PHILOSOPHY--STUDY GUIDE.pdf

The London Philosophy Study Guide

Published by the Philosophy Panel of the University of London. Unless otherwise stated, the following guides are copyright of the Philosophy Panel of the University of London.

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Contents

1 A Guide to Philosophy

1

2 Logic & Metaphysics

12

3 Epistemology & Methodology

30

4 Ethics

45

5 Political Philosophy

59

6 Greek Philosophy

67

7 Modern Philosophy

73

8 Philosophy of Mind

89

9 Philosophy of Religion

102

10 Philosophy of Language

110

11 Philosophy of Science

120

12 Aesthetics

126

13 Symbolic Logic

134

14 Post-Aristotelian Philosophy

136

15 Medieval Philosophy

141

16 Indian Philosophy

148

17 Kant

158

18 Nineteenth Century German Philosophy

168

19 Phenomenology

171

20 Frege, Russell & Wittgenstein

175

21 Marxism

189

22 Philosophy of Mathematics

194

23 Philosophy of Psychology

204

Preface This guide is intended for use by all students of the London Philosophy degrees, BA, MA and its research degrees. It is based on The Philosophy Study Guide 19934 of UCL and The Philosophy Study Guide, 1994 and 1997 of the University of London. The initial project was conceived by Jonathan Wolff, and the document which resulted was produced by the UCL Philosophy Department in October 1993 for internal use, each member of staff, Malcolm Budd, Tim Crane, Marcus Giaquinto, Robert Heinaman, Mike Martin, Lucy O’Brien, Sarah Richmond, Jerry Valberg, Jonathan Wolff, Arnold Zuboff, contributing one or more sections. With the second edition, the guide was produced by and for the University of London as a whole; thanks are due to Sebastian Gardner, Paul Helm, Christopher Janaway, M.M. McCabe, David Papineau, Richard Sorabji, and John Worrall all of whom contributed one or more extensive revisions to the guide; and to Andrew Chitty, Dorothy Edgington, Anthony Grayling, Keith Hossack, Hugh Mellor, John Milton, Sarah Patterson, Anthony Savile, Barry Smith, all of whom gave extremely helpful criticisms and made useful suggestions. Substantial revisions were added in a third edition; in that case thanks are due to Helen Beebee, Tim Crane, Sebastian Gardner, Marcus Giaquinto, Jim Hopkins, Christopher Janaway, Fraser Macbride, Véronique Munoz-Dardé, Gerard O’Daly, David Papineau, Tom Pink, Sarah Richmond, David Hillel-Ruben, Mark Sainsbury, Michelle Salis, Robert Sharples, Martin Stone, Thomas Uebel, and Jonathan Wolff, all for advice and in most cases significant revisions of the guides; and to Tom Pink and Martin Stone in particular for the substantial revision of three of the guides. The fourth edition is a further revision and updating. In this case minimum additions and corrections have been made to the guides from the third edition by various of the above mentioned. In line with alterations to the undergraduate BA degree, the guide to Philosophy of Social Science has been removed; the guide to Continental Philosophy has been replaced with guides to Nineteenth Century German Philosophy and Phenomenology; a guide to Indian Philosophy, kindly provided by Jonardon Ganeri has been added. The most substantial revision has been the proper bibliographical annotation of the entries in the various guides. This was carried out through cross-referencing with The Philosophers’ Index. This gruelling and time consuming task was carried out by Matthew Nudds, to whom many thanks. Jayne Rowse and Ann Higginson provided invaluable secretarial help. The guide is a collective effort, it expresses the opinions of no one person—bibliographical errors are ultimately the responsibility of the editor. MGF Martin, December 2000.

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A Guide to Studying Philosophy

This chapter of the guide contains some general information about studying Philosophy, while each chapter that follows contains an entry for one of the papers currently available within the B.A. degree. For each of these you will find a number of general hints about studying for that particular paper, together with a number of central readings. These reading lists vary greatly in length, but no inferences should be made on this basis about the comparative difficulty of the papers. In every case these reading lists will be supplemented by others you will receive in lectures or tutorials, and there is no attempt here at comprehensive coverage. At some London colleges, students on the B.A. degree do not begin to study for their finals papers until their second year. In that case, the main interest of this guide for first year students will be the contents of part one, together with the overview it gives of their second and third years. However it is hoped that students will use this guide throughout their whole course. The rest of this chapter offers guidance on reading philosophy; writing essays; constructing a bibliography; avoiding plagiarism; and how to get hold of books and articles.

1 Reading Philosophy At no stage in one’s career is reading philosophy easy. Some people claim to read philosophy for pleasure. Wittgenstein is reported to have said that he found reading some philosophy ‘a kind of agony’. Many people are inclined to agree with this. Whatever good intentions philosophers have to make their works clear, accessible, and fun to read, the result is rarely any better than more dull and dense prose with a few corny jokes. Remember that you read philosophy not for the pleasure of the moment, but for what you can come away with. It is important, then, that you make your reading of philosophy as efficient and rewarding as possible. In order to do this you must maintain a sympathetic but critical attitude to the text. This can often be best achieved by approaching the text with a number of general questions in mind. Normally you will not have got everything you could have out of the text until you can answer the following questions.

A. WHAT CONCLUSION DOES THE AUTHOR WISH TO REACH? It is very rare that you will be asked to read a piece in which the author is not arguing for or against a certain thesis or conclusion. (The conclusion might even be ‘no conclusion can be reached on this topic’.) Understanding what that conclusion or thesis is will be the first and most important step in understanding the reading.

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B. WHY IS THAT CONCLUSION INTERESTING? Of course, the conclusion may not seem very interesting to you, at least not at first. But, you hope, the conclusion should be interesting to its author. In what way? Does it contradict common sense? Or the view of some great philosopher of the past? Or some contemporary rival? Generally speaking, philosophers are writing to convince some people who hold a certain view. Who are those people and what is the view? Another way of thinking about this is to ask yourself why you think you have been set the reading, or why it appears on a reading list. What philosophical problem does it bear on, and how? What else that you know about does it connect with?

C. WHAT IS THE ARGUMENT? This is often the most difficult part. A thesis, generally, is not merely asserted, but argued for. To identify the argument is to determine what premisses or assumptions are being used, and to determine what logical inferences are being made. Philosophers are often very inexplicit about this. Certain premisses will be taken for granted and so not even mentioned. Many different arguments might be used, but not properly distinguished. Identifying the argument or arguments, then, often requires great imaginative and forensic skill, but is indispensable for a real understanding of the text.

D. IS THE ARGUMENT VALID IN ITS OWN TERMS? This question is really seamless with the last. If you think that you have identified the argument, but it is flagrantly invalid, then think again. Perhaps you have misunderstood something. Many readers apply a principle of hostility to philosophical texts, thinking that it is obvious that there must be a serious mistake somewhere, all one need do is identify it. A better tactic is to apply a principle of charity instead. If the argument seems flawed try to think of ways in which it can be repaired. The task here is not one of literal interpretation of the text, but of constructing the strongest line of thought available from the text. This is where some of the best, and most creative, philosophical work is to be done. Even with your best efforts, however, not all arguments can be rescued. The most common way of showing the invalidity of an argument is to find a counterexample. A counter-example to the argument is a case in which the premisses are true but the conclusion false. This shows that the argument is logically invalid, and the next task is to identify the particular logical mistake made. More often, counter-examples can be attempted to the main thesis, rather than the argument. If an author claims that all F’s are G, rack your brains to see if you can think of an F that is not a G. If you can, you have found a counterexample and (if it is genuine) you have refuted the thesis. Another common defect in philosophical arguments is equivocation, where an author uses a term in more than one sense, and the argument only goes through because this ambiguity is ignored. This can be very hard (so very rewarding) to detect. In all this, remember that the philosophically mature and responsible attitude is that understanding must precede criticism.

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E. SHOULD THE PREMISSES OF THE ARGUMENT BE ACCEPTED? Even if the argument is valid in its own terms, you might still want to reject the conclusion, perhaps because you have found a counter-example to it, or because it conflicts with something else you believe. It might even contradict something else the author has said elsewhere. At this point your strategy is to examine the premisses or assumptions of the argument. Are they true, or are there counterexamples to one or more of these? Or perhaps there are other reasons for rejecting them. If the argument relies on false premisses, then it doesn’t prove anything.

F. IF WE ACCEPT THE ARGUMENT AND CONCLUSION, WHAT ELSE FOLLOWS? Sometimes philosophers are explicit about the further implications of their view. Often they are not. If not, here is your own chance for real originality.

G. FINALLY: A CAUTION These notes are intended to help you read philosophy. But not all you read can be approached through these questions. Sometimes philosophers present views without argument. Sometimes they present arguments apparently without views. Some philosophers think that the governing assumption of these notes, that philosophy requires arguments for conclusions, is a vulgar mistake, and real philosophy requires something else. In all such cases, following this guide to the letter will lead only to frustration. But you can still apply the spirit: approach the text in a sympathetic but critical way; try to determine why the text is thought to be philosophically interesting; try to work out how it connects with other things you know about. Don’t just read: think.

2 Writing Philosophy Peter Lipton ‘Style is the feather in the arrow, not the feather in the cap’

A. AWKWARDNESS Awkward writing makes the reader uncomfortable. It is ungrammatical, unclear, choppy, or just too difficult to follow. One cause of awkward writing is not using your own words. Instead, you rely on the phrases and constructions of the author you are discussing. The resulting mixture of your author’s style and your own is almost always awkward. Even if you are describing someone else’s views, use your own words. The most general and important cause of awkwardness, however, is simply the failure to revise. Most writers produce awkward sentences the first time around; good writers take the time to review their writing and know how to spot awkwardness and how to eliminate it. You should assume that the first draft of each sentence will have to be fixed up. Writing on a word processor may make this revision easier and less time-consuming. The best way to test for awkwardness is to read your draft out loud. Most people have a better ear than eye, and if it sounds good it will usually read well. If you do have any doubts about your ear, Strunk and White, Elements of Style is a good guide to awkwardness.

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B. EMPATHY Once you understand something, it is difficult to remember what it was like not to understand it; but you have to do this to get your point across. To write effectively you must put yourself in the reader’s shoes. (Pretend that your reader is a friend not in the class rather than the teacher.) The reader cannot read your mind and she hasn’t just spent five hours thinking about your topic. So she needs plenty of help. Don’t just make your point, explain it. Give an example. Approach it from several angles. Above all, keep your writing concrete, even in as abstract a subject as philosophy because abstract writing loses the reader. In addition to keeping your reader on board, empathy helps you to figure out what it will take to convince her that what you write is true. You already believe yourself, but your reader needs an argument. Think of yourself as selling your point of view, or as defending yourself in front of a jury.

C. CHOREOGRAPHY An essay is not a list of sentences: it has structure. The structure should be obvious to the reader. Write informative introductions and conclusions. The introduction should not only introduce the topic, it should introduce your argument. That means that you should tell the reader what you are going to prove and how your are going to prove it. Unless the introduction gives the reader a clear map of the essay, she is likely to get lost. Be direct and specific. Replace sentences like ‘Throughout the centuries, the greatest minds have pondered the intractable problem of free will’ with ‘In this essay, I will show that free will is impossible’. The conclusion of the essay should tell the reader what has been accomplished and why the struggle was worthwhile. It should remind the reader how the different moves in the body of the essay fit together to form a coherent argument. Think of your essay as composed of a series of descriptive and argumentative moves. Each major move deserves a paragraph. Generally speaking, a paragraph should start with a transition sentence or a topic sentence. A transition sentence indicates how the paragraph follows from the previous one; a topic sentence says what the paragraph is about. Both types of sentences are really miniature maps. In the middle of a paragraph you may want to give another map, explaining how the move you are making here is connected to others you have made or will make. The order of your paragraphs is crucial. The reader should have a clear sense of development and progress as she reads. Later paragraphs should build on what has come before, and the reader should have a feeling of steady forward motion. To achieve this effect, you must make sure that your sentences hang together. Think about glue. You can get glue from maps, from transition sentences and words, and especially from the logic of your argument.

D. ORIGINALITY There is room for originality even when you are out to give an accurate description of someone else’s position. You can be original by using your own words, your own explanations, and your own examples. Of course in a critical essay there is much more scope for original work; most of the arguments should be your own. This worries some beginning philosophy students, who think they don’t know how to come up with their own arguments. Do not deceive yourself: Plato did not use up all the good and easy moves, nor do you have to be a Plato to

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come up with original philosophy. It is difficult to teach creativity, but here are three techniques that may help. First, make distinctions. For example, instead of talking about knowledge in general, distinguish knowledge based on what others tell you from knowledge based on your own observation. Often, once you make a good distinction, you will see a fruitful and original line of argument. Second, consider comebacks. If you make an objection to one of Plato’s arguments, do not suppose that he would immediately admit defeat. Instead, make a reply on his behalf: the resulting ‘dialectic’ will help you with your own arguments. Lastly, play the why game. As you learned as a child, whatever someone says, you can always ask why. Play that game with your own claims. By forcing yourself to answer a few of those ‘whys’ you will push your own creativity. The technique of the why game suggest a more general point. Often the problem is not lack of originality; it is rather that the originality is not exploited. When you have a good point, don’t throw it away in one sentence. Make the most of it: explain it, extend it, give an example, and show connections. Push your own good ideas as deep as they will go. © Peter Lipton.

3 Style Sheet for Bibliographical References There are several sets of conventions for referring to articles, journals, books, etc. The most commonly used method at the moment is the ‘Harvard method’. This section describes how to format a bibliography of works according to the Harvard method, and how to refer to those works from within one’s text.

A. THE FORMAT FOR A BIBLIOGRAPHY For a bibliography of works referred to, set them out in alphabetical order (by author’s surname) where more than one work by an author is listed, order them chronologically. The year of publication is cited immediately after the author’s name. If there is more than one work by the same author in the same year, use ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, etc. at the end of the year to differentiate them. Titles of books and journals should be in italics; titles of articles should be in single quotation marks. Place of publication and publisher should be included (for books) as should page numbers of articles in journals. Examples Dancy, J. (1985) Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Davidson, D. (1976) ‘Hume’s Cognitive Theory of Pride’, reprinted in Davidson 1980, pp. 277-290. Davidson, D. (1980) Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press. James, W. (1897) The Will to Believe. New York: Dover Publications, 1956. Kitcher, P. (1984a) ‘A Priori Knowledge’, in The Philosophical Review 89, pp. 3-23. Kitcher, P. (1984b) ‘Species’, in Philosophy of Science 51, pp. 308-333. Oakley, J. (1992) Emotion. London: Routledge. Taylor, G. (1985) Pride, Shame and Guilt. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

B. HOW TO REFER TO WORKS WITHIN ONE’S TEXT References within the text to a work take the following form: (Kitcher 1984, p. 20). If it is clear from the context which author is being discussed, the reference can be abbreviated to (1984, p. 20); if it is also clear which work is discussed, all that is needed is the page reference (p. 20).

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Examples There has been much recent philosophical discussion of the emotions (Oakley 1992; Taylor 1985). Philosophers have attempted to provide characterisations of the type of mental entity that emotions are; in addition, they have offered analyses of particular emotions, such as love, jealousy, pride and fear. Gabriele Taylor has made a study of the ‘emotions of self assessment’, which include pride, shame and guilt (1985). In her study she takes issue with Davidson’s (1976) well-known cognitive theory of pride. She rejects Davidson’s account for its insistence on ‘a form of rationality... which is not necessary for an understanding... of the emotional experience in question’ (Taylor 1985, p. 5).

4 Plagiarism Any work guilty of plagiarism will lead to a failing grade on that paper, and likely disqualification by the University. To avoid this possibility please bear in mind when presubmitting work: 1. Direct quotations should be in quotation marks, with reference to the source, including page numbers. 2. Indirect/paraphrased quotations and borrowed ideas should be acknowledged by means of a reference. 3. A full bibliography of work consulted and used should be appended to the essay. Below is attached an example of what is, and what is not, plagiarism, prepared by Richard Dennis of the Geography Department at UCL. If you are concerned about this in your own work, please discuss the matter with your tutor or Departmental Tutor.

AN EXAMPLE: OBSERVATIONS ON CLASS STRUGGLE Richard Dennis 1. The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat. Masses of labourers, crowded into the factory, are organised like soldiers. Not only are they slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois State; they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the overlooker, and, above all, by the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.

THIS IS PLAGIARISM. THERE IS NO ATTEMPT TO INDICATE THAT THESE ARE NOT RICHARD DENNIS’S OWN THOUGHTS BUT ARE WORDS TAKEN DIRECT FROM DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO. 2.

Marx and Engels noted that the history of all hitherto existing society had been the history of class struggles. Society as a whole was more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat. They observed that proletarians had nothing to lose but their chains. They had a world to win.

THIS IS STILL PLAGIARISM. ALTHOUGH THE IDEAS ARE ATTRIBUTED TO MARX AND ENGELS, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THE FORM OF WORDS IS NOT RICHARD DENNIS’S. JUST CHANGING IT INTO THE PAST TENSE DOESN’T MAKE IT ORIGINAL.

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In The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels (1973 edn., p. 40) noted that ‘The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles’. They argued that society was ‘more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat’ (p. 41). ‘Masses of labourers, crowded into the factory’ were ‘organised like soldiers ... slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois State’ (p. 52). They concluded that ‘The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win’ (p. 96).

THIS IS NOT PLAGIARISM, BUT IF ALL YOUR ESSAY CONSISTS OF IS A SET OF QUOTATIONS STITCHED TOGETHER, IT DOESN’T SUGGEST THAT YOU HAVE THOUGHT ABOUT OR UNDERSTOOD THE CONTENTS OF THE QUOTATIONS. SO RICHARD DENNIS WOULDN’T EARN VERY MANY MARKS FROM ME FOR THIS EFFORT! 4.

In one of the most famous first sentences ever written, Marx and Engels (1973 edn., p 40) began The Communist Manifesto thus: ‘The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.’ They went on to exemplify this claim by showing how the structure of society had, in their view, developed into two interdependent but antagonistic classes: bourgeoisie and proletariat. The latter comprised factory operatives, who had been reduced to no more than slave labour; but as they became concentrated geographically, in the great factory towns of the industrial revolution, so they had the opportunity to organise themselves politically. Hence, the authors’ conclusion that a communist revolution was not only desirable, but possible, leading them to issue their equally famous final exhortation (p. 96): ‘WORKING MEN OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!’

THIS MAY NOT BE A VERY PROFOUND COMMENTARY, BUT AT LEAST I’VE TRIED! © Richard Dennis 1989

5 General Works and Series in Philosophy One of the most noticeable trends in Philosophy publishing in recent years is the proliferation of books aimed directly at students. This is, of course, driven by thought that if a book gets on an ‘essential purchase’ list then it will make quite a lot of money for the publisher, but it does mean that publishers have started to do more to produce philosophy books that are both readable and useful, which once looked like an endangered species. For the most part these books have been produced in series, with the idea that books in the same series should have been written at the same level and in the same style, so one always knows what one is getting. Inevitably, though, there will be variations in quality. Many of these books are recommended at various places in this Study Guide. Look out for: Routledge Arguments of The Philosophers. This is a series of monographs on individual philosophers (or close-linked schools) in most cases trying to cover the entire range of the philosopher’s work. The series is almost complete, and most of the major figures in the canon are covered. The books are generally of a very high standard. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Another older series, in which a dozen or so major papers in an area are reprinted, with an Introduction by the editor. The series began in the 1960’s, and many but not all of the earliest volumes are now out of print. In general the more recent volumes are narrower in focus than the earlier ones, and as a whole the series is very highly recommended as a guide to some of the most influential papers in analytic philosophy. The Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries. These books take key terms from a particular thinker and explain them. So if you want to know what Hobbes meant by ‘covenant’ or Descartes

8 Study Guide by ‘substance’ look at the Hobbes Dictionary or the Descartes Dictionary respectively. They are not meant to be read as continuous works, but can provide excellent background material. Cambridge Companions. These are multi-authored collections, with about 15 essays on different aspects of a particular philosophers work, together with biographical and bibliographical information. Coverage is very wide and the series will probably be complete soon. Generally they are edited to a very high standard, and are reliable and informative. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. These take a particular subject area (Ethics, Philosophy of Mind, etc.) and provide a large number of articles on varying areas and sub-areas within the field. These vary substantially in format, and in some cases in the quality of the entry within a volume. However they can be a great deal of help. The volume entitled The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, edd. Nicholas Bunnin and E.P. Tsui-James, contains entries both on areas of philosophy which broadly coincide with finals papers, and on particular Philosophers. If you still have to rely on this when you get to finals then you are in trouble, but it provides excellent introductions to areas and thinkers, and should help guide choice of finals options. Routledge Philosophy GuideBooks. A fairly new series aimed at providing clear and reliable commentaries on the major works in the western tradition. Philosophy: A Guide Through The Subject ed A. Grayling. Not really a series, although a second volume is in production. Sometimes called ‘The Yellow Pages’ although at the time of writing it is not known what the colour of the cover of the second volume will be. The book was written expressly as a multi-authored textbook for people studying for the London External BA, which bears a striking resemblance to the Internal BA, so the book will be particularly useful to students of Philosophy in London. Volume 1 covers the compulsory papers and some options, and Volume 2 most of the remaining options. It aims to be introductory, but not all contributions have achieved this: some will not be easily understood by first and second year students. However all the articles are extremely valuable and close study will be rewarded. Those particularly recommended are mentioned throughout this Study Guide. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. P. Edwards. Eight Volumes. This was for a long time the standard Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and should be in all major libraries. The great majority of individuals who own it took it as their introductory offer to an American book club. It is fine piece of work, although as it is now 30 years old it records the subject as it was, rather than as it is. Nevertheless many of the entries are still very much worth reading. The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Craig. This is ten volumes long and is intended to replace Edwards as the standard work. The work is also available on CDROM, so some universities may have it networked, and there is now a web-based editions. Routledge have recently published a concise edition, though this will be a lot less useful.

6 All the Books in the World Looking for books can be time-consuming and frustrating. All the philosophy journals you will need are stocked in College libraries and in Senate House; copies of the major journals are also available from departmental libraries. Many of the books you will need will be in heavy demand so it is important that you are able to explore several possibilities in trying to find a book. Sometimes you may need or wish to buy a book rather than borrow it from the library. The list of shops below includes those which deal in second-hand copies. The manner in which one can gain access to reading material has altered radically over the period since this guide was first produced, and may well change beyond recognition before the next edition. It still remains the case that first port

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of call for both journals and books will be the college or University library, and as ever getting hold of the book or journal issue desired can be a time-consuming and frustrating business. However, access to journals and means of purchasing new and second hand books has been changed entirely by the continuing expansion of the World Wide Web. First, most of you will have access to online library catalogues throughout the world—these offer a way of determining the complete publishing details of hard to find volumes or journals. Second, many of you will have access on line to the Philosophers’ Index or other such bibliographical aids which enable you to search for relevant material on any subject. Third, and perhaps most useful, there are various online stores of humanities journals which are accessible if one’s college or university pays the appropriate subscription. For anything published in a journal at least seven years ago, by the far quickest way to track down the original journal version and to have a copy of it is to use an online store such as JSTOR (for more details see below). As physical bookstores decline and for the chains become extended coffee shops and for the specialist and second-hand dealer simply become non-existent, the web becomes yet more essential for tracking down your own copy of something. Various web sites enable you to compare prices for new books—in the UK no VAT is levied on books, so you can import from other countries without fear of surcharge. This web has taken serendipity out of hunting for rare second hand editions, but in its place you now can survey the globe to find long out of print items.

A. LIBRARIES There is a College Library with a Philosophy collection at each of the colleges. In addition, Senate House lodges the University of London Library which has a fairly comprehensive collection of philosophy books and periodicals. Some of the departments also possess a departmental library but this is normally of very limited stock. In general, undergraduates will only have limited access to libraries at other colleges, with the possibility of using them for reference but not for borrowing. Post-graduate students are often able to join a library at another college with a letter from their supervisor. All departmental libraries are restricted to the members of the respective colleges. Each department is anxious to make library provision as effective as possible. To do this, we need to know of any difficulties. In particular, it is important to find out if there are books regularly assigned by tutors not available in any of the University of London libraries. Students are encouraged to let their department know of any deficiency in their College or Departmental Library or in Senate House. Note that Inter-Library loans are possible. If a student cannot otherwise obtain a book, the book can be borrowed from another library in the British Isles Library System, by filling in a form at the Main Issue Desk. (This does, of course, take rather a long time.

B. VIRTUAL LIBRARIES In addition to library online catalogues, and the British Library, www.bl.uk, also look out for:

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Philosophers’ Index. This is published every quarter with listings of all English language philosophy publications including bibliographical details and an abstract. Colleges and universities often provide electronic access to this. JSTOR This is funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and includes a complete store of many humanities journals from their inception. Currently it provides access to the following philosophy journals: Ethics; Journal of Philosophy; Journal of Symbolic Logic; Mind; Nous and Philosophical Perspectives; Philosophical Quarterly; Philosophical Review; Philosophy and Phenomenological Research; Philosophy and Public Affairs. At present it does not provide access to current issues but only up until 1992 in one case and 1994 for most of these journals. However mode of access is currently under re-negotiation. JSTOR contains compressed images of each page of these journals, together with a searchable electronic index of all contained material (both bibliographical and full text). Any article can be downloaded (with permission only once) for printing. INGENTA This is a commercial store of various humanities and science journals which provides access to current issues of journals which your university subscribes to. Articles are made available through Adobe Acrobat pdf format; and the bibliographical information is fully searchable. Currently this does not provide access to various of the independent American journals such as Ethics, Philosophical Review, and Philosophy and Public Affairs. At UK universities access to Ingenta is normally provided through the Bath Information and Data Services web site www.bids.ac.uk. Access is normally provided both from college-based networked computers and from personal systems via the use of password control using ATHENS. POESIS This is a similar resource to Ingenta, but provided through a joint venture of a commercial company Intelex Corp. and the Philosophy Documentation Center (who produce Philosophers’ Index). You can find out which services are available to you and how you gain access from your college or university library.

C. BOOKSHOPS i. Second-hand ULU run regular book fairs which are well-advertised, and are a good source for textbooks. Skoob Books Ltd, 15 Sicilian Avenue (between Southampton Row & Bloomsbury Square) has an extensive selection of second-hand philosophy books, from review copies of recent volumes to the truly bizarre. 10% discount for all students with a student card. Unsworth, Rice & Coe, 12 Bloomsbury St. (also Turl Street, Oxford) offer an interesting and varied selection of philosophy books. Waterstone’s, 82 Gower St. has a large philosophy section in its second-hand department on the first floor. Judd St. Books. Marchmont Street, Another useful selection of second-hand and remaindered books. Bloomsbury Books, Bury Place. This has quite a large selection of philosophy, but it is also somewhat more expensive than some of the alternatives.

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If you feel you have a lot of time to waste, the various second-hand bookshops on Charing Cross Rd. stock the odd philosophy book, almost by accident.

ii. New Books For when a book is too new, too popular or too obscure to turn up in the secondhand bookshops, or for when you are feeling particularly flush: Waterstone’s, 82 Gower St, 3rd floor, still the main academic bookshop in London. Also look at their branch in Charing Cross Rd., first floor, a reasonable selection, particularly for continental philosophy, & some interesting oddities. Blackwell’s Book Shop, 100 Charing Cross Road Nowhere near as large or comprehensive as the original Oxford store, but still has a reasonable selection. Borders, 203-207 Oxford Street, 1st floor, has a more than reasonable, if slightly cramped, selection of philosophy books. W. & G. Foyle, 119 Charing Cross Rd. 3rd floor, a similar selection of philosophy books to Waterstone’s, although notably fewer, organised by author.

iii. Out of Town If you wish to travel in search of books (dedication indeed), the best selection of philosophy books for sale can be found at: B.H. Blackwell’s, 50 Broad St. Oxford, basement, this has a comprehensive selection of philosophy books in print, and a substantial, but expensive selection of second-hand books. Heffer’s, Cambridge, basement, less comprehensive than Blackwell’s in Oxford (and now owned by them) but still useful. Galloway & Porter, Cambridge, first floor, a good selection of second-hand & remaindered philosophy books. Great Expectations, 2071 Foster St, Evanston, Illinois, USA; tel: (708) 864 3881, possibly the largest selection of new philosophy books, in and out of print. If you cannot manage to hop a ride on the El. you can write to or phone them and place an order, packaging and airmail are only a slight addition to the American price of books which is still marginally lower than the UK price.

iv. The Virtual Bookstore Currently (December 2000) the most obvious stopping off points on the web are: Amazon: www.amazon.com and www.amazon.co.uk. Comprehensive provision of books in print, but rarely the cheapest. Blackwell’s: www.blackwells.co.uk for general web site, bookshop.blackwell.co.uk takes one directly into the bookshop at the moment. Currently do not charge postage within the UK. Waterstone’s: www.waterstones.co.uk. Online version of the store. Bertelsman: www.bol.com One of the largest (German based) publishing conglomerates. May provide discounts on books that others don’t, but do charge postage. Barnes & Noble: Big American bookstore similar in scope and charging to Amazon, www.bn.com.

For second hand books look at: Alibris: www.alibris.com Bibliofind: www.bibliofind.com

Both of these are large conglomerates of second-hand bookstores across the world from which you can search for books. Both Amazon and Barnes and Noble also offer booksearch facilities.

2

Logic & Metaphysics

1 The Paper The Logic and Metaphysics paper covers many of the central problems of philosophy. Do not be misled by the occurrence of the word ‘logic’ in the title of the paper: it is not primarily about formal logic (the sort of thing you will have learned in your first year) but about what is sometimes called ‘Philosophical Logic’. Philosophical Logic is about philosophical problems that arise in reflecting on logic, and in applying logic to the following areas: the analysis of reasoning (e.g. validity, conditionals); the study of aspects of natural language (e.g. names, descriptions); the treatment of certain traditional metaphysical problems (e.g. truth, existence, necessity). You are expected, of course, to know the basics of elementary logic: the propositional calculus and predicate calculus. You should understand the truthfunctional account of the sentential connectives (‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’, ‘if...then...’ and ‘if and only if ’) and how to use truth-tables to test for validity. You should have an understanding of the existential and universal quantifiers, and the notion of a variable, and you should also know how the propositional and predicate calculi can be supplemented by the modal operators ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’. In short, the course assumes as much logic as is contained in an elementary logic textbook such as Hodges’s Logic, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), or Guttenplan’s Languages of Logic, (2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1997). (A useful handbook that summarises the main elements of predicate logic and set theory is John Pollock, Technical Methods in Philosophy, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990).) What about metaphysics? Like many terms in philosophy, the term ‘metaphysics’ does not have one clear and uncontroversial definition. The term originally derives from the name of Aristotle’s Metaphysics which was so-called because it came straight after his Physics in the ordering of his works. These days, metaphysics is normally taken to cover very general questions about what there is and how the world works: questions about substance, identity, universals, time and causation, for instance. Many of the problems addressed will be familiar from the study of the history of philosophy, particularly from those philosophers found in the Modern Philosophy paper. The way in which many of these subjects are treated in contemporary philosophy means that there is considerable overlap of issues in the philosophy of logic and metaphysics as conceived by the philosophers of the Modern period. (This is particularly obvious in the issues concerning necessity, truth, realism, essence, identity and existence.) Given this, it is not really possible to draw a sharp line between what is ‘logic’ and what is ‘metaphysics’, and the paper is not divided into sections.

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2 General Reading Anthologies Martinich, A. P. ed. 1990. The Philosophy of Language, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. All the essays in §3 and §4 are central to the philosophy of language aspects of the course. Moore, A. W. ed. 1993. Meaning and Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Useful collection of classic papers and more up-to-date works on the philosophy of language. Hughes, R. I. G. ed. 1993. A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic. Indianapolis: Hackett. Contains many important papers on the philosophy of logic. Strawson, P. F. ed. 1967. Philosophical Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Contains many classic papers on the philosophy of logic and language. Frege, G. 1997. The Frege Reader. Trans., and ed., M. Beaney. Oxford: Blackwell. Quine, W.V. 1953. From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. A very useful collection of papers by one of the most influential philosophers and logicians of the twentieth century. LePoidevin, R., and M. MacBeath. eds. 1993. The Philosophy of Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Very useful collection of papers on the philosophy of time. Sosa, E., and M. Tooley. eds. 1993. Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Contains many of the classic papers on causation, some of which are also relevant to the Epistemology and Methodology paper. Mellor, D. H., and Alex Oliver. eds. 1997. Properties. Oxford: Oxford University Press. A collection of many essential papers on universals and properties. Grayling, A. C. ed. 1995. Philosophy: a Guide Through the Subject. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The chapter on Metaphysics gives introductions to the problems of causation, time, universals and substance; the chapter on Philosophical Logic introduces many of the issues mentioned under ‘Language and Logic’ below. van Inwagen P., and D. W. Zimmerman, eds. 1998 . Metaphysics: the Big Questions. Oxford: Blackwell.

Books Sainsbury, Mark. 1991. Logical Forms: an Introduction to Philosophical Logic. Oxford: Blackwell. Good introduction to the main areas of the philosophy of logic, with useful exercises. Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming & Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell. Essential reading. McCulloch, G. 1989. The Game of the Name: Introducing Logic, Language and Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chapters 1-4. Good introduction to the ideas of Frege and Russell. Haack, Susan. 1978. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Some good surveys; worth looking at. Blackburn, S. 1984. Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Quite advanced introduction to the philosophy of language, containing many of the author’s own views. van Inwagen, P. 1993. Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. An excellent introduction to metaphysics.

3 Topics A. LANGUAGE & LOGIC i. Sense and reference How does language relate to reality? How is it that words can be about things or refer to things? Referring expressions or singular terms, expressions which pick out a particular object, are normally divided into three categories: proper names (‘Julius Caesar’, ‘Rome’), descriptions (‘the conqueror of Gaul’) and demonstratives (‘this’, ‘that’, ‘that fish’, ‘this emperor’). Names and descriptions need to be treated

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separately. (Demonstratives are treated in the philosophy of language section of this Guide.) The main reading for this topic is contained in the anthologies edited by Martinich and Moore mentioned above; there is an excellent introductory essay in sections 1 & 2 of Mark Sainsbury, ‘Philosophical Logic’, in A. C. Grayling, ed., Philosophy. An essential theme is Frege’s classic theory of sense and reference. Frege thought that there are two aspects to the meaning of any term: its reference (what it applies to in the world) and its sense (the way in which the term presents its reference). So the two terms ‘Julius Caesar’ and ‘the Roman conqueror of Gaul’ have the same reference but different senses. See Frege, ‘On Sense and Reference’, in the Frege Reader, reprinted in Moore and in Martinich. See also Michael Dummett, ‘Frege’s Distinction Between Sense and Reference’, in Moore and in Dummett’s Truth and Other Enigmas, (London: Duckworth, 1978). For discussion, see Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), chapter 1; Greg McCulloch, The Game of the Name, chapters 1&5; David Bell, ‘Reference and Sense: an Epitome’, in C. Wright, ed., Frege: Tradition and Influence, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984) and ‘How “Russellian” was Frege?’, Mind 99 (1990): 267-277; and Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, (London: Duckworth, 1981) chapters 1, 5 & 6. For more on Frege see the section Philosophies of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein in this guide.

ii. Descriptions Descriptions can be divided into two kinds: definite (‘the emperor’) and indefinite (‘an emperor’). Most philosophical debate has centred upon definite descriptions. Russell argued that the logical form of sentences containing definite descriptions is that of existentially quantified sentences. The logical form of ‘The F is G’ is: there is exactly one F which is G. See the essays by Russell in Martinich and Moore, and L. Linsky, Referring, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967) for an exposition. Section 2 of Mark Sainsbury, ‘Philosophical Logic’ in A. C. Grayling, ed., Philosophy, is an excellent introduction. Russell’s theory has been influentially criticised by P. F. Strawson, ‘On Referring’, (in Martinich and in Moore) and Keith Donnellan, ‘Reference and Definite Descriptions’, (in Martinich). Kripke attacks Donnellan’s criticism of Russell in ‘Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference’, (in Martinich). In a more advanced but readable study, Stephen Neale, Descriptions, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990) has defended Russell (see especially chapters 1-2). McCulloch (chapters 2-3) gives a good introduction. See also Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) chs. 2 and 9.3. For a discussion of what Russell’s original paper was attempting to do, see Peter Hylton, ‘The Significance of “On Denoting”’, in Hughes, ed., A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic.

iii. Names Both Frege and Russell are often attributed the view that names have, in some sense, descriptive meaning: e.g. the meaning of the name ‘Julius Caesar’ may be given by the description, ‘the Roman conqueror of Gaul’. This thesis was brilliantly criticised by Saul Kripke in Naming and Necessity, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980). Despite the apparently narrow range of the topic, Kripke’s work has had a deep effect on many areas of philosophy. The whole book is essential reading. (Bear in mind that one could consistently hold Kripke’s views on names together with Russell’s view on descriptions.) For an introduction to this issue, see section 1 of

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Mark Sainsbury, ‘Philosophical Logic’, in A. C. Grayling, ed., Philosophy. For discussion of Kripke, see McCulloch, chapter 4; and Evans, ‘The Causal Theory of Names’, in Moore and in Martinich. More advanced discussion can be found in Evans’s, The Varieties of Reference, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), ch. 11; and in M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, (London: Duckworth, 1981), appendix to Ch.5.

iv. Conditionals Conditional statements, those involving ‘if...then...’ constructions, are central to logic and to reasoning in general. But there are many kinds of conditional statement, and there is no clear consensus about how to understand, or even to classify, these different kinds. In propositional logic we learn to translate ‘if...then...’ as the material conditional (symbolised as ‘→’). But this does not seem to capture the meaning of ‘if...then...’ in natural language. For one thing, there are the so-called ‘paradoxes of material implication’: according to the truth-tables for ‘→’, any conditional with a false antecedent is true; and any conditional with a true consequent is true. (The antecedent is the statement before the ‘then’; the consequent is the statement after the ‘then’.) So ‘If the Pope is not Catholic, then Paris is in Italy’ and ‘If Paris is in Italy, then the Pope is Catholic’ both come out true on this interpretation. See Sainsbury, Logical Forms, chapter 3, for a useful introduction. The essays by Grice, Jackson, Stalnaker (essay VII) and Edgington, in F. Jackson, ed., Conditionals, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) are essential further reading. Commonly philosophers draw a distinction between two types of conditionals. Compare ‘If Booth didn’t kill Lincoln, someone else did’ with ‘If Booth hadn’t killed Lincoln, someone else would have’. The former is assertible on the basis simply of knowing that Lincoln was indeed assassinated, while one will assert the latter if one believes in conspiracy theories. The distinction is often marked by talk of ‘indicative’ versus ‘subjunctive’ conditionals or between ‘indicative’ and ‘counterfactual’ conditionals, but these labels are controversial as is the criterion and place to make the division. Modern discussion of ‘counterfactual/subjunctive’ conditionals Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, (4th ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983). Lewis (Counterfactuals, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973)) and Stalnaker (Essay II in Jackson) give an account of counterfactuals in terms of possible worlds: ‘if it were the case that A, then it would be the case that B’ is analysed as, ‘in the closest possible worlds in which A is true, B is true.’ This analysis has been very influential in other areas (for instance in Nozick’s theory of knowledge: see Epistemology & Methodology). A long and difficult but comprehensive discussion of conditionals, which will also give you an introduction to the controversy about the differences between types of conditional, can be found in Dorothy Edgington, ‘On Conditionals’, Mind 104 (1995): 235-329.

v. Existence What is the logical form of sentences like ‘God exists’? Debate on this question has often focused on the question whether ‘exists’ functions as a logical predicate, like ‘walks’, true of individuals, or should be interpreted as the existential quantifier; the denial that ‘exists’ is a predicate is associated with Kant’s critique of the ontological argument for the existence of God (see his Critique of Pure Reason,

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translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) A592/B620-A603/B631), and with Frege (see The Foundations of Arithmetic: a Logico-mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of Number, translated by J. L. Austin (2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), p.65); it has recently become popular to question this interpretation. One of the background issues here is the need to make sense of singular negative existential statements, such as ‘Lao Tzu does not exist’. For introduction to these issues see section 3 of Mark Sainsbury, ‘Philosophical Logic’, in A. C. Grayling, ed., Philosophy, and Stephen Williams’s essay ‘Existence’, in J. Kim and E. Sosa, eds., A Companion to Metaphysics, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). On the idea that there is simply a univocal notion of existence associated with the existential quantifier, see Quine, ‘On What There Is’, in From a Logical Point of View; for a contrasting view see Nathan Salmon, ‘Existence’, in James E. Tomberlin, ed., Metaphysics, Philosophical Perspectives 1, (Atascadero, Cal.: Ridgeview, 1987). Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), ch.10, contains an invaluable survey of earlier discussions and an important proposal about how to interpret negative singular existential statements (a brief gloss of this is provided in Sainsbury’s essay)—for a contrasting view of empty names see Keith Donnellan, ‘Speaking of Nothing’, Philosophical Review 83 (1974): 3-31. Michael Dummett, ‘Existence’, in his The Seas of Language, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), criticises Evans’s account and defends a Fregean approach to empty names; David Wiggins, in a subtle and difficult paper, ‘The Kant-Frege-Russell View of Existence’, in W SinnotArmstrong, ed., Modality, Morality, and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), defends the Kant-Frege account of ‘exists’ and combines this with a modification of Evans’s account (an excellent primer for this is Mark Sainsbury’s ‘Names, Fictional Names, And “Really”’: Supplement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society 73, (1999): 243269.) For a survey of the various forms of ontological argument see Graham Oppy, Ontological Arguments & Belief in God, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

vi. Validity and Entailment The central concept of logic is the concept of a valid argument: an argument in which the truth of the premises in some way guarantees the truth of the conclusion. An argument can be valid without its premises being true; validity demands only that if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be. (A sound argument is a valid argument with true premises.) How should we understand validity? For one traditional account see Quine, Philosophy of Logic, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), chapters 1, 2, and 4. A good general introduction to the issue is Sainsbury, Logical Forms, chapter 1. Also central is Alfred Tarski’s ‘Truth & Proof ’, in Hughes, ed., A Companion to First-Order Logic. for a yet more advanced and partly historical (but nonetheless very clear) treatment, see John Etchemendy, The Concept of Logical Consequence, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990) which challenges Tarski’s account; for one response (of many) see William Hanson, ‘The Concept of Logical Consequence’, Philosophical Review, 106, (1997): 365-409. A related question is the question of what it is for something to entail something else. On the standard interpretations of entailment, anything follows from a

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contradiction. Some philosophers have taken this as reason to revise our notion of entailment. For a classic statement of these issues see Peter Geach, ‘Entailment’, in his Logic Matters, (Oxford: Blackwell , 1972) and D. H. Rice, ‘Entailment’, Mind 95 (1986): 345-360. On relevance logic see Stephen Read, Thinking about Logic: an Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) ch. 6; and of some relevance to this Frank Jackson’s ‘On a Puzzle about Ontological Commitment’, in J. Heil, ed., Cause, Mind, & Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1989).

vii. Alternative Logics For various reasons, philosophers have proposed alternative logics to the standard or ‘classical’ logic that one is taught in elementary logic classes. For an introduction to these difficult issues start with Susan Haack, Philosophy of Logics, chs. 9-11, and her Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic: Beyond the Formalism, (Rev. ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). See also M. Sainsbury, Paradoxes, (2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Alternative logics may add elements to classical logic or they may subtract them. Three notable ways in which logic may be supplemented include modal logic, which is used to formalise talk of possibility—see further the entry below on modal logic, and the Symbolic Logic section of this Guide; tense logic, to handle means we have in natural language of talking of the past or present—see the entry below on time and tense for more on the philosophical significance of this; and second-order logic which includes quantification over predicate position as well as subject position in sentences—for more on this see the Symbolic Logic section of this Guide, and the entry on Set Theory in the Philosophy of Mathematics section of this Guide. One way in which classical logic may be thinned out is by removing some of its assumptions about what can exist: ‘free’ logics allow for the occurrence of empty terms within well-formed formulae, requiring consequent modifications of the rules for the existential and universal quantifiers. For outlines of various forms of free logic, and their philosophical significance (i.e. to issues of reference, descriptions and existence) see Karel Lambert, ed., Philosophical Applications of Free Logic, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991)—in particular, the editor’s introduction and the papers by van Fraasen and Burge. Among other modifications to classical logic: intuitionists refuse to endorse the law of bivalence, that every sentence is determinately true or false—for an introduction to these issues see Michael Dummett, ‘The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic’, in his Truth & Other Enigmas, (London: Duckworth, 1978) and also the reading later in this section under Realism, Idealism, and Anti-Realism; quantum logicians deny the distributive law for disjunction, for an introduction to this see Hilary Putnam’s ‘Is Logic Empirical?’, in his Mathematics, Matter & Method, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1, (2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and paraconsistent logics even allow for the truth of contradictions: for this see T. Smiley and G. Priest, ‘Can contradictions be true?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 67 (1993): 17-33, 35-54. For scepticism about alternative logics, see Quine, Philosophy of Logic, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970) chapter 6. One of the main motivations philosophers have found for endorsing nonclassical logic has been the problems posed by vagueness in natural language; for

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reading on these matters see the section immediately below.

viii. Vagueness Many people think that logic should be able to accommodate vague predicates (like ‘bald’ and ‘heap’) and that this gives us a reason for departing from classical logic. See Sainsbury, Paradoxes, (2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) chapter 2, for an introduction to supervaluationist and degree-theoretic approaches to the problem of vagueness, and T. Williamson, ‘Vagueness and Ignorance’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66 (1992): 145-162, for the view that vagueness need not require giving up classical logic. See also Williamson’s book Vagueness, (London: Routledge, 1994) for an exhaustive survey of approaches to the problem since ancient times and Williamson’s own solution to it. A good critique of Williamson is Mark Sainsbury’s ‘Vagueness, Ignorance, and Margin for Error’, British Journal of Philosophy of Science 46 (1995): 589-601. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Supp. Vol. 33 (1995), contains a number of important essays on vagueness including essays by Sainsbury, Tye, Wright, and Williamson. One important sub-debate in this area is whether there can be vague objects: for an argument that there cannot be see Gareth Evans’s short (one page) paper in Analysis 38 (1978): 208, reprinted in his Collected Papers, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985); this issue is discussed by Williamson in his book, and by Sainsbury in the above mentioned article; see also Terence Parsons and Peter Woodruff, ‘Wordly Indeterminacy of Identity’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1995): 171-191. An indispensible collection is R. Keefe and P. Smith, eds., Vagueness: a Reader, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1997).

B. TRUTH & OBJECTIVITY i. Theories of truth What is truth? That is, what is it for something to be true (or false)? A preliminary question is: what sorts of things are true or false? What, for instance, should we understand the ps and qs in our truth-tables to be standing in for? Some candidates for ‘truth-bearers’ are sentences, statements, propositions, assertions, beliefs or judgements. A useful discussion is E. J. Lemmon, ‘Sentences, Statements and Propositions’, in B. Williams, ed., British Analytic Philosophy, (Routledge & K. Paul, 1966). See also Strawson, ‘On Referring’, in Moore, ed., Meaning and Reference, and Richard Cartwright, ‘Propositions’, in his Philosophical Essays, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987). For the bearing of these questions on logic, Richard E. Grandy, ‘What do “Q” and “R” stand for Anyway?’, in Hughes, ed., A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic, is a very useful introduction. The next question is: what is it about a true statement, proposition (or whatever) that makes it true? There are various traditional answers: truth consists in a relation between the proposition and a fact (the correspondence theory); the truth of a proposition consists in its membership of some specified coherent set of propositions or beliefs (the coherence theory); truth just is the property of propositions or beliefs which enables us to succeed in our endeavours (the pragmatic theory); the whole nature of truth can be explained in terms of the principle ‘“P” is true if and only if P’ (the redundancy or ‘minimalist’ theory). For these issues see Blackburn, Spreading the Word, chapters 7-8; Haack, Philosophy of Logics, chap-

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ter 7; Paul Horwich, ‘Theories of Truth’, in Hughes, ed., A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic; and his book Truth, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); M. Dummett, ‘Truth’, in Strawson, ed., Philosophical Logic, also reprinted in Dummett’s Truth & Other Enigmas, (London: Duckworth, 1978); and D. Grover, J. Camp, and N. Belnap, ‘A Prosentential Theory of Truth’, Philosophical Studies 27 (1975): 73-125, reprinted in Grover’s The Prosentential Theory of Truth, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1992). The anthology, edited by Simon Blackburn and Keith Simmons, Truth, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), contains much useful material, especially on minimalism. In addition to these issues there is the ancient puzzle of the liar sentence, ‘This sentence is false’. For an introduction to the paradox, see Sainsbury, Paradoxes, (2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) chapter 5; for more advanced discussion see the introduction to R. Martin, ed., Recent Essays on Truth & the Liar, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984)) and among the difficult but excellent papers collected there, look in particular at those by Kripke, Burge and Parsons. One impact of the liar puzzle was the problem of providing a definition of truth for formal languages. See Tarski, ‘The Semantic Conception of Truth’, in Feigl and Sellars, eds., Readings in Philosophical Analysis, (New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts Inc.,1949)). For an elementary introduction, see section 6 of Mark Sainsbury, ‘Philosophical Logic’, in A. C. Grayling, ed., Philosophy. See also Quine, Philosophy of Logic, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970). Tarski’s theory of truth has inspired a number of different accounts of truth in general, and there is a lively debate over the status and significance of Tarski’s theory of truth for formal languages for an account of the nature of truth in general. For contrasting (rather difficult, but rewarding) treatments see Hartry Field’s ‘Tarski’s Theory Of Truth’, Journal of Philosophy, 69, (1972): 347-375 and Richard Heck, ‘Tarski, Truth, and Semantics’, Philosophical Review 106 (1997): 533-554. Other essential reading on truth includes: F. P. Ramsey, ‘Facts and Propositions,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 27 (1927); reprinted in his collected papers, D. H. Mellor, ed., Philosophical Papers, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Donald Davidson, ‘True to the Facts,’ Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): 748-764, reprinted in Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Donald Davidson, ‘The Structure and Content of Truth,’ Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990): 279-328, esp. sections II-III; Crispin Wright, Truth & Objectivity, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992) chapters 1-2; (these last two are quite difficult).

ii. Realism, idealism and anti-realism Is the world independent of our experience of it? Realists hold that it is; idealists and phenomenalists deny that this is so. What arguments can one give against them? Are there other forms of attack on realism? Can we really make sense of a world independent of how we conceive it to be? See A. J. Ayer, ‘Phenomenalism’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 47 (1947): 163-196, reprinted in his Philosophical Essays, (London: Macmillan, 1954), W. V. Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in his From a Logical Point of View, (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press,1953), and J. Foster, ‘Berkeley on the Physical World’, in J. Foster, and H. Robinson, eds., Essays on Berkeley: a Ter-

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centennial Celebration, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), for three rather different discussions all somewhat favourably inclined towards phenomenalism, and I. Berlin, ‘Empirical Propositions and Hypothetical Statements’, in his Concepts & Categories: Philosophical Essays, (London: Hogarth, 1978) for a robust attack on it. Michael Dummett has been influential in framing the questions about realism in a new way: see The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy, (London: Duckworth, 1981) ch.20, and ‘Realism & Anti-Realism’, in his The Seas of Language, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); John McDowell, ‘Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding’, in H. Parret, and J. Bouveresse, eds., Meaning and Understanding, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1981); and Crispin Wright, Truth & Objectivity, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992) esp. chs.1-3. Another influential critic of realism is Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth & History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) chs. 1 & 2. Realism is defended by T. Nagel, The View from Nowhere, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) ch. 6. (Beginners will find Nagel and Putnam more accessible than Dummett and McDowell.)

iii. Subjective & objective Related to the issue of realism is the question of subjective and objective conceptions of reality. What do the terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ really mean? An objective conception of the world is sometimes described as one from a ‘God’s eye point of view’, or from no point of view at all. But is it possible to get a purely objective conception of the world? Are the only real things those which are purely objective? Or does it make sense to suppose that there are subjective ‘facts’? A good introduction is T. Nagel, ‘Subjective & Objective’, in his Mortal Questions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); see also his The View from Nowhere, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) ch. 4; B. Williams, Descartes: the Project of Pure Enquiry (London: Penguin, 1978), ch. 8, pp.236-52, and ch. 10; and A. W. Moore, Points of View, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) especially chs. 1-4. Look at Colin McGinn, The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983) chs. 1-3, 6, and F. Jackson, Perception: a Representative Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) ch. 5 on the subjectivity of so-called secondary qualities (colours, tastes and so on). John McDowell discusses the analogy between secondary qualities and values in ‘Values & Secondary Qualities’, in T. Honderich, ed., Morality & Objectivity: a Tribute to J. L. Mackie, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985). For more on the specific case of colour, see Alex Byrne and David R. Hilbert, eds., Readings on Color, Vol. 1, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997) in particular the papers by Johnston, Broackes, Boghossian & Velleman, and Campbell.

C. MIND & NATURE (For further details on these topics, see the Philosophy of Mind)

i. The place of the mind in nature What are we? Are human beings and other creatures with minds simply part of the natural order? Dualists claim that our existence as conscious and rational creatures proves the existence of immaterial substances. Naturalists claim that our lives are as governed by the laws of nature, as are the physical objects with which we interact. Some naturalists are dualists, but chiefly naturalism has come

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to be associated with materialism or physicalism, and the rejection of dualism. Influential arguments for dualism are offered by S. Kripke, Naming & Necessity, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980) lecture 3, and F. Jackson, ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982): 127-136, reprinted in William G. Lycan, ed., Mind & Cognition: a Reader, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990). Arguments for materialism/physicalism are given by D. Lewis, ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory’, in Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966): 17-25, reprinted in his Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); and D. Davidson, ‘Mental Events’ & postscript, in his Essays on Actions & Events, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). Strawson argues against the coherence of dualism, ‘Self, Mind & Body’, in his Freedom & Resentment: and Other Essays, (London: Methuen, 1974), but dualism is defended by W. D. Hart, The Engines of the Soul, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) chs. 1-3, and John Foster, The Immaterial Self: a Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind, (London: Routledge, 1996). See also S. Shoemaker, ‘On an Argument for Dualism’, in his Identity, Cause & Mind: Philosophical Essays, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). Some physicalists have argued that we will never be able fully to explain consciousness, even though we have good reason to believe that physicalism is true. See Nagel, ‘What is it like to be a bat?’, in his Mortal Questions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) and The View from Nowhere, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) chs. 2 & 3; and Colin McGinn, ‘Can we Solve the Mind-Body Problem?’ Mind 98 (1989): 349-366, reprinted in his The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Towards a Resolution, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1991).

ii. Reduction and supervenience There are many different kinds of phenomena, biological, chemical, physical, social and psychological, recognised by the various sciences and by common sense. How are all these phenomena, and the different theories of these phenomena, related? A popular theory earlier in this century was Reductionism, the theory that all sciences reduce to physics (see Nagel, and for recent discussion, Smith). These days the weaker thesis is preferred, that all the non-physical supervenes upon the physical—where X supervenes upon Y if there can be no difference in X without a difference in Y (see Kim and Horgan for discussion). Kim’s Mind in a Physical World: an Essay on the Mind-body Problem and Mental Causation, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998) is a recent defence of reductionism. Nagel, E. 1961. The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Smith, Peter. 1992. ‘Modest Reductions and the Unity of Science’. In D. Charles, and K. Lennon, eds., Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kim, J. 1984. ‘Concepts of Supervenience’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45:153-176. Reprinted in Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. ——. 1985. ‘Psychophysical Laws’. In E. Lepore, and B. McLaughlin, eds., Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Reprinted in Supervenience and Mind. ——. 1998. Mind in a Physical World: an Essay on the Mind-body Problem and Mental Causation. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Charles, David. 1992. ‘Supervenience, Composition and Physicalism’. In D. Charles, and K. Lennon, eds., Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Papineau, D. 1993. Philosophical Naturalism. Oxford: Blackwell. Ch.1.

22 STUDY GUIDE Horgan, Terence. 1993. ‘From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of the Material World’. Mind 102: 555-586.

iii. Personal identity As well as the question of how peoples’ minds are related to their physical natures, there is the question of what makes any individual person the person that they are, and what makes someone the same person over time. These are the questions of personal identity. For the reading on this topic, see ‘Identity & Substance’ below.

iv. Free will Do we have free will? Is it up to us or within our control which actions we perform? There are two parts to the problem. The first is the problem of whether freedom is inconsistent with determinism, or whether, on the contrary, it actually requires determinism. The second is whether the free will problem is rightly socalled: does control over or freedom of action require that we possess a freedom specifically of our will or decision making capacity—a control over which action we decide to perform? General Reading Pink, T. 2001. Free Will: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. O’Connor, T. ed. 1995. Agents, Causes and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Contains various attempts to make sense of freedom in the absence of the pre-determination of actions by events. Watson, G. 1982. ed. Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Contains a selection of important papers, including key readings below.

Freedom and Determinism Basic Reading Ayer, A. J. 1984. Freedom and Morality: and Other Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press. van Inwagen. P. 1975. ‘The Incompatability of Free Will and Determinism’. Philosophical Studies 27: 185-199. Strawson, P. F. 1974. ‘Freedom and resentment’. In his Freedom and Resentment: and Other Essays. London: Methuen. Further Reading Fischer, J. M. 1994. The Metaphysics of Free Will: an Essay on Control. Oxford: Blackwell. Kane, R. 1996. The Significance of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Strawson, G. 1986. Freedom and Belief. Oxford: Clarendon Press.. Velleman, J. David.1989. Practical Reflection. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wiggins, D. 1973. ‘Towards a reasonable libertarianism’. In Ted Honderich, ed., Essays on Freedom of Action. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Freedom and Free Will Basic Reading Frankfurt, H. 1971 ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’. Journal of Philosophy 68: 5-20.

Further Reading Kane, R. 1996. The Significance of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pink. T. 1997. ‘Reason and Agency’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 263-280. ——. 1996. The Psychology of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Esp. chapters 1-4. Velleman, J. David.1989. Practical Reflection. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

D. NECESSITY & ANALYTICITY It is important to distinguish between the following three distinctions: necessity —contingency; a priori—a posteriori; analytic—synthetic. Necessary truths are

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those which cannot be false, or could not have been otherwise; contingent truths are those which can be false, or might have been otherwise. A priori and a posteriori knowledge can be roughly distinguished as follows: something is known a priori when its justification does not depend on any further experience; a posteriori when its justification does depend on further experience. The third distinction is between analytic statements, which are supposed to be true solely because of the meaning of the terms involved; and synthetic statements, which are true because of what the terms involved mean, plus the way the world is. The notion of a priori knowledge is dealt with on the Epistemology and Methodology paper, but it will crop up on this paper too.

i. The nature of necessity/necessary truth What is the nature of necessity? A traditional idea is that necessary truths are true because they are analytic (and it is usually assumed that analytic statements are known a priori). See, for example, A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971; first published 1936) chapter 4. This idea comes under attack from at least two sides. On the one hand, Quine has attacked the idea of a principled distinction between the analytic and the synthetic at all, see ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in From a Logical Point of View; ‘Carnap on Logical Truth’, and ‘Truth by Convention’, in The Ways of Paradox, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966). For a recent response, see Paul Boghossian, ‘Analyticity Reconsidered’, Noûs 30 (1996): 360-39; and in B. Hale, and C. Wright, eds., A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997). On the other hand, Kripke has argued that some necessary truths are known a posteriori, and are not analytic, see ‘Identity and Necessity’, in Moore, and also in T. Honderich, and M. Burnyeat, eds., Philosophy as it is, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979).

ii. Modal logic and possible worlds The study of necessity was invigorated by the use of the idea of a possible world in the interpretation of modal logic (the logic of possibility and necessity). ‘Necessarily P’ is true iff ‘P’ is true in all possible worlds; ‘Possibly P’ is true iff ‘P’ is true at some possible world. But what are possible worlds? Lewis argues that they are entities just like this world: see On the Plurality of Worlds, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) chapter 1; Stalnaker gives a different account, and a good survey of the issue in ‘Possible Worlds’, in Honderich, and M. Burnyeat, eds., Philosophy as it is, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), also in Stalnaker’s Inquiry, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984). A good collection of readings on this topic is M. Loux, ed., The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality, (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979). Quine is sceptical of possible worlds, as he is of modal logic in general: see ‘Reference and Modality’, in From a Logical Point of View, and ‘Carnap and Logical Truth’, and ‘Necessary Truth’, in The Ways of Paradox (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966). A good introduction is Sainsbury, Logical Forms, chapter 5, and section 5 of Mark Sainsbury, ‘Philosophical Logic’, in A. C. Grayling, ed., Philosophy. For a more advanced discussion, see Graeme Forbes, The Metaphysics of Modality, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).

E. IDENTITY & SUBSTANCE When we say that A is identical with B, what are we saying? We are not saying that two things are the same thing, for no two things are the same thing! But if we are

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saying that one thing is itself, then we seem to be saying something completely trivial, since we know a priori that everything is itself. Yet surely we can learn something when we discover, for example, that Hesperus (the morning star) is Phosphorus (the evening star)? For a classic answer to this puzzle, see Frege, ‘On sense and reference’, in Moore, and Martinich. The other issues about identity and substances can be divided into questions about identity and necessity; questions about identity over time in general; questions about personal identity; and questions about the distinction between substances and events.

i. Identity and necessity Kripke’s essay ‘Identity and Necessity’, in Moore, and in Honderich, and M. Burnyeat, eds., Philosophy as it is, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), revolutionised the study of identity statements. See also his Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980). Kripke argued that certain identity statements are necessarily true, even if they are known a posteriori (see above). See also, Alan Gibbard, ‘Contingent Identity’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (1975): 187-221.

ii. Substance and identity through time What is it for an object to persist over time, for an object at one time to be identical with something at another time? Can we analyse the notion of persistence in causal terms? For an introduction to the issue of substance, see David Wiggins’s essay in the Metaphysics section of Grayling, ed., Philosophy. See also Shoemaker, S. 1984. ‘Identity, Properties & Causality’. In his Identity, Cause & Mind: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Armstrong, D. M. 1980. ‘Identity through Time’. In P. van Inwagen, ed., Time & Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Hirsch, E. 1982. The Concept of Identity. New York: Oxford University Press. Johnston, M. 1987. ‘Is there a Problem about Persistence?’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 61: 107-135.

iii. Identity and individuation Must objects fall under kinds, often called sortals? Can two objects be in the same place at the same time? Strawson, P. F. 1959. Individuals: an Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London: Methuen, 1959. Ch.1. Wiggins, D. 1968. ‘On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time’. Philosophical Review 77: 90-95. ——. 1980. Sameness and Substance. Oxford: Blackwell. Chs.1, 2. Ayers, M. R. 1991. Locke: Epistemology and Ontology. 2 Vols. London: Routledge. Vol. 2, pts. I & III. Gibbard, A. 1975. ‘Contingent Identity’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 4: 187-221.

iv. Personal Identity Is there a special problem concerning the identity of persons? Does consciousness or self-consciousness make a difference? Does persistence of personal identity turn on continuity of psychological properties, having the same memories, desires and intentions as some earlier individual? Or does it turn on being physically continuous with an earlier subject? Is personal identity what matters to us, wouldn’t we be just as well off if a perfect physical and psychological replica was to survive into the future? Basic Reading Noonan, H. 1989. Personal Identity. London: Routledge. This book is a general survey of the history of the problem of personal identity, and an account of the debate as it now stands.

LOGIC & METAPHYSICS 25 Parfit, D. 1971. ‘Personal Identity’. Philosophical Review 80: 3-27. Reprinted in J. Glover, ed., The Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976; and in Honderich, and M. Burnyeat, eds., Philosophy as it is, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979. ——. 1984. Reasons & Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pt.3. Williams, B. A. O. 1970. ‘The Self and the Future’. Philosophical Review 79: 161-180. Reprinted in Problems of the Self. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973. ——. 1957. ‘Personal Identity & Individuation’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian-Society 57: 229-252. Reprinted in in Problems of the Self. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973. Garrett, B. 1998. Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness. London : Routledge. (A very readable account of the recent debate.)

Further Reading Wiggins, D. 1980. Sameness and Substance. Oxford: Blackwell. Chapter 6. Lewis, D. 1983. ‘Survival & Identity’. In his Philosophical Papers. Vol.1. New York: Oxford University Press. Johnston, M. 1987. ‘Human Beings’. Journal of Philosophy 84: 59-83. Snowdon, P. F. 1990. ‘Persons, Animals and Ourselves’. In C. Gill, ed., The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Olson, E. 1997. The Human Animal. New York: Oxford University Press. Cassam, Q. 1992. ‘Reductionism & First-Person Thinking’. In D. Charles, and K. Lennon, eds., Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Perry, J. 1975. ed. Personal Identity. Berkeley: University of California Press. Contains many useful articles in addition to those mentioned above.

v. Events and substances In addition to concrete objects there are also those things which happen to them. Should we treat events as themselves concrete particulars (Davidson), or as akin to facts (Kim)? Davidson, D. 1967. ‘Causal Relations’. Journal of Philosophy 64: 691-703. Reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980; and in Sosa and Tooley eds., Causation. ——. ‘The Individuation of Events’. Reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. ——. ‘Events as Particulars’. Reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. ——. ‘Eternal vs. Ephemeral Events’. Reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. Kim, J. 1976. ‘Events as Property-Exemplifications’. In M. Brand, and D. Walton, eds., Action Theory. Dordrecht: Reidel. Reprinted in Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Lewis, D. 1986. ‘Events’ and ‘Postscripts’. In Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2. New York: Oxford University Press. Quine, W. V. 1985. ‘Events & Reification’. In E. Lepore, and B. McLaughlin, eds., Actions & Events. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Also see Davidson’s reply. Mellor, D. H. 1981. Real Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.8. (2nd ed. Real Time II. London: Routledge, 1998.)

F. UNIVERSALS & PARTICULARS i. Substances and properties Two chairs can be the same colour, or the same shape, or be made of the same material. When we say that this chair is the same as that one, we do not seem to be talking about strict numerical identity: no two chairs can be literally the same

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chair. So what do we mean when we say that two chairs have the same colour? Philosophers say that the chairs are of the same kind, or the same type. But what is this ‘sameness of type’? Many have thought that we can only answer this question by positing universals (like properties and relations) in the world as well as particulars (like substances). The collection edited by D. H. Mellor and A. Oliver, eds., Properties, contains many of the key readings on this subject. Introductory material includes: Russell, Bertrand. 1912. The Problems of Philosophy. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Chs. 9-10. Armstrong, D. M. 1989. Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press. Crane, Tim. 1995. ‘Universals’. In A. C. Grayling, ed., Philosophy. Oliver, A. 1997. ‘The Metaphysics of Properties.’ Mind 105: 1-80. This ‘state of the art’ article is a fairly exhaustive survey of the current state of debate.

ii. Nominalism and realism Realists about universals claim that there is a fundamental distinction between particulars, like individual physical objects, and universals. Nominalists claim that only particulars exist. Nominalists therefore have to account for facts about sameness of type. They typically do this in terms of notions like resemblance, or classmembership. Armstrong, D. M. 1978. Universals and Scientific Realism. 2 Vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vol. 1: Nominalism and Realism. Devitt, M., D. M. Armstrong, and W. V. Quine 1980. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61. The first two are reprinted in Mellor and Oliver, eds. Properties. Lewis, D. 1983. ‘New Work for a Theory of Universals’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61: 343-377. The selections from this paper in Mellor and Oliver contain the material relevant to this issue. ––. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Ch.1.5. Teichmann, R. 1989. ‘Three Kinds of Realism about Universals’. Philosophical Quarterly 39: 143-165.

iii. The nature of universals If universals exist, then what is their nature? Should they be individuated in terms of the causal powers of the things which instantiate them (Shoemaker)? Or in terms of their place in laws of nature (Mellor)? Can a tenable distinction be made between natural properties and other properties? Armstrong, D. M. 1978. Universals and Scientific Realism. 2 Vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vol. 2. A Theory of Universals. Chs.1-3. Shoemaker, S. 1980. ‘Causality and Properties’. Reprinted in Identity, Cause and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Taylor, B. 1993. ‘On Natural Properties in Metaphysics’. Mind 102: 81-100. Mellor, D. H. 1991. ‘Properties & Predicates’. In Matters of Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lewis, D. 1983. ‘New Work for a Theory of Universals’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61: 343-377. Abridged in Mellor & Oliver.

G. CAUSATION & LAWS The notions of cause and effect are fundamental to our conception of the world. But what is causation? What is the connection between causation and regularities (Hume, Anscombe), and causation and causal explanation (Owens, Lewis)? Can we give an analysis of causation in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (Mackie) or in terms of counterfactuals (Lewis)? Must all causation be backed by general laws, or are there purely singular facts about causation (Anscombe, Ducasse, Foster)? Should we

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think of causes and effects as events (Davidson) or as facts (Mellor)? Can there be probabilistic causation?

i. The analysis of causation: regularity and counterfactuals Basic reading Hume, D. Treatise, I.3, 14/15. ——. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, sec.VII. Mackie, J. L. 1965. ‘Causes and Conditions’. American Philosophical Quarterly 2: 245-264. Reprinted in Sosa, ed., Causation and Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975; and in Sosa and Tooley, eds., Causation. Owens, D. 1992. Causes and Coincidences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 3 & 4. Lewis, D. 1986. ‘Causation’, and ‘Postscripts’. In Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2. New York: Oxford University Press. Crane, Tim. 1995. ‘Causation’. In A. C. Grayling, ed., Philosophy. Elementary introduction.

Further Reading Anscombe, G. E. M. 1971. ‘Causality & Determination’. Reprinted in Sosa, ed., Causation and Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975; and in Sosa and Tooley, eds., Causation. Ducasse, C. J. 1923. ‘On the Nature and Observability of the Causal Relation’. Reprinted in Sosa, ed., Causation and Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975; and in Sosa and Tooley, eds., Causation. Foster, J. 1985. Ayer. London: Routledge. Ch.3, sec.7. Horwich, Paul. 1993. ‘Lewis’s Program’. In Sosa and Tooley, eds., Causation. Tooley, M. 1990. ‘Causation: Reductionism versus Realism’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51: 215-236. Reprinted in Sosa and Tooley, eds., Causation. Hall, N., & L. Paul, eds., The Counterfactual Analysis of Causation is an advanced collection of new essays.

ii. What are causes and effects? Davidson, D. 1967. ‘Causal Relations’. Journal of Philosophy 64: 691-703. Reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980; and in Sosa and Tooley eds., Causation. For a discussion of Davidson, see Simon Evnine, Donald Davidson, Cambridge: Polity, 1991, Ch.2. Mellor, D. H. 1991. ‘The Singularly Affecting Facts of Causation’. In Matters of Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——. 1995. The Facts of Causation. London: Routledge. More difficult material.

iii. Causation & causal explanation Lewis, D. 1986. ‘Causal Explanation’. Reprinted in Philosophical Papers, Vol.2. New York: Oxford University Press. Ruben, David-Hillel. 1993. ed. Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. This collection contains many central papers on the concept of explanation. ——. 1990. Explaining Explanation. London: Routledge. A useful introduction to the issue. Lipton, P. 1990. ‘Contrastive Explanations’. Philosophy 64: 247-266. Papineau, D. 1995. ‘Methodology’. In A. C. Grayling, ed., Philosophy.

iv. Laws of Nature Philosophical accounts of explanation and causation often appeal to the idea of a law of nature (for instance, Hempel’s account of explanation; Humean accounts of causation). But what is a law of nature? How are laws distinguished from merely accidental generalisations? One view, defended by Ramsey and Lewis, is that it is merely a form of regularity. Some recent accounts of laws have diverged from this in claiming that laws are metaphysical relations between universals.

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Basic Reading Hempel, C. 1966. Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall. Ch.5.3. Ayer, A. J. 1956. ‘What is a Law of Nature?’. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 10: 144-165. Reprinted in The Concept of a Person: and Other Essays. London: Macmillan, 1973. Nagel, E. 1961. The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch.4. Papineau, D. 1986. ‘Laws and Accidents’. In C. Wright, and G. Macdonald, eds., Fact, Science and Morality: Essays on A.J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Further Reading Ramsey, F. 1928. ‘Law and Causality’. In Philosophical Papers, edited by D. H. Mellor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Lewis, D. 1973. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Dretske, F. 1977. ‘Laws of Nature’. Philosophy of Science 44: 248-268. Armstrong, D. M. 1991. ‘Causes and Laws’. Nous 25 :63-73. ——. 1983. What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mellor, D. H. 1991. ‘Necessities and Universals in Laws of Nature’. In Matters of Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. van Fraassen, B. 1989. Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pt.I.

v. Probabilistic causation The view that determinism is false is becoming increasingly popular. Is the fact that an event is not fully determined to occur incompatible with its having been caused? Or can an analysis of causation be given which replaces the idea that a cause is sufficient for its effects with the idea that a cause raises the probability of its effects? Can a cause lower the probability of an effect? Can we use probability to analyse ‘population-level’ causal facts, for example the fact that smoking causes cancer? Basic reading Eells, E. 1991. Probabilistic Causality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Introduction. Dupré, J. 1984. ‘Probabilistic Causality Emancipated’. In Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., Howard K. Wettstein, eds., Causation and Causal Theories. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Eells, E. 1987. ‘Probabilistic Causality: reply to John Dupré’s “Probabilistic Causality Emancipated”’. Philosophy of Science 54: 105-114. Sober, E. 1986. ‘Causal Factors, Causal Inference, Causal Explanation’. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60: 97-114. Papineau, D. 1986. ‘Causal Factors, Causal Inference, Causal Explanation’. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60: 115-136. Lewis, D. 1986. ‘Causation: Postscripts’. In Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2. New York: Oxford University Press.

Further reading Salmon, W. C. 1984. Scientific Explanation and The Causal Structure of the World. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Menzies, P. 1989. ‘Probabilistic Causation and Causal Processes: a critique of Lewis’. Philosophy of Science 56: 642-663. ——. 1996. ‘Probabilistic Causation and the Pre-emption Problem’. Mind 105: 85-117. Cartwright, N. 1979. ‘Causal Laws and Effective Strategies’. Noûs 13: 419-437; reprinted in her How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983. Mellor, D. H. 1995. The Facts of Causation. London: Routledge. Chs. 6 & 7.

H. TIME & SPACE i. Time & tense (the ‘flow’ of time) There are two very different ways of thinking and talking about time: in terms of the concepts of past, present or future, or in terms of the concepts of being earlier,

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later or simultaneous. Is one of these ways of thinking more fundamental, that is, is one reducible to the other? The ‘tenseless’ theory of time says that the latter is more fundamental; the ‘tensed’ view says that the former is ineliminable and irreducible. McTaggart, J. M E. 1927. ‘The Unreality of Time’. In LePoidevin & MacBeath, The Philosophy of Time. Prior, A. N. 1962. ‘Changes in Events and Changes in Things’. In LePoidevin & MacBeath. Mellor, D. H. 1981. Real Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.6. Reprinted in LePoidevin & MacBeath.

ii. Time, change, and reductionism about time and space Is time simply the dimension of change? Some philosophers argue that time without change is impossible. Others argue that we could have no evidence for the passage of time if there were no change. See Shoemaker for an argument that time without change is conceivable. This is connected to the question about whether time is reducible to the temporal relations between events, and whether space is reducible to the spatial relations between objects. Relationists or Reductionists about time and space are those who think it is. Those who deny this are sometimes called ‘substantivalists’. Shoemaker, S. 1969. ‘Time without Change’. Journal of Philosophy 66: 363-381. Reprinted in his Identity, Cause & Mind: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984; and in LePoidevin & MacBeath. Forbes, G. 1993. ‘Time, Events and Modality’. In LePoidevin and MacBeath. Sklar, L. 1974. Space, Time & Spacetime. Berkeley: University of California Press. Ch.IV. Newton-Smith, W. H. 1986. ‘Space, Time, and Space-Time: a Philosopher’s View’. In Raymond Flood and Michael Lockwood, eds., The Nature of Time. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. A good introduction to reductionism about time. ——. 1980. The Structure of Time. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. A more detailed treatment of the question.

iii. The direction of time & the direction of causation Time is one of the four dimensions of spacetime. Time can be distinguished from the three spatial dimensions in that it has a ‘direction’. It is possible to travel in all three dimensions of space in any direction. But in time it seems that we can only ‘travel’ in one direction, from the past into the future. What accounts for the direction of time? How is it related to the direction of causation? Dummett, M. 1964. ‘Bringing about the Past’. Philosophical Review 73: 338-359. Reprinted in Truth & Other Enigmas, London: Duckworth, 1978; also in LePoidevin and MacBeath. ——. 1986. ‘Causal Loops’. In Raymond Flood and Michael Lockwood, eds., The Nature of Time. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Reprinted in The Seas of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. Lewis, D. 1976. ‘The Paradoxes of Time Travel’. American Philosophical Quarterly 13: 145152. Reprinted in Philosophical Papers, Vol.2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. ——. 1979. ‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow’. Nous 13: 455-476. Reprinted Philosophical Papers, Vol.2. Mellor, D. H. 1981. Real Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs.9 & 10. Sorabji, R. 1988. Matter, Space and Motion: Theories in Antiquity and their Sequel. London: Duckworth. Ch.10. Price, H. 1996. Time’s Arrow & Archimedes’ Point: New Directions for the Physics of Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Epistemology & Methodology

1 The Paper The Epistemology and Methodology paper focuses on some of the central questions of philosophy and is a complement to the Logic and Metaphysics paper. It raises the questions what is knowledge, and how and to what extent do we have it. ‘Epistemology’ is a term derived from Greek, meaning the science of knowledge. The problems here concern not only knowledge and its analysis, but also related notions which are sometimes appealed to in giving an account of it: belief, justification, evidence and warrant. The paper is also concerned with challenges to what, or whether, we can know: the problems of scepticism. The focus here is principally on two forms of Modern scepticism: doubts about our knowledge of the external world as pressed by Descartes in the First Meditation; and inductive scepticism, as raised by Hume in the Treatise and First Enquiry; in addition, one can look to scepticism about other minds and about the past. Typically we take ourselves to come to know things through reasoning (deductive and inductive), the use of the senses, introspection, and we come to retain knowledge through memory and pass it on through testimony, telling things to others. Methodology is the study of scientific method, and it can act as an introduction to philosophy of science. Epistemology and methodology are interdependent disciplines: one can see methodology as applied epistemology, looking at how our most general epistemological notions come to be applied to the special case of scientific investigation and knowledge; but contributions go in the other direction as well: various elements of traditional epistemology, conceptions of evidence and knowledge, have been informed by study of scientific methods. One key concern is with the problem of induction and the theory of confirmation. The paper is also concerned with the nature of scientific explanation, and the status of theories: are we committed to the existence of those entities posited by our theories; how are we to choose between competing theories equally supported by the data; can theories be incommensurable?

2 General Reading Anthologies Alcoff, L. M. ed. 1998. Epistemology: the Big Questions. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Dancy, J., and E. Sosa. eds. 1992. A Companion to Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell. Contains many commissioned articles by leading figures, arranged alphabetically by subject matter. Dancy, J. ed. 1988. Perceptual Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. A selection of articles on knowledge and perception, it includes a number of essential readings, however; in particular, a life-saving abridgement of Nozick’s discussion of knowledge and scepticism. Pappas, George S., and Marshall Swain, eds. 1978. Essays on Knowledge & Justification. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. A useful collection of articles from the late 1970s, including some key developments of ‘externalist’ theories of knowledge. Swartz, Robert J. ed. 1965. Perceiving, Sensing & Knowing: a Book of Readings from Twentieth-century Sources in the Philosophy of Perception. Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books. A much older collection, put together in 1965, which contains articles on

EPISTEMOLOGY & METHODOLOGY 31 perception and epistemology from the first half of the century up until the early 1960s. Cassam, Q. ed. 1994. Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The title advertises its contents, which are some of the most important discussions of self-knowledge and ways of thinking about oneself from the last fifty years. Moser, Paul K. ed. 1996. Empirical Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. 2nd ed. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. A useful collection of essays from the last thirty years, now in its second edition; this overlaps in content with Pappas and Swain. Swinburne, R. ed. 1974. The Justification of Induction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. A slightly older collection on the problems of induction. Stalker, D. ed. 1994. Grue!: the New Riddle of Induction. Chicago: Open Court. A useful source of recent papers on Goodman’s ‘new riddle of induction’. Ruben, David-Hillel. ed. 1993. Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. An up-to-date collection of essays on explanation, some of which are rather difficult, but all of which are invaluable. Papineau, D. ed. 1996. The Philosophy of Science. Oxford New York : Oxford University Press. Despite the title, all of the essays contained are on topics in methodology. Grayling, A. C. ed. 1995. Philosophy: A Guide Through the Subject. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The first chapter gives a basic introduction to epistemology, with short essays on the analysis of knowledge, perception and scepticism, the third chapter gives a comprehensive introduction to issues in methodology and philosophy of science.

Books Chisholm, R. 1989. The Theory of Knowledge. 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall International. A very useful and short introduction to epistemology. Pollock, John L. 1999. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. 2nd ed. Totowa, N. J.: Rowman & Littlefield. A good, but fairly hard introduction to epistemology. Dancy, J. 1985. Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell. A useful starting point for looking at issues in epistemology, this contains a very good account of sceptical arguments, Nozick’s theory of knowledge, and a discussion of perception. Lehrer, K. 1990. Theory of Knowledge. 2nd ed. London: Routledge. As well as a useful account of recent American epistemology, this develops a defence of coherentism. Foster, J. 1985. Ayer. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Pt.II, an excellent overview of epistemology, and methodology from an English perspective, expounding and criticising the views of A.J. Ayer; however, parts of it are fairly hard. Plantinga, A. 1993. Warrant: the Current Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press. An overview of recent American epistemology, by one of its leading practitioners. Hookway, C. 1990. Scepticism. London: Routledge. A useful review of discussions of scepticism throughout the ages. Goodman, N. 1983. Fact, Fiction & Forecast. 4th ed. Mass.: Harvard University Press. The source of the ‘grue’ paradox and the starting point for many recent discussions of induction; this is essential reading. Skyrms, B. 1986. Choice and Chance: an Introduction to Inductive Logic. 2nd ed. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Pub. Co. An introductory textbook on induction, confirmation and probability. Howson, C., and P. Urbach. 1989. Scientific Reasoning: the Bayesian Approach. 2nd ed. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court. A very good textbook introduction to the formal study of probability, Bayesian accounts of scientific reasoning and its application to various problems. O’Hear, A. 1989. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Weintraub, R. 1997. The Sceptical Challenge. London: Routledge.

3 Topics A. KNOWLEDGE i. The Analysis of Knowledge ‘What is knowledge?’ This question was raised by Plato in the Theaetetus (see Myles Burnyeat’s excellent commentary in The Theatetus of Plato, (Indianapolis:

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Hackett, 1990)) but not answered to his satisfaction, and it has remained a central concern of Western philosophy since then. A good starting point here is Scott Sturgeon’s short essay ‘Knowledge’, in A. C. Grayling, ed., Philosophy. We can distinguish between knowledge by acquaintance, as when you know Paris but not Berlin, with propositional knowledge, where you know that something is the case; it has also been claimed that there is knowledge how or practical knowledge which should be contrasted with propositional, or factual, knowledge (but for scepticism about that distinction see A. W. Moore, Points of View, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), ch.6). According to one tradition which descends from this, we should see propositional knowledge as comprising three elements: a state of mind, a belief that things are a certain way; that belief ’s being correct or true; and the subject having a justification, right, or warrant for what they believe. Edmund Gettier in ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ (originally published in Analysis 23 (1963): 121-123, reprinted in both Pappas and Swain and in Moser) challenged the sufficiency of this account, giving examples of people with justified true beliefs who intuitively lacked knowledge. This has set off a project of finding a Gettier-proof analysis of knowledge—look at Sosa ‘The Analysis of “Knowledge that p”’, Analysis 25 (1964): 1-8, reprinted in Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) and Gilbert Harman, Thought, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp.120-41 for two responses. A good overview is provided by Jonathan Dancy in An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, ch.2; a more exhaustive review of various of the attempts can be found in Robert K. Shope, The Analysis of Knowing: a Decade of Research, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1983); while Scott Sturgeon, ‘The Gettier Problem’, Analysis 53 (1993): 156-164, attempts to draw a general moral from the thirty years of debate. Some philosophers have thought that the problem shows that the attempted analysis of knowledge is bound to fail, and that a different approach to the problem is required. This is suggested by Edward Craig in ‘The Practical Explication of Knowledge’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87 (1987): 211-226, and in his book Knowledge and the State of Nature: an Essay in Conceptual Synthesis, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990); and in a different way by Timothy Williamson in ‘Is Knowing a State of Mind’, Mind 104 (1995): 533-565.

ii. Foundations & Coherence Foundationalism One question has focused on the structure of justification that a thinker must possess in order to have knowledge. Whenever you are justified in believing something, there is a reason that you have for believing that, but if your reason is also a belief, then it too must be justified in order for you to be justified in believing the first belief—now we seem to be threatened with an infinite regress of reasons. A foundationalist about justification seeks to block the regress by finding a range of basic beliefs which are not justified by other beliefs. One tradition of foundationalism grounds basic beliefs in incorrigible knowledge of one’s own sensory states. This has often been attacked as acceptance of the supposed ‘myth of the given’, examples of such attacks are provided by Michael Williams, Groundless Belief: an Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977; reprinted with a new preface and afterword, Princeton: Princeton University Press,

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1999), chs. 2 and 3, and Laurence BonJour, ‘Can Empirical Knowledge have a Foundation?’, American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1978): 1-13. For other variants of foundationalism see John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, ch.3; William P. Alston, ‘Two Types of Foundationalism’, Journal of Philosophy 85 (1976): 165-185, reprinted in his Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); and Ernest Sosa, ‘The Raft and the Pyramid’, in Studies in Epistemology, Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. 5, edited by P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, Jr., and H. K. Wettstein, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980); reprinted in his Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Coherentism Coherentists deny that there must be a well-founded chain of justification for beliefs, and allow that our beliefs may be mutually supporting. Such coherentism concerning empirical knowledge is defended by Williams in Groundless Belief, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977); Keith Lehrer in A Theory of Knowledge, chs. 5-7, and BonJour in The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985). Davidson in ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge’, in E. Lepore, ed., Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), offers what he there calls a form of coherentism, although he has since become wary of classifying his position as such. For criticisms of coherentism, see Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: the Current Debate, ch.4, and Ralph C. S. Walker, The Coherence Theory of Truth: Realism, Anti-realism, Idealism, (London: Routledge, 1989), ch. IX. If you wish to look at variants of coherentism and anti-foundationalism, look also at Willard van Orman Quine’s, ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, in his Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Wittgenstein’s, On Certainty, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969); David Annis, ‘A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification’, American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1978): 213-219. Also of relevance here are some of the writings on probability and Bayesianism, see Howson and Urbach, Scientific Reasoning; Mark Kaplan, Decision Theory as Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

iii. Internalism and Externalism The contrast between internalism and externalism in epistemology is in fact more than one dichotomy, and it should not be confused or conflated with the contrast between internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind or that in ethics and moral psychology concerning moral judgements and reasons for action. Internalists about justification claim that whether a subject is justified or not turns on what states of mind they are in; or that it turns only on facts that are accessible to them (these two conditions are not necessarily equivalent). Externalists about justification claim that the justification of a state may turn on facts entirely external to the subject, such as the causal history of a belief, or on facts to which the subject need not have access. Some externalists about knowledge claim that justification is not needed for knowledge, assuming in such accounts that justification is to be thought of in internalist terms. Causal Theories Early examples of externalist theories of knowledge are provided by causal theo-

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ries of knowing, which claim (roughly) that one knows some fact only where the fact is a cause of one’s belief, see Alvin Goldman, ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing’, Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967): 357-372; and David Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). Causal theories have problems accounting for our knowledge of matters with which we do not seem to have any causal contact, such as mathematics, general truths, the future. Although one motive for such theories was to avoid the Gettier problem, Gettiercounterexamples can be constructed for them as well. Reliabilism A more common form of externalism is reliabilism, which looks to the probability of the truth of one’s belief. The commonest form of reliabilism is process reliabilism, where a belief is justified or counts as knowledge only if it issues from a process of belief formation which does—and would in very similar circumstances— produce a high percentage of true beliefs: Goldman in ‘What is Justified Belief?’, in Pappas and Swain, and in Moser, ed., Empirical Knowledge, defends a process reliabilist view of justification; his view is further elaborated and defended in Epistemology and Cognition, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), and in ‘Strong and Weak Justification’, in Epistemology, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 2, (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing Co. 1988); see also his ‘Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge’, Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 771-791, reprinted in Dancy, ed., Perceptual Knowledge. Goldman’s papers are also reprinted in his Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992). Truth-Tracking & Relevant Alternatives Another form of externalism, in this case concerning knowledge rather than justification, is presented by Robert Nozick in ch. 3 of his Philosophical Explanations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) usefully abridged in Dancy’s collection, Perceptual Knowledge. According to Nozick, a knower is someone whose belief ‘tracks the truth’: two important conditions for knowledge here are given using ‘counterfactual’ or ‘subjunctive’ conditionals (see the reading under Logic & Metaphysics on conditionals for more on these), ‘Were p not the case, S would not believe that p’, ‘Were p the case, S would believe that p’. For a useful introduction to Nozick’s account see Dancy, An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, ch. 3; for criticisms, see Brian Garrett, ‘Nozick on Knowledge’, Analysis 43 (1983): 181-184, and Crispin Wright, ‘Keeping Track of Nozick’, Analysis 43 (1983): 134-140. It is also useful to compare Nozick’s approach with that of Dretske, see in particular, ‘Epistemic Operators’, Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970): 1007-1023; ‘Conclusive Reasons’, in Pappas and Swain; and Dretske’s ‘Reply to Critics: Knowledge’, in Brian McLaughlin, ed., Dretske and his Critics, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). Christopher Peacocke’s account of knowledge in Thoughts: an Essay on Content, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), ch. 9, is a sophisticated elaboration of Nozick’s approach, but which reconciles it with some internalist assumptions—this is hard, but is a useful source for discussion of, among other things, a variety of Gettier-style examples. Internalists v. Externalists For internalist criticisms of externalist accounts, see Susan Haack, Evidence &

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Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), ch. 5; Laurence BonJour’s ‘Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge’, in Studies in Epistemology, Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. 5, edited by P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, Jr., and H. K. Wettstein, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980); John Foster, Ayer, pp.85-125 (in fact this develops a view of knowledge similar to Peacocke’s); Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, ch. 4. For challenges against internalist conditions on knowledge see Alvin Goldman, ‘The Internalist Conception of Justification’, in Studies in Epistemology, Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. 5. A challenging, but very useful discussion of whether one could always know that one knows, is to be found in Timothy Williamson’s ‘Inexact Knowledge’, Mind 101 (1992): 217-242, also see his ‘Cognitive Homelessness’, Journal of Philosophy 93 (1996): 554-573. A very different view of knowledge which combines elements of internalism with elements of semantic externalism as discussed in the philosophy of mind can be found in John McDowell’s work on epistemology, see in particular, ‘Criteria, Defeasibility & Knowledge’, Proceedings of the British Academy 68 (1982): 45579, abridged reprint in Dancy, ed., Perceptual Knowledge; ‘Knowledge and the Internal’, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 55 (1995): 877-93; both are reprinted in J. McDowell, Meaning, Knowledge and Reality, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). Equally challenging but not necessarily as obscure, see Timothy Williamson, ‘Is Knowing a State of Mind’, Mind 104 (1995): 533-565, for a development of this kind of approach.

iv. Naturalized Epistemology In talking about knowledge, belief and justification, we often speak of whether someone has reason or a right to believe something: this suggests that epistemological facts are normative facts and so not obviously natural facts. Naturalized epistemology is concerned with placing the notions of epistemology within the setting of the natural sciences—for revisionary naturalized epistemologists, all that will remain of the traditional epistemological problems are questions within the cognitive sciences; a less revisionary response is the hope that some variant of our common sense notions of justification and knowledge can be found within a naturalistic framework. An advertisement for doing so can be found in Quine’s ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, in his Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). Look also at the various essays in Hilary Kornblith, Naturalizing Epistemology, (2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994) in particular Kornblith’s introduction, and Barry Stroud’s critique of Quine, ‘The Significance of Naturalized Epistemology’. Haack, Evidence & Inquiry, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) ch.6, also contains a good discussion of Quine on these matters. Alvin Goldman’s Epistemology and Cognition, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986) can be seen as an attempt to provide a less revisionary form of naturalized epistemology than Quine’s, and the second half of this book is dedicated to epistemological issues arising from the cognitive sciences.

B. SCEPTICISM Scepticism in this context is almost always ‘Modern scepticism’ and starts with both the dreaming hypothesis and the hyperbolical doubt of Descartes’s First Meditation. (It has become common to emphasise the contrast between Modern scepticism and ancient, for one influential discussion of this see Myles Burnyeat,

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‘Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed’, Philosophical Review 90 (1982): 3-40; also in a slightly abridged form in G. Vesey, ed., Idealism Past and Present, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).) ‘Cartesian’ scepticism is scepticism about our knowledge of the external world. Sceptics may challenge one’s claim to knowledge or even one’s claim to justified or reasonable belief. One useful starting point is Jonathan Dancy’s Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, ch.1; and two good general books on the topic are those of Christopher Hookway, Scepticism, and Ruth Weintraub, The Sceptical Challenge. For formulations of both the Cartesian worry and its wider philosophical significance see Bernard Williams, Descartes: the Project of Pure Enquiry, (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1978), ch. 2 and appendix 3; and Barry Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) particularly ch.1. There have been various different attempts both to state the sceptical argument and to defuse it. Some such accounts allow that one does not know that one is dreaming or not a brain-in-a-vat, but that one does know other things which entail that one is not dreaming: see for example Nozick’s account of how to defuse the sceptic in Philosophical Explanations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) ch. 3, sec.2, or the abridgement in Dancy, ed., Perceptual Knowledge; for discussion of Nozick, see Wright, ‘Keeping Track of Nozick’, Analysis 43 (1983): 134-140; Edward Craig, ‘Nozick and the Sceptic: The Thumbnail Version’, Analysis 49 (1989): 161-162; The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and his Critics, ed., Stephen Luper-Foy, (Totowa, N. J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987) contains useful work as well. Other responses suggest that one might not know something in one context, or by one standard, but yet know it by another: for a very clear development of this line of thought see Keith DeRose, ‘Solving the Skeptical Problem’, Philosophical Review 104 (1995): 1-52; and also David Lewis, ‘Elusive Knowledge’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 549-567 (reprinted in his Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Lewis’s ‘Scorekeeping in a Language-Game’, in Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), first sketched out this approach. A rather different kind of contextualist response has been suggested to some philosophers by Wittgenstein’s thoughts in On Certainty, (Oxford : Blackwell, 1969) see Marie McGinn, Sense and Certainty: a Dissolution of Scepticism, (Oxford : Blackwell, 1989), and Michael Williams, Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism, (Princeton, N. J: Princeton University Press, 1996). Compare this with Thompson Clarke, ‘The Legacy of Skepticism’, Journal of Philosophy 69 (1972): 754-769, and Stroud’s discussions of Wittgenstein and also Clarke in The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). For many philosophers consideration of external world scepticism is tied to metaphysical issues concerning the mind-independence of reality, one striking discussion of this theme is Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) ch.1; and a good critical discussion of it can be found in Crispin Wright, ‘On Putnam’s Proof that we are not Brains-in-a-Vat’, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 (1992): 67-94, and in Peter Clark, ed., Reading Putnam, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). Putnam’s argument is closely related to a form of anti-sceptical challenge called transcendental argumentation: P. F.

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Strawson’s Skepticism & Naturalism: Some Varieties, (London: Methuen, 1985) is an elegant summation of that approach, and its possible limits. See also Barry Stroud, ‘Transcendental Arguments’, Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968): 241-256, reprinted in Ralph Walker, ed., Kant on Pure Reason, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). For a recent critical survey of this form of argument also have a look at Robert Stern, Transcendental Arguments & Scepticism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000).

C. THE SOURCES AND RESOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE i. Sense-Perception Traditionally there are thought to be five senses—sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell—and through their use we can come to be acquainted with objects and acquire information about them and the world around us. Philosophers are interested both in the nature of perception for its own sake, and for the ways in which it connects with knowledge and scepticism. The problem of appearance and reality is both one of how it can be that we can experience things to be ways other than they are, and also how, given the possibility of illusion and hallucination, we can ever come to have perceptual knowledge at all. Two useful introductions to issues about the nature of perceptual experience are P. F. Strawson, ‘Perception and its Objects’, in G. Macdonald, ed., Philosophy & Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer (London: Macmillan, 1979), reprinted in Dancy, ed., Perceptual Knowledge; and Tim Crane, ‘Introduction’, in Crane, ed., The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). A good book on the epistemological role of the senses is William P. Alston’s The Reliability of Sense Perception, (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993). The idea that there is a special sceptical problem associated with perception can be traced back to Hume, see An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, sec. XII, pt I on scepticism with regard to the senses. One can find here an explicit use of the argument from illusion to support the claim that we are aware of nonphysical entities, impressions or sense-data, rather than physical objects: for a careful discussion of this argument and the issues surrounding the immediate objects of perception see Paul Snowdon’s ‘How to Interpret “Direct Perception”’; and see also J. J. Valberg’s ‘The Puzzle of Experience’, both in Crane, ed., The Contents of Experience. Defences of sense-datum theories of perception can be found in Frank Jackson, Perception: A Representative Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), look particularly at chs. 1-4; Howard Robinson, Perception, (London: Routledge, 1994); John Foster, Ayer, ch. II, sec. 10, and Moreland Perkins, Sensing the World, (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1983). Attacks on sense-data are legion— J. L. Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), remains an entertaining and vigorous critique of the views of A. J. Ayer, as found in his The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (London: Macmillan, 1940); also have a look at chapter 1 of George Pitcher’s A Theory of Perception, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1971). For examples of intentional theories of perception, which take the argument from illusion to show that perceptual experience is analogous to belief, see David Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), ch.10, reprinted in Dancy, ed., Perceptual Knowledge; John Searle, Intentionality:

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an Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), ch.2; Gilbert Harman, ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’, in James E. Tomberlin, ed., Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 4, (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview, 1990); and (rather more challenging) Christopher Peacocke, A Study of Concepts, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), ch. 3. Whether such accounts can amount to some form of direct realism is a question raised by disjunctive theories of perception, so called because they claim that when one experiences either one is perceiving or one is having an illusion, but there is no common state of experience between the two. Disjunctivism is developed by Paul Snowdon in ‘Perception, Vision and Causation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1981): 175-192; and by John McDowell, ‘Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge’, Proceedings of the British Academy 68 (1982): 45579; reprinted in his Meaning, Knowledge and Reality, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998); both are reprinted in Dancy, ed., Perceptual Knowledge (see also Snowdon’s ‘The Objects of Perceptual Experience’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 64 (1990): 121-150). Whatever the correct account of experience, what makes an experience a case of perceiving something, or perceiving at all? Paul Grice presented a key argument for the view that an object must cause one’s experience in order for one to be perceiving it in ‘The Causal Theory of Perception’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 35 (1961): 121-152; reprinted in abridged form in his Studies in the Way of Words, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), and in Dancy, ed., Perceptual Knowledge. But being a cause of one’s experience does not seem sufficient to make something the object of perception, the problem of specifying what more is needed became known as the issue of ‘deviant causal chains’, see here David Owens, Causes and Coincidences, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), ch.7; David Lewis’s ‘Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision’, in his Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). For a critique of Grice’s argument, though, see Snowdon, ‘Perception, Vision and Causation’. The role of perception in justification is raised in many of the discussions of foundationalism mentioned above, and in discussion of the theory/observation distinction—look at the reading listed on this topic below.

ii. Memory If sense-perception is a key means of gaining knowledge, memory is needed to retain it. We can distinguish between direct, personal or episodic memory and semantic or factual memory: you may remember playing in the garden as a child, but you can only remember that Italy was founded in the nineteenth century, you cannot remember its being founded. For a good discussion of these distinctions see Norman Malcolm, ‘Three Lectures on Memory’, in his Knowledge and Certainty: Essays and Lectures, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963); and C. B. Martin and Max Deutscher, ‘Remembering’, Philosophical Review 75 (1966): 161-196—they also argue for the role of a causal link to a previous experience by an argument analogous to Grice’s with respect to perception. For the distinction between recognition and recall, and their significance for the role of memory in thought, see Gareth Evans’s The Varieties of Reference, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), ch.8, sec. 8.4. For psychological background, see A. Baddeley, Human

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Memory: Theory and Practice, (Rev. ed. Hove: Psychology Press, 1997). Could one only directly remember what one has oneself experienced? Sydney Shoemaker in ‘Persons and their Pasts’, reprinted in his Identity, Cause and Mind: Philosophical Essays, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), introduces the idea of quasi-memory (see also Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp.219 ff.), to challenge this idea. For criticism of Shoemaker and Parfit see David Wiggins, ‘Remembering Directly’, in Jim Hopkins and Anthony Savile, eds., Psychoanalysis, Mind and Art: Perspectives on Richard Wollheim, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). But what makes the difference between remembering and merely imagining? Russell in his early views suggested that memory was a form of ‘direct acquaintance’ with the past, see his Problems of Philosophy, (London: Williams and Norgate, 1912), chs. 5 and 11; for a revised view appealing in part to feelings of familiarity see his The Analysis of Mind, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1921), ch.9; for discussion of these various views look at D. F. Pears, ‘Russell’s Theories of Memory’, in his Questions in the Philosophy of Mind, (London: Duckworth, 1975), and for a critique of Pears, see Lindsay Judson, ‘Russell on Memory’, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (1988): 6582. For a different approach to these topics, look at David Owens, ‘A Lockean Theory of Memory Experience’, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): 319-332. How does memory provide for the retention of knowledge or justification? Can one know something at one time, such as that Julius Caesar was the first emperor of Rome, retain the belief over time and yet not continue to know this? For discussion of this matter, see Gilbert Harman, Thought, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), ch. 12; Fred Dretske and Palle Yourgrau, ‘Lost Knowledge’, Journal of Philosophy, 80 (1983): 356-366; and Christopher Peacocke, Thoughts, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), ch.10. For more on the preservative role of memory see the hard but rewarding discussion in Tyler Burge, ‘Content Preservation’, Philosophical Review 102 (1993): 457-488.

iii. Testimony ‘Testimony’ is a term philosophers use for talking about learning things through being told them. Is testimony a distinctive source of knowledge, or means of transmitting it, or can we instead explain how I come to know something through being told it, in terms of justification deriving from perception and inductive reasoning? C. A. Coady sets this issue up in ‘Testimony and Observation’, American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1973): 149-155; for a fuller treatment of these issues see also his long study, Testimony: A Philosophical Study, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) and a useful guide to and criticism of it can be found in Elizabeth Fricker’s ‘Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony’, Mind 104 (1995): 393-411. See also Michael Dummett, ‘Testimony and Memory’, in his The Seas of Language, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); John McDowell, ‘Knowledge by Hearsay’, in A. Chakrabarti, and B. K. Matilal, eds., Knowing from Words: Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993); reprinted in John McDowell, Meaning, Knowledge and Reality, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998); and see Jonathan Adler, ‘Testimony, Trust, Knowing’, Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994): 264-275.

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iv. Introspection & Self-Knowledge Is there a special way each of us has of knowing his or her own mind? Some philosophers have thought that we are infallible in our judgements about our own current mental states—if one judges that one believes or desires that p, then one does believe or desire that p; or that one’s mental states are self-intimating— if one believes or desires that p, then one believes that one believes or desires that p. This tradition of the ‘transparency’ of the mind has at least roots in Descartes, see in particular Meditation II, but is now commonly questioned. Even among those who reject the transparency of the mental, many still hold that we have a special authority about (some) of our own mental states, in contrast to our knowledge of the world around us and the minds of others. Various different accounts have been offered of how we have such knowledge: some have thought that there are forms of inner observation or scanning, others have rejected this idea. See the essays by Armstrong and Chisholm in Cassam, ed., Self-Knowledge, for inner sense accounts and for criticisms, Sydney Shoemaker’s ‘Introspection and the Self ’, in the same volume; more advanced discussions of self-knowledge are provided in the (difficult) papers by Evans and Strawson in the Cassam volume. Also look at the entry on introspection and first person authority in the chapter on Philosophy of Mind for a more detailed bibliography.

v. A Priori Knowledge On one traditional conception, one knows something a priori where one can determine the truth of a proposition understood without appeal to experience (note that experience may yet be involved in one’s coming to grasp the proposition in the first place); a posteriori or empirical knowledge is then knowledge whose grounds rest at least in part on one’s experience. It has been claimed that we have a priori knowledge of the truths of mathematics, logic, metaphysics, even ethics. For an important discussion of the notion of a priori knowledge see the introduction to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (translated by N. Kemp Smith, 2nd ed., London: Macmillan, 1933; or translated by Paul Guyer, and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Many philosophers have been suspicious of whether there can be genuine non-empirical knowledge. Early in the twentieth century, various philosophers sought to deflate the idea of a priori knowledge by reducing it to analytic knowledge—knowledge of logic and of meaning, and treating this as simply truth by convention: a key example of this is Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic, (London: Gollancz, 1946), ch.4; for scepticism about this approach see Quine’s, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in his From a Logical Point of View: Logico-philosophical Essays, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), and ‘Truth by Convention’ in his The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, (New York: Random House, 1966). Quine’s critique of the analytic–synthetic distinction, and his proposal that our knowledge in general be considered empirical has been widely influential; Paul Boghossian’s ‘Analyticity Reconsidered’, in Noûs 30 (1996): 360-391, (a slightly different version of this appears as ‘Analyticity’, in B. Hale and C. Wright, eds., A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997)) is an assessment of Quine’s attack on the notion of analyticity and defence of that notion. For sympathetic treatments of the notion of a priori knowledge see also Ian McFetridge, ‘Explicating “x knows a priori that p”’, in his Logical Necessity and Other Essays, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990). (You might also

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consider reading Christopher Peacocke, ‘How are A Priori Truths Possible?’, European Journal of Philosophy 1 (1993): 175-199; and Hartry Field, ‘The A Prioricity of Logic’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1996): 359-379, both challenging but rewarding papers. And further advanced reading can be found in C. Peacocke and P. Boghossian, eds., New Essays on the A Priori, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000).

d. Induction The term ‘induction’ is often used for any form of non-deductive reasoning: this includes reasoning from past experience to a generalisation (for example, from the observation that the sun has risen in the past to the generalisation that the sun rises every morning) and inference to the best explanation (for example, the inference that gases are made of minute particles moving fast at random). Note that sometimes the term ‘induction’ is restricted in application to just the first of these types of reasoning. The classical ‘problem of induction’ is how to justify any form of non-deductive reasoning as a source of knowledge or warranted belief. This is normally presented as a form of scepticism, and Hume is commonly taken to provide the locus classicus of such scepticism, see A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. I, Pt. III, and An Enquriy concerning Human Understanding, secs. IV & V, although this interpretation of Hume is now under challenge, see Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism and David Hume, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). For more recent introductory statements of the problem see B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, (London: Williams and Norgate, 1912), ch.6; and B. Skyrms, Choice and Chance, ch.2. As with other forms of scepticism, philosophers have sought to combat it by applying a suitable general theory of knowledge: one such type of response to the sceptical problem is to appeal to reliabilism see in particular D. Papineau, ‘Reliabilism, Induction and Scepticism’, Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1992): 1-20, as well as the texts cited above concerning externalist theories of knowledge; Bayesianism has also been thought to offer a solution to these problems (for more on which see below). Some philosophers have questioned whether Hume presents us with a genuine problem. Karl Popper denies that science proceeds by induction, substituting instead the role of falsification of hypotheses, see Objective Knowledge: an Evolutionary Approach, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), ch.1. P. F. Strawson, An Introduction to Logical Theory, (London: Methuen, 1952), ch. 9, suggests that we cannot question the rationality of induction, since inductive reasoning is part of what we mean by ‘being rational’. See Also Newton-Smith, W. H. 1981. The Rationality of Science. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch.3. Blackburn, S. 1973. Reason & Prediction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.1. Swinburne, R. ed. 1974. The Justification of Induction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mellor, D. H. 1991. ‘The Warrant of Induction’. In The Matter of Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Edwards, P. 1949. ‘Bertrand Russell’s Doubts about Induction’. Mind 58: 141-163. Reprinted in Swinburne, ed., The Justification of Induction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974. Mackie, J. L. 1979. ‘A Defence of Induction’. In G. Macdonald, ed., Philosophy & Identity: Essays Presented to A.J. Ayer. London: Macmillan.

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E. THE NEW RIDDLE OF INDUCTION & THE PUZZLES OF CONFIRMATION i. Grue The classical problem of induction has been followed in the last fifty years by Nelson Goodman’s ‘new riddle of induction’, in Fact, Fiction & Forecast, (4th ed. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), ch. 3: we all agree that the observation of many green emeralds is a reason to believe the generalisation, ‘All emeralds are green’. Now let us stipulate that ‘x is grue’ means ‘either x is green and examined before 2000 AD, or x is blue’. Then our observations of many green emeralds would seem to support the generalisation, ‘All emeralds are grue’ just as much as they support, ‘All emeralds are green’. But surely, as yet unexamined emeralds are green and not blue! See Also Davidson, D. 1980. ‘Emeroses by Other Names’. In Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Jackson, F. 1975. ‘Grue’. Journal of Philosophy 72: 113-131. Reprinted in D. Stalker, ed., Grue!: the New Riddle of Induction. Chicago: Open Court, 1994. Sainsbury, M. 1995. Paradoxes. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.4. Skyrms, B. 1986. Choice and Chance: an Introduction to Inductive Logic. 2nd ed. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth. Ch.3. Stalker, D. ed. 1994. Grue!: the New Riddle of Induction. Chicago: Open Court. Other articles in addition to Jackson, particularly those by Earman and Pollock. Shoemaker, S. 1975. ‘Projecting the Unprojectible’. Philosophical Review 84: 178-219. Reprinted in Identity, Cause & Mind: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

ii. Confirmation Closely related to this are problems of confirmation, and Carl Hempel’s ‘paradox of the ravens’, from C. Hempel, ‘Studies in the Logic of Confirmation’, in his Aspects of Scientific Explanation: and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, (New York: Free Press, 1965). When does evidence confirm an hypothesis? Observing some black ravens is evidence for the hypothesis that all ravens are black. But this is logically equivalent to the claim that all non-black things are non-ravens (since in general, ‘All As are Bs’ is equivalent to ‘All non-Bs are non-As’). ‘All non-black things are non-ravens’ is confirmed by an observation of a white shoe. But surely what confirms an hypothesis also confirms a logically equivalent hypothesis. So, an observation of a white shoe confirms the hypothesis that all ravens are black! See Also Sainsbury, M. 1995. Paradoxes. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.4. Foster, J. 1985. Ayer. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. pp.215-239.

iii. Probability The theory of probability has a central role, according to some philosophers, in solving these problems. For a brief introduction to the notion of probability and its role in scientific reasoning see the sections on probability in David Papineau, ‘Scientific Method’, in A.C. Grayling, ed., Philosophy; and Brian Skyrms, Choice & Chance, Chs. 1 & 5. Howson & Urbach, Scientific Reasoning, is probably the best general text-book introduction to the role of probabilistic reasoning. For more on these topics see the section on Interpretations of Probability in the guide to Philosophy of Science.

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See Also Horwich, P. 1982. Probability & Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kaplan, M. 1996. Decision Theory as Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Earman, J. 1992. Bayes or Bust?: a Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

F. KNOWLEDGE OF UNOBSERVABLES A major source of our knowledge about the world, particularly our scientific knowledge, depends on the use of instruments to detect things which we cannot directly observe. Is there an epistemologically significant distinction between knowledge of the observed and knowledge, or putative knowledge, of the unobserved? One tradition within Philosophy of Science has taken the theory/observation distinction as fundamental; and just as some troubled by scepticism about the external world have turned to idealism, and those troubled by scepticism about other minds have turned to behaviourism, so those troubled by the problem of our knowledge of the unobserved turned to instrumentalism. However the theory–observation distinction has itself come in for criticism, although in recent years there have been renewed attempts to provide the distinction with a firm basis. The focus of the debate has shifted, however, from questions over the status of unobservables to the question whether genuine knowledge is possible of them at all: modern empiricists denying that this is so (see van Fraasen) while realists (such as Papineau) insist that we can. Key Reading Nagel, E. 1979. The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch.5. van Fraasen, B. 1980. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Esp. Ch.1. Papineau, D. 1993. Philosophical Naturalism. Oxford: Blackwell. Ch.5. ——. 1996. ed. The Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See the essays by Fine, Musgrave, Van Fraasen, Lipton, and Laudan, essay VI. Further Reading Churchland, Paul M., and Clifford A. Hooker, eds. 1985. Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Leplin, J. ed. 1984. Scientific Realism. Berkeley: University of California Press. Fodor, J. 1984. ‘Observation Reconsidered’. Philosophy of Science 51: 23-43. Reprinted in A Theory of Content & Other Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990. Churchland, Paul M. 1979. Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Peacocke, C. 1983. Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and their Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.4.

G. EXPLANATION What is it to explain something? The classic account is Hempel’s: to explain a phenomenon, P, is to show how a description of P follows deductively from a description of the relevant initial conditions and certain laws of nature. This is known as the ‘Deductive-Nomological’ or the ‘Covering Law’ model of explanation. This has the consequence that to explain why P is also to predict that P; counterexamples arise when, for instance, we can predict the weather by using a barometer, but the barometer’s readings do not explain the weather. Gilbert Harman has stressed the importance of inference to the best explanation, also known as ‘abduction’. Discussion of explanation is often closely tied to discussion of causation, and to the idea of causal explanation. For further guid-

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ance on these matters see the relevant entries under Logic & Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science. (Also look at reading under Causation and Causal Explanation in the Logic & Metaphysics chapter.) Key Reading Ruben, David-Hillel. 1990. Explaining Explanation. London: Routledge. Hempel, C. 1965. ‘Aspects of Scientific Explanation’. In Aspects of Scientific Explanation: and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Free Press. ——. 1966. Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs N. J.: Prentice-Hall. Chs.5 and 6. ——. 1967. ‘Explanation in Science’. In P. Edwards, ed., The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. London: Collier-Macmillan. van Fraasen, B. 1980. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.5 esp. secs. 1-2.5. Harman, G. 1965. ‘The Inference to the Best Explanation’. Philosophical Review 74: 88-95. Lewis, D. 1986. ‘Causal Explanation’. In Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in David-Hillel Ruben, ed., Explanation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Further Reading Ruben, David-Hillel. ed. Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. Particularly the introduction and essays by Lipton, Salmon and Matthews. Nagel, E. 1979. The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Chs. 2 and 3. Lipton, P. 1991. Inference to the Best Explanation. London: Routledge. Owens, D. 1992. Causes & Coincidences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 3 and 4.

H. INCOMMENSURABILITY How can competing theories be compared with one another? If new theories introduce different concepts from older theories, how can it be that the theories are even talking about the same phenomena? Key Reading Kuhn, Thomas S. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Putnam, H. 1979. ‘The “Corroboration” of Theories’. In T. Honderich, and M. Burnyeat, eds., Philosophy as it is. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Further Reading Feyerabend, Paul. 1988. Against Method. Rev. ed. London: Verso. Shapere, D. 1981. ‘Meaning and Theory Change’. In I. Hacking, ed., Scientific Revolutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hacking, I. ed. 1981. Scientific Revolutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Ethics

1 The Paper Ethics is the study of theories of how we ought to live, and what is of value or concern in life. These theories form a tradition going back to Plato and Aristotle leading up to the (in some ways very different) concerns of recent philosophy. It is important to realise that the general form that these theories have taken has varied greatly over the last 2,000 years, so one cannot approach the general questions posed within ethics without an appreciation of that history. Amongst the problems considered are the relation between the happiness of the individual and concern for others or the common good; the relation between rationality and the claims of morality; to what extent morality requires impartiality of us, and what form that impartiality should take; what is the nature of the good, and what is the relation between the good and the right; whether there are ethical truths, and whether facts of value obtain independently of us and our feelings. To what extent do ethical theories do justice to, or provide convincing critiques of, our natural moral thinking? These questions have arisen for ethical theories throughout history, and sometimes past ethical theories may appear to do more justice to common sense practical thinking than any contemporary school of thought. In this area of philosophy there is a particular concern with its practical application or consequences. In recent years, issues in applied or practical ethics have come more to the fore, including the issues of abortion, euthanasia, concern for other animals and for the environment.

2 Basic Reading A. INTRODUCTORY TEXTS Reading a few introductory texts, particularly towards the beginning of the course, will greatly help you in getting a view of the areas of concern and in orienting yourself in relation to more central material. Here are some suggestions Harman, G. 1977. The Nature of Morality: an introduction to ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Norman, R. 1983. The Moral Philosophers: an introduction to ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Williams, B. 1976. Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

B. COLLECTIONS Singer, P. ed. 1994. Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Feinberg, J. ed. 1969. Moral Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Foot, P. ed. 1967. Theories of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Raz, J. ed. 1978. Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Taylor, P. W. ed. 1967. Problems of Moral Philosophy: an introduction to ethics. Belmont, California: Dickenson.

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3 Central Historical Texts A. ANCIENT Greek philosophy looks at the problems of ethics in terms of how one can lead a happy life, or living well. Questions that arise include, ‘What role do the virtues play in an admirable life?’, ‘How far is a good life subject to luck?’, ‘What role does reason play in living well?’, and particularly in Stoicism, ‘Does living well involve conforming to some form of law?’

i. Plato Euthyphro, Gorgias, Republic. Republic, I, II, X. Use the new translation of Republic by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); otherwise Clarendon Plato for canonical edition of Gorgias, translated by Terence Irwin, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).

Commentaries Annas, J. 1981. An Introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pappas, N. 1995. Plato and the Republic. London: Routledge. Kraut, R. ed. 1992. The Cambridge Companion to Plato. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Includes an exhaustive bibliography. Irwin, T. 1995. Plato’s Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nussbaum, M. 1986. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pt.1. Price, A. W. 1989. Love & Friendship in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

ii. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics (& Eudaemian Ethics). N 1, 3, 5, 6; for the Nicomachean translation by Irwin, Hackett with useful glossary; also Ross Oxford translation; for Eudaemian Clarendon Aristotle trans. with commentary Woods.

Commentaries Rorty, A. O. ed. 1980. Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics. Berkeley: University of California Press. Broadie, S. 1991. Ethics with Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kraut, R. 1989. Aristotle on the Human Good. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Cooper, J. 1986. Reason and Human Good in Aristotle. Indianapolis: Hackett. Hutchinson, D. S. 1986. The Virtues of Aristotle. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Nussbaum, M. 1986. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pt.2.

iii. Hellenistic Ethics Long, A. A. 1974. Hellenistic philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. London: Duckworth. (2nd ed. 1986). See section 1 on Stoic and Epicurean ethics.

Commentaries Annas, J. 1993. The Morality of Happiness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nussbaum, M. 1994. The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Sorabji, R. 1993. Animal Minds and Human Morals: the Origins of the Western Debate. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press. Inwood, B. 1995. Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Price, A. W. 1995. Mental Conflict. London: Routledge. Striker, Gisela. 1996. Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology & Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bobzien, Susanne. 1998. Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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B. MEDIEVAL ETHICS Medieval ethics combines elements of Pagan thought from antiquity with the particular concerns of the three monotheistic traditions of the West: Judaism, Islam and Christianity. Central themes in Medieval thought concern: the role of free choice in ethical life; how this individual freedom is best to be understood; the connection between free choice and rationality. Medieval ethics strives to adapt models of ethical life as involving the practice of the virtues, which they derive from Greek thought, to the ideas central to Western monotheism, in particular that we arrive at moral worth and salvation through obedience to the law that comes from God. Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will. Translated by Thomas Williams. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993. Abelard, Ethical writings: his Ethics or ‘Know yourself’ and his Dialogue between a philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian. Translated by Paul Vincent Spade. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995. Aquinas, On law, Morality, and Politics. Edited by William P. Baumgarth and Richard J. Regan. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988. Aquinas, Treatise on the Virtues. Translated by John A. Oesterle. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984. Aquinas, The Treatise of Law, 1a, 2a, Questions 94-97. Duns Scotus, Scotus on Will and Morality. Selected and translated with an introduction by Allan B. Wolter Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 1986.

Commentaries On Augustine Rist, J. M. 1994. Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.5.

On Abelard: Marilyn McCord Adams introduction to Hackett edition of Abelard, Ethics.

On Aquinas McInerny, Ralph, M. 1982. Ethica Thomistica: the Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Washington, DC.: Catholic University of America Press. Westberg, D. 1994. Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

On Ockham Adams, M. M. 1995. ‘Ockham’s Moral Theory’. In James F. Keenan, and Thomas A. Shannon, eds., The Context of Casuistry. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. Spade, P. V. 1999. The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See the essays by M. M. Adams, P. King and A. S. McGrade.

On Scotus Scotus, Duns. ca. 1266-1308. On the Will and Morality. Selected and translated with an introduction by Allan B. Wolter Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 1986. See Wolter’s introduction.

Other Themes Kent, B. 1995. The Virtues of the Will: the Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century. Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press. Pink, T ‘Suarez, Hobbes and the scholastic tradition in action theory’. In Theories of the Will and Action, eds. T. Pink and M. Stone. London: Routledge, 2001.

C. MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY Modern moral philosophy has gradually detached ethical thought from specifically religious traditions, giving increasing attention to the role played in ethical life of

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rationality or, by reaction to this, human sentiments. In this period we see formed, though not always very clearly, the outlines of many of the general positions examined by contemporary moral philosophers, such as: in Hobbes, an ethics developed out of rational self-interest; in the Utilitarian movement, consequentialism; in Hume, non-cognitivism concerning moral judgement; and in Kant, a reason-based nonconsequentialist ethics. Despite the continuities in these traditions, it is important to realise, nevertheless, that many of these philosophers had interests very different from those of their self-proclaimed modern disciples. Collections Raphael, D. D. ed. 1969. The British Moralists from Hobbes to Bentham. 2 Vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Schneewind, J. B. ed. 1990. Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant: an Anthology. 2 Vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

General Commentaries Darwall, S. 1995. The British Moralists and the Internal “Ought”: 1640-1740. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, C. 1989. Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory. London: Duckworth. Haakonssen, K. 1996. Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: from Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

i. Thomas Hobbes Leviathan. See the Curley edition; or the Tuck edition: Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan: with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668. Edited, with introduction and notes by Edwin Curley. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994 Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Edited by Richard Tuck. Rev. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Hobbes, Thomas. Of Liberty and Necessity. L. Pt.1, Chs.5-16, reprinted in D. D. Raphael, ed., The British Moralists from Hobbes to Bentham. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969. Vol.1.

Commentaries Tuck, R. 1989. Hobbes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kavka, G. S. 1986. Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Oakeshott, M. 1962. ‘Introduction to Hobbes’s Leviathan’. In Rationalism in Politics and other essays. London: Methuen. Sorrel, T. ed. 1996. The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pink, T. 1996. The Psychology of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 2 & 3.

ii. David Hume A Treatise of Human Nature, edited, with an analytical index, by L. A. Selby-Bigge. 2nd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. Bk.3 (plus Bk.2). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, edited, with an analytical index by L. A. Selby-Bigge 3rd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

Commentaries Norton, D. F. 1993. ‘Hume, Human Nature and the Foundations of Morality’. In D. F. Norton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ethics 49 Baier, A. 1991. The Progress of the Sentiments: Reflections on Hume’s Treatise. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Mackie, J. L. 1980. Hume’s Moral Theory. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Livingston, D. 1984. Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Baillie, J. 2000. Hume on Morality. London: Routledge.

iii. Immanuel Kant Critique of Practical Reason, and other Writings in Moral Philosophy. Translated and edited with an introduction by Lewis White Beck. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949. Critique of Practical Reason. Translated and edited by Mary Gregor; with an introduction by Andrews Reath Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. In L. W. Beck, ed., and trans., Critique of Practical Reason, and other Writings in Moral Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949. The Metaphysics of Morals. Translated and edited by Mary Gregor, with an introduction by Roger J. Sullivan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. All three can also to be found in: Practical philosophy. Translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, with a general introduction by Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Lectures on Ethics. Edited by Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind; translated by Peter Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. In Allen Wood and George diGiovanni, eds., Religion & Rational Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Commentaries Guyer, P. ed. 1992. The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Korsgaard, C. 1996. Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Herman, B. 1993. The Practice of Moral Judgement. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univsrsity Press. Allison, H. 1990. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. O’Neill, O. 1989. The Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Beck, L. W. 1960. A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

iv. J. S. Mill & J. Bentham Mill, J. S., and Jeremy Bentham. Utilitarianism & Other Essays. Edited by Alan Ryan. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987.

Commentaries Harrison, R. 1983. Bentham. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Skorupski, J. 1989. Mill. London: Routledge. Berger, F. 1984. Happiness, Justice and Freedom: the Moral and Political Philosophy of John Stuart Mill. Berkeley: University of California Press. Lyons, D. 1994. Rights, Welfare and Mill’s Moral Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Crisp, R. 1997. Mill on Utilitarianism. London: Routledge.

v. Late Nineteenth & Early Twentieth Century Ethics In these writers we see the development of a recognisably academic form of ethics—Sidgwick and Moore were both professors in Cambridge, Bradley was a life fellow at Merton College, Oxford, Ross professor in Oxford. Like us, they had an interest in the existence of competing ethical theories, and consequently in the relation between ethical theory and everyday ethical thinking. Sidgwick, H. 1922. The Methods of Ethics. London: Macmillan. Bradley, F. H. 1927. Ethical Studies. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Moore, G. E. 1903. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ross, W. D. 1930. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Commentaries Schneewind, J. B. 1977. Sidgwick’s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Nicholson, P. 1990. The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists: Selected Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.1. Baldwin, T. 1990. G. E. Moore. London: Routledge.

vi. Recent Approaches to Ethics—Overviews Various authors have been inspired, often in a critical frame of mind, to attempt to frame an historical overview of recent developments within ethics. Hampshire, S. 1949. ‘Fallacies in Moral Philosophy’. Mind 58: 466-482. Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958. ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’. Philosophy 33: 1-19. Reprinted in From Parmenides to Wittgenstein: Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol.1. Oxford: Blackwell, 1981. Darwall, Stephen, Allan Gibbard and Peter Railton. 1992. ‘Toward Fin de Siècle Ethics: Some Trends’. Philosophical Review 101: 115-189. MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory. London: Duckworth. Williams, B. A. O. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana.

4 Contemporary Problems A. CENTRAL THEMES i. Egoism & Altruism Can ethical action be justified in terms of the rational pursuit of one’s own interests, and does it need to be? Do we have special reason to be concerned with our own interests as opposed to those of others? Plato, Republic, Bk.II. Hume, D. Treatise concerning Human Nature. Bk.III, Pt.2. ——. An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Sec. 3, Appendices 2 & 3. Williams, B. A. O. 1973. ‘Egoism & Altruism’. In Problems of Self: Philosophical Papers 19561972. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Further Reading Nagel, T. 1970. The Possibility of Altruism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pt.II. Gauthier, D. 1967. ‘Morality & Advantage’. Philosophical Review 76: 460-475. Reprinted in J. Raz, ed., Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. Griffin, J. 1986. Well-Being: its Meaning, Measurement and Moral. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.8. Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.1, secs.1-9, 20; Ch.2, secs. 32-5. Paul, E. F., Fred Miller Jr., and Jeffrey Paul. eds. 1993. Altruism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

ii. The Golden Rule ‘Do unto others only what you would have them do unto you.’ In this form the principle is closely associated with Christian ethics, although equivalent formulations of the principle can be found in Confucius. What does this principle really involve? Can it be used to provide a rational basis for ethics? Essential Reading Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. In L. W. Beck, ed., and trans., Critique of Practical Reason, and other Writings in Moral Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949. Also to be found in Practical philosophy. Translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, with a general introduction by Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Ethics 51 Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right & Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Ch.4. Wiggins, D. 1987. ‘Universalizability, Impartiality, Truth’. In Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (3rd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.) ——. 1987. ‘Truth as Predicated of Moral Judgements’. In Needs, Values, Truth.

Further Reading Kolnai, A. 1970. ‘Moral Consensus’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70: 93-120 Reprinted in Ethics, Value & Reality: Selected Papers of Aurel Kolnai. London: Athlone Press, 1977. Winch, P. 1965. ‘The Universalizability of Moral Judgements’. Monist 49: 196-214. Reprinted in Ethics and Action. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972. Korsgaard, C. 1993. ‘The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values’. Social Philosophy and Policy 10: 24-51. Reprinted in Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. ——. 1985. ‘Kant’s Formula of Universal Law’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66: 24-47. Reprinted in Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Hare, R. 1981. Moral Thinking: its Levels, Method, and Point. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.4. Gibbard, A. 1988. ‘Hare’s Analysis of Ought and its Implications’. In D. Seanor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics.

iii. Theories of Normativity & Impartiality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. It is often claimed that morality involves impartiality. There are two main competing conceptions of impartiality. One says that impartiality involves showing all persons the same respect, treating them, in some sense, as ends in themselves. The other tradition says that impartiality involves maximising good—whether conceived of as happiness or in other terms—over a whole population, the happiness of each person to count equally with the happiness of any other. Respect & Dignity Essential Reading Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, in L. W. Beck, ed., and trans., Critique of Practical Reason, and other writings in moral philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949. Also to be found in Practical philosophy. Translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, with a general introduction by Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Scanlon, T. 1982. ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’. In A. Sen and B. Williams, eds., Utilitarianism & Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hill, T. 1973. ‘Servility & Self-Respect’. Monist 57: 87-104. Reprinted in Autonomy & SelfRespect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Further Reading Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Kamm, F. M. 1993. Morality, Mortality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Volume 2, part 3. Darwall, S. L. 1983. Impartial Reason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Railton, P. 1984. ‘Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 13: 134-171. Reprinted in S. Scheffler, ed., Consequentialism and its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Korsgaard, C. 1992. ‘Creating the Kingdom of Ends’. Reprinted in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Maximisation & the Good Mill, J. S. Utilitarianism, Chs.4 & 5. Sidgwick, H. 1922. The Methods of Ethics. London: Macmillan. Bk.IV. Williams, B. and J. J. C. Smart. 1973. Utilitarianism: For & Against. Cambridge University Press.

52 Study Guide Foot, P. 1985. ‘Utilitarianism & the Virtues’. Mind 94: 196-209. Reprinted in S. Scheffler, ed., Consequentialism & its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Sen, A., and B. Williams. eds. 1982. Utilitarianism & Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Introduction. Scheffler, S. ed. 1988. Consequentialism and its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Act vs. Rule If impartiality does involve maximising good, how do we maximise it? In the performance of particular actions, as act-utilitarians recommend? Or, as ruleutilitarians claim, in the moral rules or principles that we adopt or seek to follow? Glover, J. ed. 1990. Utilitarianism & its Critics. London: Collier Macmillan. Williams, B. and J. J. C. Smart. 1973. Utilitarianism: For & Against. Cambridge University Press. See the section by Smart. Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Ch.6, secs.1-4. Rawls, J. 1955. ‘Two Concepts of Rules’. Philosophical Review 64: 3-32. Reprinted in P. Foot, ed., Theories of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Integrity & the Demands of Morality The demand to maximise good, or similarly impersonal moral demands can conflict with the projects and principles and feelings to which individuals are deeply committed. What are the implications of such conflict? Williams, B. and J. J. C. Smart. 1973. Utilitarianism: For & Against. Cambridge University Press. See the section by Williams. Williams, B. A. O. 1981. ‘Persons, Character and Morality’. In Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williams, B. A. O. 1995. ‘Moral Incapacity’. In his The Making Sense of Humanity: and other Philosophical Papers 1982-1993. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Scheffler, S. 1982. The Rejection of Consequentialism: a Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kagan, S. 1989. The Limits of Morality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Wolf, S. 1997. ‘Meaning & Morality’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 299-315.

iv. Theories of the Good The nature of goodness is a central concern in most ethical theories, but such theories differ both in what they conceive goodness to be, and how they take goodness to be related to notions such as duty and right. Is goodness to be explained prior to the notions of duty and virtue, and then to be used in their explanation; or is its explanation to be derived from an account of them? Is goodness an irreducible and ‘nonnatural’ property; or is it to be identified with properties naturally possessed by good things? Can we explain goodness by reference to the desires of people? Is there an irreducible variety of kinds of good, or is there only one kind of good? Essential Reading Kant, Foundations of Morals. Mill, J. S. Utilitarianism, Chs.1 & 2. Moore, G. E. 1903. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Korsgaard, C. 1983. ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness’. Philosophical Review 2: 169-196. Reprinted in Creating the Kingdom Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Geach, P. 1956. ‘Good and Evil’. Analysis 17: 33-42. Reprinted in P. Foot, ed., Theories of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967. Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Appendix: ‘What Makes Life go Best?’

Further Reading Griffin, J. 1986. Well-Being: its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Ethics 53 Paul, E. F., F. Miller Jr., and J. Paul, eds. 1992. The Good Life and the Human Good. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Annas, J. 1993. The Morality of Happiness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.2. Williams, B. A. O. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana. Ch.4. Finnis, J. 1980. Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.2. Scanlon, T. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Chapters 1-3.

v. Morality & Truth Is morality a matter of belief or feeling? If it is a matter of belief, are there moral properties in the world entirely independent of our sentiments; or do values depend on the feelings and responses of particular individuals or groups. Subjectivists claim that there is such a dependency, while moral objectivists deny this. How does this issue connect with questions about the nature and function of moral judgement and moral language? Cognitivists claim that such judgements are apt for assessment as true or false, non-cognitivists deny this. Ethical nihilists or ‘error theorists’ are cognitivists who claim that because there are no moral properties, all moral claims are false. Some theorists maintain cognitivism by endorsing only a minimal conception of truth or truth-aptness. (For further reading about issues concerning truth and realism in general see the relevant sections under Logic & Metaphysics.) Sentiment, Subjectivity & Objectivity Essential Reading D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals. ——, ‘On the Standard of Taste’, in Essays: Moral, Political and Literary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963. This collection originally published 1903. Ayer, A. J. 1946. Language, Truth & Logic. London: Gollancz. Ch.6. Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Ch.1. Harman, G. 1977. The Nature of Morality: an Introduction to Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. Ch.1. Sayer-McCord, G. ed. 1988. Essays on Moral Realism. New York: Cornell University Press.

Further Reading Wiggins, D. 1996. ‘Objectivism & Subjectivism’. In B. Hooker, ed., Truth in Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996 ——. 1987. ‘Towards a Sensible Subjectivism’. In Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (3rd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.) Gibbard, A. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: a Theory of Normative Judgment. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.2. Blackburn, S. 1993. Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Moral Judgement and Fact Essential Reading Hooker, B. ed. 1996. Truth in Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. Sayer-McCord, G. ed. 1988. Essays on Moral Realism. New York: Cornell University Press. Geach, P. 1965. ‘Assertion’. Philosophical Review 74: 449-465. Reprinted in Logic Matters. Oxford: Blackwell, 1972. Blackburn, S. 1993. ‘Moral Realism’. In his Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Foot, P. 1978. ‘Moral Beliefs’, in her Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Price, A. 1982-3. ‘Varieties of Objectivity and Values’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 83: 103-120.

Further Reading Wiggins, D. 1987. Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value. Oxford: Basil

54 Study Guide Blackwell. (3rd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.). Gibbard, A. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: a Theory of Normative Judgment. Oxford: Clarendon Press. See esp. Pt.III. Brink, D. O. 1989. Moral Realism & the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McDowell, J. 1979. ‘Virtue and Reason’. The Monist 62: 331-350. Reprinted in Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998. Williams, B. A. O. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana. Ch.8. Wright, C. 1992. Truth & Objectivity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Smith, M. 1994. The Moral Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

B. FURTHER THEMES i. Authority & Excellence Moral Law & Duty How far does morality involve obeying laws and fulfilling duties? And what is the source of these laws and duties? Essential Reading Kant, I. The Metaphysics of Morals, Pt. II, The Doctrine of Virtue. Wiggins, D. 1991. ‘Categorical Requirements: Kant and Hume on the Idea of Duty’. The Monist 83-106. Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958. ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’. Philosophy 33: 1-19. Reprinted in From Parmenides to Wittgenstein: Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol.1. Oxford: Blackwell, 1981.

Further Reading Wolf, S. 1982. ‘Moral Saints’. Journal of Philosophy 79: 419-439. MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory. London: Duckworth. Williams, B. A. O. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana. Ch.10.

Virtue & Well-Being Is the point of a worthwhile life that the individual achieves virtue or moral goodness? Essential Reading Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bks.8 & 9. Hume, D. An Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals. Appendix 4. Hutchinson, D. 1986. The Virtues of Aristotle. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Chs.1 & 2. Crisp, R., and M. Slote. eds. 1997. Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Foot, P. 1978. ‘Virtues and Vices’. In Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Further Reading Crisp, R. ed. 1996. How Should One Live?: Essays on the Virtues. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Slote, M. 1992. From Morality to Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press. MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory. London: Duckworth. McDowell, J. 1979. ‘Virtue and Reason’. The Monist 62: 331-350. Reprinted in Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998. Griffin, J. 1986. Well-Being: its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pt.I. Hurka, T. 1993. Perfectionism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

ii. Action & Accountability Moral Responsibility Does participating in ethical life involve a special moral responsibility for one’s actions and if it does what does this responsibility come to: does it involve a capacity for rationality; for self-determination; or an independence from external determination? Essential Reading Nagel, T. 1976. ‘Moral Luck’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50: 137-152. Reprinted in Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Ethics 55 Williams, B. A. O. 1976. ‘Moral Luck’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50: 115-136. Reprinted in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Strawson, P. F. 1962. ‘Freedom and Resentment’. Proceedings of the British Academy 48. Reprinted in Freedom and Resentement and Other Essays. London: Methuen, 1974; and in G. Watson, ed., Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. Frankfurt, H. 1969. ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’. Journal of Philosophy 66: 829-839. Reprinted in The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Further Reading Fischer, J. M. ed. 1986. Moral Responsibility. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Statman, D. ed. 1993. Moral Luck. Albany: State University of New York Press. Adams, R. M. 1985. ‘Involuntary Sins’. Philosophical Review 94: 3-31. Wallace, R. J. 1994. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Schoemann, F. ed. 1987. Responsibility, Character and Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Act, Motive & Consequence Does the rightness of an action depend solely on its consequences, or on the way those consequences are produced: whether by doing or allowing (killing or letting die); whether as intended or as merely foreseen? Essential Reading Bennett, J. 1966. ‘Whatever the Consequences’. Analysis 26: 83-102; reprinted in James Rachels, ed., Moral Problems: a Collection of Philosophical Essays. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. Foot, P. 1978. ‘The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect’. In Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Quinn, W. 1989. ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: the Doctrine of Double Effect’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18: 334-351; reprinted in Morality and Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. ——. 1989. ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing’. Philosophical Review 98: 287-312; reprinted in Morality and Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Further Reading Kagan, S. 1989. The Limits of Morality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pt.II. Kamm, F. 1993. Morality, Mortality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vol.II, Chs.1-5. Bratman, M. 1987. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Last chapter. Kenny, A. 1995. ‘Philippa Foot on Double Effect’. In R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, and W. Quinn, eds., Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bennett, J. 1995. The Act Itself. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Thomson, J. J. 1996. ‘The Trolley Problem’. In Rights, Restitution and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory, edited by William Parent. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Scanlon, T. 2000. ‘Intention and Permissibility.’ Supplement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, 74: 301-317

iii. Deliberation & Decision Reason, Desire & Decision How, if at all, does reason govern our actions? Are there rational justifications for performing one action rather than another? And, if so, where do these justifications come from? Do they depend on our desires and motivations, or are they quite independent of what we might happen to want? What form does deliberation about how to act take? Is it merely concerned with means or also with ends? Essential Reading

56 Study Guide Nagel, T. 1970. The Possibility of Altruism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Williams, B. A. O. 1981. ‘Practical Necessity’. Reprinted in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——. 1981. ‘Internal and External Reasons’. Reprinted in Moral Luck. ——. 1981. ‘Ought and Moral Obligation’. Reprinted in Moral Luck. Wiggins, D. 1987. ‘Deliberation and Practical Reason’. In Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (3rd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.)

Further Reading Dancy, J. 1993. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell. Millgram, E. 1997. Practical Induction. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Smith, M. 1994. The Moral Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kolnai, A. 1962. ‘Deliberation is of Ends’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62: 195-218; reprinted in Ethics, Value & Reality: Selected Papers of Aurel Kolnai. London: Athlone Press, 1977. McDowell, J. 1979. ‘Virtue and Reason’. The Monist 62: 331-350. Reprinted in Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998. Richardson, H. S. 1995. Practical Reasoning About Final Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Moral Dilemmas Can there be situations in which one must act, but whichever way in which one acts, one acts wrongly? If so, what is the significance of this—e.g. for the nature of good or for moral truth? Gowans, C. W. ed. 1995. Moral Dilemmas. New York: Oxford Uiversity Press. Papers by Ross, Williams, Foot, Marcus, Donagan, and Nagel. Mason, H. E. ed. 1996. Moral Dilemmas & Moral Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gowans, C. W. 1994. Innocence Lost: an Examination of Inescapable Moral Wrongdoing. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hurley, S. L. 1989. Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.7.

Weakness of Will Can our capacity to apply reason in action go wrong because of internal weakness affecting either a.) our capacity to act as we think we ought (in which case we deliberately perform an action despite thinking that we shouldn’t) or b.) our capacity to stick to our decisions and carry them out over time (in which case our own desires lead us to abandon deliberately a decision for no good reason). Essential Reading Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk.7. Davidson, D. 1980. ‘How is Weakness of the Will Possible?’. Reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Elster, J. 1979. Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.2.

Further Reading Wiggins, D. 1987. ‘Weakness, Commensurability and Desire’. In Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (3rd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.) Hare, R. 1963 Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pt.1, Ch.5. Hurley, S. L. 1989. Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.8. Schelling, T. C. 1984. Choice and Consequence. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

iv. Standards and Agreement in Values There are moral conflicts about what is valuable and what ought to be done which appear to be irresoluble. These conflicts can occur between whole societies and between individuals within a given society (indeed, even within a single individual, see ‘Moral Dilemmas’). Are such conflicts really irresoluble, and if so what explains this? Moral relativists claim that moral judgements are relative to an individual or society.

Ethics 57

Note that there are different ways of developing the idea of relativism, both the manner in which judgements may be relative and to what they relate. Value pluralists explain the conflict in terms of there being a variety of incommensurable and conflicting goods that societies or individuals can respond or aspire to. Moral Relativism Essential Reading Williams, B. A. O. 1972. Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter on ‘Relativism’. Meiland, Jack W. and M. Krausz, eds. 1982. Relativism: Cognitive and Moral. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Harman, G. 1977. The Nature of Morality: an Introduction to Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. Chs.8 & 9.

Further Reading Williams, B. A. O. 1981. ‘The Truth in Relativism’. Reprinted in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana. Ch.9. Harman, G. 1975. ‘Moral Relativism Defended’. Philosophical Review 84: 3-22. Gibbard, A. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: a Theory of Normative Judgment. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pt.III, Ch.13.

Plurality of Values Essential Reading Berlin, I. 1969. Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Introduction. Nagel, T. 1979. ‘Fragmentation of Value’. Reprinted in Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stocker, M. 1990. Plural & Conflicting Values. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs.3-7. Further Reading Williams, B. A. O. 1981. ‘Conflicts of Value’. Reprinted in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Finnis, J. 1980. Natural Law, Natural Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pt.1. Nussbaum, M. 1986. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pt.3.

Incommensurability Raz, J. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs.7 & 8. Griffin, J. 1986. Well-Being: its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.5. Williams, B. A. O. 1981. ‘Conflicts of Value’. Reprinted in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chang, R. ed. 1997. Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reasoning. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

C. PRACTICAL ETHICS Anthologies Singer, P. ed. 1986. Applied Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Winkler, E., and J. R. Coombs, eds. 1983. Applied Ethics: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell.

i. Killing and Letting Die Does the rightness of an action ever depend on whether it counts as a doing or as an allowing? What bearing does this question have on the permissibility of various kinds of euthanasia? Essential Reading Kant, Immanuel. Lectures on Ethics. Edited by Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind; translated by Peter Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Lecture on duties

58 Study Guide towards the body in regard to life. Foot, P. 1978. ‘The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect’. In Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Bennett, J. 1966. ‘Whatever the Consequences’. Analysis 26: 83-102; reprinted in James Rachels, ed., Moral Problems: a Collection of Philosophical Essays. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. Quinn, W. 1989. ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: the Doctrine of Double Effect’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18: 334-351; reprinted in Morality and Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Further Reading Uniacke, S. 1994. Permissible Killing: the Self-defence Justification of Homicide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McMahan, J. 1993. ‘Killing, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid’. Ethics 103: 250-279. Steinbock, B. ed. 1980. Killing and Letting Die. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

ii. The Sacredness of Life How in general should we conceive of the debate about the rights and wrongs of abortion? Does the issue depend on the moral status of the foetus, and how is that status to be determined? What role do the rights and interests of the woman bearing the foetus have in settling this issue? Essential Reading Thomson, J. J. 1971. ‘A Defense of Abortion’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1: 47-66; reprinted in P. Singer, ed., Applied Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. Feinberg, J. ed. 1973. The Problem of Abortion. 2nd ed. Wadsworth: Belmont. Finnis, J. 1973. ‘The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to J. J. Thomson’. Philosophy & Public Affairs 2: 117-145.

Further Reading Kamm, F. M. 1992. Creation and Abortion: a Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dworkin, R. 1993. Life’s Dominion: an Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia. London: Harper Collins. Sumner, L. W. 1981. Abortion and Moral Theory. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

iii. Humans and Other Animals Do we have duty of care towards other animals? Do non-human animals have rights? Do humans have a special moral status simply as humans? Singer, P. 1976. Animal Liberation. London: Cape. Regan, T. 1983. The Case for Animal Rights. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Carruthers, P. 1992. The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

iv. Environmental Ethics What responsibility do we have to care for the environment? Does the environment have a value independent of human interests and concerns? Essential Reading Elliot, R. ed. 1995. Environmental Ethics. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press. Winkler, E., and J. R. Coombs, eds. 1983. Applied Ethics: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. Section on Environmental Ethics.

Further Reading Taylor, P. W. 1986. Respect for Nature: a Theory of Environmental Ethics. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Attfield, R. 1991. The Ethics of Environmental Concern. Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press. Johnson, L. E. 1991. A Morally Deep World: an Essay on Moral Significance and Environmental Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

5

Political Philosophy

1 The Paper Political philosophy is the study of how we can and how we ought to live together. Throughout the history of Western philosophy, those figures whose thought has engaged with ethical problems have been equally concerned with political philosophy and vice versa. Just as the form of ethical theories have varied greatly over the last 2,000 years, so too the forms that questions and answers within political philosophy have varied. Hence it is very important to address the problems of political philosophy within an historical framework and an ethical framework. Amongst the problems considered throughout history have been: the question of the nature and claims of justice; the existence of natural rights; the status of positive law; the existence of distinctive obligations towards the state or towards each other as co-members of some society; claims of property; claims of liberty; the best understanding of equality and its claim on us. In Ancient political philosophy we can find concern with the nature of justice and the well-ordered state. In the Early Modern discussion, the authority of the state and questions of right loom large. From this tradition we derive the heuristic use of the state of nature: Hobbes uses this to ask how we can be rationally compelled to obey the sovereign, and to offer an answer; in Locke we can find an influential discussion of property rights and the origin of political obligation; Rousseau, much more radically seeks to explain how we can rationally be bound by law through the concept of the general will. In different ways Hegel and Marx offer critiques of the Enlightenment conception of the citizen and state. In Mill, we can find the radical utilitarianism of the early nineteenth century modulated into a delicate plea for liberty. In Anglo-American political philosophy over the last thirty years, the work of the Harvard philosopher John Rawls has been central in defining the scope and focus of debate, though of great importance too are the ideas of Isaiah Berlin, G.A. Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, Robert Nozick, Joseph Raz and TM Scanlon.

2 History A. GENERAL COMMENTARIES Three good general commentaries for the history side are Plamenatz, John. 1962. Man and Society: Political and Social theories from Machiavelli to Marx. 3 Vols. New ed London: Longman, 1992. Hampsher-Monk, Iain. 1992. A History of Modern Political Thought: Major Political Thinkers from Hobbes to Marx. Oxford: Blackwell. Rosen, Michael, and Jonathan Wolff, eds. 1999. Political Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Contains many relevant extracts.

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B. MAIN HISTORICAL TEXTS i. Plato Republic. Crito.

On which see Pappas, N. 1995. Plato and the Republic. London: Routledge. Annas, J. 1981. An Introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs.4 and 7. Klosko, G. 1986. The Development of Plato’s Political Theory. London: Methuen. Woozley, A. D. 1979. Law and Obedience: The Arguments of Plato’s ‘Crito’. London: Duckworth.

ii. Aristotle Politics.

On which see Lloyd, G. E. R. 1968. Aristotle, The Growth and Structure of his Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.11. Mulgan, R. G. 1977. Aristotle’s Political Theory: an Introduction for Students of Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

iii. Hobbes Leviathan.

On which see Gauthier, David P. 1969. The Logic of Leviathan: the Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Tuck, R. 1989. Hobbes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hampton, J. 1986. Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kavka, Gregory S. 1986. Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

iv. Locke Two Treatises on Government.

On which see Lloyd Thomas, D. A. 1995. Locke on Government. London: Routledge. Ashcraft, R. 1987. Locke’s Two Treatises of Government. London: Allen & Unwin. Simmons, A. John. 1980. Moral Principles and Political Obligations. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Chs. 3-4. ——. 1992. The Lockean Theory of Rights. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. ——. 1993. On the Edge of Anarchy: Locke, Consent, and the Limits of Society. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Cohen, G. A. 1995. ‘Marx and Locke on Land & Labour’. In Self-Ownership, Freedom & Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

v. Rousseau The Social Contract. Discourse on Inequality.

On which see Cassirer, E. 1987. The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Edited and translated by Peter Gay. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989. Charvet, J. 1974. The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jones, W. T. 1987. ‘Rousseau’s General Will and the Problem of Consent’. Journal of the History of Philosophy 25: 105-130. Dent, N. 1988. Rousseau: Introduction to his Psychological, Social, and Political Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. Kateb, G. 1976. ‘Aspects of Rousseau’s Political Thought’. Political Science Quarterly.

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vi. Hegel Philosophy of Right.

On which see Taylor, C. 1979. Hegel and Modern Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Waldron, J. 1988. The Right to Private Property. Oxford: Clarendon. Ch.10. Wood, Allen W. 1990. Hegel’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

vii. Marx Selected Writings, Karl Marx. Edited by David McLellan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

On which see Cohen, G. A. 1988. History, Labour and Freedom: themes from Marx. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.1. McLellan, D. 1970. Marx before Marxism. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan, 1980. Kolakowski, L. 1978. Main Currents of Marxism: its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution. Translated by P. S. Falla. 3 Vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Vol.1. Wood, Allen W. 1980. ‘The Marxian Critique of Justice’. In M. Cohen, T. Nagel, and T. Scanlon, eds., Marx, Justice and History. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

For further details see the entry for Marxism.

viii. Mill On Liberty.

On which see Ten, C. L. 1980. Mill On Liberty. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Gray, John. 1983. Mill On Liberty: A Defence. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 1996. Gray, J., and G. W. Smith. eds. 1991. J. S. Mill on Liberty: In Focus. London: Routledge. Dworkin, Gerald. ed. 1997. Mill’s On Liberty: Critical Essays. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Wolff, Jonathan. 1998. ‘Mill, Indecency & the Liberty Principle’. Utilitas 10: 1-16.

C. FURTHER HISTORICAL TEXTS Sometimes questions are asked on Kant, I. Political Writings. Edited by Hans Reiss. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Machiavelli, The Discourses. Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, and Theory of Moral Sentiments. Hume, Treatise, Book III.

It is not worth revising these thinkers unless there have been recent lectures on them, but they are often suitable subjects for pre-submissions.

3 Contemporary Problems A. GENERAL TEXTS Excellent general texts of relevance to this side of the paper are Kymlicka, W. 1990. Contemporary Political Philosophy: an Introduction. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Plant, R. 1991. Modern Political Thought. Oxford: Blackwell. Miller, D. 1976. Social Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Goodin, R. E., and P. Pettit. eds. 1993. A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell. Wolff, J. 1996. An Introduction to Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Relates contemporary problems in political philosophy to the works of some of the great political philosophers of the past.

62 STUDY GUIDE Goodin, R. E., and P. Pettit. eds. 1997. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. Contains many important and interesting recent papers. Hampton, J. 1997. Political Philosophy. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Rosen, Michael, and Jonathan Wolff, eds. 1999. Political Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Contains many relevant extracts.

B. JOURNALS Two journals which include much top quality recent work in political philosophy are Philosophy and Public Affairs, and Ethics. These will be particularly useful as reference points for those preparing pre-submissions or a dissertation. Political Studies, Political Theory, The Journal of Political Philosophy, and Social Philosophy and Policy also publish important work in this area.

C. SPECIFIC TOPICS i. Rawls Without doubt Rawls is the most important contemporary political philosopher. Central topics include the arguments for his two principles of justice; the acceptability of those principles; the idea of a ‘hypothetical contract’; the libertarian (see Nozick) and communitarian (see below) critiques of Rawls; the new doctrine of Political Liberalism; and the relation between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Rawls. Rawls, J. 1972. A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. ——. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. ——. 1999. Collected Papers. S. Freeman, ed. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Daniels, N. ed. 1975. Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’. Oxford: Blackwell. Mulhall, S. and A. Swift. 1996. Liberals and Communitarians. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell. Chs. 1, 5-7.

ii. Nozick Nozick presents a ‘libertarian’ political philosophy, based on what he calls the ‘Entitlement Theory of Justice’. How well does Nozick defend this view, and in particular can he justify initial acquisition of property? A related question concerns his use of the ‘Wilt Chamberlain example’ to attempt to establish the claim that ‘liberty upsets patterns’. By this argument Nozick claims to have refuted almost all competing theories of justice. A further topic concerns his success in defending the minimal state against the claims of the anarchist. Nozick, R. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell. Paul, J. ed. 1981. Reading Nozick: Essays on Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Totowa, N. J.: Rowman & Littlefield. Wolff, J. 1991. Robert Nozick: Property, Justice and the Minimal State. Cambridge: Polity Press. Cohen, G. A. 1995. Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Esp. Chs. 1-4. Otsuka, M. 1998. ‘Self-Ownership and Equality’. Philosophy & Public Affairs 27: 65-92.

iii. Justice How is the concept of justice best understood? Does justice require impartiality, mutual advantage, fair compromise, or something else again? Scanlon, T. 1982. ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’. In Utilitarianism and Beyond, edited by Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 63 Barry, B. 1995. Justice as Impartiality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Gibbard, A. 1991. ‘Constructing Justice’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 20: 264-279.

iv. Democracy What is democracy, and why is it so revered in the modern world? Can democracy be justified in terms of its consequences, or does it have intrinsic value? These are the primary philosophical questions concerning democracy. Christiano, T. 1996. The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory. Boulder, Colo.: Westview. Harrison, R. 1993. Democracy. London: Routledge. Dahl, Robert. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press. Wollheim, R. 1967. ‘A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy’. In Politics, Philosophy and Society, 3rd Series, edited by Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman. Oxford: Blackwell. Barry, B. 1991. ‘Is Democracy Special?’. In Democracy and Power: Essays in Political Theory, 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Wolff, J. 1994. ‘Democratic Voting and the Mixed-Motivation Problem’. Analysis 54: 193-196 Elster, J. 1987. ‘The Market and the Forum’. In Deliberative Democracy, edited by James Bohman. Cambridge MIT Press. Reprinted in R. E. Goodin, and P. Pettit. eds., Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. Dworkin, R. 1996. Freedom’s Law: the Moral Reading of the American Constitution. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. ‘Introduction’ Jones, Peter. 1983. ‘Political Equality and Majority Rule’. In D. Miller, and L. Siedentop, eds., The Nature of Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon.

v. Equality, Priority and Sufficiency It has been claimed that all political philosophies appeal to the idea of equality in one respect or other. Egalitarianism, however, is the view that the just society is the society in which, in some sense or other, all enjoy equality of condition. But can a coherent and plausible notion of equality of condition be defined? And are there arguments for preferring egalitarianism to other theories of justice? (See also Rawls, Nozick.) Kymlicka, W. 1990. Contemporary Political Philosophy: an Introduction. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Rees, J. 1971. Equality. London: Pall Mall Press. Williams, B. A. O. 1962. ‘The Idea of Equality’. Reprinted in Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers, 1956-1972. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Reprinted in R. E. Goodin, and P. Pettit. eds., Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. Nagel, T. 1979. ‘Equality’. In his Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dworkin, R. 1981. ‘What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare’, and ‘What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 10: 185-246 and 283-345. Reprinted in Sovereign Virtue: the Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000. Baker, J. 1987. Arguing for Equality. London: Verso. Cohen, G. A. 1989. ‘On The Currency of Egalitarian Justice’. Ethics 99: 906-944. Frankfurt, H. 1987. ‘Equality as a Moral Idea’. Ethics 98: 21-43. Reprinted in his The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Parfit, D. 1998. ‘Equality and Priority’. In A. Mason, ed., Ideals of Equality. Oxford: Blackwell.

vi. Liberalism, toleration and neutrality Liberals claim that the state should be neutral between competing conceptions of the good. Is this achievable or desirable? Does it pre-suppose moral scepticism?

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To what extent do contemporary societies achieve this aim? If the law should not enforce popular morality then what should it do? (See also Rawls, Nozick, Liberty, Communitarianism.) Dworkin, R. 1985. ‘Liberalism’. In A Matter of Principle. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Devlin, P. 1965. The Enforcement of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hart, H. L. A. 1963. Law, Liberty, and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Waldron, J. 1986. ‘Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism’. Philosophical Quarterly 37: 127150. Reprinted with other relevant papers in Liberal Rights: Collected Papers, 1981-1991. Cambridge: Cambridge Universtiy Press, 1993. Mendus, S. 1989. Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

vii. Liberty Berlin argues that there are two concepts of liberty: positive and negative. Is there a genuine distinction? Is one concept more ‘authentic’ than the other? What is the relation between liberty and other values? Berlin, I. 1969. ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’. In Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Political Philosophy, ed., Anthony Quinton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. MacCallum, C. G. 1967. ‘Negative and Positive Freedom’. Philosophical Review 76: 312-334. Taylor, C. 1985. ‘What’s Wrong With Negative Liberty’. Reprinted in Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Philosophical Papers 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (These are all reprinted, with other useful readings, in David Miller, ed., Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) Geuss, R. 1995. ‘Freedom as an Ideal’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 69: 87-100. Cohen, G. A. 1995. Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 53-59, (also in Rosen and Wolff).

viii. Property By what procedures, if any, can individuals legitimately come to own private property? The starting point for this topic is Locke’s discussion of property, in his Second Treatise, Ch. 5. (See also Nozick.) Becker, Lawrence C. 1977. Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Waldron, J. 1988. The Right to Private Property. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Carter, A. 1988. The Philosophical Foundations of Property Rights. London: Harvester, Wheatsheaf.

ix.The Free Market Arguments for the free market are often made in terms of liberty (see Nozick) and efficiency. But arguments for limiting the market have also been mounted on these terms, and also on the basis of equality and justice. Can we conceive of society without the market in some form or other? What role should there be for government intervention? Friedman, Milton. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Buchanan, A. 1985. Ethics, Efficiency and the Market. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Miller, D. 1989. Market, State, and Community: Theoretical Foundations of Market Socialism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

x. Communitarianism Communitarians argue that we should pursue a politics of the ‘common good’ in preference to liberal neutrality. This view is often premised on a metaphysical account of the person: that individuals are ‘partly constituted’ by the communi-

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ties of which they form part. Liberalism is said, by communitarians, to presuppose an implausible metaphysics of the self. In response liberals often claim to be neutral on metaphysical, as well as moral, issues. (See Rawls, Liberalism.) More recently the debate has broadened to include a discussion of ‘perfectionism’ (the view that some conceptions of the good are objectively better than others, as urged by J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986)) and whether public institutions should recognise or respect the particular identities of members of minority cultures. See W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). Sandel, M. J. 1982. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kymlicka, W. 1989. Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Gutman, A. 1985. ‘Communitarian Critics of Liberalism’. Reprinted in Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit, eds., Communitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, which contains many other relevant papers. Mulhall, S., and A. Swift. 1996. Liberals and Communitarians. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell. Chs. 1, 5-7.

xi. Rights Can we make sense of the idea of ‘natural rights’? If not, how can we understand rights claims? Can rights be given a consequentialist justification? And what rights do (or should) we have? (See also Nozick.) Dworkin, R. 1977. Taking Rights Seriously. 2nd ed. London: Duckworth, 1979. Waldron, J. ed. 1984. Theories of Rights. Oxford : Oxford University Press. Waldron, J. ed. 1987. ‘Nonsense upon stilts’: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man. London: Methuen.

xii. Anarchism Is there a plausible account of what life could be like without the state? Can this be combined with reasons to prefer such a situation to one in which a coercive state exists? (See also Nozick, Political Obligation.) Miller, D. 1984. Anarchism. London: Dent. Wolff, R. P. 1998. In Defence of Anarchism. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press. Taylor, M. 1982. Community, Anarchy and Liberty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

xiii. Political Obligation Should I obey the law just because it is the law? Can political obligations be given any moral foundation? Answers have been given by social contract theorists, as well as by advocates of the ‘theory of fairness’, utilitarians and communitarians. (See also Anarchism, Nozick, Rawls.) Simmons, A. John. 1980. Moral Principles and Political Obligations. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Horton, J. 1992. Political Obligation. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Green, L. 1988. The Authority of the State. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pateman, C. 1979. The Problem of Political Obligation: a Critical Analysis of Liberal Theory. Chichester: John Wiley. Klosko, G. 1992. The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Wolff, J. 1991. ‘What is the Problem of Political Obligation?’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91: 153-169. Sanders, John T., and Jan Narveson, eds. 1996. For and Against the State: New Philosophical Readings. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.

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xiv. Social Choice Theory The problem for the technical subject of social choice theory is to define a formal function that will aggregate individual choices or preferences into a ‘social ordering’. Arrow proved that no such function is consistent with a number of apparently trivial assumptions. The significance of this result is much debated. Sen, A. K. 1970. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Mathematical Economics Texts, No.5. San Fransisco: Holden-Day. Mackay, A.F. 1980. Arrow’s Theorem: the Paradox of Social choice: a Case Study in the Philosophy of Economics. New Haven: Yale University Press.

xv. Feminism Feminist political philosophy has become a major area of interest and research. One central question is whether there is a distinctive feminist subject matter, or whether feminist concerns can be subsumed under more general demands for justice and equality. Important contributions to the subject include Baier, A. C. 1994. Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Bubeck, Diemut E. 1995. Care, Gender, and Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Okin, Susan Moller. 1989. Justice, Gender and the Family. New York: Basic Books. Pateman, Carole. 1989. The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory. Cambridge: Polity Press. Fricker, M and Hornsby, J., eds. 2000. The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

xvi. Punishment A legitimate state is thought to possess a ‘monopoly’ on the right to punish. Does it possess such a monopoly, and on what grounds? Can a right to punish be derived from a right of self-protection? Assuming that the state possesses a right to punish, what is the purpose of punishment? Is it in order to deter others from committing crimes? To give criminals what they deserve? To reform criminals? Should completed crimes be punished more severely than mere attempts? Quinn, W. 1985. ‘The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punish’. Philosophy and Public Affiars 14: 327-373; Reprinted in Morality and Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Simmons, A. J. 1991. ‘Locke and the Right to Punish’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 19: 311349. Reprinted as ch. 3 of The Lockean Theory of Rights. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1992. Farrell, D. 1985. ‘The Justification of General Deterrence’. The Philosophical Review 94: 367394. Nozick, R. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 4, part 3. Hampton, J. 1984. ‘The Moral Education Theory of Punishment’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 13: 208-238. Lewis, D. 1989. ‘The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18: 53-67.

6

Greek Philosophy

1 The Paper This course is designed to make you familiar with the thought and the ways of thinking of the major classical philosophers, the pre-Socratics, Plato and Aristotle. It is focused on metaphysics and epistemology; ancient ethics, politics and aesthetics are covered in the Ethics or Politics or Aesthetics courses. You will be encouraged to analyse and criticise the arguments of the ancients and to think both constructively and critically about ancient theories. To this end, there is no substitute for reading the texts themselves (in translation, or even in Greek! Courses are available to help you to learn Greek). The examination paper requires you to answer three questions, at least two of which must be on Plato and/or Aristotle; a third question may be on the preSocratics. Credit is given both for careful and critical analysis of the ancient arguments and for wider scrutiny of the topics in question.

2 Texts and Basic Reading A. THE PRESOCRATICS i. General The work of the Presocratics survives in fragments. This means that their work needs considerable interpretation; it also means that everything they said is easily accessible to you. You can find translations of the fragments in J. Barnes, Early Greek Philosophy, and with a large and vigorous philosophical commentary in J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, (rev. ed., London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982). There is a full account of the evidence for the Presocratics, with a Greek text and translations in G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers: a Critical History with a Selection of Texts, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957). All of these are available in paperback; you should own at least one of them. The following are some books and collections of articles on the Pre-Socratics, notably where you will find interesting and important material on general topics and on individual philosophers. Furley, D. 1987. The Greek Cosmologists. Vol.1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Furley, D.1989. Cosmic Problems: Essays on Greek and Roman Philosophy of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Allen, R. E., and D. J. Furley. eds. 1970. Studies in Presocratic Philosophy. Vol.1, The Beginnings of Philosophy; Vol.2, The Eleatics and Pluralists. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Mourelatos, Alexander P. D.,ed. 1974. The Pre-Socratics: a Collection of Critical Essays. Rev. ed. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1993. Long, A. A. ed. 1999. The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

ii. Individual philosophers Heraclitus Kahn, Charles H. 1979. The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: an Edition of the Fragments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

68 STUDY GUIDE Wiggins, D. 1982. ‘Heraclitus’ Conceptions of Fire, Flux and Material Persistence’. In M. Schofield, and M. Nussbaum, eds., Language and Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G. E. L. Owen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mackenzie, M. M. 1988. ‘Heraclitus and the Art of Paradox’. In Julia Annas, ed., Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 6. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Parmenides. Gallop, D. 1984. Parmenides of Elea: Fragments. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Furley, D. 1967. ‘Parmenides’. In P. Edwards, ed., The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. London: Collier-Macmillan. Furth, M. 1974. ‘Elements of Eleatic Ontology’. In Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, ed., The PreSocratics: a Collection of Critical Essays. Rev. ed. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1993. Owen, G. E. L. 1985. ‘Eleatic Questions’. In Logic, Science and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. A difficult but brilliant paper, well worth persevering with it. Mackenzie, M. M. 1982. ‘Parmenides’ Dilemma’. Phronesis 27: 1-12.

Zeno When you think about Zeno, consider both the paradoxes described and criticised by Aristotle and the fragments quoted in Simplicius. Aristotle, Physics, VI.9, VIII.8. Vlastos, G. 1967. ‘Zeno’. In P. Edwards, ed., The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. London: Collier-Macmillan. Owen, G. E. L. 1985. ‘Zeno and the Mathematicians’. In Logic, Science and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Lear, J. 1981. ‘A note on Zeno’s Arrow’. Phronesis 26: 91-104. Sainsbury, R. M. 1995. Paradoxes. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ryle, G. 1954. Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sorabji, R. 1983. Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages. London: Duckworth. Ch.21.

Empedocles Long, A. A. 1966. ‘Thinking and Sense-perception in Empedocles’. Classical Quarterly. Sorabji, R. 1993. Animal Minds and Human Morals: the Origins of the Western Debate. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press.

Anaxagoras Schofield, M. 1980. An essay on Anaxagoras. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The Atomists Furley, D. 1967. Two Studies in the Greek Atomists: Study 1—Indivisible magnitudes.; Study 2— Aristotle and Epicurus on Voluntary Action. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Sedley, D. 1982. ‘Two Conceptions of Vacuum’. Phronesis 27: 175-193.

B. PLATO i. General The dialogues are translated in J. Cooper, ed., The Complete Works of Plato; and in Edith Hamilton, and Huntington Cairns, eds., The Collected Dialogues of Plato, including the Letters, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1961). You should buy one of these collections. Dialogues of importance include Euthyphro, Laches, Charmides, Lysis, Meno, Protagoras, Gorgias, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic, Parmenides, Phaedrus, Cratylus, Timaeus, Theaetetus, Sophist, Philebus. (Remember that ethical and political topics are dealt with elsewhere; see the ethics and political philosophy sections of the study guide.) Collections of articles Kraut, R. ed. 1992. The Cambridge Companion to Plato. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. A collection of articles on Plato with an excellent bibliography; note especially the papers by G. Fine, M. Frede, D. Frede.

GREEK PHILOSOPHY 69 Allen, R. E. ed. 1965. Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Fine, G. ed. 1999. Plato. Vol.1. Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Owen, G. E. L. 1985. Logic, Science and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Vlastos, G. 1973. Platonic Studies. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. ——. 1973. ed. Plato I: Epistemology and Metaphysics.

Notice also Crombie, I. M. 1963 . An Examination of Plato’s Doctrines. 2 Vols. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Gosling, J. C. B. 1973. Plato. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

ii. Individual dialogues One of the best ways of tackling Plato is to think hard and long about individual dialogues. To understand Plato’s epistemology and metaphysics, the following are central. Meno This dialogue considers virtue and knowledge, and contains Plato’s first extended epistemology. Sharples, R. W. ed., and trans. 1985. Meno / Plato. Chicago: Aris & Phillips. Gives a running commentary and a Greek text.

Note also Fine, G. 1992. In Kraut, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Plato. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Scott, D. 1995. Recollection and Experience: Plato’s Theory of Learning and its Successors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vlastos, G. 1965. ‘“Anamnesis” in the “Meno”’. Dialogue 4: 143-167. Day, Jane M. ed. 1994. Plato’s Meno in Focus. London: Routledge.

Phaedo Socrates’ death and the conversation about the immortality of the soul that preceded it. This dialogue may be the first to introduce Plato’s theory of Forms. Bostock, D. 1986. Plato’s Phaedo. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Vlastos, G. 1973. ‘Reasons and Causes in the Phaedo’. In G. Vlastos, Platonic Studies. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Scott, D. 1987. ‘Platonic Anamnesis Revisited’. Classical Quarterly.

Republic This is usually considered Plato’s masterpiece; it repays careful study. Annas, J. 1981. An Introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press. A very useful book, with detailed bibliographical advice. Cross R. C., and A. D. Woozley. 1964. Plato’s Republic: a Philosophical Commentary. London: Macmillan. Kraut, R. 1997. Plato’s Republic: Critical Essays. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield. Vlastos, G. 1973. ‘Degrees of Reality in Plato’. In G. Vlastos, Platonic Studies. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Pappas, N. 1995. Plato and the Republic. London: Routledge.

Parmenides This dialogue falls into two parts; the first (126-136) is an extended critique of the theory of Forms, the second (137-end) an intricate dialectical exercise. Most modern attention has been paid to the first part, and therein to the notorious Third Man Argument. Try to consider all the arguments of the first part, even if you find the second uncongenial. Vlastos, G. 1965. ‘The Third Man argument in the Parmenides’. In R. E. Allen ed., Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics. London: Routledge.

70 STUDY GUIDE Strang, C. 1972. ‘Plato and the Third Man’. In G. Vlastos, ed., Plato: a Collection of Critical Essays, Vol.1, Metaphysics and Epistemology. London: Macmillan. Mignucci, M. 1990. ‘Plato’s Third Man Argument in the Parmenides’. Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie. McCabe, M. M. 1994. Plato’s Individuals. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Gill, M. L. trans. 1996. Parmenides. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co. Introduction.

Theaetetus Here Plato reconsiders the problems of epistemology in a manner which is readily accessible to modern readers. Burnyeat, M. F. 1990. The Theaetetus of Plato. Indianapolis: Hackett. A long philosophical introduction with translation, a difficult but brilliant treatment of a dialogue which is readily accessible to those with modern epistemological concerns in mind. Bostock, D. 1988. Plato’s Theaetetus. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Sophist Here Plato tackles the problems of not-being and falsehood, and offers his own philosophical logic. Owen, G. E. L. 1985. ‘Plato on Not-Being’. In Logic, Science and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. The place to start in considering modern interpretations of the Sophist; again, difficult but rewarding. Frede, M. 1992. ‘Plato’s Sophist on False Statements’. In R. Kraut, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Plato. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Heinaman, R. 1981. ‘Self-predication in the Sophist’. Phronesis 26: 55-66.

C. ARISTOTLE i. Central Works of Aristotle The following are central works of Aristotle, as examined under this paper, i.e. excluding ethics, political philosophy and aesthetics. Physics, starting with Book 2 on explanation in natural science, 1 on matter and form, 4 on space and time, 6 on continuity vs. atomism. On the Soul (de Anima). Categories, an introduction to metaphysics (on what there is). Posterior Analytics, I 2-6; II 8-10; II 19, on scientific explanation. Metaphysics, XII; IV on the Law of contradiction; VII (much the hardest) on what there is. On The Heavens, (de Caelo). On Interpretation, (de Interpretatione).

There are very useful summaries, in the commentaries by W. D. Ross, of the Physics, Metaphysics, Posterior Analytics and de Anima.

ii. Translations The best translations are in The Complete Works of Aristotle: the revised Oxford translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes, 2 Vols., (Princeton N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). J. L. Ackrill, A New Aristotle Reader, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) covers some, but unfortunately not all, of what you need. The Clarendon Aristotle translations from the Oxford University Press of particular works are designed for Philosophy students: you will find many of these interesting and challenging.

iii. General Books Lear, J. 1988. Aristotle: the Desire to Understand. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. This is an excellent philosophical treatment of Aristotle. Irwin, T. 1988. Aristotle’s First Principles. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Is a comprehensive analysis. Barnes, Jonathan, Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji. Articles on Aristotle. 4 Vols.

GREEK PHILOSOPHY 71 London: Duckworth, 1975-1979. These 4 collections of articles cover all aspects of Aristotle. Their bibliography has been updated for the Oxford Sub-faculty of Philosophy, and is available, under the editor’s names, from Blackwell’s, Broad Street, Oxford.

Several further collections of articles covering particular areas are good Owen, G. E. L. 1985. Logic, Science and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Matthen, Mohan, ed. 1987. Aristotle Today: Essays on Aristotle’s Ideal of Science. Edmonton, Alberta: Academic Printing & Publishing. Nussbaum, M., and A. O. Rorty, eds. 1992. Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima. Oxford: Clarendon Press. On philosophy of mind, a state of the art collection. Judson, L. ed. 1991. Aristotle’s Physics: a Collection of Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Scaltsas, T., D. Charles, and M. L. Gill, eds. 1994. Unity, Identity and Explanation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Frede, M. 1987. Essays in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Gotthelf, A. ed. 1985. Aristotle on Nature and Living Things: Philosophical and Historical Studies. Bristol: Bristol Classical Press. On biology, metaphysics and scientific method. Gotthelf, A., and J. Lennox, eds. 1987. Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Barnes, J. ed. 1995. Cambridge Campanion to Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Classics students will want to know that much of this century’s scholarship starts from Werner Jaeger’s biographical study Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development, (2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948). Summaries are never adequate for examination purposes, but good as summaries are three books each called Aristotle, by W. D. Ross, J. L. Ackrill, and J. Barnes, all in paperback. Ackrill, J. L. 1981. Aristotle the Philosopher. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ross, W. D. 1949. Aristotle. 5th ed. London: Methuen, Barnes, J. 1982. Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press. A series of books by Richard Sorabji considers different aspects of Aristotle’s philosophy as follows, all paperback except the last: Sorabji, R. 1972. Aristotle on Memory. London: Duckworth. ——. 1980. Necessity, Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle’s Theory. London: Duckworth. Determinism, Moral Responsibility, Scientific explanation. ——. 1983. Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages. London: Duckworth. Time, infinity and Zeno-type paradoxes. ——. 1988. Matter, Space and Motion: Theories in Antiquity and their Sequel. London: Duckworth. More physics, as indicated by title. ——. 1993. Animal Minds and Human Morals: the Origins of the Western Debate. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Philosophy of Mind.

Good books on particular aspects of Aristotle include Lear, J. 1980. Aristotle and Logical Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. On logic. Hintikka, Jaakko. 1973. Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotle’s Theory of Modality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Waterlow, S. 1982. Nature,Change and Agency in Aristotle’s Physics: a Philosophical Study. Oxford: Clarendon Press. On nature and soul. ——. 1982. Passage and Possibility: a Study of Aristotle’s Modal Concepts. Oxford: Clarendon Press. On necessity (harder).

The particular texts and topics chosen for lectures will rotate and more detailed reading lists will be supplied with the lectures. But in relation to those currently chosen, besides what has been mentioned above, the following are useful: Hicks, R. D. 1907. De Anima; Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Still the most informative English commentary, though it includes Greek and is not written for philosophy students. Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, edited by M. Nussbaum, and A. O.

72 STUDY GUIDE Rorty, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) is the most philosophical treatment, though not a commentary. Berti, E. ed. 1981. Aristotle on Science: ‘The Posterior Analytics’. Proceedings of the Eighth Symposium Aristotelicum. Padova: Editrice Antenore. A collection of articles on Aristotle’s Scientific Methodology in the Posterior Analytics. W. K. C. Guthrie’s introduction to Aristotle’s de Caelo, (Loeb Classical Library, London: Heinemann, 1939) summarises the development of Aristotle’s theology.

Collections of papers on pre-Socratics, Plato and Aristotle Frede, M., and G. Striker, eds. 1996. Rationality in Greek Thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Gentzler, J. ed. 1998. Method in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Everson, S. 1990. ed. Epistemology. Companions to Ancient Thought 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——. 1991. ed. Psychology. Companions to Ancient Thought 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——. 1994. ed. Language. Companions to Ancient Thought 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——. 1998. ed. Ethics. Companions to Ancient Thought 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

7

Modern Philosophy: Bacon to Kant

1 The Paper This paper covers the metaphysical and epistemological thought of the great philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries. The paper is divided by a traditional classification into the Rationalists and Empiricists, with a separate final section for Kant. In all cases it is important first to look at primary sources, and to try and work out for yourself what a thinker is saying or trying to say. In almost every case, the authors in question were systematic thinkers, and what we now consider to be their philosophical writings are only part of their general intellectual interests and works. Although it is tempting to extract from one author or another a particular view on an issue of contemporary interest, one should remember that these thinkers are responding to their own philosophical concerns and interests in the intellectual context of their own age and not of ours. While there may be some perennial philosophical problems, the form they take and the plausibility of one solution rather than another can alter from epoch to epoch. The authors highlighted in this guide are not the only philosophers of the period, and while some of them had contact with each other, it is misleading to think of their work as a conversation across the decades over these philosophical problems. A fuller picture of each of them can be obtained only by attending also to some of the ‘lesser’ figures of the period (for example, in relation to Descartes, Arnauld and Mersenne; Leibniz, Arnauld and Clarke; Locke, Boyle and Gassendi; Berkeley, Malebranche; Hume, Reid and Malebranche). Secondary material can be useful as an aid, but cannot replace first hand knowledge of the texts. Where the author did not write in English there are normally good translations available, indicated below.

2 General Reading on the Period Garber, D., and M. Ayers, eds. 1998. The Cambridge History of Seventeenth Century Philosophy. 2 Vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. An exhaustive survey of the main philosophical themes and concerns of the period. Matthews, Michael R. ed. 1989. The Scientific Background to Modern Philosophy: Selected Readings. Indianapolis: Hackett. An essential selection of scientific writings from Galileo, Tycho Brahe, and Boyle. Cottingham, J. 1988. The Rationalists. Oxford: Oxford University Press; and Woolhouse, R. 1988. The Empiricists. Oxford: Oxford University Press. These two volumes are a good introduction as a whole to the period, and will give you some sense of how the different thinkers fit into a wider scheme. Funkenstein, A. 1986. Theology and the Scientific Imagination: from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. This gives a good background to the shift in the intellectual context of the period from a theological and scientific points of view. Osler, Margaret J. 1994. Divine Will & Mechanical Philosophy: Gassendi and Descartes on Contingency and Necessity in the Created World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Woolhouse, R. S. 1993. Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth-century Metaphysics. London: Routledge.

74 Study Guide Popkin, R. 1979. The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza. Rev. ed. Berkeley: University of California Press. (Prev. ed.: The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes.) Clarke, D. 1989. Occult Powers and Hypotheses: Cartesian Natural Philosophy under Louis XIV. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Barber, Kenneth F, and Jorge J. E. Gracia. 1994. Individuation and Identity in Early Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant. Albany: State University of New York Press. Cover, J. A., and M. Kulstad. eds. 1990. Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy: essays presented to Jonathan Bennett. Indianapolis: Hackett. Nadler, S. 1993. ed. Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: Cartesianism, Occasionalism, and Pre-established Harmony. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press. Lennon, Thomas M. 1993. The Battle of the Gods and Giants: the Legacies of Descartes & Gassendi, 1655-1715. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. A thorough yet provocative treatment of the Cartesian legacy in epistemology. Loeb, Louis E. 1981. From Descartes to Hume: Continental Metaphysics & the Development of Modern Philosophy. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Des Chennes, D. Physiologia Cartesiana. Gives the late Scholastic context in which Cartesian natural philosophy developed. Dear, P. 1988. Mersenne and the Learning of the Schools. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Outlines the institutional context of the relations between natural science and philosophy. Shapiro, Barbara J. 1983. Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-century England: a Study of the Relationship Between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law, and Literature. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

3 Specific Authors A. BACON Novum Organum: with other parts of the Great Instauration. Translated and edited by Peter Urbach and John Gibson. Chicago, Ill.: Open Court, 1994. Philosophical Studies c.1611-c.1619. The Oxford Francis Bacon, Vol. VI. Trans. by Graham Rees. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. In which see ‘A description of the intellectual globe’, and ‘Theory of the Heavens’.

Secondary Literature Urbach, P. 1987. Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Science: an Account and a Reappraisal. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court. Peltonen, Markku. 1996. ed. The Cambridge Companion to Bacon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vickers, B. 1978. ed. Francis Bacon. London: Published for the British Council by Longman Group. Perez-Ramos, Antonio. 1988. Francis Bacon's Idea of Science and the Maker's Knowledge Tradition. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

B. DESCARTES The best current translation of Descartes into English is The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (and Anthony Kenny, for Vol.3), 3 Vols., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985), (Hereafter CSM for Vols.1 & 2; CSMK for Vol.3). From this there are two abridgements also available, J. Cottingham, Descartes: Selected Writings, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), and J. Cottingham, Meditations on First Philosophy: with Selections from the Objections and Replies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). From these you should look at Meditations on First Philosophy, including Objections & Replies; Discourse on Method, esp. Pt.IV; The Principles of Philosophy, esp. Pt.I. You should also look at some of the selected letters to Elizabeth, Arnauld, and More, all collected in CSMK. Introductory books on Descartes’ philosophy

Modern Philosophy 75 Kenny, A. 1968. Descartes: a Study of his Philosophy. New York: Random House. Very useful first book on Descartes. Cottingham, J. 1986. Descartes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. ——. 1993. A Descartes Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell. The book is good on the history, less useful on philosophical criticism; the dictionary is a very helpful work of reference. Curley, E. M. 1978. Descartes Against the Skeptics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. A useful introduction, but now out of print. Garber, D. 1992. Descartes’s Metaphysical Physics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Excellent introduction to the setting of Descartes’ philosophical concerns among his interests in physics.

Less introductory but essential for understanding Descartes Wilson, M. D. 1978. Descartes. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. An excellent, but demanding, work. Williams, B. 1978. Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry. Hassocks: Harvester Press. Excellent book, but very demanding and not concerned with the historical context. Gueroult, Martial. 1968. Descartes’ Philosophy Interpreted According to the Order of Reasons. Translated by Robert Ariew. 2 Vols. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985.

Collections Cottingham, J. ed. 1992. The Cambridge Companion to Descartes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ariew, R., and M. Grene. eds. 1995. Descartes & his Contemporaries: Meditations, Objections and Replies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rorty, A. O. ed. 1986. Essays on Descartes’ Meditations. Berkeley: University of California Press. Doney, W. ed. 1968. Descartes: a Collection of Critical Essays. London: Macmillan. Hooker, M. ed. 1978. Descartes, Critical & Interpretive Essays. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Voss, S. ed. 1993. Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes. New York: Oxford University Press. Cottingham, J. ed. 1994. Reason, Will, and Sensation: Studies in Descartes’s Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Moyal, Georges. ed. 1991. Descartes: Critical Assessments. 4 Vols. London: Routledge.

i. Descartes and the Physical World Descartes’ principal intellectual concerns were with the natural sciences. His conception of the physical world was non-corpuscularian (i.e. no atoms), and he sought to overthrow the Aristotelian natural philosophy that dominated Sixteenth Century Europe. It is useful to compare Descartes’ views to Galileo’s The Assayer (see Matthews, The Scientific Background to Modern Philosophy for relevant selections). For Descartes’ own account of those of his scientific views of most direct interest to philosophers see in particular The Principles of Philosophy, and also The Rules for Direction of Mind and The World, all in CSM, Vol. 1. Secondary Reading Garber, D. 1986. ‘Semel in vita: The Scientific Background to Descartes’ Meditations’. In A. O. Rorty, ed., Essays on Descartes’ Meditations. Berkeley: University of California Press. Garber, D. 1992. Descartes’s Metaphysical Physics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Clarke, Desmond M. 1982. Descartes’ Philosophy of Science. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Wilson, M. D. 1978. Descartes. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Chs. 2 & 6. See the assorted papers in Pt.III of S. Voss, ed., Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

On Descartes’ attitude towards the qualities of physical objects you may find useful first Williams, B. 1978. Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry. Hassocks: Harvester Press. Ch. 8, in part. pp. 236-252.

76 Study Guide Menn, S. 1995. ‘The Greatest Stumbling: Descartes’ Denial of Real Qualities’. In R. Ariew, and M. Grene. eds., Descartes & his Contemporaries: Meditations, Objections and Replies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

ii. Ideas Thomas Reid saw Descartes as the founder of the ‘theory of ideas’, associated with ‘representationalism’ as an account of how the mind relates to the world and to God. For Descartes’ own description of the nature of ideas see Meditations 3 and 5, plus his reply to Arnauld; also look at Principles, Pt. 1, 60-64. Secondary Reading Yolton, John W. 1984. Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid. Oxford: Blackwell. This is a general critique of the view that early modern philosophers accepted some form of representationalism. Cottingham, J. 1993. A Descartes Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell. Consult the entry on ideas. Wilson, M. D. 1978. Descartes. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch.3. ——. 1990. ‘Descartes in the Representationality of Sensation’. In J. A. Cover, and M. Kulstad. eds., Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy: essays presented to Jonathan Bennett. Indianapolis: Hackett. Ariew, R., and M. Grene. 1995. ‘Ideas, in and before Descartes’. Journal of History of Ideas 56: 87-106. Ayers, M. 1998. ‘Ideas and Objective Being.’ In D. Garber and M. Ayers, eds., The Cambridge History of Seventeenth Century Philosophy: Two Volumes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

iii. Mind and Body Descartes claimed that the mind was distinct from the body—the arguments for this are presented in part in Meditations 2 and completed in Meditations 6. But Descartes was also keenly aware of the intimate relation between the two, and echoed a famous phrase of Aquinas’ that the mind is not lodged in the body as a sailor in a ship. His attitude towards the union of mind and body has been the subject of much discussion both among his contemporaries and among recent commentators. For Descartes’ own attempts to explain his position see Letters to Elizabeth, 21 May 1643, 28 June 1643, and Principles, Pt. I, secs. 53, 54, 60-64; also see Passions of the Soul. Secondary Reading On the Distinction between Mind and Body Curley, E. M. 1979. Descartes against the Skeptics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Chs. 7 & 8. Wilson, M. D. 1978. Descartes. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Chs. 2 & 6. Carriero, J. P. 1986. ‘The Second Meditation & the Essence of the Mind’. In A. O. Rorty, ed., Essays on Descartes’ Meditations. Berkeley: University of California Press. Rozemond, M. 1993. ‘The Role of Intellect in Descartes’s Case for the Incorporeity of Mind’. In S. Voss, ed., Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes. New York: Oxford University Press.

On the Union of Mind and Body Cottingham, J. 1986. Descartes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Ch.6. Garber, D. 1992. Descartes’s Metaphysical Physics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ch.4. Wilson, M. D. 1991. ‘Descartes on the Origin of Sensation’. Philosophical Topics 19: 293-323. Rorty, A. O. 1986. ‘Cartesian Passions and the Union of Mind and Body’. In A. O. Rorty, ed., Essays on Descartes’ Meditations. Berkeley: University of California Press.

iv. Cartesian Epistemology Although the Meditations begins with the ‘hyperbolic’ doubt of the malign genie, it is not solely, or even primarily a work on epistemology—it is as concerned with outlining Descartes’ metaphysical views as establishing epistemological doctrines. Descartes’ own

Modern Philosophy 77

attitude to scepticism is not clear-cut—see Popkin, The History of Skepticism; c.f. Curley, Descartes Against the Skeptics, ch.1. Nevertheless, Descartes’ distinctive positive epistemological views are developed throughout the Meditations, starting with the cogito in Meditations 2, the nature of judgement and occasion for error in Meditations 4, the role of God against doubt in Meditations 3 & 5, the final resolution of sceptical doubts in Meditations 6. Secondary Reading Scepticism Frankfurt, Harry G. 1970. Demons, Dreamers & Madmen: the Defense of Reason in Descartes’s Meditations. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Pt.1. Cottingham, J. 1986. Descartes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Ch.2. Curley, E. M. 1979. Descartes against the Skeptics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Chs. 1-3. Williams, B. 1978. Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry. Hassocks: Harvester Press. Appendix 3. Burnyeat, M. 1982. ‘Greek Philosophy and Idealism: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed’. Philosophical Review 90: 3-40. Also in G. Vesey. ed., Idealism Past and Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Stroud, B. 1984. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.1.

Cogito Kenny, A. 1968. Descartes: a Study of his Philosophy. New York: Random House. Ch.3. Curley, E. M. 1979. Descartes against the Skeptics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Ch.4. Hintikka, J. 1968. ‘Cogito Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance?’. In W. Doney, ed., Descartes: a Collection of Critical Essays. London: Macmillan. Markie, P. 1992. ‘The Cogito and its Importance’. In J. Cottingham, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Descartes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The ‘Cartesian Circle’ Curley, E. M. 1979. Descartes against the Skeptics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Ch.5. Cottingham, J. 1986. Descartes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Ch.3. Williams, B. 1978. Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry. Hassocks: Harvester Press. Ch.7. van Cleve, J. 1979. ‘Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles and the Cartesian Circle’. Philosophical Review 88: 55-91. Loeb, L. 1992. ‘The Cartesian Circle’. In J. Cottingham, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Descartes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

C. SPINOZA The best current translation of Spinoza’s works is The Collected Works of Spinoza, edited and translated by Edwin Curley, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), but affordable selections from this translation can now be obtained: A Spinoza reader: the Ethics and other Works, trans. and ed. by E. Curley, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Curley’s translation of The Ethics alone is also available as a Penguin Classic. Another useful translation and selection is The Ethics; Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect; and Selected Letters, trans. by Samuel Shirley, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992). From these you should look at The Ethics in particular, especially Pts. I & II. The following are introductory books on Spinoza Curley, E. M. 1988. Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza’s Ethics. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. ——. 1969. Spinoza’s Metaphysics: an Essay in Interpretation. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Allison, Henry E. 1987. Benedict de Spinoza: An Introduction. Rev. ed. New Haven: Yale

78 Study Guide University Press. Hampshire, S. 1951. Spinoza. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Also useful are Collections Garrett, D. ed. 1996. The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shahan, Robert W., and J. I. Biro. eds. 1978. Spinoza: New Perspectives. Norman: University of Oklahoma. Grene, M. ed. 1973. Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books. Kennington, R. ed. 1980. The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.

Books Bennett, J. 1984. A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Donagan, A. 1988. Spinoza. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Parkinson, G. H. R. 1954. Spinoza’s Theory of Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Delahunty, R. J. 1985. Spinoza. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. della Rocca, M. 1996 Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mason, R. 1997. The God of Spinoza: a Philosophical Study. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Yovel, Yirmiyahu. 1989. Spinoza and other Heretics. 2 Vols. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Wolfson, H. A. 1934 The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Processes of his Reasoning. 2 Vols. New York: Schocken Books, 1969. Walker, Ralph C. S. 1989. The Coherence Theory of Truth: Realism, Anti-realism, Idealism. London: Routledge. Ch.III Nadler, S. 1999. Spinoza: A Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

i. The Uniqueness of Substance Descartes’ philosophy occupies a central place in understanding Spinoza: his first philosophical work was a rendition of Descartes’ system into analytic form, Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy. Spinoza’s distinctive theory of substance may appear at first sight rather odd, but you should find it helpful to place it in the context of an attempt to draw out the consequences implicit in the Cartesian distinctions of substance, mode and attribute. See Ethics, Bk. I, props. 1-14, for the bald statement of his substance monism. Secondary Reading Curley, E. M. 1988. Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza’s Ethics. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Ch.I, this is probably your best route in to making sense of the 14 propositions. Woolhouse, R. S. 1993. Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz. London: Routledge. Ch.3. Bennett, J. 1996. ‘Spinoza’s Metaphysics’. In D. Garrett, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——. 1984. A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.4. Charlton, W. 1981. ‘Spinoza’s Monism’. Philosophical Review 90: 503-530.

ii. Mind, Thought & Body Other aspects of Spinoza’s thought develop out of his monistic metaphysics. This is true of his psychology and physics. For his account of mind and its relation to the physical world look at Ethics Bks. II and III. Secondary Reading Curley, E. M. 1988. Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza’s Ethics. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Chs. II & III, again this is a good place from which to start. della Rocca, M. 1996. ‘Spinoza’s Metaphysical Psychology’. In D. Garrett, ed., The Cambridge

Modern Philosophy 79 Companion to Spinoza. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Allison, Henry E. 1987. Benedict de Spinoza: An Introduction. Rev. ed. New Haven: Yale University Press. Ch.4. Bennett, J. 1984. A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 6 & 7. Donagan, A. 1980. ‘Spinoza’s Dualism’. In R. Kennington, ed., The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.

iii. Determinism & the Denial of Contingency Spinoza’s universe is a totally mechanistic one, apparently removing any place for contingency in the world of nature. His attitude towards human action and freedom of the will is strongly influenced by his general metaphysics, and it remains a matter of controversy what his account exactly is. Start with Ethics, Bk. I, props. 16-33, then look at Bk. IV. Secondary Reading Garrett, D. 1996. ‘Spinoza’s Ethical Theory’. In D. Garrett, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——. 1991. ‘Spinoza’s Necessitarianism’. In Y. Yovell, ed., God and Nature: Spinoza’s Metaphysics. Leiden: E. J. Brill. Hampshire, S. 1971. ‘Spinoza’s Theory of Human Freedom’. The Monist 55: 554-566. Parkinson, G. H. R. 1971. ‘Spinoza on the Power and Freedom of Man’. The Monist 55: 527-553. Bennett, J. 1984. A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.5. Donagan, A. 1988. Spinoza. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Ch.6.

iv. The Passions One of the central themes in Spinoza’s account of the nature of man and his place in the world is the possibility and means of overcoming the passions. See Ethics, Bk. IV. Again, one can understand his particular account of human psychology only in the context of his general metaphysics (contrast his account of the passions with Descartes’ own theory in his The Passions of the Soul, CMS, Vol.1). Secondary Reading Curley, E. M. 1988. Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza’s Ethics. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Ch.III. James, S. 1993. ‘Spinoza the Stoic’. In T. Sorell, ed., The Rise of Modern Philosophy: the Tension Between the New and Traditional Philosophies from Machiavelli to Leibniz. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Cottingham, J. 1988. ‘The Intellect, the Will and the Passions: Spinoza’s Critique of Descartes’. Journal of the History of Philosophy 26: 239-257. Bennett, J. 1984. A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.14.

D. LEIBNIZ The important works to look at are Discourse on Metaphysics. The Monadology. The Theodicy. New Essays on Human Understanding. Correspondence with Clarke & with Arnauld.

The most complete selection of work can be found in Philosophical Papers and Letters. Translated and edited by Leroy E. Loemker 2nd ed. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969.

Useful translations of selected works Philosophical Essays. Translated by Roger Ariew, and Daniel Garber. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989. New Essays on Human Understanding. Translated by Peter Remnant, and Jonathan

80 Study Guide Bennett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Philosophical Writings. Translated by Mary Morris, and G. H. R. Parkinson. London: J. M. Dent, 1973. The Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil. Edited by Austin Farrer. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1985.

Introductory Reading Brown, S. 1984. Leibniz. Brighton: Harvester. Rescher, N. 1967. The Philosophy of Leibniz. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall.

More difficult but worth looking at, and essential to understanding Leibniz Adams, R. M. 1994. Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rutherford, D. A. 1995. Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mates, B. 1986. The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ishiguro, Hidé. 1990. Leibniz’s Philosophy of Logic and Language. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Woolhouse, R. S. 1993. Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth-century Metaphysics. London: Routledge. Sleigh, R. C. 1990. Leibniz & Arnaud: A Commentary on their Correspondence. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

The following are also worth looking at Kulstad, M. 1991. Leibniz on Apperception, Consciousness, and Reflection. München: Philosophia. Wilson, C. 1989. Leibniz’s Metaphysics: a Historical and Comparative Study. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Russell, B. A. W. 1937. Leibniz. London: George Allen and Unwin. A rather idiosyncratic view of Leibniz.

Useful collections of essays Hooker, M. 1982. ed. Leibniz: Critical and Interpretive Essays. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Frankfurt, Harry G. ed. 1976 Leibniz: A Collection of Critical Essays. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Woolhouse, R. S. ed. 1981. Leibniz: Metaphysics & Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Woolhouse, R. S. ed. 1994. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Critical Assessments. 4 Vols. London: Routledge. Jolley, N. ed. 1995. The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

i. Substance, Monads & the World Leibniz’s distinctive remarks on substance are best examined in the context of Descartes’ and Spinoza’s metaphysical views. There is a sense in which Leibniz developed his theory of substance in order to address well-known problems in the Cartesian account of substance. The starting point for his view of substance and monads are Monadology and Discourse on Metaphysics. Secondary Reading Woolhouse, R. S. 1993. Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz. London: Routledge. Chs. 4 & 8. Adams, R. M. 1994. Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pt.3. Rescher, N. 1967. The Philosophy of Leibniz. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall. Chs.1 & 5. Brown, S. 1984. Leibniz. Brighton: Harvester. Ch.10. Mates, B. 1986. The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.2. Furth, R. 1967. ‘Monadology’. Philosophical Review 76: 169-200. Ishiguro, Hidé. 1990. Leibniz’s Philosophy of Logic and Language. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.6.

Modern Philosophy 81 Sleigh, R. C. 1990. Leibniz & Arnaud: A Commentary on their Correspondence. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Ch.5.

ii. Truth, Contingency & The Principle of Sufficient Reason Leibniz’s views of truth, the nature or real definition of things, and contingency are regulated by his principle of sufficient reason. On this see ‘On Contingency’, ‘On Primary Truths’, ‘On the Ultimate Origination of All Things’, ‘Principles of Nature and Grace’, Monadology, secs. 30-40, all in G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, translated by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989). Secondary Reading Sleigh, R. C. 1982. ‘Truth and Sufficient Reason in the Philosophy of Leibniz’. In M. Hooker, ed., Leibniz: Critical and Interpretive Essays. Manchester: Manchester University Press. ——. 1990. Leibniz & Arnaud: A Commentary on their Correspondence. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Ch.4. Wiggins, D. 1987. ‘“The Concept of the Subject contains the Concept of the Predicate”’. In Judith Jarvis Thomson, ed., On Being and Saying: essays for Richard Cartwright. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Ishiguro, Hidé. 1990. Leibniz’s Philosophy of logic and language. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.7. Mates, B. 1986. The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chs.5 & 6. Adams, R. M. 1994. Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.2. Walker, R. C. S. 1997. ‘Sufficient Reason’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 109-123. Rescher, N. 1967. The Philosophy of Leibniz. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall. Ch.2. Parkinson, G. H. R. 1965. Logic and Reality in Leibniz’s Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.3.

iii. Identity and Indiscernibility We owe to Leibniz formulations of the laws of identity. First, that identicals are indiscernible, ∀x∀y(x=y → (Fx ↔ Fy)), but also the converse, that indiscernibles are identical ∀x∀y((Fx ↔ Fy) → x=y): the latter is controversial if any restriction is placed on the substitution for F. For Leibniz’s discussion of identity see ‘On Primary Truths’, ‘The Source of Contingent Truths’, Monadology. Secondary Reading Wiggins, D. 1980. Sameness and Substance. Oxford: Blackwell. Ch.1. Cartwright, R. 1987. ‘Indiscernibility Principles’. In Philosophical Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Adams, R. M. 1979. ‘Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity’. Journal of Philosophy 76: 5-26. Ishiguro, Hidé. 1990. Leibniz’s Philosophy of Logic and Language. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mates, B. 1986. The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.VI. Parkinson, G. H. R. 1995. ‘Philosophy and Logic’. In N. Jolley, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

iv. Freedom and Determinism—God and Theodicy Leibniz’s determinism issues from his commitment to two principles about necessity and possibility: the first is that any predicate true of any substance is contained in the individual concept of that substance; the second is his denial of the possibility of a substance having had attributes other that it actually has—given that Leibniz was a diplomat, on his view, he could not have been the same individual if he had not been a diplomat. For Leibniz’s expression of these views look at, ‘On Freedom and Possibility’, ‘On Freedom’, ‘The Principles of Nature and Grace’, ‘The Dialogue on Human Freedom and the Origin of Evil’, all in Ariew and Garber.

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Leibniz is also well known for the view parodied in Voltaire’s Candide that this is the best of all possible worlds. This conception is central to what is referred to as his theodicy—a theodicy is an attempt to explain the existence of evil, in the light of holding the view that God had created the actual world as the best of all possible worlds. See, in addition to the above mentioned works, The Theodicy. Secondary Reading Rutherford, D. A. 1995. Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs.1-4. Adams, R. M. 1994. Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.8. ——. 1972. ‘Must God Create the Best’. Philosophical Review 81: 317-332. Blumenfeld, D. 1995. ‘Perfection and Happiness in the Best Possible World’. In N. Jolley, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Walker, R. C. S. 1997. ‘Sufficient Reason’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 109-123.

E. LOCKE The best edition is John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited by Peter H. Nidditch, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). There is also a recent edition, edited by Roger Woolhouse, available from Penguin, (London: Penguin, 1997). Two useful introductory books are Lowe, E. J. 1995. Locke on Human Understanding. London: Routledge. Woolhouse, R. S. 1983. Locke. Brighton: Harvester.

The following are also useful, Ayers and Alexander are quite hard but revealing in what they say about Locke; Mackie and Bennett are more concerned with philosophical themes extractable from Locke, than with understanding him in his own context. Ayers, M. R. 1991. Locke. Vol. 1. Epistemology, Vol. 2. Ontology. London: Routledge. Alexander, P. 1985. Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles: Locke and Boyle on the External World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mackie, J. L. 1976. Problems From Locke. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bennett, J. 1971. Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Collections Chappell, V. ed. 1994. The Cambridge Companion to Locke. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tipton, I. C. ed. 1977. Locke on Human Understanding: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Martin, C. B., and D. M. Armstrong. eds. 1968. Locke and Berkeley: a Collection of Critical Essays. London: Macmillan. Rogers, G. A. J. ed. 1994. Locke’s Philosophy: Content and Context. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ashcraft, R. ed. 1991. John Locke: Critical Assessments. 4 Vols. London: Routledge. Yolton, John W. 1993. A Locke Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell.

i. Ideas, Representation & Innateness Locke is often taken as the fount of British empiricism and an associated representationalism concerning ideas. Just as the view of Descartes as a representationalist is controversial, so too is this conception of Locke. For the little positive that Locke has to say about the nature of ideas and how they are ideas of certain things see Essay, Bk. 2, Chs. 1-7, 9, 23, secs. 9-20, Bk. 4, Chs. 1 & 3, but also search out his ‘An Examination of P.Malebranche’s Opinion of Seeing All Things in God’ (in fact a critique of an English follower of Malebranche called Norris). Locke’s empiricism is properly so called through his opposition to the innateness of any ideas, in which view he engaged Leibniz’s opposition. For Descartes’ original commitment to innateness see Meditations 3. For Locke’s attack see Essay, Bk.1, Chs.1, 2, Bk. 2, Ch.10, sec. 2; for Leibniz’s response see New Essays, Introduc-

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tion, Bk.1, Ch.1. Secondary Reading Chappell, V. 1994. ‘Locke’s Theory of Ideas’. In V. Chappell, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Locke. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lowe, E. J. 1995. Locke on Human Understanding. London: Routledge. Ch.2. Ayers, M. R. 1991. Locke. London: Routledge. Pt.I, Pt.III, Ch.18. ——. 1986. ‘Are Locke’s “Ideas” Images, Intentional Objects or Natural Signs?’. Locke Newsletter 17: 3-36. ——. 1998. ‘Ideas and Objective Being.’ In D. Garber and M. Ayers, eds., The Cambridge History of Seventeenth Century Philosophy: Two Volumes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Matthews, H. E. 1977. ‘Locke, Malebranche and the Representative Theory’. Reprinted in I. C. Tipton, ed., Locke on Human Understanding: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jolley, N. 1984. Leibniz and Locke: a Study of the New Essays on Human Understanding. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs. 1-4. Wall, I. 1977. ‘Locke’s Attack on Innateness’. Reprinted in I. C. Tipton, ed., Locke on Human Understanding: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

ii. Primary & Secondary Qualities Locke made use of the well-known seventeenth and eighteenth century distinction between primary and secondary qualities. There is a question to what extent Locke’s conception of the distinction draws on Boyle’s corpuscularianism, and whether in expounding the distinction in the way that he does, Locke commits himself to representationalism with respect to sensory ideas. For Locke’s discussion of the distinction see Essay, Bk. 2, Chs. 4 & 8; Bk. 4, Ch. 3. Secondary Reading Lowe, E. J. 1995. Locke on Human Understanding. London: Routledge. Ch.3. Ayers, M. R. 1991. Locke. London: Routledge. Vol. 1. Chs. 22-23. Smith, A. D. 1990. ‘Of Primary and Secondary Qualities’. Philosophical Review 99: 221-254. Brandt Bolton, M. 1983. ‘Locke and Pyrrhonism: The Doctrine of Primary and Secondary Qualities’. In M. Burnyeat ed., The Skeptical Tradition. Berkeley: University of California Press. McCann, E. 1994. ‘Locke’s Philosophy of Body’. In V. Chappell, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Locke. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williams, B. 1978. Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry. Hassocks: Harvester Press. pp.236-252. Mackie, J. L. 1976. Problems From Locke. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.1. Bennett, J. 1971. Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.4.

iii. Substance & Essence (Real & Nominal) Conceived purely as an empiricist, Locke is often credited with an attack on the notion of substance or substratum. However, close reading of the Essay suggests that Locke’s views on substance and essence are more involved than this. Essay, Bk. 2, Chs. xii, xiii; Bk. 3, Chs. iii, iv, vi, ix, secs. 12, 13, 17-20; Bk. 4, Chs. iii, secs. 11-16, 23-26, vi. Secondary Reading Mackie, J. L. 1976. Problems From Locke. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs.3, 5.3. Ayers, M. R. 1977. ‘Locke’s Ideas of Power & Substance’. Reprinted in I. C. Tipton, ed., Locke on Human Understanding: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ——. 1981. ‘Locke vs. Aristotle on Natural Kinds’. Journal of Philosophy 78: 247-272. ——. 1991. Locke. London: Routledge. Vol. 2, ontology, pt.I. Woolhouse, R. S. 1971. Locke’s Philosophy of Science & Knowledge: a Consideration of some aspects of ‘An essay concerning human understanding’. Oxford: Blackwell. Chs. IV-VIII. Atherton, M. 1984. ‘The Inessentiality of Lockean Essences’. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14: 277-294.

iv. Personal Identity For Locke, ‘person’ is a forensic term, associated with the attribution of responsibility. His novel account of personal identity is closely related to his remarks on

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substance and individuation; and it prefigures in many ways Kant’s critique of rational psychology. This chapter, which appeared only from the second edition on is Essay, Bk. 2, Ch. xxvii. Secondary Reading Perry, J. ed. 1975. Personal Identity. Berkeley: University of California Press. See selections from Butler and Reid. Noonan, H. 1989. Personal Identity. London: Routledge. Ch. 2. Alston, W. P., and J. Bennett. 1988. ‘Locke on People and Substances’. Philosophical Review 97: 25-46. Ayers, M. R. 1991. Locke. London: Routledge. Vol. 2, ontology, chs. 18-24. Allison, H. E. 1977. ‘Locke’s Theory of Personal Identity: A Re-examination’. Reprinted in I. C. Tipton, ed., Locke on Human Understanding: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Parfit, D. 1971. ‘Personal Identity’. Philosophical Review 80: 3-27. Reprinted in J. Perry, ed., Personal Identity.

F. BERKELEY A good selection of Berkeley’s works can be found in Philosophical Works, including the works on vision, introduction and notes by M. R. Ayers. London: J. M. Dent, 1975. Principles, Dialogues and Philosophical Correspondence, edited by Colin Murray Turbayne. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.

From which you should principally look at Principles of Human Knowledge. Three Dialogues between Hylas & Philonous. Student editions of these two have recently been published by Oxford University Press A Treatise Concerning Human Knowledge, edited by Jonathan Dancy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, edited by Jonathan Dancy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

You might also look at An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision, and the Philosophical Notebooks, both in the Ayers. Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher in Focus, a useful edition of which is edited by David Berman for Routledge, (London: Routledge, 1993).

The following are useful introductory books on Berkeley Berman, D. 1994. George Berkeley: Idealism and the Man. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Grayling, A. C. 1986. Berkeley: The Central Arguments. London: Duckworth. A difficult but rewarding book, unusually sympathetic to Berkeley. Pitcher, G. 1977. Berkeley. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. This discusses most aspects of Berkeley’s philosophy, including a chapter on the work on vision. Winkler, K. 1989. Berkeley: An Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. A recent study, which defends the view of Berkeley as a phenomenalist. Atherton, M. 1990. Berkeley’s Revolution in Vision. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Although this focuses on Berkeley’s theories of perception, it is importantly illuminating on the main areas of his thought. Warnock, G. J. 1969. Berkeley. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Rather out of date now. Dancy, J. 1987. Berkeley: an Introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Not a bad starting point to look at Berkeley, easier to digest than Grayling, if not quite as rewarding. Bennett, J. 1971. Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes. Oxford: Clarendon Press. To be treated with the same circumspection as on Locke.

The following are useful collections Foster, J., and H. Robinson, eds. 1985. Essays on Berkeley: a Tercentennial Celebration. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Martin, C. B., and D. M. Armstrong. eds. 1968. Locke and Berkeley: a Collection of Critical

Modern Philosophy 85 Essays. London: Macmillan. Turbayne, C. M. ed. 1982. Berkeley: Critical and Interpretative Essays. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Creery, Walter E. ed. 1991. George Berkeley: Critical Assessments. 4 Vols. London: Routledge.

i. Abstraction & the Idea of Matter The introduction to Berkeley’s principles contains his notorious attack on the notion of abstract idea, as it figures in the work of Locke. Many commentators have sought for the significance apparently accorded this disagreement in the role Berkeley’s anti-abstractionism plays in his arguments against matter though this neat interpretation is certainly questionable. For Locke’s own account of abstract ideas see his Essay, Bk. III, Chs. 1-3. In addition to the introduction to The Principles of Human Knowledge, also look at secs. 5, 135-140. Secondary Reading Ayers, M. R. 1991. Locke. London: Routledge. Pt.IV, chs. 26-28. Winkler, K. 1989. Berkeley: An Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs.1 & 2. Mackie, J. L. 1976. Problems From Locke. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.4. Grayling, A. C. 1986. Berkeley: The Central Arguments. London: Duckworth. pp. 29-42, 89-92. Pitcher, G. 1977. Berkeley. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch.5. Dancy, J. 1987. Berkeley: an Introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Ch.3. Geach, P. 1971. Mental Acts. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Secs. 6-11.

ii. Idealism Already by sec. 7 of the Principles, Berkeley seems to have in play the main elements of his idealism and his critique of materialism which are then played out further in the first part of the Principles (there is in fact no second part, it was apparently lost during a tour of Italy). In the mid-twentieth century a form of anti-materialism called phenomenalism had some popularity, and that has led some commentators to find phenomenalism in Berkeley. This is controversial, for there are forms of idealism which are not phenomenalist. Principles of Human Knowledge, in particular secs. 1-100, 133-156. Secondary Reading Ayers, M. R. 1975. ‘Introduction’ to Philosophical Works. Grayling, A. C. 1986. Berkeley: The Central Arguments. London: Duckworth. Chs. 2.5-2.6, 3.4. Winkler, K. 1989. Berkeley: An Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs.6 & 7. Foster, J. 1985. ‘Berkeley on the Physical World’. In J. Foster, and H. Robinson, eds., Essays on Berkeley: a Tercentennial Celebration. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Smith, A. D. 1985. ‘Berkeley’s Central Argument against Material Substance’. In J. Foster, and H. Robinson, eds., Essays on Berkeley: a Tercentennial Celebration. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Burnyeat, M. 1982. ‘Greek Philosophy and Idealism: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed’. Philosophical Review 90: 3-40. And in G. Vesey. ed., Idealism Past and Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

iii. God In addition to ideas, Berkeley allows for ‘notions’, we have notions of other subjects and of God. Both how Berkeley establishes the existence of God, and the role of God within his general metaphysics are matters of much dispute. Berkeley offers us a rare example of an anti-realist ‘proof ’ of the existence of God. See Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 135ff., Second Dialogue, Alciphron. Secondary Reading Mackie, J. L. 1982. The Miracle of Theism: Arguments For and Against the Existence of God. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.4.

86 Study Guide Winkler, K. 1989. Berkeley: An Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.9. Grayling, A. C. 1986. Berkeley: The Central Arguments. London: Duckworth. Ch.3.4. Pitcher, G. 1977. Berkeley. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Dancy, J. 1987. Berkeley: an Introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Ch.4.

G. HUME A Treatise of Human Nature, edited, with an analytical index, by L. A. Selby-Bigge. 2nd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, edited, with an analytical index by L. A. Selby-Bigge 3rd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

There are also editions published by Penguin Classics, and new editions from Oxford University Press A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by David Fate Norton, and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, edited by Tom L. Beauchamp. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

In the Treatise, you will need to look at Book 1. Introductory books on Hume Stroud, B. 1977. Hume. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Something of a standard introduction, emphasises Hume’s naturalism. Fogelin, R. J. 1985. Hume’s Scepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. This book, on the other hand, emphasises his scepticism. Flew, A. 1961. Hume’s Philosophy of Belief: a Study of his First ‘Inquiry’. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Rather old-fashioned, but still worth looking at. Bennett, J. 1971. Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes. Oxford: Clarendon Press. A defiantly ahistorical interpretation, as with the other two British Empiricists.

Rather less introductory, but important for the study of Hume Pears, D. 1990. Hume’s System: An Examination of the First Book of his Treatise. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Intended as an introductory text, this book is really quite difficult, but it is also excellent and rewards attention. Kemp Smith, N. 1941. The Philosophy of David Hume: a Critical Study of its Origins and Central Doctrines. London: Macmillan. A classic, offering a controversial interpretation of Hume as naturalist rather than sceptic. Strawson, G. 1989. The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism and David Hume. Oxford: Clarendon Press. A very thorough challenge to the ‘orthodox’ view of Hume’s account of causation. Craig, E. 1987. The Mind of God and the Works of Man. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.2. This has a revisionary attitude to Hume similar to that of the Strawson. Garrett, D. 1997. Cognition & Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. Frasca-Spada, M. 1998. Space and the Self in Hume's Treatise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Passmore, J. 1968. Hume’s Intentions. Rev. ed. London: Duckworth. Baier, A. 1991. A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume’s Treatise. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Fate Norton, D. 1982. David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Jones, P. 1982. Hume’s Sentiments: their Ciceronian and French Context. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Beauchamp, Tom L., and Alexander Rosenberg. 1981. Hume and the Problem of Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gaskin, J. C. A. 1988 Hume’s Philosophy of Religion. 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Useful collections of essays

Modern Philosophy 87 Fate Norton, D. ed. 1993. The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chappell, V. C. ed. 1968. Hume. London: Macmillan.

i. Impressions and Ideas In one sense the distinction between impression and idea is the fulcrum of Hume’s whole philosophy of mind; but on the other hand, it is both difficult to see exactly what the content of the distinction amounts to, and secondly on what grounds Hume holds to it. For his, rather unhelpful, exposition of perceptions and their classification into impression or idea, see Treatise, Bk. 1, Pt. 1, secs. i-iv and Enquiry, secs. i-iii, concentrate on ii. Secondary Reading Stroud, B. 1977. Hume. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch.2. Biro, J. 1993. ‘Hume’s New Science of the Mind’. In D. Fate Norton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pears, D. 1990. Hume’s System: An Examination of the First Book of his Treatise. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chs. 1 & 2. Geach, P. 1971. Mental Acts. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Secs. 1-10. Wittgenstein, L. 1958. The Blue & Brown Books. Oxford: Blackwell. pp.1-17, esp. pp.3, 11-15. Foster, J. 1985. Ayer. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. pp.38-44.

ii. Induction, Causation, & Necessity Hume is famous for his scepticism concerning inductive reasoning and the existence of causation. Such fame rests on controversy as to Hume’s real attitude towards causation and reasoning about probability. Hume is certainly wary of the role of ‘reason’ in the explanation or justification of our beliefs about the future and the powers at work in the world around us. Whether he denies that there are hidden mechanisms at play in the world guaranteeing its progress is a matter for discussion. For his own words on the matter see Treatise Bk.I, Pt.III & Abstract, pp.649-654 of Selby Bigge edition of Treatise, and Enquiry, secs. iv, v and ix. Secondary Reading Stroud, B. 1977. Hume. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Chs. 3 & 4. Pears, D. 1990. Hume’s System: An Examination of the First Book of his Treatise. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chs. 5-7. Craig, E. 1987. The Mind of God and the Works of Man. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.2 secs.1-4. Fogelin, R. J. 1985. Hume’s Scepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch. IV, and appendices A & B. Strawson, G. 1989. The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism and David Hume. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Rosenberg, A. 1993. ‘Hume & the Philosophy of Science’. In D. Fate Norton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Winkler, K. 1991. ‘The New Hume’. Philosophical Review 100: 541-579.

iii. The Self Hume denied that he could find any impression of his own self within the mind. In place of this, he appears to have offered a ‘bundle theory’ of the self. Although, as with his views on causation, there is some dispute as to Hume’s attitudes towards what there actually is, as opposed to what we have justification to believe. In the Appendix to the Treatise, Hume despaired of rendering his account of personal identity consistent, but is less than forthcoming about the problems he finds there. Look at Treatise, Bk. I, Pt. IV, sec. vi, plus relevant part of Appendix, pp.633-6 in Selby-Bigge. Secondary Reading Stroud, B. 1977. Hume. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch.6.

88 Study Guide Noonan, H. 1989. Personal Identity. London: Routledge. Ch.4. Pears, D. 1990. Hume’s System: An Examination of the First Book of his Treatise. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chs. 8 & 9. Craig, E. 1987. The Mind of God and the Works of Man. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.2, sec.5. Garrett, D. 1981. ‘Hume’s Self Doubts about Personal Identity’. Philosophical Review 90: 337-358. Frasca-Spada, M. 1998. Space and the Self in Hume's Treatise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

iv. Scepticism with Regard to the Senses Hume sets out to explain whence the notion of ‘body’ in his chapter on scepticism with regard to the senses in the Treatise. According to what he says there, the idea cannot be derived from either the senses or from reason, but must be the result of imagination. In the later presentation of the Enquiry, the positive aspects of the Treatise account have been removed, and Hume presents us solely with his sceptical argument (which he is concerned to claim as original to him) against our vulgar beliefs about the existence of a world independent of our senses.Treatise, Bk. I, Pt. IV, sec. ii, Enquiry, sec. xii, Pt. I. Secondary Reading Hookway, C. 1990. Scepticism. London: Routledge. Ch. V. Stroud, B. 1977. Hume. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch.5. Cook, J. 1968. ‘Hume’s Scepticism with Regard to the Senses’. American Philosophical Quarterly 5: 1-17. Fogelin, R. J. 1993. ‘Hume’s Scepticism’. In D. Fate Norton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pears, D. 1990. Hume’s System: An Examination of the First Book of his Treatise. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chs. 10-11. Strawson, P. F. 1974. ‘Imagination and Perception’. Reprinted in Freedom and Resentment. London: Methuen. M. Burnyeat, M. 1980. ‘Can the Sceptic Live his Scepticism?’. In Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat, and Jonathan Barnes, eds., Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press; reprinted in M. Burnyeat ed., The Skeptical Tradition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.

H. KANT The best translations of Kant’s First Critique at present are Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by N. Kemp Smith, 2nd ed., London: Macmillan, 1933. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Paul Guyer, and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

You should also look at Kant’s Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic of which various translations are available, the Carus translation is available from Hackett in revised form together with the Metaphysical Foundations of Nature, trans. by James W. Ellington, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977) For a guide to the First Critique read Sebastian Gardner’s Routledge Study Guide. For a very brief, but excellent overview of Kant’s complete philosophy, read R. Scruton, Kant. But for a more detailed bibliography for Kant see the separate entry for the Kant paper. For guidance on specific topics on Kant see the specialist paper on Kant below.

8

Philosophy of Mind

1 The Paper The philosophy of mind is concerned with metaphysical and epistemological issues which arise in reflecting on the mind. You will also find the Philosophy of Psychology section of this Guide useful, and various parts of the Logic and Metaphysics, and Epistemology and Methodology sections.

2 Basic Reading A. INTRODUCTORY TEXTS There are many introductions to the philosophy of mind currently available. The following three are reliable and useful: McGinn, C. 1991. The Character of Mind: an Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Originally published 1982.) Kim, J. 1996. The Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Westview Press. Braddon-Mitchell, D., and F. Jackson, eds. 1996. The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell.

B. ANTHOLOGIES Some basic anthologies. These collections contain quite a lot of the required reading. Rosenthal, D., ed. 1991. The Nature of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. probably the best anthology around. Beakley, B., and S. Ludlow, eds. 1992. The Philosophy of Mind: Classical Problems/Contemporary Issues. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. This collection covers a number of central themes on the metaphysics of mind and on mental phenomena, organised historically. Block, N. ed. 1980-81. Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, 2 vols. London: Methuen. The first volume contains many central papers on the metaphysics of mind. The papers in the second volume are more concerned with issues in the philosophy of psychology, such as mental imagery and the language of thought. Still very useful. Lycan, W. ed. 1990. Mind and Cognition: a Reader. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. This anthology contains some papers on the metaphysics of mind, but most of it is concerned with issues about mental representation, mental processing and folk psychology. Warner, R., and T. Szubka, eds. 1994. The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Oxford: Blackwell. Handy collection of recent papers on the mind-body problem, some new and some reprinted articles which have already become essential reading. Guttenplan, S., ed. 1994. A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell Reference. A collection of short survey articles, written especially for this volume, on the central topics in the philosophy of mind.

More specialised collections Stich, S., and T. Warfield, eds. 1994. Mental Representation: a Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. Lepore, E., and B. McLaughlin, eds. 1985. Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Tomberlin, J. ed. 1989. Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory. Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 3. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview. ——., ed. 1990. Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 4. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview.

90 Study Guide Wollheim, R., and J. Hopkins, eds. 1982. Philosophical Essays on Freud. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Heil, J., and A. Mele, eds. 1993. Mental Causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Moser, P., and J.D. Trout, eds. 1995. Contemporary Materialism: a Reader. London: Routledge. Charles, D., and K. Lennon, eds. 1992. Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. O’Hear, A., ed. 1998. Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

3 Topics The questions on this course can be broadly divided into three kinds. (a) The metaphysics of mind: questions about dualism, physicalism, functionalism, mental causation and so on. (b) The epistemology of mind: how do we know about our own minds? How do we know about the minds of others? (c) Mental phenomena: questions about (for example) consciousness, intentionality, action, self-deception, weakness of will, perception and memory (for which see also the entries under Epistemology & Methodology). N.B. In the reading lists which follow Items marked PP are in N. Block, ed. Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, 2 Vols. Items marked MC are in W. Lycan, ed. Mind and Cognition. Items marked NM are in D. Rosenthal, ed. The Nature of Mind.

A. THE METAPHYSICS OF MIND i. Physicalism/Materialism Physicalism says that reality is physical. So if the mind exists, it must be physical. There are broadly two sorts of physicalist view of the mind: (i) The first claims that mental items are identical with physical items. Such identity theories come in two kinds: ‘type’ identity theories those which claim that mental properties (types) are physical properties (types) and token identity theories those that claim that mental particulars (events, objects: ‘tokens’) are identical with physical particulars. (ii) The second kind of physicalism claims that mental items—events, states, properties, property instances, facts or objects—are realised by, constituted out of, or ontologically depedent or supervenient upon physical items. On type identity theory For statements of the theory see Smart, J.J.C. 1959. ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, Philosophical Review 68: 141-156. Lewis, D. 1966. ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory’, Journal of Philosophy 63:17-25. Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers, Vol.I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. Armstrong, D.M. 1977. ‘The Causal Theory of Mind’. Reprinted in NM. Lewis, D. 1994. ‘Reduction of Mind’, in S. Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Reprinted in D. Lewis. Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

One question for the type identity theory is whether it can accommodate the apparent fact that mental states are variably or multiply ‘realisable’ in creatures with different physical natures. Putnam, H. 1979. ‘The Nature of Mental States’, in Mind Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers, Vol.2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in PP Vol.I and MC.

Philosophy of Mind 91 Lewis, D. ‘Review of Putnam’, in PP Vol.I. Jackson, F. 1995. ‘Essentialism, Mental Properties and Causation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:253-68. (See also the relevant sections of Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson, The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition.) Kim, J. 1998. Mind in a Physical World: an Essay on the Mind-body Problem and Mental Causation. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Ch. 4.

Kripke has criticised the type identity theory by employing his well-known arguments about the necessity of identity. Kripke, S.1971. ‘Identity and Necessity’, in Identity and Individuation, ed., M. Munitz. New York: New York University Press. Reprinted in Honderich & Burnyeat, eds., Philosophy as it is. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979; and in PP. —— 1980. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell. See esp. Lecture 3, reprinted in NM. McGinn, C. 1977. ‘Anomalous Monism and Kripke’s Cartesian Intuitions’, Analysis 37: 7880. Reprinted in PP Vol.I.

On token identity theory Davidson, D. 1980. ‘Mental Events’, in his Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Reprinted in PP and NM. For a good comentary on Davidson see: Evnine, S. 1991. Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Polity. Ch.4. McGinn, C. 1991. The Character of Mind: an Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Originally published 1982.). Ch.2. Peacocke, C. 1979. Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.III, §§2, 3.

On physicalism and subjectivity A central objection to physicalism of any form is whether it can account for the subjective nature of experience. Nagel, T. 1974. ‘What is it like to be a Bat?’, Philosophical Review 83: 435-50. Reprinted in T. Nagel. Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Jackson, F. 1982. ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127-36. Reprinted in MC. ——. 1986. ‘What Mary didn’t Know’, Journal of Philosophy 83: 291-5. Reprinted in NM. Lewis, D. ‘What Experience Teaches’, in MC. Jackson, F. ‘Postscript’, in P.K. Moser and J.D. Trout, eds. 1995. Contemporary Materialism: a Reader. London: Routledge.

See also Consciousness, below (section C.i). On supervenience There are various versions of the claim that the mental supervenes on the physical (‘no mental difference without a physical difference’). Supervenience is often claimed to be the most non-committal form of physicalism. Kim, J. 1983. ‘Concepts of Supervenience’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45: 153-76. Reprinted in J. Kim, Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Charles, D. 1992. ‘Supervenience, Composition and Physicalism’, in D. Charles and K. Lennon, eds. Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Papineau, D. 1990. ‘Why Supervenience?’, Analysis 50: 66-71. Horgan, T. 1993. ‘From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of the Material World’, Mind 102: 555-86. Jackson, F. 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics: a Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 1 Kim, J. 1998. Mind in a Physical World. Chs. 1 & 4.

See Logic & Metaphysics for further reading. Eliminative materialism Eliminative materialists claim that the commonsense theory we use to attribute mental states to others is false, and that therefore the entities it talks about do not exist.

92 Study Guide Feyerabend, P.K. 1963. ‘Mental Events and the Brain’, Journal of Philosophy 60: 295-6. Reprinted in MC and in NM. Churchland, P.M. 1981. ‘Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes’, Journal of Philosophy 78: 67-90. Reprinted in MC. Quine, W.V. 1966. ‘On Mental Entities’, in The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. New York: Random House. Horgan, T., and J. Woodward. 1985. ‘Folk Psychology is Here to Stay’, Philosophical Review 94: 197-226. Reprinted in MC. Stich, S. 1996. Deconstructing the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. 1.

On the issue of physicalism in general What is the problem to which physicalism is supposed to be a solution? Is the issue of physicalism clearly formulated? Snowdon, P. 1989. ‘On Formulating Materialism and Dualism’, in J. Heil, ed., Cause, Mind and Reality: essays honoring C.B. Martin. Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Academic. Stroud, B. 1986-87. ‘The Physical World’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87: 263-277. Wilson, M. 1985. ‘What is This Thing Called “Pain”?’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66: 22767. A difficult paper. Crane, T., and D.H. Mellor. 1990. ‘There is No Question of Physicalism’, Mind 99: 185-206. Reprinted in D.H. Mellor, Matters of Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; and in P. Moser and J.D. Trout, eds., Contemporary Materialism. Blackburn, S. 1993. ‘Losing Your Mind’, in Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pettit, P. 1993. ‘A Definition of Physicalism’, Analysis 53: 213-23. Papineau, D. 2000. ‘The Rise of Physicalism’, in M.W.F. Stone & J. Wolff, eds., The Proper Ambition of Science. London: Routledge.

ii. Dualism Traditionally dualists have claimed that mental substances are distinct from physical or material substances. Some philosophers also talk about property dualism. Foster, J. 1996. The Immaterial Self: a Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind. London: Routledge. Hart, W.D. 1988. Engines of the Soul. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs.1-3. Strawson, P.F. 1974. ‘Self, Mind & Body’, in Freedom & Resentment and other essays. London: Methuen. Shoemaker, S. 1983. ‘On an Argument for Dualism’, in C. Ginet, and S. Shoemaker, eds., Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in S. Shoemaker, Identity, Cause & Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1984. Bealer, G. 1994. ‘Mental Properties’, in Journal of Philosophy 53: 213-23.

See Logic & Metaphysics for further reading.

iii. Functionalism Functionalism is the view that mental states (types/properties) are individuated by their causal roles: that is their characteristic patterns of relations to their inputs (e.g. perceptions), their outputs (e.g. actions) and other mental states. There are various kinds of functionalism: for example, some versions of functionalism take the position to be recommended by common sense (Lewis), others as its being a product of scientific psychology. Functionalists also differ about whether mental states are to be seen as identical with functional states or rather with what realises such states. Block, N. ‘What is Functionalism?’, in PP Vol.I. Putnam, H. 1979. ‘The Nature of Mental States’, in Mind Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Vol.2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in PP and MC. Lewis, D. 1972. ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identification’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50: 249-58. Reprinted in PP Vol.I, and NM.

Philosophy of Mind 93 ——. 1999. ‘Reduction of Mind’, in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; reprinted in S. Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Shoemaker, S. 1981. ‘Some Varieties of Functionalism’, Philosophical Topics 12: 83-118; reprinted in his Identity, Cause and Mind.

One of the main threats facing functionalism is whether it can account for the qualitative character of mental states. Block, N. ‘Troubles with Functionalism’, in PP and MC. Shoemaker, S. 1975. ‘Functionalism and Qualia’, Philosophical Studies 27: 291-315; reprinted in his Identity, Cause and Mind, PP and NM. Lewis, D. 1983. ‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain’, in Philosophical Papers, Vol.I. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in PP and NM. Zuboff, A. 1995. ‘What is a Mind?’, in P.A. French, T.E. Uehling, Jr., and H.K. Wettstein, eds., Philosophical Naturalism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.

iv. Causal theories of mind Many accounts of the mind treat mental concepts as causal concepts. There is a common pattern in the arguments offered in the case of each mental phenomenon, and a common problem of ‘deviant causal chains’. Davidson, D. 1980. ‘Actions, Reasons and Causes’, in Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Grice, H.P. 1961. ‘The Causal Theory of Perception’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 35: 121-52. Abridged in J. Dancy, ed. Perceptual Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Martin, C.B., and M. Deutscher. 1966. ‘Remembering’, Philosophical Review 75: 161-96. Owens, D. 1992. Causes and Coincidences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.7. Peacocke, C. 1979. Holistic Explanation, Ch.2. Armstrong, D. 1980. ‘The Causal Theory of Mind’, in The Nature of Mind and Other Essays. Brighton: Harvester. Reprinted in MC.

v. Mental causation Do states of mind have effects in the physical world? If so, how is this compatible with a physicalist or a naturalistic world view? Some see this as a special problem for Davidson’s Anomalous Monism; others see a problem for physicalism in general. Honderich, T. 1982. ‘The Argument for Anomalous Monism’, Analysis 16: 59-64. Davidson, D. 1993. ‘Thinking Causes’, in J. Heil and A. Mele, eds., Mental Causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kim, J. 1984. ‘Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation’, reprinted in his Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993; and in NM. Yablo, S. 1992. ‘Mental Causation’, Philosophical Review 101: 245-80. Crane, T. 1995. ‘The Mental Causation Debate’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69: 211-36. Kim, J. 1998. Mind in a Physical World, Chs. 2 & 3.

B. EPISTEMOLOGY OF MIND i. The Problem of Other Minds Do we know that others have minds as we do? Can we know how alike the minds of others are to us? Traditionally this has been conceived as a sceptical problem about our knowledge of minds, or even our ability to conceive of there being minds other than our own. This topic has now become one of more specific interest within devel-

94 Study Guide

opmental psychology, with the question: how and when we do acquire or apply mental concepts? For this topic see the section immediately below. Ayer, A.J. 1954. ‘The Problem of Other Minds’, in Philosophical Essays. London: Macmillan. Putnam, H. 1979. ‘Other Minds’, reprinted in Mind, Language & Reality. Carruthers, P. 1986. Introducing Persons: Theories and Arguments in the Philosophy of Mind. London: Croom Helm. Ch.1. Austin, J.L. 1970. ‘Other Minds’, in J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock, eds. Philosophical Papers of J. L. Austin. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1972. Pt.I, secs. 243-315, Pt.II, iv. Nagel, T. 1986. The View from Nowhere. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.II. Kripke, S. 1982. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: an Elementary Exposition. Oxford: Blackwell. Appendix.

ii. Theory versus simulation What is it to attribute mental states to others? Some philosophers say that it is a matter of applying a theory, commonsense or ‘folk’ psychology. (This is sometimes known as the ‘theory theory’. ) Others say that it is a matter of a kind of imaginative projection into others’ minds, which they call ‘simulation’ or ‘replication’. A simple introduction to the issue can be found in T. Crane. 1995. The Mechanical Mind: a Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines and Mental Representation. London: Penguin. Ch.2. For the ‘theory theory’ Sellars, W. 1997. Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, with an introduction by Richard Rorty, and a study guide by Robert Brandom. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press. Originally published in H. Feigl and M. Scriven, eds., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 1. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956. Reprinted W. Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality. New York: Humanities Press, 1963. Difficult, but influential starting point of the debate. Rorty, R. 1980. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Oxford: Blackwell. Ch.2, easier summary and discussion of Sellars; an abridged version is in NM. Churchland, P. 1991. ‘Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human Behaviour’, in J. Greenwood, ed., The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press. Dennett, D. 1971. ‘Intentional Systems’, Journal of Philosophy 68: 87-106. Reprinted in Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. London: Penguin, 1977. ——. 1975. ‘True Believers: the Intentional Strategy and Why it Works’, reprinted in his The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987; and in MC and NM.

The simulation approach is defended by Gordon, R.M. 1986. ‘Folk Psychology as Simulation’, Mind and Language 1: 158-71. Heal, Jane. 1986. ‘Replication and Functionalism’, in J. Butterfield, ed., Language, Mind and Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in M. Davies and T. Stone, eds., Folk Psychology: the Theory of Mind Debate. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.

See also Mind and Language, special issue 1992: Mental Simulation, reprinted in modified form in the following two volumes: Davies, M., and T. Stone, eds., 1995. Folk Psychology: the Theory of Mind Debate. ——, 1995. Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications. Oxford: Blackwell. These contain important papers both by philosophers and psychologists. Peacocke, C. ed. 1996. Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness: Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Proceedings of the British Academy 83 (1994). Oxford: Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press. See the essays by J. Heal and M. Davies. Smith, P., and P. Carruthers, eds. 1996. Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. This too is an interdisciplinary volume, with contributions by both

Philosophy of Mind 95 philosophers and psychologists.

iii. Introspection and First Person Authority. How do we know what we think? What is it to introspect our own mental states? Do we have some form of special inner observation, do we infer it from our own behaviour, or is there no special way of knowing at all? We seem to have a kind of authority (‘first person authority’) about the contents of our own minds. What is this authority? (See also the entry under externalism and self-knowledge below.) Cassam, Q. ed. 1994. Self Knowledge. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. This is an excellent anthology which contains most of the essential reading. Descartes, R. Meditations. Second meditation. Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1972. §§243-308, §§412-427. Budd, M. 1989. Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology, London: Routledge. Introduction and Ch.3. Heal, J. 1994. ‘Moore’s Paradox: a Wittgensteinian Approach’, Mind 103: 5-24. Ryle, G. ‘Self-Knowledge’, in Cassam. Armstrong, D.M. 1968. A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Ch.15. Reprinted in Cassam. Shoemaker, S. 1986. ‘Introspection and the Self’, in P.A. French, T.E. Uehling, Jr., and H.K. Wettstein, eds. Studies in the Philosophy of Mind. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10. Reprinted in his First Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; and in Cassam. ——. 1989. ‘First-Person Access’, in Tomberlin, ed., Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory. Philosophical Perspectives 3. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview. Reprinted in his First Person Perspective and Other Essays. Davidson, D. 1984 ‘First-Person Authority’, in Dialectica 38: 101-12. ——. 1987. ‘Knowing One’s Own Mind’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60: 441-58. Reprinted in Cassam. Burge, Tyler. 1988. ‘Individualism and Self Knowledge’, Journal of Philosophy 85: 649-63. Reprinted in Cassam. Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. J. McDowell., ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. See pp.205-233, reprinted in Cassam. Peacocke, C. 1992. A Study of Concepts, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Ch.6. Burge, Tyler. 1996. ‘Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96: 91-116. Also have a look at Peacocke, Burge and Davies in C. Macdonald, B. Smith, C. Wright, eds., On Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.

C. MENTAL PHENOMENA i. Consciousness and experience Consciousness has traditionally been considered the mark of the mental. But what exactly is consciousness? Is there a univocal notion of consciousness, or is the notion of consciousness applied to experience different from the notion applied to thought? Can there be a unified theory of consciousness? Some doubt whether there can be a theory of consciousness at all, on account of its ineffability. A good general collection is The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, eds., N. Block, O. Flanagan & G. Güzeldere. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,1997. The conscious and the unconscious What is the link between consciousness and mentality? How should consciousness in general be understood? How should we understand the notion of an unconscious mental state? Gardner, S. 1991. ‘The Unconscious’, in J. Neu, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Freud.

96 Study Guide Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rosenthal, D. 1986. ‘Two Concepts of Consciousness’, Philosophical Studies 94: 329-59. Reprinted in NM. Mellor, D.H. 1991. ‘Consciousness and Degrees of Belief’, in Matters of Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Davies, M., and G. Humphreys, eds. 1993. Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Blackwell. Introduction. Searle, J. 1992. The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Ch.7. Dennett, D. 1978. ‘Towards a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness’, in his Brainstorms. London: Penguin.

Phenomenal consciousness and qualia Some argue that consciousness involves being aware of ineffable, non-intentional properties, known as ‘qualia’. Others doubt whether there are such properties. (See also Physicalism/Materialism, above.) Shoemaker, S. 1990. ‘Qualities and Qualia: What’s in the Mind?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50 (Supplement): 109-31. Reprinted in Shoemaker, The FirstPerson Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. ——. 1991. ‘Qualia and Consciousness’, Mind 100: 507-24. Reprinted in Shoemaker, The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Harman, G. 1990. ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’, J. Tomberlin, ed., Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 4. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview. Davies, M., and G. Humphreys, eds. 1993. Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Blackwell. Introduction. Dennett, D. 1988. ‘Quining Qualia’ in A. Marcel, and E. Bisiach, eds., Consciousness and Contemporary Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Reprinted in MC.

See also Peacocke, C. 1983. Sense & Content: Experience, Thought and their Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.1. O’Shaughnessy, B. 2000. Consciousness and the World. Oxford: Clkarendon Press. Pts. I & II. Dretske, F. 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Ch.3. Tye, M.1995. Ten Problems of Consciousness: a Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Ch.1. Chalmers, D. 1996. The Conscious Mind: in Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bodily sensations What is it to be aware of the states of one’s own body? Is bodily awareness simply a kind of perception? Armstrong, D.M. 1968. A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Ch.14. O’Shaughnessy, Brian. 1980. The Will: a Dual Aspect Theory. Vol.I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.5. ——. 2000. Consciousness and the World. Oxford: Clkarendon Press. Pt. IV. Wittgenstein, L. The Blue and Brown Books. (Preliminary studies for the Philosophical investigations: generally known as the blue and brown books.) Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958. pp.48-57. ——, Philosophical Investigations, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1972. §§243-315. Anscombe, G.E.M. 1962. ‘On Sensations of Position’, Analysis 22: 55-8. Reprinted in The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, Vol. II: Metaphysics & the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell, 1981.

Perceptual content Many contemporary writers claim that experiences involve intentional content in something like the way beliefs and other intentional states do (see Intentionality, below). If

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this is so, then how should perception be distinguished from belief? Searle, J.R. 1983. Intentionality: an Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.2. Harman, G. 1990. ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’, in Philosophical Perspectives, 4: 3152; and in Reasoning, Meaning and Mind, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999. Burge, Tyler. 1991. ‘Vision and Intentional Content’, in E. Lepore and R. van Gulick, eds., John Searle and his Critics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Peacocke, C. 1983. Sense and Content, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.1.

See also Peacocke, C. 1992. A Study of Concepts, Ch.3. McDowell, J 1982. ‘Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge’, Proceedings of the British Academy 68: 455-79. Reprinted in J. McDowell, Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998. Reprinted and abridged in J. Dancy, ed., Perceptual Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. ——. 1994. Mind and World. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Chs.1-3, 6, Appendices 1 & 2.

Imagery What is it to form a mental image of something? Some claim that images have the structure of pictures, others that they are structured like sentences. What does this distinction amount to? How does it relate to the phenomenology of mental imagery? For some classic readings, see the relevant section of PP Vol. II. See also Dennett, D. 1978. ‘Two Approaches to Mental Images’, in Brainstorms. London: Penguin. Tye, M. 1991. The Imagery Debate, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Chs.1, 3, 5 & 6. Ishiguro, H. 1966. ‘Imagination’, in B.A.O. Williams and A. Montefiore, eds, British Analytical Philosophy. London: Routledge and Kegal Paul. Williams, B.A.O. 1966. ‘Imagination and the Self’, reprinted in his Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-1972. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Peacocke, C. 1985. ‘Imagination, Experience and Possibility’, in J. Foster, and H. Robinson, eds., Essays on Berkeley: a Tercentennial Celebration. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Block, N. ‘Mental Pictures and Cognitive Science’, in MC. Sterelny, K. ‘The Imagery Debate’, in MC. Eilan, N. 1993. ‘Review of Tye, The Imagery Debate,’ Philosophical Books. Akins, K. 1994. ‘Review of Tye, The Imagery Debate,’ Philosophical Review. Kosslyn, S. 1995. ‘Mental Imagery’, in S. Kosslyn, and D. Osherson, eds., Visual Cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. A brief introduction to the psychological debate. ——, 1994. Image and Brain: the Resolution of the Imagery Debate. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. A more detailed account of his approach.

ii. Intentionality Many mental states, like beliefs, desires and hopes, are ‘directed’ upon, or about, things in the world. ‘Intentionality’ is a technical term for the directedness or ‘aboutness’ of these states of mind. There are many problems which such ‘intentional states’ pose for philosophy of mind. The nature of intentionality Are all mental phenomena intentional? Is intentionality the ‘mark’ of the mental? How should intentionality be characterised? Is it a relation? But one can think about something that does not exist, so to what is one related in this case? What is the relation between intentionality and the logical notion of intensionality? Crane, T. 1995. The Mechanical Mind: a Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines and Mental Representation. London: Penguin. Ch.1. Stalnaker, R. 1984. Inquiry. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Chs.1 and 2.

98 Study Guide Searle, J.R. 1983. Intentionality: an Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ch.1. Anscombe, G.E.M. 1981. ‘The Intentionality of Sensation: a Grammatical Feature’, in The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, Vol. II: Metaphysics & the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell. Haugeland, J. 1990. ‘The Intentionality All-Stars’, in J. Tomberlin, ed., Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 4. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview. Chisholm, R.M. 1961 Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Ch.11, reprinted in NM. Mackie, J.L. 1975. ‘Problems of Intentionality’, in E. Pivcevic, ed., Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Mackie, Logic & Knowledge: Selected Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. Crane, T. 1998. ‘Intentionality as the mark of the mental’, in A. O’Hear, ed., Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Intentionality and propositional attitudes Many intentional states are usefully characterised as attitudes to propositions. Can all intentionality be characterised in this way? (See Emotion, below) Can the different types of attitude be distinguished in terms of ‘direction of fit’? Russell, B. 1912. Problems of Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.5. Fodor, J. 1978. ‘Propositional Attitudes’, The Monist 61: 501-23. Reprinted in his Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1981, and in NM. Dennett, D. 1982. ‘Beyond Belief’, in A. Woodfield, ed., Thought and Object: Essays on Intentionality. Oxford: Clarendon Press, and reprinted in his The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987. Anscombe, G.E.M. 1976. Intention. 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. §2. Humberstone, I.L. 1992. ‘Direction of Fit’, Mind 101: 59-83.

The reduction of intentionality Many physicalists think that intentionality must be explained in wholly non-intentional and non-mental terms. A central problem for these explanations is how to account for misrepresentation. Stich, S., and T. Warfield, eds. 1994. Mental Representation: a Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. A very useful collection, which contains examples of all the reductive theories of intentional content. Crane, T. 1995. The Mechanical Mind, London: Penguin. Ch.5, an elementary introduction. Fodor, J. 1987. Psychosemantics: the Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press. Ch.4. Dretske, F. 1980. ‘The Intentionality of Cognitive States’, in P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 5. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in NM. ——. 1986. ‘Misrepresentation’, in R. Bogdan, ed., Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Papineau, D. 1993. Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford: Blackwell. Ch.3. Millikan, R. ‘Thoughts Without Laws’, and ‘Biosemantics’, reprinted in her White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993. Cummins, R. 1989. Meaning and Mental Representation. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Ch.8 gives Cummins’s own view; the rest of the book is a useful survey of other views.

The language of thought See chapter on Philosophy of Psychology. Internalism/Externalism How do a thinker’s intentional states depend on the social and physical environment of the thinker? Externalists claim that there is a necessary or constitutive dependence of thoughts upon environment; internalists deny this.

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Three useful collections of papers are Pessin, A., and S. Goldberg, eds. 1996. The Twin Earth Chronicles: Twenty Years of Reflection on Hilary Putnam’s “The meaning of ‘meaning’”. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe. Contains most of the classic papers on the subject, and some more recent work. McDowell, J., and P. Pettit, eds. 1986. Subject, Thought and Context, Oxford: Clarendon Press. The Introduction is particularly useful. Woodfield, A. ed. 1982. Thought and Object. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Basic Reading Putnam, H 1975. ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, reprinted in his Philosophical papers, Vol.2: Mind Language and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979; OR ‘Meaning and Reference’, Journal of Philosophy, 1973, 70: 699-711, reprinted in S.P. Schwarz, ed., Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977. Burge, Tyler. 1979. ‘Individualism and the Mental’, in P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 4. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in NM. Fodor, J. 1987. Psychosemantics: the Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press. Ch.2. Stalnaker, R. 1989. ‘On What’s In the Head’, in J. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory. Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 3. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview. Reprinted in NM.

Further Reading McCulloch, G. 1995. The Mind and Its World. London: Routledge. Pt.II. Boghossian, P. 1994. ‘The Transparency of Mental Content’, in J. Tomberlin, ed., Logic and Language. Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 8. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview. McGinn, C. 1989. Mental Content, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Ch.1.

Object-dependent thought One variety of externalism holds that certain thoughts cannot be had unless the objects they concern actually exist. Internalists object that this thesis leaves unexplained certain features of the role of thought in the explanation of action. Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. J. McDowell., ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs.1-6. McDowell, J. 1986. ‘Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space’, in J. McDowell, and P. Pettit, eds., Subject, Thought and Context. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Reprinted in J. McDowell, Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998. Segal, G. 1990. ‘The Return of the Individual’, Mind 98: 39-57. Noonan, H. 1986. ‘Russellian Thoughts and Methodological Solipsism’, in J. Butterfield, ed., Language, Mind and Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Burge, Tyler. 1983. ‘Russell’s Problem & Intentional Identity’, in J. Tomberlin, ed., Agent, Language & the Structure of the World: Essays Presented to Hector-Neri Castañeda, with his Replies. Indianapolis: Hackett. Blackburn, S. 1984. Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 9.

Externalism and self-knowledge If a thinker’s states of mind constitutively depend on facts in their environment, how can thinkers have any epistemic authority over what they are thinking? Davidson, D. 1987. ‘Knowing One’s Own Mind’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60: 441-58. Reprinted in Q. Cassam., ed., Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. Burge, Tyler. 1988. ‘Individualism and Self Knowledge’, Journal of Philosophy 85: 649-663; reprinted in Cassam, ed., Self-Knowledge. McKinsey, M. 1991. ‘Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access’, Analysis 51: 9-16. Brueckner, A. 1992. ‘What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori’, Analysis 52: 111-18. Boghossian, P. ‘What the Externalist Can Know A Priori’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 161-175. See also the essays in P. Ludlow, and N. Martin, eds., 1998, Externalism & Self-Knowledge. Stanford, Calif.: CSLI Publications.

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iii. Emotion How should a theory of mind explain emotions? Are they akin to cognitive states, like beliefs? What is the relation between kinds of emotion and the feelings or sensations associated with them? Should we appeal to psychoanalytic or psychological theories of the mind to explain emotion? Sartre, J-P. Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions (Esquisse d’une théorie des emotions), translated by Philip Mairet; with a preface by Mary Warnock. London: Methuen, 1962. Budd, M. 1985. Music and the Emotions: the Philosophical Theories. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Ch.1. Greenspan, P. 1988. Emotion and Reasons: an Inquiry into Emotional Justification. London: Routledge. Chs.1, 5 & 6. Robinson, J. 1995. ‘Startle’, Journal of Philosophy 92: 53-74. Gordon, R. 1990. The Structure of Emotion: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——. 1980. ‘Fear’, Philosophical Review 89: 560-78. Walton, K. 1978. ‘Fearing Fictions’, Journal of Philosophy 75: 5-27. Goldie, P. 2000. Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Oatley, K. & J. Jenkins. 1995. Understanding Emotions. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Frijda, N. 1987. The Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wollheim, R. 1999. On the Emotions. London: Yale University Press. Griffiths, P. 1997. What Emotions Really Are. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

iv. Action and intention There are three main groups of issues in the study of action. The first is whether actions are caused by the mental states which rationalise them. The second is about the relation between trying and acting. The third is about the special relations which agents bear to their own actions. Intention, a closely related topic, is also a subject of interest in its own right. A useful collection here is A. Mele, ed., The Philosophy of Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Causation and action Davidson, D. ‘Actions, Reasons and Causes’, and ‘Agency’, reprinted in his Essays on Actions and Events, and in A. Mele, ed., The Philosophy of Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Melden, A.I. 1961. Free Action. Routledge & Kegan Paul. Chs.3-5. Anscombe, G.E.M. 1983. ‘The Causation of Behaviour’, in C. Ginet, and S. Shoemaker, eds., Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essays in honour of Norman Malcolm. Oxford: Oxford University Press Ginet, C. 1990. On Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Agency Is human action to be characterised, like animal action, as a product of motivations? Or is it to be explained in terms of a distinctive practical rationality? Does human action need to appeal to a special kind of causation, agent-causation, in order to accommodate free will or the special role of their agent in their actions? Chisholm, R.M. 1975. ‘The Agent as Cause’, in M. Brand, and D. Walton eds., Action Theory. Dordrecht: Reidel. Davidson, D. ‘Agency’, reprinted in his Essays on Actions and Events. Frankfurt, H. 1988. ‘The Problem of Action’, in his The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pink, T. 1996-7. ‘Reason and Agency’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 263-80. Velleman, J. David. 1992. ‘What Happens When Someone Acts?’, Mind 101: 461-81. O’Shaughnessy, Brian. 1980. The Will: a Dual Aspect Theory. Vol.I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pt.I.

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The ontology of action What are the relations between trying and action, and the bodily movements it involves? Is bodily movement essential to action? Davis, L. 1979. The Theory of Action. Englewood Cliffs; London: Prentice-Hall. Chs.1-2. McGinn, C. 1991. The Character of Mind: an Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Originally published 1982.). Ch.3. Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1972. Secs. 611-32. Anscombe, G.E.M. 1976. Intention. 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. See esp. secs. 1-16; and ‘Intention’, in The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, Vol. II: Metaphysics & the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell, 1981. Danto, A. 1965. ‘Basic Actions’, American Philosophical Quarterly 2: 141-48. O’Shaughnessy, B. 1974. ‘Trying (as the Mental Pineal Gland)’, Journal of Philosophy 70: 365-86. Hornsby, J. 1980. Actions, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Chs.1-4. Smith, M. 1983 ‘Actions, Attempts & Internal Events’, in Analysis 43: 142-46. Goldman, A. 1971. ‘The Individuation of an Action’, Journal of Philosophy 68: 761-74. Davidson, D. ‘Agency’, in his Essays on Actions and Events.

Intention Are intentions a distinctive kind of mental state, or can they be fully explained in terms of beliefs and desires? Bratman, M. 1987. Intention, Plans and Practical Reason. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Chs.1-3, 8 & 9. Davidson, D. ‘Intending’, in Essays on Actions and Events. Harman, G.1986. Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Ch.8. Charles, D. 1989. ‘Intention’, in J. Heil, ed., Cause, Mind and Reality: Essays honoring C.B. Martin. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. Pink, T. 1991 ‘Purposive Intending’, Mind, 99:343-359. ——. 1996. The Psychology of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

v. Irrationality: self-deception and weakness of will The phenomenon of self-deception seems common enough. Yet surely I must know something in order to hide it from someone. How then can I hide it from or deceive myself? Connected to this is the problem of weakness of will (or akrasia): how is it possible that I rightly take my reasons for action to favour one course of action but chose another? Freud, S. Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis (Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse), translated by James Strachey. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974. Lectures 16-19 Davidson, D. 1985. ‘Deception and Division’, in E. Lepore, and B. McLaughlin, eds., Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Davidson, D. 1982. ‘Paradoxes of Irrationality’, in R. Wollheim, and J. Hopkins, eds., Philosophical Essays on Freud. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Johnston, M. 1988. ‘Self-Deception and the Nature of the Mind’, in B. McLaughlin, and A.O. Rorty, eds., Perspectives on Self-Deception. Berkeley: University of California Press. Davidson, D. ‘How is Weakness of the Will Possible?’, in his Essays on Actions and Events. Watson, G. 1977. ‘Scepticism about Weakness of the Will’, Philosophical Review 86: 316-39. Thalberg, I. 1985. ‘Questions about Motivational Strength’, in E. Lepore, and B. McLaughlin, eds., Actions and Events. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Pears, D. 1984. Motivated Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Mele, A. 1987. Irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press.

See also Entries under Mind and Nature in Logic & Metaphysics; Perception and Memory in Epistemology & Methodology; and the entries under Cognitive Psychology and Philosophy of Psychoanalysis in Philosophy of Psychology.

9

Philosophy of Religion

1 Paper The Philosophy of Religion is not a subject that is easily demarcated in respect of its scope and point. That said, the Philosophy of Religion is commonly understood to be the philosophical scrutiny of the claims of religious believers and those made on behalf of religious traditions. The focus of study is principally on the three monotheistic traditions of the West: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Those coming to the subject for the first time need to be aware that the it demands competence in many of the central areas of philosophy: metaphysics, philosophical logic, epistemology, and ethics. In this respect, the subject provides a student with an opportunity to apply their general philosophical acumen to a body of important questions concerning theism. Among the questions raised are: the existence of God; the coherence of theism; the compatibility of divine omniscience and human freedom; the problem of evil; and immortality.

2 General Reading Anthologies Pojman, L. ed. Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology. Quinn, Philip L., and Charles Taliaferro. eds. 1997. A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Blackwell. Peterson, M., W. Hasker, B. Reichenbach, and D. Basinger. eds. 1996. Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cahn, Steven M., and David Shatz. eds. 1982. Contemporary Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Morris, T. V. ed. 1987. The Concept of God. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mitchell, B. ed. 1971. The Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davies, B. ed. 2000. Philosophy of Religion: a Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press. Stump, E., and M. Murray. eds. 1998. Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions. Oxford: Blackwell. Helm, Paul. ed. 1999. Faith and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davies, B. ed. 1998. Philosophy of Religion. A Guide to the Subject. London: Cassell.

Introductory Texts Taliaferro, C. 1998. Contemporary Philosophy of Religion. Oxford. Blackwell. Le Poidevin, R. 1996. Arguing for Atheism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. New York: Routledge. Kenny, A. 1979. The God of the Philosophers. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Mackie, J. L. 1982. The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and Against the Existence of God. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Swinburne, R. 1996. Is There a God? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davies, B. 1993. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Peterson, M., W. Hasker, B. Reichenbach, and D. Basinger, eds. 1998. Reason & Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wainwright, W. J., and William L. Rowe. eds. 1973. Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Smart, J. J. C., and J. S. Haldane. 1996. Atheism and Theism. Oxford: Blackwell.

Philosophy of Religion 103 Davis, Stephen T. 1997. God, Reason and Theistic Proofs. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Morris, Thomas V. 1991. Our Idea of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Stone, M. W. F. 1998. ‘Philosophy of Religion’. In A. C. Grayling ed., Philosophy 2: Further through the subject. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

You should also consult the following journals Religious Studies. Faith & Philosophy. International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion. Philosophia.

3 Topics A. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD Traditionally three ‘proofs’ for the existence of God have dominated philosophical discussion of this issue. These are the ontological proof, the cosmological proof, and the argument from design. A more recent addition to the list of theistic proofs are moral arguments for the existence of God.

i. The Ontological Proof The ontological proof is an a priori argument which seeks to show the existence of God from our possession of a concept or idea of God or a perfect being. There are at least two different versions of this argument. The first is to be found in Anselm, Proslogion, 2 & 3 (this form of argument can in fact be traced back at least as far as Diogenes of Babylon; see Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicus, Bk.9, ll.133-136); for a contemporary criticism of this form of argument see Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a, 1, 2. The second form of the argument is to be found in Descartes, see Meditations, V (this form of the argument has antecedents in Bonaventure; see de Mysterio Trinitatis, I1, ll.21-24); this is famously criticised in Kant, see The Critique of Pure Reason, A592/ B620–A603/B631. In recent times, interest in the argument has been revived by Norman Malcolm and Alvin Plantinga. For related issues see entries on names, descriptions and existence in Logic and Metaphysics and object-dependent thought and externalism and self-knowledge in Philosophy of Mind. Further Reading Malcolm, N. 1960. ‘Anselm’s Ontological Arguments’. Philosophical Review 69: 41-62. Reprinted in Alvin Plantinga, ed., The Ontological Argument: From St. Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers. New York: Anchor Books, 1965. Plantinga, A. 1974. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. X. ——. 1974. God, Freedom and Evil. New York: Harper and Row. Pt.II, c. ——. ed. 1965. The Ontological Argument: From St. Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers. New York: Anchor Books. Oppy, G. 1996. Ontological Arguments and the Belief in God. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Barnes, Jonathan. 1972. The Ontological Argument. London: Macmillan. Mackie, J. L. 1982. The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and Against the Existence of God. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.5. van Inwagen, P. 1993. Metaphysics. Boulder: Westview Press. Ch. 5. Davis, S. T. 1997. God, Reason and Theistic Proofs. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Chs. 2 and 4. Craig, W. L. 1980. The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz. London: Macmillan.

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ii. The Cosmological Argument Most versions of the cosmological argument are a posteriori, but there are some versions which are a priori. One standard formulation of a group of cosmological arguments can be found in the Five Ways of Aquinas (see Summa Theologicae, 1a:2-5); another much discussed version of the argument is Leibniz’s appeal to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (see ‘The Principles of Nature and Grace’, sec. 7—to be found in Philosophical Essays, translated by Roger Ariew, and Daniel Garber, (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1989). Further Reading van Inwagen, P. 1993. Metaphysics. Boulder: Westview Press. Ch.6. Kenny, A. 1969. The Five Ways: Saint Thomas Aquinas’ Proofs of God’s Existence. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Taylor, R. 1983. Metaphysics. 4th ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. pp.99-108. Rowe, William L. 1975. The Cosmological Argument. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Davis, S. T. 1997. God, Reason and Theistic Proofs. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Ch. 4. Mackie, J. L. 1982. The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and Against the Existence of God. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 3. Swinburne, R. 1991. The Existence of God. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 7. Leslie, John. 1989. Universes. London: Routledge. D. Burrill, ed., The Cosmological Argument.

iii. The Argument from Design The argument from design is an a posteriori argument which attempts to establish the existence of a designer of the cosmos. It proceeds by first claiming that the universe is not ‘gratuitous’—i.e. that it exists for no purpose—but that it exhibits an order and regularity which provides evidence of its creation by a designer who endows it with purpose. The argument can be traced back to antiquity (see Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, Bk. II) but in its modern formulation, which is now the principal focus of discussion, the best early example can be found in Newton (see General Scholium to the Principia, cf. Berkeley, Alciphron). In this form the argument has met most its elegant and forceful rebuttal in Hume’s Dialogues on Natural Religion. Further Reading Paley, William. 1802. Natural Theology: or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, collected from the appearances of nature. New ed. London: W. Mason, 1817. Famous for the watchmaker analogy. Swinburne, R. 1991. The Existence of God. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.8. Mackie, J. L. 1982. The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and Against the Existence of God. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.8. Dawkins, R. 1986. The Blind Watchmaker. Harlow: Longman. Hurlbutt, Robert. 1965. Hume, Newton and the Design Argument. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Gaskin, J. C. A. 1978. Hume & the Philosophy of Religion. London: Macmillan. Olding, A. 1990. Modern Biology & Natural Theology. London: Routledge. Gerson, L. P. 1990. God and Greek Philosophy: Studies in the Early History of Natural Theology. London: Routledge. Ch.2, secs. on Stoic Design Arguments. Davis, S. T. 1997. God, Reason and Theistic Proofs. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Ch.6. Wynn, Mark. 1999. God and Goodness: A Natural Theological Perspective. London: Routledge.

iv. Moral Arguments Moral arguments for the existence of God tend to reflect a dissatisfaction with one or all of the traditional proofs of the existence of God. The locus classicus of this variety of theistic arguments is to be found in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason

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(The Transcendental Doctrine of Method, Ch. II, A797/B823 onwards), see also Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone (a recent translation can be found in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, see the volume Religion & Rational Theology, edd. and trans. A. Wood & G. DiGiovanni). Further Reading Mackie, J. L. 1982. The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and Against the Existence of God. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.6. Adams, R. M. 1987. The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pt.3. Byrne, P. 1998. The Moral Interpretation of Religion. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Swinburne, R. 1991. The Existence of God. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.9.

v. Rationality and Faith Within the history of philosophy there has been a resistance to the attempt to prove the existence of a god on rational grounds alone. This is represented by the fideistic tradition. Fideism has been associated with various forms of scepticism, or a suspicion of reason, or else from a desire not to underplay the role of faith or revelation in the explanation of a belief in God. For a discussion of the history of this dispute see T. Penelhum, God and Scepticism: a Study in Skepticism and Fideism, (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983), and R. H. Popkin, The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza, (Rev. ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979). Further Reading Helm, Paul. 1997. Faith and Understanding. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Kenny, A. 1992. What is Faith?: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sessions, W. L. 1994. The Concept of Faith: a Philosophical Investigation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Kretzmann, N. 1990. ‘Faith Seeks, Understanding Finds’. In Thomas P. Flint, ed., Christian Philosophy. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Swinburne, R. 1994. The Christian God. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs. 1-3. ——. 1981. Faith and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Plantinga, A., and N. Wolterstorff, eds. 1983. Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Helm, P. 2000. Faith with Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Plantinga, A. 2000. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press.

B. PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY Philosophical theology is concerned with the nature and coherence of the concept of God. Traditionally this subject is closely allied to metaphysics and philosophical logic. Its central topics include the Divine Attributes and Divine Action.

i. Divine Attributes Are attributes traditionally ascribed to God, such as omniscience, omnipotence and benevolence, individually coherent and mutually consistent? What is involved in the idea of divine perfection? Can God do the impossible? What is God’s relation to time and change, and to moral goodness? Is God’s omniscience compatible with human free will? Is God impassible, or vulnerable from the effects of human action? Anselm, Monologion. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a, qq.1-13. Ockham, Philosophical Writings: a Selection. Translated by Philotheus Boehner. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1990. Chs. 8-10. Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings: a Selection. Translated by Allan Wolter. 2nd ed.

106 Study Guide Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987. Chs. 2-4. Molins, On Divine Foreknowledge. Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988. Augustine, Confessions, Book XI. Hughes, Gerard J. 1995. The Nature of God. London: Routledge. Gale, R. M. 1991. On the Nature & Existence of God. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hasker, W. 1989. God, Time and Knowledge. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Rice, Hugh. 2000. God and Goodness. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Wenady, Thomas G. 2000. Does God Suffer? Edinburgh: T & T Clark. Lucas, J. R. 1989. ‘The Vulnerability of God’. In The Future: an Essay on God, Temporality and Truth. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Swinburne, R. 1993. The Coherence of Theism. Rev. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Wierenga, Edward R. 1989. The Nature of God: an Inquiry into Divine Attributes. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Alston, William P. 1989. Divine Nature and Human Language: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Kenny, A. 1979. The God of the Philosophers. Oxford: Clarendon Press. van Inwagen, P. 1995. God, Knowledge and Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Helm, P. 1997. Eternal God: A Study of God without Time. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Morris, T. V. ed. 1987. The Concept of God. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ——. ed. 1988. Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Ross, J. 1969. Philosophical Theology. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett. Leftow, B. 1991. Time and Eternity. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Foscher, John Martin. ed. 1989. God, Foreknowledge and Freedom. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Craig, William Lane. 1991. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: the Coherence of Theism: Omniscience. Leiden: Brill. Craig, William Lane. 1988. The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez. Leiden: Brill. Rogers, Katherine A. 2000. Perfect Being Theology. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Hasker, William, David Basinger, and Eef Dekker. eds. 2000. Middle Knowledge: Theory and Applications. New York: Peter Lang.

ii. Divine Action This group of topics concerns itself with the following set of questions: What sense can be made of divine action in the world, the idea of divine creation, and of God’s sustaining of the universe? Could this be the best of all possible worlds? What is a miracle? What would count as good evidence that a miracle had occurred? Can God answer prayer? Geach, Peter. 1969. ‘Praying for Things to Happen’. In God & the Soul. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Houston, J. 1994. Reported Miracles: a Critique of Hume. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hume, David. ‘Of Miracles’. In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Sec.IX. Leibniz. G. W. Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil. Edited by Austin Farrer. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1985. Morris, T. V. ed. 1988. Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Swinburne, R. 1970. The Concept of Miracle. London: Macmillan. Ward, Keith. 1990. Divine Action. London: Collins. Stump, Eleanore. ed. 1993. Reasoned Faith. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Hughes, C., and R. M. Adams. 1992. ‘Miracles, Laws of Nature, and Causation’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66: 179-205, 207-224. Swinburne, R. 1989. ed., Miracles. London: Collier Macmillan.

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iii. The Problem of Evil The problem of evil represents an enduring challenge to philosophical theology as it issues from the seeming incompatibility of two of God’s attributes, namely His perfect goodness and His omnipotence. The problem is generated by the idea that a perfectly good god ought not to allow the extent and degree of evil that exists in the actual world. Augustine, On the Freedom of Choice, Bks.2 and 3. Aquinas, On Evil and Commentary on the Book of Job. Leibniz, Theodicy. Adams, M. M., and R. M. Adams, eds. 1990. The Problem of Evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Howard-Snyder, D. ed. 1996. The Evidential Argument from Evil. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press. Helm, P. 1993. The Providence of God. Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press. Hick, John. 1977. Evil and the God of Love. 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Peterson, Michael L. ed. 1992. The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. Plantinga. Alvin. 1974. God, Freedom and Evil. New York: Harper and Row. Phillips, D. Z. 1965. The Concept of Prayer. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Adams, R. 1987. ‘Must God Create the Best?’. In T. V. Morris, ed., The Concept of God. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Adams, M. M. 1999. Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press.

C. RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY Religious epistemology is dominated by the question how, if at all, can belief in a god be justified? Within contemporary discussion there are five approaches to the question: a) natural theology—the attempt to find evidence for the existence of God in the world of nature; b) reformed epistemology—a position which argues that belief in God does not need to be justified evidentially; c) prudentialist arguments—justification arising from expected benefits accruing to belief in God, the two standard forms being Pascal’s ‘Wager’ and William James’s ‘Will to Believe’ argument; d) fideism—an attempt to justify theistic belief by appeal to faith rather than to reason; e) experientia arguments—arguments which assert the existence of a god on the basis of religious experience. Essential Reading Penelhum, T. 1995. Reason and Religious Faith. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press. Gievett, R. Douglas, and Brendan Sweetman. eds. 1992. Contemporary Perspectives on Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Senor, Thomas D. ed. 1995. The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith: Essays in Honor of William P. Alston. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Jordan, J., and D. Howard-Snyder, eds. 1996. Faith, Freedom and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Sennett, James F. 1998. The Analytic Theist. An Alvin Plantinga Reader. Grand Rapids, Michigan: W. B. Eerdmans.

i. Natural Theology Kretzmann, Norman. 1999. The Metaphysics of Creation: Aquinas’s natural theology in Summa contra gentiles II. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kretzmann, Norman. 1997. The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas’s natural theology in Summa contra gentiles I. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Smart, J. J. C., and J. S. Haldane. 1996. Atheism and Theism. Oxford: Blackwell.

108 Study Guide Forrest, P. 1996. God without the Supernatural: a Defense of Scientific Theism. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Swinburne, R. 1991. The Existence of God. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

ii. Reformed Epistemology Plantinga, A., and N. Wolterstorff. eds. 1983. Faith & Rationality: Reason and Belief in God. Notre Dame : University of Notre Dame Press. McLeod, Mark S. 1993. Rationality & Theistic Belief: an Essay on Reformed Epistemology. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Zagzebski, Linda. ed. 1993. Rational Faith: Catholic Responses to Reformed Epistemology. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. Hoitenga, Dewey J. 1991. Faith and Reason From Plato to Plantinga: an Introduction to Reformed Epistemology. Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press. Helm, P. 1994. Belief Policies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Plantinga, A. 2000. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press. Helm, P. 2000. Faith with Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

iii. Prudentialist Arguments Pascal, P. Pensées, 343. James, W. ‘The Will to Believe’. In The Will to Believe and other Essays in Popular Philosophy. The Works of William James Vol. 6. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979. ——. ‘The Sentiment of Rationality’. Jordan, J. ed. 1994. Gambling on God: Essays on Pascal’s Wager. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Hacking, I. 1994. ‘The Logic of Pascal’s Wager’. In Jordan, ed., Gambling on God. Madden, P. 1979. Introduction to the Harvard edition of W. James, Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979. Wainwright, William J. 1995. Reason and the Heart: a Prolegomenon to a Critique of Passional Reason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Ch.3.

iv. Fideism Kiergkegaard, Søren. Concluding Unscientific Postscript to “Philosophical fragments”. Edited by Robert L. Perkins. Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1997. Wittgenstein, L. 1966. Lectures & Conversations : on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief. Edited by Cyril Barrett. Oxford: Blackwell. Barrett, C. 1991. Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief. Oxford: Blackwell. Nielsen, K. 1992. ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism’. In R. Douglas Gievett, and Brendan Sweetman. eds., Contemporary Perspectives on Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Phillips, D. Z. 1988. Faith after Foundationalism. London: Routlege. Stephen Evans, C. 1998. Faith Beyond Reason. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

v. Experientia Arguments Gelman, Jerome I. 1997. Experience of God and the Rationality of Theistic Belief. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Pike, N. 1992. Mystic Union: an Essay in the Phenomenology of Mysticism. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Martin, C. B. 1959. Religious Belief. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell Unversity Press. See chapter on religious experience. Alston, W. P. 1991. Perceiving God: the Epistemology of Religious Experience. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Yandel, K. 1993. The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kretzmann, N. 1994. ‘St. Theresa, William Alston and the Broad-Minded Atheists’. In A. Padgett, ed., Reason and the Christian Religion: Essays for Richard Swinburne. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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D. RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE Are all attempts to make theological statements cognitively meaningless? Are the criteria of meaningfulness to be found within religion? Can God be spoken of literally and positively, or only negatively, or metaphorically? Alston, W. P. 1989. Divine Nature and Human Language: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Ayer, A. J. 1946. Language, Truth and Logic. 2nd ed. London: Gollancz. Ch.VI. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a, 13. Heimbeck, R. S. 1969. Theology & Meaning: a Critique of Metatheological Scepticism. London: Allen & Unwin. Hughes, G. ed. 1987. The Philosophical Assessment of Theology: Essays in Honour of Frederick C. Copleston. Tunbridge Wells: Search Press. Phillips, D. Z. 1976. Religion Without Explanation. Oxford: Blackwell. Soskice, Janet. 1985. Metaphor and Religious Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Swinburne, R. 1993. The Coherence of Theism. Rev. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs. 4 and 5. Wolterstorff, N. 1995. Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ross, J. F. 1981. Portraying Analogy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McInerny, Ralph. 1996 Aquinas on Analogy. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press.

E. THE SOUL AND IMMORTALITY A principal concern within the three monotheistic traditions of the West has been continued existence of the soul after corporeal death. This is one area in which the Philosophy of Religion is heavily reliant on more general philosophical discussions in Metaphysics and Philosophy of Mind. Essential Reading Plato, Phaedo, and Republic, Bk.X. Aristotle, de Anima, Bks.2 and 3. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Soul, q, 14. Edwards, Paul. ed. 1992. Immortality. New York: Macmillan. Dales, Richard C. 1995. The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century. Leiden: E. J. Brill. Perry, J. ed. 1975. Personal Identity. Berkeley: University of California Press. Selections from Descartes, Locke, Hume.

Further Reading Geach, Peter. 1969. God & the Soul. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Swinburne, R. 1997. The Evolution of the Soul. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Taliaferro, C. 1994. Consciousness and the Mind of God. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Penelhum, T. 1970. Survival and Disembodied Existence. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Helm, P. 1978. ‘Disembodied Survival’. Religious Studies 14. See also the special edition of Faith & Philosophy, on the general topic of resurrection, 1996. Penelhum, T. 1982. ‘Life After Death’. In Steven M Cahn, and David Shatz., eds., Contemporary Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mavrodes, G. 1982. ‘Life Everlasting and the Bodily Criterion of Identity’. In the same volume. van Inwagen, P. 1978. ‘The Possibility of Resurrection’. International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion 9: 114-121. Lewis, Hywel D. 1978. Persons and Life After Death: Essays. London: Macmillan. Phillips, D. Z. 1970. Death and Immortality. London: Macmillan. Hasker, W. 1999. The Emergent Self. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press.

Other topics normally studied include the relation of religion to science; and beliefs specific to a particular religious tradition (for example in Christianity, the concept of incarnation, in Judaism, the concept of idolatory). For references to these other topics see the three anthologies listed under general reading.

10

Philosophy of Language

1 The Paper Philosophy of Language is organised around general questions of language and meaning. The nature of language has long been an obsession of philosophers, more recently it has also become the focus of empirical investigation in linguistics. The subject is concerned both with the most general and abstract aspects of language, meaning and knowledge of both and with more specific problems that arise in understanding particular aspects of natural languages. Certain more elementary aspects of the philosophy of language are covered in Logic and Metaphysics, and it is good to have a grounding in issues surrounding reference and truth covered on that paper. On this paper you will be focusing more on general methodological considerations about meaning and reference: what form should a theory of meaning take; in what does knowledge of meaning consist; what kinds of facts are there about meaning? Certain figures have dominated discussion of language in the twentieth century, from Frege, and Russell on to Wittgenstein’s emphasis on use of language over representation, to Quine’s scepticism about the determinacy of translation, Grice’s attempt to explicate meaning in terms of speaker’s intentions, Davidson’s work on theories of truth and radical interpretation, to the consequences of Chomskian linguistics. In addition to studying the work of these philosophers, you will have the opportunity to look at particular problems concerning indexical expressions; proper names; the nature of definite descriptions; pronouns and quantified phrases in natural language; indirect contexts and propositional attitude ascriptions; adverbs, adjectives and metaphor.

2 Basic Reading Introductory Reading Larson, R., and G. Segal. 1995. Knowledge of Meaning: an Introduction to Semantic Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. A thorough introduction to philosophy of language for both philosophy and linguistics students. Platts, M. 1997. Ways of Meaning: an Introduction to Philosophy of Language. 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. An excellent exposition of the Davidsonian approach to meaning. Neale, S. 1990. Descriptions. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. A clear defence & elaboration of Russell’s theory of descriptions, as updated by Kripke and Evans. Blackburn, S. 1984. Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Readable, if opinionated, treatment of the central areas of philosophy of language, with large amounts of metaphysics thrown in for free. McCulloch, G. 1989. The Game of the Name: Introducing Logic, Language and Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. A vigorous introduction to issues in the theory of reference.

Anthologies Hale, B. and C. Wright, eds. 1997. A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell. Contains essays by leading philosophers of language on key topics of this paper. Ludlow, Peter, ed. 1997. Readings in The Philosophy of Language. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Martinich, A. P. ed. 1996. The Philosophy of Language. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Contains most of the classic papers. Harnish, R. M. ed. 1993. Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language. New York: Harvester

PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 111 Wheatsheaf. An alternative source for many of the same papers, together with a useful abridgement of Kaplan’s classic, Demonstratives. Moore, A. W. ed. 1993. Meaning & Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Idiosyncratic selection of important papers. Evans, G., and J. McDowell, eds. 1976. Truth & Meaning: Essays in Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. State of the art papers in semantics & philosophy of language, c. 1976, including important papers by Davidson, Dummett, Evans, & Kripke. Salmon, N., and S. Soames, eds. 1988. Propositions & Attitudes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Despite its title, a selection of papers on direct reference theories. Yourgrau, P. ed. 1990. Demonstratives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Not what its title might suggest, but it does include important papers by Perry, Kaplan, Evans, & Anscombe. Lepore, E. ed. 1986. Truth & Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Blackwell. Tomberlin, J. ed. 1993. Language and Logic. Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 7. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview. Tomberlin, J. ed. 1994. Logic and Language. Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 8. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview. Katz, J. J. ed. 1985. The Philosophy of Linguistics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

C. KEY WORKS Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, edited by Peter Geach and Max Black, (3rd ed., Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980). Many of the key papers have now been collected in The Frege Reader, edited by M. Beaney, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997). Philosophical Investigations, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968; 3rd ed, 1972). Pt. 1, the first 135 odd sections of this work emphasise Wittgenstein’s gnomic insistence on the role of use in understanding meaning. Austin, J. L. 1962. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Austin’s original statement of speech-act theory which has been influential in both areas of linguistics and philosophy. Quine, W. V. 1960. Word & Object. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. Ch.2 is the original statement of Quine’s views on radical translation. Davidson, D. 1984. Inquiries into Truth & Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Contains almost all of Davidson’s important papers in the philosophy of language. Chomsky, N. 1985. Knowledge of Language: its Nature, Origins, and Use. New York: Praeger. A good introduction to his theories for philosophers. Dummett, M. 1993. The Seas of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Includes his two papers on theory of meaning, together with his valedictory lecture on anti-realism. Grice, H. P. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Includes, among other things, ‘Meaning’ and his William James lectures which outline the theory of conversational implicature. Wilson, D., and D. Sperber. 1995. Relevance: Communication and Cognition. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell. An influential theory of communication by linguists but with philosophical implications.

3 Topics A. THEORIES OF MEANING One of the most fruitful ways of addressing the question of what meaning is has been to ask what form a theory of meaning for a particular language should take. In this the work of Donald Davidson has been most influential. Davidson suggests that an adequate theory of meaning for a given language would be one which would suffice for the interpretation of speakers of that language. In addition, he has suggested that a Tarskian theory of truth (look at the reading under the semantic conception of truth in the chapter Logic and Metaphysics) could be em-

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ployed as an adequate theory of meaning for natural languages. Is it really possible that there could be a theory of truth for a natural language such as English—how is one to cope with context-sensitive expressions, for example? A truth theory is interpretive where the right-hand side of its T-theorems translate the sentence mentioned on the left-hand side: e.g., ‘“Elephants wear tutus in the wild” is true in English if and only if elephants wear tutus in the wild’ is an interpretive T-theorem, while ‘“Polar bears smoke cigars” is true in English if and only if London is south of Canberra’ is not. A theory of truth could do duty as a theory of meaning only if it was interpretive, but it is conceivable that a theory of truth could be true and not interpretive. What constraints can be imposed on constructing a theory of truth for a natural language which would narrow down the options only to the interpretive ones, and how could a theorist know that a theory was interpretive without already knowing that the right-hand side of the theorems translate the left-hand side? While the details of Davidson’s own account are the subject of much controversy, the idea that we should look at problems of language in terms of the need to construct a systematic and compositional theory of meaning for problematic constructions has been highly influential and is reflected in the way many philosophers both frame and attempt to settle the problems discussed further below.

i. Meaning & Truth Davidson, D. 1967. ‘Truth & Meaning’. Synthese 17: 304-323. Reprinted in Inquiries into Truth & Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. ——. 1976. ‘Reply to Foster’. In G. Evans, and J. McDowell, eds., Truth & Meaning: Essays in Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press;, reprinted in D. Davidson, Inquiries into Truth & Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. ——. 1973. ‘Radical Interpretation’. Dialectica 27: 314-328. Reprinted in Inquiries into Truth & Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. ——. 1977. ‘Reality Without Reference’. Dialectica 31: 247-258. Reprinted in D. Davidson, Inquiries into Truth & Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. ——. 1990. ‘The Structure & Content of Truth’. Journal of Philosophy 87: 279-328. Davies, M. 1981. Meaning, Quantification, Necessity: Themes in Philosophical Logic. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Larson, R., and G. Segal. 1995. Knowledge of Meaning: an Introduction to Semantic Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Chs. 1-3. Evans, G., and J. McDowell, eds. 1976. Truth & Meaning: Essays in Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Introduction. Blackburn, S. 1984. Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.8. Sainsbury, M. 1980. ‘Understanding and Theories of Meaning’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80: 127-144.

ii. Meaning & Anti-realism Dummett has been an influential discussant of Davidson’s approach to meaning: he both emphasises the need to see an account of meaning as an account of understanding; and that meaning is use. While endorsing Davidson’s aim to construct a systematic meaning theory for natural languages, he challenges the idea that truth should be the central notion used to construct such a theory; he places much weight on the need for speakers to be able to manifest their knowledge of meaning, and assertibility conditions in their use of language. Dummett, M. 1959. ‘Truth’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 59: 141-62. Reprinted in Truth & Other Enigmas. London: Duckworth,1978. ——. 1976. ‘What is a Theory of Meaning II?’. In G. Evans, and J. McDowell, eds., Truth &

PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 113 Meaning: Essays in Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press; reprinted in The Seas of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. ——. 1993. ‘Realism and Anti-realism’. Reprinted in The Seas of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. ——. 1991. The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, London: Duckworth. Chs. 14 & 15. Craig, E. 1982. ‘Meaning, Use & Privacy’. Mind 91: 541-564. Wright, C. 1981. ‘Anti-Realism & Revisionism’. Reprinted in Realism, Meaning & Truth. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.

B. GRICE’S THEORY Grice sought to explain facts about the meanings of public languages in terms of facts about mental states and social conventions. A speaker has the intention to lead the audience to have a certain response to his speech act and to recognise his intention in doing so. Are there problems specifying the relevant response, and the intentions involved? Can the account be generalised from one-off communication to a shared language? Even if one does not look for a reduction of meaning to the mentalistic facts that Grice appeals to, can his approach give us some account of the nature of speech-acts? Grice, H. P. 1957. ‘Meaning’. Philosophical Review 66: 377-388. Reprinted Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989. Blackburn, S. 1984. Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.4. Strawson, P. F. 1964 ‘Intention and Convention in Speech Acts’. Philosophical Review 73: 439460. Reprinted in Logico-Linguistic Papers. London: Methuen, 1971. Schiffer, S. 1972. Meaning. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Introduction. Travis, C. ‘The Annals of Analysis’. Mind 100: 237-264. ——. 1997. ‘Pragmatics’. In B. Hale, and C. Wright, eds., A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell. Rumfitt, I. 1995. ‘Truth Conditions and Communication’. Mind 104: 827-862. Avramides, A. 1989. Meaning & Mind: an Examination of a Gricean Account of Language. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

C. QUINE & INDETERMINACY OF MEANING Quine challenges the assumption that there are determinate facts about what someone means. He introduces the much-appealed to notion of a radical translator. All facts about meaning, Quine claims, must be accessible to such a translator. According to Quine, it is possible that there could be distinct translation manuals for a language each with an equally good claim to being the correct translation manual. Quine, W. V. 1960. Word & Object. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. Ch.2. ——. 1990. The Pursuit of Truth. 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Chs.1-3. ——. 1970. ‘On the Reasons for the Indeterminacy of Translation’. Journal of Philosophy 67: 178-183. ——. 1897. ‘Indeterminacy of Translation Again’. Journal of Philosophy 84: 5-10. ——. 1975. ‘Mind & Verbal Dispositions’. In S. Guttenplan, ed., Mind & Language, Oxford: Clarendon Press; reprinted in A. W. Moore, ed., Meaning & Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. Chomsky, N. 1969. ‘Quine’s Empirical Assumptions’. In D. Davidson, and J. Hintikka, eds., Words & Objections: Essays on the Work of W.V. Quine. Dordrecht: Reidel. Evans, G. 1975. ‘Identity & Predication’. Journal of Philosophy 72: 343-363. Reprinted in Collected Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. George, A. 1986. ‘Whence and Whither the Debate Between Quine and Chomsky?’. Journal of Philosophy 83: 489-499.

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D. KNOWLEDGE & RULES OF LANGUAGE What is it to know a language or to follow rules of language? Chomskian linguistics, as a matter of empirical enquiry, posits a language faculty possessed by each human in virtue of which he or she can come to acquire a language. If Chomsky is right, is it true that we know the languages we speak? Some philosophers have sought to extend Chomsky’s account of knowledge of syntax to knowledge of meaning, and there has been a lively debate over what implicit or tacit knowledge of meaning could consist in. Chomsky, N. 1985. Knowledge of Language: its Nature, Origins, and Use. New York: Praeger. Chs.1 & 2. ——. 1988. Language and Problems of Knowledge: the Managua Lectures. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. ——. 1995. ‘Language and Nature’. Mind 104: 1-61; reprinted in New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Higginbotham, J. 1989. ‘Knowledge of Reference’. In A. George, ed., Reflections on Chomsky. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. ——. 1987. ‘The Autonomy of Syntax & Semantics’. In J. Garfield, ed., Modularity in Knowledge Representation & Natural Language Understanding. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Segal, G. 1994. ‘Priorities in the Philosophy of Thought’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68: 107-130. Larson, R., and G. Segal. 1995. Knowledge of Meaning: an Introduction to Semantic Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Chs.1 & 13. Evans, G. 1981. ‘Semantic Theory and Tacit Knowledge’. In C. Leich, ed., Wittgenstein: to Follow a Rule. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Reprinted in Collected Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. Davies, M. 1987. ‘Tacit Knowledge and Semantic Theory: Can a Five Percent Difference Matter?’. Mind 96: 441-462. Wright, C. 1986. ‘Theories of Meaning & Speakers’ Knowledge’. Reprinted in Realism, Meaning & Truth. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993. Smith, Barry C. 1992. ‘Understanding Language’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92: 109-139.

E. MEANING AS USE; REALISM & IRREALISM ABOUT SEMANTICS Where the dominant approach to the study of meaning has focused on reference and truth, some philosophers have instead stressed the need to focus on the use that words are put to in order to explain what meaning is. Use-based approaches to meaning have sometimes been thought to lead to scepticism about the existence of rules or of determinate meaning facts. Some have argued that such irrealism about semantic facts is incoherent; others have argued that use-theories do not lead to these consequences anyway. Wittgenstein, L. 1968. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. 3rd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972. See esp. Pt. 1 secs. 1-315 Brandom, R. 1994. Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Horwich, P. 1998. Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ——. 1990. ‘Wittgenstein & Kripke on the Nature of Meaning’. Mind & Language 5: 105-121. Kripke, S. 1982. Wittgenstein on Rules & Private Language: an Elementary Exposition. Oxford: Blackwell. Schiffer, S. 1987. The Remnants of Meaning. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Boghossian, P. 1989. ‘The Rule Following Considerations’. Mind 98: 507-549. ——. 1990. ‘The Status of Content’. Philosophical Review 99: 157-184. Wright, C. 1992. Truth & Objectivity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Ch.6.

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F. REFERENCE i. Indexicals & Demonstratives Indexical expressions appear to have a constant conventional meaning across different speakers, while varying in their reference. Can a semantic theory both account for how indexicals have a constant meaning, and yet in a context fix a referent? Do indexicals cause special problems for a Fregean theory of meaning? Frege, G. ‘Thoughts’. Reprinted in N. Salmon, and S. Soames, eds., Propositions & Attitudes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988; also in M. Beaney, ed., The Frege Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. Kaplan, D. 1979. ‘On the Logic of Demonstratives’. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8: 81-98. Reprinted in P. Yourgrau, ed., Demonstratives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. ——. 1977. Demonstratives. Reprinted in Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein, eds., Themes from Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Perry, J. 1977. ‘Frege on Demonstratives’. Philosophical Review 86: 474-497. Reprinted in P. Yourgrau, ed., Demonstratives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. Evans, G. 1981. ‘Understanding Demonstratives’. Reprinted in Collected Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985; and in P. Yourgrau, ed., Demonstratives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. Larson, R., and G. Segal. 1995. Knowledge of Meaning: an Introduction to Semantic Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Ch.6. Taylor, B. 1980. ‘Truth Theory for Indexical Languages’. In M. Platts, ed., Reference, Truth & Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Rumfitt, I. 1994. ‘Frege's Theory of Predication: An Elaboration and Defense, with Some New Applications’. Philosophical Review 103: 599-637. Higginbotham, J. 1993. ‘Priorities in the Philosophy of Thought’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68: 85-106. ——. 1995. ‘Tensed Thoughts’. Mind & Language 10: 226-249. Sainsbury, M. 1998. ‘Indexicals and Reported Speech’. In T. Smiley, ed., Philosophical Logic. Oxford: Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press.

ii. Proper Names Must a name have a bearer in order to have a sense? Does one have to know which person is being referred to in understanding a name? Could we treat names as predicates rather than referring expressions? Kripke, S. 1980. Naming & Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell. Frege, G. ‘On Sense and Reference’. Reprinted in A. W. Moore, ed., Meaning & Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993; and in Peter Geach and Max Black, eds., Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. 3rd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980; and in M. Beaney, ed., The Frege Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. Larson, R., and G. Segal. 1995. Knowledge of Meaning: an Introduction to Semantic Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Ch.5. McCulloch, G. 1989. The Game of the Name: Introducing Logic, Language and Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. See esp. Chs.4 & 8. Evans, G. 1973. ‘The Causal Theory of Proper Names’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 47: 187-208. Reprinted in Collected Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985; and in A. W. Moore, ed., Meaning & Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993; and in A. P. Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. ——. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Edited by John McDowell. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.11, but also look at Chs.1-3, 6, & 9. McDowell, J. 1977. ‘The Sense and Reference of a Proper Name’. Mind 86:159-185. Reprinted in A. W. Moore, ed., Meaning & Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993; and in M. Platts, ed., Reference, Truth & Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

116 STUDY GUIDE Burge, T. 1973. ‘Reference and Proper Names’. Journal of Philosophy 70: 425-439. ——. 1983. ‘Russell’s Problem and Intentional Identity’. In J. Tomberlin, ed., Agent, Language & the Structure of the World: Essays Presented to Hector-Neri Castañeda, with his replies. Indianapolis: Hackett. Heck, 1995. ‘The Sense of Communication’. Mind 104: 79-106. Recanati, F. 1993. Direct Reference: from Language to Thought. Oxford: Blackwell. Donnellan, K. 1974. ‘Speaking of Nothing’. Philosophical Review 83: 3-31. Bach, K. 1987. Thought and Reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Blackburn, S. 1984. Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.9.

iii. Descriptions What is the best treatment of definite descriptions in a theory of meaning? Does the distinction between referential and attributive uses bear on this? Do recent theories of quantification in natural languages bear on the theory of descriptions? Russell, B. 1905. ‘On Denoting’. Mind 14: 479-93. Reprinted in R. C. Marsh, ed., Logic & Knowledge: Essays 1901-1950. London: Allen & Unwin, 1956. ——. 1919. ‘Descriptions’. In Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. London: Allen & Unwin, Ch. 19; reprinted in A. W. Moore, ed., Meaning & Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. Strawson, P.F. ‘On Referring’. Mind 59:269-86. Reprinted in Logico-Linguistic Papers. London: Methuen, 1971; and in A. W. Moore, ed., Meaning & Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. Donnellan, K. 1966. ‘Reference & Definite Descriptions’. Philosophical Review 77: 203-15. Reprinted in A. P. Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Kripke, S. 1977. ‘Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference’. In P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein, eds., Studied in the Philosophy of Language. Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Vol. 2. Revised edition, Contemporary Perspectives on the Philosophy of Language. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979. Reprinted in A. P. Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Edited by John McDowell. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs.2 & 9.3. Neale, S. 1990. Descriptions. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. See esp. Chs.2 & 5. Larson, R., and G. Segal. 1995. Knowledge of Meaning: an Introduction to Semantic Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Ch.9. Bezuidenhout, A. 1997. ‘Pragmatics, Semantic Underdetermination and the Referential/ Attributive Distinction’. Mind 106: 375-409.

iv. Quantifiers in natural language & anaphora What treatment should we give of terms such as ‘every’, ‘all’, ‘some’, and ‘most’ in English? In first order logic we translate these using ‘unary’ quantifiers which attach to single predicates, simple or complex; but no such account is available for terms such as ‘most’ which seem to belong in the same category. The natural language equivalent of variables in a formal language seem to be pronouns, but are there different varieties of pronoun? Larson, R., and G. Segal. 1995. Knowledge of Meaning: an Introduction to Semantic Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Chs. 8 & 10. Davies, M. 1981. Meaning, Quantification, Necessity: Themes in Philosophical Logic. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Ch.6. Dummett, M. 1981. Frege: Philosophy of Language. 2nd ed. London: Duckworth. Ch.15. Geach, P. 1980. Reference & Generality: an Examination of some Medieval and Modern Theories. 3rd ed. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Wiggins, D. 1980. ‘“Most” and “All”: Some Comments on a Familiar Programme and on the Logical Form of Quantified Sentences’. In M. Platts, ed., Reference, Truth & Reality: Essays

PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 117 on the Philosophy of Language. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Evans, G. 1977. ‘Pronouns, Quantifiers, and Relative Clauses (I)’. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7: 467-536. Reprinted in Collected Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. Neale, S. 1990. ‘Descriptive Pronouns & Donkey Anaphora’. Journal of Philosophy 87: 113-150. Soames, S. 1994. ‘Attitudes & Anaphora’. In J. Tomberlin, ed., Logic and Language, Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 8. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview. Kripke, S. 1976. ‘Is There a Problem about Substitutional Quantification?’. In G. Evans, and J. McDowell, eds., Truth & Meaning: Essays in Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Boolos, G. 1984. ‘To Be is to Be A Value of a Variable (or to Be Some Values of Some Variables)’. Journal of Philosophy 81: 430-448.

G. PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE ASCRIPTIONS Many have the intuition that the sentence ‘John said that Cary Grant lived in the next street’ can be true while the sentence, ‘John said that Archibald Leach lived in the next street’ is false, even though Cary Grant is Archibald Leach. This suggests that words occurring within ‘oblique contexts’ have a significance over and above what they stand for. Frege sought to solve this problem by appeal to his theory of sense, but it is not clear how his approach can deal with the use of indexical expressions within subordinate clauses or with the existence of ‘quantifying in’ to attitude ascriptions—various recent accounts nevertheless attempt to develop Fregean ideas to handle such problems. An alternative approach has been offered by Davidson, with his paratactic theory, which seeks to preserve ‘semantic innocence’, allowing words to mean the same thing in different contexts, and seeking to avoid any commitment to the existence of abstract items such as Fregean thoughts or propositions. Kripke has questioned whether our intuitions here are coherent, with his notorious Pierre and Paderewski examples, and others have sought to explain the intuitions away as bearing solely on the pragmatics of attitude ascription and not on their semantics. Frege, G. ‘On Sense and Meaning’. Reprinted in A. W. Moore, ed., Meaning & Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993; and in Peter Geach and Max Black, eds., Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. 3rd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980; and in M. Beaney, ed., The Frege Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. Forbes, G. 1990. ‘The Indispensability of Sinn’. Philosophical Review 99: 535-563. Richard, M. 1990. Propositional Attitudes: an Essay on Thoughts and How we Ascribe Them. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Crimmins, M. 1992. Talk about Beliefs. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Chs.1, 5 & 6. Davidson, D. 1968. ‘On Saying That’. Synthese 19: 130-146. Reprinted in D. Davidson, Inquiries into Truth & Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. Burge, T. 1986. ‘On Davidson’s “Saying That”’. In E. Lepore, ed., Truth & Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Blackwell. Schiffer, S. 1987. The Remnants of Meaning. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Ch. 5. Higginbotham, J. 1986. ‘Linguistic Theory and Davidson’s Program in Semantics’. In E. Lepore, ed., Truth & Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Blackwell. Segal, G. 1989. ‘A Preference for Sense and Reference’. Journal of Philosophy 86: 73-89. Larson, R., and G. Segal. 1995. Knowledge of Meaning: an Introduction to Semantic Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Ch.11. Rumfitt, I. 1993. ‘Content and Context: The Paratactic Theory Revisited & Revised’. Mind 102: 429-454. Kripke, S. 1979. ‘A Puzzle about Belief’. In A. Margalit, ed., Meaning and Use. Dordrecht: Reidel. Reprinted in N. Salmon, and S. Soames, eds., Propositions & Attitudes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.

118 STUDY GUIDE Salmon, N. 1986. Frege’s Puzzle. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

H. SENSE, FORCE & MOOD Can a semantic theory given in terms of truth provide an account of non-indicative sentences in natural languages? What is the connection between mood and type of speech act performed? Dummett, M. 1991. The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, London: Duckworth. pp.113-121. ——. 1993. ‘Mood, Force & Convention’. In The Seas of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Davidson, D. 1984. ‘Moods & Performances’. On Inquiries into Truth & Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Austin, J. L. 1962. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Green, M. S. 1997. ‘On the Autonomy of Linguistic Meaning’. Mind 106: 217-243. Segal, G. 1990. ‘In the Mood for a Semantic Theory’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91: 103118. Pendlebury, M. 1986. ‘Against the Power of Force: Reflections on the Meaning of Mood’. Mind 95: 361-372. Hornsby, J. 1986. ‘A Note on Non-Indicatives’. Mind 95: 92-99.

I. ADVERBS What account can we give of adverbs? Can we best understand our use of action verbs in terms of quantification over events? Davidson, D. 1980. ‘The Logical Form of Action Sentences’. In Essays on Actions & Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Wiggins, D. 1985. ‘Verbs and Adverbs and some other Modes of Grammatical Combination’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86: 273-306. Bennett, J. 1985. ‘Adverb-Dropping Inferences and the Lemmon Criterion’. In E. Lepore, and B. McLaughlin, eds., Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Taylor, B. 1985. Modes of Occurrence: Verbs, Adverbs, and Events. Oxford: Blackwell. Higginbotham, J. 1983. ‘The Logic of Perceptual Reports: An Extensional Alternative to Situation Semantics’. Journal of Philosophy 80: 100-127.

J. LANGUAGE, CONVENTIONS & IDIOLECTS Is there such a thing as a common language shared by a social group? Or is the notion of a shared language simply a socio-political fiction? Chomsky gives one reason for rejecting shared languages and Davidson another. Davidson, D. 1986. ‘A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs’. In E. Lepore, ed., Truth & Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Blackwell. Dummett, M. 1986. ‘Reply to Davidson’. In E. Lepore, ed., Truth & Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Blackwell. Burge, T. 1989. ‘Wherein is Language Social?’. In A. George, ed., Reflections on Chomsky. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. George, A. 1990. ‘Whose Language is it Anyway? Some Notes on Idiolects’. Philosophical Quarterly 40: 275-298. Higginbotham, J. 1989. ‘Knowledge of Reference’. In A. George, ed., Reflections on Chomsky. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Lewis, D. 1975. ‘Languages and Language’. Reprinted in Philosophical Papers. Vol.I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. Peacocke, C. 1976. ‘Truth Definitions & Actual Languages’. In G. Evans, and J. McDowell, eds., Truth & Meaning: Essays in Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Schiffer, S. 1993. ‘Actual-Language Relations’. In J. Tomberlin, ed., Language and Logic. Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 7. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview.

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K. METAPHOR What is metaphor? Is there a distinction to be drawn between literal and metaphorical meaning? Can a systematic theory be given of metaphorical meaning? Davidson, D. 1984. ‘What Metaphors Mean’. In Inquiries into Truth & Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Black, M. 1979. ‘How Metaphors Work: a Reply to Davidson’. In S. Sacks, ed., On Metaphor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Goodman, N. 1981. ‘Metaphor as Moonlighting’. In M. Johnson, ed., Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Moran, R. 1997. ‘Metaphor’. In B. Hale, and C. Wright, eds., A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell. Cooper, D. 1986. Metaphor. Oxford: Blackwell. Davies, M. 1983. ‘Idiom and Metaphor’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83: 67-86. Wilson, D., and D. Sperber. 1986. ‘Loose Talk’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86: 153172.

11

Philosophy of Science

1 The Paper This paper deals with philosophical issues which arise in science and in reflecting on science. Some of the issues overlap with those in the methodology section of the Epistemology and Methodology paper (see the study guide for that paper) though they are treated at a more advanced level here.

2 General Reading Introductory Hempel, Carl G. 1966. Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall. Chalmers, A. F. 1982. What is this Thing Called Science?: an Assessment of the Nature and Status of Science and its Methods. 2nd ed. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Kuhn, Thomas. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hacking, Ian. 1983. Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hacking, Ian. ed. 1981. Scientific Revolutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Papineau, David. ed. 1996. The Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. O’Hear, A. 1989. Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Gillies, Donald. 1993. The Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century: Four Central Themes. Oxford: Blackwell. Losee, John. 1993. A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Advanced Ruben, David-Hillel. ed. 1993. Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Boyd, Richard and Philip Gasper, and J. D. Trout. eds. 1991. Philosophy of Science. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Leplin, J. ed. 1984. Scientific Realism. Berkeley: University of California Press. Sklar, L. 1992. Philosophy of Physics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sober, E. 1993. The Philosophy of Biology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Psillos, S. 1999. Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. London: Routledge.

3 Topics A. THEORY AND OBSERVATION A generally accepted view is that science is special because its ‘conclusions’ (i.e. scientific theories) are appropriately ‘inferred from’ observational and experimental evidence. But is there a principled distinction between theoretical and observational beliefs that does not rely on contentious philosophical assumptions (e.g. about perception or about language)? Introductory Reading Hempel, Carl G. 1966. Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall. Chs. 1-3. Chalmers, A. F. 1982. What is this Thing Called Science?: an Assessment of the Nature and Status of Science and its Methods. 2nd ed. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Ch.3. Hacking, Ian. 1983. Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs.10 and 11.

Philosophy of Science 121 Hanson, N. R. 1958. Patterns of Discovery: an Enquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.1.

Advanced Reading Fodor, J. 1984. ‘Observation Reconsidered’. Philosophy of Science 51: 23-43. Reprinted in A Theory of Content and Other Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990. ——. 1991. ‘The Dogma that Didn’t Bark’. Mind 100: 201-220. Churchland, Paul M. 1979. Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——. 1989. A Neurocomputational Perspective: the Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Ch.12. Shapere, D. 1982. ‘The Concept of Observation in Science and Philosophy’. Philosophy of Science 49: 485-525. Peacocke, C. 1983. Sense & Content: Experience, Thought and their Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.4.

B. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF THEORY CONFIRMATION Can we at least be sure on the basis of empirical evidence that certain scientific theories are false? Or does the inevitable involvement of ‘auxiliary assumptions’ in any test of a theory mean that we can never definitely refute a theory? Are theories so intimately interrelated that (ultimately) the whole of our knowledge is involved in any attempt to test any particular theory? Do the notions of simplicity and avoidance of ad hoc assumptions play major (and clear and defensible) roles in deciding how to modify a set of theoretical assumptions in the face of a negative experimental result? Introductory Reading Hempel, Carl G. 1966. Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall. Chs.24.

Advanced Reading Horwich, P. 1982. Probability and Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Howson, C., and P. Urbach. 1993. Scientific Reasoning: the Bayesian Approach. 2nd ed. Chicago: Open Court. Earman, J. 1992. Bayes or Bust?: a Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Glymour, C. 1980. Theory & Evidence. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

C. INTERPRETATIONS OF PROBABILITY Statements of probability play a central role in science and in thinking about science. But the interpretation of such statements raise difficult philosophical issues. A number of interpretations of probability (not all of them incompatible) are available. Introductory Reading O’Hear, A. 1989. Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. See the section on ‘Interpretations of Probability’. Pollock, John L. 1989. Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction. New York: Oxford University Press. Ch.1. Howson, C., and P. Urbach. 1993. Scientific Reasoning: the Bayesian Approach. 2nd ed. Chicago: Open Court. Ch.2. Gillies, D. 1973. An Objective Theory of Probability. London: Methuen. Ch.1. Subjective Interpretation Ramsey, F. 1926. ‘Truth and Probability’. In Philosophical Papers, ed., D. H. Mellor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Also Horwich, and Howson & Urbach, opp. cit.

Frequency Interpretation von Mises, R. 1939. Probability, Statistics and Truth. New York: MacMillan.

122 Study Guide Howson, C., and P. Urbach. 1993. Scientific Reasoning: the Bayesian Approach. 2nd ed. Chicago: Open Court. Ch.9.

Propensity Interpretation Popper, K. 1959. ‘The Propensity Interpretation of Probability’. British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 10: 25-42. Lewis, D. 1980. ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance’. In R. Jeffrey, ed., Sudies in Inductive Logic and Probability. Vol. 2. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. Reprinted in Philosophical Papers. Vol.2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. Salmon, W. 1979. ‘Propensities: a discussion-review’. Erkenntnis 14.

D. EXPLANATION Can necessary and sufficient conditions be supplied for what it takes to explain an event scientifically? The so-called covering law model (see Epistemology & Methodology) has been subject to a variety of criticisms. Can an event be explained probabilistically? Does any generalisation that entails an experimental outcome explain it? Or does the generalisation need to be a law of nature (see Laws of Nature below)? Are real explanations inevitably causal? Is explanation really achieved through and only through unification? What is it to explain something in terms of its function (teleological explanation)? Introductory Reading Hempel, Carl G. 1966. Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall. Chs. 5 and 6. Ruben, David-Hillel. ed. 1993. Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Introduction.

Advanced Reading Salmon W. C. ed. 1971. Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press. Humphreys, P. 1989. The Chances of Explanation: Causal Explanation in the Social, Medical, and Physical Sciences. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. van Fraassen, B. 1980. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.5, esp. sections 1-2.5. Hempel, C. G. 1967. ‘Explanation in Science’. In Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopædia of Philosophy. Vol.3. New York: Macmillan and The Free Press. Ruben, David-Hillel. 1990. Explaining Explanation. London: Routledge. Ruben, David-Hillel. ed. 1993. Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See the essays by Lewis, Lipton, Salmon, van Fraassen, (and commentators) and Matthews. Kitcher, P. 1989. ‘Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World’. In Philip Kitcher and Wesley C. Salmon, eds., Scientific Explanation. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 13. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

On teleological explanation: Introductory Reading Wright, L. 1973. ‘Functions’. Philosophical Review 82: 139-168.

Advanced Reading Hempel, C. 1970. ‘The Logic of Functional Analysis’. In Aspects of Scientific Explanation: and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Free Press. Millikan, R. 1989. ‘In Defense of Proper Functions’. Philosophy of Science 56: 288-302. Reprinted in White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993. Bigelow, J., and R. Pargetter. 1987. ‘Functions’. Journal of Philosophy 84: 181-196.

E. LAWS OF NATURE What is a law of nature? Is there an objective distinction between a law of nature and a generalization that is merely universally true? Can laws be explained in terms of relations between universals? Have philosophers misrepresented science’s concern with laws?

Philosophy of Science 123

Introductory Reading Ayer, A. J. 1956. ‘What is a Law of Nature?’. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 10: 144-165. Reprinted in The Concept of a Person, and Other Essays. London: Macmillan, 1963. Hempel, Carl G. 1966. Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall. Ch.5.3. Armstrong, D. M. 1983. What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pt.I.

Advanced Reading Papineau, David. 1986. ‘Laws and Accidents’. In C. Wright and G. Macdonald, eds., Fact, Science and Morality: Essays on A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Nagel, E. 1961. The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch.4. Dretske, Fred. 1977. ‘Laws of Nature’. Philosophy of Science 44: 248-268. Mellor, D. H. 1991. ‘Necessities and Universals in Laws of Nature’. In Matters of Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. van Fraassen, B. 1989. Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pt.I.

F. SCIENTIFIC REALISM Scientific theories seem, if taken literally, to describe an unobservable reality underlying the phenomena. Are there good reasons for interpreting theories in this way and for holding that they are at any rate approximately true? Or should we instead think of theories as merely instruments for codifying and predicting phenomena? Does the fact that any given set of data can be accommodated within an infinite number of possible scientific theories mean that there are never good reasons to accept any particular scientific theory on the basis of given data? Does the existence of “scientific revolutions” (and the possibility of further revolutions in the future) imply that there is no good reason to think our present theories even approximately true? Is there even an objective notion of what it takes for a claim to be false, but approximately true? Introductory Reading Papineau, D. 1987. Reality and Representation. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Chs.1 and 2. Leplin, J. ed. 1984. Scientific Realism. Berkeley: University of California Press. Editor’s introduction. Hacking, Ian. 1983. Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Papineau, David. ed. 1996. The Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See esp. the editor’s introduction.

Advanced Reading Leplin, J. ed. 1984. Scientific Realism. Berkeley: University of California Press. van Fraassen, B. 1980. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Cartwright, N. 1983. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Introduction, and essays 2-4, 6, and 8. Worrall, John. 1989. ‘Structural Realism: the Best of Both Worlds?’. Dialectica 43: 99-124. Reprinted in David Papineau, ed., The Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Popper, K. 1969. Conjectures and Refutations: the Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch.10. Miller, D. 1974. ‘Popper’s Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude’. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25: 166-177.

G. REDUCTION OF THEORIES Is science a unity? Are some theories more fundamental than others? Can some theories be reduced to others? What is reduction? (See also Philosophy of Mind, and Logic & Metaphysics)

124 Study Guide

Introductory Reading Hempel, Carl G. 1966. Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall. Ch.8. Nagel, E. 1961. The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch.11. Searle, John. 1984. Minds, Brains and Science: the 1984 Reith Lectures. London: British Broadcasting Corporation. Ch.5.

Advanced Reading Friedman, Michael. 1981. ‘Theoretical Reduction’. In R. Healey, ed., Reduction, Time and Reality: Studies in the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fodor, J. 1974. ‘Special Sciences (or: the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)’. Synthese 28: 97-115. Reprinted in Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Brighton: Harvester, 1981. Smith, Peter. 1992. ‘Modest Reductions and the Unity of Science’. In David Charles and Kathleen Lennon, eds., Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Crane, Tim, and D. H. Mellor. 1990. ‘There is No Question of Physicalism’. Mind 99: 185-206. Papineau, David. 1993. Philosophical Naturalism. Oxford: Blackwell. Chs.1 & 2.

H. METHODOLOGICAL RULES & NATURALISED PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Methodological principles govern the way that theories are assessed in the light of evidence, but what is the status of those principles themselves? Are they a priori or are they rather themselves part of science and subject to change as science changes? If the latter, can the traditional normative character of such principles be preserved? Introductory Reading Laudan, L. 1987. ‘Progress or Rationality: the Prospects for Normative Naturalism’. American Philosophical Quarterly 24: 19-31.

Advanced Reading Laudan, L. 1984. Science and Values: the Aims of Science and their Role in Scientific Debate. Berkeley: University of California Press. Worrall, John. 1988. ‘The Value of a Fixed Methodology’. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Kitcher, Philip. 1993. The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.7.

I. SPACE AND TIME What are space and time? Are they absolute or constructions out of objects and events? In what ways does modern physics (especially Relativity Theory) require us to change our conceptions of space and time? Introductory Reading van Fraassen, B. 1970. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Time and Space. New York: Random House. Macbeath, Murray, and Robin Le Poidevin. eds. 1993. The Philosophy of Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Advanced Reading Earman, John. 1989. World Enough and Spacetime: Absolute versus Relational Theories of Space and Time. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Sklar, L. 1974. Space, Time and Spacetime. Berkeley: University of California Press. Mellor, D. H. 1981. Real Time. Cambridge University Press. Second revised edition reprinted as Real time II. London: Routledge, 1998. Nerlich, G. 1994. The Shape of Space. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Philosophy of Science 125 Freidman, M. 1983. Foundations of Space-Time Theories: Relativistic Physics and Philosophy of Science. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

J. QUANTUM MECHANICS In what ways does the interpretation of quantum mechanics require a revision of deeply held metaphysical assumptions, e.g. about realism, locality, determinism and causation? This topic requires specialised mathematical knowledge of the basic elements of quantum theory; it is therefore not possible to distinguish between introductory and advanced reading. Hughes, R. I. G. 1989. The Structure and Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Mermin, N. 1981. ‘Quantum Mysteries for Anyone’. Journal of Philosophy 78: 397-408. Putnam, H. 1975. ‘A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics’. In Mathematics, Matter and Method. Philosophical Papers. Vol.I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Albert, David Z. 1992. Quantum Mechanics and Experience. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Maudlin, T. 1994. Quantum Non-Locality & Relativity: Metaphysical Intimations of Modern Physics. Oxford: Blackwell. van Fraassen, B. 1991. Quantum Mechanics: an Empiricist View. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Lockwood, Michael. 1989. Mind, Brain and the Quantum: the Compound ‘I’. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

12

Aesthetics

1 The Paper In aesthetics we turn to questions about the nature of art, values in art and the appreciation of nature as art. Wide reading in the history of aesthetics is necessary for a proper approach to the subject. Issues in contemporary aesthetics are illuminated by their treatment throughout history, and the understanding and assessment of the views of past thinkers is facilitated by reflection on the problems they deal with. Aesthetics, done properly, is as hard and as rewarding as any branch of philosophy. It is philosophy turning its attention to the nature of aesthetic experience and judgement, and to questions about art, the various different art forms, how they relate to the world and to the mind, and what value they may have. Some questions in aesthetics also form part of philosophy of mind or metaphysics, for example. It is not an easy subject to study. One does best by using as material one’s own experience of artworks and of aesthetic situations, but has to use the tools of philosophy as carefully as possible in order to think about them relatively dispassionately and in a disciplined way. There are no fixed startingpoints in the subject, which is why, again, wide reading in the history of aesthetics is especially recommended.

2 Basic Reading A. INTRODUCTORY Useful introductory books (though Wollheim is more than introductory) Wollheim, Richard. 1978. Art and its Objects, 2nd edn. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Hanfling, O. ed. 1992. Philosophical Aesthetics: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell.

For general works on history of aesthetics, see Hofstadter, A., and R. Kuhns. eds. 1976. Philosophies of Art and Beauty: Selected Readings in Aesthetics from Plato to Heidegger. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press. Beardsley, M. C. 1966. Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the Present. London: Collier-Macmillan,

B. CLASSICS OF PHILOSOPHICAL AESTHETICS i. Pre-twentieth century Plato, Republic, esp. Bks.2-3, 10. ——, Ion. Aristotle, Poetics. Alison, A. 1817. ‘On the Nature and Principles of Taste’. In Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste. London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown. Hume, David. ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. In Of the Standard of Taste and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963 (collection originally published 1903); also in Selected Essays, edited with an introduction by Stephen Copley and Andrew Edgar, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgement. Translated by Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987. Pt.I: ‘The Critique of Aesthetic judgement’. Schiller, F. Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters. Translated and edited by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson, and L. A. Willoughby. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967. Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representation, Vol.I, Bk.III, Vol. II, Supplements to Bk. III.

AESTHETICS 127 Hegel, G. W. F. Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art. Translated by T. M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. Introduction. Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Birth of Tragedy. Translated by Douglas Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. ——. The Will to Power. Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968. Bk.III, Ch.4, ‘The Will to Power as Art’. Tolstoy, Leo. What is Art?

ii. Twentieth century Croce, Benedetto. Aesthetic as the Science of Expression and of the Linguistic in General. Translated by Colin Lyas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Pt.I. Dufrenne, M. The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience. Heidegger, M. ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’. In Poetry, Language and Thought, Ch.2, also in Basic Writings. Collingwood, R. G. 1958. The Principles of Art. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Langer, Susanne, K. 1957. Philosophy in a New Key: a Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite and Art. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Wittgenstein, L. 1966. Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief. Edited by Cyril Barrett. Oxford: Blackwell.

C. RECENT BOOKS i. General Beardsley, M. C. The Aesthetic Point of View: Selected Essays. Edited by Michael J. Wreen and Donald M. Callen. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982. Danto, Arthur C. 1981. The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: a Philosophy of Art. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Goodman, Nelson. 1969. Languages of Art: an Approach to a Theory of Symbols. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mothersill, Mary. 1984. Beauty Restored. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Savile, Anthony. 1982. The Test of Time: an Essay in Philosophical Aesthetics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Scruton, Roger. 1974. Art and Imagination: a Study in the Philosophy of Mind. London: Methuen. Walton, Kendall. 1990. Mimesis as Make-Believe: on the Foundations of the Representational Arts. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Budd, Malcolm. 1995. Values of Art: Pictures, Poetry, and Music. London: Allen Lane. Levinson, Jerrold. 1996. The Pleasures of Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ——. 1990. Music, Art and Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

ii. On Particular Arts Budd, Malcolm. 1985. Music and the Emotions: the Philosophical Theories. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Scruton, Roger. 1997. The Aesthetics of Music. Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press. ——. 1979. The Aesthetics of Architecture. London: Methuen. Gombrich, E. 1972. Art and Illusion: a Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation. London: Phaidon. Wollheim, R. 1987. Painting as an Art. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Lamarque, Peter, and Stein Haugom Olsen. 1994. Truth, Fiction and Literature: a Philosophical Perspective. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

iii. Collections of Articles Barrett, C. ed. 1965. Collected Papers on Aesthetics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Dickie, G., and R. J. Sclafani. 1977. eds. Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

128 STUDY GUIDE Elton, W. ed. 1954. Aesthetics and Language: Essays. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Hospers, J. ed. 1969. Introductory Readings in Aesthetics. New York: Free Press. Osborne, H. ed. 1972. Aesthetics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schaper, E. ed. 1983. Pleasure, Preference and Value: Studies in Philosophical Aesthetics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Margolis, J. ed. 1978. Philosophy Looks at the Arts: Contemporary Readings in Aesthetics. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Wollheim, R. 1973. On Art & the Mind. London: Allen Lane. ——. 1993. The Mind & its Depths. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Essays VIII-XII. Scruton, R. 1983. The Aesthetic Understanding: Essays in the Philosophy of Art and Culture. Manchester: Carcanet Press. Neill, A., and Aaron Ridley. eds. 1995. Arguing about Art: Contemporary Philosophical Debates. New York: McGraw-Hill. Hjort, M., and Sue Laver. eds. 1997. Emotion and the Arts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997

3 Topics A. AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND JUDGEMENT When someone judges an object aesthetically good or aesthetically valuable, what kind of judgement is this? Two issues predominate: (1) whether the judgement is subjective (e.g. an expression of one’s own feelings or preferences) or objective (e.g. a report on qualities discerned in the object and discernible by others); (2) whether aesthetic judgements can be made only on the basis of a peculiarly aesthetic feeling or experience. Further questions arise rapidly: if there are aesthetic qualities, how are they detected, and how do they relate to non-aesthetic properties? Is there a distinctively aesthetic mode of experience? Is there an aesthetic attitude? If aesthetic judgements are based on a subjective liking, why do we think they can be right or wrong and amenable to intersubjective debate? The classic writings of Kant and Hume continue to have an important role in discussion of these issues. Sibley, F. 1959. ‘Aesthetic Concepts’. Philosophical Review 68: 421-450; reprinted in G. Dickie, and R. J. Sclafani, eds., Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977. Sibley, F. 1965. ‘Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic’. Philosophical Review 74: 135-159. Meager, R. 1970. ‘Aesthetic Concepts’. British Journal of Aesthetics 10: 303-322. Cohen, Ted. 1973. ‘Aesthetic/Non-aesthetic and the Concept of Taste: A Critique of Sibley’s Position’. Theoria 39: 113-152. Hanfling, O. 1992. ‘Aesthetic Qualities’. In O. Hanfling ed., Philosophical Aesthetics: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell. Essay Two. Collinson, D. 1992. ‘Aesthetic Experience’. In O. Hanfling, ed., Philosophical Aesthetics: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell. Essay Four. Hampshire, S. 1954. ‘Logic and Appreciation’. In W. Elton, ed., Aesthetics and Language: Essays. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Strawson, P. F. 1966. ‘Aesthetic Appraisal and Works of Art’. Reprinted in Freedom and Resentement and Other Essays. London: Methuen, 1974. Hume, David. ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. In Of the Standard of Taste and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963 (collection originally published 1903); also in Selected Essays, edited with an introduction by Stephen Copley and Andrew Edgar. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgement. Translated by Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987. ‘Analytic of the beautiful’, sec.1-22. Wittgenstein, L. 1966. Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief. Edited by Cyril Barrett. Oxford: Blackwell.

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B. THE AESTHETIC APPRECIATION OF NATURE What is distinctive of the aesthetic appreciation of nature? For instance, in what ways does it differ from the appreciation of art? Is nature, as such, immune to aesthetic defects? What is the relevance, if any, of the understanding of nature provided by the natural sciences to the aesthetic appreciation of nature? Hepburn, R. W. 1984. ‘Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty’. In ‘Wonder’ and Other Essays: Eight Studies in Aesthetics and Neighbouring Fields. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Carlson, Allen. 1995. ‘Appreciation and the Natural Environment’. In A. Neill, and Aaron Ridley, eds., Arguing about Art: Contemporary Philosophical Debates. New York: McGraw-Hill.. Carlson, Allen. 2000. Aesthetics and the Environment: the Appreciation of Nature, Art, and Architecture. London: Routledge. Carroll, Noël. 1995. ‘On Being Moved by Nature: Between Religion and Natural History’. In A. Neill, and Aaron Ridley, eds., Arguing about Art: Contemporary Philosophical Debates. New York: McGraw-Hill. Budd, Malcolm. 1996. ‘The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature’. The British Journal of Aesthetics 36: 207-222. Budd, Malcolm. 2000. ‘The Aesthetics of Nature’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100: 137158.

C. THE VALUE OF ART It is generally assumed that art is of positive value, but surprisingly hard to give an answer as to why this is so. What is the value of a poem as a poem, or of a painting as a painting? Does the traditional notion of aesthetic value exhaust what is of value in art? Art may have instrumental values—educational, political, therapeutic, religious— but it is often thought that its status must rest on a form of autonomous value. The writings of Kant, Hegel, Schiller and Schopenhauer in different ways assign art a supreme and autonomous value—a tradition much questioned in this century. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgement. Translated by Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987. Secs.1-22, 43-52, 56-60. Schopenhauer, A. The World as Will and Representation, Vol.I, Bk.III, Vol. II, Supplements to Bk. III. Schiller, F. Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters. Translated and edited by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson, and L. A. Willoughby. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967. Hegel, G. W. F. Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art. Translated by T. M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. Introduction, esp. [5]-[6]. Tolstoy, Leo. What is Art? Bungay, S. 1984. Beauty and Truth: A Study of Hegel’s Aesthetics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Savile, A. 1987. Aesthetic Reconstructions: the Seminal Writings of Lessing, Kant and Schiller. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Mothersill, Mary. 1984. Beauty Restored. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Budd, Malcolm. 1995. Values of Art: Pictures, Poetry, and Music. London: Allen Lane. McCloskey, M. 1986. Kant’s Aesthetic. Albany: State University of New York Press. Chs. 11-14. Savile, A. 1982. The Test of Time: an Essay in Philosophical Aesthetics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.5. Diffey, T. J. 1982. ‘Aesthetic Instrumentalism’. British Journal of Aesthetics 22: 337-349.

D. REPRESENTATION What is it for an arrangement of lines or colours to be a picture of, say, a horse? How does a picture represent a specific individual? How does depiction differ from other forms of representation (e.g. linguistic)? The apparently common-sense notion that

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a picture must resemble what it depicts has been rejected by a number of recent theorists. Other notions used include ‘seeing as’ and ‘make believe’. Goodman, Nelson. 1969. Languages of Art: an Approach to a Theory of Symbols. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.1. Wollheim, Richard. 1978. Art and its Objects. 2nd ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Appendix, ‘Seeing-as, Seeing-in, and Pictorial Representation’. Wollheim, R. 1987. Painting as an Art. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Schier, F. 1986. Deeper into Pictures: an Essay on Pictorial Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Walton, Kendall. 1990. Mimesis as Make-Believe: on the Foundations of the Representational Arts. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Ch. 8. Budd, M. 1993. ‘How Pictures Look’. In Dudley Knowles and John Skorupski, eds., Virtue & Taste: Essays on Politics, Ethics and Aesthetics: in Memory of Flint Schier. Oxford: Blackwell. Hopkins, R. 1995. ‘Explaining Depiction’. Philosophical Review 104: 425-455. —–. 1998. Picture, Image and Experience: a Philosophical Enquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Peacocke, C. 1987. ‘Depiction’. Philosophical Review 96: 383-410. Hyman, John. 2000. ‘Pictorial Art and Visual Experience’. The British Journal of Aesthetics 40.

E. EXPRESSION (MUSIC) A notoriously difficult topic. It seems initially obvious that music can express sadness or joy, or at any rate present a sad or joyful character to the listener. But how? Expression here is distinct from arousing emotions in the listener. Also, expressive music does not necessarily express the feelings of its composer or performer, or indeed those of any actual human being. Part of dealing with this topic is to think about what emotions are per se—though that does not necessarily make the analysis of expression in music any easier. Budd, Malcolm. 1985. Music and the Emotions: the Philosophical Theories. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Hanslick, E. 1891. On the Musically Beautiful: a Contribution Towards the Revision of the Aesthetics of Music. Translated and edited by Geoffrey Payzant. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1986. Kivy, P. 1980. The Corded Shell: Reflections on Musical Expression. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Kivy, P. 1990. Music Alone: Philosophical Reflections on the Purely Musical Experience. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Gurney, E. 1880. The Power of Sound. London: Smith, Elder, & Co. Ch. XIV. Levinson, J. 1996. ‘Musical Expressiveness’. In The Pleasures of Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Ridley, A. 1995. Music, Value & the Passions. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Scruton, Roger. 1997. The Aesthetics of Music. Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press.

F. MEANING, INTENTION & INTERPRETATION (LITERATURE) ‘The intentional fallacy’ is supposed to consist in the assumption that a literary work has a privileged interpretation for which the intention of its author is the decisive criterion. This raises the issue—in fact a more general one covering all the arts— whether interpretation should be based on ‘internal’ features of the work or ‘external’, relational features such as its causal history. Further: can interpretations be ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’? Can there be more than one ‘correct’ interpretation of the same work? Newton-de Molina, D. ed. 1976. On Literary Intention: critical essays. Edinburgh: University

AESTHETICS 131 Press. Esp. W. K. Wimsatt and M. C. Beardsley, ‘The Intentional Fallacy’. Olsen, S. H. 1978. The Structure of Literary Understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Currie, G. 1990. The Nature of Fiction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

G. PLATO Plato is hostile to poetry, especially the poetry of the tragedians. He classes it as mimesis, an attempt to represent the appearance of things. He accuses it of usurping the function of rational thought in attempting to provide ethical knowledge, and with stimulating emotional reactions whose effects are detrimental. His provocative stance challenges us to ask: What is the value of tragedy? Should art have autonomous value, or be expected to be morally improving and to provide knowledge? What is the nature of artistic representation? How does art affect the emotions, and does it do so in a beneficial way? Plato, Republic, Bks.2-3, 10. ——, Ion. ——, Hippias Major. (Additional reading: Plato, Laws, Bks.2, 7; Gorgias, 499c-503d; Phaedrus, 245a-249d, 274b-279c.) Moravcsik, J. & S. Temko. eds. 1982. Plato on Beauty, Wisdom and the Arts. Totowa, N. J.: Rowman & Allanheld. Ferrari, G. R. F. 1989. ‘Plato and the Poets’. In George A. Kennedy, ed., The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, Vol.1: Classical Criticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nehamas, Alexander. 1988. ‘Plato and the Mass Media’. The Monist 71: 214-234. Janaway, C. 1995. Images of Excellence: Plato’s Critique of the Arts. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

H. ARISTOTLE Aristotle’s Poetics is a classic in the philosophy of art. He analyses tragic drama, arguing (against Plato) that it is beneficial. His notion of mimesis is an improved notion of artistic representation. Tragedy’s value lies in a kind of pleasure which engages the emotions of pity and fear in the audience, and through which they learn universal truths about human life. Issues that arise include: how can the portrayal of the painful be pleasurable? Is it true that we typically feel genuine pity and fear in the theatre? What do we learn from such an experience? Aristotle, Poetics. Halliwell, S. 1986. Aristotle’s Poetics. London : Duckworth. House, Humphrey. 1956. Aristotle’s Poetics: a Course of Eight Lectures. London: Hart-Davis.

I. FICTION AND EMOTION Arising out of Aristotle’s central claim that tragedy arouses emotions of pity and fear, this debate starts from the thought that emotions typically involve not only feelings but also beliefs. It seems I cannot be afraid unless I believe something threatening may occur. But do I believe the situations and characters in a play or novel are real? It seems not. So how can I have genuine emotions in this case? And if I am not feeling genuine emotions, what am I feeling? Walton, Kendall. 1978. ‘Fearing Fictions’. Journal of Philosophy 75: 5-27. Walton, Kendall. 1997. ‘Spelunking, Simulation, and Slime: On Being Moved By Fiction’. In Mette Hjort and Sue Laver eds., Emotion and the Arts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schier, Flint. 1989. ‘The Claims of Tragedy: An Essay in Moral Psychology and Aesthetics Theory’. Philosophical Papers 18: 7-26. Radford, Colin. 1975. ‘How Can we be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 49: 67-80.

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J. COLLINGWOOD’S THEORY OF ART R. G. Collingwood proposes a clear distinction between art and craft, including in the latter category many so-called ‘artistic’ ventures which are a means to the end of arousing specific emotions. His conception is that art is concerned with expressing rather than arousing emotion. The mental act of expression is the true work of art, he suggests. His work raises many fundamental questions: What is expression? In what sense does the artist foresee or intend the completed work? What is the ontological status of an art work? Is there a significant distinction between art and craft? Is ‘art proper’ restricted to works with no end outside themselves? Collingwood, R. G. 1958. The Principles of Art. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chs.I-VIII, XIV. Wollheim, Richard. 1978. Art and its Objects. 2nd ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Secs. 20-23. Wollheim, R. 1973. ‘On an Alleged Inconsistency in Collingwood’s Aesthetic’. Reprinted in On Art & the Mind. London: Allen Lane. Shorter version in M. Krausz, ed., Critical Essays on the Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. Wilkinson, R. 1992. ‘Art, Emotion and Expression’. In O. Hanfling, ed., Philosophical Aesthetics: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell. Janaway, C. 1992. ‘Arts and Crafts in Plato and Collingwood’. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 50: 45-54.

K. NIETZSCHE Nietzsche’s first book, The Birth of Tragedy, is a remarkable and elusive work, regarded as having a unique place in the history of aesthetics. He suggests that Greek tragedy arose from a unification of the Dionysian and Apollinian impulses: the impulse towards a delirious abandonment of individuality, and the impulse to create beautiful illusions. He considers a pessimistic attitude to life — it would have been better not to exist—and states ‘only as an aesthetic phenomenon is existence justified’. Almost impossible to analyse, the work nevertheless raises profound questions about art, its value, and its alleged opposition to rational thought and philosophy itself. Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Birth of Tragedy. Translated by Douglas Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Young, Julian. 1992. Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.2. Silk, M. S., and J. P. Stern. 1981. Nietzsche on Tragedy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. A detailed book, historical rather than philosophical in its emphasis.

L. THE NATURE AND DEFINITION OF ART Traditional definitions of art in terms of representation, expression, pure aesthetic form (for example) do not seem to cover everything which is regarded as art. The rapid diversification and radical nature of much art practice in the twentieth century have made the problem harder. Is art definable? Is the concept a loose one of ‘family resemblance’? Is the whole point of the concept that it is open-ended? Or can art be defined by its relation to certain social institutions? Dickie offers an institutional definition, taking ‘art’ purely as a classificatory rather than an evaluative term. Danto’s more subtle work seeks a definition of art that will encompass minimalist and conceptual works of the post-war period. Art can exist, for Danto, only in an ‘artworld’ which generates theories of art, and gives us the historical and creative context that allows us to regard things as art. For Danto any art’s existence is dependent on an interpretation, which may ‘transfigure’ an ordinary object into an art work. Dickie, George. 1974. Art and the Aesthetic. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Dickie, George. 1984. The Art Circle: a Theory of Art. New York: Haven.

AESTHETICS 133 Danto, Arthur. 1981. The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: a Philosophy of Art. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Danto, Arthur. 1986. The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art. New York: Columbia University Press, Danto, Arthur. 1992. Beyond the Brillo-Box: the Visual Arts in Post-historical Perspective. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux. Davies, Stephen. 1991. Definitions of Art. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Carroll, Noël. 1998. A Philosophy of Mass Art. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

M. ONTOLOGY & IDENTITY-CONDITIONS OF ARTWORKS The metaphysics of art works throws up some difficult problems. Are art works physical objects? Some seem definitely not to be, for example: a novel, a piece of music. Others look as if they are: an oil-painting, a carved sculpture. But even here the cultural, representational and expressive properties of art works have led some to argue that they cannot be identical with a ‘mere physical thing’. Is a musical work (as distinct from its performances) a type, or a universal? Or are all art works really actions? Danto’s work once again raises issues about identity. How is causal history relevant to the identity of a work, and to its artistic content? Danto suggests that two perceptually indistinguishable things can be distinct art works, subject to different interpretations. Another relevant issue is forgery: one can forge a particular painting in a way in which one cannot forge a particular piece of music—why? Goodman, Nelson. 1969. Languages of Art: an Approach to a Theory of Symbols. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. III. Danto, Arthur. 1981. The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: a Philosophy of Art. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Wollheim, Richard. 1978. Art and its Objects. 2nd ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Levinson, Jerrold. 1990.‘What a Musical Work Is’, ‘Autographic and Allographic Art Revisited’ and ‘What a Musical Work Is, Again’. In Music, Art and Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Currie, Gregory. 1989. An Ontology of Art. Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with the Scots Philosophical Club.

N. KANT’S AESTHETIC THEORY Use preferably the Hackett edition of the Critique of Judgement, trans. Werner S. Pluhar. (Note that only Part One of this work is concerned with aesthetics and need be read.) Central issues are Kant’s analysis and justification of judgements of beauty; the Antinomy of Taste and its resolution; Kant’s treatment of the sublime; Kant’s theory of art, and concepts of genius and aesthetic ideas; and Kant’s account of the relation of aesthetic judgement to teleology, morality and the supersensible. Commentaries (Starred items are strongly recommended) Cohen, T., and P. Guyer, eds. 1982. Essays in Kant’s Aesthetics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. * Crawford, D. 1974. Kant’s Aesthetic Theory. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. * Elliott, R. K. 1968. ‘The Unity of Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgement’. British Journal of Aesthetics 8: 244-259. Guyer, P. 1997. Kant and the Claims of Taste. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McCloskey, M. 1986. Kant’s Aesthetic. Albany: State University of New York Press. Schaper, E. 1979. Studies in Kant’s Aesthetics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. * Savile, A. 1987. Aesthetic Reconstructions: the Seminal Writings of Lessing, Kant and Schiller. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Chs.4-6. Savile, A. 1993. Kantian Aesthetics Pursued. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

13

Symbolic Logic

1 The Paper The paper covers formal methods and results relevant to the philosophy of mathematics and logic, and to some aspects of metaphysics. This paper forms a natural pair with the Philosophy of Mathematics paper; each informs the other, but neither depends on the other. Broadly speaking there are four parts: (a) set theory, which includes the theory of the infinite and provides methods needed in the other parts; (b) metatheory of first order logic, which sets out the syntax and semantics of formal systems, and establishes main relations between them; (c) computability and the limitative results, which introduces the basic methods and major results of metamathematics; (d) modal logic. The paper is relatively demanding of one’s mathematical abilities, but you do not have to be brilliant. Success in the first year Elementary Logic course is prerequisite. Symbolic logic, as all other mathematical subjects, is not a spectator sport; you must do the problems, as well go through the lecture notes (or textbook) to make sure you understand what is going on, after each lecture. If you keep up with this you are likely to do well in the exam.

2 General Textbooks Devlin, K. 1992. Sets, Functions & Logic: an Introduction to Abstract Mathematics. 2nd ed. London: Chapman & Hall. A good starting point for moving between first-year Elementary Logic and the Symbolic Logic course. Machover, M. 1996. Set Theory, Logic & Their Limitations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The main textbook in recent years. Boolos, G., and R. Jeffrey. 1989. Computability & Logic. 3rd ed. Cambridge University Press. A useful alternative to the main textbook. Enderton, H. 1972. A Mathematical Introduction to Logic. New York: Academic Press. Another useful alternative to the main textbook. Mendelson, E. 1997. Introduction to Mathematical Logic. 4th ed. London: Chapman & Hall. This is also highly thought of. Lyndon, R. 1966. Notes on Logic. Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand. This is something manageable. Shoenfield, J. 1967. Mathematical Logic. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. High-flyers might look at Shoenfield’s classic.

3 Topics A. SET THEORY The class paradoxes, sets/classes, the axioms; relations, functions, orderings; ordinals; transfinite induction & recursion; the axiom of choice & equivalents; finite & infinite cardinality; well-foundedness & the cumulative hierarchy. Texts Enderton, H. 1977. Elements of Set Theory. New York: Academic Press. Hrabcek, K. and M. T. Jech. 1984. Introduction to Set Theory. 2nd ed. New York: M. Dekker.

Symbolic Logic 135 Machover, M. 1996. Set Theory, Logic & Their Limitations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-6.

B. FIRST-ORDER LOGIC Soundness, completeness & decidability of propositional calculus; predicate calculus; satisfaction & truth-in-a-structure; soundness, completeness & compactness of predicate calculus. Texts See relevant chapters in general books under (2).

C. COMPUTABILITY AND THE LIMITATIVE RESULTS Computability & computable functions; formal theories; undefinability of arithmetical truth (Tarski); Church’s undecidability theorem; incompleteness of formal arithmetic & unprovability of consistency (Gödel); non-standard models. Texts Epstein, R., and W. Carnielli. 1989. Computability: Computable Functions, Logic, and the Foundations of Mathematics. Pacific Grove, Calif.: Wadsworth & Brooks/Cole. This relates the material to philosophy of mathematics. Boolos, G., and R. Jeffrey. 1989. Computability & Logic. 3rd edn. Cambridge University Press. Relevant chapters. Machover, M. 1996. Set Theory, Logic & Their Limitations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 9-10.

D. MODAL LOGIC Modal logic: basic systems of propositional & predicate modal logic; Kripke semantics. Texts Hughes, G., and M. Cresswell.1968. An Introduction to Modal Logic. London: Methuen. New edition: New Introduction to Modal Logic. London: Routledge, 1995.

14

Post-Aristotelian Philosophy

1 The Paper This period of 900 years from 322 B.C. to 600 A.D. is full of philosophical excitement and innovation. Philosophers transformed old problems and introduced new ones, in such a way as to turn the subject in fresh directions. Much that we encounter in modern philosophy takes its character from the developments of this time. Seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophy cannot be fully understood without it. Since the history of philosophy is a continuous story, this period in its turn cannot be fully understood without some knowledge of Plato and Aristotle. It connects well with the Medieval Philosophy paper, which from 2001 will include Islamic, as well as Latin Medieval Philosophy. There are two main areas covered by this paper: (i) Hellenistic Philosophy, 322 B.C. – 200 A.D. (ii) Neoplatonism and Christianity, 200 A.D. – 600 A.D.

2 Hellenistic Philosophy A. GENERAL READING i. Main Source Book Hellenistic Philosophy can now be studied very simply because the fragments previously scattered, have been collected in an excellent translation with very helpful commentary: Long, A. A., and D. N. Sedley. 1987. The Hellenistic Philosophers. 2 Vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vol.1.

They study the Epicureans, Stoics and Sceptics, covering the main topics as they were distinguished by the ancients. This is the main book for Hellenistic Philosophy. For overviews of the whole subject, the following two books are very useful Long, A. A. 1986. Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. 2nd ed. London: Duckworth. Sharples, R. W. 1996. Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics. London: Routledge.

ii. Philosophical treatments of Hellenistic Philosophy Philosophy students will want to see the light that these schools shed on modern philosophical concerns, and for this purpose the relevant sections of any of the following books are worth reading. Sorabji, R. 1972. Aristotle on Memory. London: Duckworth. ——. 1980. Necessity, Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle’s Theory. London: Duckworth. (NCB), chapters on determinism. ——. 1983. Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages. London: Duckworth. (TCC), chapters on time, on atomism, on death and eternal recurrence, on Idealism and antiquity ——. 1988. Matter, Space and Motion: Theories in Antiquity and their Sequel. London: Duckworth. (MSM), chapters on Stoic categories, mixture, interpenetration of bodies, space, vacuum, the world’s finitude, natural motion, eternal recurrence and circular time.

Post-Aristotelian Philosophy 137 ——. 1993. Animal Minds and Human Morals: the Origins of the Western Debate. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. (AMHM), on reason, perception, perceptual content, memory, emotion, social contract, human rights, justice, cynicism. ——. 2000. Emotion and Peace of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (EPM), is emotion just an attitude of mind, or due to irrational psychic forces, or to physiology? How does the Stoic calming of emotions relate to Christian avoiding of temptations? Sharples, R. W. 1983. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Fate: text, translation and commentary. London: Duckworth. Translates and explains the main reply on determinism by the Aristotelian school to the Stoics. Bobzien, Susanne. 1998. Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. This is a brilliant analysis of the later stages of the determinism debate. Nussbaum, Martha. 1994. The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. A vivid philosophical analysis of the ethics and psychology of the emotions in these schools.

B. FURTHER READING i. Introductions to the main Hellenistic schools & early Roman Period Stoics Inwood, Brad. 1985. Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Long, A. A. 1971. ed. Problems in Stoicism. London: Athlone Press. Rist, J. M. ed. 1978. The Stoics. Berkeley: University of California Press. ——. 1969. Stoic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sambursky, S. 1959. Physics of the Stoics. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Hahm, D. E. 1977. The Origins of Stoic Cosmology. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

Epicureans Furley, D. J. 1967. Two Studies in the Greek Atomists: Study 1 - Indivisible magnitudes. Study 2 - Aristotle and Epicurus on Voluntary Action. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Mitsis, Phillip. 1988. Epicurus’ Ethical Theory: the Pleasures of Invulnerability. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Sceptics Annas, J., and J. Barnes. 1985. The Modes of Scepticism: Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hankinson, R. J. 1998. The Sceptics. London: Routledge.

Philosophy of the Roman Republic & Early Empire Powell, J. G. F. ed. 1999. Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Griffin, M., and J. Barnes, eds. 1989. Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society. 2 Vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Dillon, J. 1977. The Middle Platonists: a Study of Platonism, 80 BC to AD 220. London: Duckworth.

See also Kneale, W., and M. Kneale. 1962. The Development of Logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Annas, Julia. 1992. Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind. Berkeley: University of California Press. ——. 1993. The Morality of Happiness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

ii. Further Sources Although many of the texts for the Hellenistic period are fragmentary, there are a number of non-fragmentary texts available, many in the volumes of the Loeb Classical Library, which has English on one side and Greek or Latin facing (marked LCL in what follows). Epicureans Epicurus’s 3 letters summarising his views, in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers. With a translation by R. D. Hicks. 2 Vols. Series Loeb Classical Library

138 Study Guide (henceforth LCL). London: Heinemann: Putnam’s Sons, 1925. Bk.10, in Vol.2. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things (LCL), a latin verse summary of Epicurus. Inwood, Brad, and L. P. Gerson. 1994. The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonia. Introduction by D. S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Aristotelians See above for Alexander On Fate.

Stoic Ethics Seneca, Letters (Epistulae Morales) (LCL), 3 Vols. Seneca, Moral Essays (LCL), 3 Vols. Seneca, Moral and Political Essays. Edited and translated by John M. Cooper and J. F. Procopé. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Cicero, parts of On Ends (de Finibus); On Duties (de Officiis); Tusculan Disputations. (LCL) Epictetus, The Discourses, the Handbook, fragments. Ed., and trans., by Christopher Gill and Robin Hard. The Everyman Library. London: Dent, 1995. Also translated in LCL.

Sceptics Sextus Empiricus, 4 Vols. (LCL) Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism. Translated by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Cicero, Academica. (LCL)

iii. Collections of Articles There are some excellent collections of articles. On epistemology see Schofield, M., M. Burnyeat, and J. Barnes. eds. 1980. Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology: Oxford: Clarendon Press. Burnyeat, M. ed. 1983. The Skeptical Tradition. Berkeley: University of California Press.

And see Barnes, J., J. Brunschwig, M. Burnyeat, and M. Schofield. eds. 1982. Science and Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Includes theory of inference. Schofield, M., and G. Striker. eds. 1986. The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. On ethics. Brunschwig, J., and Martha C. Nussbaum. eds. 1993. Passions and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind: proceedings of the fifth Symposium Hellenisticum. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Contains work relevant to philosophy of mind. Barnes, J., and Mario Mignucci. eds. 1988. Matter and Metaphysics: fourth Symposium Hellenisticum. Napoli: Bibliopolis. With verse introduction by Sorabji. Laks, A., and Malcolm Schofield. eds. 1995. Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy: sixth Symposium Hellenisticum. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. On social and political philosophy. Brunschwig, Jaques. 1994. Hellenistic Philosophy. Translated by Janet Lloyd. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Frede, Michael. 1987. Essays in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Everson, S. 1990. ed. Epistemology. Companions to Ancient Thought 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——. 1991. ed. Psychology. Companions to Ancient Thought 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——. 1994. ed. Language. Companions to Ancient Thought 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——. 1998. ed. Ethics. Companions to Ancient Thought 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ierodiakonou, Katerine. 1999. Topics in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

iv. Influence For the influence of ancient scepticism on seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophy, see

Post-Aristotelian Philosophy 139 Popkin, Richard H. 1979. The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza. Berkeley: University of California Press. (Revised and expanded edition of The history of scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes. New York: Humanities Press, 1964)

v. Further Bibliography Long, A. A., and D. N. Sedley. 1987. The Hellenistic Philosophers. 2 Vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vol.2.

3 Neoplatonism and Christianity Eleven philosophers are particularly important Neoplatonists Plotinus c.205-260 A.D. Porphyry 232-309 Iamblichus c.250-c.320. Proclus c.411-485 Ammonius c.435/45-c.517/26 Simplicius, wrote after 532

Christians Origen 185-284 A.D. Gregory of Nyssa c.331-396. Augustine 354-430.

Christian Neoplatonists Boethius c.480-c.525. Philoponus c.490-570.

A. SOURCES The later period can be studied simply, because the pagan sources are now available in a 3-volume Sourcebook, Richard Sorabji, Philosophy of the Commentators, 200-600 AD.

A first draft of 1999 is available for London students only in each London University Philosophy Department. The final publication is expected in breakdown by topic: (i) Logic and Metaphysics; (ii) Psychology with Ethics and Religion; (iii) Physics. Two particularly interesting philosophical texts of the period are: (i) Porphyry, On Abstinence from Killing Animals, translated 2000, a Neoplationist account of why, if you understand God, humans and animals, you will not sacrifice or eat animals. (ii) Philoponus, Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World, a confrontation between pagan and Christian cosmology, translation expected 2002.

But it is also important to sample (iii) Plotinus, Enneads, Loeb translation, the background of all subsequent Neoplatonism, with the riveting biography of Plotinus by Porphyry in Vol. 1.

Three more interesting texts: (iv) Philoponus, Corolleries on Place and Void, translated. (v) Simplicius, Corolleries on Place and Time, translated. (vi) Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, translated, criticises Plotinus’s attempt in Enneads, 6, 1-3, to demolish Aristotle’s Categories.

On the Christian side, the two most important thinkers of all are easy to read. A useful start would be Augustine, Confessions (Henry Chadwick’s translation, in Oxford World’s Classics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) is the best), a riveting autobiography, which describes how Neoplatonism converted him to Christianity and any part of the larger and later City of God, in which he distances himself from Neoplatonism (available both in Penguin, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972) and Loeb, (Lon-

140 Study Guide

don: Heinemann, 1957-1972).) (Look esp. at Books 8-14.) Boethius Consolation of Philosophy, (Penguin, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books) and Loeb, (Rev. ed. London: Heinemann, 1918)) is also attractive. Written by him in prison awaiting execution on a doubtful charge, frustrated in completing his life’s work of putting Aristotle, Plato, and Neoplatonist-style commentaries on them into Latin. The result was truncated knowledge of Plato and Aristotle in the West until the 12th century, although the Consolation itself was paraphrased or translated by King Alfred and Queen Elizabeth. Philosophy students will find Book 5 the most interesting, on whether life is governed by chance, fate or divine providence. Plotinus’s Christian contemporary Origen wrote the clever and original On First Principles translated by Butterworth (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1973).

B. PHILOSOPHICAL TREATMENTS There are again books bringing out the relation of the above texts to modern philosophical concerns Sorabji, Richard. 1983. Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages. London: Duckworth. ——. 1988. Matter, Space and Motion: Theories in Antiquity and their Sequel. London: Duckworth. ——. 1993. Animal Minds and Human Morals: the Origins of the Western Debate. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. ——. 2000. Emotion and Peace of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Sambursky, S. 1962. The Physical World of Late Antiquity. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Discusses science. Stead, C. 1994. Philosophy in Christian Antiquity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Discusses concepts relevant to Christianity.

C. BOOKS ON PARTICULAR PHILOSOPHERS Augustine Brown, Peter. 1967. Augustine of Hippo: a Biography. London: Faber. The standard biography. O’Daly, Gerard. 1987. Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind. London: Duckworth. Chadwick, Henry. 1986. Augustine. Oxford: Oxford University Press. A brief introduction. Kirwan, C. 1989. Augustine. London: Routledge.

Boethius Chadwick, Henry. 1989. Boethius: the Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology and Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Plotinus O’Meara, Dominic J. 1993. Plotinus: an Introduction to the Enneads. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Rist, J. M. 1967. Plotinus, The Road to Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hadot, Pierre. 1993. Plotinus or, The Simplicity of Vision. Translated by Michael Chase. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gerson, Lloyd P. 1994. Plotinus. London: Routledge.

Philoponus Sorabji, Richard. ed. 1987. Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science. London: Duckwork. de Haas, Frans A. J. 1997. John Philoponus’ New Definition of Prime Matter: Aspects of its Background in Neoplatonism and the Ancient Commentary Tradition. Leiden: Brill.

D. GENERAL TREATMENT OF NEOPLATONISM Lloyd, A. C. 1990. The Anatomy of Neoplatonism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Wallis, R. T. 1972. Neoplatonism. 2nd ed. London: Duckworth, 1995. A historical survey.

15

Mediæval Philosophy

1 The Paper This option requires knowledge of the main philosophical themes discussed by the major thinkers from St. Augustine to Suárez. Because of the extent of the influence of Greek thought on the mediaeval period, the student is advised to be well advanced in his or her work for the Greek Philosophy paper before starting to work for this one. All students should have a thorough grounding in Augustine and Aquinas, and Scotus and Ockham. The questions asked are for the most part restricted to the areas of metaphysics and epistemology, with some attention paid to logic. There is a great continuity of theme within medieval philosophical thought, and it is rewarding to trace the treatment of philosophical problems right through from Augustine to Suárez.

2 Basic Reading Anthologies & Works of Reference Kretzmann, N., and E.Stump. eds. 1988. The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988. Vol.1: Logic and the Philosophy of Language. Wippel, J. F., and A. Wolter. eds. 1969. Medieval Philosophy: from St. Augustine to Nicholas of Cusa. London: Collier-Macmillan. Hyman, Arthur, and James J. Walsh. eds. 1967. Philosophy in Middle Ages: the Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Traditions. 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983. Schoedinger, A. ed. 1996. Readings in Medieval Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. Gilson, E. 1936. The Spirit of Mediæval Philosophy. London: Sheed & Ward. Kretzmann, Norman, A. J. P. Kenny, and Jan Pinborg. eds. 1982. The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. J. F. Wippel, ed., Readings in Medieval Philosophy. Dronke, P. ed. 1992. A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy. New ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Spade, P. ed. 1994. Five Texts on the Medieval Problem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius, Aberlard, Duns Scotus and Ockham. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Introductory Texts Evans, G. R. 1993. Philosophy and Theology in the Middle Ages. London: Routledge. Leaman, O. 1985. An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Martin, C. J. F. 1996. An Introduction to Medieval Philosophy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Luscombe, D. 1997. Medieval Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Copleston, F. C. 1972. A History of Medieval Philosophy. London: Methuen. Marenbon, J. 1988. Early Medieval Philosophy (480-1150): an Introduction. Rev. ed. London: Routledge. ——. 1987. Later Medieval Philosophy (1150-1350): an Introduction. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Grant, E. 1996. The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages: Their Religious, Institutional and Intellectual Contexts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kenny, A., and J. Pinborg. 1982. ‘Medieval Philosophical Literature’. In Kretzmann, Kenny and Pinborg, eds. The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. Jolivet, J. 1992. ‘The Arabic Inheritance’. In P. Dronke, ed., A History of Twelfth-Century

142 Study Guide Western Philosophy. Hughes, C. 1998. ‘Medieval Philosophy’. In A. C. Grayling, ed., Philosophy 2: Further Through the Subject. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

3 Specific Authors A. AUGUSTINE The Confessions. City of God. On Freedom of Choice. The Soliloquies. On the Immortality of the Soul. On Christian Doctrine. On the Trinity.

The above texts are available as single volume works, in editions from Penguin, Hackett, the Bristol Classical Texts, Oxford University Press, and the Catholic University Press of America. Secondary Reading O’Daly, G. 1987. Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind. London: Duckworth. O’Connell, R. J. 1969. St. Augustine’s Confessions: the Odyssey of Soul. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press. ——. 1968. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Rist, John M. ed., Augustine: A Collection of Critical Essays. ——. 1994. Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kirwan, C. 1989. Augustine. London: Routledge. Evans, G. R. 1982. Augustine on Evil. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wetzel, J. 1992. Augustine and the Limits of Virtue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bourke, V. 1947. Augustine's Quest of Wisdom: Life and Philosophy of the Bishop of Hippo. Milwaukee, WI: Bruce Publishing Company. Chappell, T. D. J. 1995. Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom: Two Theories of Freedom, Voluntary Action and Akrasia. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Pt.2. Stump, E., and N. Kretzmann. eds. 2001. Cambridge Companion to Augustine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

B. BOETHIUS Boethius: Theological, Tractates and on the Consolation of Philosophy. Translated and edited by H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester. Rev. ed. Loeb Classical Library. London: Heinemann, 1973. The Consolation of Philosophy is available in the Penguin Classics series. Second Commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge. In P. Spade, ed., Five Texts on the Medieval Problem of Universals. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994.

Secondary Reading Chadwick, H. 1981. Boethius: the Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Gibson, M. ed. 1981. Boethius: his Life, Thought and Influence. Oxford: Blackwell. Stump, E. 1989. Dialectic and its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Liebeschutz, H. 1967. ‘Boethius and Legacy of Antiquity’. In A. H. Armstrong ed., The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McInerny, R. 1990. Boethius and Aquinas. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America. Patch, H. R. 1929. ‘Fate in Boethius and the Neoplatonits’. Speculum. Davies, M. 1989. ‘Boethius on Divine Foreknowledge’. In J. Fischer ed., God, Foreknowledge, and Freedom. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Craig, W. L. 1988. The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle

Medieval Philosophy 143 to Suarez. Leiden: Brill. Ch.3. Schmid, W. 1957. ‘Boethius and the claims of Philosophy’. Studia Patristica.

C. ERIUGENA Treatise on Divine Predestination. Translated by Mary Brennan. Notre Dame, In.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998.

Secondary Literature Carabine, Deirdre. 2000. John Scottus Eriugena. Moran, D. 1989. The Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena: a Study of Idealism in the Middle Ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gersh, S. 1978. From Iamlichus to Eriugena: an Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition. Leiden: Brill. O’Meara, J. J. 1988. Eriugena. Oxford: Clarendon, O’Meara, J. J. 1973. The Mind of Eriugena. Dublin: Irish University Press for Royal Irish Academy.

D. ABELARD Ethica. Peter Abelard’s ‘Ethics’. Translated by D. Luscombe. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971. Ethical writings: his Ethics or Know yourself and his Dialogue between a philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian. Translated by Paul V. Spade. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995. Glosses on Porphyry in his Logica ingredientibus. In P. Spade, ed., Five Texts on the Medieval Problem of Universals. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994.

Secondary Reading Adams, M. M. ‘Introduction’ to Spade edition of Ethical Writings. Marenbon, J. 1997. The Philosophy of Peter Abelard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Quinn, P. 1993. ‘Abelard on Atonement’. In E. Stump, ed., Reasoned Faith. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. de Rijk, L. 1986. ‘Peter Aberlard's Semantics and his Doctrine of Being’. Vivarium 24: 85-127. Jacobi, K. 1983. ‘Statements About Events: Modal and Tense Analysis in Medieval Logic’. Vivarium 21: 85-107 Lewis, N. 1987. ‘Determinate Truth in Aberlard’. Vivarium 25: 81-109. Luscombe, D. E. 1969. The School of Peter Aberlard: the Influence of Abelard’s Thought in the Early Scholastic Period. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mews, Constant J. 1995. Peter Aberlard. Authors of the Middle Ages. Vol. 2. Aldershot: Variorum. Tweedale, M. 1992. ‘Logic: to the time of Aberlard’. In P. Dronke ed., A History of TwelfthCentury Western Philosophy. New ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

E. ANSELM Anselm of Canterbury, Vol.1. Monologion; Proslogion; Debate with Gaunilo; and a Meditation on Human Redemption. Edited and translated by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson. London: S.C.M. Press, 1974. Anselm of Canterbury, Vol.2. Philosophical fragments; De grammatico; On truth; Freedom of choice; The fall of the devil; The harmony of the foreknowledge, the predestination, and the grace of God with free choice. Edited and translated by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson. London: S. C. M. Press, 1974. St Anselm: Basic Writings, trans. and ed., S. N. Deane. LaSalle: Open Court Publishing Company, 1962. Contains Monologion, Proslogion, and the debate with Gaunilo. Anselm: Monologion & Proslogion with the Replies of Gaunilo & Anselm, trans. and ed., T. Williams, Indianapolis: Hackett.

Secondary Reading Southern, R. 1990. St. Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Henry, D. P. 1967. The Logic of St. Anselm. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Schufrieder, G. 1994. Confessions of a Rational Mystic: Anselm’s Early Writings. West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press. Evans, G. R. 1978. Anselm and Talking about God. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hartshorne, C. 1965. Anselm's Discovery: a Re-examination of the Ontological Proof for God’s Existence. Lasalle, Ill.: Open Court.

144 Study Guide La Croix, R. 1972. Proslogion II and III: A Third Intepretation of Anselm's Argument. Leiden: Brill. Morris, Thomas V. 1987. Anselmian Explorations: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. Wierenga, E. 1988. ‘Anselm on Omnipresence’. New Scholasticism 62: 30-41. Rogers, Katherin A. 1997. The Neoplatonic Metaphysics and Epistemology of Anselm of Canterbury. Lewiston Lampeter: Edward Mellen Press.

F. AQUINAS Basic Writings of St Thomas Aquinas. Edited by Anton C. Pegis. 2 Vols. New York: Random House, 1945. Contains many selections from the Summa Theologiae and Summa Contra Gentiles. Gilby, T., and T. C. O’Brian. eds. Summa Theologiae. The Blackfriars Edition. London: Eyre & Spottiswood, 1964-81. The edition has many volumes, each with its own introduction and comments, and has Latin and English on facing pages. McDermott, T. ed. 1991. The Summa Theologiae: A Concise English Translation. London: Methuen. ——. Aquinas: Philosophy Writings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Martin, C. J. F. ed. 1988. The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas: Introductory Readings. London: Routledge. Pegis, A. ed. 1975. Summa Contra Gentiles. 4 Vols. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press. Bobik, J. ed. 1965. On Being and Essence. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press. Contains an extensive and careful commentary. Goodwin, R. ed. 1965. Selected Writings of St Thomas Aquinas. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing. Contains On Being and Essence, along with The Principles of Nature, On the Virtues in General, and On Freedom of Choice. M. Fitzpatrick and J. Wellmuth. edd., Aquinas’ Commentary on Spiritual Creatures, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. Rowan, J. trans. 1961. Aquinas’ Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. Baumgarth, W. M., and Richard J. Regan. eds. 1988. St. Thomas Aquinas: On Law, Morality & Politics. Indianapolis: Hackett. Disputed Questions On Evil, trans. and eds., J. and J. Oesterle, Catholic Univ. Press of America. Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, trans., and ed., C. Litzinger. Chicago Univ. Press. Bobik, J. 1998. ed. Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements: a translation and interpretation of the De principiis naturae and the De mixtione elementorum of St. Thomas Aquinas. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Disputed Questions on the Soul, trans. J. Robb, Marquette Univ. Press. Disputed Questions on Truth, transs. R. Mulligan, V. McGlynn and Schmidt, Hackett.

Secondary Reading Davies, B. 1992. The Thought of Thomas Aquinas. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Finnis, J. 1988. Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Macdonald, S., and E. Stump. 1998. Aquinas’s Moral Theory: Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Wawrykow, J. 1995. God’s Grace and Human Action: ‘merit’ in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Kenny, A. 1969. The Five Ways: Saint Thomas Aquinas’ Proofs of God’s Existence. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ——. 1993. Aquinas on Mind. London: Routledge. ——. ed. 1969. Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays. New York: Doubleday. McInerny, R. 1982. Ethica Thomistica: the Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. ——. 1996. Aquinas and Analogy. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. Kretzmann, N., and E. Stump. eds. 1993. The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bradley, D. 1997. Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas’s Moral Science. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press.

Medieval Philosophy 145 Aertsen, Jan A. 1996. Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas. Leiden: E.J. Brill. ——. 1988. Nature & Creature: Thomas Aquinas’ Way of Thought. Leiden: E. J. Brill. Gilson, E. 1983. The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. New York: Octagon Books. Copleston, F. C. 1955 Thomas Aquinas. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Westberg, D. 1994. Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Wippel, J. F. 1984. Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. Anscombe, G. E. M., and P. Geach. 1961. Three Philosophers: Aristotle, Aquinas, Frege. Oxford: Blackwell. See Geach’s essay on Aquinas. Hughes, C. 1989. On a Complex Theory of a Simple God: An Investigation in Aquinas’ Philosophical Theology. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Blanchette, O. 1992. The Perfection of the Universe According to Aquinas: A Teleological Cosmology. Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Lisska, A. 1996. Aquinas's Theory of Natural Law: an Analytic Reconstrution. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Jenkins, J. 1997. Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Boland, V. 1996. Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas Aquinas. Leiden: Brill. O'Rourke, F. 1992. Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas. Leiden: E. J. Brill. Martin, C. J. F. 1997. Thomas Aquinas: God and Explanations. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

G. MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY Primary Sirat, C. 1985. A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

See also selections from Saadia, Maimonides, Gersonides and Crescas in the anthologies listed above. And the sections on the Jewish Philosophical tradition in the Islamic cultural world in S. H. Nasr and O. Leaman, eds., History of Islamic Philosophy, 2 Vols., (London: Routledge, 1995), Part 1. And M. Friedlander, ed., Maimonides: The Guide for the Perplexed, (London: Routledge, 1904). Secondary Reading Broadie, A. 1995. ‘Maimonides’. In S.H. Nasr, ed., History of Islamic Philosophy. Leaman, O. 1990. Maimonides. London: Routledge. Ormsby, E. L. ed. 1989. Maimonides and his Time. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. Leaman, O. 1995. Evil and Suffering in Jewish Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 3-5. Davidson, H. 1987. Proofs of Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic & Jewish Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.

H. MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY See selections from Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes in the above listed anthologies, and O. Leaman, An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy. Secondary Reading H. Davidson, H. 1992. Alfarabi, Avicenna, Averroes on Intellect: their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active and Theories of Human Intellect. New York: Oxford University Press. ——. 1987. Proofs of Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic & Jewish Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. Hasse, D. N. Avicenna in the West. Goodman, L. 1992. Avicenna. London: Routledge. Leaman, O. 1988. Averroes and his Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Marmura, M. 1986. ‘Avicenna's “Flying Man” in Context’. Monist 69: 383-395.

146 Study Guide Bello, I. 1989. The Medieval Islamic Controversey Between Philosophy and Orthodoxy: ijma‘ and ta’wil in the conflict between al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd. Leiden: E. J. Brill. Goodman, L. 1999. Jewish and Islamic Philosophy: Crosspollinations in the Classical Age. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

I. DUNS SCOTUS Duns Scotus: Philosophical Writings. Translated by Allen B. Wolter. Indianapolis: Hackett. A Treatise on God as First Principle. Translated by Allen B. Wolter. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1966. Duns Scotus On the Will & Morality. Translated by Allan B. Wolter. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1997. Frank W., and A. Wolter. eds. 1995. Duns Scotus Metaphysician. West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press. A. Wolter, ed. 1975. John Duns Scotus: God and Creatures, the Quolitbetal Questions. Princeton: Princeton Universitty Press.

Secondary Reading Wolter, A. 1990. The Philosophical Theology of Duns Scotus. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. ——. 1946. The Transcendentals and their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus. St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: The Franciscan Institute. Bettoni, E. The Philosophy of Duns Scotus. Harris, C. R. S. 1927. Duns Scotus. 2 Vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bonansea, B., and J. K. Ryan. ed. 1965. John Duns Scotus, 1265-1965. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. Bonansea, B. 1983. Man and his Approach to God in John Duns Scotus. Lanham: University Press of America. Broadie, A. 1995. The Shadow of Scotus: Philosophy and Faith in pre-Reformation Scotland. Edinburgh: T & T Clark. Langston, D. 1986. God’s Willing Knowledge: the Influence of Scotus’ Analysis of Omniscience. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Ingham, M. 1989. Ethics and Freedom: An Historical-Critical Investigation of Scotist Ethical Thought. Lanham: University Press of America. Honnefelder, L., R. Wood, and M. Dreyer. eds. 1996. John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics. Leiden: E. J. Brill. Cross, R. 1999. Scotus. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ——. 1998. The Physics of Duns Scotus: the Scientific Context of a Theological Vision. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

J. OCKHAM Loux. M. J. trans.1974. Ockham’s Theory of Terms: Part 1 of the Summa Logicae. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. Boehner. P. ed. Ockham: Philosophical Writings. Indianapolis: Hackett. Adams, M., and N. Kretzmann, trans., William Ockham: Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents, Indianapolis: Hackett. Freddoso, Alfred J., and Francis E. Kelley. 1998. Quodlibetal Questions. 2 Vols. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Secondary Reading Adams, M. M. 1987. William Ockham. 2 Vols. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. Wood, R. ed. 1997. Ockham on the Virtues. West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press. Leff, G. 1975. William of Ockham: The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse. Totowa, N. J. Adams, M. M. 1995. ‘Ockham’s Moral Theory’. In The Context of Casuistry, edited by James F. Keenan and Thomas A. Shannon. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. Spade, P. V. 1999. Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Freppert, L. 1988. The Basis of Morality According to William Ockham. Chicago, Ill.: Franciscan Herald Press.

K. LATE MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY Nicholas of Autrecourt, Correspondence with Master Giles and Bernard of Arezzo, trans. and ed., L.

Medieval Philosophy 147 M. de Rijk. Niholas of Cusa, see selections in Hyman and Walsh eds., and Wippel and Wolter, eds. Universal Treatise, trans. and ed., L. Kennedy, R. Arnould and A. Millward, Marquette University Press. Luis de Molina, Concordia, trans., and ed., A Freddoso. Cornell: Cornell University Press. Part IV Suárez, On Efficient Causality, trans. and ed., A. Freddoso. Yale University Press.

L. SELECTED SPECIALIST READING Carre, M. H. 1946. Realists and Nominalists. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kneale, W., and M. Kneale. 1962. The Development of Logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Sections on the Medievals. Boehner, Philotheus. 1952. Mediæval Logic: an Outline of its Development from 1250 to c.1400. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Hamlyn, D. W. 1961. Sensation and Perception: a History of the Philosophy of Perception. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. The section on medieval theories of perception. Gracia, J. J. E. ed. 1994. Individuation in Scholasticism: the Later Middle Ages and CounterReformation. Albany: State University of New York Press. Kent, B. 1995. The Virtues of the Will: the Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. Brett, A. 1997. Liberty, Right & Nature: Individual Rights in Later Scholastic Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Knuuttila, S. 1993. Modalities in Medieval Philosophy. London: Routledge. Boh, I. 1993. Epistemic Logic in the Later Middle Ages. London: Routledge. Halopainen, T. 1996. Dialectic & Theology in the Eleventh Century. Leiden: E. J. Brill. Saarinen, R. 1994. The Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought: from Augustine to Buridan. Leiden: E. J. Brill. Dales, R. 1995. The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century. Leiden: E. J. Brill. ——. 1990. Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World. Leiden: E.J. Brill. Gracia, J. J. E. 1984. Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Middle Ages. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. Weisheipl, J. 1985. Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. Bosley, R., and M. Tweedale. eds. 1992. Aristotle and his Medieval Interpreters. Calgary: University of Calgary Press. John Marenbon ed., Aristotle in Britian During the Middle Ages. Pasnau, R. 1997. Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Grant, E. 1994. Planets, Stars and Orbs: The Medieval Cosmos 1200-1687. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Livesey, S. 1989. Theology and Science in the Fourteenth Century. Leiden: E. J. Brill. Southern, R. 1995. Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe. Oxford: Blackwell. Colish, M. 1994. Peter Lombard. 2 Vols. Leiden: E.J. Brill. Smalley, B. 1960. English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Gerson, L. P. ed. 1983. Graceful Reason: Essays in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Presented to Joseph Owens. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. Long, R. J. ed. 1991. Philosophy and the God of Abraham: Essays in Memory of James A. Weisheipl, OP. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. Davenport, A. 1999. Measure of a Different Greatness: the Intensive Infinite, 1250-1650. Leiden: E.J. Brill. Reynolds, P. L. 1999. Food and the Body: Some Peculiar Questions in High Medieval Theology. Leiden: E.J. Brill. Wissink, J. B. M. 1990. The Eternity of the World: in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas and his Contemporaries. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

16

Indian Philosophy

1 The Paper This paper deals with the thought of major writers in the classical Indian theory. Most lived in the period AD 100 to AD 1600. In recent years, philosophers have begun to reassess the sophistication and richness of the philosophical literature of ancient and classical India. The analytical techniques of modern philosophy are being used to interpret the texts in fresh and original ways. This paper explains the key methods, concepts and devices of Indian philosophical theory, situating them in a proper historical context. It will not be a mere survey of thinkers and doctrines, but will seek new interpretations designed to bring out the richness and contemporary interest of the Indian theory. So, for a range of key Indian thinkers, we will ask: what is the nature of their philosophical project? what are the methods of philosophical inquiry used in pursuit of those goals? As the field is very vast, we shall concentrate on those philosophers who worked within and explored the parameters of a specific philosophical method, the so-called pramāa method, a way of analysing the basis and grounds of rational belief. We will study the work of the philosophers belonging to the traditional schools of Nyāya, Vaiśe ika, Buddhism and Jainism, who used this method in their philosophical theory. And we will look at several independent sceptical philosophers who were highly critical of the conception of rational inquiry this method sustains. Knowledge of Sanskrit is not a requirement for this paper as all the texts we discuss are available in translation. Most of the secondary literature are available in the University and College libraries. SOAS library has all the books that are needed for this paper and students who are not at SOAS are allowed access to books and journals there.

2 General Reading There are a number of excellent introductions to Indian philosophical theory. For more advanced treatment of the theory, the work of Bimal Matilal is highly recommended. Bimal Krishna Matilal, Perception. The best single volume in Indian epistemology, scholarly and reliable. J. N. Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy. A short but wide-ranging and engaging book. Chakravarthy Ram-Prasad, Knowledge and the Highest Good. Explains the context in which the Indian theory developed. Jonardon Ganeri, Philosophy in Classical India. A study of rationality and analysis in Indian philosophical theory with detailed readings.

Others. Bimal Krishna Matilal, Philosophy, Culture and Religion: Collected Essays. A collection of fine essays on a great variety of philosophical topics. Bimal Krishna Matilal, Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis. A

Indian Philosophy 149 classic introduction to the Indian theory. Bimal Krishna Matilal, Logic, Language and Reality. Difficult but definitive treatment of many important issues. J. N. Mohanty, Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought. Challenging interpretations of many key doctrines. Stephen Phillips, Classical Indian Metaphysics. Modern and engagingly written. Karl Potter, general ed., Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. This is an ongoing project with different volumes being devoted to different philosophical schools. So far 8 volumes have been published. Volume 1 is a comprehensive bibliography (available online at http://faculty.washington.edu/kpotter/). S. N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy. An old and monumental classic, dated but still useful. Richard King, Indian Philosophy: An Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought. An introductory survey of doctrine.

3 Texts A. NYĀYA i. Early Nyāya The principal interests of the philosophers of the Nyāya school are epistemology and philosophical method. These are the philosophers who most forcefully advocate the so-called pramāa method as a method for rational inquiry. The main philosophers and texts in early Nyāya are Gautama Ak apāda c. AD 150. Nyāyasūtra Vātsyāyana c. AD 450. Nyāyabhāya — commentary on Nyāyasūtra Uddyotakara c. AD 600. Nyāyavārttika — commentary on Nyāyabhā ya Jayanta c. AD 875. Nyāyamañjarī — an independent work on Nyāya Vācaspati c. AD 960. Nyāyavārttikatātparyaīkā — commentary on Nyāyavārttika Udayana AD. 975-1050. Ātmatattvaviveka, Lakaāvalī, Nyāyakusumāñjali, and other treatises. Nyāyasūtra, by Gautama Ak apāda; Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, Gautama’s Nyāyasūtra with Vātsyāyanaís Commentary, with an introduction by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (Calcutta: Indian Studies Past and Present, 1982). Nyāyavārttika by Uddyotakara; Ganganatha Jha, The Nyāyasūtras of Gautama with the Bhāya of Vātsyāyana and the Vārttika of Uddyotakara (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), vols. 1-4. Nyāyamañjarī by Jayanta.; J. V. Bhattacharyya, Nyāyamañjarī: The Compendium of Indian Speculative Logic (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978). Ātmatattvaviveka, by Udayana; Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti, Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind: The Nyāya Dualist Tradition (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), pp.219-276. —, N. S. Dravid, Ātmatattvaviveka of Udayanācārya (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1995). Lakaāvalī, by Udayana; Musashi Tachikawa, The Structure of the World in Udayana’s Realism: A Study of the Lakaāvalī and the Kiraāvalī (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, 1981). Nyāyakusumāñjali, by Udayana; N. S. Dravid, Nyāyakusumāñjali of Udayanācārya (Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1996).

ii. Navya-Nyāya Navya-Nyāya, the ‘new’ Nyāya is a philosophical system invented by Gageśa

150 Study Guide

Upādhyāya c. AD 1325. It tries to find solutions to many of the criticisms that the early Nyāya conception of rational inquiry were confronted with by the sceptics. Raghunātha Śiroma#i c. AD 1500 revolutionised the teachings and methods of the school. Both he and his great follower, Gadādhara Bha%%ācārya c. AD 1650 wrote many short tracts on particular philosophical problems and concepts. Tattvacintāmai, by Ga#geśa; Chapter I (epistemology) — Stephen Phillips and N. S. R. Tatacharya, Gageśaís ‘Jewel of Reflection on Reality,’ the Perception Chapter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Chapter II (logic) — Cornelius Goekoop, The Logic of Invariable Concomitance in the Tattvacintāmai (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 55-154. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1951). B. K. Matilal, The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1968). There is a very thorough précis of the whole book in Karl Potter and Sibajiban Bhattacharyya eds. Indian Philosophical Analysis — Nyāya-Vaiśeika from Gageśa to Raghunātha Śiromai Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 6 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993), pp. 85-311. Padārthatattvanirūpaa, by Raghunātha; Karl H. Potter, The Padārthatattvanirūpaam of Raghunātha Śiromai (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Harvard Yenching Institute Studies, vol. 17, 1957). Viayatāvāda, by Gadādhara; Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, Gadādharaís Theory of Objectivity (Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1990), vol. 2.

B. VAIŚE(IKA Vaiśe ika is an ancient school of metaphysics, known especially for its theory of categories and attempts to offer philosophical explanations for a variety of natural phenomena. Its generally naturalistic outlook complemented the heuristic methods of the Nyāya school, and with Udayana the two schools virtually merged into one. Important philosophers and texts in Vaiśe ika include Kaāda c. AD 100. Vaiśe ikasūtra. Praśastapāda c. 575. Padārthadarmasa+graha. Śrīdhara c. 990. Nyāyakandalī. Śa/kara Miśra c. 1425. Upaskāra.

Vaiśeikasūtra, by Ka#āda; Nandalal Sinha, The Vaiśeikasūtras of Kaāda, with the commentary of Śa/kara Miśra (Allahabad: The Panini Office, Bhuvaneswari Asrama, 1911). Padārthadarmasa1graha, by Praśastapāda; Ganganatha Jha, Padārthadharmasa1graha with Śrīdharaís Nyāyakandalī, The Pandit, n.s. vols. 25-37 (1903-15).

C. THE BUDDHISTS i. Nāgārjuna and the Madhyamaka School Nāgārjunaís c. AD 150 interpretation of the teachings of the Buddha was called the Doctrine of the Middle Way. He argues that all philosophical and scientific theories are empty of content. He is a severe critic of the pramāa method for conducting rational inquiry, and he claims instead that the only way to reason is by exposing incoherencies within the fabric of one’s conceptions. Candrakīrti c. AD 600 is an influential exponent and interpreter of Nāgārjuna.

Indian Philosophy 151 Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (The Middle Stanzas), by Nāgārjuna; Jay L. Garfield, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). —, David Kalupahana, Nāgārjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way (Albany: SUNY Press 1986). —, Kenneth Inada, Nāgārjuna: A Translation of his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1970). —, Frederick Streng, Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967), pp. 183-220. Vigrahavyāvartanī (Reply to Critics), by Nāgārjuna; K. Bhattacharya, E. H. Johnston, and A. Kunst in The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna: Vigrahavyāvartanī (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986). Prasannapadā, by Candrakīrti; Mervyn Sprung, Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way: The Essential Chapters from the Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti (Boulder, Colorado: Prajña Press, 1979).

ii. Dināga and Yogācāra Buddhism Dināga c. AD 500 and his great follower Dharmakīrti c. AD 625 interpreted the teachings of the Buddha in a very different direction, as a kind of idealism. The members of this school were brilliant logicians and made many important advances in philosophical theory. Although they are idealists, they are also advocates of the pramāa method as the correct way of investigating and resolving philosophical problems. They disagree with the Nyāya about almost every matter of philosophical substance, but because they share a common approach to the rational resolution of philosophical dilemmas, the encounter between the two schools is fascinating and is an important axis in the evolution of Indian philosophical thought. Pramāasamuccaya (Collection on Knowing), by Dināga; Chapter I (perception). Masaaki Hattori, Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakapariccheda of Dignāgaís Pramāasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 21-70. Chapter II, V (logic, language). Richard P. Hayes, Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), pp. 231-248, 252-299. Ālambanaparīkā (Examination of Supports), by Dināga; Fernando Tola And Carmen Dragonetti, ‘Dignāgaís Ālambanaparīk āv4ttií, Journal of Indian Philosophy 10 (1982), pp. 105-134. —, N. Aiyaswami Shastri, Ālambanaparīkā and v5tti by Di/nāga with the Commentary of Dharmapāla, restored into Sanskrit from the Tibetan and Chinese Versions and Edited with an English Translation and Notes (Madras: The Adyar Library, 1942). Hetucakra7amaru (Chart of Reasons), by Dināga; Durgacharan Chatterji, ‘Hetucakranir#aya—A Translation’, Indian Historical Quarterly 9 (1933), pp. 266-272, 511-514. —, Richard S. Y. Chi, Buddhist Formal Logic: A Study of Dignāgaís Hetucakra and K’uei-chi’s Great Commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1969). Pramāavārttika (Commentary on Knowing), by Dharmakīrti; Chapter I (‘inference for oneself’). [v. 1-10] Richard P. Hayes and Brendan S. Gillon, ‘Introduction to Dharmakīrtiís Theory of Inference as Presented in Pramā#avārttika Svopajñav4tti 1-10’, Journal of Indian Philosophy 19 (1991), pp. 1-74. Chapter II (‘establishment of knowing’). [verses 1-6] Shoryu Katsura, ‘Dharmakīrtiís Theory of Truth’, Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (1984), pp. 215-235. [34-72] Eli Franco, Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1997). Chapter III (‘perception’). [1-51] Satkari Mookerjee and Hojun Nagasaki, The Pramā#avārttika of Dharmakīrti — An English Translation of the First Chapter with the Autocommentary (Nalanda: Nava-Nalanda Mahavira Research Publication, 1964).

152 Study Guide Chapter IV (‘inference for others’). [1-148] Tom J. F. Tillemans, Dharmakīrtis Pramāavārttika — An Annotated Translation of the Fourth Chapter (parārthānumāna) Vol. 1 (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2000). Nyāyabindu, by Dharmakīrti; Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, Vinītadevaís Nyāyabinduīkā (Calcutta: Indian Studies Past & Present, 1971). —, Theodore Stcherbatsky, ‘A Short Treatise of Logic by Dharmakīrti with its Commentary by Dharmottara’, in his Buddhist Logic, vol. 2 (New York: Dover Publications, 1962), pp. 1-253. —, G. C. Pande, Nyāyabindu (Sarnath, 1996). Vādanyāya, by Dharmakīrti; Pradeep P. Gokhale, Vādanyāya of Dharmakīrti: The Logic of Debate (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1993).

D. OTHERS i. The Jainas Important Jaina philosophers include Siddhasena Divākara c. AD 700, Haribhadra Sūri c. AD 750, Hemacandra c. AD 1150 and Malli ena c. AD 1290. Their belief in the principles of tolerance, harmony and rapprochement lead them to a philosophy of pluralism in metaphysics and ethics and to perspectivalism in epistemology and semantics. Nyāyāvatāra, by Siddhasena Divākara; Piotr Balcerowicz, Jaina Epistemology in Historical and Comparative Perspective (Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000). —, Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, Nyāyāvatāra: The Earliest Jaina Work on Pure Logic (Arrah: Central Jain Publishing House, 1915); reprinted in A. N. Upadhye ed., Siddhasena’s Nyāyāvatāra and Other Works (Bombay: Jain Sahitya Vikasa Mandala, 1971). —, Satkari Mookerjee, ‘A Critical and Comparative Study of Jaina Logic and Epistemology on the Basis of the Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena Divākara’, Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1 (1971), pp. 1144. Pramāamīmā1sā, by Hemacandra; Satkari Mookerjee and N. Tatia, Hemacandra’s Pramāamīmā1sā, Text and Translation with Critical Notes (Varanasi: Tara Publications, 1970). Syādvādamañjarī, by Malli e#a; partial translation by S. K. Saksena and C. A. Moore, in S. Radhakrishnan and C. A. Moore eds. A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 260-268.

ii. Sceptics Two important sceptical thinkers are Jayarāśi c. AD 750, and Śrīhar a c. AD 1150. They are critics of the epistemological and metaphysical theories of the Nyāya, Vaiśe ika, Buddhist and Jaina philosophers, and their criticisms were often the spur for philosophical progress in those systems. Tattvopaplasi1ha, by Jayarāśi; Chapter 1 (Perception). Eli Franco, Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief: A Study of Jayarāśiís Scepticism (2nd Edition, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994). Chapter 2 (Inference). S.N. Shastri and S. N. Saksena, in Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles Moore eds., A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 236-246. Kha7anakha7akhādya, by Śrīhar a; Ganganath Jha, The Kha7anakha7akhādya of Śrī Hara (Delhi: Sri Satguru, 1986), 2 vols. —, (Book I, Introduction). Phyllis Granoff, Philosophy and Argument in Late Vedānta: Śrīharaís Kha7anakha7akhādya (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, 1978), pp. 71-208. —, (Book I, Inference). Gangopadhyay, Mrinalkanti, Indian Logic In Its Sources (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1984), pp. 67-118.

Indian Philosophy 153

4 Topics A. EARLY NYĀYA — METHODS OF RATIONAL INQUIRY (THE PRAMĀ:A METHOD)

i. Rationality and philosophical method in India Arindam Chakrabarti, ‘Rationality in Indian Philosophy’, in Eliot Deutsch and Ron Bontekoe eds., A Companion to World Philosophies (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), pp. 259-278. Wilhelm Halbfass, ‘Darśana, Ānvīk ikī, Philosophy’, in his India and Europe: an Essay in Understanding (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 263-286. Bimal Krishna Matilal, ‘On The Concept of Philosophy in India’, in Philosophy, Culture and Religion: Collected Essays (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001). Bimal Krishna Matilal, Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chapter 3.

ii. The senses, the mind and the soul Kishor Chakrabarti, Indian Philosophy of Mind: The Nyāya Dualist Tradition (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999). Bimal Krishna Matilal, Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986), chapters 6, 8. Bimal Krishna Matilal, ‘A Realist View Of Perception’, in P. K. Sen and R. R. Verma eds., The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson (New Delhi: Indian Council Of Philosophical Research, 1995), pp. 305-326; reprinted in his Philosophy, Religion, Culture: Collected Essays (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001). Arindam Chakrabarti, ‘I Touch What I Saw’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1992), pp. 103-117. Jonardon Ganeri, ‘Cross-modality and the self’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2001).

iii. Extrapolation, informal logic, theory of debate Bimal Krishna Matilal, The Character of Logic in India (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998). Esther Solomon, Indian Dialectics (Ahmedabad: B. J. Institute of Learning and Research, 1976), 2 volumes. Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyay, Indian Logic In Its Sources (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1984). Claudius Nenninger, ‘Analogical Reasoning in Early Nyāya-Vaiśe ikaí, Asiatische Studien 48 (1994), pp. 819-832. Claus Oetke, ‘Ancient Indian Logic as a Theory of Non-Monotonic Reasoning,’ Journal of Indian Philosophy 24 (1996), pp. 447-539. Jonardon Ganeri, Indian Logic: a Reader (London: Curzon Press, 2001). Pradeep Gokhale, Inference and Fallacies Discussed in Ancient Indian Logic (Delhi: Sri Satguru, 1992).

iv. Testimony and tradition Bimal Krishna Matilal and Arindam Chakrabarti eds., Knowing from Words (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994). J. N. Mohanty, Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), chapters 8, 9. Jonardon Ganeri, ‘Testimony’, in Semantic Powers: Meaning and the Means of Knowing in Classical Indian Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 72-81.

154 Study Guide

B. MADHYAMAKA BUDDHISM — EMPTINESS, SCEPTICISM AND OBJECTIVITY i. Emptiness David Seyfort Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981). C. W. Huntington, The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Madhyamaka (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989). David Burton, Emptiness Appraised: A Critical Study of Nāgārjunaís Philosophy (London: Curzon Press, 1999).

ii. The four options, Nāgārjunaís dialectical method Robinson, Richard H., ‘Some Logical Aspects of Nāgārjunaís System’, Philosophy East and West 6 (1957), pp. 291-308. David Seyfort Ruegg, ‘The Uses of The Four Positions of The Catu ko%i and The Problem of The Description of Reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism’, Journal of Indian Philosophy 5 (1977), pp. 1-71. Brian Galloway, ‘Some Logical Issues in Madhyamaka Thought’, Journal of Indian Philosophy 17 (1989), pp. 1-35. Frank Hoffman, ‘Rationality in Early Buddhist Four-Fold Logic’, Journal of Indian Philosophy 10 (1982), pp. 309-337. Vijay Bharadwaja, ‘Rationality, Argumentation and Philosophical Embarrassment: A Study of Four Logical Alternatives (catu ko%i) in Buddhist Logic’, Philosophy East & West 34 (1984), pp. 303-319; reprinted in his Form and Validity in Indian Logic (Shimla: Indian Institute for Advanced Study, 1990), chapter 4.

iii. Paradoxes of causation, proof and motion Richard Hayes, ‘Nāgārjunaís Appeal’, Journal of Indian Philosophy 22 (1994), pp. 299-378. Bimal Krishna Matilal, Perception (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chapter 2. Mark Siderits, ‘Nāgārjuna as Anti-Realist’, Journal of Indian Philosophy 16 (1988), pp. 311-325. Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, ‘Nāgārjunaís Arguments against Motion: Their Grammatical Basis’, in G. Bhattacharya et al. eds., A Corpus of Indian Studies: Essays in Honour of Professor Gaurinath Sastri (Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1980), pp. 85-95. Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, ‘The Grammatical Basis of Nāgārjunaís Arguments: Some Further Considerations’, Indologica Taurinensia, 8-9 (1980-1), pp. 35-43. George Cardona, ‘A Path Still Taken: Some Early Indian Arguments Concerning Time’, Journal of the American Oriental Society 111.3 (1991), pp. 445-464.

iv. The threat of self-refutation Richard Robinson, ‘Did Nāgārjuna Really Refute All Philosophical Views?’, Philosophy East and West 22 (1972), pp. 325-331. David Seyfort Ruegg, ‘Does the Mādhyamika have a Thesis and Philosophical Position’, in B. K. Matilal and R. D. G. Evans eds., Buddhist Logic and Epistemology: Studies in The Buddhist Analysis of Inference & Language (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, 1982), pp. 229-238. Paul Sagal, “Nāgārjunaís Paradox,” American Philosophical Quarterly 29.1 (1992), pp. 79-85.

C. VAIŚE(IKA METAPHYSICS — ORDER IN NATURE i. The categories Wilhelm Halbfass, On Being and What There Is: Classical Vaiśeika and the History of Indian Ontology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), chapters 1-5. Karl Potter ed., Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology — The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeika up to

Indian Philosophy 155 Gageśa, the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 2 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), introduction. S. Bhaduri, Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeika Metaphysics (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1947).

ii. Universals, cross-cutting systems of natural kinds Bimal Matilal, Perception (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chapters 11, 12. Kishor Chakrabarti, ‘The Nyāya-Vaiśe ika Theory of Universals’, Journal of Indian Philosophy 3 (1975), pp. 363-382. Wilhelm Halbfass, On Being and What There Is: Classical Vaiśeika and the History of Indian Ontology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), chapters 6, 7. Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, ‘The Navya-Nyāya Theory of Universals’, in his Gadādharaís Theory of Objectivity, Part 1: General Introduction to Navya-Nyāya Concepts (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1990), chapter 3.

iii. Absence as a type of entity Daniel Ingalls, Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 54-62, 69-72. Bimal Matilal, The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1968). ——, ‘Double Negation in Navya-Nyāya’, in M. Nagatomi et al. eds., Sanskrit and Indian Studies: Essays in Honour of Daniel H. H. Ingalls (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1980), pp. 1-10; reprinted in Logic, Language and Reality (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985), pp. 145-154. Prabal Kumar Sen, ‘The Nyāya-Vaiśe ika Theory of Variegated Colour (citrarūpa): Some Vexed Problems’, Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences 3.2 (1996) — Epistemology, Logic And Ontology After Matilal (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Studies), pp. 151-172.

iv. Number Jonardon Ganeri, ‘Numbers as Properties of Objects: Frege and the Nyāya’, Studies In Humanities And Social Sciences 3.2 (1996) — Epistemology, Logic And Ontology After Matilal (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Studies), pp. 111-121. ——, ‘Objectivity and Proof in the Indian Theory of Number’, in P. K. Sen ed., Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, forthcoming). J. L. Shaw, ‘Number: From the Nyāya to Frege-Russell’, Studia Logica 41 (1982), pp. 283-291. Roy W. Perrett, ‘A Note on the Navya-Nyāya Account of Number’, Journal of Indian Philosophy 13 (1985), pp. 227-234.

D. YOGĀCĀRA BUDDHISM — REDUCTION, EXCLUSION AND RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION i. Metaphysics and epistemology in Di/nāga Masaaki Hattori, Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakapariccheda of Dignāgaís Pramāasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968). Richard Hayes, Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988). B. K. Matilal & J. G. D. Evans eds., Buddhist Logic and Epistemology: Studies in the Buddhist Analysis of Inference and Language (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, 1982). Bimal Matilal, Perception (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chapters 7, 10.

ii. Language, meaning, exclusion Katsura Shoryu, ‘Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on apoha’, in E. Steinkellner ed., Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1991), pp. 129-146.

156 Study Guide Hattori Masaaki, ‘The Sautrāntika Background of the apoha Theory’, in Leslie S. Kawamura & Keith Scott eds., Buddhist Thought and Civilization: Essays in Honour of Herbert V. Guenther on his Sixtieth Birthday (Emeryville: Dharma Press, 1977), pp. 47-58. Hattori Masaaki, ‘Apoha and Pratibhāí, in M. Nagatomi et al. eds. Sanskrit and Indian Studies: Essays in Honour of Daniel H. H. Ingalls (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, 1980), pp. 61-74. Bimal Matilal, Perception (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chapter 12. Jonardon Ganeri, ‘Dharmakīrtiís Semantics for the Particle eva (only)’ in Shoryu Katsura ed., Dharmakīrtiís Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie Der Wissenschaften, 1999), pp. 101-116.

iii. Extrapolation, the triple condition theory of reason Katsura Shoryu, ‘Dignāga on trairūpya’, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 32 (1983), pp. 15-21. Bimal Matilal, ‘Buddhist Logic and Epistemology’, in B. K. Matilal and R. D. Evans eds., Buddhist Logic and Epistemology: Studies in the Buddhist Analysis of Inference and Language (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, 1982), pp. 1-30; reprinted in his The Character of Logic in India (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), chapter 4. Tom F. Tillemans, ‘On sapak a’, Journal of Indian Philosophy 18 (1990), pp. 53-80. Claus Oetke, Studies on the Doctrine of trairūpya (Wien: Wiener Studien fur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, 1993). Motoi Ono, ‘Dharmakīrti on asāsāra#ānaikāntika’, in Shoryu Katsura ed., Dharmakīrtiís Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie Der Wissenschaften, 1999), pp. 301-316. Richard Hayes, ‘On the Reinterpretation of Dharmakīrtiís svabhāvahetu’, Journal of Indian Philosophy 15 (1987), pp. 319-332.

E. JAINA PHILOSOPHY — RATIONALITY, HARMONY AND PERSPECTIVE i. Manysidedness Sukhlalji Sanghvi, ‘Anekāntavāda: The Principal Jaina Contribution to Logic’, in his Advanced Studies in Indian Logic & Metaphysics (Calcutta: Indian Studies Past & Present, 1961), pp. 15-28. Y. J. Padmarajiah, Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge (Bombay: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, 1963). Jayandra Soni, ‘Dravya, Guöa and Paryāya in Jaina Thought’, Journal of Indian Philosophy 19.1 (1991), pp. 75-88. Frank Van Den Bossche, ‘Jain Relativism: An Attempt at Understanding’, in R. Smet and K. Watanabe eds. Jain Studies in Honour of Jozef Deleu (Tokyo: Hon-No-Tomosha, 1993), pp. 457474. Frank Van Den Bossche, ‘Existence and Non-Existence in Haribhadra Sūriís Anekāntajayapatākā’, Journal of Indian Philosophy 23 (1995), pp. 429-468.

ii. Standpoints, logic of assertion Pradeep Gokhale, ‘The Logical Structure of Syādvāda’, Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 8 (1991), pp. 73-81. R. A. Kumar, T. M. Dak and A. D. Mishra eds., Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda (Landun: Jain Visva Bharati, 1996). B. K. Matilal, ‘Anekānta: both yes and no?’, Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 8 (1991), pp. 1-12; reprinted as ‘The Jaina Contribution to Logic’, in The Character of Logic in India (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), pp. 127-139.

Indian Philosophy 157 Piotr Balcerowicz, ‘The logical structure of the naya method of the Jainas’, Proceedings of the ICANAS Conference, Montreal 2000.

iii. Jaina logical theory Sukhlalji Sanghvi, ‘On Problems of Inference’, in his Advanced Studies in Indian Logic & Metaphysics (Calcutta: Indian Studies Past & Present, 1961), pp. 77-110. Atishi Uno, ‘Vyāpti in Jainism’, in N. K. Wagle and F. Watanabe eds., Studies on Buddhism in Honour of Professor A. K. Warder (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1993), pp. 160-167.

F. NAVYA-NYĀYA — REASON IN EQUILIBRIUM i. Suppositional reasoning Sitansusekhar Bagchi, Inductive Reasoning: A Study of Tarka and its Role in Indian Logic (Calcutta: Munishchandra Sinha, 1953). Vijay Bharadwaja, Form and Validity in Indian Logic (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1990), chapter 5. Esther Solomon, Indian Dialectics (Ahmedabad: B. J. Institute of Learning and Research, 1976) , chapter 12 (vol. 1), chapter 13 (vol. 2).

ii. Scepticism, doxastic ascent — Jayarāśi and Śrīhara Phyllis Granoff, Philosophy and Argument in Late Vedānta: Śrīharaís Kha7anakha7akhādya (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, 1978). Stephen Phillips, Classical Indian Metaphysics (La Salle: Open Court, 1995), chapter 3. Bimal Matilal, Logical and Ethical Issues in Religious Belief (Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1982), chapter 4. Bimal Matilal, The Logical Illumination of Indian Mysticism, inaugural lecture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977). C. Ram-Prasad, ‘Immediacy and the Direct Theory of Perception: Problems from Śrīhar a’, Studies In Humanities And Social Sciences 3.2 (1996) — Epistemology, Logic And Ontology After Matilal (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Studies), pp. 33-56. Eli Franco, Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief: A Study of Jayarāśiís Scepticism, 2nd edition (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994).

iii. Epistemic equilibrium, the new epistemology Stephen Phillips, Classical Indian Metaphysics (La Salle: Open Court, 1995), chapter 4. Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyay, ‘Ga#geśa on vyāptigraha: The Means for the Ascertainment of Invariable Concomitance’, Journal of Indian Philosophy 3 (1975), pp. 167-208. Bimal Krishna Matilal, Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chapters 4, 5.

iv. Navya-Nyāya logic Daniel Ingalls, Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951). Bimal Krishna Matilal, ‘Ga#geśa on The Concept of Universal Property (kevalānvayin)’, Philosophy East And West 18 (1968), pp. 151-161; reprinted in Logic, Language And Reality (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985), pp. 128-139. J. N. Mohanty, Ga/geśaís Theory of Truth (Santiniketan, 1966). Cornelius Goekoop, The Logic of Invariable Concomitance in the Tattvacintāmai (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Co., 1967). Toshihiro Wada, Invariable Concomitance in Navya-Nyāya (Delhi: Sri Satguru, 1990).

17

The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant

1 The Paper The syllabus is restricted to Kant’s critical philosophy, and in particular to the main doctrines of the Critique of Pure Reason, the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, the Critique of Practical Reason, and Part I of the Critique of Judgement (the ‘Critique of Aesthetic Judgement’). The examination paper is divided into two parts, the first dealing with Kant’s epistemology and metaphysics as presented in the Critique of Pure Reason, the second with Kant’s ethics and aesthetics. Candidates are required to answer at least one question from each part. It follows that candidates must be familiar with the Critique of Pure Reason and either Kant’s ethics or Kant’s aesthetics. Questions on Kant in Ethics, Modern Philosophy and Aesthetics may be barred to candidates taking the Kant paper, if the questions are too similar to those on the Kant paper. It is not possible to fully understand Kant’s ethics or aesthetics without a knowledge of Kant’s epistemology and metaphysics. It is therefore essential on the Kant paper to master the main lines of thought of the Critique of Pure Reason. This is facilitated by a sound knowledge of the thought of Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley and Hume.

2 Basic Reading Introductory books which cover Kant’s philosophy as a whole Cassirer, E. 1981. Kant’s Life and Thought. New Haven: Yale University Press. Höffe, O. 1994. Immanuel Kant. Albany: State University of New York Press. Kemp, J. 1968. The Philosophy of Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Körner, S. 1955. Kant. Harmondsworth: Penguin. * Scruton, R. 1982. Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in German Philosophers: Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Strongly recommended at the outset.

3 Topics A. KANT’S EPISTEMOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS Main text to be studied: Critique of Pure Reason. The translation by Norman Kemp Smith, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1933), provided for many decades the standard edition in English, but two other translations, also available in paperback, have appeared very recently: one by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), the other by Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996). Both have considerably more supporting textual and scholarly apparatus than Kemp Smith, including thorough indices, but it is arguable that Kemp Smith’s edition remains the most accessible. A second text relevant to Kant’s epistemology and metaphysics is his Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, trans. L.W. Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950) or translated by Paul Carus, rev. by James W. Ellington, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977), a much shorter work which may be read alongside, and which throws light on, the Critique.

KANT 159

Commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason *

Broad, C. D. 1978. Kant: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ewing, A. C. 1950 A Short Commentary on Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ . 2nd ed. London: Methuen, 1961. Gardner, S. 1999. Kant and the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. London: Routledge. * Höffe, O. 1994. Immanuel Kant. Albany: State University of New York Press. Pt.II. Kemp Smith, N. 1923. A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ . 2nd ed. New York: Humanities Press. * Körner, S. 1955. Kant. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Chs.1-5. Paton, H. J. 1936. Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience: a Commentary on the First Half of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 2 Vols. London: Allen & Unwin. * Walsh, W. H. 1975. Kant’s Criticism of Metaphysics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Wilkerson, T. E. 1976. Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ : a Commentary for Students. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Wolff, R. P. 1963. Kant’s Theory of Mental Activity: a Commentary on the Transcendental Analytic of the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. *

Advanced critical discussion of Kant’s epistemology and metaphysics *

Allison, H. E. 1983. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defense. New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press. Bennett, J. 1966. Kant’s Analytic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bennett, J. 1974. Kant’s Dialectic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bird, G. 1962 Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: An Outline of One Central Argument in the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. New York: Humanities Press. * Friedman, M. 1992. Kant and the Exact Sciences. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Kitcher, P. 1990. Kant’s Transcendental Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Guyer, P. 1987. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Henrich, D. 1990. ‘Identity and Objectivity’. Reprinted in The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant’s Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. * Strawson, P. F. 1966. The Bounds of Sense: an Essay on Kant’s ‘Critique of pure reason’. London: Methuen. Walker, R. 1978. Kant. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Collections of articles on Kant’s epistemology and metaphysics Beck, L. W. ed. 1969. Kant Studies Today. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court. ——. 1978. Essays on Kant and Hume. New Haven: Yale University Press. * Guyer, P. ed. 1992. The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Penelhum, T., and J. J. Macintosh, eds. 1969. The First Critique: Reflections on Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth. Schaper, E., and W. Vossenkuhl, eds. 1989. Reading Kant: New Perspectives on Transcendental Arguments and Critical Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Walker, R. ed. 1982. Kant on Pure Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wolff, R. P. ed. 1967. Kant: a Collection of Critical Essays. New York: Anchor Books. Pt.I. Wood, A. W. ed. 1984. Self and Nature in Kant’s Philosophy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Principal topics to be studied, related to specific sections of the Critique, include: the concept of synthetic a priori judgement; Kant’s treatment of space and time in the Transcendental Aesthetic; the Metaphysical Deduction of the categories; the Transcendental Deduction of the categories; the treatment of substance and causality in the Analogies of Experience; the Refutation of Idealism; the concepts of thing in itself and noumenon; the ideas of reason and their regulative employment in the Dialectic; the treatment of the self in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason; the contradictions of reason in the Antinomy of Pure Reason; the treatment of human freedom in the third antinomy; the criticisms of the arguments for the

160 STUDY GUIDE

existence of God in the Ideal of Pure Reason. Principal topics to be studied, with corresponding sections of the Critique and suggestions for reading. (References to the Critique of Pure Reason [CPR] refer to the Akademie pagination, cited in the margin of Kemp Smith’s translation. The ‘A’ number refers to the First Edition and the ‘B’ number to the Second; where only one reference is given, the text appears only in the one edition.)

i. The concept of synthetic a priori judgement CPR, A1-16/B1-30. Passages to concentrate on: B1-6, A6-10/B10-14, B14-18. Allison, H. E. 1983. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defense. New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press. pp. 73-8. Beck, L. W. 1967. ‘Can Kant’s Synthetic Judgements Be Made Analytic?’. In R. P. Wolff ed., Kant: a Collection of Critical Essays. New York: Anchor Books. Bennett, J. 1966. Kant’s Analytic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. §§2-4. Robinson, R. 1969. ‘Necessary Propositions’. In T. Penelhum, and J. J. MacIntosh eds., The First Critique: Reflections on Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth. Strawson, P. F. 1966. The Bounds of Sense: an Essay on Kant’s ‘Critique of pure reason’. London: Methuen. pp. 42-4.

ii. Kant’s treatment of space and time in the Transcendental Aesthetic CPR, A19-49/B33-73. Passages to concentrate on: A19-25/B33-40, B40-5. Parsons, C. 1992. ‘The Transcendental Aesthetic’. In P. Guyer ed., The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Allison, H. E. 1983. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defense. New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press. Chs. 1-2, 5. Aquila, R. E. 1983. Representational Mind: A Study of Kant’s Theory of Knowledge. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. Ch. 3. Guyer, P. 1987. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 16. Horstmann, R. P. 1976. ‘Space as Intuition and Geometry’. Ratio 18: 17-30. Walker, R. 1978. Kant. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Chs. 3-5. Strawson, P. F. 1966. The Bounds of Sense: an Essay on Kant’s ‘Critique of pure reason’. London: Methuen. pp. 51-62, 68-71. Greenwood, T. 1989. ‘Kant on the Modalities of Space’. In E. Schaper and W. Vossenkuhl eds., Reading Kant: New Perspectives on Transcendental Arguments and Critical Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

iii. The metaphysical deduction of the categories CPR, A50-95/B74-116. Passages to concentrate on: A55-7/B79-82, A67-70/B92-5, A76-80/ B102-6. Allison, H. E. 1983. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defense. New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press. Ch. 6. Bird, G. 1962 Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: An Outline of One Central Argument in the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. New York: Humanities Press. Ch. 7. Guyer, P. 1987. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 123-36. Melnick, A. 1973 Kant’s Analogies of Experience. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 37-42. Strawson, P. F. 1966. The Bounds of Sense: an Essay on Kant’s ‘Critique of pure reason’. London: Methuen. pp. 72-89.

iv. The Transcendental Deduction of the categories CPR, A84-95/B116-29, A95-130, B129-69. Passages to concentrate on: A84-95/B116-29, B129-43, B165-9. Allison, H. E. 1983. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defense. New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press. Ch. 7. Allison, H. E. 1996. Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant’s Theoretical and Practical Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 2-3.

KANT 161 Bennett, J. 1966. Kant’s Analytic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 8-9. Bird, G. 1962 Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: An Outline of One Central Argument in the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. New York: Humanities Press. Chs. 8-9. Ewing, A. C. 1950 A Short Commentary on Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ . 2nd ed. London: Methuen, 1961. Ch. 3. Guyer, P. 1992. ‘The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories’. In P. Guyer ed., The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Guyer, P. 1987. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pt. II. Henrich, D. 1969. ‘The Proof-Structure of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction’. Review of Metaphysics 22: 640-659. Reprinted R. Walker, ed., Kant on Pure Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. Henrich, D. 1989. ‘The Identity of the Subject in the Transcendental Deduction’. In E. Schaper and W. Vossenkuhl eds., Reading Kant: New Perspectives on Transcendental Arguments and Critical Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Henrich, D. 1990. The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant’s Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Ch. 4. Strawson, P. F. 1966. The Bounds of Sense: an Essay on Kant’s ‘Critique of pure reason’. London: Methuen. pp. 89-117. Wolff, R. P. 1967 ‘A Reconstruction of the Argument of the Subjective Deduction’. In R. P. Wolff ed., Kant: a Collection of Critical Essays. New York: Anchor Books. Förster, E. ed. 1989. Kant’s Transcendental Deductions: the Three Critiques and the Opus postumum. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Pt. I.

v. The treatment of substance and causality in the Analogies of Experience CPR, A130-235/B169-294. Passages to concentrate on: A137-47/B176-87, A182-211/B22456. Allison, H. E. 1983. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defense. New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press. Chs. 9-10. Bennett, J. 1966. Kant’s Analytic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 11, 13, 15. Bird, G. 1962 Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: An Outline of One Central Argument in the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. New York: Humanities Press. Ch. 10. Buchdahl, G. 1992. Kant and the Dynamics of Reason: Essays on the Structure of Kant’s Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell. Ch. 9. Guyer, P. 1987. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 8-11. Melnick, A. 1973 Kant’s Analogies of Experience. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chs. 2-3. Strawson, P. F. 1966. The Bounds of Sense: an Essay on Kant’s ‘Critique of pure reason’. London: Methuen. pp. 118-52. Walker, R. 1978. Kant. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. pp. 98-105.

vi. The Refutation of Idealism CPR, B274-9, and Preface to the Second Edition, Bxxxix-xli. Kemp Smith, N. 1923. A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ . 2nd ed. New York: Humanities Press. pp. 298-321. Allison, H. E. 1983. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defense. New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press. Ch. 14. Aquila, R. 1979. ‘Personal Identity and Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism”’. Kant-Studien 70, 259-78. Bennett, J. 1966. Kant’s Analytic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 14. Gram, M. 1982. ‘What Kant Really Did to Idealism’. In J. N. Mohanty, and Robert W. Shahan eds., Essays on Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Guyer, P. 1987. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pt. IV. Strawson, P. F. 1966. The Bounds of Sense: an Essay on Kant’s ‘Critique of pure reason’. London: Methuen. pp. 125-8.

vii. The concepts of thing in itself and noumenon CPR, A235-60/B294-315 and A260-92/B316-49. Passages to concentrate on: A248-53, B3059, A254-60/B309-15, A279-80/B335-6, A285-9/B341-6.

162 STUDY GUIDE Ameriks, K. 1982. ‘Recent Work on Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy’. American Philosophical Quarterly 19: 1-24, pp. 1-11. Allison, H. E. 1983. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defense. New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press. Ch. 11. Matthews, H. E. 1969. ‘Strawson on Transcendental Idealism’. Philosophical Quarterly 19: 204-220. Reprinted in R. Walker ed., Kant on Pure Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. Melnick, A. 1973 Kant’s Analogies of Experience. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sect. 21. Strawson, P. F. 1966. The Bounds of Sense: an Essay on Kant’s ‘Critique of pure reason’. London: Methuen. pp. 38-42 and pt. IV. Fichte, J. G. The Science of Knowledge: with the first and second introductions. Edited and translated by Peter Heath, John Lachs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. I, 480-91. Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representation. Translated by E. F. J. Payne. New York: Dover Publications, 1966. Vol. I, pp. 435-7, 501-7, vol. II, ch. 18.

viii. The ideas of reason and their regulative employment in the Dialectic CPR, A293-340/B349-98 and A642-704/B670-732. Passages to concentrate on: A293-311/ B349-68, A321-40/B377-98, A642-8/B670-6, A663-82/B691-710. Bennett, J. 1974. Kant’s Dialectic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 1, 12. Buchdahl, G. 1992. Kant and the Dynamics of Reason: Essays on the Structure of Kant’s Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell. Ch. 7. Friedman, M. 1991. ‘Regulative and Constitutive’. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30, Supplement, 73-102. Neiman, S. 1994. The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. 2. Wartenburg, T. 1992. ‘Reason and the Practice of Science’. In P. Guyer ed., The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

ix. The treatment of the self in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason CPR, A341-405, B399-432. Passages to concentrate on: A341-8/B399-406, A348-51, B406-32. Allison, H. E. 1983. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defense. New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press. pp. 278-86. Ameriks, K. 2000. Kant’s Theory of Mind: An Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon. Chs. 2-6. Bennett, J. 1974. Kant’s Dialectic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 4-6. Strawson, P. F. 1966. The Bounds of Sense: an Essay on Kant’s ‘Critique of pure reason’. London: Methuen. pp. 162-9. Powell, C. Thomas. 1990. Kant’s Theory of Self-Consciousness. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

x. The contradictions of reason in the Antinomy of Pure Reason CPR, A405-567/B432-595. Passages to concentrate on: A405-61/B432-89, A497-507/B525-35. Allison, H. E. 1983. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defense. New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press. Ch. 3. Bennett, J. 1974. Kant’s Dialectic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 7-9. Gram, M. 1969. ‘Kant’s First Antinomy’. In L. W. Beck ed., Kant Studies Today. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court. Guyer, P. 1987. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 18. Strawson, P. F. 1966. The Bounds of Sense: an Essay on Kant’s ‘Critique of pure reason’. London: Methuen. pp. 175-206. Walsh, W. H. 1975. Kant’s Criticism of Metaphysics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. §§345.

xi. The treatment of human freedom in the third antinomy CPR, A444-51/B472-9 and A532-58/B560-86. Passages to concentrate on: A444-51/B472-9, A532-58/B560-86. Allison, H. E. 1983. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defense. New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press. Ch. 15.

KANT 163 Allison, H. E. 1990. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pt. I. Bennett, J. 1974. Kant’s Dialectic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 10. Bird, G. 1962 Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: An Outline of One Central Argument in the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. New York: Humanities Press. Ch. 12. Körner, S. ‘Kant’s Conception of Freedom’. Proceedings of the British Academy 53: 193-217. Wood, A. 1984. ‘Kant’s Compatibilism’. In Self and Nature in Kant’s Philosophy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

xii. The criticisms of the arguments for the existence of God in the Ideal of Pure Reason CPR, A452-61/B480-9, A559-65/B587-93, and A567-642/B595-670. Passages to concentrate on: A452-61/B480-9, A559-65/B587-93, A590-614/B618-42, A620-30/B648-58. Bennett, J. 1974. Kant’s Dialectic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. §§72-81. Strawson, P. F. 1966. The Bounds of Sense: an Essay on Kant’s ‘Critique of pure reason’. London: Methuen. pp. 207-31. Walker, R. 1978. Kant. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch. 12. Walsh, W. H. 1975. Kant’s Criticism of Metaphysics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. §§378. Wood, A. 1978. Kant’s Rational Theology. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 25-63, 100-45.

B. KANT’S ETHICS Main texts to be studied: Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason. (The former is known also as Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals.) Both texts are available in a new translation in the Cambridge Edition: Practical Philosophy. Critique of practical reason, and other Writings in Moral Philosophy. Translated and edited with an introduction by Lewis White Beck. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949. Critique of practical reason. Translated and edited by Mary Gregor; with an introduction by Andrews Reath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, in L. W. Beck, ed., and trans., Critique of Practical Reason, and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949. The Metaphysics of Morals. Translated and edited by Mary Gregor, with an introduction by Roger J. Sullivan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. All three can also to be found in: Practical Philosophy. Translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, with a general introduction by Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Introductions to Kant’s ethics Acton, H. B. 1970. Kant’s Moral Philosophy. London: Macmillan. * Schneewind, J. B. 1992. ‘Autonomy, Obligation, and Virtue: an Overview of Kant’s Moral Philosophy’. In P. Guyer, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. * Sullivan, R. 1994. An Introduction to Kant’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter-length discussions of Kant’s ethics may be found in the books by Cassirer, Höffe, Kemp, Körner, Scruton, and Walker listed at the beginning. Advanced critical discussion of Kant’s ethics * Allison, H. E. 1990. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Aune, B. 1979. Kant’s Theory of Morals. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Beck, L. W. 1960. A Commentary on Kant’s ‘Critique of Practical Reason’. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Förster, E. ed. 1989. Kant’s Transcendental Deductions: the Three Critiques and the Opus postumum. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Pt.II. Guyer, P. 2000. Kant on Law, Freedom and Happiness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Henrich, D. 1992. Aesthetic Judgement and the Moral Image of the World: Studies in Kant.

164 STUDY GUIDE Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Ch.1. Hill, T. 1992. Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Neiman, S. 1994. The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.3. * Nell, O. 1975. Acting on Principle: an Essay on Kantian Ethics. New York: Columbia University Press. * Korsgaard, C. 1996. Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. O’Neill, O. 1989. Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. * Paton, H. J. 1947. The Categorical Imperative: a Study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. London: Hutchinson. * Sullivan, R. 1989. Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Herman, B. 1993. The Practice of Moral Judgment. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univsrsity Press. Williams, T. C. 1968. The Concept of the Categorical Imperative: a Study of the Place of the Categorical Imperative in Kant’s Ethical Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Wood, A. 1999. Kant’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Collections of articles on Kant’s ethics: Guyer, P. ed. 1998. Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Wolff, R. P. ed. 1967. Kant: a Collection of Critical Essays. New York: Anchor Books. Pt. II Wolff, R. P. ed. 1969. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant. Translated by Lewis White Beck; with critical essays edited by R. P. Wolff. London: Collier Macmillan. Wolff, R. P. ed. 1967. Kant: a Collection of Critical Essays. New York: Anchor Books. Pt.II.

Principal topics to be studied include, with suggested reading:

i. Kant’s account of moral motivation (the concepts of the good will & duty) Groundwork I. Allison, H. E. 1990. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 6. Aune, B. 1979. Kant’s Theory of Morals. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. pp. 3-12, 20-8. Guyer, P. ed. 1998. Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Pt. II. Höffe, O. 1994. Immanuel Kant. Albany: State University of New York Press. Sect. 8.1. Korsgaard, C. 1996. Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 2, 9. Paton, H. J. 1947. The Categorical Imperative: a Study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. London: Hutchinson. Chs. 2-6. Dietrichson, P. 1962. ‘What Does Kant Mean By “Acting From Duty”?’. In R. P. Wolff ed., Kant: a Collection of Critical Essays. New York: Anchor Books, 1967.

ii. Kant’s analysis of morality (the concept of the categorical imperative & derivation of its several formulas) Groundwork I-II. Aune, B. 1979. Kant’s Theory of Morals. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. pp. 2894, 104-11. Allison, H. E. 1990. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 94106. Dietrichson, P. 1964. ‘When is a Maxim Fully Universalisable?’. Kant-Studien 55: 143-70. Guyer, P. ed. 1998. Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Pt. III. Hill, T. 1992. Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Chs. 2-3, 5. Korsgaard, C. 1996. Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 2-4. Nell, O. 1975. Acting on Principle: an Essay on Kantian Ethics. New York: Columbia

KANT 165 University Press. Ch. 5. O’Neill, O. 1989. Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 5, 7. Paton, H. J. 1947. The Categorical Imperative: a Study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. London: Hutchinson. Chs. 14-18. Sullivan, R. 1994. An Introduction to Kant’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 3-5. ——. 1989. Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 11-15. Williams, T. C. 1968. The Concept of the Categorical Imperative: a Study of the Place of the Categorical Imperative in Kant’s Ethical Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 3.

iii. Kant’s deduction of the moral law and account of the relation between morality and freedom Groundwork III, and Critique of Practical Reason, Of the deduction of the principles of pure practical reason. Allison, H. E. 1990. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 1213. ——. 1989. ‘Justification and Freedom in the Critique of Practical Reason’. In E. Förster, ed., Kant’s Transcendental Deductions: the Three Critiques and the Opus postumum. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Beck, L. W. 1960. A Commentary on Kant’s ‘Critique of Practical Reason’. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ch. 10. Guyer, P. ed. 1998. Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Pt. IV. Henrich, D. 1990. The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant’s Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Ch. 2. Herman, B. 1989. ‘Justification and Objectivity: Comments on Rawls and Allison’. In E. Förster, ed., Kant’s Transcendental Deductions: the Three Critiques and the Opus postumum. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Hill, T. 1992. Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Ch. 6. Höffe, O. 1994. Immanuel Kant. Albany: State University of New York Press. Sect. 8.4. Korsgaard, C. 1996. Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 6. Neiman, S. 1994. The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. 3. O’Neill, O. 1989. Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 1, 3. Paton, H. J. 1947. The Categorical Imperative: a Study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. London: Hutchinson. Chs. 21-4. Sullivan, R. 1994. An Introduction to Kant’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 10. —–. 1989. Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 7.

iv. The postulates of practical reason Critique of Practical Reason, Dialectic. Beck, L. W. 1960. A Commentary on Kant’s ‘Critique of Practical Reason’. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chs. 13-14. Buchdahl, G. 1992. Kant and the Dynamics of Reason: Essays on the Structure of Kant’s Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell. Ch. 15. Neiman, S. 1994. The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. 4. Sullivan, R. 1989. Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 139-44, 218-26. Wood, A. 1992. ‘Rational Faith, Moral Theology, and Religion’. In P. Guyer ed., The

166 STUDY GUIDE Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——. 1970. Kant’s Moral Religion. Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

C. KANT’S AESTHETICS Main text to be studied: ‘Critique of Aesthetic Judgement’, Part I of the Critique of Judgement. Introductions to Kant’s aesthetics *

Schaper, E. 1992. ‘Taste, Sublimity, and Genius: the Aesthetics of Nature and Art’. In P. Guyer, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. * Kemal, S. 1997. Kant’s Aesthetic Theory: An Introduction. 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Chapter-length discussions of Kant’s aesthetics may be found in the books by Höffe, Körner, Scruton, and Walker listed at the beginning. Advanced critical discussion of Kant’s aesthetics Cohen, T., and P. Guyer, eds. 1982. Essays in Kant’s Aesthetics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. * Crawford, D. W. 1974. Kant’s Aesthetic Theory. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. Crowther, P. 1989. Kant’s Sublime: from Morality to Art. Oxford: Clarendon Press. * Elliott, R. K. 1968. ‘The unity of Kant’s Critique of Judgement’. British Journal of Aesthetics 8: 244-259. Guyer, P. 1997. Kant and the Claims of Taste. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——. 1993. Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. * Henrich, D. 1992. Aesthetic Judgement and the Moral Image of the World: Studies in Kant. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Ch.2. Kemal, S. 1986. Kant and Fine Art: an Essay on Kant and the Philsophy of Fine Art and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon Press. McCloskey, M. 1987. Kant’s Aesthetic. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Mothersill, M. 1984. Beauty Restored. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs.6 and 8. * Savile, A. 1987. Aesthetic Reconstructions: the Seminal Writings of Lessing, Kant and Schiller. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Chs.4-6. Savile, A. 1993. Kantian Aesthetics Pursued. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Schaper, E. 1979. Studies in Kant’s Aesthetics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Wolff, R. P. ed. 1967. Kant: a Collection of Critical Essays. New York: Anchor Books. Pt.III.

Principal topics to be studied with suggested reading:

i. Kant’s analysis of judgements of taste in the Analytic of the Beautiful, & associated theory of imagination & understanding Critique of Judgement, pt. I, Analytic of the Beautiful, §§1-22. Budd, M. 1998. ‘Delight in the natural world: Kant on the aesthetic appreciation of nature’ (Parts I-III). British Journal of Aesthetics 38: 1-18, 117-26, 233-50. Crawford, D. W. 1974. Kant’s Aesthetic Theory. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. Ch. 2, sects. 5.1, 6.1. Guyer, P. 1997. Kant and the Claims of Taste. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 3-6. ——. 1982. ‘Pleasure and Society in Kant’s Theory of Taste’. In T. Cohen and P. Guyer eds., Essays in Kant’s Aesthetics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Henrich, D. 1992. Aesthetic Judgement and the Moral Image of the World: Studies in Kant. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Ch. 2. Kemal, S. 1997. Kant’s Aesthetic Theory: An Introduction. 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Chs. 2-4. McCloskey, M. 1987. Kant’s Aesthetic. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Chs. 4-8.

KANT 167 Savile, A. 1987. Aesthetic Reconstructions: the Seminal Writings of Lessing, Kant and Schiller. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Ch. 4. ——. 1993. Kantian Aesthetics Pursued. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Chs. 1-2. Schaper, E. 1979. Studies in Kant’s Aesthetics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Ch. 3. Zimmerman, R. 1967. ‘Kant: The Aesthetic Judgement’. In R. P. Wolff ed., Kant: a Collection of Critical Essays. New York: Anchor Books.

ii. Kant’s deduction of judgements of taste & solution to the Antinomy of Taste Critique of Judgement, pt. I, Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgements, §§30-42, and Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgement, §§55-60. Crawford, D. W. 1974. Kant’s Aesthetic Theory. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. Passim. Elliott, R. 1968. ‘The Unity of Kant’s Critique of Judgement’. British Journal of Aesthetics 8: 244-59. Guyer, P. 1997. Kant and the Claims of Taste. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 7-11. Kemal, S. 1997. Kant’s Aesthetic Theory: An Introduction. 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Chs. 5-6. ——. 1986. Kant and Fine Art: an Essay on Kant and the Philsophy of Fine Art and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs. 1, 5-6. McCloskey, M. 1987. Kant’s Aesthetic. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Ch. 9. Savile, A. 1987. Aesthetic Reconstructions: the Seminal Writings of Lessing, Kant and Schiller. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Chs. 5-6. ——. 1993. Kantian Aesthetics Pursued. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Ch. 3.

iii. Kant’s theory of art (the concepts of genius and aesthetic ideas) Critique of Judgement, pt. I, Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgements, §§43-54. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method. Translated by William Glen-Doepel. 2nd ed. London: Sheed and Ward, 1989. pp. 42-60. Gotshalk, D. 1967. ‘Form and Expression in Kant’s Aesthetics’. British Journal of Aesthetics 7: 250-60. Kemal, S. 1986. Kant and Fine Art: an Essay on Kant and the Philsophy of Fine Art and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pt. I. McCloskey, M. 1987. Kant’s Aesthetic. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Chs. 11-14. Savile, A. 1993. Kantian Aesthetics Pursued. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Chs. 56. Schaper, E. 1979. Studies in Kant’s Aesthetics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Ch. 4. Cohen, T., and P. Guyer, eds. 1982. Essays in Kant’s Aesthetics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pt. II.

18

Nineteenth Century German Philosophy

1 The Paper This paper covers three post-Kantian nineteenth century German philosophers: Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. The most essential historical background for this paper is a general knowledge of Kant’s philosophy, to which all three of these thinkers are, to varying degrees, responding. Any student who is not already studying Kant for some other paper, therefore, is recommended to read at least one introductory book about Kant. Although knowledge of German is a considerable advantage (enabling one to read the central texts in the original, and to draw on an extended range of secondary literature), it is not necessary: all the central texts are available in English, along with the recommended secondary literature. In the exam, students are asked to answer questions on at least two of the three authors included. Most of the questions refer to one philosopher only, but there are usually some, in addition, that are general or comparative (students may be asked, for example, to discuss an aspect of Nietzsche’s rejection of Schopenhauer). As there is quite a wide range of questions asked, it is probably sufficient, for examination purposes, to prepare just two authors, studying their views on a range of topics, and the arguments for and against them, in some depth.

2 General Reading The following sections offer reading suggestions and list some of the central topics for each philosopher. The most useful books are marked with an asterisk. Of course this is not an exhaustive list, and more detailed reading will be required for particular topics. To gain a general idea of Kant’s philosophy: Körner, S. 1955. Kant. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Scruton, Roger. 1982. Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in German Philosophers: Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Guyer, P. ed. 1992. The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

General discussions of German philosophy include: Solomon, R., and K. Higgins. eds. 1993. Routledge History of Philosophy, Vol VI: The Age of German Idealism. London: Routledge. Roberts, Julian. 1988. German Philosophy: An Introduction. London: Polity Press.

3 Specific Authors A. HEGEL (1770-1831) Topics include Hegel’s criticism of Kant; his idealism; the dialectic; the evolution of Geist; the identification of ‘the real’ with ‘the rational’; the theory of history; Lordship and Bondage; morality. Main texts

19th Century German Philosophy 169 Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977. Logic: being part one of ‘Encyclopaedia of the philosophical sciences’. Translated by William Wallace. 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975

Additional texts Philosophy of Right. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976

Secondary Reading *Inwood, M. J. 1983. Hegel. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. *Norman, Richard. 1976. Hegel’s ‘Phenomenology’: a Philosophical Introduction. Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press. *Taylor, Charles. 1979. Hegel and Modern Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Inwood, M. J. ed. 1985. Hegel. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kojève, Alexandre. 1960. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Translated by James H. Nichols, Jr. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1980. MacIntyre, Alasdair. ed. 1976. Hegel: a Collection of Critical Essays. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Pippin, Robert B. 1989. Hegel’s Idealism: the Satisfactions of Self-consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rosen, Michael. 1982. Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Soll, I. 1969. An Introduction to Hegel’s Metaphysics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Taylor, Charles. 1975. Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vesey, G. ed. 1982. Idealism Past and Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

B. SCHOPENHAUER (1788-1860) Topics include Schopenhauer’s development of Kant’s idealism; his identification of the will with the thing-in-itself; the world as will; the rationality of pessimism; aesthetic experience; determinism; compassion and morality; the self. Main text The World as Will and Representation. Translated by E.F.J. Payne. 2 Vols. New York: Dover, 1966.

Additional texts On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Translated by E. F. J. Payne. La salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1974. On the Freedom of the Will. Translated by Konstantin Kolenda. Oxford: Blackwell, 1985. On the Basis of Morality. Translated by E. F. J. Payne. Rev. ed. Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995. (Prev. ed. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.) Secondary Reading *Janaway, Christopher. 1989. Self and World in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hamlyn, D. 1980. Schopenhauer. London: Routledge. Gardiner, Patrick. 1971. Schopenhauer. Harmonsworth: Penguin. Atwell, John E. 1990. Schopenhauer: The Human Character. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Atwell, John E. 1995. Schopenhauer on the Character of the World: The Metaphysics of Will. Berkeley: University of California Press. Young, Julian. 1987. Willing and Unwilling: A Study in the Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff. Jacquette, Dale. ed. 1996. Schopenhauer, Philosophy and the Arts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

C. NIETZSCHE (1844-1900) Topics include Nietzsche’s view of tragedy; the self; truth and perspectivism; the critique of morality (genealogical method); the revaluation of values; the ascetic

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ideal; Nietzsche on philosophy; Nietzsche as philosopher/writer; the will to power; the doctrine of eternal recurrence. Main texts Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990. On The Genealogy of Morals: a Polemic, by way of clarification and supplement to my last book, Beyond good and evil. Translated by Douglas Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Additional texts Twilight of the Idols (and The Anti-Christ). Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. Harmondsworth: Penguin,1968. The Birth of Tragedy. Translated by Francis Golffing. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1956. The Gay Science. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1974. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969. The Will to Power. Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage Books, 1968.

Secondary Reading * Schacht, Richard. ed. 1994. Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: essays on Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals. Berkeley: University of California Press. * Clark, Maudmarie. 1990. Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. * Hunt, Lester. 1990. Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue. London: Routledge. *Nehamas, Alexander. 1985. Nietzsche: Life as Literature. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. *Solomon, Robert C. ed. 1973. Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. Magnus, Bernd and Kathleen Higgins. eds. 1996. The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tanner, Michael. 1994. Nietzsche. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Heller, Erich. 1988. The Importance of Nietzsche: Ten Essays. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Staten, Henry. 1990. Nietzsche’s Voice. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Kaufman, Walter. 1974. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Schacht, Richard. 1983. Nietzsche. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Silk, M, and J. Stern. 1981. Nietzsche on Tragedy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Danto, Arthur C. 1965. Nietzsche as Philosopher. London: Collier-Macmillan. Solomon, R. C., and K. M. Higgins. eds. 1988. Reading Nietzsche. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Young, Julian. 1992. Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

19

Phenomenology

1 The Paper This paper covers some of those philosophers belonging to the school of ‘phenomenology’, which began with Brentano and Husserl (in its ‘pure’ form), and was developed and highly modified (in its ‘existentialist’ form) later in the twentieth century by Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. As with the Nineteenth Century German Philosophy paper, knowledge of Kant is an advantage; and knowledge of the original languages (German, French) is helpful, but not necessary. In the exam, students are asked to answer three questions, on at least two authors. Most of the questions refer to one philosopher only, but there are sometimes some that are general or comparative. As there is a wide range of questions asked on each author, it is probably sufficient, for examination purposes, to select two philosophers, and to examine their doctrines, and the arguments for and against them, in detail. However, a broad knowledge of (at least some of) the other philosophers on the paper will often enhance your understanding of those you choose to study in detail; in particular, each of the three later philosophers is responding in large part to one or more of their predecessors.

2 General Reading The following sections offer reading suggestions and list some of the central topics for each philosopher. The most useful books are marked with an asterisk. Of course this is not an exhaustive list, and more detailed reading will be required for particular topics. To gain a general idea of Kant’s philosophy: Körner, S. 1955. Kant. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Scruton, Roger. 1982. Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in German Philosophers: Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Guyer, P. ed. 1992. The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Three helpful books covering phenomenology are: *Spiegelberg, Herbert. 1955. The Phenomenological Movement: a Historical Introduction. 3 Vols. 3rd ed. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982. * Hammond, J., M. Howarth, and R. Keat. 1991. Understanding Phenomenology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Grossman, Reinhardt. 1984. Phenomenology and Existentialism: an Introduction. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Other general discussions (i.e. covering more than one author) which may be of use are: Rorty, Richard. 1979. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Theunissen, Michael. 1984. The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger,

172 Study Guide Sartre, and Buber. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Pivcevic, Edo. ed. 1975. Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cooper, David E. 1991. Existentialism. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.

3 Specific Authors A. HUSSERL (1859-1938) Topics include Husserl’s relation to Descartes; the idea of ‘presuppositionless’ philosophy; the epoche ; the modification of Brentano’s conception of the intentional object; time-consciousness; the transcendental ego; the experience of other minds. Main text Cartesian Meditations. Translated by Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960.

Additional texts The Paris Lectures: an Introduction to Phenomenology. Translated by Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960. The Idea of Phenomenology. Translated by William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964. The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness. Translated by James S. Churchill. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980. First Book. Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy: Philosophy as Rigorous Science; and Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man. Translated by Quentin Lauer. New York: Harper & Row, 1965. Husserl: Shorter Works. Edited by P. McCormick, and F. A. Elliston. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1981. Pt. 1, and Ch. 10.

Secondary Reading *Bell, David. 1990. Husserl. London: Routledge. Dreyfus, H. L. ed. 1982. Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Elliston, F. A., and P. McCormick. eds. 1977. Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Kockelmans, Joseph. ed. 1967. Phenomenology. The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday. Ricoeur, Paul. 1967. Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology. Translated by Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. Smith, D. W., and R. McIntyre. 1982. Husserl and Intentionality. A Study of Mind, Meaning and Language. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.. Smith, Barry, and D. Woodruff Smith, eds. 1995. The Cambridge Companion to Husserl. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

B. HEIDEGGER (1889-1976) Topics include the Question of Being; the ‘destruction’ of the history of ontology; Heidegger’s conception of phenomenology; his criticism of Descartes and Kant; Dasein; the ready-to-hand/present-at-hand distinction; State-of-mind (fear, anguish, etc.); Inauthenticity; Death, being-towards-death, and finitude. Main text Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell, 1962.

Additional texts The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Translated by Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1981.

Phenomenology 173 An Introduction to Metaphysics. Translated by Ralph Manheim. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959. ‘Letter on Humanism’. In Basic writings from ‘Being and time’ (1927) to ‘The task of thinking’ (1964), edited by D. F. Krell. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978. Secondary Reading *Guignon, Charles. 1993. ed. The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. *Dreyfus, Hubert. 1991. Being-in-the-world: a Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. *Richardson, John. 1986. Existential Epistemology: a Heideggerian Critique of the Cartesian Project. Oxford: Clarendon Press. *Murray, Michael. ed. 1978. Heidegger and Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays. New Haven: Yale University Press. *Mulhall, Stephen. 1996. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Heidegger and Being and Time. London: Routledge, 1996. Olafson, Frederick A. 1997. Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind. New Haven: Yale University Press. Zimmerman, M. ed. 1984. The Thought of Martin Heidegger. New Orleans: Tulane University Press. Taylor, Charles. 1973. ‘Interpretation and the Sciences of Man’. In Explorations in Phenomenology: Papers of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, edited by David Carr and Edward S. Casey. The Hague: Nijhoff. Tolstoy, Leo. The Death of Ivan Illych. Adorno, Theodor. 1973. The Jargon of Authenticity. Translated by Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Cahiers de l’Herne. Heidegger. Paris, 1983 (available in French). Vattimo, G. 1971. Introduzione a Heidegger. Bari, Laterza. (Also available in French) Rorty, R. 1991. Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Part I.

C. SARTRE (1905-1980) Topics include Sartre vs. Husserl on the transcendental ego; other minds; Sartre’s metaphysics; the ‘reality’ of nothingness; freedom; the nature of consciousness; anti-determinism and the pre-reflective cogito; anguish and bad faith; Sartre’s rejection of Freud; interpersonal relations; choice and responsibility; the nature of value. Main text Being and Nothingness: an Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. Translated by Hazel E. Barnes. London: Methuen, 1958

Additional texts The Transcendance of the Ego: an Existentialist Theory of Consciousness. Translated by Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick. New York: Octagon Books, 1972 (c1957). Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. Translated by Philip Mairet. London: Methuen, 1971. The Psychology of Imagination. Translated by Philip Mairet. London: Methuen, 1972. Existentialism and Humanism. Translated by Philip Mairet. London: Methuen, 1973. Sartre, J. P. 1970. ‘Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl’s Phenomenology’. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 1: 4-5.

Secondary Reading *Caws, Peter. 1979. Sartre. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. *Whitford, Margaret. 1982. Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Sartre’s Philosophy. Lexington, Ken.: French Forum.. *Catalano, J. S. 1980. A Commentary on Sartre’s ‘Being and Nothingness’. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

174 Study Guide McCulloch, Gregory. 1994. Using Sartre: an Analytical Introduction to Early Sartrean Themes. London: Routledge. *Howells, Christina. ed. 1992. The Cambridge Companion to Sartre. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Howells, Christina. 1988. Sartre: The Necessity of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. le Doeuff, Michèle. 1991. Hipparchia’s Choice: an Essay Concerning Women, Philosophy, etc. Oxford: Blackwell. Mészáros, István. 1979. The Work of Sartre. Brighton: Harvester Press. Schillp, P. A. ed. 1981. The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court. Murdoch, Iris. 1953. Sartre, Romantic Rationalist. Cambridge: Bowes and Bowes. Murdoch, Iris. 1970. The Sovereignty of Good. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Plantinga, A. 1958. ‘An Existentialist’s Ethics’. Review of Metaphysics 12: 235-256. Danto, Arthur C. 1991. Sartre. 2nd ed. London: Fontana.

D. MERLEAU-PONTY (1908-1961) Topics include Merleau-Ponty’s critique of empiricism and intellectualism; his conception of phenomenology; his criticisms of Sartre; his account of embodiment (‘bodily intentionality’); his use of clinical/scientific data (cf. Schneider); the metaphysics of perception. Main text The Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Colin Smith. Rev. ed. London: Routledge, 1989.

Additional texts The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics. Translated by James M. Edie. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1964. The Visible and the Invisible: Followed by Working Notes. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968.

Secondary Reading *Langer, M. M. 1989. Merleau-Ponty’s ‘Phenomenology of Perception’: A Guide and Commentary. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Priest, Stephen. 1999. Merleau-Ponty, London: Routledge. Gillan, G. ed. 1973. The Horizons of the Flesh: Critical Perspectives on the Thought of MerleauPonty. London: Feffer & Simons. Kaelin, E. 1962. An Existentialist Aesthetic: The Theories of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Young, Iris Marion. 1989. ‘Throwing like a girl’. In J. Allen, and I. Young, eds. The Thinking Muse: Feminism and Modern French Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

20

The Philosophies of Frege, Russell & Wittgenstein

1 The Paper Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein have had a unique and powerful influence on almost all aspects of twentieth century analytic philosophy. A study of these authors is thus an excellent introduction to a good range of the most important contemporary debates in philosophy. Study in this area requires that you should know the work of at least two of these authors (somewhat artificially, Wittgenstein’s early and late work are counted as separate bodies of work for this requirement). The best plan is to read carefully some of the main texts of all three, even if your natural interests leads to your putting more work into two of them. The paper offers some chance to study related philosophers working at the same time as these three; some reading is attached concerning the Vienna Circle, with whom Wittgenstein had both contact and influence.

2 Basic Readings (*Those marked with an asterisk are specially suitable for students starting work on this topic.)

A. FREGE Primary Texts *

The Foundations of Arithmetic: a Logico-mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of Number. Trans. by J. L. Austin. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953. The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System. Translated by M. Furth. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964. Frege’s Introduction, Sections 1-9. Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Edited by Peter Geach and Max Black. 3rd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. The Frege Reader. Ed., M. Beaney. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.

The first of these (the Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 1884) is Frege’s brilliant informal exposition and defence of his views of the nature of cardinal numbers. It is worth starting here—the book is a delight to read, and contains many of Frege’s key claims relevant both to his philosophy of mathematics and his philosophy of language. He is the father of mathematical logic and had published his ‘Concept Script’, the Begriffschrift in (1879)(a complete translation of which can be found in J. Van Heijenoort, ed., From Frege to Gödel), from this you should read the introduction. In his early work, Frege talks only of content (inhalt), but from 1892 on, with ‘On Sense and Reference (Bedeutung)’, he introduced a distinction between the sense of a term and its bedeutung (variously translated as reference, nominatum, semantic value or Meaning). In his Basic Laws (the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Vol. 1, 1893), Frege aimed to provide a fully rigorous account of his logicism about arithmetic; when the second volume was already in press, Frege was informed by letter of Russell’s discovery of the paradoxes deriving from Frege’s Basic Law V. Although Frege first attempted to provide a patch

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for this problem, he later came to think of his attempt to provide foundations for arithmetic a failure. Among the essays of his you should read are some from the time of ‘On Sense and Reference’, collected in Geach and Black and in Beaney, and some late essays, particularly ‘Thoughts’ (1918-19), when Frege appears to have been intending to present his general views on logic. Introduction to Begriffschrift. * ‘Function and Concept’. * ‘On Concept and Object’. * ‘On Sense and Reference’, in recent editions translated as ‘On Sense and Meaning’. ‘What is a Function?’. * ‘Thoughts’. In Logical Investigations, translated by P. T. Geach and R. H. Stoothoff (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977); Collected Papers On Mathematics Logic and Philosophy, edited by Brian McGuinness (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), or The Frege Reader, may also be found in N. Salmon & S. Soames, eds., Propositions & Attitudes; (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) and, translated as ‘The Thought’, can be found in P. F. Strawson, ed., Philosophical Logic, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967). Posthumous Writings, Gottlob Frege, edited by Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kambartel, Friedrich Kaulbach, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979); in particular, ‘Dialogue with Punjer on Existence’, ‘Comments on Sense and Meaning’, ‘Introduction to Logic’, ‘A Brief Survey of my Logical Doctrines’, ‘My Basic Logical Insights’, ‘Logical Generality’.

Secondary Texts *

Kenny, A. 1995. Frege. London: Penguin Books. Evans, G. 1982. Varieties of Reference. Edited by John McDowell. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.1. * Dummett, M. 1981. Frege: Philosophy of Language. 2nd ed. London: Duckworth. * Dummett, M. 1991. Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics. London: Duckworth. *Weiner, J. 1999. Frege. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Beaney, M. 1996. Frege: Making Sense. London: Duckworth. Dummett, M. 1981. The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy. London: Duckworth. Carl, W. 1994. Frege’s Theory of Sense and Reference: Its Origins and Scope. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. * Furth, M. 1964. ‘Editor’s Introduction’, to Gottlob Frege, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System, trans. by M. Furth. Berkeley: University of California Press. Sluga, H. 1980. Gottlob Frege. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Bell, D. 1979. Frege’s Theory of Judgment. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Currie, G. 1982. Frege: An Introduction to his Philosophy. Brighton: Harvester Press. Wright, C. 1983. Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press. Weiner, J. 1990. Frege in Perspective. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Resnik, M. D. 1980. Frege and the Philosophy of Mathematics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. *

Collections of Articles Klemke, E. ed. 1968. Essays On Frege. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. * Demopoulos, W. ed. 1995. Frege’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Wright, C. ed. 1984. Frege: Tradition & Influence. Oxford: Blackwell. Haaparanta, L., and J. Hintikka. eds. 1986. Frege Synthesized: Essays on the Philosophical and Foundational Work of Gottlob Frege. Dordrecht: Reidel. Mind 101 (October), 1992, for the special issue on the centenary of the publication of ‘On Sense and Reference’.

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B. RUSSELL Russell’s philosophy went through a number of phases, and he is well-known for changing his mind regularly on philosophical issues. His work in the first two decades of the twentieth century is among the major influences on the development of analytic philosophy, especially in logic, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of language. Particularly significant from this period are the article ‘On Denoting’ (1905), which expounds his famous Theory of Descriptions, and Principia Mathematica (1910-1913), the monumental attempt to defend logicism, written jointly with A. N. Whitehead. The Introduction to Principia is essential reading, as is ‘Mathematical Logic as based on the Theory of Types’; the 1919 Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1919; with a new introduction by John G. Slater, London: Routledge, 1993), contains a shorter, more informal presentation of his views on mathematics and logic. For Russell’s epistemological twists and turns, start with the ‘shilling shocker’, Problems of Philosophy, (London: Williams and Norgate, 1912; with a new introduction by John Skorupski, Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, 1998); Russell devoted himself to an extended work of epistemology, The Theory of Knowledge, 1913, which he abandoned in despair after criticism by Wittgenstein, it has only recently come into print (Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Vol.7, London: Allen & Unwin, 1984; and Theory of Knowledge: the 1913 Manuscript, London: Routledge, 1992). Essential reading is also ‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism’, 1918, a series of lectures, available in Logic & Knowledge: Essays 1901-1950, ed. R. C. Marsh, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1956)— the most important collection of Russell’s shorter pieces from this period in Russell's philosophy—and in Russell’s Logical Atomism, ed. David Pears, (London: Fontana, 1972). Russell himself gave an engaging and readable account of his ideas in My Philosophical Development, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1959). Additional Works by Russell The Principles of Mathematics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903. Our Knowledge of the External World, as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, 1914. Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. London: Allen & Unwin, 1919. ‘On the Nature of Acquaintance’. In Logic & Knowledge, ed. R.C. Marsh. London: Allen & Unwin, 1956. ‘On Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’, * ‘On the Relation of Sense-data to Physics’, both in Mysticism & Logic. 2nd ed. London: Allen & Unwin, 1917. ‘Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types’, 1908. In Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901-1950, ed. R. C. Marsh. London: Allen & Unwin, 1956; also in Frege and Gödel: two Fundamental Texts in Mathematical Logic, edited by Jan van Heijenoort. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970.

Secondary Texts *

Sainsbury, R. M. 1979. Russell. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Grayling, A. C. 1996. Russell. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pears, D. F. 1972. Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy. London: Fontana. Hylton, P. 1990. Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ayer, A. J. 1972. Russell. London: Collins. *

Collections of Articles Klemke, E. ed. 1970. Essays on Bertrand Russell. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Savage, C. Wade, and C. Anthony Anderson. eds. 1989. Rereading Russell: Essays in Bertrand Russell’s Metaphysics and Epistemology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

178 Study Guide Irvine, A. D., and G. A. Wedeking. eds. 1993. Russell & Analytic Philosophy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

C. WITTGENSTEIN Wittgenstein published in his lifetime only one book and one article and attempted to prepare one further book for publication. His philosophical writings are nevertheless prodigious. This work can be divided into three periods: an early period crystallised in the Tractatus; a middle period from which various manuscripts and notes on lectures survive; and a later period marked by the text we now know as the Philosophical Investigations. Primary Texts The essential texts to read are Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translation by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuiness, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961). This consists of 7 propositions numbered from 1 to 7. Attached to each proposition are further comments, together with comments on comments, etc. each of which is assigned a number appropriate to the proposition or comment on which it is a comment. Philosophical Investigations, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968; 3rd ed, 1972). The Investigations is a construction by its editors. It is published as a preface followed by parts one and two. The preface and remarks §§1-421 were arranged in this form in 1945; the remainder of Pt.1 and all of Pt.2 are extracted from other sources.

You should read both even if you intend just to focus on Wittgenstein’s early period or his late period. Wittgenstein intended that both works should be published together as he took each to throw much light on the other. Among the many, many works published from Wittgenstein’s manuscripts since his death (still only a small portion of the unpublished material, the Nachlass), and from the notes others took from his lectures you should at least look at Notebooks 1914-16, edited by G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe; translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979). This contains first formulations of many of the ideas which appear in the Tractatus, together with many others which came to be rejected in the course of composition. Philosophical Remarks, edited from his posthumous writings by Rush Rhees; translated by R. Hargreaves and R. White, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975). Philosophical Grammar, edited by Rush Rhees; translated by Anthony Kenny, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974). These two collections of remarks constitute a transition between the early views expressed in the Tractatus, and the later ones of the Investigations. The Blue & Brown Books, (2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1969). The Blue Book, so-called for the covers in which it circulated, was prepared by Wittgenstein for his students, and hence offers a more straightforward exposition of the tenets contained within it than the Investigations; the Brown Book with which it is published is an early draft, in typescript, of the first part of the Investigations. On Certainty, edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright; translated by Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969). This is Wittgenstein’s last work, and is of particular interest for his views on epistemology. Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, edited by G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, and G. E. M. Anscombe; translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, (3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1978). Pts. I and VI of this volume are particularly important in the study of Wittgenstein’s views about rule-following. Surveying this volume makes clear that Wittgenstein was inclined to think that his views on rule-following had radical implications for the philosophy of mathematics. Few of these conclusions are drawn in the Investigations, so it is unclear how far Wittgenstein held to them.

Secondary Texts Introductory Works on Wittgenstein’s philosophy as a whole

Frege, Russell, & Wittgenstein 179 Kenny, A. 1995. Frege. London: Penguin Books. Hacker, P. M. S. 1972. Insight & Illusion: Wittgenstein on Philosophy and the Metaphysics of Experience. Oxford: Clarendon Press; rev. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. Note that there are two editions of this book; the second removes one chapter of the first edition, adds a new chapter and revises many of Hacker’s earlier views. Both editions are worth looking at. Pears, D. F. 1988. The False Prison: a Study of the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy. Vol.1. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Part One of this book offers an excellent overview of Wittgenstein’s work, emphasising the continuity in his thought over the discontinuities that it is more common to note. Fogelin, R. 1976. Wittgenstein. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Useful Collections of Articles on his work as a whole Winch, P. ed. 1969. Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Pitcher, G. ed. 1964. Wittgenstein. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall. Block, I. ed. 1981. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Oxford: Blackwell. French, Peter A., Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein. eds. 1992. The Wittgenstein Legacy. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17. Notre Dame, In.: University of Notre Dame Press. Sluga, H., and D. Stern. eds. 1996. The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Books on the Tractatus Mounce, H. O. 1981. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell. Anscombe, G. E. M. 1971. An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. 4th ed. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Stenius, E. 1960. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: a Critical Exposition of the Main Lines of Thought. Oxford: Blackwell. Griffin, J. 1964. Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pears, D. F. 1988. The False Prison: a Study of the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy. Vol.1. Oxford: Clarendon Press. The second half of this book is a discussion centred on the Tractatus, discussing many of the main strands in a highly lucid manner.

Collections of Articles Copi, Irving M., and Robert W. Beard. eds. 1966. Essays on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Books on the Investigations McGinn, M. 1997. Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations. London: Routledge.

There is a series of scholarly works on Part One of the Investigations produced by Peter Hacker and Gordon, and then by Peter Hacker alone, which contain essays full of contentious interpretation and detailed exegesis and analytical commentary, section by section through the Investigations. These are useful to browse. Baker, G. P., and P. M. S. Hacker. 1983. Meaning and Understanding. Oxford: Blackwell. Together with An Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, originally published together as Wittgenstein—Understanding and Meaning. These two volumes cover §§1-184. ——. 1985. Rules, Grammar & Necessity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. §§185-242. Hacker, P. M. S. 1990. Wittgenstein: Meaning & Mind. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. §§243-427. ——. 1996. Wittgenstein: Mind & Will. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. §§428-693.

D. THE VIENNA CIRCLE The Vienna Circle was a group of philosophers and scientists who met periodically for discussions in Vienna from 1922/3 to 1938. Building on the development of the logic of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein and of the metamathematics of Hubert, the conventionalisms of Poincaré and Duhem and Einstein’s exemplar of

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the ‘new’ physics, the Circle proposed a controversial conception of scientific philosophy. By means of an empiricist criterion of meaning and use of the analyticsynthetic distinction they claimed to be able to discard metaphysics and put aside as ‘pseudo-problems’ most previous philosophy. Initiated by the mathematician Hans Hahn and centred around the philosopher Moritz Schlick, the Vienna Circle included Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Philipp Frank, Viktor Kraft, Otto Neurath and Friedrich Waismann and counted Kurt Gödel, Karl Menger and Edgar Zilsel among its associates. The Circle’s activities were confined to private meetings until 1929, when they began publishing several series of monographs and collaborated with the Berlin “Society of Empirical Philosophy” (including Hans Reichenbach and C.G. Hempel) in organising international conferences and editing the journal Erkenntnis. The death and dispersion in exile of key members from 1934 onwards did not mean the extinction of Vienna Circle philosophy. Through the subsequent work of foreign visitors (A. J. Ayer, E. Nagel, W. V. O. Quine) and emigré members and collaborators in America, so-called ‘logical positivism’ or ‘logical empiricism’ strongly influenced the development of analytic philosophy, occasionally suffering distortions of its original conceptions. Current scholarship of the movement is concerned to retrieve the latter and combat the carricatures that obscure the continuities with present ‘post-positivism’. Sources (general) Carnap, R., H. Hahn, and O. Neurath. 1929. ‘Scientific World-Conception: the Vienna Circle’. In O. Neurath, ed., Empiricism and Sociology. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973. The original 1929 manifesto; popular. Ayer, A. J. 1959. ed. Logical Positivism. New York: Free Press. The standard anthology with classic papers from the Vienna years, bibliography and reflective preface by one-time enthusiast. Sources (individual authors) Ayer, A. J. 1936. Language, Truth and Logic. London: Gollance; 2nd ed., 1946. Potboiler by former visitor assimilating the Circle’s thought too seamlessly to British empiricism. Carnap, R. 1928. The Logical Structure of the World: Pseudo-problems in Philosophy. Translated by Rolf A. George. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967. (Originally published as ‘Der logische Aufbau der welt’. Benary, 1928.) ——. 1934. The Logical Syntax of Language. London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Teubner & Cie., 1937. Studies of the foundations of the empirical and formal science by Circle’s most influential theorist; difficult. ——. 1949. Meaning and Necessity: a Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 2nd ed., 1956. Later work on intensional semantics, with important and accessible essays reprinted in supplement to 2nd ed. Hahn, H. 1980. Empiricism. Logic. Mathematics: Philosophical Papers. Dordecht: Reidel. Collected philosophical papers (1928-34) by founding member, with bibliography. Feigl, H. 1981. Inquiries and Provocations: Selected Writings 1929-1974. Dordrecht: Reidel. Essays by former student documenting the developments in ‘received view’ into the 70s. Frank, P. 1949. Modern Science and Its Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Philosophical papers (1907-1949) by founding member, with significant historical retrospective. Hempel, C. G. 1965. Aspects of Scientific Explanation: and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Free Press. Essays by former student documenting the developments in ‘received view’ from 40s into the 60s. Neurath, O. 1983. Philosophical Papers 1913-1946. Dordecht: Reidel. Representative selection of founding member, with bibliography. ——. 1973. Empiricism and Sociology. Dordrecht: Reidel. Selection of papers and monographs on social science and visual education, with memoirs.

Frege, Russell, & Wittgenstein 181 Reichenbach, H. 1938. Experience and Predicion: an Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. General epistemology of important Berlin associate. ——. 1978. Selected Writings 1909-1953, 2 Vols. Dordecht: Reidel. Philosophical papers, reviews and monographs, with bibliography. Schlick, M. 1918. General Theory of Knowledge. Lasalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1974 (orig. 1918; 2nd ed. 1925). Early epistemological work of later head of Circle, anticipating much that was to come. ——. 1979. Philosophical Papers, 2 Vols. Dordrecht: Reidel. Collected philosophical essays (1909-1936), incl. the important monograph on relativity (1917), with bibliography. Carnap, R., C. Morris, and O. Neurath. eds. 1938. Foundations of the Unity of Science, 2 Vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Multi-monograph series laying foundations of ‘received view’, with only occasional dissent from emerging orthodoxy.

Secondary Literature (general) Kraft, V. 1953. The Vienna Circle: the Origin of Neo-positivism, a Chapter in the History of Recent Philosophy. New York: Greenwood Press, 1969. Influential but decontextualised and traditionalist account by participant. Hanfling, O. 1981. Logical Positivism. Oxford: Blackwell. Traditionalist foundationalist account. Skorupski, J. 1993. ‘Modernism II: Vienna’. In English-Language Philosophy 1750-1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pithy account of fate of original verificationism. Haller, R. 1993. Neoposivismus. Damstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Only reliable one-volume treatment of Vienna Circle in its full historical breadth.

Secondary Literature (essays on individual authors & special topics) Schilpp, P. A. ed. 1963. The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. Lasalle, Ill.: Open Court, . Classic discussions of Carnap’s work by collaborators, students and critics, with autobiographical essay and bibliography. Achinstein, P., and S. F. Barker. eds. 1969. The Legacy of Logical Positivism : studies in the philosophy of science. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press. Critical assessments documenting the overthrow of the ‘received view’. Bell, D., and W. Vossenkuhl. eds. 1992. Science and Subjectivity. The Vienna Circle and 20th Century Philosophy. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Giere, R., and A. Richardson. eds. 1996. The Origins of Logical Empiricism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 16. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Rescher, N. ed. 1985. The Heritage of Logical Empiricism. University Press of America. Sarkar, S. ed. 1993. Carnap Reconsidered. Synthèse. Spohn, W. ed. 1991. Hans Reichenbach. Rudolf Carnap: A Centenary. Erkenntnis 35. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Stadler, F. ed. 1993. Scientific Philosophy: Origins and Development. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook I. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Uebel, T. E. ed. 1991. Rediscovering the Forgotten Vienna Circle. Austrian Studies on Otto Neurath and the Vienna Circle. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Collections of interpretative papers documenting stages in the rediscovery and re-evaluation of logical positivism.

Secondary Literature (recent book-length treatments of individual authors/special topics) Cartwright, N., J. Cat, L. Fleck, and T. E. Uebel. eds. 1996. Otto Neurath: Philosophy Between Science and Politics. Cambridge: University Press. Intellectual biography and legacy of Circle’s enfant terrible. Coffa, J. Alberto. 1991. The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: to the Vienna Station. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Defense of Carnap’s logical reconstructivism with good account of interactions with Wittgenstein. Oberdan, T. 1993. Protocols. Truth. Convention. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Examination of protocol sentence debate, with emphasis on Schlick’s later philosophy. Proust, J. 1989. Questions of Form: Logic and the Analytic Proposition from Kant to Carnap. Translated by Anastasios Albert Brenner. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

182 Study Guide Historical perspective on Carnap’s efforts. Richardson, A. 1998. Carnap’s Construction of the World: the ‘Aufbau’ and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reconstruction of development of Carnap’s early philosophy. Uebel, T. E. 1992. Overcoming Logical Positivism From Within: the Emergence of Neurath’s Naturalism in the Vienna Circle’s Protocol Sentence Debate. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Analysis of variety of the epistemological positions adopted in the Viennese protocol sentence debate, with emphasis on Neurath’s naturalism. Zolo, D. 1989. Reflexive Epistemology. The Philosophical Legacy of Otto Neurath. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Assessment of Neurath’s unorthodox neopositivist perspective.

3 Topics A. FREGE i. Philosophy of Mathematics Logicism What is the nature of Frege’s logicism? To what extent are his concerns philosophical, mathematical or a combination of the two? Benacerraf, P. 1983. ‘Frege: the Last Logicist’, In Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, and Howard K. Wettstein, eds., Contemporary Perspectives on the History of Philosophy, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 8, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; reprinted in W. Demopoulos, ed., Frege’s Philosophy of Mathematics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995. Wilson, M. 1992. ‘Frege: The Royal Road from Geometry’. Noûs 26: 149-180; reprinted in W. Demopoulos, ed., Frege’s Philosophy of Mathematics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995. Weiner, J. 1990. Frege in Perspective. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. ——. 1984. ‘The Philosopher Behind the Last Logicist’. In C. Wright, ed., Frege: Tradition & Influence. Oxford: Blackwell. Diamond, C. 1991. ‘What does a Concept-Script Do?’. In The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Wright, C. 1983. Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press. Ch.4.

Basic Law V Why Basic Law V; whence the contradiction; how does one escape? Furth’s Introduction to The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System. Translated by M. Furth. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964. Dummett, M. 1991. Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics. London: Duckworth. Chs.16-18. ——. 1994. ‘Chairman’s Address: Basic Law V’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94: 243-251. Resnik, M. 1980. Frege and the Philosophy of Mathematics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Final chapter. Boolos, G. 1993. ‘Basic Law V—Whence the Contradiction?’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 67: 213-233. ——. 1987. ‘The Consistency of Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic’. In J. J. Thomson, ed., On Being and Saying: Essays in Honour of Richard Cartwright, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press; reprinted in W. Demopoulos, ed., Frege’s Philosophy of Mathematics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995. ——. 1990. ‘The Standard of Equality of Numbers’. Reprinted in W. Demopoulos, ed., Frege’s Philosophy of Mathematics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995. Hale, B. 1994. ‘Dummett’s Critique of Wright’s Attempt to Resuscitate Frege?’. In Philosophia Mathematica, 3: 122-147.

Frege, Russell, & Wittgenstein 183

Implicit Definition—‘Hume’s Principle’ How can the principle be justified; is it an analytic principle? What is ‘the Julius Caesar Problem’ that leads Frege to reject an implicit definition of cardinal number? What grounds Frege’s commitment to treating numbers as objects? Parsons, C. 1965. ‘Frege’s Theory of Number’. Reprinted in W. Demopoulos, ed., Frege’s Philosophy of Mathematics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995. Wright, C. 1983. Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press. Chs. 1-3. Dummett, M. 1981. Frege: Philosophy of Language. 2nd ed. London: Duckworth. Ch.14. ——. 1991. Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics. London: Duckworth. Chs. 13-15. Hale, B. 1987. Abstract Objects. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Brandom, R. 1996. ‘The Significance of Complex Numbers for Frege’s Philosophy of Mathematics’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96: 293-315.

Frege’s Criticisms of Other Views Resnik, M. D. 1980. Frege and the Philosophy of Mathematics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Dummett, M. 1991. Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics. London: Duckworth. Ch.8. Kessler, G. 1980. ‘Frege, Mill and the Foundations of Arithmetic’. Journal of Philosophy 77: 65-79. Simons, P. 1982. ‘Against the Aggregate Theory of Number’. Journal of Philosophy 79: 163-167. Kitcher, P. 1983. The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Weiner, J. 1990. Frege in Perspective. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. Ch.1.

ii. Philosophy of Logic and Language Some topics here overlap with topics in the Logic and Metaphysics paper. However, preparing for the present paper will normally require additional work, to gain a deeper understanding and one better informed by details of Frege’s texts. Sense and Reference (Bedeutung) What is the motivation for Frege’s introduction of the distinction, and what argument can he provide for it? Dummett, M. 1978. ‘Frege’s Distinction between Sense and Reference’. In Truth & Other Enigmas. London: Duckworth; reprinted in A. W. Moore, ed., Meaning & Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. Salmon, N. 1986. Frege’s Puzzle. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Wiggins, D. 1976. ‘Frege’s Problem of the Morning Star and the Evening Star’. In M Schirn, ed., Studies on Frege. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog. McDowell, J. 1977. ‘On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name’. Mind 86: 159-185; reprinted in A. W. Moore, ed., Meaning & Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. Evans, G. 1982. Varieties of Reference. Edited by John McDowell. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.1. Burge, T. 1990. ‘Frege on Sense and Linguistic Meaning’. In David Bell and Neil Cooper, eds., The Analytic Tradition: Meaning, Thought and Knowledge, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Thoughts Frege’s term for the sense of a sentence is gedank, thought. He seems to take such entities to be structured and composed out of the senses of the component words of a sentence; he takes the bedeutung of true sentences to be an object, the True. He also thinks of thoughts as eternal, and as possessing absolute truth-values, how does reconcile this with the existence of tense and indexicality? Dummett, M. 1981. Frege: Philosophy of Language. 2nd ed. London: Duckworth. Chs.6, 11, 12. ——. 1981. The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy. London: Duckworth Ch.6. ——. 1989. ‘More about Thoughts’. Reprinted in Frege & Other Philosophers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

184 Study Guide Burge, T. 1986. ‘Frege on Truth’. In L. Haaparanta, and J. Hintikka, eds., Frege Synthesized: Essays on the Philosophical and Foundational Work of Gottlob Frege. Dordrecht: Reidel. Ricketts, T. 1986. ‘Objectivity & Objecthood: Frege’s Metaphysics of Judgment’. In L. Haaparanta, and J. Hintikka, eds., Frege Synthesized: Essays on the Philosophical and Foundational Work of Gottlob Frege. Dordrecht: Reidel. Evans, G. 1981. ‘Understanding Demonstratives’. In H. Parret, and J. Bouveresse, eds., Meaning and Understanding. Berlin: W. de Gruyter. Reprinted in his Collected Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. Perry, J. 1977. ‘Frege on Demonstratives’. Philosophical Review 86: 474-497; reprinted in The Problem of the Essential Indexical & Other Essays. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Harcourt, E. 1993. ‘Are Hybrid Proper Names the Solution to the Completeness Problem? A Reply to Wolfgang Kunne’. Mind 102: 301-313. Kaplan, D. 1977. Demonstratives. In J. Almog, J. Perry, and Howard Wettstein, eds., Themes from Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Indirect sense Frege applies the sense/reference distinction to the task of explaining the significance of attitude ascriptions—he introduces the idea of both indirect reference and sense. This seems to threaten an infinite hierarchy of senses of senses. Dummett, M. 1981. Frege: Philosophy of Language. 2nd ed. London: Duckworth. Ch.9. Forbes, G. 1990. ‘The Indispensability of Sinn’. Philosophical Review 99: 535-563. Burge, T. 1979. ‘Frege and the Hierarchy’. Synthese 40: 265-281.

The distinction between concept and object Frege ascribes bedeutung not only to names and descriptions, but also predicates. The referent of a name is an saturated entity, that of a predicate, an unsaturated entity, together they can be unified into a thought. Seemingly paradoxically, Frege must deny that the concept horse (which must be a saturated entity, since it is picked out by a description) is what the predicate ‘horse’ stands for. Dummett, M. 1981. Frege: Philosophy of Language. 2nd ed. London: Duckworth. Ch.7. Wiggins, D. 1984. ‘The Sense and Reference of Predicates’. In C. Wright, ed., Frege: Tradition & Influence. Oxford: Blackwell. Diamond, C. 1991. ‘Frege and Nonsense’, and ‘What Nonsense Might Be’, both in The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Burge, T. 1984. ‘Frege on Extensions of Concepts, from 1884 to 1903’. Philosophical Review 93: 334. Sullivan, P. M. 1992. ‘The Functional Model of Sentential Complexity’. Journal of Philosophical Logic 21: 91-108. Rumfitt, I. 1994. ‘Frege's Theory of Predication: An Elaboration and Defense, with Some New Applications’. Philosophical Review 103: 599-637. Higginbotham, J. 1990. ‘Frege, Concepts and the Design of Language’. In E. Villanueva, ed., Information, Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

B. RUSSELL i. Philosophy of Mathematics Russell’s definition of number; the contrast wih Frege; the no-class theory. Paradoxes: type theories, simple and ramified; semantic and logical paradox. Copi, I. 1971. The Theory of Logical Types. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Chihara, C. 1973. Ontology & the Vicious Circle Principle. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Gödel, K. ‘Russell’s Mathematical Logic’. Reprinted in P. Benacerraf, and H. Putnam, eds., Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings. Cambridge University Press , 1983. Goldfarb, W. D. 1989. ‘Russell’s Reasons for Ramification’. In C. Wade Savage, and C. Anthony Anderson, eds., Rereading Russell: Essays in Bertrand Russell’s Metaphysics and Epistemology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Frege, Russell, & Wittgenstein 185 Priest, G. 1994. ‘The Structure of the Paradoxes of Self-reference’. Mind 103: 25-33.

ii. Philosophy of Logic and Language Russell’s theory of descriptions, names, identity, existence; his criticism of Frege’s theory (the ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument); significance of descriptions for the philosophy of mathematics and for epistemology; belief, truth and the unity of the proposition. Hylton, P. 1990. Russell, Idealism & the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.6 & 8. Blackburn, S., and A. Code. 1978. ‘The Power of Russell’s Criticism of Frege: “On denoting”’. Analysis 38: 48-50. Pakuluk, M. 1993. ‘The Interpretation of Russell’s Gray’s Elegy Argument’. In Andrew Irvine, and Gary Wedekind, eds., Russell and Analytic Philosophy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Hochberg, H. 1976. ‘Russell’s Attack on Frege’s Theory of Meaning’. Philosophica 18: 9-34. Reprinted in his Logic, Ontology and Language: Essays on Truth and Reality. München Wien: Philosophia Verlag, 1984. Griffin, N. 1985. ‘Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement’. Philosphical Studies 47: 213-248. ——. 1986. ‘Wittgenstein’s Criticism of Russell’s Theory of Judgement’. Russell 5: 132-145. Cartwright, R. 1987. ‘On a Neglected Theory of Judgement’. In Philosophical Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

iii. Epistemology and Metaphysics Perception: sense data, idealism. Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Analysis, logical atomism, facts. Logical constructions: space, time, the external world. Pears, D. F. ed. 1972. Russell’s Logical Atomism. London: Fontana. Hylton, P. 1990. Russell, Idealism & the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.8.

C. WITTGENSTEIN i. Tractatus Analysis Why does Wittgenstein think that sentences can be analysed into simple signs and the world into simple objects? How are the linguistic and ontological aspects of his thinking about this topic interlinked? The Analysis of Language 2.0201, 3.2ff. especially 3.24-3.261. The Analysis of the World 1, 2, 2.02-2.0203. Fogelin, R. 1976. Wittgenstein. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch.I. Anscombe, G. E. M. 1971. An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. 4th ed. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Chs.1 & 2. Stenius, E. 1960. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: a Critical Exposition of the Main Lines of Thought. Oxford: Blackwell. Chs. II-IV. Pears, D.F. 1988. The False Prison: a Study of the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy. Vol.1. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs. 4, 5. Griffin, J. 1964. Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The Picture Theory What are pictures? What can picture what? How are pictures related to what they picture? In what sense are linguistic items pictures? What aspects of meaning might the picture theory serve to explain; is it intended to explain meaning at all?

186 Study Guide 2.1-2.1515, 3, 3.01, 3.1-3.1431, 4.01-4.0311, especially 4.012-4.0141. Anscombe, G. E. M. 1971. An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. 4th ed. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Chs.3-5 Stenius, E. 1960. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: a Critical Exposition of the Main Lines of Thought. Oxford: Blackwell. Chs. VI-VII. Pears, D. F. 1988. The False Prison: a Study of the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy. Vol.1. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.6. Fogelin, R. 1976. Wittgenstein. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch.II.

Logic in the Tractatus What is Wittgenstein’s conception of logical complexity? What is the status of the logical constants? What is Wittgenstein’s notion of a formal concept? How is that related to his conception of generality, logical form and the general form of the proposition. What are operations and what is Wittgenstein’s account of numbers? Why is logic a ‘scaffolding’ of the world, and why do tautologies say nothing? 3.3441-3.42, 4.023, 4.0312-4.0411, 4.12-4.5, 5-5.135, 5.14-5.151, 5.2-5.54, 6-6.3751. Anscombe, G. E. M. 1971. An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. 4th ed. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Chs.8-11. Stenius, E. 1960. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: a Critical Exposition of the Main Lines of Thought. Oxford: Blackwell. Chs.VIII. Fogelin, R. 1976. Wittgenstein. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Chs.IV-VI.

Self in the Tractatus Why does Wittgenstein say that there is no such thing as the soul or ‘the subject that thinks or entertains ideas’? What is the metaphysical subject and in what sense can philosophy talk about the self ‘in a non-psychological way’? In what sense is what the solipsist means correct? Why is the world independent of my will? 5.54-5.5423, 5.6-5.641, 6.371-6.374, 6.41-6.4321. Pears, D. F. 1988. The False Prison: a Study of the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy. Vol.1. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.7. Hacker, P. M. S. 1972. Insight & Illusion: Wittgenstein on Philosophy and the Metaphysics of Experience. Oxford: Clarendon Press; rev. ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986). Ch.3. Anscombe, G. E. M. 1971. An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. 4th ed. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Ch.13. Sullivan, P. M. 1996. ‘The “Truth” in Solipsism and Wittgenstein’s Rejection of the A Priori’. European Journal of Philosophy 4: 195-219.

The Mystical What is the distinction between saying and showing, and how does it bear on the most central lessons of the Tractatus? 6.432-7. McGuinness, B. 1988. Wittgenstein A Life. London: Duckworth. Ch.9. Moore, A. W. 1987. ‘On Saying and Showing’. Philosophy 62: 473-497 .

ii. Investigations The ‘Augustinian’ Picture of Meaning What picture of language is Wittgenstein attacking? What role do language games play in this attack; and what is the force of the slogan, ‘meaning is use’? Investigations, §§1-65. The Brown Book, pp.77-88. Goldfarb, W. D. 1983. ‘I Want You to Bring me a Slab: Remarks on the Opening Sections of the Philosophical Investigations’. Synthèse 56: 265-282. Baker, G. P., and P. M. S. Hacker, 1983. Meaning and Understanding. Oxford: Blackwell. Ch.1.

Frege, Russell, & Wittgenstein 187 Pears, D. F. 1988. The False Prison: a Study of the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy. Vol.1. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pt.1.

Meaning and Understanding What is wrong with thinking of understanding as a psychological process? How else should we conceive it? Investigations, §§28-36; 66-87; 132-242; Pt.II, pp.175-6, 181-3, 216-9. The Blue Book, pp.1-5. Budd, M. J. 1989. Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology. London: Routledge. Ch.II. Baker, G. P., and P. M. S. Hacker, 1983. Meaning and Understanding. Oxford: Blackwell. Ch.XVI. Goldfarb, W. D. 1992. ‘Wittgenstein on Understanding’. In Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, eds., The Wittgenstein Legacy. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17. Notre Dame, In.: University of Notre Dame Press. McDowell, J. 1992. ‘Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy’. In Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, eds., The Wittgenstein Legacy. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17. Notre Dame, In.: University of Notre Dame Press.

Rule-Following What is it for me to follow one rule rather than another? Is Wittgenstein a ‘sceptic’ about following a rule, or attacking a misconception of rule-following for which scepticism might be unavoidable? Investigations, §§138-242. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Pt.I, 1-3, 113-8; Pt.III, 8-9; Pt.V, 32-5, 45-6; Pt.VI, 15-49; Pt.VII, 47-60. Brown Book, II, 5. Kripke, S. 1982. Wittgenstein on Rules & Private Language: an Elementary Exposition. Oxford: Blackwell. Fogelin, R. 1976. Wittgenstein. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Boghossian, P. 1989. ‘The Rule-Following Considerations’. Mind 98: 507-549. McDowell, J. 1983. ‘Wittgenstein on Following a Rule’. Synthèse 58: 325-364. Reprinted in A. W. Moore, ed., Meaning & Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. Wright, C. 1980. Wittgenstein on the Foundation of Mathematics. London: Duckworth. ——. 1984. ‘Kripke’s Account of the Argument against Private Language’. Journal of Philosophy 81: 759-777. Diamond, C. 1991. ‘Wittgenstein & Metaphysics’. In The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Pears, D.F. 1988. The False Prison: a Study of the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy. Vol.2. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs.16 & 17.

Private Languages Is there only one private language argument? What is the disabling defect of a private language? How does Wittgenstein’s arguments here bear on our conception of the ‘inner’? Investigations, §§243-315. Blue Book. Budd, M. J. 1989. Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology. London: Routledge. Ch.III. Hacker, P. M. S. 1972. Insight & Illusion: Wittgenstein on Philosophy and the Metaphysics of Experience. Rev. ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. Rev. ed., Ch.8. Kenny, A. 1995. Frege. London: Penguin Books. Ch.10. Pears, D. F. 1988. The False Prison: a Study of the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy. Vol.2. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs. 13-15 (look also at Chs.11 & 12). McDowell, J. 1994. Mind & World. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Lec.2. Wright, C. 1989. ‘Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy and Intention’. Journal of Philosophy 86: 622-634.

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Seeing As and Seeing Aspects Is there a difference between seeing and seeing as? What is problematic about seeing aspects? Investigations, Pt.II, sec. ix. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, (look in index for seeing and seeing as). Budd, M. J. 1989. Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology. London: Routledge. Ch.IV. Mulhall, S. 1990. On Being in the World: Wittgenstein & Heidegger on Seeing Aspects. London: Routledge. Strawson, P. F. 1974. ‘Imagination and Perception’. In Freedom & Resentment: and Other Essays. London: Methuen. Peacocke, C. 1983. Sense & Content: Experience, Rhought and their Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.1.

Certainty Is there a sharp divide between necessary truths and what is simply beyond question? What are hinge propositions? What is Wittgenstein’s attitude towards Moore’s response to scepticism? On Certainty. Moore, G. E. 1959. ‘Certainty’. In Philosophical Papers. London: George Allen and Unwin. Kenny, A. 1995. Frege. London: Penguin Books. Ch.11. McGinn, M. 1989. Sense & Certainty: a Dissolution of Scepticism. Oxford: Blackwell. Wright, C. 1985. ‘Facts & Certainty’. Proceedings of the British Academy.

21

Marxism

1 The Paper The Marxism paper is predominantly addressed to those aspects of Marx’s thought that have attracted the attention of analytical philosophers. Thus of Marx’s copious writings, only a small proportion will be studied on this course, and only a few examples of the work of his many followers. Nevertheless, all of Marx’s writings are relevant as background, and lectures are often given on the work of selected Marxists. Although the paper is not divided into sections, the topics broadly fall into a number of distinct areas. The paper is usually designed so that students must answer questions on at least two of the areas listed below. 1. Historical Materialism 2. Early Writings 3. Economics 4. Political Thought 5. Philosophy 6. Morality 7. Twentieth-Century Marxism

2 Basic Reading The best selection of works by Marx is Selected Writings, Karl Marx. Edited by David McLellan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). Particular readings from Marx will be indicated in the sections below. Of the general secondary sources on Marx, strongly recommended are Wood, Allen W. 1981. Karl Marx. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Elster, Jon. 1985. Making Sense of Marx. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kolakowski, L. 1978. Main Currents of Marxism: its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution. Translated by P. S. Falla. 3 Vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Vol.1. Conway, David. 1987. A Farewell to Marx: an Outline and Appraisal of his Theories. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Usefully assembles and summarises a number of critical discussions, although the interpretations and judgements it contains are often controversial. Carter, A. 1988. Marx: A Radical Critique. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books. Singer, P. 1980. Marx. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Carver, T. 1982. Marx’s Social Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Important collections of papers include Cohen, M., T. Nagel, and T. Scanlon. eds. 1980. Marx, Justice and History: a Philosophy & Public Affairs Reader. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Callinicos, A. ed. 1989. Marxist Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Roemer, J. ed. 1986. Analytical Marxism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Carver, T. ed. 1991. The Cambridge Companion to Marx. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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3 Topics A. HISTORICAL MATERIALISM This is the part of Marx’s work that has attracted most attention from analytical philosophers, following G. A. Cohen Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978) which gives the definitive ‘technological materialist’ interpretation of Marx’s theory of history. Cohen’s interpretation is given a useful shorter statement in Chapter 1 of Cohen’s History, Labour and Freedom: Themes from Marx, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) (Chs. 2-10 are also relevant). Topics emphasised by Cohen, and taken up by others include Marx’s theory of historical change and development; the relationship between the economic base and the political superstructure; and the role of functional explanation in Marx’s thought and in history. Allen Buchanan raises related questions concerning revolution and class struggle (‘Revolutionary Action and Motivation’, in Cohen, Nagel and Scanlon). Marx’s concept of ideology is explored by Michael Rosen in ‘The Problem of Ideology’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 70 (1996): 209-228. Texts by Marx German Ideology, Pt.1. Critique of Political Economy, Preface (the ‘1859 Preface’). Capital, Vol.1, Chs.26-32.

Texts by Engels Socialism: Utopian and Scientific.

Secondary Sources, responding to Cohen’s interpretation Wright, E. O., and A. Levine. 1989. ‘Rationality and Class Struggle’. In A. Callinicos ed., Marxist Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Revised version in E. O. Wright, A. Levine and E. Sober, eds., Reconstructing Marxism: Essays on Explanation and the Theory of History. London: Verso, 1992. Cohen, J. 1982. ‘Review of G. A. Cohen, KMTH’. Journal of Philosophy 86. Torrance, J. 1985. ‘Reproduction and Development’. Political Studies. Carter, A. 1992. ‘Functional Explanation and the State’. In P. Wetherly, ed., Marx’s Theory of History: The Contemporary Debate. Aldershot: Avebury Publications. Secondary Source, proposing an alternative interpretation Miller, R. W. 1984. Analysing Marx: Morality, Power and History. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. ——. 1981. ‘Productive Forces and Forces of Change’. Philosophical Review.

Other Sources Acton, H. B. 1962. The Illusion of the Epoch: Marxism-Leninism as a Philosophical Creed. London: Cohen & West. Bober, M. M. 1948. Karl Marx’s Interpretation of History. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

B. EARLY WRITINGS Marx wrote a Doctoral thesis in philosophy, and his early writings show German philosophy’s influence upon him, while at the same time mark his attempt to broaden his position by studying and reacting to economic theory and contemporary politics. Thus in the early writings Marx is writing both as a philosopher and as a critic of philosophy. The concept of alienation is central to his view at this point, and it is used as a critical device in his early criticism of religion and society; money; and private property; and strongly influences his view of emancipation.

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Texts by Marx ‘On the Jewish Question’. ‘A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’, Introduction. ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, esp. ‘Alienated Labour’. ‘On James Mill’. ‘Theses on Feuerbach’.

Secondary Sources McLellan, D. 1970. Marx before Marxism. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan, 1980. Chs.5-7. Maguire, John. 1972. Marx’s Paris Writings: an Analysis. London: Macmillan. Hook, Sidney. 1950. From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual Development of Karl Marx. New York: Humanities Press. Chs. 1-3, 8. Kolakowski, L. 1978. Main Currents of Marxism: its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution. Translated by P. S. Falla. 3 Vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Vol.1. Chs.1-7. Arthur, C. J. 1986. Dialectics of Labour: Marx and his Relation to Hegel. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wolff, Jonathan. 1992. ‘Playthings of Alien Forces’. Cogito 10. Adams, W. 1991. ‘Aesthetics: Liberating the Senses’. In T. Carver, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Marx. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tucker, R. C. 1972. Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fraser, I. 1998. Hegel and Marx: The Concept of Need. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Ch. 6 & 7. Cohen, G. A. 2000. If you’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich? Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Chs. 4 & 5.

C. ECONOMICS Marx believed that his version of the labour theory of value provided the key to understanding the nature of capitalism; the origin of profit; exploitation and the breakdown of capitalism. This view has come under severe pressure, and it is commonly thought, even by those sympathetic to Marx, that the labour theory of value is fatally flawed. Nevertheless many of his economic insights survive. Texts by Marx Capital, Vol.1, Chs.1,2, 4-10, 25; Vol.3, Pts.2, 3. ‘Wages, Prices and Profits’. ‘Wage-Labour and Capital’.

Secondary Sources Sweezy, Paul M. 1946. The Theory of Capitalist Development: Principles of Marxian Political Economy. London: Dobson. Chs.1-12. Broadly defends Marx’s view. Robinson, Joan. 1942. An Essay on Marxian Economics. London: Macmillan. Sympathetic to Marx’s general approach, but not to the labour theory of value. Wolff, Robert Paul. 1985. Understanding Marx: a Reconstruction and Critique of Capital. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Cohen, G. A. 1980. ‘The Labour Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation’. In M. Cohen, T. Nagel, and T. Scanlon. eds., Marx, Justice and History: a Philosophy & Public Affairs Reader. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Reprinted in Cohen’s History, Labour and Freedom: Themes from Marx. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. Ruben, Isaak Il´ich. 1972. Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value. Translated by Milos Samard´zija and Fredy Perlman. Detroit, Mich.: Black & Red. Braverman, H. 1974. Labour and Monopoly Capital: the Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century. London: Monthly Review Press. Nozick, R. 1974. Anarchy, State & Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell. pp.252-262.

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D. POLITICAL THOUGHT Much of Marx’s writings concerns the analysis and development of various political concepts, including the state; the dictatorship of the proletariat; class. Certain of Lenin’s writings take this process further. Texts by Marx The Communist Manifesto. The Class Struggles in France. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. The Civil War in France.

Texts by Lenin What is to be Done? The State and Revolution.

Secondary Texts Avineri, S. 1968. The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Also relevant for the Early Writings. Milliband, R. 1977. Marxism and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Parkin, F. 1979. Marxism and Class Theory: a Bourgeois Critique. London: Tavistock Publications. Graham, K. 1992. Karl Marx, Our Contemporary: Social Theory for a Post-Leninist World. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Moore, S. 1980. Marx on the Choice between Socialism and Communism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Milliband, R. 1979. ‘Marx and the State’. In T. Bottomore, ed., Karl Marx. Oxford: Blackwell.

E. PHILOSOPHY Although Marx began as a philosopher, only his Early Writings include any explicit attempt to write on philosophical themes. What is often identified as Marxist philosophy—dialectical materialism—stems from the writings of Engels. Whether or not this accurately reflects Marx’s own view remains controversial. Texts by Marx The Holy Family. The German Ideology.

Texts by Engels Anti-Duhring. Dialectics of Nature.

Secondary Texts Callinicos, A. 1983. Marxism and Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon. Ruben, David-Hillel. 1979. Marx and Materialism: a Study in Marxist Theory of Knowledge. Rev. ed. Brighton: Harvester. ——. 1999. ‘Karl Marx’. In German Philosophy Since Kant, edited by Anthony O’Hear. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

F. MORALITY Marx’s views on morality generate if not a paradox, then certainly a puzzle. On the one hand there seems little doubt that he writes about capitalism from the standpoint of high moral outrage. On the other, on certain readings of Marx

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morality is merely a form of ideology, with no independent critical force. This has led to a variety of views on the place of the notions of morality and, more particularly, justice in Marx’s thought. Reading on this topic should begin with the seminal paper of Allen Wood, ‘The Marxian Critique of Justice’. Related questions concern the nature of communism, for which Marx’s most developed writing occurs in his Critique of the Gotha Programme. Texts by Marx The German Ideology. Critique of the Gotha Programme. Capital, Vol.1, Chs.26-33.

Secondary Texts Wood, A., and Z. Husami, papers in M. Cohen, T. Nagel, and T. Scanlon. eds., Marx, Justice and History: a Philosophy & Public Affairs Reader. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1980. Geras, N. 1989. ‘The Controversy about Marx and Justice’. In A. Callinicos, ed., Marxist Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lukes, S. 1985. Marxism and Morality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kain, P. J. 1988. Marx and Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Buchanan, A. 1979. ‘Exploitation, Alienation and Injustice’. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9: 121-139. Cohen, G. A. 1995. ‘Self-ownership, Communism and Equality’. In Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wolff, J. 1999. ‘Marx and Exploitation’. Journal of Ethics 3: 105-120.

G. TWENTIETH-CENTURY MARXISM The following are among the most interesting and influential of works by other writers in the Marxist tradition. Original Works Althusser, L. 1977. For Marx. Translated by Ben Brewster. London: NLB. Adorno, T. 1973. Negative Dialectics. Translated by E. B. Ashton. London: Routledge, 1990. Lukács, Georg . 1971. History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics. Translated R. Livingstone. London: Merlin Press. Marcuse, H. 1963. Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. New York: Humanities Press. Horkheimer, M. 1972. Critical Theory: Selected Essays. Translated by Matthew J. O’Connell and others. New York: Herder and Herder. Merleau-Ponty, M. 1974. Adventures of the Dialectic. Translated by Joseph Bien. London: Heinemann Educational. Sartre, J-P. 1976. Critique of Dialectical Reason. Translated by Alan Sheridan-Smith, and Quintin Hoare. 2 Vols. Rev. ed. London: Verso, 1991. ——. 1960. The Problem of Method. Translated by Hazel E.Barnes. London: Methuen, 1964. (This translation originally published as Search for a Method. Knopf, 1963).

Secondary Texts Anderson, P. 1979. Considerations on Western Marxism. London: Verso. McLellan, D. 1980. Marxism after Marx: an Introduction. New York: Harper & Row. Kolakowski, L. 1978. Main Currents of Marxism: its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution. Translated by P. S. Falla. 3 Vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Vol.3.

22

Philosophy of Mathematics

1 The Paper Philosophy of mathematics lies at the deep end of epistemology and metaphysics. Its problems have absorbed the most powerful minds from Plato on. Those problems form the subject of this paper. You do not need to know a great deal of mathematics; if you have been exposed to basic school mathematics plus a touch of calculus you will be able to feel the full force of the philosophical mysteries. However, some knowledge of mathematical logic brings parts of the subject into much sharper focus; thus the paper forms a natural pair with the Symbolic Logic paper, but neither paper depends on the other. Although the paper is not divided into sections, the subject matter can be looked in two ways, thematically and historically.

a. The subject matter Thematically, the subject centres on the following problem: how can we provide accounts of the nature of (a) mathematical reality and (b) mathematical knowledge, which are internally plausible and mutually compatible? Mathematical reality is in itself mysterious: how can it be highly abstract and yet applicable to the physical world? How can mathematical theorems be necessary truths about an unchanging realm of abstract entities and at the same time so useful in dealing with the contingent, variable and inexact happenings evident to the senses? Mathematical knowledge is no less puzzling. True, we know some things by proving them; but if a proof is to deliver knowledge of its conclusion, its premisses must be known; on pain of an infinite regress there must be some truths known without proof: axioms. How do we know the axioms? And what exactly is a proof anyway? There is ample evidence that people can come to see some mathematical truths for themselves, without deducing them from things they have been told. What modes of cognition are involved? What makes it reasonable to trust them? All these problems are intensified once we move from finite mathematics to the infinite. Finally, there is a special problem for any comprehensive philosophy of mathematics: how can a plausible account of mathematical reality be coherently combined with a plausible account of mathematical knowledge? How can we finite physical creatures have knowledge of the infinite non-physical structures of mathematics? Historically, the starting point is Plato who proposed that mathematical reality consists of perfect forms independent of the physical world. This view of the subject matter of mathematics lies at one end of a spectrum of metaphysical views; towards the other end is the view is that the subject matter is a purely human artefact. Views towards the Platonic end are known as Platonist; towards the other end, anti-Platonist. That is a classification of metaphysical views. Epistemological views fall into two classes, roughly speaking mathematical truths are known (i) by reason, or (ii) by inference from the evidence of the senses supplemented by deduction. There are a few important epistemological views which fall into neither camp, notably those of Plato, Kant and Gödel.

Philosophy of Mathematics 195

In the 16th-17th century there was some epistemological agreement across the rationalist/empiricist divide: Descartes and Leibniz, both great mathematicians, thought that mathematical truths are known by reason rather than by inference from the evidence of the senses; Locke and Hume agreed. But they disagreed famously about the origin of our mathematical concepts, the rationalists (following Plato) holding that they are in some sense innate, the empiricists holding that they are in some way derived from sense experience. This debate has recently been revived by work of cognitive psychologists which suggests that the basis of our grasp of concepts of e.g. cardinals 1, 2, and 3 has a significant innate component. In the 18th Century Kant boldly proposed that the structure of our minds provides the basis of both mathematical reality and our knowledge of it. This was opposed in the 19th Century by Mill; he thought that arithmetical and geometrical truths are generalisations about the natural world known by induction from sense experience or by deduction from such generalisations. Developments in 19th century mathematics now burst in: the (non-empirical) discovery of nonEuclidean geometries refuted not only views of Kant and Mill, but also undermined the time-honoured view that geometry is the paradigm of justified certainty; no less important are spin-offs of the attempt to give calculus a rigorous formulation, e.g. the discovery of functions in the plane which have no curve, and Cantor’s development of a theory of infinite numbers. The basis of the drive for rigour was Cantor’s theory of classes; this was used by Dedekind and Frege (in quite different ways) in an attempt to provide ‘logical’ foundations for non-negative integer arithmetic and thence for all mathematics. The view that logic encompasses mathematics and provides its epistemic basis is known as ‘logicism’, a version of the idea that mathematics is known by reason rather than sense experience. At the end of the 19th century Cantor discovered certain paradoxes within the theory of classes, and soon after Russell discovered that Frege’s precise version of the theory is inconsistent. This produced a crisis: philosophy of mathematics in the early decades of the 20th century was a response to the class paradoxes. Russell’s theory of types, a version of logicism, and Hilbert’s formalist philosophy proposed different ways of providing a consistent foundation for mathematics. Meanwhile Brouwer, under the banner of intuitionism, urged that mathematics has no foundations. In an epoch-making paper Gödel quietly proved that mathematics does not have foundations of the kinds envisaged by Russell and Hilbert. This and subsequent findings in mathematical logic have led to the demise of the view that all of mathematics has some indubitable foundation. In its place two main schools came to the fore: constructivism, according to which only a restricted part of mathematics, that which we can in some sense construct, can be justifiably regarded as true; Quine’s empiricist view, according to which we can justifiably regard as true that part of mathematics which is indispensable to natural science. Constructivists are invariably anti-Platonists; Quinian empiricists tend to be Platonists. Constructivism takes various forms, chiefly predicativism (Poincaré, Russell, Feferman) and intuitionism (Brouwer, Heyting, Dummett). Explanation of these isms is impossible here. Quine’s view has recently come under fire, but has also been defended and extended (Resnik); and some new empiricist views have emerged (Kitcher, Maddy). There remains also Gödel’s view that we have some

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non-sensory mode of cognising elements of mathematical reality, which is in no way a human construction. Recent efforts to avoid commitment to abstract independent objects has led to a variety of views; mathematics is false but useful (Field, Papineau), mathematics is about possible constructions (Chihara); mathematics is about structural possibilities (Hellman). These are anti-Platonist views. A view favoured by Platonists who want to avoid the idea that we have some non-sensory mode of apprehending mathematical objects is that pure mathematics is about abstract structures (Resnik, Shapiro). At present there is a dearth of fine-grained work in epistemology of mathematics. Exceptions are studies of the epistemology of the infinite (Lavine) and of some simple arithmetical and geometrical beliefs (Giaquinto). Recent empirical work on numerical cognition is likely to be valuable (Butterworth), given that the ways in which we actually acquire numerical beliefs might suffice to deliver knowledge.

b. Approaching the subject This account of the subject matter is just a sketch. But it should be clear that one could not cover it all in two years. The purpose of the sketch is to help you locate the four or five topics you choose to concentrate on. In choosing your topics you must take into account (a) which topics most catch your imagination as a result of your reading and the lectures, and (b) which topics are most regularly and most straightfowardly covered in the exam paper. In setting the exam the examiners will ask for questions from those who have lectured on the subject over the past couple of years, so it is wise to attend some lecture courses. To make best use of the lecture courses you should try to get clear about the topic under discussion: What precisely are the positions? What precisely are the arguments for and against? There is no substitute for formulating your answers in writing between lectures, so that by the end of the lecture course you have a substantial body of written material to draw on when preparing for exams and writing pre-submissions. What you get out of lectures can be re-inforced and deepened by reading. *** This bibliography is selective in two ways. First, many articles, including good ones, on topics dealt with here are not mentioned. Secondly, whole topics are not dealt with e.g. the nature of proof, and the metaphysical nature of the transfinite. Writings on the philosophical significance of results in mathematical logic have also been omitted, apart from Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. This does not adequately explain why certain notable contributors to the subject are here under-represented, for example, Lakatos, Putnam, Parsons (C), and others. But one has to stop somewhere.

2 Basic Reading You will have to read some of the primary sources e.g. the exchange between Socrates and the slave boy in Plato’s Meno. Sometimes secondary reading can give a helpful preview of primary material e.g. Furth’s introduction to Frege’s Basic Laws of Arithmetic. But there is a huge literature and a consequent retrieval problem. Here annotated bibliographies are useful. Lecturers will supply bibliographies of relevant material: if you get a long list of items with no indication of relative importance or relative difficulty, do not hesitate to ask the lecturer where to start and how to go on. The most useful collection of readings for this paper is

Philosophy of Mathematics 197 Benacerraf, Paul, and Hilary Putnam, eds. 1983. Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Referred to as B&P below.

A useful recent collection is Hart, W. D. ed. 1996. The Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

To bolster your acquaintance with mathematics itself Allen, R. G. D. 1962. Basic Mathematics. London: MacMillan. Waismann, F. 1951. Introduction to Mathematical Thinking: the Formation of Concepts in Modern Mathematics. London: Hafner Publishing Co.

The introduction to Benacerraf & Putnam (op. cit.) gives a helpful overview. See also Parsons, C. 1967. ‘Foundations of Mathematics’. In P. Edwards, ed., The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. London: Collier-Macmillan.

There are several general introductions to philosophy of mathematics. Avoid them: they tend to be unreliable and your time is better spent on basic material.

3 Historical Here is a ruthlessly selective list. Nothing marginal, technical or inaccessible is included. Plato Meno, §§82b9-85b7. Phaedo, §§72e-77d. Republic, §§507a-511e, 525d-527c. Wedberg, A. 1955. Plato’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell. Giaquinto, M. 1993. ‘Diagrams: Socrates and Meno’s Slave’. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1: 81-97.

Aristotle Metaphysics M3, Physics B2. For more precise references see Lear below. Lear, J. 1982. ‘Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mathematics’. Philosophical Review 91: 161-192. Stich, Stephen P. 1975. ed. Innate Ideas. London: University of California Press. Look at this for the 17th century debate see the writings by Descartes, Locke and Leibniz.

Berkeley His writing on Philosophy of Mathematics is scattered. See the references in the very useful study: Jesseph, D. 1993. Berkeley’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kant The Critique of Pure Reason, translated by N. Kemp Smith, 2nd ed., London: Macmillan, 1933. Or translated by Paul Guyer, and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Introduction & Transcendental Aesthetic. Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, trans. L. W. Beck, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950. Or translated by Paul Carus, rev. by James W. Ellington, Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1977. First Part of the Main Transcendental Question, How is Mathematics Possible? Walker, Ralph C. S. 1982. ed., Kant on Pure Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Papers by Parsons, Hopkins. See also §§4a, 4b of its bibliography. Parsons, C. 1992. ‘The Transcendental Aesthetic’. In The Cambridge Companion to Kant, edited by Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Friedman, M. 1992. Kant & the Exact Sciences. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Chs.1 & 2.

J.S. Mill A System of Logic. London: Longman, 1843. Bk.II, Chs. 5, 6, 7. Kim, J. 1981. ‘The role of Perception in A Priori Knowledge’. Philosophical Studies 40: 339-354.

198 Study Guide An important collection of primary material is: Ewald, W. B. ed. 1996. From Kant to Hilbert: Readings in the Foundations of Mathematics. 2 Vols. Oxford: Clarendon. Vol. I, II, 1996.

4 Selective Reading for the Modern Period The discovery of the paradoxes (1895-1905) opens a new period. The writing is inevitably more technical, more involved with issues of philosophical logic; but the fundamental epistemological and metaphysical problems have not changed. At the end of an entry [i] signifies an introductory non-technical item, [d] signifies a difficult item and [t] a technical item. Fraenkel, A. A., J. Bar-Hillel, and A. Levy. 1973. The Foundations of Set Theory. 2nd rev. ed. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co. Ch. 1, ‘The Antinomies’, gives a full statement of all the paradoxes. [t] Maniosu, P. ed. 1998. From Brouwer to Hilbert: The Debate on the Foundations of Mathematics in the 1920’s. New York: Oxford University Press. A collection of articles by major contributors to the debate in the 20’s with helpful editorial introductions. [d] Feferman, S. 1998. In the Light of Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. 2, ‘Infinity in mathematics: Is Cantor necessary?’. A brilliant overview of the period from Cantor to Gödel by a top logician. [t]

A. LOGICISM i. Frege Frege, G. 1884. Foundations of Arithmetic: a Logico-mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of Number. Translated by J. L. Austin. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953. For deeper investigation of Frege’s logicism, see Frege’s introduction to G. Frege, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System. Translated by Monygomery Furth. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964. Furth’s substantial preface to the above is especially helpful. For Frege’s response to the inconsistency found in his system by Russell, see Appendix II. [t] Resnik, M. 1980. Frege and the Philosophy of Mathematics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Dummett, M. 1991. Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics. London: Duckworth.

For recent assessments of Frege’s contribution see the papers collected in Demopoulos, W. ed. 1995. Frege’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

ii. Russell The philosophy underlying Principia Mathematica is logicism constrained by predicativism. This view is explained in Russell, B. 1908. ‘Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types’. In Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901-1950, ed. R. C. Marsh. London: Allen & Unwin, 1956; also in Frege and Gödel: two Fundamental Texts in Mathematical Logic, edited by Jan van Heijenoort. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970. ([t][d], but not philosophically marginal.) Russell, B. 1919. Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. London: Allen and Unwin. An introduction to post-paradox logicism which avoids the complexities of the ramified theory of types. [i]

For an incisive appraisal of Russell’s logical views Gödel, K. ‘Russell’s Mathematical Logic’. In B&P. [d]

iii. Ramsey Distinguishing between mathematical and semantic paradoxes, Ramsey defended

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foundations based on non-predicative type theory as against predicative type theory Ramsey, F. 1925. ‘Foundations of Mathematics’. In Philosophical Papers, edited by D. H. Mellor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. [d]

B. HILBERT An alternative foundational programme was proposed by Hilbert. The underlying ideas are to be found in Hilbert, D. ‘On the Infinite’. Abridged in B&P. ——. ‘The Foundations of Mathematics’. In Jan van Heijenoort, ed., Frege and Gödel: two Fundamental Texts in Mathematical Logic. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970. [d]

Digestible expositions of Hilbert’s programme are hard to come by. Kreisel’s paper in B&P is technical and assumes too much to count as an exposition. Stressing the connections between Hilbert’s programme and logical positivism is Giaquinto, M. 1983. ‘Hilbert’s Philosophy of Mathematics’. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34: 119-132.

C. GÖDEL’S INCOMPLETENESS THEOREMS Gödel’s incompleteness theorems effectively sunk the (very different) foundational outlooks of Russell and Hilbert, this is the standard view. Again there appears to be no good non-technical exposition of the matter. For Gödel vs. Hilbert something may be gleaned from Giaquinto (op. cit.). For opposition to the standard view, (in defence of Hilbert’s programme), see Detlefsen, M. 1986. Hilbert’s Programme: an Essay on Mathematical Instrumentalism. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

For a defence of the standard view against Detlefsen’s argument see Auerbach, D. 1992. ‘How To Say Things With Formalisms’. In Proof, Logic and Formalization, edited by Michael Detlefsen. London: Routledge.

For an intuitionist’s reaction see Dummett, M. 1963. ‘The Philosophical Significance of Gödel’s Theorem’. Ratio 5: 140-155. Reprinted in Truth and Other Enigmas. London: Duckworth, 1978.

D. WITTGENSTEIN Wittgenstein still gets much attention. He favoured a kind of conventionalism, but had no worked out view. Yet his exploratory remarks can be stimulating. Wittgenstein, L. 1978. Remarks on The Foundations of Mathematics. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell.

The best work on his philosophical remarks on mathematics is Wright, C. 1980. Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics. London: Duckworth.

Look also at the discussion of Wittgenstein’s conception of mathematics in Dummett, M. 1959. ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics’. Philosophical Review 68: 324-348. Reprinted in Truth and Other Enigmas. London: Duckworth, 1978, and his later reflections on that paper in Dummett, M. 1993. ‘Wittgenstein on Necessity: Some Reflections’. In The Seas of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

E. INTUITIONISM The originator of intuitionism was Brouwer. His views are set out in Brouwer, L. ‘Consciousness, Philosophy and Mathematics’. Reprinted in B&P.

The leading exponent of intuitionism among English-speaking philosophers is

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Dummett. Brouwer’s view is inspired by Kant; Dummett’s by Wittgenstein (his philosophy of language, that is). See Dummett, M. 1973. ‘The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic’. Reprinted in B&P; and in in Truth and Other Enigmas. London: Duckworth, 1978. [d]

Quite helpful is the introduction and first chapter of Dummett, M. 1977. Elements of Intuitionism. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000.

While his latest statement of his views of mathematics can be found in Dummett, M. 1993. ‘What is Mathematics About?’. In The Seas of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

See also Hellman, G. 1989. ‘Never say “Never”! On the Communication Problem between Intuitionism and Classicism’. Philosophical Topics 17: 47-67. Velleman, Daniel. 1993. ‘Constructivism Liberalized’. Philosophical Review 102: 59-84.

F. PREDICATIVISM The mathematician Henri Poincaré was the source of the predicativism of Principia Mathematica, but he was unsympathetic to logicism. A good expression of his views is Poincaré, H. 1963. ‘The Logic of Infinity’. In Mathematics and Science: Last Essays. Translated by John W. Bolduc. New York: Dover.

For the view of Whitehead and Russell see ch. 2 of the Introduction to Vol. 1, Whitehead, A. N., and B. Russell, 1910. Principia Mathematica. 3 Vols. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925-1927.

Weyl begins to overcome the problem that stumped the authors of Principia Mathematica before being thrown off-track by Brouwer. See part II of Maniosu (op. cit.) especially Maniosu’s introduction to that part. See also the section on Weyl in Feferman (op. cit.). Feferman, S. 1998. ‘Weyl Vindicated: Das Kontinuum Seventy Years Later’. In In the Light of Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Not only an excellent account of Weyl’s predicativist programme but also an exposition of Feferman’s own work in bringing the programme to fruition. [t]

A relatively recent defence of predicativism without logicism is Chihara, C. 1973. Ontology and the Vicious Circle Principle. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

For a recent appraisal of Poincaré’s views Folina, J. 1991. Poincaré and the Philosophy of Mathematics. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

For a shift of emphasis which illuminates the philosophical motive for both constructivist schools see Detlefsen, M. 1991. ‘Brouwerian Intuitionism’. In M. Detlefsen ed., Proof & Knowledge in Mathematics. London: Routledge.

G. GÖDEL Gödel’s views are closer to Plato’s than any other notable philosopher of mathematics. Gödel, K. ‘What is Cantor’s continuum Problem?’. Reprinted in B&P. [d]

This is vital. To go further you should consult volumes two and three of Collected Works: Kurt Gödel, edited by Solomon Feferman, et al., 3 Vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.

For reports of Gödel’s late views authenticated by the man himself see Wang, H. 1974. From Mathematics to Philosophy. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

For criticism of Gödel’s views see Ch.II of Chihara (op. cit.).

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H. SET THEORY There has been an increasing amount of work done on the question of what conception of set we should have, in the light of responses to the paradoxes. In addition to the works mentioned above, see Boolos, G. ‘The Iterative Conception of Set’. Reprinted in B&P. Lewis, D. 1991. Parts of Classes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. [d] Hallett, M. 1984. Cantorian Set Theory & Limitation of Size. Oxford: Clarendon Press. [d] Bigelow, J. 1990. ‘Sets are Universals’. In Physicalism in Mathematics, edited by A. D. Irvine. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. [d]

I. MODERN PLATONISM: QUINE Expressions of Quine’s empiricist view of mathematics are scattered throughout his publications. You might start with Quine, W. V. 1955. ‘Posits and Reality’. In Ways of Paradox: and other Essays. New York: Random House, 1966.

The locus classicus of Quine’s view, detailing his break with the logical positivists, is Quine, W. V. 1954. ‘Carnap and Logical Truth’. In Ways of Paradox: and other Essays. New York: Random House, 1966. Reprinted in B&P.

But also see references in Parsons, C. 1985. ‘Quine’s Philosophy of Mathematics’. In L. E. Hahn, and P. A. Schilpp, eds., The Philosophy of W. V. Quine. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court. Quine, W. V. 1985. ‘Reply to Charles Parsons’. In L. E. Hahn, and P. A. Schilpp, eds., The Philosophy of W. V. Quine. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.

Quine’s indispensability view has been recently criticised in Maddy, P. 1992. ‘Indispensability and Practice’. Journal of Philosophy 89: 275-289. Sober, E. 1993. ‘Mathematics and Indispensability’. Philosophical Review 102: 35-57.

Quine’s view has been extended and defended in Resnik, M. 1997. Mathematics as a Science of Patterns. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

J. MODERN PLATONISM: NEO-FREGEANS There has been renewed interest, in recent years, in applying Frege’s ‘context principle’ to argue for some form of platonism. Wright, C. 1983. Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press. Dummett, M. 1991. Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics. London: Duckworth. Esp. Chs. 15-17. Field, H. 1989. ‘Platonism for Cheap? Crispin Wright on Frege’s Context Principle’. In Realism, Mathematics & Modality. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Hale, B., and C. Wright. 1994. ‘A Reductio ad Surdum? Field on the Contingency of Mathematical Objects’. Mind 103: 169-184. Hodes, H. 1984. ‘Logicism and the Ontological Commitments of Arithmetic’. Journal of Philosophy 81: 123-149. Heck, R. 1992. ‘On the Consistency of Second-order Contextual Definitions’. Noûs 26: 491-494.

K. MODERN ANTI-PLATONISM Feferman argues that only a small part of mathematics is needed for science Feferman, S. 1998. ‘Why a Little Bit goes a Long Way: Logical Foundations of Scientifically Applicable Mathematics’. In the Light of Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.14. [t]

Field argues that science can dispense with numbers; taking Quine’s epistemology as gospel he concludes that arithmetic is false Field, H. 1980. Science without Numbers. Oxford: Blackwell.

For criticisms of Field’s attempt see

202 Study Guide Shapiro, S. 1983. ‘Conservativeness and Incompleteness’. Journal of Philosophy 80: 521-530; reprinted in W. D. Hart, ed., The Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. [t]

An alternative approach to ‘fictionalism’ about maths Papineau, D. 1993. Philosophical Naturalism. Oxford: Blackwell. Ch.5.

An alternative empiricist view is developed by Kitcher Kitcher, P. 1983. The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Of relevance to the debate about Field’s fictionalism is the question of what interpretation of modality an anti-platonist can appeal to. On this topic look at the following Putnam, H. 1967. ‘Mathematics without Foundations’. Journal of Philosophy 64: 5-22. Reprinted in Mathematics, Matter and Method, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975; also reprinted in W. D. Hart, ed., The Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Kessler, G. 1978. ‘Mathematics and Modality’. Noûs 12: 421-441. Chihara, C. 1990. Constructibility and Mathematical Existence. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pt.1. Hellman, G. 1989. Mathematics without Numbers: Towards a Modal-structural Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Burgess, J., and G. Rosen. 1997. A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

For the connection between these issues and Field’s fictionalism then look at these Field, H. 1990. ‘Mathematics and Modality’. In G. Boolos, ed., Meaning & Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted In Realism, Mathematics & Modality. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. —— 1991. ‘Metalogic and Modality’. Philosophical Studies 67: 1-22. Shapiro, S. 1993. ‘Modality and Ontology’. Mind 102: 455-481.

L. STRUCTURALISM According to structuralists, mathematics is the science of patterns; they differ over what account of patterns they favour. Benacerraf, P. 1965. ‘What Numbers Could Not Be’. Philosophical Review 74: 47-73. Reprinted in P&B. Resnik, M. 1994. ‘What is Structuralism?’. In D. Prawitz, and D. Westerståhl, eds., Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala: papers from the 9th International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer. A useful short paper discussing relations between structuralism and Platonism re mathematical objects.

Resnik sets out and discusses difficulties for structuralism in his clear no-nonsense way in Resnik, M. 1988. ‘Mathematics from the Structural Point of View’. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 42: 400-424.

For an early overview of his account, see also Resnik, M. 1982. ‘Mathematics as a Science of Patterns: Epistemology’. Noûs 16: 95-105. ——. 1981. ‘Mathematics as a Science of Patterns: Ontology and Reference’. Noûs 15: 529566. ——. 1997. Mathematics as a Science of Patterns. Oxford: Clarendon Press. This is his most recent statement. Shapiro, S. 1989. ‘Structure and Ontology’. Philosophical Topics 17: 145-171. ——. 1983. ‘Mathematics and Reality’. Philosophy of Science 50: 523-548. ——. 1997. Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology. New York: Oxford University Press..

See also Philosophia Mathematica, Vol.4, May 1996. It has articles by Shapiro, Resnik, Hellman, Hale,

Philosophy of Mathematics 203 MacLane (the famous algebraist), and Benacerraf. None but Hellman’s is too recherché to be worth studying (unless you are into the details of modal-structuralism). Parsons, C. 1990. ‘The Structuralist View of Mathematical Objects’. Synthese 84:303-346. Reprinted in W. D. Hart, ed., The Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. This provides an overview and critique of all of the modalist and structuralist positions.

M. MATHEMATICS & KNOWLEDGE If one combines Goldman’s (1967) view of knowledge with Field’s view of truth and reference one gets Benacerraf ’s problem Field, H. 1972. ‘Tarski’s Theory of Truth’. Journal of Philosophy 69: 347-375. Goldman, A. 1967. ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing’. Journal of Philosophy 64: 357-372. Benacerraf, P. 1973. ‘Mathematical Truth’. Journal of Philosophy 70: 661-679. Reprinted in B&P. Field, H. 1989. ‘Realism, Mathematics & Modality’. In Realism, Mathematics & Modality. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Sec. 2.

Maddy’s view is posed as an answer to Benacerraf Maddy, P. 1980. ‘Perception and Mathematical Intuition’. Philosophical Review 84: 163-96. Reprinted in W. D. Hart, ed., The Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Maddy’s view is developed in her book Maddy, P. 1990. Realism in Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Her view is criticised by Chihara, C. 1990. Constructibility and Mathematical Existence. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Lavine, S. 1994. Understanding the Infinite. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Giaquinto, M. 1994. ‘Epistemology of Visual Thinking in Elementary Real Analysis’. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45: 789-813. ——. 1996. ‘Non-Analytic Conceptual Knowledge’. Mind 105: 249-268. ——. 1998. ‘Epistemology of the Obvious: A Geometric Case’. Philosophical Studies 92: 181204.

For a recent overview of findings in numerical cognition by a leader in the field see Butterworth, B. 1999. The Mathematical Brain. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

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Philosophy of Psychology

1 The Paper This paper is concerned with philosophical questions which arise out of theories in psychology, the empirical study of the mind. It differs from the Philosophy of Mind paper in that the topics it covers are more specialised, and require a certain amount of knowledge of the psychological theories involved. The paper divides into three sections: the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of cognitive psychology, and the philosophy of psychoanalysis. You must answer at least three questions, which must be drawn from at least two sections (i.e. it is not possible to answer questions from one section only). If you are doing the Philosophy of Mind paper as well, you cannot answer questions from the first section.

2 Basic Reading A. GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OF MIND Anthologies Rosenthal, David. ed. 1991. The Nature of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. Perhaps the best anthology around. Extensive selection, less fashionable than others, so less likely to go out of date. Worth buying. Borst, C. V. ed. 1970. The Mind/Brain Identity Theory: a Collection of Papers. London: Macmillan. Dated but quite useful collection of essays on the Type Identity theory. Beakley, Brian, and Stephen Ludlow. eds. 1992. The Philosophy of Mind: Classical Problems/ Contemporary Issues. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Interesting collection, with a wide range of historical selections and a good coverage of issues such as imagery, innate ideas and associationism.

Books McGinn, Colin. 1997. The Character of Mind: an Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smith, Peter, and O. R. Jones. 1986. The Philosophy of Mind: an Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Churchland, Paul M. 1988. Matter and Consciousness: a Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Kim, Jaegwon. 1996. The Philosophy of Mind. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

B. PHILOSOPHY OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY Anthologies Block, Ned. ed. 1980-1. Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, 2 Vols. London: Methuen. The first volume is about the mind-body problem, the second is about issues in the philosophy of psychology such as imagery and intentionality. Haugeland, John. ed. 1981. Mind Design: Philosophy, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence. Montgomery, Vt.: Bradford Books. (See also Mind design II. Revised and enlarged ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997). Excellent collection of articles on the philosophy of cognitive science. Many of the articles are classics. Lycan, William G. ed. 1990. Mind and Cognition: a Reader. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Useful collection of recent articles on issues in philosophy of psychology. The emphasis tends to be on the issues of folk psychology, the language of thought and eliminative materialism. Boden, Margaret. ed. 1990. The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University

PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY 205 Press. Excellent collection of articles, though many are printed in other anthologies. Macdonald, C., and G. Macdonald, eds. 1995. Philosophy of Psychology. Debates on Psychological Explanation. Vol.1. Oxford: Blackwell. ——. 1995. Connectionism. Debates on Psychological Explanation. Vol. 2. Oxford: Blackwell. Osherson, Daniel N. et al., eds. 1995. An Invitation to Cognitive Science. 4 Vols. Language; Visual Cognition; Thinking; Methods, Models and Conceptual Issues. 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. All four volumes contain useful introductory essays by psychologists and some philosophers.

Books Sterelny, Kim. 1990. The Representational Theory of the Mind: an Introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Clear introduction to the philosophical approach to cognitive science pioneered by Jerry Fodor. Johnson-Laird, Philip. 1993. The Computer and the Mind: an Introduction to Cognitive Science. 2nd ed. London: Fontana. Clear introduction, from a psychologist’s point of view, to the computational theory of the mind (part I) and its applications to the phenomena of vision (part II) learning and memory (part III) and reasoning (part IV). Haugeland, John. 1985. Artificial Intelligence: the Very Idea. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Excellent historical and philosophical survey and defence of traditional artificial intelligence. Cummins, Robert. 1989. Meaning and Mental Representation. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Interesting and sophisticated account of the various philosophical theories of mental representation. Clark, Andy. 1997. Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. A good up-to-date account of issues in the philosophy of psychology and artificial intelligence. Pinker, Stephen. 1994. The Language Instinct: the New Science of Language and Mind. London: Allen Lane. A lively introduction to the Chomskian revolution and current cognitive psychological approaches to language. Dennett, Daniel. 1993. Consciousness Explained. London: Penguin Books. A provocative book which combines challenging philosophical theses with accounts of suprising results in various areas of cognitive neuroscience.

C. PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Freud: the most useful volumes to purchase (in the Penguin edition) are Vols. 12, Introductory Lectures and New Introductory Lectures, and Vol. 11, On Metapsychology. Anthologies Wollheim, R. ed. 1974. Freud: A Collection of Critical Essays, (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books) reprinted as Philosophers on Freud: New Evaluations, (New York: Jason Aronson, 1985), out of print. Hopkins, James, and Richard Wollheim. eds. 1982. Philosophical Essays on Freud. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Clark, Peter, and Crispin Wright. eds. 1988. Mind, Psychoanalysis and Science. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Neu, Jerome. ed. 1991. The Cambridge Companion to Freud. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Books Wollheim, R. 1991. Freud. 2nd ed., with Supplementary Preface. London: Fontana. Essential reading. Segal, Hanna. 1979. Klein. London: Fontana. Wollheim, R. 1984. The Thread of Life. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Gardner, S. 1993. Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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3 Philosophy of Mind See Philosophy of Mind section. Relevant topics here are: physicalism, functionalism and the reduction of the mental; the status of ‘folk psychology’; the causal efficacy of mental content; the explanation of consciousness; psychological laws and psychological explanation; theories of mental content; internalism and externalism about mental content.

4 Philosophy of Cognitive Science A. COMMONSENSE PSYCHOLOGY AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE What is the relation between commonsense psychological explanation and explanations in cognitive science? Fodor (Psychosemantics, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), Introduction and chapter 1) thinks commonsense explanations are backed up by a theory, folk psychology, which posits beliefs and desires as inner causes of behaviour, and that the success of cognitive science shows that this theory is on the right track. He calls this position ‘intentional realism’: i.e. realism about intentional states and their contents. Paul Churchland agrees that folk psychology is a theory, but he thinks it is on the wrong track (see ‘Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human Behaviour’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 62 (1988): 209-221; ‘Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes’, Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 67-90). Daniel Dennett tries to steer an instrumentalist middle course between Fodor’s and Churchland’s eliminativism (see The Intentional Stance, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), especially the essays ‘True Believers’, and ‘Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology’; see also Dennett’s ‘Real Patterns’, Journal of Philosophy 88 (1991): 27-51, for his latest view). For a good collection of readings, see John Greenwood, ed., The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

B. THE COMPUTATIONAL THEORY OF MIND/ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Is the mind, or any part of it, a computer? The claim that the mind is a computer should be distinguished from the claim that mental processes can be modelled on computers (this is often taken to be the main claim of artificial intelligence or ‘AI’). An excellent account of the computational theory of mind is John Haugeland, ‘Introduction’, and ‘The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism’, in Mind Design, (Montgomery, Vt.: Bradford Books, 1981). See also Ned Block ‘The Computer Model of the Mind’, in Edward E. Smith and Daniel N. Osherson, eds., An Invitation to Cognitive Science, Vol. 3, Thinking, (2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995). For more detail, see Haugeland’s Artificial Intelligence: the Very Idea, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985); and Cummins, Meaning and Mental Representation, (Mass.: MIT Press, 1989), chapter 8. See also Clark Glymour, Thinking things through: an Introduction to Philosophical Issues and Achievements, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), chapters 12-13; and Johnson-Laird, The Computer and the Mind: an Introduction to Cognitive Science, (London: Fontana, 1993), part I. For a critical assessment of the fundamental elements of the computational theory, see D. H. Mellor, ‘How Much of the Mind is a

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Computer?’, in his Matters of Metaphysics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). The computational theory has been famously attacked by John Searle, ‘Minds, Brains and Programs’ (in D. Dennett, and D. Hofstadter, eds., The Minds I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul, (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1981) and in Boden, Haugeland and Rosenthal, see the replies by Dennett, and Fodor in these anthologies); an interesting critique of AI from a phenomenological standpoint is Hubert Dreyfus, What Computers Can’t Do: a Critique of Artificial Reason, (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). (New edition: What Computers Still Can’t Do, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992)), which also contains an interesting critical history of the early days of AI research.

C. THE LANGUAGE OF THOUGHT One of the most influential theories in philosophy of cognitive psychology is Jerry Fodor’s thesis that we think in a ‘Language of Thought’. The idea is that mental processes have a structure that is best explained by postulating sentence-like structures realised in the brain. This was first proposed in his book The Language of Thought, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975); the best exposition is the appendix to Psychosemantics: the Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), reprinted in Lycan’s anthology; and ‘Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation’, Mind 94 (1985): 55-97, reprinted in his Theory of Content & Other Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1990). See also Hartry Field, ‘Mental Representation’, Erkenntnis 13 (1978): 9-61, reprinted in Block, Vol. II; and (for an introduction) Sterelny, The Representational Theory of the Mind: an Introduction, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990). For criticism, see Dennett, ‘A Cure for the Common Code?’, in his Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1981); Paul and Patricia Churchland, ‘Stalking the Wild Epistemic Engine’, in Lycan; R. Stalnaker, Inquiry, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1984), chapters 1-2; and C. Peacocke, Sense & Content: Experience, Thought and their Relations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), chapter 8. Fodor has always maintained that the Language of Thought is an empirical theory; Martin Davies has argued that it can be defended through a priori philosophical argument, see ‘Concepts, Connectionism and the Language of Thought’, in William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich, and David E. Rumelhart, eds., Philosophy & Connectionist Theory, (Hillsdale, N. J.: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1991).

D. CONNECTIONISM Connectionism understands mental processing in terms of the activation and inhibition of many simple units, connected in various ways. Representation resides in the strengths of the connections between the units, and the subsequent pattern of activation across the whole network. For a short non-technical introduction, see Paul Churchland, ‘Cognitive Activity in Artificial Neural Networks’, in Edward E. Smith and Daniel N. Osherson, eds., An Invitation to Cognitive Science, Volume 3, Thinking. (2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995). William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen, Connectionism and the Mind: an Introduction to Parallel Processing in Networks, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), is a more technical introduction. Philosophy and Connectionist Theory, edited by Ramsey, Stich and Rumelhart (Hillsdale, N. J.: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1991) is a good anthology. Connectionists claim that their theory provides a substantial alternative to ‘classical’ artificial intelligence and cognitive science research. Are they right? See Paul Smolensky ‘On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism’,

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Brain & Behavioral Sciences, 1983, for the affirmative answer; and Cummins, ‘The Role of Representations in Connectionist Explanations of Cognitive Capacities’, in Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Fodor and Pylyshyn, ‘Connectionism & Cognitive Architecture’, Cognition, 1988, defend the Language of Thought against Smolensky. See also Fodor and McLaughlin, ‘Connectionism & the Problem of Systematicity: why Smolensky’s Solution doesn’t work’, in Cognition, 1990, which is a reply to Smolensky’s ‘Connectionism, Constituency & the Language of Thought’, in Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, edited by Barry Loewer, and Georges Rey (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991). Some argue that the success of connectionism would support eliminativism about beliefs and desires posited by folk psychology (see (a) above). See Patricia Churchland and Terence Sejnowski, ‘Neural Representation and Neural Computation’, in Lycan, ed., Mind and Cognition; and the papers by Ramsey, Stich and Garon, and by Martin Davies in Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Andy Clark, ‘Beyond Eliminativism’, in Mind and Language 4 (1989): 251-279, argues that connectionists need not be eliminativists.

E. MODULARITY AND THE FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE MIND AND BRAIN One of the distinctive features of cognitive psychology is an approach to psychological structures and capacities through functional analysis—on this mode of explanation see Robert Cummins, The Nature of Psychological Explanation, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983). Both Chomsky and Fodor have argued for the modularity of various psychological capacities, but the notion of a module has been open to different interpretations. For Chomsky on these matters see, Knowledge of Language: its Nature, Origins, and Use, (New York: Praeger, 1985), Chs. 1 & 2; for Fodor, The Modularity of Mind: an Essay on Faculty Psychology, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983), and ‘The Modularity of Mind: A Precis’, in his A Theory of Content & Other Essays, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1990). Within psychological work itself the notion of modularity has become of central concern partly through single-case studies of patients with impairments that reflect dissociations of various psychological capacities from each other: the broadest overview of the approach, and the methodology behind it can be found in Tim Shallice’s From Neuropsychology to Mental Strucure, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). For evidence of modularity in language abilities see Neil Smith and I. Tsimpli, The Mind of a Savant: Language Learning and Modularity, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). For further application of the notion of modules involved in psychological capacities see also Simon Baron-Cohen’s Mindblindness for an account of this in our abilities to ascribe mental properties to ourselves and others; contrast this with the approach of Harold Wellman in The Child’s Theory of Mind, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990) and Alison Gopnik and Andrew N. Meltzoff in Words, Thoughts and Theories, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998). One of the other startling areas in which modularity theses seem strikingly to be confirmed is work on certain specialised areas of visual recognition, for example face recognition. On this see, Farah in S. M. Kosslyn and D. N. Osherson, eds., An Invitation to Cognitive Science, Vol. 2, Visual Cognition, (2nd ed., Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), and the chapter on face recognition in Vicki Bruce, Patrick R. Green, and Mark A. Georgeson, Visual Cognition: Physiology, Psychology, and Ecology, (Hove: Psychology Press, 1996). See also A. Karmiloff-Smith, Beyond Modularity: a Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992); and Jay L. Garfield, ed., Modularity

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in Knowledge Representation and Natural-language Understanding, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987).

F. THE THEORY OF VISION The main example of a psychological theory used by contemporary philosophers is the theory of vision. David Marr’s theory has been one of the most influential, see his Vision: A Computational Investigation into Human Representation and Processing of Visual Information, (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1982), chapter 1, for an account of the project. John Fisby, Seeing: Illusion, Brain, and Mind, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); Philip Johnson-Laird, The Computer and the Mind, (2nd ed., London: Fontana, 1993), provide non-technical introductions, and philosophical accounts of Marr’s theory can be found in Sterelny, The Representational Theory of the Mind, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) and in Michael Tye’s The Imagery Debate (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991). A number of papers discuss internalist versus externalist interpretations of Marr’s theory: Gabriel Segal, ‘Seeing What is Not There’, Philosophical Review 98 (1989): 189-214; Tyler Burge, ‘Individualism and Psychology’, Philosophical Review 95 (1986): 3-45; Martin Davies, ‘Individualism and Perceptual Content’, Mind 100 (1991): 461-484; and Gabriel Segal, ‘In Defence of a Reasonable Individualism’, Mind 100 (1991): 485-494; Frances Egan, ‘Must Psychology be Individualistic?’, Philosophical Review (1991): 179-203, and ‘Individualism, Computation & Perceptual Content’, Mind 101 (1992): 443-459. For accounts of recent developments in vision research see S. M. Kosslyn and D. N. Osherson, eds., An Invitation to Cognitive Science, Vol. 2, Visual Cognition, (2nd ed., Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), in particular the essays by Nakayama, et al.; Goodale; Kosslyn; and Spelke, et. al. You might also look at Irvin Rock’s The Logic of Perception, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983), and his posthumous collection, Indirect Perception, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997); Stephen M. Kosslyn’s Image & Brain: the Resolution of the Imagery Debate, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994); and possibly Shimon Ullman’s High Level Vision: Object Recognition and Visual Cognition, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996). For a very different approach to perception and psychology as a whole see J. J. Gibson, An Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1979), and his earlier The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966). Gibson’s approach is emphatically anti-representational, yet his views have influenced some of the best recent work in visual cognition. Further issues about visual cognition are raised in an interdisciplinary volume, Perception, edited by Kathleen Akins, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), the introduction of which is a good starting point—some of this work discusses ideas raised in Dennett’s Consciousness Explained, particularly those of chapter 5; also have a look at Naomi Eilan, Rosaleen McCarthy, and Bill Brewer, eds., Spatial Representation: Problems in Philosophy and Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), see in particular essays by O’Keefe, Cooper, Spelke, et al., Meltzoff, Atkinson, Braddick, and McCarthy, for psychologists on various aspects of visual perception and spatial perception in general, and contributions by Campbell, Peacocke, and Eilan, among philosophers for relevant material.

G. THE EXPLANATORY AND CAUSAL ROLE OF CONTENT What explanatory or causal role does the content of representational states play in psychological theories? It has been suggested that content plays no causal role in pro-

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ducing behaviour if a computational theory of cognition is true, since in a computational system the form, but not the content, of representations determines how they are processed. See Cummins, Meaning and Mental Representation, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989), chapter 10; and G. Segal, ‘The Causal Efficacy of Content’, Philosophical Studies 67 (1991): 1-30. Does psychology use or need to use an internalist notion of content, according to which the content of psychological states supervenes on intrinsic properties of their bearers, or an externalist notion, according to which content is partly determined by environment? Chapter 2 of Fodor’s Psychosemantics, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), argues for internalism, while Burge’s ‘Individuation and Causation in Psychology’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1989): 303-322, defends externalism. See also the papers on internalist and externalist interpretations of Marr’s theory of vision (f), especially the paper by Burge.

H. LINGUISTICS Linguistics is the empirical study of language. The theories of Noam Chomsky, arguably the leading practitioner in the field, have been of particular interest to philosophers. Chomsky rejects any conception of language as an abstract object or a social practice. Instead, he sees language as a faculty of the mind, and linguistics as a branch of cognitive psychology which studies the properties of the language faculty. On this view there are no linguistic facts over and above the psychological facts about individual language users: so the theory of grammar offers both a description of the structure of a language and a model of a speaker’s competence (i.e. his or her knowledge of the language). Here we have the much disputed claim for the psychological reality of grammar. This is of interest to philosophers both because it raises questions of how to tell which is the correct grammar of a speaker’s language, given his or her linguistic behaviour, and because competence, as understood by Chomsky, is a species of tacit knowledge. Furthermore, Chomsky argues that a speaker’s ability to acquire native competence depends upon an innate knowledge of the principles of universal grammar: a common species-specific inheritance due to the initial state of the language faculty. Philosophers have contested this innateness hypothesis and questioned the grounds for postulating tacit knowledge of grammar. For a guide to Chomsky’s views on the above issues, the nature of rule-following, and non-existence of shared public languages, see his Knowledge of Language: its Nature, Origins, and Use, (New York: Praeger, 1985), and his ‘Language and Nature’, Mind 104 (1995): 1-61, reprinted in New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). For platonist and behaviourist alternatives to Chomsky’s mentalism, see J. J. Katz’s useful anthology,The Philosophy of Linguistics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). For a detailed philosophical discussion of Chomsky’s views, there is Fred D’Agostino’s Chomsky’s System of Ideas, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), and a collection of philosophical essays edited by A. George, Reflections on Chomsky, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989). For an accessible introduction to the empirical issues surrounding the study of language see Lila R. Gleitman, and Mark Liberman, eds., An Invitation to Cognitive Science, Vol. 1, Language, (2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press , 1995).

5 Philosophy of Psychoanalysis This part of the paper examines the central psychoanalytic concepts and issues in the philosophy of psychoanalysis, with reference to general issues in the philosophy of

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mind and special attention to the grounds of legitimation of psychoanalytic claims. Central topics are: the view that psychoanalysis is continuous with commonsense psychology, the critique of psychoanalysis as a science, the concept of the divided mind, the concepts of Kleinian theory, the relation of psychoanalytic theory to connectionism (see above), the psychoanalytic theory of sexuality, and the concept of unconscious mental states.

A. SELECTED WORKS OF FREUD Editions Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, translated under the general editorship of James Strachey, in collaboration with Anna Freud, 24 Volumes, (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis, c1964). In all libraries. Pelican Freud Library, translation originally published as ‘The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud’, 15 Volumes, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, c1984). (Volume numbers are to each in turn.)

Texts You should aim to read as many of as possible; essential reading is starred. Studies on Hysteria, (1895d [1893-95]) (with Josef Breuer) SE 2/PFL 3, Ch.1, ‘Preliminary communication’. * The Interpretation of Dreams, (1900a) SE 4-5/PFL 4, Chs.2-3. * On Dreams, (1901a) SE 5. Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, (1905d) SE 7/PFL 7. ‘Fragments of an analysis of a case of hysteria’, (‘Dora’) (1905e [1901]) SE 7/PFL 8. ‘Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis’, (‘The Ratman’) (1909d) SE 10/PFL 9. * Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, (1910a [1909]) SE 11 (and in Penguin, Two Short Accounts of Psychoanalysis, 1962). ‘Repression’, (1915d) SE 14/PFL 11. ‘The unconscious’, (1915e) SE 14/PFL 11. * Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, (1916-17 [1915-17]) SE 15-16/PFL 1. ‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’, (‘The Wolfman’) (1918b [1914]) SE 24 /PFL 9. The Ego and the Id, (1923b) SE 19/PFL 11. * New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, (1933a [1932]) SE 22/PFL 2. An Outline of Psychoanalysis, (1940a [1938]) SE 23/PFL 15.

B. REASON EXPLANATION AND PSYCHOANALYTIC EXPLANATION Dreams and symptoms; the nature and scope of commonsense explanation by reasons. Smith, P., and O. R. Jones. 1986. The Philosophy of Mind: an Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See esp. chs. 9 and 17. Davidson, D. 1980. ‘Actions, Reasons, Causes’. In Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Lepore, E., and B. McLaughlin. 1985. ‘Actions, Reasons, Causes, Intentions’. In E. Lepore, and B. McLaughlin, eds., Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Blackwell. Sayre-McCord, G. 1989. ‘Functional Explanation and Reasons as Causes’. In James E. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory, Philosophical Perspectives 3, Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Pub. Co.

C. PSYCHOANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION BY REASONS i. The applicability of the belief/desire model to psychoanalysis Wollheim, R. 1991. Freud. 2nd ed. London: Fontana. Supplementary Preface, pp. xxvi-xxxviii.

212 STUDY GUIDE Hopkins, J. 1982. ‘Introduction: Philosophy and Psychoanalysis’. In R. Wollheim, and J. Hopkins, eds. Philosophical essays on Freud. Cambridge University Press. See esp. pp. xix-xxvi. Cavell, M. 1986. ‘Metaphor, Dreamwork, and Irrationality’. In E. LePore ed.,Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Blackwell. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, ch.2, ‘Analysis of a Specimen Dream’. Freud, On Dreams, (1901a) SE 5.

ii. Psychoanalysis as an extension of commonsense psychology The nature of the extension, and its consequences for methodology. Sketches of the mode of extension Hopkins, J. 1982. ‘Introduction: Philosophy and Psychoanalysis’. In R. Wollheim, and J. Hopkins, eds. Philosophical essays on Freud. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hopkins, J. 1988. ‘Epistemology and Depth Psychology: critical notes on The Foundations of Psychoanalysis’. In Peter Clark and Crispin Wright, eds., Mind, Psychoanalysis, and Science. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Hopkins, J. 1991. ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’. In Jerome Neu, ed., The Cambridge companion to Freud. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Methodological critiques of psychoanalysis Popper, K. 1969. ‘Conjectures and Refutations’. In Conjectures and Refutations: the Growth of Scientific Knowledge. 3rd ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. See esp. pp.33-9. Grünbaum, A. 1986. ‘Précis of The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique’. In Clark and Wright, eds.; also (with Commentary and Response) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1986, or, at length, The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. Pts. I-II.

Methodological defense of psychoanalysis Hopkins, J. 1992. ‘Psychoanalysis, Interpretation, and Science’. In J. Hopkins, and A. Savile, eds., Psychoanalysis, Mind, and Art: Perspectives on Richard Wollheim. Oxford: Blackwell.

D. CASE HISTORIES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION Dora Freud, ‘Fragments of an analysis of a case of hysteria’, (‘Dora’) (1905e [1901]) SE 7/PFL 8. Cummins, R. 1983. The Nature of Psychological Explanation. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Ch.4, sec.3, pp.142-61.

The Ratman Freud, ‘Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis’, (‘The Ratman’) (1909d) SE 10/PFL 9. Hopkins, J. 1982. ‘Introduction: Philosophy and Psychoanalysis’. In Wollheim and Hopkins, eds., pp.xxx-xxxvi. Gay, P. 1988. Freud: A Life for Our Time. London: Dent. See index. Glymour, C. 1982. ‘Freud, Kepler and the Clinical Evidence’. In Wollheim and Hopkins, eds.

E. FREUD AND CONNECTIONISM The text of Freud’s which this topic is concerned with is his ‘Project for a scientific psychology’, Standard Edition 1 (not in Pelican Freud Library). Wollheim, R. 1991. Freud. 2nd ed. London: Fontana. Ch.1. Glymour, C. 1991. ‘Freud’s Androids’. In Jerome Neu, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Freud. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

F. PSYCHOANALYSIS, AKRASIA AND SELF-DECEPTION Davidson, D. 1980. ‘How is weakness of the Will Possible?’. In Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY 213 Pears, D. 1984. Motivated Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs. 1-3, and, optionally, Chs. 610. ——. 1975. ‘The Paradoxes of Self-deception’. In Questions in the Philosophy of Mind. London: Duckworth.

G. DIVISION OF THE MIND Freud, ‘The unconscious’, SE 14/PFL 11. Freud, ‘The dissection of the psychical personality’, New Introductory Lectures, Lecture 31. Sartre, J.-P. 1958. Being and Nothingness: an Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. Translated by Hazel E. Barnes. London: Routledge. pp.50-4. Davidson, D. 1982. ‘Paradoxes of Irrationality’. In Hopkins and Wollheim, eds.; or ‘Deception and Division’, in Jon Elster ed., The Multiple Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Pears, D. 1984. Motivated Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.5; or ‘Goals and Strategies of Self-deception’, in Elster, ed., The Multiple Self.. Cummins, R. 1983. The Nature of Psychological Explanation. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Ch.4, sec.3, pp.142-61.

H. FREUD’S THEORY OF SEXUALITY Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, (1905d) SE 7/PFL 7. Freud, Introductory Lectures, SE 16/PFL 1, Lectures 20 and 21. Wollheim, R. 1991. Freud. 2nd ed. London: Fontana. Ch.4. Neu, J. 1991. ‘Freud and Perversion’. In Jerome Neu, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Freud. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Klein, M. ‘The Development of a Child’, and ‘Personification in the play of Children’, in her Love, Guilt and Reparation, and other works, 1921-1945. London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1975. (see below, topic 8).

I. INTERNAL OBJECTS Freud, ‘Mourning and melancholia’, (1917e [1915]) SE 14/PFL 11. Hinshelwood, R. 1991. A Dictionary of Kleinian Thought. 2nd ed. London: Free Association. See the entries on Internal Objects.

J. KLEIN Mitchell, J., ed., The Selected Melanie Klein, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986) contains a good selection. Melanie Klein’s complete works (Hogarth Press, 1975) are available in libraries. Klein’s most important papers can also be found in the Virago paperback editions, Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921-1945 (LGR), and Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946-1963 (EG) (London: Virago, 1988).

Essential reading ‘The development of a child’, in LGR. ‘Early development’, in LGR. ‘Personification in the play of children’, in LGR. ‘A contribution to the psychogenesis of manic-depressive states’, in LGR. ‘The importance of symbol-formation in the development of the ego’, in LGR. ‘Notes on some schizoid mechanisms’, in EG.

On Klein Segal, H. 1973. Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein. London: Hogarth. New enl. ed. London: Karnac and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1988; or Segal, H. 1979. Klein. London: Fontana. Hopkins, J. 1987. ‘Synthesis in the Imagination: Psychoanalysis, Infantile Experience and the Concept of an Object’. In J. Russell, ed., Philosophical Perspectives on Developmental

214 STUDY GUIDE Psychology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Hinshelwood, R. 1991. A Dictionary of Kleinian Thought. 2nd ed. London: Free Association. To be consulted for its entries on individual Kleinian concepts. Segal, H. 1981. The Work of Hanna Segal: A Kleinian Approach to Clinical Practice. New York: Aronson. See esp. ‘The importance of symbol-formation’. ——. 1991. Dream, Phantasy and Art. London: Routledge. See esp. ch.3, on symbolism.

Projective identification Klein, ‘Notes on some schizoid mechanisms’, in EG. Hinshelwood, R. 1991. A Dictionary of Kleinian Thought. 2nd ed. London: Free Association. ‘Projective Identification’, ‘Projection’, ‘Splitting’. Spillius, Elizabeth. ed. 1988. Melanie Klein Today: Developments in Theory and Practice. London: Routledge. Part Two, especially Introduction, Betty Joseph, and Herbert Rosenfeld. Wollheim, R. 1984. The Thread of Life. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp.2705. ——. 1982. ‘The Bodily Ego’. In Wollheim and Hopkins, eds.

K. UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL STATES Freud, ‘The unconscious’, (1915) SE 14 /PFL 11, Pt. I, ‘Justification for the concept of the unconscious’. Searle, J. 1989. ‘Consciousness, Unconsciousness, and Intentionality’. Philosophical Topics 17: 193-209. See also Philosophy of Mind on Consciousness and Experience.