Poli Case Digests 7 1
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF FRANCIS SAEZ VS GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO GR NO. 183533 AREVALO DOCTRINE: Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, can be held liable for affront against the petitioner‟s rights to life, liberty and security as long as substantial evidence exist to show that he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with knowledge of the violations, or had failed to exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary investigations required under the rules. It cannot be overemphasized that Section 1 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data expressly include in their coverage even threatened violations against a person‟s right to life, liberty or security. Further, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will – although not involving invasion of bodily integrity – nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of “freedom from threat”. FACTS: On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with the Court a petition to be granted the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order, inspection of place and production of documents. In the petition, he expressed his fear of being abducted and killed; hence, he sought that he be placed in a sanctuary appointed by the Court. He likewise prayed for the military to cease from further conducting surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for his name to be excluded from the order of battle and other government records connecting him to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007, he noticed that he was always being followed by a certain “Joel,” a former colleague at Bayan Muna. “Joel” pretended peddling pandesal in the vicinity of the petitioner‟s store. Three days before the petitioner was apprehended, “Joel” approached and informed him of his marital status and current job as a baker in Calapan, Mindoro Oriental. “Joel” inquired if the petitioner was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. When asked by the CA justices during the hearing if the petitioner had gone home to Calapan after having filed the petition, he answered in the negative explaining that he was afraid of Pvt. Osio who was always at the pier.
CA denied the petition for WRIT OF AMPARO because fail to allege how the supposed threat or violation of petitioner‟s [right to] life, liberty and security is committed. Neither is there any narration of any circumstances attendant to said supposed violation or threat to violate petitioner‟s right to life, liberty or security to warrant entitlement to the privilege of the writs prayed for. Application for WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is likewise denied because allegations therein do not comply with the aforestated requirements of Section 6 [Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data] of the pertinent rule. The petition is bereft of any allegation stating with specific definiteness as to how petitioner‟s right to privacy was violated or threatened to be violated. The court also dropped Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (then incumbent president) as a party respondent. The court issued a resolution affirming the decision of CA. Hence, this peititon. ISSUE: 1) Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the petition and dropping Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a party respondent. 2) Whether or not the CA committed gross abuse of discretion when it failed to conclude from the evidence offered by the petitioner the fact that by being placed in the order of battle list, threats and violations to the latter‟s life, liberty and security were actually committed by the respondents. HELD: 1) No. The petitioner, however, is not exempted from the burden of proving by substantial evidence his allegations against the President to make the latter liable for either acts or omissions violative of rights against life, liberty and security. In the instant case, the petitioner merely included the President‟s name as a party respondent without any attempt at all to show the latter‟s actual involvement in, or knowledge of the alleged violations. Further, prior to the filing of the petition, there was no request or demand for any investigation that was brought to the President‟s attention. Thus, while the President cannot be completely dropped as a respondent in a petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data merely on the basis of the presidential immunity from suit, the petitioner in this case failed to establish accountability of the President, as commander-in-chief, under the doctrine of command responsibility. 2) No. The Court notes that the petition for issuance of the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data is sufficient as to its contents. However,
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT they are mere allegations, which the Court cannot accept “hook, line and sinker”, so to speak, and whether substantial evidence exist to warrant the granting of the petition is a different matter altogether. In this case, the petition was mainly anchored on the alleged threats against his life, liberty and security by reason of his inclusion in the military‟s order of battle, the surveillance and monitoring activities made on him, and the intimidation exerted upon him to compel him to be a military asset. While as stated earlier, mere threats fall within the mantle of protection of the writs of amparo and habeas data, in the petitioner‟s case, the restraints and threats allegedly made allegations lack corroborations, are not supported by independent and credible evidence, and thus stand on nebulous grounds. (Details of the petitioner‟s claim and respective reasons why it was not considered sufficient:) -it was claimed that “Joel” once inquired from the petitioner if the latter was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. By itself, such claim cannot establish with certainty that the petitioner was being monitored. - The petitioner insisted that he was brought against his will and was asked to stay by the respondents in places under the latter‟s control. The respondents, on the other hand, averred that it was the petitioner who voluntarily offered his service to be a military asset, but was rejected as the former still doubted his motives and affiliations. - inclusion in the “order of battle” - it was categorically denied by respondent Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr. who stated that he “does not have knowledge about any Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) „order of battle‟ which allegedly lists the petitioner as a member of the CPP.” - Moreover, the evidence showed that the petitioner‟s mobility was never curtailed. From the time he was allegedly brought to Batangas in August of 2007 until the time he sought the assistance of KARAPATAN- ST, there was no restraint upon the petitioner to go home, as in fact, he went home to Mindoro on several instances.
accredited citizen‟s arm to conduct the “unofficial counting of votes for the national or local elections. FACTS: On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. It also mandated the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. On October 29, 2002, the COMELEC adopted, in its Resolution No. 02-0170, a modernization program for the 2004 elections consisting of three (3) phases, to wit: (1) PHASE I – Computerized system of registration and voters validation or the so-called "biometrics" system of registration; (2) PHASE II – Computerized voting and counting of votes; and (3) PHASE III – Electronic transmission of results. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three phases. Problems were encountered as to the enforcement of phase I and II, leaving Phase III imposable. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6712 regarding the said phase which leads to this petition. Resolution 6712 provides for the electronic transmission of advanced result of “unofficial” count. Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and would likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens‟ accredited arm, to conduct the "unofficial" quick count as provided under pertinent election laws. Comelec contended that the resolution was promulgated in the exercise of its executive and administrative power "to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections” Comelec added that the issue is beyond judicial determination. ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution 6712 was valid?
BRILLANTES VS COMELEC G.R. No. 163193 June 15, 2004 CRUZ, CHANINE
DOCTRINE: The quick count under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation would not only be pre-emptive of the authority of congress and NAMFREL, but would also be lacking constitutional and/or statutory basis. Congress has the sole and exclusive authority to officially canvass the votes for the elections of President and Vice-President. NAMFREL is solely authorized and the duly-
NO. The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 6712. The issue squarely fell within the ambit of the expanded jurisdiction of the court. It is a justiciable question. Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436, vest upon Congress the sole and exclusive authority to officially canvass the votes for the elections of President and VicePresident. Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely authorize
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT NAMFREL, the duly-accredited citizen‟s arm to conduct the “unofficial counting of votes for the national or local elections. The quick count under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation would not only be pre-emptive of the authority of congress and NAMFREL, but would also be lacking constitutional and/or statutory basis. The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President. The contention of the COMELEC that its tabulation of votes is not prohibited by the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 8436 as such tabulation is “unofficial,” is puerile and totally unacceptable. If the COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the President and VicePresident, the COMELEC is, with more reason, prohibited from making an “unofficial” canvass of said votes. Moreover, the assailed COMELEC resolution likewise contravened the constitutional provision that "no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." It being “unofficial”, any disbursement of public fund would be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General Appropriations Act. The Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and functions of the Commission subjects the same to certain conditions with respect to the adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, to wit: (1) consideration of the area and available funds (2) notification to all political parties and candidates. The aforementioned conditions were found to have not been substantially met. Resolution 6712 was null and void. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, ET. AL. GR No. 83896, GR No. 83815 || February 22, 1991 DUMALANTA DOCTRINE: While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be
construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials FACTS: These are two petitions assailing the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Cory Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions of the EO provide: Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman. Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive official of the Executive Department holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position. Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-owned or controlled corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary. Petitioners argue that this EO allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government positions in addition to their primary positions, however limited by Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. This provision prohibits respondents as members of the Cabinet, alongside other certain public officials, from holding any other office or employment during their tenure. ISSUE: WON the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned, admit of the
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT exceptions made for other appointive officials under Section 7, par (2), Article IX-B of the Constitution? HELD: NO. Section 7, Article IX-B contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government for both elective and appointive public officials. The prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is stricter and more specific, wherein it prohibits the President, the Vice President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided by the Constitution. Such disqualification is absolute and all-embracing, and covers both public and private office or employment. It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or functions may not transgress the prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or functions must be required by the primary functions of the official concerned, who is to perform the same in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation therefor. ESTRADA V. GMA G.R. Nos. 146710-15 [DISIERTO], 146738 [GMA], March 02, 2001 GATACELO CAVEAT: TIN CRUZ NEED NOT SUBMIT A DIGEST FOR THIS ROUND BECAUSE WE HAVE THE SAME CASE, APPARENTLY. LATE NA NAPANSIN. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO AND ESTRADA V. GMA ARE CONSOLIDATED CASES. DI KO ALAM KUNG BAKIT PA NILAGAY „TO NI SIR. DODOBLE NA LANG SI TIN NEXT WEEK, GANYAN. DOCTRINE: Resignation is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. Using the totality test (e.g. Angara‟s diary published in Philippine Daily Inquirer [WEIRD!], press statement, overt acts before, during, and after Estrada left Malacanan), Estrada has resigned from Office and thus Arroyo‟s [THE BEST PRESIDENT EVER!] assumption of power is valid and legal. FACTS:
EDSA DOS! Upon Singson‟s revelation that the President received millions of pesos from jueteng, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated. The more detailed revelations of President Estrada's alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and Industry. As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for his resignation intensified. The call reached a new crescendo when the 11 members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their number grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire. January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Estrada and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace. Part of his press statement reads: “At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.” Allegedly, on the same day, Estrada signed a letter addressed to the House of Representative, which states: “By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.” On January 22, however, Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued a Resolution recognizing Arroyo‟s presidency. Consequently, several cases for bribery, graft and corruption, perjury, serious misconduct, among others, were filed against Estrada before the Ombudsman. Now, Estrada came before the Supreme Court asking the Ombudsman to prohibit from conducting the investigation since his term as President had not yet ended, and that Arroyo was only performing in acting-capacity.
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT ISSUES: 1. Whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President. 2. Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. 3. Whether he is immune from criminal prosecution. RULING: 1. NO. Resignation is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President. As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner. The window is provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer. The Angara Diary reveals that in the morning of January 19, Estrada‟s loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to create an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo." An hour later or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country. At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary
Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the palace." This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time. In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) heacknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up, and (5) he called on this supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. With respect to the letter he allegedly sent to the Congress saying he was only incapable of performing his duties, to say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery. The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, nay even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation from the presidency, then the resignation must prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press release, still, it commands scant legal significance. Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people. There is
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT another reason why this Court cannot give any legal significance to petitioner's letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision. 2. No. Estrada claims that "Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII." This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President. However, the facts speak otherwise. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolutions recognizing and confirming Arroyo‟s assumption of power. Thereafter, Senate also passed a resolution of the same tenor. Give this, the Court has no jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco, we hold that this Court cannot "exercise its judicial power for this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative . . . branch of the government." Thus, SC rejects his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio." Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. 3. No. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and
the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser. CONCURRING OPINION VITUG, J.: So it is argued, Mr. Estrada remains to be the President because under the 1987 Constitution, the Vice-President may assume the presidency only in its explicitly prescribed instances; to wit, firstly, in case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President; secondly, when the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and thirdly, when a majority of all the members of the cabinet transmit to the President and to the speaker of the House of representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the latter two grounds being culled as the "disability." Resignation is an act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he renounces his office indefinitely. In order to constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by an act of relinquishment. Resignation implies, of the intention to surrender, renounce, relinquish the office. Abandonment of office is a species of resignation, and it connotes the giving up of the office although not attending by the formalities normally observed in resignation. Abandonment may be effected by a positive act or can be the result of an omission, whether deliberate or not. Mr. Joseph Estrada invokes "temporary incapacity" under Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution. This assertion is difficult to sustain since the temporary incapacity contemplated clearly envisions those that are personal, either by physical or mental in nature, and innate to the individual. Neither can it be implied that the takeover has installed a revolutionary government. A revolutionary government is one which has taken the seat of power by force or in defiance of the legal processes. EDSA 2 did not envision radical changes. The government structure has remained intact. Succession to the presidency has been by the dulyelected Vice-President of the Republic. All told the installation of Mme. Macapagal-Arroyo perhaps came close to, but not quite, the revolutionary government that we know. The new government, now undoubtedly in effective control of the entire country, domestically and internationally recognized to be legitimate, acknowledging a previous pronouncement of the court, is a de jure government both in fact and in law. A reminder of an elder to the youth.
