Philippine Sinter Corporation and Phividec Industrial Authority Vs Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co Inc

 

PHILIPPINE SINTER CORPORATION and PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY vs. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER and LIGHT CO., INC. G.R. No. 127371, April 25, 2002 FACTS:

On January 21, 1987, Pursuant to President Corazon C. Aquino’s approval of the Cabinet Memorandum, respondent Cagayan Electric Power and Light, L ight, Co. (CEPALCO), grantee of a legislative franchise to distribute electric power to some of the municipalities in the province of Misamis Oriental, filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) a petition. The petition sought the "discontinuation of all existing direct supply of power by the National Power Corporation (NPC, now NAP NAPOCOR) OCOR) within CEPALCO's franchise area."   After hearing, the ERB rendered a decision granting the petition. On October 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, holding that the motion for reconsideration filed by NAPOCOR with the ERB was out of time and therefore, the assailed decision became final and executory and could no longer be subject of a petition for review. On a petition for review on certiorari, c ertiorari, this Court affirmed the Resolution of the Court of Appeals. Judgment was entered on September 22, 1993, thus rendering final the decision of the ERB. To restrain the execution of the ERB Decision, PSC and PIA filed a complaint for injunction against CEPALCO with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. On April 11, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of PSC and PIA. CEPALCO filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the trial. Aggrieved, CEPALCO appealed to the Court Co urt of Appeals. On July 23, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued is DISSOLVED. PSC and PIA filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution16 dated December 2, 1996. Hence the instant petition. ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrine of non-interference apply to administrative bodies? HELD: Yes. Corollarily, Section 10 of Executive Order Or der No. 172 (the law creating the t he ERB) provides that a review of its decisions or orders is lodged in the Supreme Court. Settled is the rule that where the law provides for an appeal from the decisions of administrative bodies to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts in terms of rank r ank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter. Hence, the trial court, being co co-equal -equal with the ERB, cannot interfere with the decision of the latter. It bears stressing that this doctrine of non-interference of trial courts with co-equal administrative bodies is intended to ensure judicial stability in the administration of  justice whereby the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.