Plato's Theory of Desire

Plato's Theory of Desire Author(s): Charles H. Kahn Reviewed work(s): Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Sep., 1987), pp. 77-103 Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20128559 . Accessed: 24/01/2012 08:08 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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PLATO'S THEORY OF DESIRE CHARLES

aim here

1YJ.Y middle

sense

is to make

dialogues.

account

of Plato's

I need

To do that

of desire

or reconcile

to unify

H. KAHN

in the are

what

at first sight two quite different accounts: the doctrine of eros in the in the Repub Symposium and the tripartite theory of motivation It may

lic.1

be

that

the

two

theories

are

after

all

irreconcilable,

that Plato simply changed his mind on the nature of human desire after

and

the Symposium

writing

before

the Republic.

composing

But that conclusion can be justified only if attempts two

end

theories This

temporary articulate

of the some

provoke other hand, pate

Plato,

a full-scale the concept

view

some

psychology,

subject critical

Plato of

the

The

attempt

a historical

interest.

to formulate

his

in failure.

is primarily

must

be made

first.

but

one with

some

project,

in the Republic,

theory of desire

to reconcile the con

is the first philosopher

of the psyche, in a systematic

the first

to

Furthermore, view today's

to

and hence way.

remote is sufficiently on our own reflection

from

On

assumptions. is perhaps the only major philosopher of twentieth-century central discoveries

depth

that is, of Freud and his school; I shall end with

Plato and Freud. between comparisons to begin Plato's structive by presenting the contemporary of action. theory

But view

it will within

the

to antici

some

be more the

context

in of

I at supposed, or intentional

It is commonly a voluntary plain

that to ex by philosophers, we must a action both identify

least

1 I ignore whatever For present there may be differences purposes of the Phaedrus between and I and that of the Republic, the psychology to deal with the complications in later works introduced make no attempt I briefly discuss of and Timaeus. the treatment such as the Philebus such as the Gorgias and Lysis. desire in earlier dialogues Review Metaphysics

of Metaphysics

41

(September

1987):

77-103.

Copyright

?

1987

by

the Review

of

CHARLES H. KAHN

78 on the part

a belief

and

desire

the agent's

of the agent:

in question will

certain goal and his belief that the action A

this

belief

goal. to act; agent

it is assumed, alone, must be an appropriate

there

ought

to be the

Hobbes,

who

spies,

to range

"the

abroad

common

embedded, reasons

action:

although

Aristotle

explicitly

avoids

simply of action

a deliverance has

it seems For

to Aristotle. a two-factor

give the Humean

assumption As Aristotle puts

good to us, rather the starting-point

pattern by Hobbes For Aristotle ultimately the slave, ing action. nant form

criti

is that, he for action, explanation is funda that motivation

that makes

all

difference

it, "we desire

something we because

it seeming good is rational thought

than

(no?sis)"

of this explanatory

the difference.4

his then, despite in charge of our actions;

double-factor it remains

reason

theory, the master

and

even

it needs the cooperation of desire though can play this role because Reason boul?sis, in human is of desire rational. beings, fully

less, Aristotle's

traditional

The

It is the reversal

(Metaphysics A.7.1072a29).

theory

assumption

may

rightly

be regarded

that human

action

as the

is not

in initiat the

domi

Neverthe

source

of the

is to be explained

2 Leviathan 1.8. the comments of John Cooper, Compare of Human Motivation," Theory History of Philosophy Quarterly 3-21.

of

been

The is just a desire-belief pair.3 one old. With differ very significant

does

non-rational.

it.

desire

is not

and

a reason

in question is, in fact, can back it be traced

mentally because

desired."2

thing

recent

for

of

ence,

to the

only echoing as scouts and

theory It is but it is still widely discussions, accepted. treatment in Donald for example, Davidson's influential

in some

theory

desires

is and

to the fact that this notion of desire

a philosophical theory sense. The belief-desire

embodies

was

Hume

case.

in every

desire

to the

thoughts and find the way

the

claim that reason

And are

to call attention

I want

cized

of the passions.

slave said

lead to

not motivate

could

is the view that lies behind Hume's

This

for a

desire

by

"Plato's 1 (1984):

3

on Ac See D. Davidson, and Causes," in Essays "Actions, Reasons tions and Events (Oxford, 1980), 3-19 (although Davidson speaks not of but more generally desires of "pro-attitudes"). to the For a challenge Humean view see T. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism 1970), (Oxford, 29-30.

4 or Leviathan 1.6: "But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite that is it, which he for his part calleth Good" (Hobbes's Leviathan, Desire; ed. C. B. Macpherson [Penguin Books, 1968], 120).

79

PLATO'S THEORY OF DESIRE to two distinct

reference or,

in a later if we

to take note of the originality

Plato, seem

are

because

an accurate

to have

It is hard

theory.

factors: contrasting reason and will.

terminology,

It is essential regard

and

this

to be the merest

to avoid view

view

imposing become

has

common

reason

and desire,

in this

of Aristotle

of Plato's

so familiar

different

quite

a double-factor to us

upon theory that it may

sense.

And there may be passages Plato in the dialogues where himself flirts with such a view.5 But most mature in and the is his fullest psychological theory, Republic, In the Republic not a double-factor at all. is no con there theory can in with and that be contrasted this sense reason, cept of desire of desire. The fun does not have Aristotle's concept simply can be illustrated the two views at the between damental difference

Plato

of terminology, is also particularly level

where clear.

the historical Aristotle

connection

to be good), and pride), genus eral;

which and

the

of the soul in the Republic.

of

species

for what

is judged

with connected feelings or desire for pleasure). is orexis, desire species

(self-assertive thymos and epithymia (appetite three embraces these

principle corresponding psychic of desire). Now the names alone make faculty are directly of desire Aristotle's three species

partition

three

recognizes

desire: boul?sis (rational desire for the good?or

them

between

anger The in gen

is to orektikon clear based

that upon

(the two out of the

(See the diagram below.)

tri

But

term. term and no generic The genus comparable never occurs no in his orexis and that is accident. writings; (desire) he may Aristotle the word, have deliber did not invent Although to fit the needs of his theory.6 at its meaning Plato, ately stretched Plato

least

has

no

in the Republic,

has

no place

for a generic

concept

of desire,

as

like Gorgias 51 have in mind passages and Meno 468a-b, 509d-510a, Socrates claims that everyone desires what is good and 77b-78b, where hence implies that doing evil is to be explained in cognition by a mistake out to me (by Alexander rather than volition. It has been pointed Ne to construe be tempted the contrast that one might the between hamas) as a distinction in the Phaedrus and the two horses charioteer be myth tween reason and desire; but I think that would be a misconstrual. The not reason alone but rational desire: he relies upon charioteer represents the horses for his locomotion but not for his motivation. His desire to is precisely the desire for knowledge behold the Forms and the good that (I will argue) is constitutive of reason in the Republic. 6 The only earlier use of orexis is in three fragments of Democritus at two of which least appear (DK B.72, 219, 284), genuine (no.s 219 and seems to use orexis and epithymia Democritus 284). interchangeably.

CHARLES H. KAHN

80 Plato

Freud

Aristotle

(psyche)

(psyche) Reason

1.

Desire

2. ?

Nutrition

(orexis) 1. boul?sis

1. logistikon (rational) 2. thymoeides

ego

Sensation

2.

thymos

("spirited", anger)

3. epithymia

3. id (libido)

3. epithymia

("appetite")

opposed to some other psychic faculty. The tripartition of the Re public is not the division of a faculty of desire but a division of the itself. psyche the soul can reason

From also

all

three

Plato divides

When out

as

some

from

divides desire

reason,

the psyche

into three parts, he the

and

sense-perception,

into three parts, he divides

like.

it with

remainder. This

Platonic to us

miliar Perhaps

that

that

concept it may

is why

even

noted that the tripartition not generally of theory rationality Aristotle of love.

have

that what

Plato's, good,

of view, Plato's of point tripartition as a partition But of desire. then as a distinct but principle particular

When Aristotle

form of desire. distinguishes

be described not

appears

another

will

belong

drawn and

of reason

as a form a kind

seem

to be

those

commentators

of the Republic the

necessary

category who have

is a tripartition consequences of philosophy

for his

conception in mapping his remarks, or the rational he calls boul?sis, in Plato's

logistikon,

"in

the

is so unfa

of desire of

mistake. correctly

of desire7 for Plato's as a form

onto tripartition desire for what is

rational,

calculating

part of the soul" (De Anima 3.9.432b5), but this is an understate ment. For Plato the rational desire for what is good just is the part of the soul. reason itself. for Plato, rational

Aristotle's

rational

I begin with a sketch of this extraordinary the Republic, in the context of the tripartite 7 Notably Press, 1977), Motivation,"

principle

of desire

is,

theory of reason in conception of the

T. H. Irwin, Plato's Moral (Oxford at the Clarendon Theory "Plato's Theory of Compare Cooper, p. 192 n. 20, p. 195. \*. 5-6.

81

PLATO'S THEORY OF DESIRE a brief

After

psyche.

I turn

desire,

of eros.

on the subject of dialogues a account Plato gives unified

earlier

to the Symposium,

And

where

I end by considering can be made

of love

theory

at

look

how this unified

the question with

compatible

the

tripartite

psychol

ogy of the Republic.

II the theory of the Republic: My description

To begin with reason be

as a form

there

as

regarded

of desire

implies and will

controversial

an

of

that may

interpretation defense. require

For

what

Plato says at Republic 9.580d7 is that for the three parts of the soul there

are

has.

I think,

to each part, and similarly "one proper pleasures, to each part). and three rules" there are three desires (one proper seem more to construe It might to reason natural the desire proper or property reason not as reason which itself, but as an attribute three

and its desire

such

distinction

cannot be a distinction

between

but

property

that

however, between

only Plato regularly

principle.

any

two

reason

between

the thing and its

of a single psychic aspects on the one this principle

essential

characterizes

hand as the capacity to calculate and to think things through (to logistikon) and as "that by which we learn" (580dl0), but also, on the other

hand,

as

is "always wholly

which

so that

stand,"

things

the

the philomathes,

which

to knowing

directed

it is called

part

"lover

of

to

loves

and

learn,

the truth of how

learning

(philo-mathes)

and lover of wisdom (philo-sophon)" (581b9, in book 9). It was the of to philomathes (intellectual curiosity and notion precisely by love of learning)

that

Plato

first

ciple in book 4 (435e7), where

us to the

introduced

the mention

rational

prin

of this love is immedi

we to the part learn" by a reference "by which Thus the two descriptions, "lover of learning" and "that we we calculate"), are used both learn" in (or "by which

followed

ately

(436a9). by which

book 4 and in book 9 as alternative What

part.8 8

Plato

means,

I think,

designations is that

nothing

for the rational could

cause

us

(or

to the four passages cited see book 4.439d5 (hoi logizetai), "Lover of learn and 586e4 (to philosophon). (h?i manthanomen) a course is of of the philosophic standard ing" (philomathes) description both in the Republic temperament, (5.475c2,6.485d3,490a9, etc.) and in the Phaedo Socrates (67b4, 82cl, d9, etc.); in the Phaedrus, applies the term to 9.583a2

In addition

CHARLES H. KAHN

82

us want to learn. So although the soul) to learn if it did not make we may and between the capacity distinguish conceptually verbally to know, to know and the desire between just as we may distinguish the

theoretical

ity to calculate In each Plato.

to know capacity and deliberate,

the

truth

these

are

and not

the practical capac real distinctions for

reason and desire?we practice, a single two aspects of what is, for Plato, in is so fundamental of theory and practice and

case?theory

are

only distinguishing This unity principle. that he never makes Aristotle's distinction between Plato's thought in exercised wisdom and the theoretical contemplation, sophia, in action wisdom exercised and delibera the practical phron?sis, tion.

This

of

unity

that

presupposition edge of value,

of what

has as and practice theory of truth must the knowledge is worth

pursuing,

so that

a consequence or also be a knowl the desire

to know

the truth will ultimately be a desire to know and to possess the good. As Plato tells us inRepublic 6, the good is "that which every soul

And

(505dll).

for

and

pursues

the

sake

of which

since the Form

of the Good

all reality, rational desire knowledge a the know to and obtain be desire good. not soul is (or essentially comprises) only like Aristotle's for the good, also a desire and

come

clearer The

three

it performs

all

must

for Plato

So the rational a desire

its actions"

is the source of all ultimately part of the

for knowledge This will

boul?sis.

our sketch of the tripartition. complete are 4 by a distinction in book introduced parts

but be

as we

tween: (1) the philomathes,

be

the love of learning and the principle by

16 [1971]: As Richard has noted Robinson (Phronesis (230d3). the parts of the soul both as instruments by which 46-47), Plato describes we do things and also as agents in their own right. the instru However, or faculty, view of the parts must be seen as an expository device mental, to introduce since it is our actions them at the level of the explanandum, The agent-view of the parts ("lover of learning", that are to be explained. "lover of honor," etc.), on the other hand, represents them as theoretical Plato's of human character entities with explanatory power. explanation in terms of the interaction of these parts. and conduct is given exclusively There is no room for a person or self over and above the three parts on the over in book 9 to the person "handing level of the explanans. References a pictur the throne of his soul" to one or another of the parts constitute not to be taken literally feature of Plato's esque but eliminable exposition, as part of the explanatory It remains model. to be seen how far an to the model. of the three parts is essential conception anthropomorphic see of anthropomorphism Julia Annas, discussion For an interesting here, An Introduction toPlato's Press, 1981), 'Republic' (Oxford at the Clarendon himself

142-46.

PLATO'S THEORY OF DESIRE

83

which we learn, (2) the thymoeides, the principle "by which we get principle (to philokhr?maton) or angry," and (3) the money-loving we desire the pleasures with concerned food and "by which are distin Thus the parts and the like" (435e-436a).

the part begetting

to so many from the beginning different by reference guished types or impulse.9 or appetitive The third of drives, desires part (to

will

epithym?tikon) into biologically

be elaborately and

necessary are

desires

non-necessary

and then the desires, into lawful and crimi

non-necessary

further

in books 8-9, first

subdivided subdivided

are latent in everyone, which These criminal desires, impulses. as Plato in a famous in dreams, describes themselves anticipa the rational ele tion of the Freudian "then, when Oedipal insight: . . ment wild the and and is from freed part. beastly sleeps, [wakes] nal

show

reason.

It does not hesitate to try to have inter or with in imagination, anyone else, man, god or beast; it is ready for any deed of murder, and will abstain from no transi, after Shorey). kind of food" (9.571c-d Plato's of the picture all

shame

course

with

and

a mother

thus

epithym?tikon

rather

corresponds

of the id. Struck by this parallel correlating

reason

with

the Freudian

tried to find the superego moeides),10 nation,

which

he describes and

nicely

to Freud's

depiction

and by the obvious possibility

in Plato's

ego,

some

principle

have

interpreters

of anger

as "always wholly impelled and hence called 'ambitious'

of

(to thy to domi

prestige, (philoni to win") and philotimon 'lov "loving literally, "loving victory," " terms As these honor' Plato's indicate, ing principle (9.581a-b). is self-assertive to competition and directed outwards with others, victory,

kon,

not

internalized

and

closer

affinities

with

first.

In view

of this

9

like the superego.11 self-punishing the love of power and with the desire essentially

social

character,

the

It has

thymoeides

to be is

See 436b2: The question is whether it is with a different in principle each case "or with the whole soul that we engage in these activities, when we are impelled to do so (hotan horm?s?men)." 10 A. J. P. Kenny, in Plato's Republic," "Mental Health in The Anat 1-27. omy of the Soul (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), 11 In the Leontius does seem to act the part of the story the thymoeides in reproaching the eyes for their compulsion to gaze at the superego, cannot be its essential But self-reproach corpses (439e-440a). function, since in the parallel (at 441b) from Odyssey 20.17 it is Odysseus' example reason that upbraids his thymoeides (for urging punishment immediately, without regard to the larger plan of action).

CHARLES H. KAHN

84 more

perhaps

like Aggression we will focus here

But

cept.

Plato's

reason

"good

on the

other

any

rational

begins in book 4: they

in the psyche.

represents

ians will

like

reason

of

picture of the guardians

wisdom

than

at

the

part. social

be essentially their practical: or "goodness in deliberation."

of the whole

virtue

responding

They

must

city, and their wisdom

will

the welfare

concerning

judgment

of the

the

deliber

be good cor

The

be the excellence

to rule, what concerning

deserves

part psychic naturally "calculates (analogisamenon)

with

as a whole.

city

for the individual will

which

level

in the state what represent the knowledge of the guard excellence will be euboulia,

Now

counsel"

ate on behalf

con

Freudian

of the

the

which

logistikon or worse" is better

(441cl); which "has a care for the whole soul" (441e5) and "deliber ates on behalf of the whole soul and body" (442b6). Wisdom con in this

sists

part's

the whole

ruling

on "the knowledge

of what

of

for

the

parts

(442c5-8). as

has

and

function

it must advantageous, what is The best. pursue

to know and obtain what controversial

At

good.

three; whole

at

that

part

I shall

is not only essentially the

the

level

Hence

three"

reason for

wisdom

city, the goal

the whole at

of rational

love

This is the in the

desire for the

at what

aims

aims

also

reason

that

here:

desire but essentially

is advan

composed the welfare

desire,

of all of

the

of reason

as

the good of the individual alone (as it is sometimes

to be, on egoistic of Plato) readings but in the every case, nity alone, good as Good such. said

This

must

it takes to be) good.

individual, of the soul and the

to learn"

defend

of the

part level of

community.

such, is neither

reason

to all

of what is good knowledge nature be able to know and

"loves

is (orwhat

thesis

for each

tageous

based

for each

(to sympheron) is common

which

the practical by its very

and

Republic

is advantageous

the whole

orders

giving

But if the rational part, both in city and in individual,

its specific

second

and

person

identification, with for desire

or at the

least

good

can

ment which Plato uses to establish

this be

nor the

the good of the commu or the in general good

necessary confirmed

the distinction

of

convergence, from

the

between

argu

reason

as an example a thirsty man Plato who proposes appetite. on from a himself the basis of resistance that prevents drinking comes "from reasoning" thirst pulls him on to drink, (ek logismou): but this pull is "over-powered" force drag (kratein) by a rational and

ging him back (439b3-d8).

Plato has just emphasized

that thirst

PLATO'S THEORY OF DESIRE here must

be construed

85 as desire

simply

for

drink

not

and

as desire

This passage has sometimes been for good drink (437d-439a). thought to imply that the appetite (epithymia) in question is a no cognitive with of its object;12 grasp craving," but, as its object thirst must and hence drinkable recognize

"blind course,

So a minimum

desirable. elemental

A more

appetite.

for other

characteristic

which moeides, been wronged.

complex such as the

drives,

appetitive

of a sexual object. are

of cognition

even is implied form of cognition

And quite definite of

the angry

gets

when

component emphasizes

that

as such

of

as

the most

is required or the pursuit

of a moral

judgments

intermediate

So a cognitive in all three parts thirst

love of money

for

of

the

sort

the

part soul, thy it thinks it (i.e., the person) has element of some kind is an essential

of the

soul.13

is a desire

The for drink

reason

why Plato as such, and not

a desire for hot drink or good drink, is not because he wants

to deny

a cognitive to appetite to insist upon element but because he wants to all considerations the appetite's other than getting indifference reason it wants. what In order to establish the distinction between

and appetite Plato must here define, for the first time, the notion of a desire that is essentially independent of any judgment concerning or advantageous beneficial, as synonymous). In earlier dialogues, as desire for something construed desire

what

is good,

ficial.14

Opinions will

these three terms (taking Plato had systematically to be good or bene judged

differ as to how far this "intellectualist"

of the historical the position the represents Socrates, a more or a naive I of delib younger, Plato, psychology (as believe) on Plato's erate to make the part, designed simplification plausible in the contained Socratic On of any insights paradoxes. reading must this earlier Plato with it break in order to view, decisively

view

of desire

reason

distinguish flicting

and

in the

factors

as separate con and potentially appetite as a desire It is precisely soul. for what is

judged to be good and beneficial appetite

and

the

that reason

is set apart

from

thymoeides.15

12 J. to Plato's Introduction 'Republic' 139. 13 Annas, This has been argued at length by Jon Moline, "Plato on the Com of the Psyche", Archiv f?r Geschichte der Philosophie, 60 (1978): plexity 1-26.

14 77c-78b. Meno See Section III, below. 15Gorgias 468b-c, 499e; 195: reason of consists So, rightly, Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, "rational desires for the over-all good." Plato's Similarly, Cooper, Theory

CHARLES H. KAHN

86 We

must

that

as at by Plato two nonrational

represented sense. The

ing their objects; to attain soning reason.

with

in mind

bear

if all

what

intelligent,

of

the

soul

are

in the Humean

con seizing or analogue

very

But

to succeed this

(How

three

is distinctive

love of knowledge,

theoretical

parts rational

or appetite of spirit possibility since it obviously takes some form

The

below.)

three

of recogniz only capable use must some rea also of make means-end they their goal, at least in the intra-psychic competition

as much, trol implies of intelligence for these parts reason for their own ends. seen

all

least minimally parts are not

in enslaving to use reason, is to be understood will be

are parts of reason

represented are its twin

as minimally goals:

(a) the

and (b) the practical pursuit of what

concern it is primarily the second, more is good. And that practical reason on in the to Plato must the arguments rely upon distinguish For it is not any theoretical basis of psychic conflict. conclusion about the nature of the beverage but only the practical decision that

to drink which can explain why the thirsty man

itwould be harmful resists

to quench his the connection

the

impulse In order to see

and the fuller psychology three the

of reason

1. In the weakest has

no

action

guiding desire will

understand

of the

rule

to play in fixing the towards and desire as

count are

consequences

argument

in book

4

help to distinguish

Plato

to be speaking

of

in the notion

role

this

between

of books 8-9 it will

we might soul.

at which

levels rule

thirst.

judged as counts

ends these

rational

deliberation

to be pursued but only in ends. On this view, any

it is lucidly "all advantageous

rational

if

of reason,

pursued,

when

its

considered."

things is independently advantageous speci reason con in the hedonistic of the Protagoras: calculus not the ends. we may trols only the means, in fact while Now as a a case is not this rational this will that Plato life, regard as one in which reason describe "rules" he may (archei); though

However, fied, as

what

21 n. 18. But Cooper distinguishes about the of Motivation, "judgements the good" from "desires for good that follow upon them," thus introducing Aristotelian of rational and rational desire. bifurcation judgement (On p. 6 he thus speaks of reason having desires.) I do not think this does justice to the radically Platonic of reason as constituted different conception by desire.

87

PLATO'S THEORY OF DESIRE reason

in any particular to decision "prevails" (kratei) from acting.16 2. A stronger notion of the rule of reason that the ends of requires not the be For action determined. means) rationally (and only this means that if reason will rules, the goal to be pursued Plato, that

say

act

or refrain

by a specific of which version

of human the mini welfare, conception is given of virtue in the by the account

be defined mum

and in the early books of the Republic

Socratic dialogues the

introduction

aims

at a good

ment 3.

of philosophy life,

in book

The rule 5). of the harmonious

in terms

specified

(before

of reason develop

of bodily health and psychic excellence.

In the

strongest

to be

and

pursued

rules

action

guiding

not

the ends only by fixing towards these but by ends,

the goal of human life through its own philosophical

constituting

in (2) the

Whereas

activity.

reason

notion,

of reason

function

is strictly

prac

tical, here it is both practical and theoretical: it is as knowledge of reality and the Forms (including the Form of the Good) that reason

both

specifies

three

These

stronger

action. ference

of

the

Plato's

between

of

rule

content

reason

of reason,

between account

of the good

are

as the goal

virtue

virtue

in books 5-6.

an

is not

innovation here: both Diotima's view stronger the doctrine of the Phaedo these later books anticipate

including

access

composed

as a defense Plato

to

4

is replaced by references

and speech of the Re

is explicitly Since the Republic Forms.) as a defense of justice and only secondarily of does not emphasize the distinction between (2)

our noticing

in books

the

philosopher to "the rule

it that the just man of book

of

reason"

tween (2) and (3). But the contrast between 16 At

(But the

the

and (3): it is almost without Plato's

the dif in Repub

the best human life with the life of philosophy,

public by identifying

philosophy,

of rational

(2) and (3) coincides with of pre-philosophic

lic 4 and the account of philosophic

life.

distinguished by to progres corresponding

of the good

characterizations

The distinction

the

provides

accounts

richer

progressively sively

levels

and

8-9. seem

Hence

of many as be ambiguous

the purely instrumen

that it be reason 439c7 it is essential that prevails (kratein), role for though, as we shall see, Plato hints at a more than instrumental reason here. in the In the case of the repression desires of spendthrift but of some appetities oligarchic soul, he speaks not of reason prevailing others dominating kratousas, (epithymias epithymion [554dl0]).

CHARLES H. KAHN

88

tal role of reason

in (1) and its teleological

role in (2) and (3) is

reason marked: this is the difference between sharply as master of the passions. Thus the Pha do deprecates of virtue based upon a balancing of pleasures conception in contrast

to

the

life

of genuine

virtue

as slave the

and

slavish

and

pains, wisdom

determinedly

(68d-69c). The Gorgias had argued earlier that no version of (1) can be fully coherent unless it coincides with (2), and hence that the only rational life is one that accepts the Socratic notion of the good.17 A similar argument is implicit in the account of the deviant lives of Republic 8-9, where the rule of reason is identified with the life of the just man (here equated with the philosopher). If reason is able to rule in the soul, itwill specify the life of virtue (the life of philosophy) as the good to be aimed at. If it does not succeed in so, that

doing

is because

it has

appetite that itmis-identifies part

can

that

form

any

the domination

so "overpowered"

been

the good.

even

of the good,

conception of the

by

spirit

or

Since it is only the rational

other

has

an

erroneous

the

conception, consequence parts reason a mistake of causing to make in its recognition of the ends to be pursued. it means That is what to be enslaved.18 for reason

Reason

can rule only if it is enlightened in a virtuous

to say only

in (3)?only

could

of reason

in book

not

And

need

not

his present the before 4, even the weaker

appearance view

much

skillfully

to philosophers. only so as not under-described, less

can be fully

that

full-strength

of the tripartite support psychology. to apply is designed to human beings men,

in regard its object, that is

its rule

if it is fully enlightened,

philosophy. Plato

does

soul.

for After

realized?as

is, only in the life of

of the rule conception of philosophy. But he his initial in argument all,

generally, Hence

the tripartite model not only to virtuous Plato's

to presuppose

example the notion

is of

reason ruling in the soul that will be specified in the following definition of the virtues.19 All he requires is a single instance in 17 See my "Drama and Dialectic in Plato's Gorgias," in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. Julia Annas, 113-18. 1, (1983), 18 Here I am agreeing with Cooper (Plato's Theory ofMotivation, p. 19 n. 9 and p. 20 n. 18), against lives as Irwin, who speaks of the deviant a "rational following plan," being "controlled by (the) rational part," or from "a rational resulting choice, made by the rational part" (Plato's Moral I see no textual support for this interpretation. 19Theory, 227-34). The application seems quite general, of Plato's since the argument is not explicitly limited to the case where reason sets the ends of example

89

PLATO'S THEORY OF DESIRE someone

which

of long-term established

calculation tion

from

refrains

of this result. is capable over intense ment prevail answer Plato's here, a contains, primitive tially

geous. soul what duct

urge

some

thirst? is that reason I submit, just is, or essen non for the good, an irreducible, desire to and advanta be it takes what good

to pursue it means

to claim

that

our action that determines is advantageous a is Plato's what On for rational desire led by good. the the good and wanting is no gap between there knowing we be desire that statement something (Even Aristotle's

view good. cause

it seems

distinct

episodes

book

4, wanting to perform its

morphic

what

good

to us might

been

rejected

by Plato

as

of in terms of the psychology Now means the soul of each part wanting just In the anthropo in a harmonious way.

or events.) the good function

language with which

parts,

have

that the judgment and the desire are

since it suggests

misleading,

one

of

the good is "what every is acts": the it always and for the sake of which good pursues our con Whenever we all want in so far as we are rational a judg can we it that is either is under rational say control,

concerning or that we are

will

a consequence

even

But the weakest concep an argument how it must explain can a faculty and of cognition judg

How

is what

That

ment

these

as

advantage. by such

of reason

derivative

drinking

reason's

desire

as commands

be expressed and with another

its own

Plato

concerning to them

describes

the interaction

of

of the soul the other parts with to perform in harmony to rule desire So reason's

judgment. and its judgment thing, over and above to rule is just the expression its desire is beneficial: for what desire is beneficial.20 or the spelling-out for what of its desire that the other reason in ruling, succeeds Whether is, whether in the soul

is not

some

third

use of reason in what Plato calls include the instrumental action but might Plato cunningly "slavish virtue" However, calculus). (as in the hedonic in the described rule of reason (which is gradually the virtuous insinuates that the desire to drink in his pages, 440a-441e) by suggesting following or disease" "affect (path?mata) is due to excessive (439d2), thus example If at is aimed health welfare. and calculation rational the that implying we would the role of reason were thought of here as merely instrumental, to establish in fact not get the division of psychic parts that Plato wants 7-8 n. 9). Motivation reasons Plato's Theory of by Cooper, (for 20 developed with Cooper to be a disagreement Here there seems (p. 6) who In the end, however, to reason "an innate taste for ruling." ascribes desire for good (p. 8). this from the more fundamental Cooper too derives

CHARLES H. KAHN

90

to obey (peithesthai)

parts will be persuaded

reason's

is

judgment

matter.

another

In order for appetite to listen to reason, and anger be hence the for the scheme need of they trained; properly education in books 2-3. too must Reason be pre-philosophical must

properly trained in order to give the right commands; hence the need for philosophy, and for the theory of knowledge and higher education in books 5-7.21 By the end of book 6 we know that the the

of

part

learning

soul will

until it reaches the highest

not

be

to rule

prepared

adequately

form of learning (tomegiston math?ma),

the only knowledge that can satisfy its desire, of namely cognition the Good "which in soul all its actions." The every pursues itself, we find in earlier which such as the Gorgias and principle dialogues the Meno,

was

and which

cited

in book

desire

of reason.

that

the

realize

that

and as the essential desire beings for Plato all knowledge culminates

of the Good, since it is the Good that makes

as well

knowable see

we

Once

in knowledge

of all human

as making

love of

them that

learning

real

identical with

shared

but which,

by all mankind,

because

doctrine

knowledge, real things these

is easy

do not and

difficult

still

and

to state see

clearly less do we

knowable.

problems.22

the

we (6.508e-509b), rational part of

to Plato,

according but

all things

the love of the good that

realized only by lovers of that Form which we

true

and

characterizes

the soul is ultimately

This

desires

"everyone

in book 6 in a double form: as

good things" (438a3), thus reappears the universal

4, that

can

be

is

fully

is truly the Good. hard

extremely the Good

to understand

can be an object how for see why or how the Good makes other I have no solution to propose to here

But

even without

an

explication

of the

21 The theory of the virtues in book 4 is not self-contained, as we can see if we ask what activity of reason constitutes wisdom to book according 4. If reason rules, it aims at the welfare of each part and of the whole as well. But what is the welfare of the rational And what is it for part? reason to do "its own proper work"? for an occasional mention of Except there is no hint of an adequate knowledge (428b6ff., 428cll-d8, 442c6), answer until we reach books 5-7. We can give no non-circular account of what Plato means to by the rule of reason until we can give some content the autonomous as love of (non-instrumental) activity of reason, conceived and pursuit of the good. And here the notion of what is good knowledge must be specified by more than civic concord and psychic harmony, since these both presuppose the notion of the rule of reason. 22 see G. Santas, For discussion of the Good "The Form in Plato's in Essays in Greek Philosophy, vol. 2, ed. J. P. Anton and A. Republic", Preus P. White, Plato (Albany: SUNY, 1983), 232-63. Compare Nicholas on Knowledge and Reality Hackett, (Indianapolis: 1976), 100-03.

91

PLATO'S THEORY OF DESIRE supreme

we

of the Good,

principle

can

see how

the

factor

psychic

defined by the love of knowledge

and truth can coincide with

rational

welfare

common and

for

desire to all

the

human

the practical As has been

good?for beings. of our

sides

For

these

the

or happiness?which are just the theoretical

is

essential

rationality. of the soul have a cognitive seen, all three parts of desire. But only at the level and all three are also forms aspect of reason do the cognitive and desiderative elements fully coincide,

so that their highest Plato

though

always the erotic

correlation, is essentially sium

fulfillment must avoids

be achieved

mechanical

to the dialectical

equivalent

and

repetition of Beauty

to the Form

ascent

together.

Al

one-to-one

in the Sympo to the vision

ascent

of the Good inRepublic 6-7. Without begging the question whether the Form of Beautiful is to be taken as strictly identical for Plato with

the Form

precisely

the

of Good, role

same

of philosophical

can

that

recognize dialogue,

the

as terminus

two Forms

play for the scheme

enlightenment.

In the Symposium of eros presented

tion

we

in each

this whole

scheme

as a universal

desire

by the no A cursory

is structured for the good.

glance at the earlier dialogues inwhich this theme is developed will help us appreciate the rather different ways in which this desire is articulated in the Symposium and Republic.

Ill

Phaedo

the earliest with any system is, I believe, dialogue of desire. And it is the only dialogue the before a contrast to recognize and Republic between rational desire

aiming

at the good

atic

The Gorgias discussion

(expressed

desires aimed at pleasure desires

for

pleasure,

by the verb

boulesthai)

and

sensuous

(expressed by the term epithymia)P

praised

by Callicles

as

constituting

the

The life

23 Aristotle's distinction between boul?sis terminological (rational is inherited from the Gorgias, probably by desire) and epithymia (appetite) in the Academy. The Charmides also men way of semi-technical usage a terminological distinction between epithymia tions, in passing, aiming at and boul?sis aiming at some good (167e, where eras is said to be pleasure The author of the Gorgias and Char directed towards something kalon). not suffering from any "Socratic" mides was obviously illusion that all desire is desire for the good. the description of erotic (And compare emotion at Charmides 155d.)

CHARLES H. KAHN

92 of a naturally

goal

man,

superior

or "spirited"

anger

One where

correspond

are

appetites

"appe

include the

as well.24

drives even

passage

to the

roughly

though they probably would

titive" part of the Republic,

speaks prophetically found" But (493a-bl).

of "the there

part of the soul is no correspond

ing attempt to define a rational part of the soul. The psychological The possibility of a theory of the Gorgias is at best incipient. conflict

between

desires

is not

choice

between

the

rational

envisaged, satisfaction

505a-b, 507e2). that what implies

what

he

of our own

desire.25

all men

Meno:

A

desire

a person

we may

he wants:

thinks

closely

good

do hear

and

bad

wants

really be mistaken paradox no one wants

of a

desires

of argument is not always

as to the

related

things;

we

a famous

In addition,

cf. 491dll,

(500a; the Gorgias

although of good

true

object is argued for in the what is bad (Meno

77cl, 78b4). The Meno to be

wants one

unhappy"

of Socrates'

want

serves

also premiss love in the Symposium. "dear structs dear

in what

paradox

(78a4-5).26 arguments

protreptic

to be happy"

Symposium

this

supports

(282a2). as

As we

the

starting come We

the

Similarly takes

as

claim

that

"no

in the Euthydemus, its premiss: "We

shall see in a moment, for

point even closer

one

all

this

the Platonic

of theory to the doctrine of the

the Lysis has to say about something

that is

In a famous

con

for its own sake." (philon) the regress, and then breaks for the sake

with

of Z, etc.,"

Socrates

"X is dear suddenly

passage

which

for the sake introduces

of Y, Y is the notion

of the primary or truly dear thing "for the sake of which all other things are dear" (219c-220b). This alone is truly called dear; other things are dear only for the sake of this primary object, of which

24 in the Gorgias. There is no trace of the thymoeides Presumably Plato had not yet thought of it as a distinct type of desire; but in any case it in the Gorgias. A third there would have been no reason to introduce class of impulses would have spoiled the neat dualism by which Calliclean are opposed to Socratic boulesthai. appetites 25 Here again we have a paradox that Plato echoes in Gorgias 468b-c. do what it wants ruled soul will by no means the Republic: the tyrannically an 468e5 cf. and d5-7. 9.577el-2; Gorgias (ha 26 boul?th?i) Rep. is of course questionable. The logic of these arguments For an to which in view makes them too them defend my tame, see G. attempt and Henley: Socrates Kegan Paul, Santas, (London, Boston Routledge as protreptic must be understood I think these arguments 1979), 187-89. rather than deductive.

PLATO'S THEORY OF DESIRE are

they

as

it were

the

93

deceitful

"images"

(eid?la,

The

219d3).

"original" is left open in the Lysis, identity of this mysterious though an interpretation in terms of the good is hinted at (222c4, d5; cf. 221e3-4). and primarily

For

a fuller

dear

we

account now

turn

of what

Plato

as

regards

truly

to the Symposium.

IV

to the priestess which Socrates attributes great speech into two parts. falls The first and longer section Diotima presents or lesser mysteries of love based upon the universal the preliminary The

for happiness.

desire

The

concluding

of Diotima's

portion

speech,

designed for full initiates, describes the philosophic ascent to the Beautiful itself outside of time and place. It will be necessary to between get clear on the relation to reconcile before we attempt

the

exoteric

this

and

esoteric

with

theory

the

doctrines ac

tripartite

count of desire in the Republic. The initial account of love is prefaced by a general definition of desire (epithymia) as wanting (boulesthai) to get what one lacks or keep what one has (200b-e). Although bodily appetities other than sex

are

not mentioned,

them as well; money,

fame,

the

is broad

analysis

it is explicitly

extended

and

in addition

learning,

enough

to apply

to love of children, to erotic

desires

to

sports, proper

(205d, 208c ff.). Eros is first specified as desire for what is beauti ful, which includes or is identical to what is good (201c; cf. 204el, But

the possession of good things is happiness, nor admits this desire neither needs happiness;

206al). desire ther desire

explanation (205a). as for happiness

things

forever

and

Diotima

eros, as hence

then is, as

that the

pursuit

reinterprets the desire of

and all men of any the

universal

to possess

immortality

fur

good

by procre

ation in beauty, beauty either of body or of soul (206b7). At first sight this definition picks out the erotic as a special case of the general pursuit that all human

of happiness. become beings

But

since

pregnant

Diotima and have

goes on to claim a natural to desire

procreate, and that at the biological level this can be seen as a pursuit of immortality shared even by the animals, it turns out that specifically sexual activity connected with begetting counts less as a species lastingly

as a sample of eros structure The good.

than

conceived revealed

as the pursuit of what case of biological

in the

is

CHARLES H. KAHN

94 will

procreation artists,

in every

be found and

lawgivers

of eros.

type

live different

parents

ordinary

and

poets

Heroes, kinds

of erotic

lives because they identify in different ways what the Lysis calls "that which is truly and primarily dear," that for the sake of which are valued. things Thus the more popular characterized different by

all other

surveys

theory choices

of

the

different

forms

of

ultimate

erotic

object.

But the Lysis had pointed to a single proton philon. for the erotic makes unique enterprise object announces the last section, where Diotima "for

love, The

the

sake

universal

desire

for

lasting

other

its appearance final

the

mysteries of what

possession

informed

matters,

correctly of the beautiful.

session

these

The notion of a of mysteries exist" (210al). is good, by pro

tiful body to the love of all beautiful love

of souls,

being

wants,

the

then upwards

bodies,

led in

nature and pos love of one beau

the

concerning pass from

One must

in

only

in beauty, can be fully satisfied only if one is rightly

creation erotic

of which

love,

to the

of moral

of knowledge, to the and finally excellence, true knowledge of true beauty, the Beautiful itself. the phi Only can in contact Form the achieve with what every human losopher in possession

immortality

of the good,

since

the

only

Form is itself wholly good and lasting, imperishable (211a-b) and divine (211e3). Diotima's ladder of love is not only the true way to philosophic ness. That

knowledge; is, I suggest,

this present cal associates

doctrine

it is also

the

why Plato not in intimate

true

path

has

arranged conversation

to human to have

happi Socrates

with

philosophi but at a prominent social occasion (as in the Phaedo) a group in Athenian of leading before life and culture. The figures over crown the poets in the contest for the of victory philosopher's is not

wisdom public Plato

to be

claim chose

I believe,

the

this

the

occasion

some

of

achievement teacher

all men

of what

to reveal

narrow

his mature

but specialist want to know.

doctrine

for the first time) and in connection with it was

to make

clear

that

Beauty

alone,

highest

object not only of knowledge concern

momentous Diotima's

account

to all men of the

the reality

of Forms

a If (as

the Form of

of Forms

was

the

but also of desire, and hence of not

only to philosophers. ascent clearly implies

and lover's

that

it is

a single desire that begins by taking beautiful bodies as its object and ends with the beatific vision of the Form, just as in the Republic it

is a

turned

single around,

cognitive faculty from the shadows

that on

must the

be

converted, literally cave wall to the vision of

95

PLATO'S THEORY OF DESIRE in the objects for procreation

fully

the desire

serves precisely to link the carnal lover to as participants of a common in the pursuit the metaphysical lover, the Platonic philosopher, us with of Plato's the problem But that presents

attain.

on the

consistency

as

of eros

characterization

lover

the metaphysical only goal, which can

The

sunlight. in beauty

of desire.

subject

V

The theoretical

of desire in the Symposium

unification

ismade

reason of desire between the bifurcation only by ignoring possible was in and the documented which and sensual Gorgias, appetite,

which reappears in the Phaedo before being replaced by the trifur in In following the Meno and Euthydemus cation of the Republic. as a rational desire for happiness desire the universal in effect considers of Diotima is good, the doctrine only the alto calls boulesthai, and ignores the Gorgias kind of desire which a con As Calliclean of the broader "appetites." spectrum gether which conflict of psychic the phenomena it also sequence ignores construing for what

of the richer so large in the Republic. Once we take account the conception how are we to reconcile of the Republic, psychology sources more or with Diotima's of desire of three there independent loom

doctrine

of eros,

which

but

ends

production

Beauty?

How

with the

Or must

we

admit

the

tripartite a new model

innovation, human motivation

of tripartition trace of it in the

hint

and

contemplation

passion that the

sium is simply incompatible with Now

sexuality

and

theory

truth, of eros

the Republic

drive

incorporeal

that

to be

is, for the

in the Sympo

of the Republic? is certainly

an

to the

of diversity justice there is a of conflict. Although there is as far as I can see no clear to do

designed the facts

in the Phaedo, Symposium

the

the psychology of

psychology

for

to re

the of

is the sexual drive rooted in the epithym?tikon into a rational

"transformed" Forms?

begins with

or

in any

earlier

dialogue.27

The

27 the at Phaedo of tripartition We have a foretaste 68cl-3, where else rational love of wisdom and learning here, philomathes (philosophos "love of the body" with the non-rational e.g., 67b4) is contrasted where, as "love of money and honor, either one or both." which is characterized as as loves soon these two "corporeal" Plato emerges splits Tripartition 82c5-8. Some scholars have found the apart, as he does in fact at Phaedo

CHARLES H. KAHN

96 the Symposium

is not whether

then

question

the Re

anticipates

There

are,

considerations

several

however,

this

with

it is incompatible public theory of desire but whether seem as to be. at first sight it might theory,

the

against

as

sumption that the two dialogues are flatly incompatible on the subject of desire. The first consideration is the doctrine of Forms, identical in the Symposium, Phaedo, and which is substantially be would It strange (though of course not impossible) Republic. that Plato three

have

should

one

dialogues,

his mature metaphysical presented a psychological contains of which

the

as a form

of philosophy

of eros

account

The

of the Symposium. theory of Diotima's last in the love part sophical taken for granted but actually contradicted tation

in

two. (I indicate below how the less fully articulated than that of with it.) Even more striking is two dialogues has certainly not

compatible with that of the other psychology of the Phaedo, though the Republic, is entirely consistent the fact that Plato in the other abandoned

in

theory doctrine

is not speech Plato in his by

in the Phaedo

of philo only not presen

and Republic.28

On this score it is not only the metaphysics but also the psychology None of this of the three dialogues that forms a unified whole. with is tripartition; but it compatible proves that Diotima's theory at

does

least

I suggest

an attempt justify two different ways

eros

be to take of

any

energy ian

not

part, single or motivation

id or

libido

as

as

for all

we might

an

a pool of be identified

proposal

eros will

complex The

with the relationship or first, quasi-Freudian,

parts, instinctual with

other

source

of psychic of the Freud

On my

energy. desire

two parts of eros

view

as the desire

on the model

rational

ta combine

nor

desire

undifferentiated

three

try

My first proposal will

to rational

as restricted but

the

in which

and Republic.

the theories of the Symposium

two.

to reconcile

alone, of the soul. is suggested

second but

by

in a

an

at reference the "three vaguer types of life" in the much or eros love of in to turn to who "those 205d money-making Symposium or love of wisdom So Cornford, (philosophia)". sports (philogymnastia) in G. Vlastos, "The Doctrine of Eros in Plato's Symposium", ed., Plato: A also 123. Cornford 2 Collection Critical Books, 1971), (Anchor Essays of at Symp. 208c3 with "the spirited the pursuit of fame (philotimia) connects we have only the raw part of the soul" (ibid., 125). But in the Symposium it is on its way to being organized in the Phaedo for tripartition; material in triads. 28 490b2-7. Phaedo 65c9, 66b7, 66e2-3, 67b9, 68a2-7, Rep. 6.485b-d, doctrine

of

97

PLATO'S THEORY OF DESIRE

on the rechannelling of desire in Republic 6. passage important one a we in know incline "When desires direction, strongly person's in other directions, that they will be weaker like a stream of water directed to flow

one

into

off

towards

the pleasures sures of the

ing the channel learning

would

cording

to which

Taken

the of

part

of some

the notion

to direct

of bodily pleasure

standard the

source

for

leav

towards ac

of the Republic theory has its own distinctive

soul

de

to different

belong parts. pleasure bodily a generalized notion of eros as the common of of each part, we see how the strengthening

the desires

in one

desires

themselves

and

since sires, learning introduce But if we here

set

have

the

literally,

contradict each

desires

itself

if he

(6.485d).

Republic,

someone's

with be concerned like, they will will itself and abandon the by plea is truly a lover of wisdom (philo-sophos)" and

learning of the soul

body,

So when

channel.

in weakening for other desires in ex model is used Freud very by hydraulic of sublimation. Libidinal his concept says impulses, to one another like a network of communicating "are related

desires objects. plaining Freud,

will

direction

result

same

The

canals filled with fluid"; these impulses show a great "capacity for their

that

displacement," the

redirecting ble or acceptable. calls "sublimation,"

is, for abandoning same towards impulse This

original an aim that

sexual

aim

is more

and

accessi

is the process

of rechannelling which Freud the grounds the that society will recognize as a eros as view aim The of surrogate suggests parallel "higher."29 a common to be distributed between the energy pool of motivational more one means a for for that in such less three psychic way parts on

another.

out

force.

doctrinal

for his

to rechannelling is not a random is of central The view expressed

reference

Plato's

theory

of the virtues

and

their

unity

in the Republic and also in the Phaedo make

psychologically and love for wisdom

virtues:

other

desirable perfection

29 viere,

will

pursuits

to one who of

plausible truth will

in wisdom.

importance Both here

the philosopher's his possession of the other

claim

guarantee seem petty

In comparison

S. Freud, A General Introduction (Garden City, N.Y., 1943), 302.

with

(see 69a-b) this view helps to

Plato's

and

that

other

is gratified by intercourse with

the Forms.

image

with

such

to Psychoanalysis

less

pleasures

the being and an object

trans.

nei

Joan Ri

CHARLES H. KAHN

98 ther any ance

profit serious will

nor

nor

and sensual will hold luxury indulgence so that the virtues of and temptations, honesty temper be trivial of this redirection of desire into consequences power

eros. The philosophical how the pursuit of wisdom sible

for moral The

of eros

self, would

reasons,

psychology the

tyrant's

represents less called

of Oedipal dreams recognition one of the more to explain help

of the Republic,

the

in the desires

motivation, psychic

unity of psychic

of each

to Plato.

of the divergence and consequently

conflict

control

that

are

the

the

other

two with

strictly incompatible sium in terms of the universal

everyone we

find

in

passion

part.30 It would

three

parts

to account

nothing center of attention

(205a).

parts. psychic the presentation boul?sis

this view of

do nothing to account as independent sources for in books

Nor does it shed any clear light on the dynamics can

in the

energy that finds

as itmay be, I very much doubt whether

can be attributed radical

points

is essentially criminal and destructive and of is neverthe eros, opposite philosophical the very same name: er?s or lust (9.572e5, 573b7, d4). nomenclature for the two polar extremes would then

Attractive eros

It

noticed).

puzzling

that the dominant

namely

point to eros as the underlying expression

already

it

soul, which the extreme

by identical

This

respon

(the tripartition

psychology

the

also

to see

as a pool of libidinal is attractive energy of the fascinating with Freudian parallel

in view

insights at other points of Plato's and

us

permits be causally

virtue.

conception

for many

image of rechannelling so understood might

the

for of

facts

of

4, 8 and

by which

9.

reason

Above

for good

is all, this view in the Sympo on the part of things

of eros

For this is just that rational desire for the good

in the Gorgias,

Meno,

and Euthydemus

as prefiguring

both

Aristotle's

boul?sis and Plato's conception of the logistikon in the What these parallels with Aristotle and with other Republic. works of Plato strongly suggest is that eros in the Symposium 30 This Freudian eros in terms of libido was of Platonic interpretation See his "Group Psychology and the Analysis accepted by Freud himself. of the Ego," in the Standard Edition of Freud's work, vol. 18, p. 91, where he cites studies by Nachmansohn and Pfister that treat Plato as a precur sor of psychoanalysis. is a similar comment There in the preface to the on Sexuality", 4th edition of "Three Essays Standard Edition I 7, p. 134. am indebted here to some unpublished work by G. Santas.

99

PLATO'S THEORY OF DESIRE be seen

should directed more

as undifferentiated

not

concern by a rational of rational conception

for what eros

can

that

as desire

but

energy psychic is good. And

it is only this to the close

do

justice between the erotic ascent of the upon coincidence, verging of and the the Cave and the Sun. progress cognitive Symposium can eros in then becomes: The question how the interpretation of parallel,

terms

of rational

desire

posium and the rechannelling I want which

the

suggest and cognitive so

that

every level, over the other reason

native

parts

of desire

"enslaving"

And

As we

phenomenon.

it is not

for

by

their

own

of

as alter

have

ends

rule

seen,

it is

that the in the

de

of

lies behind the metaphors force

but

by persuasion,

for its own judgment of what

is beneficial,

by

that

and thus can harmonize principles and integrate the psyche soul," by its by its "care for the entire one of what is for each and for the whole "knowledge advantageous reason

which

can

rule

over

the

is good and desirable

reason

viant lives of Republic 8-9: that iswhat gaining acceptance

to degree in hand go hand the

emphasizes

components of desire and rechannelling of the soul can be understood

in using

reason.

in the Sym

in the Republic?

desiderative the

our judgment of what succeed

of eros

scope

that

solution

parts of the same

descriptions

by perverting lower

a

to

at

the broad

explain

the

other

is common to all three" (441e5,442c6).

What

lies behind the

and the rule of reason is the com of psychic metaphors harmony or resistance of emotional interference absence to, the with, plete our is in rational of what best interest. appraisal have

We reason

sl vivid

in the Phaedo

to be enslaved

by

the

lower

of what it means for description of this the which in parts soul,

dialogue are presented as the desires (epithymiai) connected with the body. The philosopher, who is here designated as the philo the mathes, and fastened from which (82e-83a). bodily these

will of learning, that his soul is fettered recognize in a cunning to the body constructed of desire, prison it by gentle he must release admonition and persuasion as far as possible will abstain from The philosopher lover

pleasures,

and desires because he sees that to undergo pains, one feels is to suffer harm: "when in cognitive

experiences or pain concerning pleasure as clearly real this regard thing tense

a given and

true,

object, although

one

to

is forced it is not.

. . .

Each pleasure and pain is like a nail which clasps and rivets the soul to the body

and makes

it corporeal,

so that

it takes

for

real what

CHARLES H. KAHN

100 ever

the body cave

one's

constructed and

ambition

the

by

sensual

for honor:

competition

favorite

lightened

it is enlightened

Unless

(83c-d).31

reason is obliged to live in the darkness of the cogni

by philosophy, tive

to be so"

declares

pursuits.

or by thymos, appetites one's ontology is affected as reason

Conversely,

that good moral

(and assuming

of the

lower

by by en

is progressively

is also available),

training

will

the guidance of the cognitive aspect parts accept own reason to what is their will and moder concerning advantage to the judgment of reason. ate their own claims is This according as the rechannelling described of de phenomenon is the of half reinforcement sire. reason's progressive (The other own preoccupation It is not that with and the Good.) knowledge or political is transformed ambition into the love sensual appetite one

half

of

the

these by definition, But they now objects.

of wisdom; proper reason. directed economy How

a result

As

to its own

of

this

proper

The

remain

operate

within

to their

the

limits

the

desires

by assigned of reason

subordination, will be predominant

place

prison-house

is explained of carnal

own

attached

in the over-all

object

of the psyche. takes this change

the Symposium.

desires

in the

ladder

in

of love

is represented

desire

by the first stage, in which the initiate is enamoured of a single beautiful body (210a). But a skillful erotic guide will use the initial triggering

effect

sense-perception get the lover exemplar

of

sexual

in the Phaedo's to see his

desired

of a desirable

of effect (like the triggering account in order to of Recollection) as as an and hence object beautiful,

attraction

principle

that

is to be found

as

elsewhere

This is the first step in the cognitive liberation of the rational principle that will permit it to turn its attention towards its proper object. What is affected by this first step is not the sensual desire to the epithym?tikon) but the as such (which belongs essentially

well.

cognitive

component

to

the extent

that

it represents

the rational

prin

to a lovely body, as ciple temporally trapped in the attachment as an object of to real and hence be and good something judged misplaced

31

rational

desire.

What

happens

in the

course

of erotic

cites William James In this connection (who Shorey appropriately all turn to the most in Locke and "Among sensations, Berkeley): appeals or of pain." W. James, are those productive of pleasure belief-compelling 2 in The Principles 1950), 306, cited by Shorey (Dover, of Psychology, in G. Vlastos, "Plato's Ethics," ed., Plato 2, p. 28 n. 129.

PLATO'S THEORY OF DESIRE is that this rational element

initiation

for a single

passion

The

soul as more precious

that

cess of altering

bodies:

this

intense

it a small

of

weakening,

in a recognition

sensual

by an

essentially

under which

in

it is the

movement.

In

lust to

of desire from physical

place

the description

mat

of "beauty

to the upward

is the key

takes

passion

metaphysical

in all

relax

thinking

hence

then

the rechannelling

the Symposium,

same"

than that in body" (210b6-7): again

r??valuation

cognitive

"upwards," first

shift to a higher form of beauty

and

devaluation, continues process

the

and

stage it and

despising

body,

is directed "he will

in the

result

desire.

"one

this

Thus the cognitive

ter" (210b5-6). will

as

of beauty recognition the lover has reached

to the when

101

pro

epistemic

the object

is initially

the lover's attention from a view of the and thus converting desired, a as to of individual world bodies vision of the incorpo consisting from which this phenomenal real principles world derives whatever and

beauty

structure

rational

it possesses.

tion requires just the sort of dialectical so

6-7,

Republic images

that

the

as images

precisely

This

come

initiate may of a higher Beauty.

to see Like

a cognitive is essentially Symposium enterprise, to an inadequate attachment from rational desire to its proper

true

"the

goal,

in

the

beautiful

the conversion

the education of eros in the

of the "eye of the soul" in the Republic,

redirection

redirec

cognitive

exercise that is described

knowledge

the

liberation

of

and its object which is knowl

edge of Beauty itself" (211c7). What the Symposium makes clear is what is only partially indicated by the description of rechannelling in the Republic: the same time

of enlightenment for reason of reeducation for the desires.32

the process

that

a process

is at

VI

has view

In conclusion, certain definite of reason

ego and

id.

I want

and

The

advantages desire and

advantage

a faculty of cognition

32 account

to suggest

that over

both also

over cases

in both

and judgment

Irwin, Plato's Moral of the ascent.

Theory,

Plato's

theory

of desire

the Humean-Davidsonian the Freudian is that

conception reason for Plato

of as

is at the same time equipped

167-71,

gives

a partially

analogous

CHARLES H. KAHN

102

if not simply identical to, its own autonomous with, as good the recognition of an action Hence vation. or as a component to contribution one's welfare?is of in favorable

and

reason,

the act.

performing us relieves

the

of

The icant.

decision

advantage For Freud,

"the

issues

motivation, in reason

is after

ego

for itself

a pre-existent

in action.33

seems

view

a

ipso facto

this practical power Admitting of artificial necessity inventing over Freud's

of moti

or beneficial?

a sufficient

circumstances

a rational

whenever

desire

source

to me

even more

a part

all only

of the

signif id, a part

purposively modified by its proximity to the dangers of reality. From a dynamic point of view it isweak; it borrows its energy from the

Freud

id."34

of rational

principle begins

with

babies,

a

of the ego, as the conception his because of he knowledge, genetic approach: sense of "reality." who have a very weak But a such

has

limited

of rational from an in faculty cognition to understand is poorly rational equipped pleasure-principle to account unable for the development and wholly decision-making the motiva and mathematics. of theoretical science By deriving theory fantile

tion sires

which

for

derives

rational

to know

the

the

knowledge truth and

and

action

from

irreducible de basic, is good, and on the other structure of reason the from

what

obtain

the content and by deriving as structured of intelligibil of things by objective principles more can account for the existence science and than of do ity, Plato for some people, for example, He can also explain why, philosophy. hand

nature

for a devoted the world, when we

scientist,

and why, somehow

know very well

for all of us, cannot

is the most

knowledge bring

is the best

it is such ourselves

is best is seen

thing in

a frustrating experience to do something that we

thing for us to do.

of akrasia in an experience involved for what desire tration of a rational

important

The frustration

understood

as the

frus

to be good.35

33 rea in conceiving For a sensitive discussion of the issues involved see C. M. Korsgaard, son as a source of motivation about "Scepticism 83 (1986): 5-25. The Journal Practical Reason," of Philosophy 34 on Psycho-analysis, trans. Lectures Introductory Freud, New 107. York: W. J. H. Sprott Norton, 1933), (New 35 or eudaimonia If one appeals here to a standing desire for welfare we have in effect Aristotle's to explain notion the efficacy of deliberation, of boul?sis or rational desire, which gets focussed on a particular action by a judgment to act (prohairesis), the fusion of issuing in a choice or decision reason and desire the fusion, saw Plato, recognizing (NE 6. 2,1139b4-5). no advantage in splitting the two apart. On the question of whether his see Section VII. is defensible, position

103

PLATO'S THEORY OF DESIRE VII

simply

that

Although content,

surely they and the contrast

tudes; as a difference

thought?

propositional

atti propositional be vividly characterized

them

can

of "fit":

the urge to know the truth, which manifests

could be identified with as in a judgement reason that Plato of as a single

thought

same

different

very

between

of rational the

is or

the world

require construed

grant

may

represent

of desire

our beliefs to fit the world, "We require but to fit our desires."36 If the desire is for good as an effort to change to see how it is hard it the world,

we

itself

have

two

the

of judgement

element

in any analysis

a desire

and

to the

happens

is fundamental a belief

of

be

What

incoherent.

belief

suggested, by a partisan as a form of reason conception

It might Plato's

Postscript. that factor view,

to what and

psychic

is in fact the

desire

case.

the

knowledge it does not seem

principle,

even

So

for

if we be

might coherent

to

identify this principle with desire for the good. Plato might well respond by suggesting that desire for good is to be

own

our

and

capacity

to change to "imitate

effort

pattern: and this will

judgements

include

in conformity

to conform

but reality the divine"

by setting

our

setting with

the

cognitive nature of

Coming to know the world as it iswould be part of what

things. means

us

for

to

knowing

the good

the

imitate

as it is will

world

an

to an objective in order, soul

ourselves our

as

not

construed

But

divine.

include knowing what and

loving

it will

be only

for

Plato

is good.

knowing

At

notionally

not

it the

the limit, psycho

logically distinct. Much

more of

something prepared love and

to the

would this

sort

interpret climb out

have

to be

is surely his elaborate of the

cave

said

such

a view. unless

by Plato, the between parallel as a mere coincidence.37

implied

The 36 Richard

to defend

University

we ladder

But are of

of Pennsylvania

The Thread of Life (Cambridge: Harvard Uni Wollheim, versity37 Press, 1986), 53. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the University of Helsinki in March 1983 and before various audiences since then, including a lecture at the Catholic of America in October 1983. I am University indebted to my auditors for many valuable and am particularly comments, to Myles and Alexander Nehamas for their detailed grateful Burnyeat criticism.