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT After two non-violent civilian uprising within just a short span of years between them, it might be said that popular mass action is fast becoming an institutionalized enterprise. Should the streets now be the venue for the exercise of popular democracy? Where does one draw the line between the rule of law and the rule of the mob, or between "People Power" and "Anarchy?" If, as the sole justification for its being, the basis of the Arroyo presidency lies alone on those who were at EDSA, then it does rest on loose and shifting sands and might tragically open a Pandora's box more potent than the malaise it seeks to address. Conventional wisdom dictates the indispensable need for great sobriety and extreme circumspection on our part. In this kind of arena, let us be assumed that we are not overcome by senseless adventurism and opportunism. The country must not grow oblivious to the innate perils of people power for no bond can be stretched far too much to its breaking point. To abuse is to destroy that which we may hold dear. MENDOZA, J.: To recall these events is to note the moral framework in which petitioner's fall from power took place. Petitioner's counsel claimed petitioner was forced out of Malacañang Palace, seat of the Presidency, because petitioner was "threatened with mayhem." What, the President of the Philippines, who under the Constitution is the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces, threatened with mayhem? This can only happen because he had lost his moral authority as the elected President. Indeed, the people power movement did not just happen at the call of some ambitious politicians, military men, businessmen and/or prelates. It came about because the people, rightly or wrongly, believed the allegations of graft and corruption made by Luis "Chavit" Singson, Emma Lim, Edgardo Espiritu, and other witnesses against petitioner. This is the confession of one who is beaten. After all, the permanent disability referred to in the Constitution can be physical, mental or moral, rendering the President unable to exercise the powers and functions of his office. This is the clearest proof that petitioner was totally and permanently disabled at least as of 11 P.M. of Friday, January 19, 2001. Hence the negotiations for the transfer of power to the respondent Vice-President Gloria MacapagalArroyo. Indeed, the right to revolt cannot be recognized as a constitutional principle. A constitution to provide for the right of the people to revolt will carry with it the seeds of its own destruction. Rather, the right to revolt is affirmed as a natural right. Even then, it must be exercised only for weighty and serious reasons. What took place at EDSA was not a revolution but the peaceful expression of popular will. The operative fact which enabled Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to assume the presidency was the fact that there was a crisis, nay a vacuum, in the
executive leadership which made the government rife for seizure by lawless elements. For the foregoing reasons, I vote to dismiss the petitions in these cases. N.B. In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate. MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS G.R. NO. 88211. OCTOBER 27, 1989 GLORIA DOCTRINE: The President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. Also, among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. FACTS: Ferdinand E. Marcos was overthrown from presidency by Corazon Aquino, and he was forced into exile. The presidency of Corazon Aquino was challenged by failed coup attempts, and plots of Marcos loyalists and the Marcoses themselves. Marcos, in his deathbed, has expressed his desire to return to the Philippines. But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences of his return to the nation has firmly decided to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Thus, petitioners filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition, asking the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT their return to the Philippines. Having the petition initially denied by the Court, petitioners filed this motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the President has power to bar a Filipino from his own country, and if he/she has such power, whether or not President Aquino exercised it arbitrarily. HELD: Yes. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power. And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's implied or residual powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained analogy, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate. There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution and the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all, Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of the specific power of legislation. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision. Separate Opinions:
Cruz, dissentingNothing important has happened to change my vote for granting the petition. The death of Marcos has not plunged the nation into paroxysms of grief as the so-called "loyalists" had hoped. This only shows that if he was at all a threat to the national security when he was already moribund, that feeble threat has died with him. Paras, dissenting(2) The former President, although already dead, is still entitled to certain rights. (3) The alleged threats to national security have remained unproved and consequently, unpersuasive. (4) Reconciliation can proceed at a much faster pace if the petition for the return is granted. (5) The entire world will surely applaud our government's act of mercy. As Shakespeare once wrote "the quality of mercy is not strained." Surely, compassion is the better part of government. Padilla, dissentingRespondents have succeeded in denying Mr. Marcos the first two (2) rights, i.e. to return to and die in this country. The remaining right of this Filipino that cries out for vindication at this late hour is the right to be buried in this country. Respondents should not be allowed to complete the circle of denying the constitutional and human right of Mr. Marcos to travel which, as stated in my dissenting opinion, includes the right to return to, die and be buried in this country, if the Constitution is to still prevail. We are to avoid the completely indefensible act of denying a Filipino the last right to blend his mortal remains with a few square feet of earth in the treasured land of his birth. Sarmiento, dissentingIf the Constitution has imposed limitations on specific powers of the President, it has, a fortiori, prescribed a diminution of executive power. The Charter says that the right may only be restricted by: (1) a court order; or (2) by fiat of law. Had the fundamental law intended a presidential imprimatur, it would have said so. It would have also completed the symmetry: judicial, congressional, and executive restraints on the right. No amount of presumed residual executive power can amend the Charter. Also, the military has shown no hard evidence that "the return of the Marcoses" would indeed interpose a threat to national security. MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO G.R. No. 149036. April 2, 2002 GOMEZ
8 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT DOCTRINE: The term “ad interim appointment”, as used in letters of appointment by the President, means a permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. An ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office, and the withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, as any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office. FACTS: Petitioner Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag questions the constitutionality of the appointment and the right to hold office of the following: (1) Alfredo L. Benipayo as Chairman of the Commission on Elections; and (2) Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason,Jr. as COMELEC Commissioners. Petitioner also questions the legality of the appointment of Velma J. Cincoas Director IV of the COMELEC‟s Education and Information Department (“EID” for brevity). The COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as “Acting Director IV” of the EID. Thereafter, her appointments were subsequently renewed in “temporary capacity”. On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all expiring on February 2, 2008. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason took their respective oaths of office. The Office of the President then submitted to the Commission on Appointments the ad interim appointments of the three for confirmation. However, the Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments. On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions and for the same term of seven years, expiring on February 2, 2008. They took their oaths of office for a second time. The Office of the President transmitted on June 5, 2001 their appointments to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on their appointments. Thus, on June 8, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions. The Office of the President submitted their
appointments for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments. They took their oaths of office anew. In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated April 11, 2001 addressed to petitioner as Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco Officer-inCharge of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of EID and her reassignment to the Law Department but he denied her request. Petitioner then appealed to the COMELEC en banc. Likewise, she also filed an administrative and criminal complaint against Benipayo. During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interimappointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members. ISSUES: WON the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution HELD: (1) The SC found petitioner‟s argument without merit.An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
9 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows: “The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.” Thus, the term “ad interim appointment”, as used in letters of appointment signed by the President, means a permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term, although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence. An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that moment a government employee and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitutional protection that ”[n]o officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.” Thus, an ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office. Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process. (2) There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the President can no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but because of a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment. An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter.
A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. This is recognized in Section 17 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments. The jurisprudence under the 1935 Constitution governing ad interim appointments by the President is doubtless applicable to the present Constitution. The established practice under the present Constitution is that the President can renew the appointments of by-passed ad interim appointees. This is a continuation of the well-recognized practice under the 1935 Constitution, interrupted only by the 1973 Constitution which did not provide for a Commission on Appointments but vested sole appointing power in the President. The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad interimappointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years. PIMENTEL vs. ERMITA G.R. NO. 164978. October 13, 2005 LAZARO DOCTRINE: The law expressly allows the President to temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. FACTS: The Senate and the House of Representatives commenced their regular session on 26 July 2004. The Commission on Appointments, composed of Senators and Representatives, was constituted on 25 August 2004. Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments.
10 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Appointee|||
Arthur C. Yap||| Alberto G. Romulo||| Raul M. Gonzalez||| Florencio B. Abad||| Avelino J. Cruz, Jr.|| Rene C. Villa||| Joseph H. Durano||| Michael T. Defensor|||
Agriculture Foreign Affairs Justice Education National Defense Agrarian Reform Tourism Environment and Natural Resources
Date Appointment||| 15 August 2004||| 23 August 2004||| 23 August 2004||| 23 August 2004||| 23 August 2004||| 23 August 2004||| 23 August 2004|| 23 August 2004|||
Respondents took their oath of office and assumed duties as acting secretaries. Petitioners filed the present petition as Senators of the Republic of the Philippines. Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23 September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity. ISSUE: WON Arroyo's appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session is constitutional. HELD: Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President's confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee. The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that "the President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch." Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent. Petitioners assert that Section 17 does not apply to appointments vested in the President by the Constitution, because it only applies to appointments vested in the President by law. Petitioners forget that Congress is not the only source of law. "Law" refers to the Constitution, statutes or acts of Congress, municipal ordinances, implementing rules issued pursuant to law, and judicial decisions. Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But adinterim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. However, the Court finds no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo's issuance of ad interim
11 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZAMORA G.R. NO. 141284. AUG. 5, 2000 DOCTRINE: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. FACTS:
North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic Airport. On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional. IBP argues that no emergency exists that would justify the need for the calling of the military to assist the police force. It contends that no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the calling of the Marines. Thus, the IBP prays that this Court "review the sufficiency of the factual basis for said troop [Marine] deployment."||| ISSUE:
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President (Estrada), in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the "AFP"), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief. In the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols. The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anticrime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle,
WON there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President in calling the armed forces to warrant judicial review. HELD: No. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-inchief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President's wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Court's duty of purposeful hesitation" before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the President's judgment. To doubt is to sustain. The President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. The determination of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining order every time it is exercised.
concurrence of Congress is a public act of w/c the courts should take judicial notice. FACTS: Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., a member of the NPA, was found guilty by the trial court of the crime of murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant appealed the decision of the RTC. RTC: finds accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias Ka Django, alias Carlos Narra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo and for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, said Jose Patriarca alias Carlos Narra, Ka Django, is hereby acquitted.
Upon arraignment on November 25, 1993, accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Joint trial of the three cases was conducted considering the substantial identity of the facts and circumstances of the case. Prosecution witness Nonito Malto testified that on the accused, with ten (10) armed companions, requested permission to rest in his house, which was granted. They had with them a person who was hogtied. Accused Patriarca asked that the lights in Malto's house be extinguished and Malto complied. Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of July 1, 1987, Malto was awakened by a gunshot. When he looked out, he saw Patriarca holding a gun and ordering the person who was hogtied to lie down. After several minutes, Malto heard two gunshots. He then heard the accused direct his companions to carry away the dead man. Nonito Malto, later on, learned that the dead man was Alfredo Arevalo when Patriarca went back to his place, together with the military.The skeletal remains of Alfredo Arevalo were recovered in the property of a Rubuang Tolosa and were identified by Elisa Arevalo, the mother of the victim. After she was informed by her tenant Alegria Moratelio Alcantara that her son was abducted by the New People's Army (NPA) led by Patriarca, she reported the matter to the military and looked for him. She was informed by the residents of the place where the NPA passed, that they saw her son hogtied, that her son even asked for drinking water, and complained that he was being maltreated by the NPA. After three days of searching, a certain Walter Ricafort, an NPA member and a relative of hers, notified her that her son Alfredo was killed by Jose Patriarca, Jr.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive. It is a private act, which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the CE with the
In the municipal building, Nonito Malto likewise informed her of her son's death in the hands of Ka Django. Consequently, a Death Certificate was issued by the Local Civil Registrar.
Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the President's exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court. PEOPLE V. JOSE PATRIARCA G.R. No.135457, Sept.29, 2000 Matillano
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT When the skeletal remains of a man were recovered, she was able to identify them as belonging to her son by reason of the briefs found in the burial site. Her son, Alfredo Arevalo, used to print his name on the waistband of his briefs so that it would not get lost. Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724. His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his political beliefs. ISSUE: Whether or not the application for amnesty should be granted? HELD:
NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE G.R. No. 180643. March 25, 2008 MUÑEZ DOCTRINE: Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of the President. It exists to protect public interest, not to benefit a particular public official. Its purpose, among others, is to assure that the nation will receive the benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled communication and exchange of information between the President and his/her advisers in the process of shaping or forming policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise of the functions of the Presidency under the Constitution. FACTS:
Yes 'Applicant admitted joining the NPA in 1977. He served under the Sandatahang Yunit Pampropaganda and participated in armed activities: 'After a careful verification and evaluation on (sic) the claims of the applicant, the Local Amnesty Board concluded that his activities were done in the pursuit of his political beliefs. It thus recommended on 20 May 1998 the grant of his application for amnesty. The court acquitted the appellant. His application for amnesty was approved and one of the acts listed in the resolution of the Nat‟l Amnesty Commission is the killing of the victim in this case. The approval was pursuant to Proc. No 347 granting amnesty to all persons who shall apply who have committed crimes on or before June 1 1995 in pursuit of their political beliefs. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive. It is a private act, which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the CE with the concurrence of Congress is a public act of w/c the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of person or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, it abolishes or forgives the punishment thus it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office or right of suffrage unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (Art 36).
On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioner‟s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it. Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner‟s answers to these three questions by requiring him to appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioner‟s testimony on the ground of executive privilege. On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the President invoking executive privilege. On November 22, 2007, the respondent Committees issued the show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. On November 29, 2007, in petitioner‟s reply to respondent Committees, he manifested that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and
14 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. He also manifested his willingness to appear and testify should there be new matters to be taken up. He just requested that he be furnished "in advance as to what else" he "needs to clarify." Respondent Committees found petitioner‟s explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order citing petitioner in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. Petitioner then filed his Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction) on February 1, 2008. On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari on two grounds: first, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions were covered by executive privilege; and second, respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. ISSUE: WON there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege HELD: Yes. Respondent Committees claim that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are not covered by executive privilege because the elements of the presidential communications privilege are not present. A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power." First, respondent Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan does not relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power," because the Constitution does not vest it in the President alone, but also in the Monetary Board which is required to give its prior concurrence and to report to Congress. This argument is unpersuasive. The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less executive. "Quintessential" is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated essence of substance.24 On the other hand, "non-delegable" means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the
responsibility remains with the obligor.25 The power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.26 Now, the fact that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power. B. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege but, in any case, it is not conclusive. Second, respondent Committees also seek reconsideration of the application of the "doctrine of operational proximity" for the reason that "it may be misconstrued to expand the scope of the presidential communications privilege to communications between those who are „operationally proximate‟ to the President but who may have "no direct communications with her." It must be stressed that the doctrine of "operational proximity" was laid down in In re: Sealed Case27precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege. The U.S. court was aware of the dangers that a limitless extension of the privilege risks and, therefore, carefully cabined its reach by explicitly confining it to White House staff, and not to staffs of the agencies, and then only to White House staff that has "operational proximity" to direct presidential decision-making. In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath of the executive branch" (a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official family. Nevertheless, in circumstances in which the official involved is far too remote, this Court also mentioned in the Decision the organizational test laid down in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice.28 This goes to show that the operational proximity test used in the Decision is not considered conclusive in every case. In determining which test to use, the main consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the President, not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of their positions in the Executive‟s organizational structure. Thus, respondent Committees‟ fear that the scope of the privilege would be unnecessarily expanded with the use of the operational proximity test is unfounded. C. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely based
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT on a generalized interest; and in balancing respondent Committees’ and the President’s clashing interests, the Court did not disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information. Third, respondent Committees claim that the Court erred in upholding the President‟s invocation, through the Executive Secretary, of executive privilege because (a) between respondent Committees‟ specific and demonstrated need and the President‟s generalized interest in confidentiality, there is a need to strike the balance in favor of the former; and (b) in the balancing of interest, the Court disregarded the provisions of the 1987 Philippine Constitution on government transparency, Even in Senate v. Ermita, it was held that Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect for a coordinate and co-equal department. It is easy to discern the danger that goes with the disclosure of the President‟s communication with her advisor. The NBN Project involves a foreign country as a party to the agreement. It was actually a product of the meeting of minds between officials of the Philippines and China. Whatever the President says about the agreement - particularly while official negotiations are ongoing - are matters which China will surely view with particular interest. There is danger in such kind of exposure. It could adversely affect our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People‟s Republic of China. Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition involves the President‟s dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court is wary of approving the view that Congress may peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented acts of the President but even her confidential and informal discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative need. Regardless of who is in office, this Court can easily foresee unwanted consequences of subjecting a Chief Executive to unrestricted congressional inquiries done with increased frequency and great publicity. No Executive can effectively discharge constitutional functions in the face of intense and unchecked legislative incursion into the core of the President‟s decision-making process, which inevitably would involve her conversations with a member of her Cabinet. With respect to respondent Committees‟ invocation of constitutional prescriptions regarding the right of the people to information and public accountability and transparency, the Court finds nothing in these arguments to support respondent Committees‟ case.
Incidentally, the right primarily involved here is the right of respondent Committees to obtain information allegedly in aid of legislation, not the people‟s right to public information. This is the reason why we stressed in the assailed Decision the distinction between these two rights. As laid down in Senate v. Ermita, "the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress" and "neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials." As pointed out, these rights belong to Congress, not to the individual citizen. It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the parties here are respondent Committees and petitioner Neri and that there was no prior request for information on the part of any individual citizen. This Court will not be swayed by attempts to blur the distinctions between the Legislature's right to information in a legitimate legislative inquiry and the public's right to information. CLINTON VS JONES 520 U.S. 681 (1997) Murillo DOCTRINE: A sitting President of The United States does not have immunity from civil lawsuits based on the President‟s private actions unrelated to his public actions as President. FACTS: Petitioner, William Jefferson Clinton, was elected to the Presidency in 1992, and reelected in 1996. His term of office expires on January 20, 2001. In 1991, he was the Governor of the State of Arkansas. Respondent, Paula Corbin Jones, is a resident of California. In 1991, she lived in Arkansas, and was an employee of the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission. Respondent filed a complaint containing four counts against President Clinton, alleging that the petitioner made unwanted sexual advances towards her when he was the Governor of Arkansas. She alleged that her rejection of those advances led to punishment by her supervisors in the state job she held at the time. Petitioner filed motions asking the district court to dismiss the case on grounds of presidential immunity, and to prohibit Jones from re-filing the suit until after the end of his presidency. The district court rejected the presidential immunity argument, but held that no trial would take place until the Petitioner was no longer president. Both parties appealed to the United States Supreme Court. ISSUE:
16 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Whether or not the President can be involved in a lawsuit during his presidency for actions that occurred before the tenure of his presidency and that were not related to official duties of the presidency? HELD: YES. The President of the United States can be involved in a lawsuit during his tenure for actions not related to his official duties as President. It was an abuse of discretion of the District Court to order a stay of this lawsuit until after the President‟s tenure. The District Court‟s decision to order a stay was premature and a lengthy and categorical stay takes no account whatsoever of the Respondent‟s interest in bringing the suit to trial. It is important to recognize that civil lawsuits could significantly interfere with the public duties of an official. The concurring judge believed that ordinary case-management principles were likely to prove insufficient to deal with private civil lawsuits, unless supplemented with a constitutionally based requirement that district courts schedule proceedings so as to avoid significant interference with the President‟s ongoing discharge of his official responsibilities. A sitting President of The United States does not have immunity from civil lawsuits based on the President‟s private actions unrelated to his public actions as President. The doctrine of separation of powers does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves office. The doctrine of separation of powers is concerned with the allocation of official power among the three co-equal branches of government. As Madison explained, separation of powers does not mean that the branches "ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other." The fact that a federal court's exercise of its traditional Article III jurisdiction may significantly burden the time and attention of the Chief Executive is not sufficient to establish a violation of the Constitution. Two long-settled propositions, first announced by Chief Justice Marshall, support that conclusion. First, it has been long held that when the President takes official action, the Court has the authority to determine whether he has acted within the law. Second, it is also settled that the President is subject to judicial process in appropriate circumstances. In sum, "[i]t is settled law that the separationof-powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of the United States." If the Judiciary may severely burden the Executive Branch by reviewing the legality of the President's official conduct, and if it may direct appropriate process to the President himself, it must follow that the federal courts have power to determine the legality of his unofficial conduct. The burden on the President's time and energy that is a mere byproduct of such review surely cannot be considered as onerous as the direct burden imposed by judicial review and the occasional invalidation of his official actions. 17 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO