Poli Case Digests 4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES VILLAVICENCIO VS LUKBAN GR NO. L- 14639 MARCH 25, 1919
which directed them to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty.
"The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives."
1. WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to grant the petition for habeas corpus.
2. WON the writ may be granted even if the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; that they were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits HELD:
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers. About midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25. The attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. The application set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally re- strained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court. The court awarded the writ
1. Yes. The fiscal contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ. 2. Yes. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right. Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded. Government of Laws. Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that
supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee , 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." TUASON VS REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALOOCAN CITY GR NO. 70484 DOCTRINE: The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a determination of facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function, 10 or an exercise of jurisdiction — which is the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause. FACTS: Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers. On April 6, 1965, with funds pooled from their retirement benefits and savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. (hereafter simply, Carmel) a piece of land measuring about 8,756 square meters, in the latter's subdivision in Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. In virtue of this sale, Carmel's Torrens title (No. 64007) over the lot was cancelled and a new one (No. 8314) issued in the name of the Tuasons. The Tuasons took possession of their property. They woke up one morning to discover that by presidential flat, they were no longer the owners of the land they had purchased with their hardearned money, and that their land and the other lots in the subdivision had been "declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants thereof." A year almost to the day after the declaration of martial law Mr. Ferdinand Marcos, then president of the country, invoking his emergency powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 293 with immediate effect. The decree invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons' vendor, Carmel, which had earlier purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into several lots for sale to the public (the Tuasons being
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES among the buyers). The land bought by Carmel was part of the Tala Estate (one of the so-called "Friar Lands"). Carmel had bought the land under Act No. 1120 and C.A. No. 32, as amended. Said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding that Carmel had failed to complete payment of the price. On the strength of this presidential decree, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City caused the inscription on the Tuasons' title, TCT No. 8314, of the following:
MEMORANDUM. — Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 293, this certificate of title is declared invalid and null and void ab initio and considered cancelled as against the Government and the property described herein is declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc.
ARGUMENTS: The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos decree as an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in violation not only of the constitutional provisions on due process and eminent domain but also of the provisions of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles; and they prayed that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory inscription on their title and restore its efficacy, or in the alternative, that they be compensated for the loss from the Assurance Fund. Mr. Marcos' Solicitor General sought to sustain the decree. In his comment on the petition, he questioned the propriety of the remedy of certiorari resorted to by the petitioners, it not appearing that the public respondents were being sued as judicial or quasi-judicial officers who had acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. He opined that the petitioner spouses had no cause to complain of unjust deprivation of property because in legal contemplation they had never become owners thereof because of non-payment of the purchase price by their predecessor-in-interest; and the decree was justifiable under the social justice clause of the Constitution and the police power, being in response to the pressing housing need of the employees of the Office of the President who were left homeless and landless after they were asked to vacate Malacanang Park where they had theretofore been residing. He expressed the view, too, that petitioner spouses were not entitled to recover anything from the Assurance Fund.
1. WON the remedy of certiorari is proper considering that Pres. Marcos is neither a judicial or quasi-judicial officer. 2. Whether or not PD 293, as exercise of the President’s emergency powers, is valid
1. Yes. It is true that the extraodinary writ of certiorari may properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of prohibition which may be directed against acts either judicial or ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person ... exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the petition will be shown upon analysis to be in reality directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power. 2. The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a determination of facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function, or an exercise of jurisdiction — which is the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause. He adjudged it to be an established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of ... (the) Association (of homeowners) stand." And applying the law to that situation, he made the adjudication that "title to said land has remained with the Government, and the land now occupied by the members of said association has never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines," and that 'any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the said property of the Republic ... (were) null and void ab initio as against the law and public policy. These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law — the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his office as chief executive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had assumed as head of the martial law regime. Moreover, he had assumed to exercise power — i.e. determined the relevant facts and applied the law thereto without a trial at which all interested parties were accorded the opportunity to adduce evidence to furnish the basis for a determination of the facts material to the controversy. He made the finding ostensibly on the basis of "the records of the Bureau of Lands." Prescinding from the fact that there is no indication whatever the nature and reliability of these records and that they are in no sense conclusive, it is undeniable that the petitioner Tuasons (and the petitioners in intervention) were never confronted with those records and afforded a chance to dispute their trustworthiness and present countervailing evidence. This is yet another fatal defect. The adjudication was patently and grossly violative of the right to due process to which the petitioners are entitled in virtue of the Constitution. Mr. Marcos, in other words, not only arrogated unto himself a power never granted to him by the Constitution or the laws but had in addition exercised it unconstitutionally.
were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. The provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes. On November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office. Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified Petitioner Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period Respondent Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation.
ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION GR NO. L-45081
The Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.
1. WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and if in the affirmative,
1. Yes. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the
In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor,
2. WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly? HELD:
4 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." 2. No. The issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides: "SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of
determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court. The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature. If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.
5 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction. From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time when the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose
election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935). We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered. MARCOS vs MANGLAPUS G.R. 88211 September 15, 1989 CRUZ, CHANINE DOCTRINE: The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare; The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel. FACTS: Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into exile. Corazon Aquino’s ascension into presidency was challenged by failed coup attempts as well as by plots of Marcos loyalists and the Marcoses themselves. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, this petition for mandamus and prohibition to order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs Manglapus, et. al to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family, and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Marcos invokes the constitutional guarantees of liberty of abode and right to travel.
capriciously. Further, the ponencia (the coups, the communist threat, peace and order issues especially in Mindanao, Marcos loyalists plotting) bolsters the conclusion that the return of Marcos will only exacerbate the situation in the country. Another reason of the Court: ―We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.‖ (2) No. In essence, the right involved in this case is the ―right to return to one’s country‖, which is a separate and distinct right from the liberty of abode and the right to travel. These two rights may only be restricted by reasons of national security, public order, public health, etc. Being distinct from each other, it would be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one’s country in the same context as those two other rights. Our Bill of Rights only embraces the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but we must take into consideration this right to return, pursuant to the generally accepted principles of international law.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos to the Philippines? (2) Whether or not Marcos’ liberty of abode and travel are impaired by Pres. Aquino/’s prohibition of their return? RULING: (1) Yes. The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light of constitutional provisions, it must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. Such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied. It is found by the Court that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, that there exist factual bases for the President's decision. Hence, this act cannot be said to have been done arbitrarily or
CASIBANG vs AQUINO G.R. L-38025 August 20, 1979 DOCTRINE: A purely justiciable question implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law for said breach of right. FACTS: Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, Dante Casibang who seasonably filed on November 24, 1971 a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code. Proceedings therein continued with respect to the election protest of petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, presided by respondent Judge Aquino, who initially took cognizance of the same as it is unquestionably a justiciable controversy. In the meantime or on September 21, 1972,
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two mont hs t he reafte r, m ore or le ss, or specifically on Nov 29, 1972, the 1971Const it utional Conve nt ion passed and a p p r o v e d a C o n s t i t u t i o n t o s u p p l a n t t h e 1 9 3 5 Constitutin; and the same was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of the Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, this Court declared that "there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect". The petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence and in fact had rested his case, when Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which — principally (Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2of Article XI) — a political question has intervened in the case.
provision to the President must be consistent: that authority must be exercised in "the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security."||| FACTS: The President issued an EO which imposed, across the board, including crude oil and other oil products, additional duty ad valorem. The Tariff Commission held public hearings on said EO and submitted a report to the President for consideration and appropriate action. The President, on the other hand issued an EO which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products. ISSUE:
Whether or not the President may issue an EO which is tantamount to enacting a bill in the nature of revenue-generating measures?
Whether or not the case is under the purview of political question?
Yes. Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. There is explicit constitutional permission (Section 28 of Article VI of the Constitution) to Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . ." The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, and Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions thereof. These are the provisions which the President explicitly invoked in promulgating Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478.
No, the case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary par la nce , name ly, a q uest i on of p o l icy . It refer s t o th o se q u e s t i o n s w h i c h u n d e r t h e Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. The trial under the Court of First Instance should proceed. GARCIA vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 101273. July 3, 1992 DOCTRINE: The President is authorized by the Congress to fix tariff rates and other duties and imposts; The Tariff and Customs Code establishes the general standards with which the exercise of the authority delegated by that
Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code establishes general standards with which the exercise of the authority delegated by that provision to the President must be consistent: that authority must be exercised in "the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security." Petitioner, however, insists that the "protection of local industries" is the only permissible objective that can be secured by the exercise of that delegated authority, and that therefore "protection of local industries" is the sum total or the alpha and omega of "the national economy, general welfare and/or national security." We find it extremely difficult to take
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES seriously such a confined and closed view of the legislative standards and policies summed up in Section 401. We believe, for instance, that the protection of consumers, who after all constitute the very great bulk of our population, is at the very least as important a dimension of "the national economy, general welfare and national security" as the protection of local industries. And so customs duties may be reduced or even removed precisely for the purpose of protecting consumers from the high prices and shoddy quality and inefficient service that tariff-protected and subsidized local manufacturers may otherwise impose upon the community. Hence, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which levied special duties on imported crude oil and imported oil products as a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority under the Tariff and Customs Code. ARANETA VS DINGLASAN G.R. No. L-2044. August 26, 1949 CRUZ, CHRISTINE
PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY. Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The consequences of the various constructions offered will also be resorted to as additional aid to interpretation. Under this law, Congress delegated its legislative power to the President during a time of war as provided for in Section 26 Art. VI of the Constitution. On June 21, 1947 Pursuant to this delegation, the President issued Executive Orders regulating rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings etc. The petitioner specifically Araneta, is under prosecution for violation of the provisions of this Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of the Writ of Prohibition contending that the Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have any force and effect. ISSUE:
When did the Emergency Powers Act become inoperative? Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, must be temporary or it cannot be said to be an emergency. FACTS: This case is a consolidation of three petitions filed by J. Araneta (who is prosecuted under Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings), Antonio Ma. Guerrerro (who filed a mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes but denied because it violates E.O 192, which aims to control exports from the Philippines), and Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., (application for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing money under this Executive Order. Affected here is Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the holding of the national elections to be held in November, 1949). The common factor among these cases is the challenge on validity of executive orders of the President avowedly issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. During World War II, on December 16, 1941, Congress enacted Commonwealth Act No. 671 otherwise known as the AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE
HELD: The SC ruled that Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946. Since the assailed executive orders were issued after the said date, they were issued without authority of law. Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not fix the duration of its effectiveness, but Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, must be temporary or it cannot be said to be an emergency. It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law. After the convening of Congress new legislation had to be approved if the continuation of the emergency powers, or some of them, was desired. The fact that Congress was able to hold a regular session denotes that the emergency such as war which caused congress to delegate its legislative powers to the president no longer existed. The holding of a regular session by Congress has made the Emergency Powers Act automatically inoperative.
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES authority granted by this provision, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on October 12, 1990 Executive Order No. 429, "Providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao.
Separate opinions: Act no. 671 should have become inoperative when Congress held a special session on June 9, 1945. The SC did not appreciate the fact that a special session also signifies that congress is no longer prevented to conduct sessions by the threat of war or emergency. Also there shouldn’t have been a blanket voiding of all executive orders after Act no. 671 became inoperative since those laws have created rights for the people and have been issued in good faith. There should have been a careful deliberation by congress for each executive order on whether or not they could stand as valid laws on their own. CHONGBIAN VS. ORBOS G.R. No. 96754. June 22, 1995 DOCTRINE: While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied. 10 Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subjects as that of the challenged legislation. FACTS: Pursuant to Art. X, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling for a plebiscite to be held in several provinces of Mindanao. In the ensuing plebiscite held on November 16, 1989, four provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous region. These are the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and TawiTawi. In accordance with the constitutional provision, these provinces became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of the Autonomous Region, Art. XIX, Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides, that only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscites shal be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shal remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided, however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions. Pursuant to the
Petitioners at the time of the filing of their petition, are members of Congress representing various legislative districts in South Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Lanao del Norte and Zamboanga City. On November 12, 1990, they wrote then President Aquino protesting E.O. No. 429. They contended that there is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities within the existing regions — some of which did not even take part in the plebiscite as in the case of the province of Misamis Occidental and the cities of Oroquieta, Tangub and Ozamiz — and restructure them to new administrative regions. On the other hand, the law (Sec. 13, Art. XIX, R.A. 6734) is specific to the point, that is, that "provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shal remain in the existing administrative regions. Simply stated, petitioners contention is that ---while the authority necessarily includes the authority to merge, the authority to merge does not include the authority to reorganize. Therefore, the President's authority under RA No. 6734 to "merge existing regions" cannot be construed to include the authority to reorganize. Another petition was filed a Jaldon, filing in his capacity as taxpayer and citizen of the Philippines. Petitioners in both cases contend that Art. XIX, Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because (1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and (2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law. ISSUE: 1.WON the president has the authority to reorganize the said province/ WON there is undue delegation of legislative power to the president 2. Won the Congress has provided sufficient standard by w/c the president is to be guided in the exercise of such power HELD: 1. There is no undue delegation. In conferring on the President the power "to merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES local governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices. As this Court observed in Abbas, "while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, Sec. 4 of the Constitution]." The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes 2. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subjects as that of the challenged legislation. With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business." Indeed, as the original eleven administrative regions were established in accordance with this policy, it is logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" in view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces now constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative regions.
have been or shall be a signatory. FACTS: Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines, is charged before a Military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such commander to control the operations of members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces, in violation of the laws and customs of war." Petitimer Kuroda comes before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines; to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission; and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioner. Executive Order No. 68, established a National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals.It was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th day of July, 1947. Petitioner's contention:
KUROSAWA VA JALANDONI G.R. No. L-2662. March 26, 1949
1. E.O 68 is unconstitutional for it violates not only the provisions of our constitutional law but also our local laws, to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and, therefore, petitioner is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international. 2. That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the Commission in behalf of the United States of America, of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port, who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines 3. That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecutors, the United States not being a party in interest in the case.
International rules and principles, form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may
WON E.O 68 is unconstitutional on the ground that the philippines is not a signatory of the mentioned conventions.
The reorganization of administrative regions in E.O. No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit: (1) contiguity and geographical features; (a) transportation and communication facilities; (3) cultural and language grouping (4) land area and population; (5) existing regional centers adopted by several agencies; (6) socio-economic development programs in the regions and (7) number of provinces and cities.
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES E.O 68 is valid. In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of the present day, including the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nations, all those persons, military of civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization, are held accountable therefor. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. In fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who were signatories to the two Conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory. Furthermore, when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed, the Philippines was under the sovereignty of the United States, and thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan, to the rights and obligations contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligations were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all, our emergence as a free state entitles us to enforce the right, on our own, of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against our people. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that — "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generaly accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.( tingin ko 1935 constitution to since 1943 case) Add'l info: There is nothing in Executive Order No. 68 which requires that counsel appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In fact, it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training. The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law, with jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner by having said petitioner in its custody, this Court will not interfere with the due processes of such Military Commission. Dissenting opinion: Executive Order No. 68 provides rules of procedure for the conduct of trials before the War Crimes Office. This provision on procedural subject constitutes a usurpation of the rule-making power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court. It further authorizes military commissions to adopt additional rules of procedure. If the President of the Philippines cannot exercise the rule making power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court, he cannot, with more reason, delegate that power to military commissions. Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671, granting the President of the Philippines emergency powers to promulgate rules and regulations during national emergency has ceased to have effect since the liberation of the Philippines, or at latest, upon the surrender of Japan on September 2, 1945. The absurdity of the contention that these emergency acts continued in effect even after the surrender of Japan cannot be gainsaid. Only a few months after liberation, and even before the surrender of Japan, the Congress started to function normally. To let the hypothesis on continuance prevail will result in the existence of two distinct, separate and independent legislative organs. — the Congress and the President of the Philippines. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. LANTION G.R. NO. 139465, JANUARY 18, 2000 GATACELO DOCTRINE: The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect — a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution. FACTS: In 1977, Marcos issued PD 1069, prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country. Consequently, Secretary of Justice Drilon signed the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The Senate also expressed its concurrence in the ratification of
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES said treaty. In 1994, DOJ received from the U.S. DFA a diplomatic note requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached was the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court. Jimenez appears to be charged with conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; attempt to evade or defeat tax; fraud by wire, radio, or television; false statement or entries; election contributions in name of another. Jimenez, subsequently, requested that he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the request of the US Government. However, Sec. Drilon denied the request stating that evaluation by this Department of the documents is not a preliminary investigation or akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. Thus, the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are not available. It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said documents. Moreover, the formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and documents obtained through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law. Jimenez then filed with RTC Manila a petition against the Secretary, et al. for mandamus – to compel Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively; prohibition – to restrain DOJ from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court. RTC ruled in favor of Jimenez. ISSUE: WON Jimenez’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty. HELD: No. The rule of pacta sunt servanda equires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them; in a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances. The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect — a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution. In the case at bar, there is no conflict between international law and municipal or national law. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty/PD 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. Prior the filing of petition to extradite, the law is silent as to these rights. Thus, in the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Take note that Jimenez does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. He faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. Thus, the evaluation process, in essence, partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation making available certain constitutional rights to the prospective extradite. ALIH, ET AL. V. GEN. GASTRO, ET AL. G.R. NO. L-69401, JUNE 23, 1987 DOCTRINE:
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES Respondents defied the precept that "civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military" so clearly proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution. In the instant case, the respondents simply by-passed the civil courts, which had the authority to determine whether or not there was probable cause to search the petitioner's premises. FACTS: More than 200 Philippine marines raided (commonly known as operation ―zona‖) the compound occupied by Alih, et al. in Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the invasion with a burst of gunfire. No one was hurt as presumably the purpose was merely to warn the intruders and deter them from entering. Unfortunately, as might be expected in incidents like this, the situation aggravated soon enough. The soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in a number of casualties. The besieged compound surrendered the following morning. The military also inventoried and confiscated rifles, grenades, among others. Alih, et al. filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order – to recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and to challenge their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right against selfincrimination. They argued further that these were taken without a search warrant pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, which was inforce at the time of the incident in question, and Article IV, Section 4(2). Respondents, while admitting the absence of the required search warrant, sought to justify their act on the ground that they were acting under superior orders, and it was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem generated by the assassination of the Mayor.
committed therein against the petitioners. Alih, et al. were merely suspected of the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily pronounced by the military. Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of argument that they were guilty, they would not have been any less entitled to the protection of the Constitution, which covers both the innocent and the guilty. Moreover, if the respondents did not actually disdain the Constitution when they made their illegal raid, they certainly gave every appearance of doing so. In acting as they did, they also defied the precept that "civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military" so clearly proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution. In the instant case, the respondents simply bypassed the civil courts, which had the authority to determine whether or not there was probable cause to search the petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded to make the raid without a search warrant on their own unauthorized determination of the petitioner's guilt. The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant from any of the TEN civil courts then open and functioning in Zamboanga City before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly processes required by the Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military invasion. It follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution, all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous tree." LIM V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. NO. 151445, APRIL 11, 2002
ISSUE: WON the civilian authority has been bypassed and thus violated the Constitutional rights of the petitioners. HELD: Yes. The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in question certainly did not excuse the non-observance of the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. There was no state of hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it could, the repressions
DOCTRINE: Sections 2, 7, and 8 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies betray a marked antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct exception. FACTS:
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES In 2002, personnel from the armed forces of USA started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in "Balikatan 02-1." In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty. Prior to 2002, the last "Balikatan" was held in 1995. This was due to the paucity of any formal agreement relative to the treatment of United States personnel visiting the Philippines. In the meantime, the respective governments of the two countries agreed to hold joint exercises on a reduced scale. The lack of consensus was eventually cured when the two nations concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1999. The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic events that occurred on September 11, 2001. Consequently, Lim, et al.filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. They argued that the Philippines and US signed the mutual defense treaty (MDT) in 1951 to provide mutual military assistance in accordance with the 'constitutional processes' of each country only in the case of an armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country against one of them. By no stretch of the imagination can it be said that the Abu Sayyaf bandits in Basilan constitute an external armed force that has subject the Philippines to an armed external attack to warrant US military assistance under the MDT of 1951. Neither does the VFA of 1999 authorize American soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine territory, not even to fire back "if fired upon. On the other hand, Solicitor General is of the view that since the Terms of Reference are clear as to the extent and duration of "Balikatan 02-1," the issues raised by petitioners are premature, as they are based only on a fear of future violation of the Terms of Reference. Apart from these threshold issues, the Solicitor General claims that there is actually no question of constitutionality involved. The true object of the instant suit, it is said, is to obtain an interpretation of the VFA. ISSUE: WON Balikatan 02-01 is constitutional. WON American troops may engage in combat while in the Philippines. HELD: Yes. The lapse of the US-Philippine Bases Agreement in 1992 and the decision not to renew it created a vacuum in US-Philippine defense relations, until it was replaced by the VFA. It should be recalled that in
2000, this Court upheld the validity of the VFA. The VFA provides the "regulatory mechanism" by which "United States military and civilian personnel [may visit] temporarily in the Philippines in connection with activities approved by the Philippine Government." It contains provisions relative to entry and departure of American personnel, driving and vehicle registration, criminal jurisdiction, claims, importation and exportation, movement of vessels and aircraft, as well as the duration of the agreement and its termination. It is the VFA which gives continued relevance to the MDT despite the passage of years. Its primary goal is to facilitate the promotion of optimal cooperation between American and Philippine military forces in the event of an attack by a common foe. Now, is "Balikatan 02-1" covered by the VFA? The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities," the exact meaning of which was left undefined. However, applying the provisions of the Vienna Convention to interpret the treaty, it appears that the Terms of Reference, as approved by the Senate, rightly fall within the context of the VFA. After studied reflection, the joint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation's marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress, and the like. Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that "Balikatan 02-1," a "mutual anti-terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise," falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities — as opposed to combat itself — such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized. IN SHORT, IF VFA IS VALID, THE BALIKATAN IS ALSO VALID. No. The Terms of Reference, approved by the Senate, stipulates that US exercise participants may not engage in combat "except in self-defense.‖ Neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory. In the same manner, both the MDT and VFA must be read in the context of the 1987 Constitution. In particular, the MDT was concluded way before the present Charter, though it nevertheless remains in effect as a valid source of international obligation [Remember Hofi!]. The Declaration of Principles and State Policies provides that: SEC. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
15 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES SEC. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to selfdetermination. SEC. 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in the country. The aforequoted provisions betray a marked antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct exception. Moreover, provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State. The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory. CALALANG VS WILLIAMS G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940 GLORIA DOCTRINE: Social justice is not to be achieved through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is ―neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,‖ but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
to 530 pm; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm. The Chairman of the NTC recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned pursuant to the provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 548. The Director and the Secretary approved the recommendations with the modifications. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila then caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. Consequently, all animal-drawn vehicles were disallowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well. Calalang contends that (1) Commonwealth Act No. 548, which authorizes the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets, is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power; (2) the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion; and (3) the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution is valid. HELD:
FACTS: Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission (NTC); Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila. The NTC issued a resolution, recommending to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street from 7:30 am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm
Yes. (1) Commonwealth Act No. 548 does not confer legislative power to determine what public policy demands. Rather it confers authority to promulgate the rules and regulations to merely carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, ―to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines‖, and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic ―whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest.‖ To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. (2) Also, Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National
16 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. (3) There is no infringement of the promotion of social justice, because social justice is not to be achieved through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is ―neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,‖ but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about ―the greatest good to the greatest number.‖ POSTIGO VS PHILIPPINE TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETY, INC. (PTSI) G.R. No. 155146 January 24, 2006 DOCTRINE: No provision in R.A. No. 7641 justifies the exclusion of employees in the public sector, who are already enjoying retirement benefits under the GSIS law, from the New Retirement Law. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7641 provides that ―nothing in this Act shall deprive any employee of benefits to which he may be entitled under existing laws or company policies or practices.‖ (In this case, there was no mention of anything on the 1987 Constitution’s Principles and State Policies. But considering that the main issue of the case involves labor, the case is a reflection of Sections 9, 10 and 18 of Art. II of the Constitution.) FACTS: Dr. Perla A. Postigo, et al., regular employees of the Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. (PTSI), retired on various dates from 1996 to 1998. Upon retirement from service, some of them who were compulsory members of the GSIS obtained retirement benefits from the GSIS. At the time the petitioners retired, Republic Act No. 7641 amended Article 287 of
the Labor Code, granting retirement pay to qualified employees in the private sector, in the absence of any retirement plan or agreement with the company. PTSI did not have a retirement plan for its employees, aside from its contribution to the GSIS, so Postigo claimed from PTSI their retirement benefits under R.A. No. 7641. PTSI denied their claims on the ground that the GSIS benefits removed them from the coverage of the law. The Bureau of Working Conditions (BWC) of the Department of Labor and Employment regarding, upon Postigo’s inquiry, confirmed their entitlement to the retirement benefits provided in R.A. No. 7641. Despite the same opinion rendered and submitted by the PTSI’s legal counsel, Atty. Rene V. Sarmiento, to its Board of Directors, PTSI refused to pay the petitioners their retirement benefits. Postigo then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter, where the Labor Arbiter ruled in their favor. However, one petitioner, Dr. Tan who was awarded her terminal leave pay, was not included in the award of retirement benefits. PTSI then appealed to the NLRC. Instead of posting the required cash or surety bond equivalent to the amount of the award, PTSI filed a Motion to Reduce Bond on the ground that the amount awarded by the Labor Arbiter was erroneous. The NLRC dismissed the appeal for failure to post the required cash or surety bond. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRC. Postigo et al. contend that despite their compulsory membership in the GSIS, they are still covered by R.A. No. 7641 for the following reasons: (1) PTSI is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as a non-stock and non-profit corporation as a private entity and its employees are employees in the private sector; and (2) they are not included in the exemptions from coverage of Rep. Act No. 7641. PTSI counters that as an employer in the public sector, it is not covered by R.A. No. 7641 which applies only to employees in the private sector. ISSUE: Whether or not Postigo et al. are entitled to benefits under Rep. Act No. 7641. HELD: Yes. Extant on the records is PTSI’s admission that although its employees are compulsory members of the GSIS, said employees are not governed by the Civil Service Law, pursuant to Section 2(1), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution. PTSI is a non-profit but private corporation organized under the Corporation Code, and the petitioners are covered by the Labor Code and not by the Civil Service Law. It is clear to us that the petitioners are employees in the private sector, hence entitled to the benefits of R.A. No. 7641. Even assuming that by virtue of their compulsory inclusion in the GSIS, the petitioners became employees in the public sector, they are
17 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES still entitled to the benefits of R.A. No. 7641 since they are not covered by the Civil Service Law and its regulations. The Supreme Court does not find merit in PTSI’s argument that the rationale behind the enactment of R.A. No. 7641 justifies the exclusion of employees in the public sector, who are already enjoying retirement benefits under the GSIS law, from the New Retirement Law. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7641 provides that ―nothing in this Act shall deprive any employee of benefits to which he may be entitled under existing laws or company policies or practices.‖ In Juco v. NLRC, it was clarified that employees of government-owned and controlled corporations with special charters are covered under the Civil Service. On the other hand, employees of government-owned and controlled corporations under the Corporation Code are governed by the provisions of the Labor Code. PTSI belongs to the latter category and is covered by R.A. 7641. The accommodation under Rep. Act No. 1820 extending GSIS coverage to PTSI employees did not take away from Postigo et al. the beneficial coverage afforded by Rep. Act No. 7641. Hence, the retirement pay payable under Article 287 of the Labor Code as amended by Rep. Act No. 7641 should be considered apart from the retirement benefit claimable by the petitioners under the social security law or, as in this case, the GSIS law. PT&T vs. NLRC G.R. No. 118978. May 23, 1997 Gomez Doctrine: The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. To cite a few of the primordial ones, Section 14, Article II on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands the State to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Corollary thereto, Section 3 of Article XIII (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly requires the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers. Similarly, Section 14 of Article XIII mandates that the State shall protect working women through provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach their full potential. FACTS:
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a "Supernumerary Project Worker," for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. Under the Reliever Agreement which she signed with petitioner company, her employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter she was hired again as a reliever on 2 counts (June 10-July 1,1991 and July 19,1991-August 8,1991). On September 2, 1991, she was asked by PT&T to become a probationary employee for the probationary period of 150 days. In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991. It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the company's policy of not accepting married women for employment. In her reply letter, De Guzman stated that she was not aware of PT&T's policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations. Thereafter, she was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992, which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City. The Labor Arbiter ruled that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner and that she had been discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules. On appeal, the NLRC upheld the labor arbiter and ruled that private respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her employer, PT & T. However, the decision of the labor arbiter was modified with the qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature of her acts which should not be condoned. ISSUE:
18 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES WON private respondent De Guzman had been discriminated by PT&T in violation of the constitutional provision under Art. II, Sec 14 which recognizes the fundamental equality of men and women HELD: Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be regarded with love and respect but, through the ages, men have responded to that injunction with indifference, on the hubristic conceit that women constitute the inferior sex. Nowhere has that prejudice against womankind been so pervasive as in the field of labor, especially on the matter of equal employment opportunities and standards. In the Philippine setting, women have traditionally been considered as falling within the vulnerable groups or types of workers who must be safeguarded with preventive and remedial social legislation against discriminatory and exploitative practices in hiring, training, benefits, promotion and retention. The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. To cite a few of the primordial ones, Section 14, Article II on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands the State to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Corollary thereto, Section 3 of Article XIII (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly requires the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers. Similarly, Section 14 of Article XIII mandates that the State shall protect working women through provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach their full potential. In the case at bar, petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the company's policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT & T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of
stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. 39 Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that petitioner's policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage. Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the relations between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely contractual, impressed as they are with so much public interest that the same should yield to the common good. 40 It goes on to intone that neither capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against the other, nor impair the interest or convenience of the public. In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by petitioner PT & T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation. That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively required. OPOSA VS. FACTORAN G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993 Doctrine: While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
19 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
WON petitioners are entitled to the reliefs prayed for under Art II, Sec 15 (Promotion of health and ecology)
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. The SC found no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
Principal petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. The Philippine Ecological Network Inc (PENI) is also impleaded as an additional plaintiff. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." Petitioners prays that judgment be rendered: . . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to — (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country; Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. They likewise aver that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae. Herein defendant Sec. Factoran, Jr. filed a motion to dismiss to which the RTC granted. Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and asked the SC to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. ISSUE:
The SC do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides: Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article: Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
20 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. VILLAR vs. TIP 135 SCRA 706 G.R. No. 69198. April 17, 1985 LAZARO DOCTRINE: ACADEMIC FREEDOM JUSTIFIES THE EXCLUSION OF PETITIONERS WHO HAVE SEVERAL FAILING GRADES FACTS: The case involves the barring of enrolment of the petitioners by TIP because of the exercise of their freedom of assembly. However, other circumstances were also taken into consideration by the court. Two of the petitioners, Rufino G. Salcon, Jr., and Romeo L. Guilatco, Jr., had only one failing grade each, with the first having failed in only one subject in either semester of 1984-1985 schoolyear and the second having failed in only one subject, having passed in eight other subjects in the 1984-1985 schoolyear. Petitioner Venecio Villar failed in two subjects but passed in four subjects in the first semester of the academic year, 1983-1984. Petitioner Inocencio F. Recitis passed all his subjects in the first semester of 1983-1984 schoolyear and had one failing grade during its second semester. He had two failing grades during the first semester of 19841985 schoolyear. Petitioner Noverto Barreto, had five failing grades in the first semester of schoolyear 1983-1984, six failing grades in the second semester of the same schoolyear, and six failing grades in the first semester of 1984-1985 schoolyear. Petitioner Edgardo de Leon, Jr., had three failing grades, one passing grade and one subject dropped in the
first semester of schoolyear 1984-1985. Petitioner Regloben Laxamana had five failing grades with no passing grade in the first semester of 19841985 schoolyear. ISSUE: WON the school has the right to deny enrolment of some of the petitioners by virtue of the constitutional provision on academic freedom. HELD: Yes. Among the most important social, economic, and cultural rights is the right to education not only in the elementary and high school grades but also on the college level. The constitutional provision as to the State maintaining "a system of free public elementary education and, in areas where finances permit, establish and maintain a system of free public education" up to the high school level does not per se exclude the exercise of that right in colleges and universities. It is only at the most a reflection of the lack of sufficient funds for such a duty to be obligatory in the case of students in the colleges and universities. As far as the right itself is concerned, not the effectiveness of the exercise of such right because of the lack of funds, Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: "Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit." It is quite clear that while the right to college education is included in the social, economic, and cultural rights, it is equally manifest that the obligation imposed on the State is not categorical, the phrase used being "generally available" and higher education, while being "equally accessible to all should be on the basis of merit." To that extent, therefore, there is justification for excluding three of the aforementioned petitioners because of their marked academic deficiency. Petitioners Barreto, de Leon, Jr. and Laxamana could be denied enrollment in view of such failing grades. Respondent educational institution is under no obligation to admit them this coming academic year. The constitutional provision on academic freedom enjoyed by institutions of higher learning justifies such refusal. The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students
21 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded. The petitioners were allowed to enrol with the exception of Barreto, de Leon, Jr. and Laxamana. SORIAO vs. PINEDA CA-GR SP NO. 31546 10 AUG. 1994 FACTS: Louie Soriao was a high school student in the sub province of Dinalungan, Aurora (S.Y. 1993 to 1994). Due to his reputation of talking back to school authority during the past years, he was refused readmission to complete his fourth and final year of high school through a verbal notice not to readmit. Soriao questioned the notice, averring that he was deprived of a hearing on the matter and thus the verbal notice was a denial of his right to due process. The administration ignored the student’s plea to reconsider its decision to deny him readmission claiming, ―it was their prerogative.‖ Seeking further remedies to no avail, Soriao filed a petition for certiorari to the CA.
parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age; (3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs, subsidies, and other incentives which shall be available to deserving students in both public and private schools, especially to the under-privileged; (4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning system, as well as self-study programs particularly those that respond to community needs; and (5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics, Article II, Section 13: The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. Section 17: The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was denied his right to education. HELD: YES. The Court of Appeals ordered Pineda, Head Teacher of the Juan C. Angara Memorial High School to allow Soriao to enroll and study after he was meted out a disciplinary action without due process. The Court of Appeals invoked the 1987 Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article XIV, Sections 1 and 2 and Article II, Sections 13 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution provide: Article XIV, Section 1: The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all. Section 2: The State shall: (1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to the needs of the people and society; (2) Establish and maintain, a system of free public education in the elementary and high school levels. Without limiting the natural right of
Also since it is the Constitution which granted petitioner the right of education, he may only deprived of such right with due process of law as stated in Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution, ―No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws. PHILILIPPINES ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS v. DRILON G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988 MATILLANO DOCTRINE: That it does not apply to all Filipina workers is not an argument of unconstitutionality. Not all of them are similarly situated. What the constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group within an existing class to the prejudice of such a person or group resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group. FACTS: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers,
22 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State. ISSUE: Whether or not the Department Order 1, series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment is valid? HELD: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled that equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that: 1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions 2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law 3. They are not confined to existing conditions 4. They apply equally to all members of the same class. In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions. Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of ―public safety‖ as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers."The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof. ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY GR NO. 110526, FEB 10, 1998
DOCTRINE: (FREE ENTERPRISE) Art 12, Sec 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and when the public interest so requires. FACTS: PCA was created by PD 232 as an independent public corporation to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth through a regulatory scheme set up by law. PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant operators. On 24 March 1993, however, PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 which no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a condition for engaging in such
23 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES business. The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition among operators specifically in congested areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based commodities. The APCD then filed a petition for mandamus to compel PCA to revoke BR No. 018-93. ISSUE: Whether or not PCA ran in conflict against the very nature of its creation. HELD: Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-faire as an economic principle. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of ―protective regulations‖ for the benefit of the general public. This is so because under Art 12, Sec 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and when the public interest so requires. BASCO. VS. PAGCOR G.R. No. 91649. May 14, 1991 MUÑEZ
"A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law; "B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy; "C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices; "D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization. In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of the "new restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution. ISSUE:
DOCTRINE: Local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means ―decentralization‖, and does not make local governments sovereign within the State or an imperium in imperio. FACTS: A TV ad proudly announces: "The new PAGCOR — responding through responsible gaming." But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter — PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because —
(1) WON the Court can settle policy issues. (2) WON exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. HELD: No. Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government away from monopolies and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the government's policies then it is for the Executive Department to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment. "The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power."
24 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES No. Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local." Their contention is without merit for the following reasons: The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it.‖ Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax‖ The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative powers." Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power. The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government,PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides: "Sec. 5.Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and
limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government." (emphasis supplied). Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization." It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio." Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments. Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. PAMATONG VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 161872. April 13, 2004 DOCTRINE: ―Equal access of opportunities for public service‖ under Sec. 26 Art. II does not bestow a constitutional right to run for or hold public office nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. FACTS: Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy. The decision, however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as they believed he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy.
25 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES The COMELEC, acting on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same. The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for petitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired. In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to ―equal access to opportunities for public service‖ under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the candidate’s bio-data and his program of government. ISSUE: WON petitioner has constitutional right to run for or hold public office by virtue of the constitutional provision ensuring ―equal access to opportunities for public office‖ HELD: No. Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring ―equal access to opportunities for public office‖ is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing
in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. The ―equal access‖ provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled ―Declaration of Principles and State Policies.‖ The provisions under the Article are generally considered not selfexecuting, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the ―equal access‖ provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on ―Nuisance Candidates‖ and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create. However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance involved are, their proper application in the case of the petitioner cannot be tested and reviewed by this Court on the basis of what is now before it. The assailed resolutions of theCOMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence which it considered in determining that petitioner was a nuisance candidate. This precludes the Court from reviewing at this instance whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review would necessarily take into account the matters which theCOMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions. Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of various documents purportedly evincing his credentials as an eligible candidate for the presidency. Yet this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not properly pass upon the reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither the COMELEC nor the Solicitor General appended any document to their respective Comments.
26 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The case is remanded to the COMELEC. VALENTIN L. LEGASPI vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. No. 72119. May 29, 1987 MURILLO DOCTRINE: Civil service eligibilities of employees who claim to be civil service eligibles are matters of public concern. People have the right to access these info. FACTS: Government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians. Due to this, petitioner Legaspi requested for information on the civil service eligibilities of these certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. Respondent, however, denied the request. The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is thus invoked in this special civil action for Mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas is guaranteed by the Constitution, petitioner Legaspi prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of Mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information. ISSUE:
naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain government employees that they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed. Thus, it is indeed a matter of public concern. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian is a matter of public interest. But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For Mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent CSC has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. The SC took judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes, therefore, imperative. Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution also reads: "The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."
W/N the civil service eligibilities are considered matters of public concern HELD: Yes. In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters
These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES discretion of such agencies. (Additional note: SC defined "public" in this case)
W/N the voting slips of the members are considered as private, personal, and confidential information HELD:
. . . "Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it embraces every person. To say that only those who have a present and existing interest of a pecuniary character in the particular information sought are given the right of inspection is to make an unwarranted distinction. . . . (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra at p. 387). MA. CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO vs. MANUEL L. MORATO G.R. No. 92541. November 13, 1991 DOCTRINE: There's no invasion of privacy of information if what is sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing official functions. FACTS: Aquino-Sarmiento, a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), requested that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly. Petitioner's request was denied by respondent Morato, MTRCB chairman, on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private and personal. The individual voting slips are alleged to be the exclusive property of the member concerned, and anybody who wants access thereto must first secure his (the member's) consent, otherwise, a request therefor may be legally denied. Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the records she wishes to examine are public in character. Thereafter, respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members. ISSUE:
No. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public in character; it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties. There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing official functions. To declare otherwise would be to clothe every public official with an impregnable mantle of protection against public scrutiny for their official acts. Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land. The Constitutional recognition of the citizen's right of access to official records cannot be made dependent upon the consent of the members of the board concerned, otherwise, the said right would be rendered nugatory. Additional note: (exceptions to the general rule - this, take note, is not applicable here. Added info lang in case itanong.) The Court is not unaware of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) which provides, among others, certain exceptions as regards the availability of official records or documents to the requesting public, e.g., closed door Cabinet sessions and deliberations of this Court. Suffice it to state, however, that the exceptions therein enumerated find no application in the case at bar. Petitioner's request is not concerned with the deliberations of respondent Board but with its documents or records made after a decision or order has been rendered. Neither will the examination involve disclosure of trade secrets or matters pertaining to national security which would otherwise limit the right of access to official records. (Last. There's another set of facts and issue in the case which concerns an MTRCB officer's right to change decisions of the Board. Hindi ko na sinama
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS : PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES since it does not cover State Principles and Policies / Consti. The issue merely revolved around the IRR of MTRCB's implementing law.)
29 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO