HELD: 1. YES. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 2.

It is a judicial question.

3. YES. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the Interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather,  with the Interim Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically,  by its very constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments  without constitutional infractions. For the President to shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would leave the governmental machinery at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a destructive  vacuum. After all, the constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, are mere agents of the people. 4. YES. Art. XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that “it shall be held not later than 3 months after the approval of such amendment or revision.” The period from September 21 to October 16, or a period of three weeks is not too short for free debates or discussions on the referendum-

plebiscite issues. The issues are not new. They are the issues of the day, and the people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago. The referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law. That notwithstanding, the contested brief period for discussion is not without counterparts in previous plebiscites for constitutional amendments. Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections GR. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976 FACTS: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens  Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise  by the President of his present powers.

On 22 September 1976, the President issued another PD 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. The President also issued PD 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The Commission on Elections was  vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National ReferendumPlebiscite.

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Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare  without force and effect PD 991, 1033 and 1031. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, was institutedby Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power topropose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National  Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Another petition for Prohibition  with Preliminary Injunction was filed by Raul M. Gonzales, his son, and Alfredo Salapantan, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees. ISSUE: W/N the power of the incumbent President (Marcos) to propose amendments to the present Constitution in the absence of the interim National Assembly which has not convened, a  valid one? HELD: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1)  Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National  Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of twothirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid  when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three

months after the approval of such amendment or revision." The power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that  body in utter recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National Assembly.  Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to assume that constituent power of the interim  Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is  but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically,  by its very constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments  without constitutional infractions. For the President to shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would leave the governmental machineries at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a destructive

“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”