POLI CASE DIGESTS 8 Part 2 - Constitutional Commissions

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION VS. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT G.R. NO 158791 JULY 22, 2005 DOCTRINE:

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION (CHREA) VS. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004, July 21, 2006. GATACELO DOCTRINE:

The ‗no-report, no-release‘ policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy. The agencies vested by the Constitution with fiscal autonomy should thus be given priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all other agencies not similarly vested in the event of a revenue shortfall.

The 1987 Constitution expressly and unambiguously grants fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman; CHR is not one of them. FACTS:

FACTS: In the present petition for mandamus, the CSC demands that the DBM release the balance of Php 5, 807, 392.30 for its budget for the fiscal year 2002. The amount of Php 215, 285, 660, 790.44 was appropriated for its Central Ofice by virtue of GAA 2002. However, the total release of funds from the DBM only amounted to Php 279, 853, 398.14. The balance was alleged to be withheld because of the ‗no-report, no-release‘ policy where allocations were withheld from agencies pending their submission of documents mentioned in Secs 3.8 to 3.10 and Sec 7.0 of the National Budget Circular No. 478. ISSUE: WON the DBM can validly refuse to release the balance of the CSC‘s budget? HELD: NO. ‗Automatic release‘ of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. With regard to respondent‘s allegations that there was a revenue shortfall, the same does not lie as it was not substantiated at all. Even assuming that there was indeed such a shortfall, it does not justify noncompliance with the mandate of the Constitution. To hold that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would place petitioner and other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all other agencies which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution itself.

Congress passed the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of Article XXXIII covers the appropriations of the CHR. On the strength of these special provisions, CHR promulgated a Resolution adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission. Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of ten additional plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV position, with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, four Security Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and five Process Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners. Thereafter, CHR issued another Resolution providing for the upgrading or raising of salary grade of the several positions in the Commission. To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same resolution, authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from savings under Personnel Services. The CHR ―collapsed‖ the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification. Among the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one accounting Clerk II. The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to DBM with a request for its approval, but the DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request on the following grounds: (1) It involved the elevation of the field units from divisions to services. (2) In the absence of a specific provision of law which may be used as a legal basis to elevate the level of divisions to a bureau or regional office, and the services to offices, such scheme should be denied. (3) Pursuant to General Provisions of the General Appropriations Act of 1998, no organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by the President, thus, the creation of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office cannot be given favorable recommendation. (4) Moreover, as provided under the Compensation

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS Standardization Law, the DBM is directed to establish and administer a unified compensation and position classification system in the government. (5) Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under the Compensation Standardization Law. In light of the DBM‘s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office recommended to the CSCCentral Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBM‘s disapproval of the plantilla reclassification. Meanwhile, the officers of CHREA, in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions. The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA‘s request and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. CA affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR‘s fiscal autonomy. Petitioner elevated its case to the Supreme Court and successfully obtained the favorable action. Respondent then filed its Motion for Reconsideration. ISSUES: 1. WON CHR is one of the constitutional bodies clothed with fiscal autonomy 2. WON approval of DBM is a condition precedent to the approval of the scheme HELD: 1.

NO.

The 1987 Constitution expressly and unambiguously grants

fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman. As already settled in the assailed Decision of this Court, the creation of respondent may be constitutionally mandated, but it is not, in the strict sense, a constitutional commission. The creation of respondent may be constitutionally mandated, but it is not, in the strict sense, a constitutional commission. Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, plainly entitled ―Constitutional Commissions,‖ identifies only the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. The mandate for the creation of the respondent is found in Section 17 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution on Human Rights. Thus, the respondent cannot invoke provisions under Article IX of the 1987 Constitution on constitutional commissions for its benefit. It must be able to present constitutional and/or statutory basis particularly pertaining to it to support its claim of fiscal autonomy. The 1987 Constitution extends to respondent a certain degree of fiscal autonomy through the privilege of having its approved annual appropriations released automatically and regularly. However, it withholds from respondent fiscal autonomy, in its broad or extensive sense, as granted to the Judiciary, constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman – expressio unius est exclusio alterius, wherein the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Provisions granting fiscal autonomy to those mentioned departments contain two sentences stating that: (1) The government entity shall enjoy fiscal autonomy; and (2) its approved annual appropriation shall be automatically and regularly released. The respondent anchors its claim to fiscal autonomy on the fourth paragraph of Article XIII, Section 17, which provides that the approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and regularly released. As compared to the Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman, Article XIII, Section 17(4) on the CHR evidently does not contain the first sentence on the express grant of fiscal autonomy, and reproduces only the second sentence on the automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations. Fiscal Autonomy defined. It means independence or freedom regarding financial matters from outside control and is characterized by self direction or self determination. It does not mean mere automatic and regular release of approved appropriations to agencies vested with such power in a very real

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS sense, the fiscal autonomy contemplated in the constitution is enjoyed even before and, with more reasons, after the release of the appropriations. Fiscal autonomy encompasses, among others, budget preparation and implementation, flexibility in fund utilization of approved appropriations, use of savings and disposition of receipts. 2.

YES. This Court staunchly holds that the imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in government. Regardless of whether or not respondent enjoys fiscal autonomy, this Court shares the stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law. In sum, CHR as a constitutional body enjoys limited fiscal autonomy, in the sense that it is entitled to the automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations; nonetheless, it is still required to conform to the Salary Standardization Law. Accordingly, its entire reclassification scheme remains subject to the approval of the DBM.

GAMINDE V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. NO. 140335, DECEMBER 13, 2000

opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her coterminus staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02,1999. On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that "the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional intent." Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminus staff, effective February 02, 1999. Petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit en banc. On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision No. 99-090 dismissing petitioner's appeal. The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioner's term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date on February 02, 1999, and that the Commission was bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. Petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the Commission on Audit denied the motion in Decision No. 99129. ISSUE: WON Gaminde is entitled to receive salary and other emoluments for actual services.

DOCTRINE:

HELD:

The appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution.

Yes. The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993 expired on February 02, 1999. However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual services rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminus staff.

FACTS: The President appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointments, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment. On February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel opined that petitioner's term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on, February 02, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in office after February 02, 1999. On February 04, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon wrote the Commission on Audit requesting

In Republic vs. Imperial, we said that "the operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first three (3) Commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term." Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms. Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or qualification, the interval between the start of the term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter. In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions of a staggered 7-5-3 year terms, we considered the plain language of Article IX (B), Section 1 (2), Article IX (C), Section 1 (2) and Article IX (D), Section 1 (2) of the 1987 Constitution that uniformly prescribed a sevenyear term of office for Members of the Constitutional Commissions, without re-appointment, and for the first appointees terms of seven, five and three years, without reappointment. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. There is no need to expressly state the beginning of the term of office as this is understood to coincide with the effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratification (on February 02, 1987). Moreover, the transitory Provisions contemplate is "tenure" not "term" of the incumbent Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, who "shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for cause or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or appointed to a new term thereunder." The term "unless" imports an exception to the general rule. Clearly, the transitory provisions mean that the incumbent members of the Constitutional Commissions shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution under their existing appointments at the discretion of the appointing power, who may cut short their tenure by: (1) their removal from office for cause; (2) their becoming incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, or (3) their appointment to a new term thereunder, all of which events may occur before the end of the one year period after the effectivity of the Constitution. However, the transitory provisions do not affect the term of office fixed in Article IX, providing for a seven-five-three year rotational interval for the first appointees under this Constitution. In the case at hand, the President appointed Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, for a term expiring February 02, 1999. This terminal date is specified in her appointment paper. On. September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the

appointment. She accepted the appointment and assumed office on June 22, 1993. She is bound by the term of the appointment she accepted, expiring February 02, 1999. In this connection, the letter dated April 07, 1998, of Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona clarifying that her term would expire on February 02, 2000, was in error. What was submitted to the Commission on Appointments was a nomination for a term expiring on February 02, 1999. Thus, the term of her successor must be deemed to start on February 02, 1999, and expire on February 02, 2006. We adjudge that the term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999. However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminous staff. FETALINO V. COMELEC G.R. NO. 191890, DECEMBER 04, 2012 DOCTRINE: To be entitled to the five-year lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, any of the following events must transpire: (1) Retirement from the service for having completed the term of office; (2) Incapacity to discharge the duties of their office; (3) Death while in the service; and (4) Resignation after reaching the age of sixty (60) years but before the expiration of the term of office. In addition, the officer should have rendered not less than twenty years of service in the government at the time of retirement. FACTS: President Ramos extended an interim appointment to the petitioners (Fetalino and Calderon) as Comelec Commissioners, each for a term of 7 years. 11 days later, Pres. Ramos renewed the petitioners' ad interim appointments for the same position. Congress, however, adjourned in May 1998 before the CA could act on their appointments. The constitutional ban on presidential appointments later took effect and the petitioners were no longer re-appointed as Comelec Commissioners. Thus, the petitioners merely served as Comelec Commissioners for more than four months or from February 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998. Subsequently, on March 15, 2005, the petitioners applied for their retirement benefits and monthly pension with the Comelec, pursuant

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS to R.A. No. 1568. The Comelec initially approved the petitioners' claims pursuant to its Resolution No. 06-1369. Thereafter, the petitioners asked for a re-computation of their retirement pay on the principal ground that R.A. No. 1568 does not cover a pro-rated computation of retirement pay. In response, the Comelec completely disapproved the petitioners' claim for a lump sum benefit under R.A. No. 1568. The Comelec reasoned out that the non-confirmation and non-renewal of appointment is not a case of resignation or incapacity or death. When the law refers to completion of term of office, it can only mean finishing up to the end of the seven year term. By completion of term, the law could not have meant partial service or a variable tenure that does not reach the end. It could not have meant, the "expiration of term" of the Commissioner whose appointment lapses by reason of non-confirmation of appointment by the Commission on Appointments and non-renewal thereof by the President. It is rightly called expiration of term but note: it is not completion of term. RA 1568 requires 'having completed his term of office' for the Commissioner to be entitled to the benefits. Therefore, one whose ad interim appointment expires cannot be said to have completed his term of office. Thus, petitioners, together with Barcelon (same fate as the petitioners‘), submit that the involuntary termination of their ad interim appointments as Comelec Commissioners should be deemed by this Court as a retirement from the service. ISSUE: WON petitioners are entitled to the full five-year lump sum gratuity provided for by R.A. No. 1568. HELD: No. That the petitioners failed to meet conditions of the applicable retirement law — Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 — is beyond dispute. To be entitled to the five-year lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, any of the following events must transpire: (1)Retirement from the service for having completed the term of office; (2)Incapacity to discharge the duties of their office; (3)Death while in the service; and (4)Resignation after reaching the age of sixty (60) years but before the expiration of the term of office. In addition, the officer should have rendered not less than twenty years of service in the government at the time of retirement.

Death during the service obviously does not need to be considered in the present case, thus leaving retirement, incapacity and resignation as the event that must transpire in order to be entitled to the lump sum gratuity. We note that the termination of the petitioners' ad interim appointments could hardly be considered as incapacity since it was not the result of any disability that rendered them incapable of performing the duties of a Commissioner. Thus, incapacity is likewise effectively removed from active consideration. "Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to it. To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of relinquishment." In this sense, resignation likewise does not appear applicable as a ground because the petitioners did not voluntarily relinquish their position as Commissioners; their termination was merely a consequence of the adjournment of Congress without action by the CA on their ad interim appointments. This eliminative process only leaves the question of whether the termination of the petitioners' ad interim appointments amounted to retirement from the service after completion of the term of office. We emphasize at this point that the right to retirement benefits accrues only when two conditions are met: first, when the conditions imposed by the applicable law — in this case, R.A. No. 1568 — are fulfilled; and second, when an actual retirement takes place. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that retirement entails compliance with certain age and service requirements specified by law and jurisprudence, and takes effect by operation of law. Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of retirement benefits to the Chairman or any Member of the Comelec who has retired from the service after having completed his term of office. The petitioners obviously did not retire under R.A. No. 1568, as amended, since they never completed the full seven-year term of office prescribed by Section 2, Article IX-D of the1987 Constitution; they served as Comelec Commissioners for barely four months, i.e., from February 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998. More importantly, we agree with the Solicitor General that the petitioners' service, if any, could only amount to tenure in office and not to the term of office contemplated by Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the holdover. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS beyond the power of the incumbent. There is no principle, law or doctrine by which the term of an office may be extended by reason of war. While we characterized an ad interim appointment in Matibag v. Benipayo "as a permanent appointment that takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office," we have also positively ruled in that case that "an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office." Simply, petitioners did not serve a "term of office" as required by Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended. Liberal interpretation was also not considered since the law is clear and unambiguous to begin with. Further, the Court avoids situation where they would conduct judicial legislation. In the present case, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, by its plain terms, is clear that retirement entails the completion of the term of office. To construe the term "retirement" in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 to include termination of an ad interim appointment is to read into the clear words of the law exemptions that its literal wording does not support; to depart from the meaning expressed by the words of R.A. No. 1568 is to alter the law and to legislate, and not to interpret. We would thereby violate the time-honored rule on the constitutional separation of powers. As a last point, we agree with the Solicitor General that the retirement benefits granted to the petitioners under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 are purely gratuitous in nature; thus, they have no vested right over these benefits. Retirement benefits as provided under R.A. No. 1568 must be distinguished from a pension which is a form of deferred compensation for services performed; in a pension, employee participation is mandatory, thus, employees acquire contractual or vested rights over the pension as part of their compensation. In the absence of any vested right to the R.A. No. 1568 retirement benefits, the petitioners' due process argument must perforce fail. ALVAREZ VS COMELEC G.R. No. 142527. March, 2, 2001 GLORIA DOCTRINES: (1) Overly strict adherence to deadlines might induce COMELEC to resolve election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of material time. In our view this is not what the framers of the Code had intended since a very strict construction might allow procedural flaws to subvert the will of the electorate and would amount to disenfranchisement of voters in numerous

cases. (2) The requisites for the grant of execution pending appeal are: (a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be a good reason for the execution pending appeal; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special order. (3) Appeal by way of a special civil action for certiorari is available only when the COMELEC's factual determination are marred by grave abuse of discretion. FACTS: Alvarez was proclaimed duly elected Punong Barangay of Doña Aurora, Quezon City on May 12, 1997. He received 590 votes while his opponent, private respondent Abad-Sarmiento, obtained 585 votes. Abad-Sarmiento filed an election protest claiming irregularities, i.e. misreading and misappreciation of ballots by the Board of Election Inspectors. The Metropolitan Trial Court ordered the reopening and recounting of the ballots in ten contested precincts, and found that Abad-Sarmiento won the election. She garnered 596 votes while petitioner got 550 votes after the recount. On appeal, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that AbadSarmiento won. Abad-Sarmiento filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal which petitioner opposed. Alvarez‘s Motion for Reconsideration and Abad-Sarmiento's Motion for Execution pending appeal were submitted for resolution. The COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed the decision of the Second Division. It granted the Motion for Execution pending appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion. HELD: No. (1) The Supreme Court agrees with Alvarez that election cases must be resolved justly, expeditiously and inexpensively, and is aware of the requirement of Section 257 of the Omnibus Election Code that election cases brought before the Commission shall be decided within ninety days from the date of submission for decision. Records show that Alvarez contested the results of ten election precincts involving scrutiny of affirmation, reversal, validity, invalidity, legibility, misspelling, authenticity, and other irregularities in these ballots. The COMELEC has numerous cases before it where attention to minutiae is critical. Considering further the tribunal's manpower and logistic limitations, it is sensible to treat the procedural requirements on deadlines realistically. Overly strict adherence to deadlines might induce COMELEC to resolve election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of material time. In our view this is not what the framers of the Code had intended since a very strict

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS construction might allow procedural flaws to subvert the will of the electorate and would amount to disenfranchisement of voters in numerous cases. Alvarez avers the COMELEC abused its discretion when it failed to treat the case preferentially. He misreads the provision in Section 258 of the Omnibus Election Code. "Preferential disposition" applies to cases before the courts and not those before the COMELEC, as a faithful reading of the section will readily show. The Court noted that as Alvarez raised the alleged delay of the COMELEC for the first time before this Court, his active participation coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will him from later impugning the court or the body's jurisdiction. (2) When the motion for execution pending appeal was filed, Alvarez had a motion for reconsideration before the Second Division. This pending motion for reconsideration suspended the execution of the resolution of the Second Division, so the division must act on the motion for reconsideration. Thus, when the Second Division resolved both Alvarez's motion for reconsideration and Abad-Sarmiento's motion for execution pending appeal, it did so in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. The requisites for the grant of execution pending appeal are: (a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be a good reason for the execution pending appeal; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special order. These three requisites were present in this case. AbadSarmiento cites that their case had been pending for almost three years and the remaining portion of the contested term was just two more years. In a number of similar cases and for the same good reasons, this Court upheld the COMELEC's decision to grant execution pending appeal in the best interest of the electorate. Correspondingly, COMELEC did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the execution pending appeal. (3) Appeal by way of a special civil action for certiorari is available only when the COMELEC's factual determination are marred by grave abuse of discretion. We find no such abuse in the instant case. From the pleadings and the records, we observed that the lower court and the COMELEC meticulously pored over the ballots reviewed. Because of its fact-finding facilities and its knowledge derived from actual experience, the COMELEC is in a peculiarly advantageous position to evaluate, appreciate and decide on factual questions before it. Here, we find no basis for the allegation that abuse of discretion or arbitrariness marred the factual findings of the COMELEC. As previously held, factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly

supported by evidence, are conclusive on this Court, more so in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud, or error of law in the questioned resolutions. CSC VS COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 176162. October 9, 2012. DOCTRINE: CSC has jurisdiction over cases filed directly with it, regardless of who initiated the complaint. the identity of the complainant is immaterial to the acquisition of jurisdiction over an administrative case by the CSC. The law is quite clear that the CSC may hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases brought directly before it or it may deputize any department or agency to conduct an investigation. FACTS: Petitioner Cueva, then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an administrative case against Guevarra, PUP Officer-in-Charge/President, and Cezar, PUP Vice President for Administration, for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of official documents, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, being notoriously undesirable, and for violating Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713. Cueva charged Guevarra with falsification of a public document, specifically the Application for Bond of Accountable Officials and Employees of the Republic of the Philippines, in which the latter denied the existence of his pending criminal and administrative cases. As the head of the school, Guevarra was required to be bonded in order to be able to engage in financial transactions on behalf of PUP. Both Guevarra and Cezar admittedly had 17 pending cases for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan. Cezar, knowing fully well that both he and Guevarra had existing cases before the Sandiganbayan, endorsed and recommended the approval of the application. Guevarra and Cezar explained that they believed "criminal or administrative records" to mean final conviction in a criminal or administrative case. Thus, because their cases had not yet been decided by the Sandiganbayan, they asserted that Guevarra responded to Question No. 11 in General Form No. 58-A correctly and in good faith. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) issued Resolution No. 060521 formally charging Guevarra with Dishonesty and Cezar with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Guevarra and Cezar filed their Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Declare Absence of Prima Facie Case. Cueva, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of Preventive Suspension and an Omnibus Motion, seeking the issuance of an order of preventive suspension and the inclusion of the following

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS offenses in the formal charge against them: Grave Misconduct, Falsification of Official Document, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, Being Notoriously Undesirable, and Violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713. The CSC denied the motion for reconsideration filed for being a non-responsive pleading, akin to a motion to dismiss, which was a prohibited pleading under Section 16 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Commission. It also denied Cueva‘s motion to include additional charges against the respondents. The CSC, however, placed Guevarra under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days, believing it to be necessary because, as the officer-in-charge of PUP, he was in a position to unduly influence possible witnesses against him. Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA essentially questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC over the administrative complaint. The CA rendered its Decision granting the petition and nullifying and setting aside the questioned resolutions of the CSC for having been rendered without jurisdiction. According to the CA, Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987), the second paragraph of which states that heads of agencies and instrumentalities "shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction," bestows upon the Board of Regents the jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against respondents Guevarra and Cezar. In addition, the CA noted that the CSC erred in recognizing the complaint filed by Cueva, reasoning out that the latter should have exhausted all administrative remedies by first bringing his grievances to the attention of the PUP Board of Regents. ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction over administrative cases filed directly with it against officials of a chartered state university. HELD: Yes. CSC has jurisdiction over cases filed directly with it, regardless of who initiated the complaint. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the power to appoint and discipline its officials and employees and to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal. Section 2(1), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution defines the scope of the civil service, to wit: ―The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.‖ By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341, PUP became a chartered state university, thereby making it a

government-owned or controlled corporation with an original charter whose employees are part of the Civil Service and are subject to the provisions of E.O. No. 292. The understanding by the CA of Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 which states that "a complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee" is that the CSC can only take cognizance of a case filed directly before it if the complaint was made by a private citizen. The Court is not unaware of the use of the words "private citizen" in the subject provision and the plain meaning rule of statutory construction which requires that when the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says. The Court, however, finds that a simplistic interpretation is not in keeping with the intention of the statute and prevailing jurisprudence. A literal interpretation of E.O. 292 would mean that only private citizens can file a complaint directly with the CSC. For administrative cases instituted by government employees against their fellow public servants, the CSC would only have appellate jurisdiction over those. Such a plain reading of the subject provision of E.O. 202 would effectively divest CSC of its original jurisdiction, albeit shared, provided by law. Moreover, it is clearly unreasonable as it would be tantamount to disenfranchising government employees by removing from them an alternative course of action against erring public officials. It cannot be overemphasized that the identity of the complainant is immaterial to the acquisition of jurisdiction over an administrative case by the CSC. The law is quite clear that the CSC may hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases brought directly before it or it may deputize any department or agency to conduct an investigation. CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board of Regents over administrative cases. there is no incongruity between R.A. No. 8292 and E.O. No. 292, as previously explained in Sojor. Moreover, the Court fails to see how a complaint filed by a private citizen is any different from one filed by a government employee. If the grant to the CSC of concurrent original jurisdiction over administrative cases filed by private citizens against public officials would not deprive the governing bodies of the power to discipline their own officials and employees and would not be violative of R.A. No. 8292, it is inconceivable that a similar case filed by a government employee would do so. Such a distinction between cases filed by private citizens and those by civil servants is simply illogical and unreasonable. To accede to such a mistaken interpretation of the Administrative Code would be a great disservice to our developing jurisprudence. Velasco, Jr., dissenting: It is basic that a rule issued by a government agency pursuant to its quasi-legislative power cannot modify, reduce or enlarge the scope of the law which it seeks to implement. Sec. 4 of the Civil Service Rules cannot

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS be construed as authorizing one other than a private citizen to file a complaint directly with the CSC, contrary to the ruling in the ponencia. DEL CASTILLO VS CSC G.R. No. 112513. August 21, 1997 DOCTRINE: When an official or employee was illegally dismissed and his reinstatement has later been ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered as not having left his office. Therefore, he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office he held. FACTS: Del Castillo, an employee of the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), was placed under preventive suspension for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. After investigation, he was found guilty of grave misconduct and was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits. He appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) who exonerated him of the charge and ordered his reinstatement to his former position. On appeal by the PRC, however, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal. Del Castillo then filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court which reversed the CSC and reinstated the decision of the MSPB. Petitioner was eventually reinstated, but his claim for backwages was denied by the PRC Chairman. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Clarificatory Relief seeking a clarification of the decision of the Supreme Court and praying for an award of backwages and other benefits accruing the petitioner as a result of his illegal dismissal.

official or employee was illegally dismissed and his reinstatement has later been ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered as not having left his office. Therefore, he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office he held― (Tañada * v. Legaspi, 13 SCRA 566 [1965]). Having been exonerated of the charges against him, petitioner should clearly be awarded back salaries, the silence of the MSPB's decision notwithstanding. In Cristobal vs. Melchor, it was stressed that ―under Section 45 of Rule 39, Rules of Court xxx a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.' xxx In construing a judgment, its legal effects including such effects that necessarily follow because of legal implications, rather than the language used, govern. Also, its meaning, operation, and consequences must be ascertained like any other written instrument. Thus, a judgment rests on the intention of the court as gathered from every part thereof, including the situation to which it applies and the attendant circumstances.'‖ PNB VS. GARCIA G.R. No. 141246. September 9, 2002 GOMEZ DOCTRINE: Speaking through Justice Bernardo P. Pardo, the Court said that ―we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that the phrase ‗party adversely affected by the decision‘ refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office.‖ In the same light, herein Petitioner PNB has the standing to appeal to the CA the exoneration of Respondent Garcia. After all, it is the aggrieved party which has complained of his acts of dishonesty.

ISSUE: Whether or not Del Castillo is entitled to backwages and other monetary benefits from the time of his preventive suspension on August 1, 1990 up to the time of his actual reinstatement on July 17, 1995. HELD: Yes. In the Resolution dated March 26, 1996, we required the respondents to comment on petitioner's motion. It appears that the CSC does not pose any objection to petitioner's motion. Indeed, the Commission "submits to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court the resolution of the instant motion." As held in De Guzman v. Civil Service Commission, ―when an

FACTS: Private respondent Ricardo V. Garcia, Jr. was a check processor and cash representative at the Buendia branch of petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB). He was charged by PNB with Gross Neglect of Duty in connection with the funds it had lost on August 5, 1994 worth P7 million. The PNB-Administrative Adjudication Office (AAO) rendered its decision finding Garcia guilty as charged and imposed upon him the penalty of ‗Forced Resignation with Benefits. . . without prejudiced to his monetary liability arising from the case.

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS Garcia moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by PNB-AAO. Aggrieved, private respondent appealed to public respondent. Meanwhile petitioner was privatized pursuant to Executive Order No. 80, otherwise known as the 1996 Revised Charter of the Philippine National Bank. Public respondent issued a resolution granting Garcia‘s appeal after finding that the evidence on record failed to establish neglect of duty on his part. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. In dismissing PNB‘s appeal, the CA cited Mendez v. Civil Service Commission, which had ruled that only the ―party adversely affected by the decision‖ -- namely, the government employee -- may appeal an administrative case. The CA held that a decision exonerating a respondent in an administrative case is final and unappealable. Hence, this Petition. ISSUE: WON CA is correct in so holding that petitioner cannot anymore elevate on appeal the resolution of the CSC reversing petitioner‘s finding of guilt for gross neglect of duty on Respondent Garcia as CSC is not the party adversely affected

and to allow multiple appeals in those instances would overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our administrative systems. Indeed, the battles against corruption, malfeasance and misfeasance will be seriously undermined if we bar appeals of exoneration. After all, administrative cases do not partake of the nature of criminal actions, in which acquittals are final and unappealable based on the constitutional proscription of double jeopardy. Finally, the Court in Dacoycoy ruled that the CSC had acted well within its rights in appealing the CA‘s exoneration of the respondent public official therein, because it has been mandated by the Constitution to preserve and safeguard the integrity of our civil service system. In the same light, herein Petitioner PNB has the standing to appeal to the CA the exoneration of Respondent Garcia. After all, it is the aggrieved party which has complained of his acts of dishonesty. Besides, this Court has not lost sight of the fact that PNB was already privatized on May 27, 1996. Should respondent be finally exonerated indeed, it might then be incumbent upon petitioner to take him back into its fold. It should therefore be allowed to appeal a decision that in its view hampers its right to select honest and trustworthy employees, so that it can protect and preserve its name as a premier banking institution in our country.

HELD: Citing Mendez v. Civil Service Commission, the CA construed the phrase ―party adversely affected‖ in the above-quoted provision to refer solely to the public officer or employee who was administratively disciplined. Hence, an appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty. However, this interpretation has been overturned in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy. Speaking through Justice Bernardo P. Pardo, the Court said that ―we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that the phrase ‗party adversely affected by the decision‘ refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office. In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Reynato S. Puno explained that the Civil Service Law did not categorically sanction the old doctrine barring appeals by parties other than the respondent employee. What the law declared as ―final‖ were only those decisions of heads of agencies involving suspensions of not more than thirty days or fines not exceeding thirty days‘ salary. These decisions, he said, involved minor and petty offenses,

BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 177271. May 4, 2007 DOCTRINE: Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in herein petitions. As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. FACTS: There are 2 consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus involved in this case. In the first petition, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) assail the various Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to represent. In the second petition, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 effectively denying their request for the release or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales‘ previous letter-request. On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations. Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the nominees sought to be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees. Petitioner Rosales sent a letter to Director Alioden Dalaig od the Comelec‘s Law Department requesting a list of that groups‘ nominees. Another letter was sent but to no avail. Thereafter, Manila Bulletin carried the front-page banner headline "COMELEC WON‘T BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES", with the following sub-heading: "Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented." On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their own behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter8 to the Comelec formally requesting action and definitive decision on Rosales‘ earlier plea for information regarding the names of several party-list nominees. Unknown to Rosales et,al. was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 virtually declaring the nominees‘ names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales‘ basic disclosure request. ISSUE: WON Comelec is correct in refusing to disclose the names of the nominees of party-list organizations HELD: Insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the petitions are impressed with merit.

Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale therefor is the right to information enshrined in the selfexecutory15 Section 7, Article III of the Constitution. Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another constitutional provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II of the Constitution. Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the people‘s right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded precise definition. But both terms embrace, to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally whet the interest of an ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts to determine, on a case to case basis, whether or not at issue is of interest or importance to the public. If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain persons employed as sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil service eligibles, surely the identity of candidates for a lofty elective public office should be a matter of highest public concern and interest. As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. The Comelec‘s reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is valid to a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to information. While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions.

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS SANTOS VS. CA G.R. No. 139792. November 22, 2000 DOCTRINE: For the purpose of computing or determining petitioner‘s separation pay under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924, his years of service in the Judiciary should be excluded and that his separation pay should be solely confined to his services in the MMA. To credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his separation pay under R.A. No. 7924 notwithstanding the fact that he had received or has been receiving the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, as amended, would be to countenance double compensation for exactly the same services, i.e., his services as MeTC Judge. Such would run counter to the policy of this Court against double compensation for exactly the same services. FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Santos was appointed Judge of the MeTC of Quezon City on January 1983 , and he thereafter assumed office. After the militarybacked EDSA revolt, petitioner was reappointed to the same position. On 1 April 1992, petitioner optionally retired from the Judiciary under R.A. No. 910, as amended, and received his retirement gratuity under the law for his entire years in the government service; and five years thereafter he has been regularly receiving a monthly pension. On December 1993, he re-entered government service. He was appointed Director III of the Traffic Operation Center of the MMA. His appointment was approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Congress then enacted R.A. No. 7924, which reorganized the MMA and renamed it as Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA). Part of section 11 of said law provides: The civil service laws, rules and regulations pertinent to the displacement of personnel affected by this Act shall be strictly enforced. The national government shall provide such amounts as may be necessary to pay the benefits accruing to displaced employees at the rate of one and one-fourth (1¼) month‘s salary for every year of service: Provided, That, if qualified for retirement under existing retirement laws, said employees may opt to receive the benefits thereunder. The President then issued a memorandum order approving the Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. No. 7924. Pursuant thereto, the MMDA issued Resolution No. 16, series of 1996, which, inter alia, authorized the

payment of separation benefits to the officials and employees of the former MMA who would be separated as a result of the implementation of R.A. No. 7924. Petitioner received a memorandum informing him that in view of his ―voluntary option to be separated from the service‖ his services would automatically cease effective at the close of office hours on 15 September 1996, and that he would be entitled to ―separation benefits equivalent to one and one-fourth (1¼) monthly salary for every year of service as provided under Section 11 of the MMDA Law.‖ Due to some confusion as to the extent of his separation benefits, petiitoner submitted a Position Paper wherein he asserted that since the retirement gratuity he received under R.A. No. 910, as amended, is not an additional or double compensation, all the years of his government service, including those years in the Judiciary, should be credited in the computation of his separation benefits under R.A. No. 7924. The Director of the CSC-NCR handed down an opinion adverse to petitioner‘s take. He filed a MFR but it was denied. He then elevated the opinion of Director Acebedo to the CSC. The CSC rendered a decision citing Chaves vs. Mathay, it held that petitioner cannot be paid retirement benefits twice – one under R.A. No. 910, as amended, and another under R.A. No. 7924 – for the same services he rendered as MeTC Judge. He can only exercise one of two options in the computation of his separation pay under R.A. 7924. Accordingly, petitioner filed with the CA a petition to set aside these resolutions. However, CA affirmed CSC‘s decision. ISSUE: WON CA erred in its decision in ruling that petitioner‘s years in ithe Judiciary should be excluded in computing his separation pay from the MMA HELD: The SC affirmed the assailed judgment. It agreed with CA and CSC that for the purpose of computing or determining petitioner‘s separation pay under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924, his years of service in the Judiciary should be excluded and that his separation pay should be solely confined to his services in the MMA.

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS In the first place, the last paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 on the grant of separation pay at the rate of ―one and one-fourth (1¼) months of salary for every year of service‖ cannot by any stretch of logic or imagination be interpreted to refer to the total length of service of an MMA employee in the government, i.e., to include such service in the government outside the MMA. Since it allows the grant of separation pay to employees who were to be displaced thereby the separation pay can be based only on the length of service in the MMA. The displacement amounted to an abolition of the office or position of the displaced employees, such as that of petitioner. Indeed, the retirement benefits which petitioner had received or has been receiving under R.A. No. 910, as amended, do not constitute double compensation. He could continue receiving the same even if after his retirement he had been receiving salary from the defunct MMA as Director III thereof. This is but just because said retirement benefits are rewards for his services as MeTC Judge, while his salary was his compensation for his services as Director III of the MMA. However, to credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his separation pay under R.A. No. 7924 notwithstanding the fact that he had received or has been receiving the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, as amended, would be to countenance double compensation for exactly the same services, i.e., his services as MeTC Judge. Such would run counter to the policy of this Court against double compensation for exactly the same services. CSC vs. YU 679 SCRA 39; G.R. No. 189041. July 31, 2012 LAZARO DOCTRINE: Devolution is the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. FACTS: In 1992, the national government implemented a devolution program pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the "The Local Government Code of 1991," which affected the Department of Health (DOH) along with other government agencies. Prior to the devolution, Dr. Fortunata Castillo (hereinafter Dr. Castillo) held the position of Provincial Health Officer II (PHO II) of the Department of

Health (DOH) Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City and was the head of both the Basilan Provincial Health Hospital and Public Health Services. Respondent Dr. Agnes Ouida P. Yu (Dr. Yu), on the other hand, held the position of Provincial Health Officer I (PHO I). She was assigned, however, at the Integrated Provincial Health Office in Isabela, Basilan. Upon the implementation of the devolution program, then Basilan Governor Gerry Salapuddin (Governor Salapuddin) refused to accept Dr. Castillo as the incumbent of the PHO II position that was to be devolved to the local government unit of Basilan, prompting the DOH to retain Dr. Castillo at the Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City where she would serve the remaining four years of her public service. She retired in 1996. Meanwhile, in 1994, or two years after the implementation of the devolution program, Governor Salapuddin appointed Dr. Yu to the PHO II position. On February 23, 1998, Republic Act No. 8543, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Basilan Provincial Hospital in the Municipality of Isabela, Province of Basilan, into a Tertiary Hospital Under the Full Administrative and Technical Supervision of the Department of Health, Increasing the Capacity to One Hundred Beds and Appropriating Funds Therefor," was passed into law whereby the hospital positions previously devolved to the local government unit of Basilan were re-nationalized and reverted to the DOH. The Basilan Provincial Health Hospital was later renamed the Basilan General Hospital, and the position of PHO II was then re-classified to Chief of Hospital II. TaDSHC While Dr. Yu was among the personnel reverted to the DOH with the renationalization of the Basilan General Hospital, she was made to retain her original item of PHO II instead of being given the re-classified position of Chief of Hospital II. Subsequently, on August 1, 2003, then DOH Secretary Manuel M. Dayrit (Secretary Dayrit) appointed Dr. Domingo Remus A. Dayrit (Dr. Dayrit) to the position of Chief of Hospital II. Aggrieved, Dr. Yu filed a letter of protest dated September 30, 2003 3 before the CSC claiming that she has a vested right to the position of Chief of Hospital II. The CSC issued Resolution 4 No. 040655 granting Dr. Yu's protest and revoking the appointment of Dr. Dayrit as Chief of Hospital II of Basilan General Hospital. Further, Secretary Dayrit was directed to appoint Dr. Yu to said position. Upon motion for reconsideration, however, the CSC reversed itself and issued Resolution 5 No. 040967 dated September 1, 2004 declaring that the position of PHO II was never devolved to the

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS Provincial Government of Basilan but was retained by the DOH; that the PHO II position held by Dr. Yu was a newly-created position; and that, therefore, she did not have a vested right to the Chief of Hospital II position that was created by virtue of R.A. No. 8543. ISSUE: WON the PHO II previously occupied by respondent Yu is a devolved position. HELD: Yes. As defined, "devolution" is the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. To ensure the proper implementation of the devolution process, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 503, otherwise known as the "Rules and Regulations Implementing the Transfer of Personnel and Assets, Liabilities and Records of National Government Agencies Whose Functions are to be Devolved to the Local Government Units and for Other Related Purposes," which laid down the following pertinent guidelines with respect to the transfer of personnel. It was mandatory for Governor Salapuddin to absorb the position of PHO II, as well as its incumbent, Dr. Fortunata Castillo. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the use of the word "shall" both in Section 17 (i) of R.A. No. 7160 and in Section 2 (a) (2) of E.O. No. 503, which connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. The only instance that the LGU concerned may choose not to absorb the NGA personnel is when absorption is not administratively viable, meaning, it would result to duplication of functions, in which case, the NGA personnel shall be retained by the national government. However, in the absence of the recognized exception, devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed [Section 2 (a) (12)] by the local chief executive concerned immediately upon their transfer which shall not go beyond June 30, 1992. There is no dearth of evidence showing that the item position of PHO II was, in fact, devolved to the Provincial Government of Basilan. Governor Salapuddin himself certified that said position was included in the 1992 OSCAS received from the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) with its corresponding budget appropriation. He further declared that during the formal turn over program in 1993 attended by Dr. Milagros Fernandez, representing the DOH Regional Office, the item position of PHO

II was among the positions turned over to the Provincial Government of Basilan. Thus, the argument of petitioner CSC that only 53 plantilla positions, not 54, were devolved to the local government of Basilan does not hold water. It cannot be disputed that Dr. Castillo's PHO II position was devolved. However, Governor Salapuddin refused to reappoint Dr. Castillo to her devolved position in the LGU for no other reason than that he "wanted to accept only the item position of PHO II." 18 It was not shown, and no attempt was ever made on the part of the LGU to show, that the absorption of Dr. Castillo was not administratively viable. There being no valid and legal basis therefor, Governor Salapuddin's refusal to accept Dr. Castillo was, plainly and simply, whimsical. Be that as it may, Governor Salapuddin's refusal did not prevent the devolution of Dr. Castillo which, together with that of the PHO II position, took effect by operation of law. In order to solve his dilemma, Governor Salapuddin requested that Dr. Castillo be detailed instead at the DOH, which was confirmed by then Secretary of Health Juan M. Flavier in his Department Order. The drawing of Dr. Castillo's salary from the LGU of Basilan which Governor Salapuddin claimed to have allowed simply "to accommodate her (Dr. Castillo)" was, in fact, a necessary consequence of her devolution to the LGU and subsequent detail to the DOH. Officials and employees on detail with other offices shall be paid their salaries, emoluments, allowances, fringe benefits and other personal services costs from the appropriations of their parent agencies and in no case shall such be charged against the appropriations of the agencies where they are assigned or detailed, except when authorized by law. Had Dr. Castillo felt aggrieved by her detail to the DOH Regional Office, she was not without recourse. The law afforded her the right to appeal her case to the CSC, but she had not seen fit to question the justification for her detail. We could only surmise that, since Dr. Castillo was looking at only three more years from the time of her detail until her retirement in 1996, and considering that she obviously would not suffer any diminution in salary and rank, she found it pointless to pursue the matter. Neither did Dr. Castillo find need to raise a howl when, at the behest of Governor Salapuddin who was determined to replace her, DOH officials categorized her as a devolution non-viable employee, along with 216 others nationwide, by the mere fact that she was not accepted by the LGU of Basilan and not because of an actual non-viability. Hence, in 1994, when Governor Salapuddin formally manifested his intention to stop the drawing of Dr. Castillo's salary from the LGU in anticipation of his appointment of Dr. Yu to the PHO II position, Dr. Castillo ceased to be a detailed employee at the DOH Regional Office but was re-absorbed by the

14 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS DOH as a devolution non-viable employee and, consequently, paid salaries and benefits from the Miscellaneous Personnel Benefits Fund that had been set aside under the Office of the Secretary of Health precisely for such employees. PENERA vs. COMELEC G.R. NO. 181613; 25 NOV. 2009 DOCTRINE: A candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. FACTS: The case involves a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court which disqualified Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera. In support of her motion for reconsideration, Penera submits the argument, among others, that Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under Section 11 of RA 8436 as amended by Section 13 of RA 9369. Andanar claimed that on 29 March 2007 — a day before the start of the authorized campaign period on 30 March 2007 — Penera and her partymates went around the different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the people to vote for them on the day of the elections. Section 79 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a "candidate" as "any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy . . . ". The second sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by Section 13 of RA 9369, provides that "[a]ny person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the period for filing] shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy". The immediately succeeding proviso in the same third paragraph states that "unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period". These two provisions determine the resolution of this case. The Decision states that "[w]hen the campaign period starts and [the person who filed his certificate of candidacy] proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign

period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified". Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period. From the filing of the certificate of candidacy, even long before the start of the campaign period, the Decision considers the partisan political acts of a person so filing a certificate of candidacy "as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate". Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a "candidate" even before the start of the campaign period. ISSUE: WON Penera is already considered as a candidate on the day before the start of the authorized campaign period. HELD: No. The assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law. The Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC, which held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. In the Lanot case, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period. The second element requires the existence of a "candidate". Under Section 79 (a), a candidate is one who "has filed a certificate of candidacy" to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he is not a "candidate". The third element requires that the campaign period has not started when the election campaign or partisan political activity is committed. Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, which under Section 75 of the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of the campaign period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section 80 for acts done prior to such last day. Before such last day, there is no "particular candidate or candidates" to campaign for or against. On the day immediately after the last day of

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS filing, the campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since Section 80 covers only acts done "outside" the campaign period. When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law realizing that Lanot merely relied on the deliberations of Congress in holding that the clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as . . . fixed by existing law" prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be considered as a candidate". Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second sentence of the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, which cannot be annulled by this Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The Decision cannot reverse Lanot without repealing this second sentence, because to reverse Lanot would mean repealing this second sentence. The assailed Decision, however, in reversing Lanot does not claim that this second sentence or any portion of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, is unconstitutional. In fact, the Decision considers the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision is self-contradictory — reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the second sentence, which embodies the Lanot doctrine. In so doing, the Decision is irreconcilably in conflict with the clear intent and letter of the second sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.||Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that election offenses can be committed by a candidate "only" upon the start of the campaign period. This clearly means that before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed.| When the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, are read together, these provisions of law do not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots, until the start of the campaign period. There is absolutely no room for any other interpretation. In layman's language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law. The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified or prosecuted only after the start of the campaign period. This is not what the law says. What the law says is "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only

upon the start of the campaign period". The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful. The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. This is clearly not the language of the law. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness. ESCTIA Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy". Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period" QUINTO vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010 MATILLANO DOCTRINE: The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one‘s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work. FACTS: Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide: SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in governmentowned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position. Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs. ISSUE: Whether

or

not

the

said

COMELEC

resolution

was

valid

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one‘s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work. Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world. The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or brgy. level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale. MENDOZA VS. COMELEC AND PAGDANGANAN G.R. No. 191084, March 25, 2010. (MAHABA TO KASI MAY DISSENT SI COMM. SARMIENTO KAYA SINAMA KO PLEASE UNDERSTAND QUALITY OVER QUANTITY)

HELD: NO. In the Fariñas case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of the equal protection clause. However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didn‘t squarely challenge Sec. 66. Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement – that it must be germane to the purpose of the law.

DOCTRINE: The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the required majority vote even after the 15 February 2010 re-hearing should have caused the dismissal of respondent‘s Election Protest. Promulgated on 15 February 1993 pursuant to Section 6, Article IX-A and Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is clear on this matter. Without any trace of ambiguity, Section 6, Rule 18 of said Rule categorically provides as follows: ―Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. – When the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.‖

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS December 2009 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division only garnered three concurrences.

FACTS: Petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza was proclaimed the winner of the 2007 gubernatorial election for the province of Bulacan, besting respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan by a margin of 15,732 votes. On 1 June 2007, respondent filed the Election Protest which, anchored on the massive electoral fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioner, was raffled to the 2nd of the COMELEC). With petitioner‘s filing of his Answer with CounterProtest on 18 June 2007, the COMELEC proceeded to conduct the preliminary conference and to order a revision of the ballots from the contested precincts indicated in said pleadings. Upon the evidence adduced and the memoranda subsequently filed by the parties, the COMELEC Second Division went on to render the 1 December 2009 Resolution, which annulled and set aside petitioner‘s proclamation as governor of Bulacan and proclaimed respondent duly elected to said position by a winning margin of 4,321 votes. Coupled with a directive to the Department of Interior and Local Government to implement the same, the resolution ordered petitioner to immediately vacate said office, to cease and desist from discharging the functions pertaining thereto and to cause a peaceful turn-over thereof to respondent. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing resolution with the COMELEC En Banc . The Commission En Banc DENIES the MR for lack of merit. The Resolution of the Commission (2 ndDivision) ANNULLING the proclamation of JOSELITO R. MENDOZA as the duly elected Governor of Bulacan and DECLARING ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN as duly elected to said Office is AFFIRMED with modification. Considering the proximity of the end of the term of office involved, this Resolution is declared immediately executory. The Commission En Banc hereby ISSUES a WRIT OF EXECUTION directing the Provincial Election Supervisor of Bulacan, ordering JOSELITO R. MENDOZA to CEASE and DESIST from performing the functions of Governor of the Province of Bulacan and to VACATE said office in favor of ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN. In the meantime, it appears that the COMELEC En Banc issued a 10 February 2010 Order, scheduling the case for re-hearing on 15 February 2010, on the ground that ―there was no majority vote of the members obtained in the Resolution of the Commission En Banc promulgated on February 8, 2010.‖ At said scheduled re-hearing, it further appears that the parties agreed to submit the matter for resolution by the COMELEC En Banc upon submission of their respective memoranda, without further argument. As it turned out, the deliberations which ensued again failed to muster the required majority vote since, with three (3) Commissioners not taking part in the voting, and only one dissent therefrom, the assailed 1

ISSUE: W/N the failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the required vote even after the Feb 15 2010 hearing should have caused the dismissal of respondent‘s Election Protest? YES HELD: Yes. Promulgated on 15 February 1993 pursuant to Section 6, Article IX-A and Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is clear on this matter. Without any trace of ambiguity, Section 6, Rule 18 of said Rule categorically provides as follows: Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. – When the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. The propriety of applying the foregoing provision according to its literal tenor cannot be gainsaid. As one pertaining to the election of the provincial governor of Bulacan, respondent‘s Election Protest was originally commenced in the COMELEC, pursuant to its exclusive original jurisdiction over the case. Although initially raffled to the COMELEC Second Division, the elevation of said election protest on motion for reconsideration before the Commission En Banc cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered an appeal. Tersely put, there is no appeal within the COMELEC itself. As APTLY OBSERVED in the lone dissent penned by COMELEC Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, respondent‘s Election Protest was filed with the Commission ―at the first instance‖ and should be, accordingly, considered an action or proceeding ―originally commenced in the Commission.‖ The dissent reads Section 6 of COMELEC Rule 18 to mean exactly the opposite of what it expressly states. Thus was made the conclusion to the effect that since no decision was reached by the COMELEC En Banc, then the decision of the Second Division should stand, which is squarely in the face of the Rule that when the Commission En Banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be re-heard, and if on re-hearing, no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission. The reliance is on Section 3, Article IX(C) of the Constitution which provides: Section 3. The Commission

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS on Elections may sit En Banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission En Banc. The dissent reasons that it would be absurd that for a lack of the necessary majority in the MR before the COMELEC En Banc, the original protest action should be dismissed as this would render nugatory the constitutional mandate to authorize and empower a division of the COMELEC to decide election cases. The election protest of respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan is hereby DISMISSED. TALAGA V COMELEC G.R. Nos. 196804 and 197015, October 9, 2012,683 SCRA 197. DOCTRINE: Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate. All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. FACTS: In focus are the disqualification of a substitute who was proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty election and the ascertainment of who should assume the office following the substitute‘s disqualification. Ramon Talaga and Philip Castillo filed their certificates of candidacy (COC) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City for the 2010 elections. Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition to cancel the COC of Talaga on the ground that he has already served as mayor of Lucena for three consecutive terms (2001, 2004, 2007) without interruption. Talaga countered by saying that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from office during his second and third terms, which he claims to have amounted to an interruption. Thereafter, Talaga withdrew his candidacy. On May 4, 2010, Barbara Ruby filed her own COC to substitute Talaga. Talaga‘s name remained printed on the ballots and votes in his favor were counted for Barbara Ruby, who won against Castillo. But it was only on May 13, 2010

when the Comelec gave due course to Ruby‘s COC to include her in the official list of candidates. Ruby was proclaimed newly elected mayor. ISSUES: The core issue involves the validity of the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband. Ancillary to the core issue is the determination of who among the contending parties should assume the contested elective position. RULING: 1. Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate. All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. 2. A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC, to wit:67 Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. – If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. x x x ABUNDO VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 201716. January 8, 2013. MUÑEZ DOCTRINE: The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the "monopolization of political power" and prevent elected officials from breeding "proprietary interest in their position" but also to "enhance the people‘s freedom of choice." FACTS:

19 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres‘ election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the former‘s disqualification to run, the corresponding petition predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule. On June 16, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding for Abundo, who in the meantime bested Torres by 219 votes and was accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga, Catanduanes. Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the COMELEC could resolve the adverted disqualification case Torres initiated against Abundo, herein private respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto action before the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his petition to disqualify. ISSUE: Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms HELD: No. The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo‘s three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the "monopolization of political power" and prevent elected officials from breeding "proprietary interest in their position" but also to "enhance the people‘s freedom of choice." In the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, "while people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed." In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor serve the functions of the said elective office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the May 2004 elections or for only a little over one year and one month. Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local elected officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that Abundo actually served less. The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is related to the concepts of interruption of service and voluntary renunciation of service. The word interruption means temporary cessation, intermission or suspension. To interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or prevent. When the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is to the obstruction to the continuance of the service by the concerned elected official by effectively cutting short the service of a term or giving a hiatus in the occupation of the elective office. On the other hand, the word "renunciation" connotes the idea of waiver or abandonment of a known right. To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline or resign. Voluntary renunciation of the office by an elective local official would thus mean to give up or abandon the title to the office and to cut short the service of the term the concerned elected official is entitled to.

20 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundo‘s full term has been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term. On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law. As a final note, We reiterate that Abundo‘s case differs from other cases involving the effects of an election protest because while Abundo was, in the final reckoning, the winning candidate, he was the one deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his constituents. To a certain extent, Abundo was a victim of an imperfect election system. While admittedly the Court does not possess the mandate to remedy such imperfections, the Constitution has clothed it with enough authority to establish a fortress against the injustices it may bring. JALOSJOS VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 192474. June 26, 2012. DOCTRINE: While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions affecting elections, such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. FACTS: In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr. ran for Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and won. While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he bought a residential house and lot in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay and renovated and furnished the same. In September 2008 he began occupying the house.

Jalosjos applied with the Election Registration Board (ERB) for the transfer of his voter‘s registration record to Precinct 0051F of Barangay Veterans Village. Dan Erasmo filed a petition to exclude Jalosjos from the list of registered voters. After hearing, the MCTC rendered judgment excluding Jalosjos from the list of registered voters in question. The MCTC found that Jalosjos did not abandon his domicile in Tampilisan since he continued even then to serve as its Mayor. The RTC affirmed the MCTC decision. On appeal, the CA granted his application and enjoined the courts below from enforcing their decisions, with the result that his name was reinstated in the Barangay Veterans Village‘s voters list pending the resolution of the petition. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 National Elections. This prompted Erasmo to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel his COC before the COMELEC, claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in that COC when he indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC En Banc declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that Jalosjos did not satisfy the residency requirement since, by continuing to hold the position of Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del Norte, he should be deemed not to have transferred his residence from that place to Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The CA also rendered judgment in the voter‘s exclusion case holding that Jalosjos should not be excluded from the voters list of Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil since he was qualified under the Constitution and Republic Act 8189 to vote in that place. (In short, conflicting decision ng CA and COMELEC). Both Jalosjos and Erasmo elevated the case to SC on certiorari. The Court ordered the consolidation of the three related petitions. In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) sought the dismissal of Erasmo‘s petitions and the grant of that of Jalosjos since all such petitions deal with the latter‘s qualifications as proclaimed Representative of the district mentioned. The OSG claims that under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, jurisdiction over this issue lies with the HRET. ISSUE: WON the SC has jurisdiction considering that he has been proclaimed winner in the election and has assumed the discharge of that office. HELD:

21 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS No. While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions affecting elections, such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET. Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos had already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the election. Thus, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay. Consequently, the Court holds in G.R. 192474 that the COMELEC En Banc exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the position of representative for the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay, which he won in the elections, since it had ceased to have jurisdiction over his case. Necessarily, Erasmo‘s petitions (G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566) questioning the validity of the registration of Jalosjos as a voter and the COMELEC‘s failure to annul his proclamation also fail. The Court cannot usurp the power vested by the Constitution solely on the HRET. SOBEJAN-CONDON VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 198742. August 10, 2012 DOCTRINE: The COMELEC en banc has the power to order discretionary execution of judgment. FACTS: The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.

On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003." The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen. The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010. Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan and Luis M. Bautista, (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner‘s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner‘s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship. The trial court held that the petitioner‘s failure to comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. On appeal, The COMELEC en banc concurred with the findings and conclusions of the RTC; it also granted the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed by the private respondents. ISSUE: (1) Whether the COMELEC en banc may resolve the merits of an appeal after ruling on its reinstatement; (2) Whether the COMELEC en banc may

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS order the execution of a judgment rendered by a trial court in an election case.

Additional info: Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office for failure to renounce her Australian citizenship in accordance with RA 9225.

HELD:

R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship 18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic, thus:

(1) Yes. An appeal may be simultaneously reinstated and definitively resolved by the COMELEC en banc in a resolution disposing of a motion for reconsideration. The power to decide motions for reconsideration in election cases is arrogated unto the COMELEC en banc by Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, viz: Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. Considering that the above cited provisos do not set any limits to the COMELEC en banc‘s prerogative in resolving a motion for reconsideration, there is nothing to prevent the body from directly adjudicating the substantive merits of an appeal after ruling for its reinstatement instead of remanding the same to the division that initially dismissed it. (2) Yes. The COMELEC en banc has the power to order discretionary execution of judgment. We cannot subscribe to petitioner‘s submission that the COMELEC en banc has no power to order the issuance of a writ of execution and that such function belongs only to the court of origin. There is no reason to dispute the COMELEC‘s authority to order discretionary execution of judgment in view of the fact that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal may be issued by an appellate court after the trial court has lost jurisdiction. In Batul v. Bayron, we stressed the import of the provision vis-à-vis election cases when we held that judgments in election cases which may be executed pending appeal includes those decided by trial courts and those rendered by the COMELEC whether in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: xxx ARATEA V. COMELEC G.R. No. 195229, October 09, 2012 MURILLO DOCTRINE: A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. FACTS: Romeo D. Lonzanida and Estela D. Antipolo were candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. On 8 December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code both prohibit a local elective official from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position. The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution cancelling Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy. Lonzanida's motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the May 2010 elections. Eventually, Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of votes and

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor. Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Raymond C. Viray of Branch 75, Olongapo City on 5 July 2010. On the same date, Aratea wrote the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and requested for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanida's disqualification. DILG Legal Opinion stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal conviction. Thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without prejudice to the COMELEC's resolution of Lonzanida's motion for reconsideration. COMELEC then issued an order disqualifying Lonzanida on the grounds of his successive terms and the criminal conviction. On 25 August 2010, Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention. She claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC Second Division, through its 18 February 2010 Resolution, ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the striking out of his name from the list of official candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 elections. Aratea asserted that Antipolo, as the candidate who received the second highest number of votes, could not be proclaimed as the winning candidate. Since Lonzanida's disqualification was not yet final during election day, the votes cast in his favor could not be declared stray. COMELEC issued a resolution once again which, this time, granted Antipolo‘s petition to be the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Aratea was ordered to cease and desist from acting as the mayor. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Antipolo, a second-placer in the elections, should be declared as the mayor by virtue of Lonzanida‘s disqualification

only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections — Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of votes. A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. SC quoted from the COMELEC's 2 February 2011 Resolution with approval: As early as February 18, 2010, the Commission speaking through the Second Division had already ordered the cancellation of Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy, and had stricken off his name in the list of official candidates for the mayoralty post of San Antonio, Zambales. Thereafter, the Commission En Banc in its resolution dated August 11, 2010 unanimously affirmed the resolution disqualifying Lonzanida. Our findings were likewise sustained by the Supreme Court no less. The disqualification of Lonzanida is not simply anchored on one ground. On the contrary, it was emphasized in our En Banc resolution that Lonzanida's disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the constitutional fiat on the three-term limit; and second, as early as December 1, 2009, he is known to have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, on election day, respondent Lonzanida's disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in law. Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. (PS – There was a lengthy discussion about RPC, specifically on the principal/accessory penalty of disqualification. I presume hindi na mag-d-dwell si sir doon.) DELA CRUZ V. COMELEC G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012 DOCTRINE:

HELD: YES. SC held that Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor. Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was

Votes garnered by nuisance candidates whose names have not been deleted in the official ballots shall be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate. FACTS: In the 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections, petitioner ran for and was elected member of the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Bugasong, Antique. On November 28, 2009, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique under the ticket of the National People's Coalition (NPC). Subsequently,

24 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS Aurelio N. Dela Cruz (Aurelio) also filed a certificate of candidacy for the same position. IATSHE On December 6, 2009, petitioner filed a petition to declare Aurelio a nuisance candidate on the ground that he filed his certificate of candidacy for the vice-mayoralty position to put the election process in mockery and to cause confusion among voters due to the similarity of his surname with petitioner's surname. Petitioner emphasized that she is considered a very strong candidate for the said position having been elected as member of the SB for three consecutive terms under the ticket of the NPC and obtained the fifth (2001), fourth (2004) and third (2007) highest number of votes. In contrast, Aurelio is an unknown in the political scene with no prior political experience as an elective official and no political party membership. Being a retiree and having no known business, Aurelio has no sufficient source of income but since the 2007 elections petitioner's opponents have been prodding him to run for the same position as petitioner in order to sow confusion and thwart the will of the voters of Bugasong. Petitioner further cited Aurelio's miserable showing in the previous local elections when he ran and garnered only 126 and 6 votes for the positions of SB member (May 2007) and barangay captain of Barangay Maray, Bugasong (November 2007), respectively. Citing Bautista v. COMELEC, petitioner asserted that these circumstances clearly demonstrate Aurelio's lack of a bona fide intention and capability to run for the position of Vice-Mayor, thus preventing a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate. On January 29, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution declaring Aurelio as a nuisance candidate and cancelling his certificate of candidacy for the vice-mayoralty position in Bugasong. Despite the declaration of Aurelio as a nuisance candidate, however, his name was not deleted in the Certified List of Candidates and Official Sample Ballot issued by the COMELEC. The names of the candidates for Vice-Mayor, including Aurelio and respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete, appeared on the Official Sample Ballot. On May 10, 2010, the first automated national and local elections proceeded as scheduled. Aurelio's name remained in the official ballots. During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) of Bugasong on May 13, 2010, petitioner insisted that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio be counted in her favor. However, the MBOC refused, citing Resolution No. 8844. The Statement of Votes by Precinct for Vice-Mayor of Antique-Bugasong showed the following results of the voting: Dela Cruz, Aurelio – 532 votes; Dela Cruz, Casimira – 6389 votes; Pacete, John Lloyd – 6428 (winner in the tally). On May 21, 2010, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of the Province of Antique an election protest praying for (1) the tallying in her

favor of the 532 votes cast for Aurelio; (2) the annulment of respondent Pacete's proclamation as Vice-Mayor of Bugasong; and (3) her proclamation as winning candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor of Bugasong. ISSUE: If the name of a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy had been cancelled by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) was still included or printed in the official ballots on election day, should the votes cast for such nuisance candidate be considered stray or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate? HELD: VOTES SHOULD BE COUNTED IN FAVOR OF THE BONA FIDE CANDIDATE. SC held that the 532 votes cast for Aurelio N. Dela Cruz during the elections of May 10, 2010 should have been counted in favor of Casimira S. Dela Cruz and not considered stray votes, making her total garnered votes 6,921 as against the 6,428 votes of private respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete who was the declared winner. Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, 2010 elections. On the basis of Resolution No. 4116, the votes cast for him should not have been considered stray but counted in favor of petitioner. COMELEC's changing of the rule on votes cast for nuisance candidates resulted in the invalidation of significant number of votes and the loss of petitioner to private respondent by a slim margin. SC cited in Martinez case: Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter. The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the electoral exercise into an uneven playing field where the bona fide candidate is faced with the prospect of having a significant number of votes cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the mere presence of another candidate with a similar surname. Any delay on the part of the COMELEC increases the probability of votes lost in this manner. While political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the ballot, still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist. SC held that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, not stray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law. As earlier discussed, a petition to cancel or deny a COC under

25 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS Section 69 of the OEC should be distinguished from a petition to disqualify under Section 68. Hence, the legal effect of such cancellation of a COC of a nuisance candidate cannot be equated with a candidate disqualified on grounds provided in the OEC and Local Government Code. The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if the names of nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be discounted or eliminated, even under the automated voting system especially considering that voters who mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate instead of the bona fide candidate they intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots to correct the same. Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent with the rule well-ensconced in our jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. Indeed, as our electoral experience had demonstrated, such infirmities and delays in the delisting of nuisance candidates from both the Certified List of Candidates and Official Ballots only made possible the very evil sought to be prevented by the exclusion of nuisance candidates during elections. Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz is thereby declared the duly elected ViceMayor of the Municipality of Bugasong. DELOS SANTOS V. COA G.R. No. 198457, August 13, 2013 DOCTRINE: Public officers who are custodians of government funds shall be liable for their failure to ensure that such funds are safely guarded against loss or damage, and that they are expended, utilized, disposed of or transferred in accordance with the law and existing regulations, and on the basis of prescribed documents and necessary records. FACTS: Sometime in October 2001, then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco of the Second District of Cebu City entered into a Memorandum of Agreement 5 (MOA) with the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center (VSMMC or hospital), represented by Dr. Eusebio M. Alquizalas, Medical Center Chief, appropriating to the hospital the amount of P1,500,000.00 from his Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) to cover the medical assistance of indigent patients under the Tony N' Tommy (TNT) Health Program (TNT Program). It was agreed, inter alia, that: (a) Cuenco shall identify and recommend the indigent patients who may avail of the benefits of the TNT Program for an amount not exceeding P5,000.00 per patient, except those with major illnesses for whom a separate limit may

be specified; (b) an indigent patient who has been a beneficiary will be subsequently disqualified from seeking further medical assistance; and (c) the hospital shall purchase medicines intended for the indigent patients from outside sources if the same are not available in its pharmacy, subject to reimbursement when such expenses are supported by official receipts and other documents. In line with this, Ma. Isabel Cuenco, Project Director of the TNT Program, wrote petitioner Nelanie Antoni, Pharmacist V of VSMMC, requesting the latter to purchase needed medicines not available at the hospital pharmacy from Sacred Heart Pharmacy or Dell Pharmacy which were supposedly accredited suppliers of the Department of Health. The said request was approved. Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations of forgery and falsification of prescriptions and referrals for the availment of medicines under the TNT Program surfaced. On December 14, 2004, petitioner Filomena G. Delos Santos, who succeeded Dr. Alquizalas, created, through Hospital Order No. 1112, a fact-finding committee to investigate the matter. Meanwhile, the fact-finding committee created by Delos Santos submitted its Report dated January 18, 2005 essentially affirming the "unseen and unnoticeable" irregularities attendant to the availment of the TNT Program but pointing out, however, that: (a) VSMMC was made an "unwilling tool to perpetuate a scandal involving government funds X X X. In the initial investigation conducted by the CoA, the results of which were reflected in AOM No. 2005-001 dated October 26, 2005, it was found that: (a) 133 prescriptions for vaccines, drugs and medicines for anti-rabies allegedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy costing P3,407,108.40, and already paid by VSMMC from the PDAF of Cuenco appeared to be falsified; (b) 46 prescriptions for other drugs and medicines allegedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy costing P705,750.50, and already paid by VSMMC from the PDAF of Cuenco likewise appeared to be falsified; and (c) 25 prescriptions for drugs and medicines allegedly issued by Dell Pharmacy costing P602,063.50 were also ascertained to be falsified and have not been paid by VSMMC. Examination by the SAT of the records and interviews with the personnel involved showed that the purported patients-beneficiaries of the TNT Program were mostly non-existent and there was no actual procedure followed except for the mere preparation of payment documents which were found to be falsified. Subsequently, COA issued an order disallowing the amount of P3,386,697.10 for the payment of drugs and medicines for anti-rabies with falsified prescription and documents, and holding petitioners, together with other VSMMC officials, solidarily liable therefor. Petitioners appealed to the SC. ISSUE:

26 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [8] Part 2: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS Whether or not the CoA committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners solidarily liable for the disallowed amount of P3,386,697.10 HELD: NO. At the outset, it must be emphasized that the CoA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government. The CoA correctly pointed out that VSMMC, through its officials, should have been deeply involved in the implementation of the TNT Program as the hospital is a party to the MOA and, as such, has acted as custodian and disbursing agency of Cuenco's PDAF. Further, under the MOA executed between VSMMC and Cuenco, the hospital represented itself as "willing to cooperate/coordinate and monitor the implementation of a Medical Indigent Support Program." More importantly, it undertook to ascertain that "[a]ll payments and releases under [the] program . . . shall be made in accordance with existing government accounting and auditing rules and regulations." It is a standing rule that public officers who are custodians of government funds shall be liable for their failure to ensure that such funds are safely guarded against loss or damage, and that they are expended, utilized, disposed of or transferred in accordance with the law and existing regulations, and on the basis of prescribed documents and necessary records. However, as pointed out by the SAT, provisions of the National Budget Circular No. (NBC) 476 dated September 20, 2001 prescribing the guidelines on the release of funds for a congressman's PDAF authorized under Republic Act No. 8760 were not followed in the implementation of the TNT Program, as well as other existing auditing laws, rules and regulations governing the procurement of medicines.

would have been prevented from processing falsified claims and unlawfully disbursing funds from the said PDAF. Verily, petitioners cannot escape liability for failing to monitor the procedures implemented by the TNT Office on the ground that Cuenco always reminded them that it was his money. Petitioners' acts and/or omissions as detailed in the assailed CoA issuances and as described reasonably figure into the finding that they failed to faithfully discharge their respective duties and to exercise the required diligence which resulted to the irregular disbursements from Cuenco's PDAF. In this light, their liability must be upheld. Truly, the degree of their neglect in handling Cuenco's PDAF and the resulting detriment to the public cannot pass unsanctioned, else the standard of public accountability be loosely protected and even rendered illusory. Towards this end, and in addition to the liability of petitioners as adjudged herein, the Court deems it proper to refer this case to the Office of the Ombudsman for the investigation and possible prosecution of any and all criminal offenses related to the in irregular disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF.

Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated. Evidently, petitioners' neglect to properly monitor the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF facilitated the validation and eventual payment of 133 falsified prescriptions and fictitious claims for anti-rabies vaccines supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy, despite the patent irregularities borne out by the referral slips and prescriptions related thereto. Had there been an internal control system installed by petitioners, the irregularities would have been exposed, and the hospital 27 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO