Poli Case Digests 10

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [10]: SOCIAL JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS, EDUCATION, ETC. ASTUDILLO VS BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF PEOPLE’S HOMESITE NO. We hold that she has no cause of action to impugn the award to Mitra AND HOUSING CORP. and to require that she be allowed to purchase the lot. As a squatter, she GR NO. L-28066 SEPT. 22,1976 has no possessory rights over Lot 16. In the eyes of the law, the award to AREVALO Mitra did not prejudice her since she was bereft of any rights over the said lot which could have been impaired by that award (Bañez vs. Court of DOCTRINE: Appeals, L-30351, September 11, 1974, 59 SCRA 15, 22). The State is committed to promote social justice and to maintain adequate social services in the field of housing (Secs. 6 and 7, Art. II, New Constitution). But the State's solicitude for the destitute and the have-nots does not mean that it should tolerate usurpations of property, public or private. "In carrying out its social readjustment policies, the government could not simply lay aside moral standards, and aim to favor usurpers, squatters, and intruders, unmindful of the lawful and unlawful origin and character of their occupancy. Such a Policy would perpetuate conflicts instead of attaining their just solution" (Bernardo vs. Bernards, 96 Phil. 202, 206). FACTS: On December 28, 1957 applied, in behalf of his minor son, Ramon Mitra Ocampo, for the purchase of Lot 16, Block E-155 of the East Avenue Subdivision of the PHHC in Piñahan, Quezon City. His application was approved. He made a downpayment of P840, an amount equivalent to ten percent of the price of the lot. On September 9, 1961 the PHHC and Mitra executed a contract of conditional sale. After Mitra had paid in full the price, which totalled more than P9,000, a final deed of sale was executed in his favor on February 18, 1965. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89875 was issued to him on March 1, 1965. The lot in question is actually in the possession of Peregrina Astudillo. She constructed thereon a residential house (a shanty, according to Mitra). She admits that she has been squatting on the said lot "uninterruptedly since 1957 up to the present”. She filed with the administrative investigating committee of the PHHC a request dated February 24, 1963, praying for the cancellation of the award of Lot 16 to Congressman Mitra and asking the committee to recommend that it be re-awarded to her. No action was taken on that request. She questioned the legality of the award of Lot 16 to Mitra. She asked that Lot 16 be sold to her. ISSUE: Whether or not Peregrina Astudillo has a cause of action to annul the sale of Lot 16 to Mitra and to compel the PHHC board to award that lot to her. HELD:

The record does not show, and Peregrina does not claim, that she is a member of the Piñahan Homeowners Association some of whose members are "deserving squatters" (Kempis vs. Gonzales, L-31701, October 31, 1974, 60 SCRA 439). In the familiar language of procedure, she was not entitled to sue Mitra and the PHHC for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of a wrong. Those respondents did not commit any delict or wrong in violation of her rights because, in the first place, she has no right to the lot. Not being principally or subsidiarily bound in the contract of sale between Mitra and the PHHC, she is not entitled to ask for its annulment (Art. 1397, Civil Code). Peregrina invokes the PHHC charter (erroneously referred to as section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 648) which provides that the PHHC should acquire buildings so as to provide "decent housing for those who may be unable otherwise to provide themselves therewith" and that it should acquire large estates for their resale to bona fide occupants. Those provisions do not sustain her action in this case. They do not justify her act of squatting on a government-owned lot and then demanding that the lot be sold her because she does not yet own a residential lot and house. She is not a bona fide occupant of Lot 16. SSSEA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989 CRUZ, CHAN DOCTRINE: While the Constitution and the Labor Code are silent as to whether or not government employees may strike, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 6 series of 1987 of the Civil Service Commission and as implied in E.O. No. 180; In lieu of strikes, government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law.

1 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [10]: SOCIAL JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS, EDUCATION, ETC. absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so. In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180, the employees in the SSS Employees Association (SSSEA) went on strike after the SSS failed to civil service are denominated as “government employees” and that the act upon the union’s demands concerning the implementation of their CBA, SSS is one such government-controlled corporations with an original which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, so its employees are collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; memorandum prohibiting strikes. Government employees may, however, conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the more of service into regular and permanent employees and their betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action. But employees labor practices. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary for writ of preliminary injunction against SSSEA for staging an illegal work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the strike. The court issued a temporary restraining order pending the Government to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while SSSEA filed a Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject Government Employees to Self-Organization, which took effect after the matter. SSSEA contend that the court made reversible error in taking instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor and government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the SSSEA are covered by are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the the Civil Service laws, thus they have no right to strike and that they are purpose of securing changes thereof." not covered by the NLRC or DOLE, so the court may enjoin the SSSEA from striking. The Public Sector Labor-Management Council has not been granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its ISSUE: jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to the general courts of Whether or not SSSEA’s members, being government employees, have the law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is right to strike? appropriate. The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being prohibited by law, an injunction may be issued to RULING: restrain it. FACTS:

NO. The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law". On the other hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress”, referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the

PEOPLE VS LEACHON G.R. No. 108725-26. September 25, 1998 CRUZ, TIN DOCTRINE: Under the Constitution, what makes the eviction and demolition of urban or rural poor dwellers illegal or unlawful is when the same are not done in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. However, what is meant by “in accordance with law” and “just and humane manner” is that the person to be evicted be accorded due process or an opportunity to controvert the allegation that his or her occupation or possession of the property involved is unlawful or against the will of the

2 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [10]: SOCIAL JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS, EDUCATION, ETC. landowner; that should the illegal or unlawful occupation be proven, the The Court holds that the respondent judge did not err in so construing the occupant be sufficiently notified before actual eviction or demolition is aforecited constitutional provision. Under the Constitution, what makes done; and that there be no loss of lives, physical injuries or unnecessary the eviction and demolition of urban or rural poor dwellers illegal or loss of or damage to properties. unlawful is when the same are not done in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. FACTS: Every legislative act attaches the presumption of constitutionality. Unless Pursuant to the Resolution of the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose, otherwise repealed by a subsequent law or adjudged unconstitutional by Occidental Mindoro, the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed this Court, a law will always be presumed valid and the first two separate informations for violation of P. D. 772, otherwise known as and fundamental duty of the court is to apply the law. Presidential Decree the Anti-Squatting Law, against Noli Hablo, Edmundo Mapindan and Diego No. 772, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law, enjoys this Escala, before the Regional Trial Court of Occidental Mindoro presided over presumption of constitutionality. At the time the respondent Judge by respondent judge Hon. Emilio Leachon Jr. rendered the questioned Decision and issued the orders of dismissal in 1993, Presidential Decree No. 772, Anti-Squatting Law, was still The cases proceeded to trial. After presenting its evidence, the effective. Neither has this Court declared its unconstitutionality, prosecution rested the cases, sending in a written offer of evidence on notwithstanding the social justice provision of Article XIII of the 1987 November 14, 1991. On August 18, 1992, almost a year after the Constitution, specifically on urban land reform and housing. prosecution had rested, the respondent Judge issued an Order dismissing the said cases motu proprio on the ground of “lack of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: Sec. 10. Urban or rural jurisdiction.” poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished, except in From the aforesaid order of dismissal, petitioners appealed via a Petition accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. No resettlement of for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, which was referred to the CA for urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate consultation proper disposition. with them and the communities where they are to be relocated." On December 24, 1992, the 12th Division of the CA came out with a decision reversing the appealed Order of dismissal, ordering continuation of trial of subject criminal cases, and disposing, instead of conducting the trial, as directed by the Court of Appeals, the respondent judge dismissed the cases motu proprio, once more, opining that P.D. 772 is rendered obsolete and deemed repealed by Sections 9 and 10, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provide that “urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.” Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration interposed on January 29, 1993, having been denied by the respondent Judge on February 4, 1993, petitioners found their way to this court via the instant petition. ISSUE: WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing subject criminal cases for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law, and in declaring the said law as repugnant to the provisions of the 1987 Constitution. HELD:

Presidential Decree No. 772, on the other hand, states: “Sec. 1. Any person, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine not less than one thousand or more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the Court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. If the offender is a corporation or association, the maximum penalty of five years and the fine of thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the president, director, manager or managing partners thereof.” In dismissing subject criminal cases for anti-squatting, respondent Judge ratiocinated that “if all the accused in these cases were convicted and ordered evicted, it will run counter to the said specific constitutional provisions because the conviction and eviction will not be in a just and humane manner as the government has not yet undertaken the resettlement of urban and rural dwellers (referring to all accused in the cases at bar) and neither has the government consulted all the accused as to where they should be relocated.” The import of the Order of dismissal under scrutiny is that- should the eviction be in a just and humane manner, the same shall be valid and upheld.

3 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [10]: SOCIAL JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS, EDUCATION, ETC. However, respondent Judge erred in predicating the validity or legality of DOCTRINE: eviction on the existence of a resettlement plan and area. The constitutional requirement that the eviction and demolition be in Section 3 of Article XIII (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the accordance with law and conducted in a just and humane manner does not 1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly requires the State to afford full mean that the validity or legality of the demolition or eviction is hinged on protection to labor and to promote full employment and equality of the existence of a resettlement area designated or earmarked by the employment opportunities for all, including an assurance of entitlement to government. What is meant by “in accordance with law” and “just and tenurial security of all workers. Similarly, Section 14 of Article humane manner” is that the person to be evicted be accorded due process XIII mandates that the State shall protect working women through or an opportunity to controvert the allegation that his or her occupation or provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach their full possession of the property involved is unlawful or against the will of the potential. landowner; that should the illegal or unlawful occupation be proven, the occupant be sufficiently notified before actual eviction or demolition is FACTS: done; and that there be no loss of lives, physical injuries or unnecessary loss of or damage to properties. Private respondent Grace de Guzman was initially hired as a reliever for a fixed period from November 21, 990 to April 20, 1991 for one CF Tenorio Precisely, the enactment of an anti-squatting law affords the alleged who went on maternity leave. The employment contract provided that her “squatters” the opportunity to present their case before a competent court employment was to be terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. where their rights will be amply protected and due process strictly Then on June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and from July 19, 1991 to August observed. By filing the proper informations in court, complainants have 8, 1991, respondent was again hired. On September 2, 1991 she was complied with the first requirement of due process, that is, the opportunity hired again. She indicated on her job application form that she was single. for the accused to be heard and present evidence to show that his or her However, a few months earlier on May 26, 1991, she had contracted occupation or possession of the property is not against the will or without marriage. the consent of the landowner and is not tainted by the use of force, intimidation, threat or by the taking advantage of the absence of or Respondent made two more similar representations on agreements signed tolerance by the landowners. on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. Petitioner eventually discovered the discrepancies and asked respondent to account for them. Respondent In the case at bar, the respondent Judge dismissed subject cases motu explained that she was not aware of petitioner’s policy regarding married proprio, after the prosecution had rested the same and without giving the women, and that she did not deliberately hide her status. She was then three accused an opportunity to present their evidence. What is more, dismissed effective January 29, 1992. Respondent filed for illegal there is no showing that the issue of constitutionality of P. D. 772 was ever dismissal. The Labor Arbiter decided in her favor, saying that she had posed by the accused. Consequently, such an issue cannot be given due acquired the status of a regular employee and therefore entitled to course for the simple reason that it was not raised by the proper party at reinstatement plus backwages. The NLRC affirmed. the earliest opportunity. ISSUE: NB: But the foregoing antecedent facts and proceedings notwithstanding, the petition cannot now prosper because on October 27, 1997, Republic WON respondent was validly dismissed for just cause? Act No. 8368, entitled “An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772 Entitled ‘Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts’” was HELD: enacted. Section 3 of the said Act provides that “all pending cases under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772 shall be dismissed upon the NO. On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by effectivity of this Act.” PETITION DISMISSED. the company falls within the so-called management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the matter of hiring, supervision of workers, work assignments, working methods and assignments, as well as regulations on PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY VS. NLRC AND the transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and the discipline, dismissal, GRACE DE GUZMAN and recall of employees. 19 As put in a case, an employer is free to GR No. 118978 May 23, 1997 regulate, according to his discretion and best business judgment, all DUMALANTA

4 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [10]: SOCIAL JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS, EDUCATION, ETC. aspects of employment, "from hiring to firing," except in cases of unlawful CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. The most that discrimination or those which may be provided by law. may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as In the case at bar, petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all writ. women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed private respondent from FACTS: employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the EPZA bought parcels of land in Cavite from Filoil Refinery Corporation. company's policy that married women are not qualified for employment in However, before EPZA could take possession of the area, several PT & T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural products without permission from EPZA or Filoil. So EPZA paid a P10,000-financialThat it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private assistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Ten respondent by Delia M. Oficial, the branch supervisor of the company, with years later, conversely, Valles, Aledia and Ordoñez filed in CHR a joint the reminder, in the words of the latter, that "you're fully aware that the complaint for violation of human rights, alleging that in 1991, Engr. company is not accepting married women employee (sic), as it was Damondamon of EPZA, accompanied by his subordinates and the PNP, verbally instructed to you." 21 Again, in the termination notice sent to her brought a bulldozer and a crane to level the area occupied by the Valles et by the same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to al. who tried to stop them by showing a copy of a letter from the President understand that her severance from the service was not only by reason of ordering postponement of the bulldozing. However, the letter was her concealment of her married status but, over and on top of that, was crumpled and thrown to the ground by a member of Damondamon's group her violation of the company's policy against marriage ("and even told you who proclaimed that: "The President in Cavite is Governor Remulla!" that married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our [Pyudal na pyudal!]. company.") 22 Parenthetically, this seems to be the curious reason why it was made to appear in the initiatory pleadings that petitioner was Thereafter, CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA and PNP. represented in this case only by its said supervisor and not by its highest to desist from committing further acts of demolition, terrorism, and ranking officers who would otherwise be solidarily liable with the harassment. Two weeks later, the same group accompanied by men of corporation. Governor Remulla, again bulldozed the area. Consequently, CHR Chairman Bautista issued another injunction Order. However, EPZA filed in the CHR a Verily, private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of her status motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue from PT & T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders, which the CHR denied. she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to Thus, EPZA filed Special civil action of certiorari and prohibition before the retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was SC, which eventually ordered the CHR to cease and desist from enforcing practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into and/or implementing the questioned injunction orders. misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it ISSUE: should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the employer's WON the CHR has jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes order against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease which are improper, illegal, or unjustified. and desist from continuing the acts complained of. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY V. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS G.R. No. 101476, April 14, 1992 GATACELO DOCTRINE:

HELD: No. CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political

5 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [10]: SOCIAL JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS, EDUCATION, ETC. rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to else they would get back at her. AAA went to San Pedro, Laguna after the the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or incident and told her sister what happened and the latter informed their official. The constitutional provision (Sec. 18, Art. 13) directing the CHR to mother about it. AAA, her sister and mother, filed a complaint at Barangay "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the San Dionisio. Thereafter, the barangay officials of San Dionisio referred the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need complaint to the police station. The Parañaque City Police Office asked the protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission assistance of the Child Protection Unit of the PGH, upon which the latter to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the assigned the case to Dr. Merle Tan. Consequently, with the consent of AAA intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is and her mother, and in the presence of a social worker of the DSWD, Dr. conferred only by the Constitution or by law. Evidently, the "preventive Tan conducted the requisite interview and physical examination on AAA. measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to An information was filed, charging Dulay with the crime of Rape under extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of Article 266-A, No. 1 (a) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353 in relation to injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610. the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ. Defense’s Facts (from the testimony of Dulay) Appellant met AAA a few days before June 2005 when the latter was DISSENTING (PADILLA): introduced to her by her cousin Eglay Akmad during the wake of a relative If the CHR cannot, by itself, issue any cease and desist order in order to of AAA at Palanyag. The cousin of appellant was AAA's neighbor at maintain the status quo pending its investigation of cases involving alleged Palanyag. Around 1 o'clock in the morning of July 3, 2005, appellant human rights violations, then it is, in effect, an ineffective instrument for averred that she was at La Huerta, at the Bulungan Fish Port in Parañaque the protection of human rights. City with her cousin Eglay and stayed there for about thirty (30) minutes. They then proceeded to the house of appellant's cousin in Palanyag. In the said house, appellant saw "Speed" and two (2) other male persons. She PEOPLE VS DULAY also saw AAA who was engaged in a conversation with "Speed" and his G.R. NO. 193854. SEPTEMBER 24, 2012 two (2) companions. She asked AAA what she was doing there and the GLORIA latter said that it was none of her business ("wala kang pakialam sa akin"). Because of the response of AAA, appellant left the house and went home DOCTRINE: to General Trias, Cavite. The purpose of the R.A. 7610 is to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.

The trial court found Dulay guilty of the crime of rape by indispensable cooperation. The Court of Appeals affirmed such decision.

FACTS:

ISSUE:

Prosecution’s facts (from the testimony of AAA and Dr. Tan) Dulay convinced complainant AAA, 12 years of age, to accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio, Parañaque City. Before going to the said wake, they looked for Dulay’s boyfriend in several places. When they went to Bulungan Fish Port to ask for some fish, they saw Dulay's boyfriend. AAA, appellant and the latter's boyfriend proceeded to the Kubuhan located at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. When they reached the Kubuhan, Dulay suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man known by the name "Speed" was waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money to appellant and heard "Speed" tell appellant to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, "Speed" wielded a knife and tied AAA's hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for appellant's help when she saw the latter peeping into the room while she was being raped, but appellant did not do so. After the rape, "Speed" and appellant told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or

Whether or not the court erred in finding Dulay guilty of rape as coprincipal by indispensable cooperation. HELD: Yes, but she is held guilty for the violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610. Under the RPC, to be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished. The events narrated by the CA, from the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money

6 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [10]: SOCIAL JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS, EDUCATION, ETC. and AAA could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own Access to justice by all, especially by the poor, is not simply an ideal in our services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being society. Its existence is essential in a democracy and in the rule of law. raped. It must be clear that this Court respects the findings of the trial Without doubt, one of the most precious rights which must be shielded and court that AAA was indeed raped by considering the credibility of the secured is the unhampered access to the justice system by the poor, the testimony of AAA. However, the review of a criminal case opens up the underprivileged and the marginalized. case in its entirety. The totality of the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense are weighed, thus, avoiding general FACTS: conclusions based on isolated pieces of evidence. In the case of rape, a review begins with the reality that rape is a very serious accusation that is This case stemmed from the Feb.7, 2011 letter of Atty. Persida V. Ruedapainful to make; at the same time, it is a charge that is not hard to lay Acosta, Chief Public Attorney of the Public Atty.’s Office (PAO), to the against another by one with malice in her mind. Because of the private Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In the said letter, Atty. Acosta nature of the crime that justifies the acceptance of the lone testimony of a sought a clarification as to the exemption of PAO’s clients from the credible victim to convict, it is not easy for the accused, although innocent, payment of sheriff’s expenses, alleging that PAO’s clients in its Regional to disprove his guilt. These realities compel [this Court] to approach with Office in Region VII are being charged with the payment of sheriff’s great caution and to scrutinize the statements of a victim on whose sole expenses in the amount of P1,000 upon the filing of a civil action in court. testimony conviction or acquittal depends. In this light, while this Court She claimed that sheriff’s expenses should not be exacted from PAO’s does not find appellant to have committed the crime of rape as a principal clients since Sec. 6 of RA No. 9406 specifically exempts them from the by indispensable cooperation, she is still guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) payment of docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in of R.A. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, court and other quasi-judicial bodies. Exploitation and Discrimination Act. Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It contemplates In reply, OCA clarified that PAO’s clients, notwithstanding the exemption sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In other words, under under SEc.6 of R.A. No. 9406 are not exempted from paying sheriff’s paragraph (a), the child is abused primarily for profit. The act of appellant expenses. The OCA explained that sheriff’s expenses, strictly speaking, are in convincing AAA, who was 12 years old at that time, to go with her and not considered as “legal fees” under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court since thereafter, offer her for sex to a man in exchange for money makes her they are not payable to the government; they are payable to the sheriff/ liable under the above-mentioned law. The purpose of the law is to provide process server to defray his travel expenses in serving court processes in special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, relation to the litigant’s case. exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. A child exploited in prostitution may seem to "consent" to Considering that the matter involves an interpretation of RA No. 9406, what is being done to her or him and may appear not to complain. Atty. Acosta requested that the same be referred to the Court en banc for However, we have held that a child who is "a person below eighteen years resolution. The Court en banc however issued its resolution adopting OCA’s of age or those unable to fully take care of themselves or protect recommendation. themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of their age or mental disability or condition" is incapable of giving Atty. Acosta filed a MFR but the Court en banc denied the same. rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse. It is noted that Unperturbed, Atty. Acosta filed a motion for leave to file a second MFR. the sufficiency of an information is not negated by an incomplete or Still, the Court found the same to be devoid of merit. defective designation of the crime in the caption or other parts of the information but by the narration of facts and circumstances which ISSUE: adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprises the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. WON PAO’s clients are exempted from the payment of sheriff’s fees RE: LETTER DATED APRIL 18, 2011 OF PAO A.M. No. 11-10-03-O GOMEZ DOCTRINE:

HELD: The term “fees” is defined as a charge fixed by law or by an institution for certain privileges or services. Viewed from this context, the phrase “docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action” refers to the totality of the legal fees imposed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. In particular,

7 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [10]: SOCIAL JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS, EDUCATION, ETC. it includes filing or docket fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of the officials and employees of PAO shall be limited only to cases involving provisional remedies, mediation fees, sheriff’s fees, stenographer’s fees their client. and commissioner’s fees. These are the fees that are exacted for the services rendered by the court in connection with the action instituted TABLARIN vs. GUTIERREZ before it. 154 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164. July 31, 1987 LAZARO Sheriff’s expenses are not exacted for any service rendered by the court; they are the amount deposited to the Clerk of Court upon filing of the DOCTRINE: complaint to defray the actual travel expenses of the sheriff, process server or other court-authorized persons in the service of summons, The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality subpoena and other court processes that would be issued relative to the education "accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to trial of the case. It is not the same as sheriff’s fees under Section 10, Rule enrol in a professional school but rather merely to make such education 141 of the Rules of Court, which refers to those imposed by the court for accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable services rendered to a party incident to the proceedings before it. admission and academic requirements." The Court, however, is not unmindful of the predicament of PAO’s clients. In exempting PAO’s clients from paying docket and other legal fees, R.A. No. 9406 intended to ensure that the indigents and the less privileged, who do not have the means to pay the said fees, would not be denied access to courts by reason of poverty. Indeed, requiring PAO’s clients to pay sheriff’s expenses, despite their exemption from the payment of docket and other legal fees, would effectly fetter their free access to the courts thereby negating the laudable intent of Congress in enacting R.A. No. 9406. Free access to the courts and adequate legal assistance are among the fundamental rights which the Constitution extends to the less privileged. Thus, Section 11, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that “[f]reeaccess to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.” The Constitution affords litigants—moneyed or poor—equal access to the courts; moreover, it specifically provides that poverty shall not bar any person from having access to the courts. Accordingly, laws and rules must be formulated, interpreted, and implemented pursuant to the intent and spirit of this constitutional provision. Access to justice by all, especially by the poor, is not simply an ideal in our society. Its existence is essential in a democracy and in the rule of law. Without doubt, one of the most precious rights which must be shielded and secured is the unhampered access to the justice system by the poor, the underprivileged and the marginalized. Having the foregoing principles in mind, the Court, heeding the constitutional mandate of ensuring free access to the courts and adequate legal assistance to the marginalized and less privileged, hereby authorizes the officials and employees of PAO to serve summons, subpoena and other court processes pursuant to Section 3, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The authority given herein by the Court to

FACTS: The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. ISSUE: WON the NMAT violates Article XIV of the Constitution particularly as to the right to quality education. HELD: No. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of Article XIV as one must one cannot but note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not really enjoined to take

8 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [10]: SOCIAL JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS, EDUCATION, ETC. appropriate steps to make quality education "accessible to all who might DOCTRINE: for any number of reasons wish to enrol in a professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, The raison d’etre of the written notice rule is to inform the student of the reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements." disciplinary charge against him and to enable him to suitably prepare a defense. DUE PROCESS IN ADMIN CASES INVOLVING STUDENTS: (1) the The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been the school authorities to hear and decide the case. recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. 9 Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements — i.e., the FACTS: completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school — for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a Petitioners claim that respondents Colegio de San Juan de Letran (Letran), legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. 10 What we Rev. Fr. Edwin Lao, Rev. Fr. Jose Rhommel Hernandez, Mr. Albert Rosarda have before us in the instant case is closely related; the regulation of and Ma. Teresa Suratos should be held liable for moral, exemplary, and access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the actual damages for unlawfully dismissing petitioner Emerson Chester Kim rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional B. Go (Kim) from the rolls of the high school department of Letran. THE and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the RESPONDENTS CLAIM THAT THEY LAWFULLY SUSPENDED KIM FOR quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That VIOLATING THE SCHOOL’S RULE AGAINST FRATERNITY MEMBERSHIP. In upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity time, the respondents found that twenty-nine (29) of their students, consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit including Kim, were fraternity members. The respondents found in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for substantial basis in the neophytes’ statements that Kim was a senior medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, fraternity member. Based on their disciplinary rules, the Father Prefect for high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools Discipline (respondent Rev. Fr. Jose Rhommel Hernandez) recommended in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, the fraternity members’ dismissal from the high school department rolls; are widely known. incidentally, this sanction was stated in a January 10, 2002 letter to Mr. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test and Mrs. Go.8 After a meeting with the Rector’s Council,9 however, like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading respondent Fr. Edwin Lao, Father Rector and President of Letran, rejected the selection of applicants into our medical schools" and of "improving the the recommendation to allow the fourth year students to graduate from quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use Letran. Students who were not in their fourth year were allowed to finish today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the the current school year but were barred from subsequent enrollment in United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] 11 Letran. and quite probably in other countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of The RTC24 held that the respondents had failed to observe "the basic the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold requirement of due process" and that their evidence was "utterly that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of insufficient" to prove that Kim was a fraternity member. On appeal, the CA legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the reversed and set aside the RTC decision. It held, among others, that the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence petitioners were not denied due process as the petitioners had been given and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds ample opportunity to be heard in Kim’s disciplinary case. The petitioners for disease or trauma. moved for the reconsideration of the decision, but the CA denied the motion for lack of merit;27hence, the present petition for review GO vs. LETRAN on certiorari. G.R. No. 169391, October 10, 2012) MATILLANO ISSUE: 9 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [10]: SOCIAL JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS, EDUCATION, ETC. The order’s title, "Prohibition of Fraternities and Sororities in Elementary Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC’s restrictive and Secondary Schools," serves to clarify whatever ambiguity may arise interpretation which accordingly limit the prohibition in DECS Order No. from its fourth paragraph.32 It is a straightforward title. It directs the 20, s. 1991 to students enrolled in public schools? YES prohibition to elementary and secondary schools in general, and does not distinguish between private and public schools. We also look at the order’s Whether or not due process was accorded to the students? YES second paragraph, whereby the department faults an earlier regulation, Department Order No. 6, series of 1954, for failing to ban fraternities and HELD1: sororities in public and privatesecondary schools. With the second paragraph, it is clear that the education department sought to remedy the We deny the petition and affirm the CA decision. Preliminarily, we note earlier order’s failing by way of DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991. that the disciplinary sanction the respondents imposed on Kim was actually a suspension and not a "dismissal" as the petitioners insist in their FINALLY, WE NOTE THAT THE ORDER IS ADDRESSED TO THE HEADS OF complaint. We agree with the CA that the petitioners were well aware of PRIVATE SCHOOLS, COLLEGES, AND UNIVERSITIES, AND NOT JUST TO this fact, as Mrs. Go’s letter specifically requested that THE PUBLIC SCHOOL AUTHORITIES. We find Letran’s rule prohibiting its Kim’s suspension be deferred. That this request was granted and that Kim high school students from joining fraternities to be a reasonable was allowed to take the examination further support the conclusion that regulation, not only because of the reasons stated in DECS Order No. 20, Kim had not been dismissed. s. 1991,42 but also because of the adult-oriented activities often associated with fraternities. Expectedly, most, if not all, of its high school students Further, the RTC’s statement that Letran, a private school, possesses no are minors. Besides, Letran’s penalty for violation of the rule is clearly authority to impose a dismissal, or any disciplinary action for that matter, stated in its enrollment contracts and in the Students Handbooks43 it on students who violate its policy against fraternity membership must be distributes at the start of every school year. corrected. The RTC reasoned out that Order No. 20, series of 1991, of the then Department of Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS Order No. 20, s. HELD2: 1991),29 which the respondents cite as legal basis for Letran’s policy, only covered public high schools and not private high schools such as Letran. Yes. In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,48 the Court held We disagree with the RTC’s reasoning because it is a restrictive that Guzman v. National University,49 not Ang Tibay, is the authority on interpretation of DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991. True, the fourth paragraph the procedural rights of students in disciplinary cases. In Guzman, we laid of the order states: down the minimum standards in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, as follows: 4. EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT OF THIS ORDER, FRATERNITIES AND SORORITIES ARE PROHIBITED IN PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY It bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students SCHOOLS. PENALTY FOR NON-COMPLIANCE IS EXPULSION OF does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for PUPILS/STUDENTS. actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and crossexamination is not, contrary This paragraph seems to limit the scope of the order’s prohibition to public to petitioners’ view, an essential part thereof. There are withal minimum elementary and secondary schools. However, in ascertaining the meaning standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due of DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991, the entire order must be taken as a process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing whole.30 It should be read, not in isolated parts, but with reference to of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall every other part and every word and phrase in connection with its have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of context.31 counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; Even a cursory perusal of the rest of DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991 reveals and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating the education department’s clear intent to apply the prohibition against committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and fraternity membership for all elementary and high school students, decide the case. regardless of their school of enrollment. Since disciplinary proceedings may be summary, the insistence that a "formal inquiry" on the accusation against Kim should have been 10 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [10]: SOCIAL JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS, EDUCATION, ETC. conducted lacks legal basis. It has no factual basis as well. While the Discipline Committee after letters of complaint were filed before the Board petitioners state that Mr. and Mrs. Go were "never given an opportunity to following the publication of the school paper that contains obscene, vulgar, assist Kim,"56 the records show that the respondents gave them two (2) and sexually explicit contents. Prior to the disciplinary sanction to the notices, dated December 19, 2001 and January 8, 2002, for conferences defendants they were required to submit a written statement to answer on January 8, 2002 and January 15, 2002.57 The notices clearly state: the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but the "Dear Mr./Mrs. Go, We would like to seek your help in correcting Kim’s defendants, instead of doing so wrote to the Committee to transfer the problem on: Discipline & Conduct Offense: Membership in case to the DECS which they alleged to have the jurisdiction over the Fraternity."58 Thus, the respondents had given them ample opportunity to issue. Pushing through with the investigation ex parte the Committee assist their son in his disciplinary case. found the defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions. Defendants filed before the court for prohibition with preliminary injunction The raison d’etre of the written notice rule is to inform the student of the on said decision of the Committee questioning the jurisdiction of said disciplinary charge against him and to enable him to suitably prepare a Discipline Board over the defendants. defense. The records show that as early as November 23, 2001, it was already made plain to the petitioners that the subject matter of the case ISSUE: against Kim was his alleged fraternity membership. Thus, by the time Mr. Rosarda spoke to Kim and asked for his written explanation in December WON the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the 2001, Kim has had enough time to prepare his response to this plain defendants. charge. We also note that the information in the notice the respondents subsequently sent is no different from the information that they had earlier Whether Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act precludes the school’s conveyed, albeit orally, to the petitioners: the simple unadorned statement right to discipline its students. that Kim stood accused of fraternity membership. Given these circumstances, we are not convinced that Kim’s right to explain his side as Held1: exercised in his written denial had been violated or diminished. The essence of due process, it bears repeating, is simply the opportunity to be The court resolved the issue before it by looking through the power of heard. DECS and the Disciplinary Committee in imposing sanctions upon the defendants. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC. V CA institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional 348 SCRA 265 December 15, 2000 academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from DOCTRINE: outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to The right of the students to free speech in school premises, however, is discipline its students and inculcate upon them good values, ideals and not absolute. The right to free speech must always be applied in light of attitude. The right of students to free speech in school is not always the special characteristics of the school environment. absolute. The court upheld the right of students for the freedom of expression but it does not rule out disciplinary actions of the school on the Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of conduct of their students. Further, Sec. 7 of the of the Campus Journalism higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom Act provides that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and the basis of the articles they write EXCEPT when such article materially objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or disrupts class work of involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for of others. Therefore the court ruled that the power of the school to some restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to discipline its investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary students and inculcate upon them good values, ideals and attitude. corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That FACTS: power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundation’s Constitution. The court held that Miriam College has the authority to hear school paper were subjected to disciplinary sanction by the College and decide the cases filed against respondent students. 11 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [10]: SOCIAL JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS, EDUCATION, ETC. Held2: The right of the students to free speech in school premises, however, is not absolute. The right to free speech must always be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. Thus, while the Court upheld the right of the students to free expression in the cases of Malabanan vs. Ramento,Villar vs. Technological Institute of the Philippines, Arreza vs. Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, and Non vs. Dames II, the Court did not rule out disciplinary action by the school for "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason - whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior - which materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." Provisions of law (such as Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act) should be construed in harmony with those of the Constitution; acts of the legislature should be construed, wherever possible, in a manner that would avoid their conflicting with the fundamental law. A statute should not be given a broad construction if its validity can be saved by a narrower one. Thus, Section 7 should be read in a manner as not to infringe upon the school’s right to discipline its students. At the same time, however, said provision should not be construed as to unduly restrict the right of the students to free speech. Consistent with jurisprudence, Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act is read to mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such article materially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Further, the power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court therefore rules that Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against the students. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER VS. CA G.R. No. L-82499 October 13, 1989 MUÑEZ DOCTRINE:

Petitioner Capitol Medical Center, Inc. (or CMCI), a hospital corporation, organized, opened, and operated the Capitol Medical Center College (CMCC or "the College") beside its hospital, the Capitol Medical Center (hereafter "the Hospital") in Quezon City. It offered a four-year nursing course, a two-year midwifery course, and a two-year medical secretarial course. In the first semester of the school year 1987-88, 900 students were enrolled in various courses in the college. Half-way through the first semester in 1987, the college faculty, led by the Dean of Nursing, demanded that they be granted vacation and sick leave privileges similar to those enjoyed by hospital personnel. Dialogues were held but no agreement was reached between the faculty and the school administration, headed by the president, Dr. Thelma Navarette-Clemente, who was concurrently also the chairman of the CMCI Board. During the next thirty (30) days, the rift between the administration and the faculty aggravated. The school administration scheduled the holding of the final semestral examinations on October 14 to 19, 1987, but the teachers defiantly and - unilaterally "postponed" them. On the scheduled dates for the examinations, the students joined their teachers in a noisy demonstration in front of the hospital. As the demonstrations disturbed the peace and quiet of the hospital and fearful of possible subversive action by hostile student nurses which might endanger the safety and lives of the patients in the hospital, an emergency special meeting was held by the CMCI Board on October 17, 1987. It unanimously resolved "to close the school effective at the end of the first semester of this school year, 198788" On December 2, 1987, fifteen (15) students and parents purporting to represent the 900 students of the CMCC filed a class suit (Civil Case No. 52429) against "Capitol Medical Center College" and petitioner Dr. Clemente, in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City praying for the reopening of the Capitol Medical Center College which had been closed effective at the end of the first semester of the school year 1987-1988. The lower court granted the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and directed the defendants "to reopen (the) school and allow plaintiffs students to enroll in their respective course[s]. The CA affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Since a contract creates reciprocal rights and obligations, the obligation of the school to educate a student would imply a corresponding obligation on the part of the student to study and obey the rules and regulations of the school.

ISSUE:

FACTS:

HELD:

WON private respondents have a clear legal right to reopen the school and to be readmitted therein.

12 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [10]: SOCIAL JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS, EDUCATION, ETC. But even if it can be supposed that the enrollment of a student creates an No. The Court of Appeals answered that question affirmatively on the implied "binding contract" with the school to educate him for the entire theory that "the initial enrollment" of the students (meaning their course, since a contract creates reciprocal rights and obligations, the enrollment in the first year of their chosen courses) created "a binding obligation of the school to educate a student would imply a corresponding contract" between the students and the school, by which the latter became obligation on the part of the student to study and obey the rules and "legally and morally bound to continue operating the school until such regulations of the school. When students breach that supposed contract by enrollees shall have finished their courses. refusing to attend their classes, preferring to take to the streets to mount a noisy demonstration against their school, the latter may cancel the The Court of Appeals presumably, but erroneously, relied on paragraph contract and close its doors. Its action would neither be arbitrary nor 137, Sec. IV of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which unfair. provides: TAN VS. CA Every student has the right to enroll in any school, college or university G.R. No. 97238 July 15, 1991 upon meeting its specific requirements and reasonable regulations, provided, that except in the case of academic delinquency and violation of DOCTRINE: disciplinary regulations, the student is presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the entire period he is expected to complete his course Where relations between parents and students on the one hand, and without prejudice to his right to transfer. teachers and administrators upon the other hand, have deteriorated to the level here exhibited, a private school may, in the interest of the rest of the The meaning of this provision is that the school, after having accepted a student body and of the faculty and management as a whole, and of the student for enrollment in a given course may not expel him or refuse to children of the parents affected, require the affected children to be re-enroll him until he completes his course, except when he is enrolled elsewhere. academically deficient or has violated the rules of discipline. He is presumed to be qualified to study there for the entire period it will take to FACTS: complete his course. Petitioner Julia L. Tan is an 84 year old widow who is the Principal of Grace The contract between the college and a student who is enrolled and pays Christian High School offering both elementary and secondary courses the fees for a semester, is for the entire semester only, not for the entire while petitioner James L. Tan is the Administrative Consultant of the course. The law does not require a school to see a student through to the school. This case arose from the refusal of the petitioners to admit and completion of his course. If the school closes or is closed by proper enroll certain students for the school year 1987-1988 because heated authority at the end of a semester, the student has no cause of action for controversies, acts of misbehavior, and a refusal to dialogue with the breach of contract against the school. school administration led the school authorities to believe that it would be best for all concerned if these children enrolled in other schools. Two We, therefore, hold that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in separate petitions for mandamus with prayers for preliminary mandatory compelling the CMCC to reopen and re-admit the striking students for injunction were eventually filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon enrollment in the second semester of their courses. Since their contracts City. with the school were terminated at the end of the first semester of 1987, and as the school has already ceased to operate, they have no "clear legal Sometime in 1986, private respondent Grace Christian High School right" to re-enroll and the school has no legal obligation to reopen and ("Grace Christian") applied with the then Ministry of Education, Culture readmit them. No provision in the Education Act of 1982, nor in the and Sports (MECS) for a tuition-fee increase of fifteen percent (15%) for Manual of Regulations for Private Schools can be, or has been, cited to the School Year (SY) 1986-87. Private respondent Grace Christian had support the novel view that a school is obligated to remain open until its applied for, and been granted, yearly increments in tuition fees from SY students have completed their courses therein. Indeed, neither is there a 1973-74 (except for SY 1983-84) until SY 1985-1986. Meanwhile, a group law or rule that obligates a student who has enrolled in a school, to remain of parents whose children are enrolled in Grace Christian, allegedly there until he finishes his course. On the contrary he may transfer at any alarmed by what they perceived to be the deterioration –– despite the time to any school that is willing to accept him. periodic fee increases –– in academic standards and physical facilities of the school, formed the Grace Christian High School Parents-Teachers 13 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [10]: SOCIAL JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS, EDUCATION, ETC. Association ("Association"). Some of the above-mentioned group of argued that petitioners' children have been innocent victims in a parents lobbied with the other parents urging non-payment of the fee deplorable confrontation between some parents and respondent School, increase. From 23 February to 5 March 1987, a group of parents, but the situation here finds some analogy in labor cases where, because of petitioners included, staged a rally outside the school gates. Banners and pre-existing and supervening strained relations, reinstatement is not placards critical of the school administration were set up. The latent always a feasible solution. animosity between the Association (or some members thereof) and Grace Christian began to flare up. Petitioners first came out with statements in No thinking person can dispute the fact that our country is suffering from the print and broadcast media attacking Grace Christian's periodic fee the effects of a serious deterioration of academic and other standards in increases and allegedly deteriorating academic standards. Some of the our educational system. This Court is disturbed by the big number of petitioners, armed with video-cameras, forced their way into the school candidates taking the bar examinations who, after six (6) years in the premises and interrupted a class in session, urging students therein to elementary grades, four (4) years in high school, and eight (8) years in speak –– using the allotted class hour –– against school policies. Some of college appear to be functionally semi-illiterate judging from the answers the students walked out of their classrooms to join their parents in the they give to bar examination questions. The same is true of other rally outside. disciplines, professions, and occupations. A drastic upgrading of educational standards especially in the elementary and high school levels During the period 14-18 April 1987, petitioners were individually and is imperative. personally informed through a letter by the principal of Grace Christian that, as they were severely critical of the school's policies, it would be best It is for the above reason that Government should uphold and encourage for all concerned if their children enrolled in some other school. schools and colleges which endeavor to maintain the highest standards of education. We have consistently sustained the rights of students to ISSUE: legitimately address their grievances both to school authorities, media, and the general public to the extent of sometimes countenancing uncivil Can the school refuse admission of the said students? and rowdy behavior. However, we have not hesitated to strike down violence and anarchy when certain students and their inevitable supporters HELD: misuse the grant of "ordered liberty" mandated by the Constitution.Educators who insist on high standards and who enforce YES. Private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and reasonable rules of discipline deserve support from courts of justice and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of students. This other branches of Government. right to establish and enforce reasonable rules and regulations extends as well to parents and parent-teacher associations, as parents are under a UP BOR V. WILLIAM social and moral (if not legal obligation, individually and collectively, to G.R. No. 136425, August 31, 1999 assist and cooperate with the schools. In the instant case, since petitioners MURILLO have failed to comply with the conditions and prerequisites for admission, i.e., registration within the prescribed dates, payment of dulyDOCTRINE: approved tuition fees, and compliance with school rules and regulations, Grace Christian cannot be regarded as having acted arbitrarily or Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was capriciously in refusing to re-enroll petitioners' children. obtained through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. Where relations between parents and students on the one hand, and teachers and administrators upon the other hand, have deteriorated to the FACTS: level here exhibited, a private school may, in the interest of the rest of the student body and of the faculty and management as a whole, and of the Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine, a citizen of India children of the parents affected, require the affected children to be and holder of a Philippine visitor’s visa, enrolled in UP Diliman under the enrolled elsewhere. The maintenance of a morally conducive and orderly doctoral program in Anthropology. After completing her course units, she educational environment will be seriously imperiled if, under the went on a two-year leave of absence to work as Tamil Programme circumstances of this case, Grace Christian is forced to admit petitioners' Producer of the Vatican Radio in the Vatican and as General Office children and to reintegrate them to the student body. It may even be Assistant at the International Right to Life Federation in Rome. She 14 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [10]: SOCIAL JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS, EDUCATION, ETC. returned to the Philippines in July 1991 to work on her dissertation Private respondent filed an action for mandamus to prevent them from entitled, “Tamil Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.” She revoking her degree. RTC denied it. CA, however, granted her request. eventually submitted her dissertation for checking and defense. After going over her dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Consuelo ISSUE: Joaquin-Paz that there was a portion in private respondent’s dissertation that was lifted, without proper acknowledgment, from Balfour’s W/N private respondent’s degree can be revoked due to plagiarism Cyclopaedia of India and Eastern and Southern Asia and from John Edye’s article. Nonetheless, private respondent was allowed to defend her HELD: dissertation on February 5, 1993. Four (4) out of the five (5) panelists gave private respondent a passing mark for her oral defense by affixing YES. The Constitution provides that “[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed their signatures on the approval form, conditioned on some amendments in all institutions of higher learning.” it is a freedom granted to that she has to incorporate. “institutions of higher learning” which is thus given “a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students.” If such institution On March 24, 1993, the CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved private of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it respondent’s graduation pending submission of final copies of her certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and dissertation. distinction of being its graduates. In April 1993, private respondent submitted copies of her supposedly revised dissertation to Drs. Manuel, Skandarajah, and Quiason, who expressed their assent to the dissertation. Her thesis panelists maintain, however, that private respondent did not incorporate the revisions suggested by the panel members in the final copies of her dissertation. On April 17, 1993, the University Council met to approve the list of candidates for graduation for the second semester of school year 19921993. The list included private respondent’s name. On April 21, 1993, Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr. Milagros Ibe, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, requesting the exclusion of private respondent’s name from the list of candidates for graduation, pending clarification of the problems regarding her dissertation. Apparently, however, Dean Paz’s letter did not reach the Board of Regents on time, because the next day, April 22, 1993, the Board approved the University Council’s recommendation for the graduation of qualified students, including private respondent. Two days later, on April 24, 1993, private respondent graduated with the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology. In a letter addressed to Dean Paz, Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. The Committee submitted a report to Dean Paz, finding at least ninety (90) instances or portions in private respondent’s thesis which were lifted from sources without proper or due acknowledgment. The CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private respondent’s doctorate degree and forwarded its recommendation to the University Council. The University Council, in turn, approved and endorsed the same recommendation to the Board of Regents. Then, the UP BOR approved such recommendation.

Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the “graduation” of a student, as the Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the “graduation” of such a student that is in question. It is noteworthy that the investigation of private respondent’s case began before her graduation. If she was able to join the graduation ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many investigations conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided she should not have been allowed to graduate. Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for the constitutional grant of academic freedom, to quote again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, “is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.” In this case, U.P. does not seek to discipline private respondent. Indeed, as the appellate court observed, private respondent is no longer within “the ambit of disciplinary powers of the U.P.” Private respondent cannot even be punished since, as she claims, the penalty for acts of dishonesty in administrative disciplinary proceedings is suspension from the University for at least one year. What U.P., through the Board of Regents, seeks to do is to protect its academic integrity by withdrawing from private respondent an academic degree she obtained through fraud. CAGAYAN CAPITOL V. NLRC 189 SCRA 658, September 14, 1990 DOCTRINE:

15 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [10]: SOCIAL JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS, EDUCATION, ETC. The prerogative of a school to provide standards for its teachers and to same were not renewed because their performances were considered determine whether or not these standards have been met is in accordance unsatisfactory while they were on probation. Petitioners further contended with academic freedom and constitutional autonomy which give that private respondents, as probationary employees, did not qualify for educational institution the right to choose who should teach. tenureship as their services on probation, upon evaluation, did not reach the standard prescribed for probationary employees. FACTS: NLRC eventually granted the petitions of Villegas and Pagapong. Private respondents Virgilio Villegas and Leonor Pagapong were teachers on a probational basis of the petitioner college. Villegas was initially hired ISSUE: as an instructor in the Nautical Science Department of said petitioner and was extended an appointment on a ten-month contractual basis which W/N the respondent teachers were illegally dismissed ended on March 31, 1982. Upon expiration of said contract he re-applied and was given a new contract commencing on June 1, 1982 and ending on HELD: March 31, 1983. Thereafter he re-applied for employment and was given a contract for a fixed period starting June 1, 1983 up to March 31, 1984. NO. There is no question that private respondents were probationary Upon mutual agreement the contract was extended to include the summer teachers. Thus, they are covered by the policy instructions issued by the of 1984 up to May 31, 1984 which is still part of the school-year 1983Department of Labor and Employment that the probationary employment 1984. Upon expiration of said period he sent a letter re-applying for of professional instructors and teachers shall be subject to the standards employment with the petitioner. His application, however, was turned established by the Department of Education and Culture. Said standards down because of various complaints from his students borne out by the are embodied in paragraph 75 of the Manual of Regulations for Private report of his superiors who investigated the matter. Thus, he filed a Schools, as follows: complaint in the Regional Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Cagayan City for illegal dismissal with 75. Full time teachers who have rendered three (3) consecutive years of reinstatement, payment of backwages, moral damages and attorney's satisfactory services shall be considered permanent. fees. There is no question that private respondents have been employed for On the other hand, respondent Pagapong was initially hired as a three (3) consecutive years as teachers at petitioners' college and on a full probationary instructor in the High School Department of petitioner college time basis. However, they do not automatically become permanent unless on June 15, 1981 on a contractual basis to end on March 31, 1982. Upon it is shown that their services during the probationary period were re-application her contract was renewed for another fixed period covering satisfactory. June 1, 1982 up to March 31, 1983. Her employment was on a probationary basis. Similarly, a third contract was executed by the The contention of respondents that upon termination of the three-year petitioner college covering the period starting June 15, 1983 and ending probationary period the teacher automatically becomes permanent is not on March 31, 1984. Upon the termination of the said third contract quite correct. It must be conditioned on the compliance with the third respondent Pagapong wrote to petitioner seeking re-employment. Her requisite that the services of said teacher during the probationary period application was accompanied by a clearance. However, her application was was satisfactory. denied upon the recommendation of her immediate superiors who considered her inefficient. Thus, she also filed with the Regional Arbitration The employer is the one who is to set the standards and determine Branch of the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal. whether or not the services of an employee are satisfactory. It is the prerogative of an employer to determine whether or not the said standards In their position paper, private respondents Villegas and Pagapong alleged have been complied with. In fact, it is the right of the employer to shorten that they were dismissed by petitioners without valid grounds and that the probationary period if he is impressed with the services of the they were deprived of their constitutional right to due process and security employees. of tenure. Petitioners, on the other hand, filed their position paper and supplemental manifestations wherein they denied that private respondents This prerogative of a school to provide standards for its teachers and to were illegally dismissed. They maintained that the private respondents determine whether or not these standards have been met is in accordance alleged employment contracts on a probation basis expired and that the with academic freedom and constitutional autonomy which give 16 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [10]: SOCIAL JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS, EDUCATION, ETC. educational institution the right to choose who should teach. At the start of their employment, private respondents were duly furnished the Faculty Manual expressly stating among others, the duties of teachers and the grounds for termination of employment or non-appointment to permanent status of a probationary employee. In the case of respondent Villegas, it appears that there were complaints of students during his last year of service and that these complaints were duly investigated by the Acting Dean of the Nautical Department who came up with the report of the acts complained of. Thus, his performance was considered unsatisfactory and was not renewed by petitioner college after the third year. That he was made to teach in the summer of 1984 appears to be prompted by the fact that the summer sessions were still part of the third probationary period which started in July of the first semester of school year 1981-82. Similarly, respondent Pagapong was found to be inefficient due to her absences. The Court thus finds and so holds that private respondents were not illegally dismissed by petitioner.

17 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO