Pfr Digests Finals

Tanada vs Tuvera No. L-63915 December 29, 1986 FACTS: The petitioners Lorenzo Tanada, Abraham Sarmiento and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) demand for the disclosure of various presidential decrees from Hon. Juan Tuvera as executive Assistant to the President< Hon. Joaquin Venus, deputy Executive Assistant to the President, Melquiades dela Cruz, et al. because they claim that such presidential decrees had not been published as what Article 2 of the Civil Code has provided. The government defended that while such publication was necessary, the statement “Otherwise provided” let such decrees too become effective immediately. The decision of the court was affirmative to the necessity of publication before such Law, decree or order will be effective. The petitioners suggest that there should be some clarifications on this rule. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 2 of the Civil Code is absolute that effectivity of the law shall take effect after 15 days from its publication. RULING: Article 2 of the Civil Code states “laws shall take effect after 15 day following the completion of their publication in the official gazette or in newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.” Supreme Court held that all laws shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette or any newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. It becomes effective only after fifteen days from their publication or in any other date specified by the legislature, this is what the proviso ‘unless it is otherwise provided’ means.

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Firestone Tire Company vs. Lariosa GR no. 70479 February 27, 1987 FACTS: Carlos Lariosa work in Firestone as factory worker. When he was about to leave the company premises, he was frisked by security guard because while his personal bag was inspected, there were 16 wool flannel swabs all belonging to the company. As a result, he was terminated by firestone on the ground of stealing company property and loss of trust. The company also files criminal complaint for attempted theft. Lariosa, on other hand, filed a case for illegal dismissal Labor Arbiter found the dismissal just bust the NLRC reversed the decision. Firestone contends that NLRC erred in not dismissing Lariosa’s appeal for being late. ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal filed by Lariosa n NLRC was filed late. RULING: Lariosa filed his appeal on June 7, 1984 or after the lapse of 14 days from the notice of the decision of the labor arbiter. Under the Labor Code, the reglementary period for which an appeal from decision of labor arbiter may be filed to NLRC is within a period of ten days. The ten-day period has to be interpreted to mean as ten ‘calendar’ days and not ten ‘working’ days.

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Gonzaga vs David GR no. L-14858 December 29, 1960 FACTS: Mariano Gonzales, as owner of a cargo truck and passenger bus, registers the vehicles and pays the first installment for registration fees due on 1957. To cover the second installment for registration fees, he remitted to the provincial treasurer of Cagayan, by registered mail, the amount of P500.00, under postal money orders. The postal cancellation mark on the envelope containing the remittance bears the date August 31, 1957. The registrar of the Motor Vehicle Office ruled that pursuant to Revised Motor Vehicle Law, the second installment for registration fees was payable on or before the last working day of August. The last working day of August 1957 was Friday, August 30, 1957. And consequently, the remittance of Gonzaga which bears cancellation mark dated August 31, 1957 was made beyond time fixed by law. ISSUE: Whether or not the remittance for second installment of registration fees was made beyond the time fixed by law. RULING: The Motor Vehicle Office in Cagayan had no office on Saturday, August 31, 1957. However, it was immaterial the last working day contemplated in the Revised Motor Vehicle Law should not necessarily mean the last working day of Motor Vehicle Office. The fact that August 31, 1957 was declared a special public holiday did not have the effect of making the preceding day, August 30, the last day for paying registration fees without penalty. Moreover, under the said law, for payment of registration fees by mail, the date of cancellation of the postage stamps of the envelope containing the remittance is considered the date of application.

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Rural Bank of Caloocan vs CA GR no. L-32116 April 21, 1981 FACTS: Maxima Castro, accompanied by Severino Valencia, went to Rural Bank of Caloocan to apply for industrial loan. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage on Castor’s house, after that, the bank approved the loan of P3000. Valencia obtained from the bank an equal amount of loan affixing Castro’s signature as co-maker without its knowledge. The sheriff then sent a notice announcing the property would be sold at public auction to satisfy the obligation. Upon request, the auction sale which was scheduled for March 10, 1961 was postponed for April 10, 1961. But April 10 was subsequently declared a special holiday so the sheriff sold the property on public auction on April 11, 1961 which was the next succeeding business day following the special holiday. Castro prayed for the annulment of sale alleging that there was fraud on the part of Valencias who induced her to sign as co-maker of a promissory note since she is a 70-year old widow who cannot read and write and it was only when she receive the notice of sheriff, she learned that the encumbrance on her property was P6000 and not for P3000. ISSUE: Whether or not the public auction sale was null and void for transferring the date already set by law. RULING: The sale is null and void for not having in accordance with Act 3135 which states that that a notice shall be given by posting notices of sale for not less than 20 days in at least 3 public places and if the property is worth more than P400 such notice shall also be published for in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. The pretermission of a holiday applies only ‘where the day, or the last day for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday or when the last day of a given period for doing an act falls on holiday. It does not apply to a day fixed by an office or officer of the government for an act to be done. Since April 10, 1961 was not the day or the last day set by law for the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, nor the last day of a given period but a date fixed by deputy sheriff, the sale cannot be legally made on the next succeeding business day without the notice of the sale in accordance with Act no. 3135.

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People of the Philippines vs Quo Po Lay GR no. L-6791 March 29, 1854 FACTS: Quo Po lay was in possession of a foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and S money orders amounting to about $700 but failed to sell it to the central bank as required under Circular no. 20. The said circular was issued in the year 1949 but was published in official gazette only on November 1951 after the act imputed to Que Po Lay. Quo Po Lay appealed from the decision of the Lower court finding him guilty of violating the Central Bank Circular no. 20 and sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of 1000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Central Bank Circular no. 20 is needed for it to become effective. RULING: The Supreme Court held that as a rule those municipal ordinances, or those interpretative in nature or those internal in nature and the letter of instruction need not to be published in order for them to become effective. But the circulars and regulations that prescribe penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its content as well as penal provisions, law, regulation and circular must first be published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such provision. In the case, the fact that Circular no. 20 had not been published, in the eyes of the law, there was no such circular to be violated and appellant Quo Po Lay committed no violation of the circular.

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Consunji vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 137873 April 20, 2001 FACTS: At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision. ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence. Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, RULING: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself) is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It has the following requisites: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3)the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. Petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident. The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmen´s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In the course of availing the remedies provided under the Workmen’s Compensation law, the claimants are deemed to have waived theirknown right of the remedies provided by other laws. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she would’ve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she already had.

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Emetrio Cui v Arellano University GR NO. L15127, May 30, 1961 | 112 Phil 135 FACTS: Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then enrolled in its College of Law from first year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of his 4 th year. During these years, he was awarded scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos University. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from Arellano University. The defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without Arellano’s issuance of his TOR. On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing all heads of private schools, colleges and universities. Part of the memorandum states that “the amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school”. ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the scholarship grant provided by Arellano University. HELD: The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set therein was advisory and not mandatory in nature. Moreover, the stipulation in question, asking previous students to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights and hence, null and void. The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon at the legal rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of this case as well as the costs and dismissing defendant’s counterclaim.

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FLORESCA vs PHILEX MINING CORPORATION 136 SCRA 141 FACTS: Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the WCA. ISSUE: Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue. HELD: Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such a remedy. However, if in case they’ll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man’s survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life.

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Miciano vs Brimo GR No.22595, November 1, 1927| 50 Phil 867

FACTS: Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen. ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimo’s estates. HELD: Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions. The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.

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Bellis vs Bellis 20 SCRA 358 Facts: Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas and was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. Hehad two wives, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced and had five legitimate children namely Edward,George,Henry, Alexander and Anna, and Violet Kennedy who survived him and had three legitimatechildren namely Edwin, Walter and Dorothy, and finally he had three illegitimate children: Amos Jr.,Maria and Miriam. On August 5,1952, Amos executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed thatafter all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate shouldbe divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a)$240,000 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b)P120,000 to his three illegitimate children or P40,000 each and (c) after the foregoing two items havebeen satisfied the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives inequal shares. On July 8,1958, Amos died. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15,1958. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, as the executor of the will,paid all the bequests therein released from time to time according as the lower court approved andallowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on accountof their respective legacies. On January 17,1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed theirrespective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of theirlegitimes as illegitimate children and therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. On the other hand,Amos Bellis Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him . Issue: Which law will apply in executing the deceased’s will? Philippine Law or Texas Law? Held: The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., andthat there are no forced heirs or legitimes under the laws of the state of Texas. Accordingly, since theintrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determinedunder Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.Ratio: Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of thedecedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will;and (d) the capacity to succeed.Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the orderof succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentaryprovisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property maybe found

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UNITED AIRLINES vs. Court of Appeals 357 SCRA 99 Facts: On Mar. 1, 1989, PR Fontanilla purchased tickets from petitioner United Airlines in Manila. The cause of non-boarding of the Fontanillas on United Airlines makes up the bone of contention of this controversy. Aniceto Fontanilla & his son claim that upon arrival at Los Angeles Airport they proceeded at United Airlines counter where they were attended by an employee, Linda; when the flight was called, they proceeded to the plane but the stewardess did not allow them to board because they had no assigned seat numbers; they were directed to go back to the checkin-counter. Linda told them in an arrogant manner, “Who do you think you are? You lousy Flips are good for nothing beggars. You always ask for American aid.” After which she remarked “Don’t worry about your baggage. Anyway there is nothing in there. What are you doing here anyway? I will report you to immigration. You Filipinos should go home.” such rude statement was made infront of other people causing the Fontanillas to suffer shame, humiliation & embarrassment. However, according to United Airlines, Fontanilla’s did not initially go to checkin-counter to get their seat assignment that is why they were not allowed to board. Linda denied the derogatory & resisted words attributed to her by the Fontanilla’s. The incident prompted the Fontanilla’s to file for damages. Issue: WON there was a breach of contract in bad faith on the part of the petitioner in not allowing the Fontanilla’s to board United Airlines? WON Fontanilla is entitled to damages? NO Held: Aniceto Fontanilla’s assertion that upon arrival at the airport at 9:45 a.m., he immediately proceeded to the check-in counter, and that Linda Allen punched in something into the computer is specious and not supported by the evidence on record. In support of their allegations, private respondents submitted a copy of the boarding pass. Explicitly printed on the boarding pass are the words “Check-In Required.” Curiously, the said pass did not indicate any seat number. If indeed the Fontanillas checked in at the designated time as they claimed, why then were they not assigned seat numbers? Absent any showing that Linda was so motivated, we do not buy into private respondents’ claim that Linda intentionally deceived him, and made him the laughing stock among the passengers. Plaintiffs fail to realize that their failure to check in, as expressly required in their boarding passes, is the very reason why they were not given their respective seat numbers, which resulted in their being denied boarding. Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. What this Court considers as bad faith is the willful and deliberate overbooking on the part of the airline carrier. The above-mentioned law clearly states that when the overbooking does not exceed ten percent (10%), it is not considered as deliberate and therefore does not amount to bad faith. While there may have been overbooking in this case, private respondents were not able to prove that the overbooking on United Airlines Flight 1108 exceeded ten percent. For the plaintiff to be entitled to an award of moral damages arising from a breach of contract of carriage, the carrier must have acted with fraud or bad faith. The private respondents were not able to prove that they were subjected to coarse and harsh treatment by the ground crew of united Airlines. Neither were they able to show that there was bad faith on part of the carrier airline. Hence, the award of moral and exemplary damages by 12

the Court of Appeals is improper. Corollarily, the award of attorney’s fees is, likewise, denied for lack of any legal and factual basis ALBENSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific Banking Corporation Check was paid and drawn against the account of EL Woodworks. Check was later dishonored for the reason “Account Closed.” Company traced source of check and later discovered that the signature belonged to one Eugenio Baltao. Albenson made an extrajudical demand upon Baltao but latter denied that he issued the check or that the signature was his. Company filed a complaint against Baltao for violation of BP 22. It was later discovered that private respondent had son: Eugene Baltao III, who manages the business establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from the father to inform Albenson of such information. Rather the father filed complaint for damages against Albenson. ISSUE: Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson Enterprise. RULING: Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didn’t have the intent to cause damage to the respondent or enrich themselves but just to collect what was due to them. There was no abuse of right on the part of Albenson on accusing Baltao of BP 22. Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who issued check based on ff inquiries: • • •

SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao Bank said signature belonged to EB EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and the III.

There was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson: there must be proof that: •

the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person and • that damages was initiated deliberately by defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent Baltao

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Nikko Hotel vs. Reyes GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005 FACTS: Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals in reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka “Amang Bisaya”, an entertainment artist. There are two versions of the story: Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the latter’s gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation. Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filart’s sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s group. She wasn’t able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the phone and doesn’t want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party. During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very close because we nearly kissed each other”. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay the request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what happened. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. HELD: Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.

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Sps. Quisumbing vs. MERALCO CITATION: GR No. 142943, April 3, 2002 FACTS: The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the owners of a house located at #94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3, 1995, defendant’s inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot inspection of all single phase meters at the house and observed as standard operating procedure to ask permission and was granted by the plaintiff’s secretary. After the inspection, it was found that the meter had been tampered with. The result was relayed to the secretary who conveyed the information to the owners of the house. The inspectors advised that the meter be brought in their laboratory for further verifications. In the event that the meter was indeed tampered, defendant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of the couple. After an hour, inspectors returned and informed the findings of the laboratory and asked the couple that unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential bill their electric supply will be disconnected. The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.

ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent manner done without due process, lack of regard for QUISUMBING’s rights, feelings, social and business reputation and therefore held them accountable and plaintiff be entitled for damages.

HELD: Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay respondent the billing differential of P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages including attorney’s fees. Moral damages may be recovered when rights of individuals including right against the deprivation of property without due process of law are violated. Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed by way of example or correction for public. SC recognized the effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use of electricity. However, any action must be done in strict observance of the rights of the people. “Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric service on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board”. During the inspection, no government official or ERB representative was present.

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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST VS. ROMEO A. JADER GR No. 132344. February 17, 2000 FACTS: Romeo Jader, a law student of the University of the East, failed to take his regular examination in Practice Court I in his first semester of his last school year. However, he was able to remove the incomplete mark when the Dean of his college approved his application to take a removal examination. In the 2nd semester, his name appeared in the tentative list of candidates for graduation for the Decree of Bachelor of Laws and in the invitation for the 35th Investiture and Commencement Ceremonies, the plaintiff’s name appeared. Thus, he attended the investiture ceremonies and graduated. On April to September 1998, he took a leave of absence from his work and enrolled at the prebar review class in Far Eastern University. To his dismay upon knowing that he incurred a deficiency, he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examinations. He then filed a suit against UE praying for moral and exemplary damages arising from the latter’s negligence. The trial court ruled in his favor and was granted for actual damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification. The CA awarded moral damages. On account of suffering moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights and ultimately for not having to take the bar exam. ISSUE: Whether

or

not

Romeo

Jader

can

validly

claim

for

moral

damages.

RULING: In view of the foregoing issue, the Supreme Court emphatically enunciated that moral damages cannot be awarded to Romeo Jader. It cannot believe that he suffered shock, trauma, and pain. Along this vein, the Supreme Court held Jader negligent. It opined that as a student, he should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, especially those appertaining to his academics, are in order. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements. While the Court held the University of the East negligent and therefore liable for actual damages in favor of Jader, the latter was also held liable for negligence thereby no moral damages can be awarded in his favor. The decision was affirmed with modification.

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GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH VS. CA 219 SCRA 778 FACTS: This is an appeal by certiorari. On October 27, 1987, without the assistance of counsel, private respondent filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that she is 20 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her country; other petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student, before August 20, 1987 the latter courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition that they get married; they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano apartments. She was a virgin at that time; after a week before the filing of complaint, petitioner’s attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of the complaint. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that the petitioner is already married to someone in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering petitioner to pay her damages. On the other hand, petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent and denied all allegations against him. After trial on the merits, the lower court ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent damages. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. HELD: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines quasi-delicts thus: “Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.” In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a man’s promise to marry in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and deceit behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that

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such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. PE v PE 30 MAY 1962 FACTS: Defendant Alfonso Pe was treated like a son by the plaintiff Cecilio Pe, as such he was given access to visit to their house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, one of the daughters of Cecilio. The defendant frequented the house of Lolita because he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Eventually they fell in love with each other; Lolita disappeared from the house so her parents reported the same to the police. They filed a case against Alfonso under Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides for moral damages. But the case was dismissed by the lower court. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the ground of moral, good custom and public policy for their illicit affair? HELD: There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing injury in manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. The defendant took advantage of the trust of Cecilio and even used the praying of rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee. So ordered.

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WASSMER v VELEZ 26 DECEMBER 1964 FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get married on September 4, 1954. Two days before the wedding, Velez left a note for his bride-tobe saying that he wants to postpone the wedding as his mother opposes the same. The following day, Sept. 3, he sent a telegram and told her that nothing is changed and that he apologize and will go back. But Velez did not appear on their wedding, it prompted Wassmer to sue him for damages. Velez was declared in default for failure to answer the complaint. The lower court held in favor of Wassmer for payment of damages. ISSUE: Whether or not a mere breach of promise to marry entitles Wassmer for damages? HELD: A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong but to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized is different. This is palpably and justifiably contrary to good customs for which the defendant must be answerable for. PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated, the lower court’s judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

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HERMOSISIMA v CA 30 SEPTEMBER 1960 FACTS: An appeal by certiorari, on October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas as complainant, filed with the said CFI a complaint for the acknowledgment of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as a natural child of said petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. Petitioner admitted the paternity of the child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry complainant. Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917, since 1950, Soledad then a teacher and petitioner who was almost ten years younger than her used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he made no promise of marriage thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter where intimacy developed between her and petitioner, since one evening in 1953 when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board MV Escano to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was pregnant, whereupon he promised to marry her. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to marry? HELD: It appears in the case, that because of the defendant-appellant’s seductive powers, plaintiffappellee was overwhelmed by her love for him yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control. The court is unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten years younger but also because the CFI found that complainant surrendered herself to the petitioner because overwhelmed by her love for him she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy. With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to cost in the instance. It is so ordered.

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CONSTANTINO v MENDEZ 14 MAY 1992 FACTS: Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child is represented by Amelita, his mother, asking for support from Ivan Mendez as well as damages. The latter and Amelita met in a restaurant where she worked as a waitress. When Ivan invited her to his hotel, she agreed with a promise of marriage after having sexual intercourse. He even admitted being a married man to her, but despite the confession they continue to have sexual intercourse. When she got pregnant, she had to resign from work. The trial court held in favor of Amelita for actual and moral damages, acknowledging Michael as Ivan’s illegitimate child and giving monthly support to him. Upon appeal, the CA set aside the decision of the lower court. ISSUE: Whether or not Michael as an illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support? HELD: Amelita has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan is the father of her son Michael. Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first week of November is the crucial point that was not even established in her testimony. Their repeated sexual intercourse indicated that passion and not alleged promise to marriage was the moving force to submit herself with Ivan. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

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ST. LOUIS REALTY CORP. v CA 14 NOVEMBER 1984 FACTS: Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio. St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading “where the heart is”. This was republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr Aramil’s house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission and the intended house to be published. After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or apology was published despite that it was received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr. Aramil’s counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadio’s real house but nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for damages on March 29. The trial court ruled in favor of Dr. Aramil for damages because of the violation of his right to privacy and later on affirmed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil for violation of his right to privacy? HELD: St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication. Furthermore, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification". The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the judgement for the reason that “St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps”. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appelate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner. 22

TENCHAVEZ v ESCANO 29 NOVEMBER 1965 FACTS: Vicenta Escano who belongs to a prominent family, got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However Vicenta’s dad disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila. Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband. ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce sought by Escano is valid and binding upon the courts in the Philippines? HELD: Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decree of divorce because it would be in violation of the Civil Code. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for legal separation prayed for by Tenchavez. The latter and Escano is still married in the eyes of the Philippine laws.

Vda de Chua vs. CA GR No. 70909, January 5, 1994 FACTS: Roberto Lim Chua, during his lifetime, lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970-1981. The couple had two illegitimate children, Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo, all surnamed Chua. Roberto died intestate in Davao City on May 28, 1992. Vallejo filed on July 2, 1992 with RTC-Cotabato a petition for declaration of guardianship of the two child and their properties worth P5,000,000.00. Antonietta Garcia Vda De Chua, the petitioner, filed a motion alleging that she was the true wife of Roberto. However, according to Vallejo, she is not the surviving spouse of the latter but a pretender to the estate since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman and died a bachelor. 23

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is indeed the true wife of Roberto Chua. HELD: The court ruled that petitioner was not able to prove her status as wife of the decedent. She could not produce the original copy or authenticated copy of their marriage certificate. Furthermore, a certification from the Local Civil Registrar was presented that no such marriage contract between petitioner and Roberto Chua was ever registered with them, attested by Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have solemnized the alleged marriage, that he has not solemnized such alleged marriage. Hence, it is clear that petitioner failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which she failed to produce.

Republic vs. CA and Castro GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994 24

FACTS: Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas. The baby was brought in the US and in Castro’s earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig. ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage. HELD: The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he chose to ignore. Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.

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Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio 366 SCRA 437 GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 FACTS: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989. On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson. ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy. HELD: The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either: (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be: (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

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WOLFGANG O. ROEHR vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003 Facts: Petitioner Wolfgang, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen, a Filipina, on 11 December 1980 in Hamburg, Gemany. Early 1981, the marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. They had two daughters, Carolyne and Alexandria Kristine. Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati on 28 August 1996. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondent but was again denied by the trial court. In 1997, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father. It was June 14, 1999 when public respondent issued an order granting the petitioner’s motion to dismiss, but was partially set aside on September 1999 for the purpose of tackling issues regarding property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children. Petitioner assailed for the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction, and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. Issue: Whether or not the Philippine courts can determine the legal effects of a decree of divorce from a foreign country. Held: Yes. Our courts can determine the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as those concerning with support and custody of the children. In this case, the decree did not touch as to who the offending spouse was. The trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education of the best interests of the children. After all, the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolyne 27

and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo 139 SCRA 139

FACTS: Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property. ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen. HELD: Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.

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Cang vs Court of Appeals Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married, begot three children. During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital affair. Anna Marie subsequently filed a petition for legal separation which was granted. They had an agreement for support of the children and that Anna Marie can enter into agreements without the written consent of Herbert. Petitioner left for the US. Meanwhile, the brother and sister-inlaw of Anna Marie filed for the adoption of the 3 minor Cang children. Upon learning of the adoption, Herbert went back to the Philippines to contest it, but the petition for adoption was granted by the court. Issue: Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them? Held: Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." As amended by the Family Code, the statutory provision on consent for adoption now reads: Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (2) the parents by nature of the child , the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality. Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrange mental one, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.

Tenchavez vs. Escano 15 SCRA 355 FACTS: 27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s 29

parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila. Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.

HELD: Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages. WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows; (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño; (2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees; (3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

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Republic vs. Orbecido GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005 FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code. HELD: The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law. Ninal vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122 FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 31

year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void? 2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s marriage after his death? HELD: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void. Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.

Manzano vs. Sanchez AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001

FACTS: Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated” thus, respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels. ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code. 32

HELD: Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both “separated” is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

Cosca vs. Palaypayon 237 SCRA 249 FACTS: The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process Server). Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. EsmeraldaBaroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony. Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included. It was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due 33

to the insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract. An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents. ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid. HELD: Bocaya & Besmonte’s marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage license. They already started living together as husband and wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. However, considering that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated. On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage license was dispensed with considering that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years already before they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when they started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement. Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that “in the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.

Mariategui vs. CA GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992

FACTS: Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children 34

with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto. On the other hand, Lupo’s second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967. ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license. HELD: Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s marriage, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Republic vs. Dayot GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

FACTS: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud. ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement. 35

HELD: CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.

Domingo vs. CA 226 SCRA 572

FACTS: Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of remarriage. HELD: The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from being charged with bigamy. When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of 36

the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. Republic v. Molina GR No. 108763, February 13, 1997 FACTS: Roridel and Reynaldo Molina got married on April 14, 1985 and begotten a child. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and wife who preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them. Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them. Roridel filed for the declaration of nullity of marriage with Reynaldo on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. RULING: The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. There is no showing that the psychological defect refers to the confined meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage existing at the time of marriage. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics but rather the manifestation that he is irresponsible and that the couple cannot get along. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.

LOUEL SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS GR No. 112019, January 4, 1995 FACTS: Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos got married in 1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The two fight a lot because of the frequent inter interference by Julia's parents into the 37

young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents. Julia left to US in 1988 to work as a nurse despite Leouel’s pleas to stop her. He lost contact of her who only called after seven months and promised to return home upon the expiration of her her contract in July 1989 but she never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit US to underwent a training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touc with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail. Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than 5 years are circumstances that show her being psychologically Article 36 of the Family Code incapacitated to enter into married life. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage falls under Article 36 of the Family Code. RULING: The marriage between Leouel and Julia subsists and remains valid. The psychological must exist at the time of marriage and refers to the most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. However, the family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. Marcos v. Marcos G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000 FACTS: Brenda B. Marcos and Wilson Marcos got married in 1982 and had a five children. The two both work at Malacanang at the time of Marcos regime but after the downfall of President Marcos, Wilson had a hard time to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would physically abuse her. Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage on the ground that Wilson Marcos has psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Article 36 which was however reversed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUES: Whether or not the marriage falls under Article 36 of the Family Code. RULING: 38

The marriage between Brenda and Wilson subsists and remains valid. Although undeniable the respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. The conditions of psychological incapacity must exist at the time of marriage. Apparently the petitioner failed to establish the required quantum of evidence to proof such allegation. The behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004 FACTS: Lolita Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, Japanese national, started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayted there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 1987. They got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite on 1988. A month following their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return. He sent money for two months and stopped giving support after that. In 1991, she learned learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child. In her failure to contact him, Lolita filed a for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage falls under Article 36 of the Family Code. RULING: The marriage between Lolita and Toshio subsists and remains valid. The mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina (sic).

Choa vs. Choa GR No. 1473376, November 26, 2002 Facts: Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981 and had two children. In 1993, Alfonso filed an annulment of his marriage to Leni. Afterwards, he filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and 39

deportation which shows latter’s psychological incapacity because according to him it clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him behind bars but also to banish outside the country. ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Choa had presented quantum evidence for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. RULING: Alfonso Choa had presented evidence which was clearly insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Thus, the marriage between Leni and Alfono remains valid. Alfonso testified and complained about three aspects of Leni’s personality namely lack of attention to children, immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and none of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of marital obligations. Irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity.

Antonio vs. Reyes GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006 FACTS: Barely after a year Leonilo Antonio and Marie Ivonne Reyes met, they got married at at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. They hd a child born but died five months later. Antonio claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment. She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family; fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her and other things. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage falls under Article 36 of the Family Code. RULING: The court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Aside from the testimony of the petitioner, a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and 40

significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes’ psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent. Morigo v.People GR NO. 145226, February 6, 2004

Facts: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were Boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted> In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage since the civil case peding posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy and moved for suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith. Issue: Whther or not Morigo must have filed a declaration for nullity of his marriage with barrette before his second marriage in order to free from the bigamy case. Held: Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration off the nullity of his marriage where he contracted his second marriage ith Lumbago. Hence,he did not commit bigamy and acquitted in the case filed. Mercado V. Tan GR. No. 137110, August 1, 2000 Facts: From the evidence adduced by the parties, thre is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo tan got married on June 27,1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. Judge Gornio J. Ibanez which a marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused was single> there is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the weeding with complainant, accused was actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with ma. Thelma Olivia in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge canares. The civil marriage between accused and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Rivas, judicial Vicar Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Olivia bore accused two chidren/ Accused deposited the defence that his previous marriage had been judicially declared null and void and that the private complaint had 41

knowledge of the first marriage of accused. In which the second marriage was entered into with Tan on June 27, 1991, accused prior marriage was still subsisting when he contracted the second marriage. Issue: Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy, in relation to Article 36 and $0 of the Family Code , negates the guilt of the petitioner. Held: The court ruled that the absence of the declaration of nullity of marriage holds that one to be charged with and convicted with bigamy. Such declaration is necessary before one can contract second marriage. Petitioner contracted second marriage although there was yet nu judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the petition the marriage to be declared void only. He committed acts punishable under Article 349 of RPC. That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendecy of that action as prejudicial question in the criminal case. Bobis v. Bobis GR. NO. 138509, July 31, 2000

Facts: On October 21,1985 Isagani Bobis contracted his first marriage with maria Dulce Javier. Without any annulment or termination he contracted a second marriage again with petitioner Imelda Marbella and later on his third marriage agaian with Julia Hernandez.Imelda Marbella Filed a case of bigamy agiants the respondent at RTC of Quezon City. Redpondent filed a motion of suspension to the criminal prejudicial question to criminal case which the RTC granted. Issue: Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of the to bigamyas criminal case. Held: Article 40 fo the family code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage require prior judicial declaration of nullity for the subsequent marriage. Where the decision for the civil case is not essential for the determination of the criminal case is not essential for the determination of the criminal charge. It is therefore not a prejudicial question which arises in a case of resolution which is a logical antecedent to issue involved. The court otherwise ruled that it is in different case of concubinage. De Castro v. De Castro GR. NO. 160172, February 13,2008 42

Facts: Husband and Wife were married in 1963. Wife was a school teacher and Husband worked for DEC. In 1968, Husband with four (4) others formed a company named as Data General Corporation. Husband contributed $15,000 from a joint savings account to help start the company. Three children were born and Wife remained at home caring for the children and husband. Data General Corporation prosper and they lived quite well> in 1980, Husband still visited the wife and still having sexual intercourse. After husband left, Wife began to work as librarian. Wife contributed all of her salary to the maintenance of herself and her children. Husband continued to pay expenses of the households. As of the date of the parties separation husband owned 315,320 shares of Data General Corporation. After further financial dealings, eventually in 1991, husband owned 847,306 shares of Data General Corporation and option to purchase another 50,000 shares at below market value. The judge considered the wife’s contribution and found mat she was 90% responsible for raising the children. The trial judge stock between Husband and appeal. Issue: Whether or not Jusge will not the judge is compelled to consider a husband’s contributions to the computer industry in distributing martial property. Held: Defendant husband in a divore proceeding successfully south a stay of a probate court order dividing company stock equally between the parties. Plaintiff wife sought direct appellate review. The wife contended on appeal that she had been damaged by the issuance of the stay, ad also sought attorney’s fees on the basis that the husband’s appeal of the property division was frivolous. On appeal, the court erred in granting a stay of the transfer of all company stock and held that the stay should have been limited to those shares of stock acquired by the husband after the parties separation. The court held that the wife was entitled to damages resulting from any difference in the value of stock purchased during the marriage or acquired by a stock split between the date of the saty and the date of decision. The court dissolved the saty and remanded the case for a hearing on the amount of damages to which the wife is entitled. Armas v. Calisterio Gr. No. 136467, April 6, 2000

Facts: Teodorico Calisterio was married to Marietta Calisterio. Teoderico died leaving several parcel f land estimated value of P604,750.00. he was the second husband of Marietta who was previously married to William Bounds but latter disappeared for 11 years without traced. Teoderico and Marietta contracted married without securing a declaration of Bounds presumptive death from Marietta. Antonia Armas y calisterio, surviving sister of Teoderico filed a petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the Teodorico. Alleged Teoorico and Marietta’s marriage was bigamous is thereby null and void.Prayed that her son be appointed as the administrator of the intestate of Teodorico and inheritance be adjudicated to her after all. Issue: 43

Whether or not Marietta and Teodorico’s marriage was void due to the absence of the declaration of presumptive death. Held: The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in May 1958where the law in force at the time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took effect in August 1988.Article 256 of the family code itself limit it’s retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rigts in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Since Civil code provides the declaration of presumptive death is not essential before contracting marriage. Which at least 7 consecutive years of absence is enough to remarry therefor Marietta and Teodorico’s marriage was valid.

Republic v. Callejo GR. No. 159614, December 9, 2005 Facts: On March 29, 2001, Alan Alegro filed a petition in RTC of Catbalogan, Samar. For the declaration of presumptive death of his wide, Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton. On January 20,1995 in Catbalogan, Samar.He testified that, on February 6,1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and the berated her for being always out of their house. He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would better for her to go back to her parents.lea did not reply. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found. Alan thought that Lea merely went to her parents’s house in Bliss, Sto Nino, Catbalogan,Samar. However,Lea did not return to their house anymore. Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to manila to look for Lea, but his moter asked him to leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for fiesta. However< lea did not show up. Alan then left for Manila to Lea’s friend house to find out Lea’s whereabouts but he failed to find her. Issue: Whether or not Alan can obtain judicial declration of presumptive death of Lea. Held: The court ruled under Article 41 of the family Code for the Declaration of Presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in the above mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with. There have been times when Article 41of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those who cannot have their marriages declared null and void under Article 36 fo the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for the relief. SSS v. Bailon GR. No. 165545, march 24,2006 44

Facts: In 1995 Clemente bailon and Alice Diaz married in barcelo, Sorsogon. After fifteen years, Clemente filed filed an action to declare the presumptive death of Alice she being an absentee. The petition was granted in 1970. In 1983,, Clemente married jarquue. The two live together until Clemente’s death in 1998. Jarque then sought to claim her husband’s SSS benefits hand, a certain Cecilia Baion-Yap who claimed that presumptive death in bad faith for he was awre of the whereabouts of Alice or if not he could easily located her in her parent’s place. She was in Sorsogon all along in her parent’s place. She went there upon learning that Clemente had been having extramarital affairs. Issue: Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared presumptively dead automatically terminates the subsequent marriage. Held: There is no previous marriage to restore for it is terminated upon Clemente’s death. Likewise there is no subsequent marriage to terminate for the same is terminated upon Clemente’s death. SSS is correct in ruling that it is inutile for Alice to pursue the recording of her reappearance before the local civil registrar through an affidavit or a court action. But it is not correct for the SSS to rule upon the declaration made by the RTC. The SSC or the SSS has no judicial power to review the decision of RTC. It was ruled that jarque’s marriage to Clemente is till valid because no affidavit was filed by Alice to make known her reappearance legally. Alice reappeared only after Clemente’s death and in this case she ca no longer file such affidavit; in this case the bad faith either good faith can no longer be reaised. The marriage herein is considered voidable and must be attacked directly not collaterally. No longer marriage can be questioned for the same has been terminated upon Clemente’s death. Valdez v. Republic GR. No. 180863, September 8, 2009 Facts: Angelita Valdez was married ith Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and id not bring home either provide for there expenses. He left their home on March 1972 so Angelita and her child waited till May 1972 later on they decided to go back to her parent’s home. Three years have passed without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a document to the effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilio’s application for naturalization in US was denied because petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in march 200, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio. Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of Sofio. 45

Held: The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s death is necessary because Civil Code governs during 1971 and not family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and valid. Almenor v. RTC GR. No. 179620, August 26,2008

Facts: Petitioner manuel G. Almenor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 at Manila cathedral. Their union bore thre children. Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician. After 11 years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition wth the RTC. After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the Rtc in las Pinas City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychological incapacitated to perform his marital obligation. Alledging Manuel is homosexual. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in ruling that the trial court as regards the order declaring the marriage as null and void on the ground of petitioner in his share of the conjugal assets. Held: Leonida’s petition for nullity had ‘no basis at all because the supporting gronds relied upon can not legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code. It went further by citing Repulic v. Molina. Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels and or/beatings, unpredictable mood swings or failure in the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to establish psychological incapacity.She wanted to prove that the perceived homosexuality rendered manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential marital obligations. But instead of dismissing the petition, the Trial Court nullified the marriage between thema on the ground of vitiated consent by virtue of fraud. Before this marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him even including his own close friend doubted his true sexual preference. Sin v. Sin GR. No. 137590, march 26,2001

Facts: On January 4, 1987,after a two year courtship and engagement, Florence and respondent Philipp T. Sin a Portuguese citizen , were married at St. Jude catholic parish in San Miguel, 46

Manila. On September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the regional Trial court, Branch 158, Pasig city, a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage against Phillipp. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. On june 16,1995, the trial court dismissed Florence’s petition . On December 19, 1995, Florence filed with the trial court a notice of appeal to the court of appeals. Issue: Whether or not the spouses can obtain judicial declaration of nullity. Held: The court ruled that there is collusion between the parties, he did not actively participate therein. Other than entering his appearance at certain hearings of the case, nothing mre was heard from him. Neither did the presiding Judge take any step to encourage the fiscal to contribute to the proceedings. As provided in Article 48.In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Padilla-Rumbua v. Rumbua GR. No. 166738, August 14,2009 Facts: Petitioner Rowena Padilla-Rumbua alleged his band Edward Rumbua for being psychological incapacity as a ground for Declartion of Nullity of marriage. Psychological incapacitated for not performing his essential of obligations of marriage. The marriage was reported to be negative from collusion. The couples were actually not living together. Petitioner found out that respondent is already cohabitating with another woman. Petitioner presented Dr. Tayag for claiming respondents psychological incapacity through his interviews. Issue: Whether or not the decision of RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grants of new trial . Held: Trial courts decision in remanding the case was not proper, also the petitioner from the onset failed to establish the respodent’s psychological incapacity. According to Article 40 of the Family Code talks about the procedure for the declaration of nullity of marriage to check, aside from the observance of procedure, whether the evidenced are reliable. The petition were denied for lack of merit, which failed to extent the psychological incapacitated of her husband as also baseless when Dr. Tayag never interviewed them both and the psychological incapacity was not rooted historically. Psychological capacity is not present in the case of Bar. Ilusorio v. Bilder 47

GR. No. 127406, November 27,2000 Facts: On march 11,1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio Potenciano Ilusorio were married but been separated. Later on Erlinda filed a case to the Court of Appeals for habeas Corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium. Supreme Court replied via Certiorari pursuing her desire to have the custody of the husband Potenciano. The petition was dismissed for the lack of merit. Issue: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus is valid. Held: Court ruled that petitioner failed to sufficiently convince the Court for the facts presented. Law provides that the husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. It is the sanction of spontaneous affection between spouses. Wherein, empathy received to be the emphasize on the case that defined as a shared feeling between husband and wife were intimacy and affection are discussed. Ayala Investments v. Court of Appeals GR. NO. 118305, February 12,1998 Facts: Private-respondent Alfredo, as executive VP of Philippine blooming Mills, made himself answerable with PBM’s indebtedness of Ayala when he executed security agreements. PBM and Ayala, there will be no judgement since the subject loan did not allowed to benefit of the family and of the conjugal partnership. The lower court issued a temporary retraining order. The court of appeals lifted such order to the success of the auction. The lower court declared the sale null and void, whih the decision of the court was affirmed. Issue: Whether or not the obligation contracted by te husbnd as gurantor can be considered as to have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal pursuant to Article 161 (121) of the Family Code. Held: Under Article 161 of the Civil Code from the old Family Code but now it is on 121 of the family Code. Which provides that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for all the debts and obligations on the benefit of the family’s business , the law presumes that such obligation will redound to the benefit of conjugal partnership. It may not be proven for the actual benefit, the contracted loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety of his family.

48

Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio 43 SCRA 177 Facts: Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio, married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically on September 30, 1943. In 1943, her husband abandoned her. Carmen discovered Eufemio cohabiting with a Chinese woman, Go Hiok. Carmen prayed for the issuance of the decree of legal separation. Eufemio amended answer to the petition and alleged affirmative. Before the trial could be completed, petitioner died in a vehicular accident. With these respondent moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on two grounds; the petition was filed beyond 1-year period and the death of petitioner abated the acted for legal separation. Issue: Whether or not the death of plaintiff in action for legal separation before final decree abated the action. Ruling: An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse and no one else to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona. Gandionco vs. Peñaranda 49

G.R. No. L-72984 November 27, 1987

Facts:

Teresita Gandionco, legal wife of the petitioner, Froilan Gandionco, filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental a complaint against petitioner for legal separation on the ground of concubinage with a petition for support and payment of damages. Teresita also filed a complaint for concubinage against petitioner with MTC of General Santos City. And again for the application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite. The respondent Judge Peñaranda ordered the payment of support pendente lite. Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents thereto should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage.

Issue:

Whether or not the civil action for legal separation shall be suspended on the case of concubinage.

Ruling:

Petition is dismissed. A civil action for legal separation based on concubinage may proceed ahead of or simultaneously with a criminal action for concubinage for the action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability arising from the offense.

50

Civil action is not one “to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense” even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation and granted at the discretion of the judge. Bugayong vs. Ginez G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956 Facts: Benjamin Bugayong, serviceman in the US Navy was married to defendant Leonila Ginez in Pangasinan, while on furlough leave. After marriage, the couples live with the sisters of the husband, before the latter left to report back to duty, the couple came to an agreement that Leonila would stay with Benjamin's sisters. Leonila left the dwelling of her sisters-in-law which she informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Pangasinan. Early in July 1951, Benjamin receive letters from his sister Valeriana Polangco that her wife informing him of alleged acts of infidelity. Benjamin went to Pangasinan and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of Leonila's godmother. They lived again as husband and wife and stayed in the house of Pedro Bugayong, cousin of the plaintiffhusband. On the second day, he tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received but instead of answering, Leonila packed up and left him which Benjamin concluded as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. After he tried to locate her and upon failing he went to Ilocos Norte. Benjamin filed in CIF of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against Leonila, who timely filed an answer vehemently 51

denying the averments of the complaint. Issue: Whether or not the acts charged in line with the truth of allegations of the commission of acts of infidelity amounting to adultery have been condoned by the plaintiff-husband. Ruling: Granting that infidelities amounting to adultery were commited by the wife, the act of the husband in persuading her to come along with him and the fact that she went with him and together they slept as husband and wife deprives him as the alleged offended spouse of any action for legal separation against the offending wife because his said conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of Civil Code.

Pacete vs. Cariaga 231 SCRA 321 Facts: Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation of property. In her complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato; that they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted in 1948 a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in North Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on 1979; that during her

52

marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other "dummies;" that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable settlement; and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. Issue: Whether or not RTC of Cotabato City gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners' motion for extension of time to file their answer on the decree of legal separation. Ruling: Petition is granted. The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate. It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That other remedy, whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted. An action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

53

Macadangdang vs. CA 108 SCRA 314 Facts: Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband being Crispin Anahaw. She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967. She also alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. She gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites. Respondent, then plaintiff, filed a complaint for recognition and support against petitioner, then defendant, with the CIF of Davao. Defendant, now petitioner, Macadangdang filed his answer, opposing plaintiff's claim and praying for its dismissal. The lower court in a pre-trial conference, issued a Pre-trial Order formalizing certain stipulations, admissions and factual issues on which both parties agreed. Correspondingly, upon agreement of the parties, an amended complaint was filed by plaintiff. In its decision rendered, the lower court dismissed the complaint. The decision invoked positive provisions of the Civil Code and Rules of Court and authorities. Issue: Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard. Ruling: SC find no merit in petitioner's submission that the questioned decision had not become final and executory since the law explicitly and clearly provides for the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation. 54

It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised attempt to evade the responsibility and consequence of her reckless behavior at the expense of her husband, her illicit lover and above all her own son. For this Court to allow, much less consent to, the bastardization of respondent's son would give rise to serious and far-reaching consequences on society. This Court will not tolerate scheming married women who would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and then exploit the children born during such immoral relations by using them to collect from such moneyed paramours. This would be the form of wrecking the stability of two families. This would be a severe assault on morality. Ilusorio vs. Bildner G.R. No. 139789 May 12, 2000 Facts: Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty years. Out of their marriage, the spouses had six children. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived in Makati when he was in Manila and in Ilusorio penthouse when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. When Potenciano arrived from United States and lived with Erlinda in Antipolo City for five months. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that their mother overdosed their father with an antidepressant drug which the latter's health deteriorated. Erlinda filed with RTC of Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the person and property of her husband due to the latter's advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight 55

and impaired judgment. Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived in a condominium in Makati City after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City. With these, Erlinda filed with CA a petition for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband and also for the reason that respondent refused petitioner's demands to see and visit her husband and prohibiting Potenciano from living with her in Antipolo City. Issue: Whether or not Erlinda Ilusorio may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with The essential her in conjugal bliss. Ruling: object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman's free choice. Therefore, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. Ayala Investments vs. CA G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998 Facts: 56

Article 73; Philippine Blooming Mills loan from petitioner Ayala Investment. As an added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching - Exec. VP, executed security agreements and making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness to Ayala Investments. PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, Ayala Investments filed a case for sum of money against PBM and Alfredo Ching. The lower court issued a writ of execution of pending appeal. Thereafter, deputy sheriff Magsajo caused issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties. Private respondents, spouses Ching, filed a case of injunction against petitioners alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against conjugal partnership levied on the ground that the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. Upon application of private respondents, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order to prevent Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale of the said properties at public auction. Issue: Whether or not loan acquired by PBM from Ayala Investments as guaranteed by Alfredo Ching be redounded to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. Ruling: The husband and the wife can engage in any lawful enterprise or profession. While it is but natural for the husband and the wife to consult each other, the law does not make it a requirement that a spouse has to get the prior consent of the other before entering into any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity. The exercise by a 57

spouse of a legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity is always considered to redound to the benefit of the family. But an isolated transaction of a spouse such as being guarantor for a third person's debt is not per se considered as redounding to the benefit of the family. Therefore, to hold the absolute community or the conjugal partnership property liable for any loss resulting from such isolated activity, proofs showing a direct benefit to the family must be presented. Agapay vs. Palang 276 SCRA 341 Facts: Article 87; Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage to Carlina Vallesterol in the church at Pangasinan. A few months after the wedding, he left to work in Hawaii. Out their union was born Herminia Palang, respondent. Miguel returned to the Philippines but he stayed in Zambales with his brother during the entire duration of his year-long sojourn, not with his wife or child. Miguel had also attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good, he refused to live with his wife and child. When Miguel was then 63 yrs. old, he contracted his second marriage with a nineteen year old Erlinda Agapay, petitioner. As evidenced by deed of sale, both jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan. A house and lot was likewise purchased allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. To settle and end a case filed by the first wife, Miguel and Cornelia executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement. The parties agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to 58

their only child, Herminia Palang. Miguel and Erlinda's cohabitation produced a son and then two years later Miguel died. Thereafter, Carlina filed a complaint of concubinage on the previous party. Respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. Petitioner contended that she had already given her half of the riceland property to their son and that the house and lot is her sole property having bought with her own money. RTC affirmed in favor of the petitioner while CA reversed the said decision. Issue: Whether or not petitioner may own the two parcels of land acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner and Miguel Palang. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the conveyance of the property was not by way of sale but was a donation and therefore void. The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001 Facts: Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of two lots in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with

59

waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her ¼ share of the property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the latter's cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take care of his house and store. Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same room while Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her. A few months before Francisco's death, he executed an instrument denominated “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of the “faithful services she had rendered over the past ten years.” Thereafter, Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession and damages. Respondents, who are nieces, nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille be declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code. Ruling:

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Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two persons lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by one in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the donation inter vivos is considered null and void.

Brown v. Yambao 102 Phil 168 Facts:

Brown alleges that while he was interned by the Japanese from 1942 to1945, his wife had engaged in adulterous relationships from which she begot a child. He learned of it after his release. From then on they decided to live separately from each other and executed, to this effect, an agreement liquidating conjugal partnership, even giving the erring wife a share. On July, he filed a suit for legal separation praying for confirmation of said agreement, custodial rights and disqualification of wife from succession of plaintiff. Her wife was declared in default for not having answered on time. When cross-examined by the assistant city fiscal, it was revealed however that Brown, after the liberation from the internment, had also lived with another woman with whom he has begotten children. The court refused to grant the petition on the basis of prescription, commission of similar offense by petitioner, and involvement of consent and connivance.

Issue Can a proceedings for legal separation can still be instituted when both spouses are offenders?

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No. His petition cannot prosper for two reasons: (1) prescriptive period is over since he learned of his wife’s relations in 1945 and only filed a complaint after ten years; and (2) His cohabitation with another woman bars him from claiming legal separation. Failure of the wife to set up a defense may be considered circumstantial evidence of collusion between them. Consent and connivance no longer need to be proven there being two established statutory grounds to grant the decree f legal separation.

MALANG vs. MOSON (G.R. No. 119064, 22 August 2000) FACTS: Abdula contracted marriage with Aida and had 3sons with her. Adbula then married for a second time withJ u b a i d a a n d n o c h i l d w a s b o r n o u t o f t h a t m a r r i a g e . Abdula divorced

Aida. Abdula

no child. Thereafter,

then he

married

contracted

Nayo

and

they

also

had

a n o t h e r marriage with Mabay and had a

daughter with her. Not long after, Abdula married 3 other Muslim women but eventually d i v o r c e d t h e m . A b d u l a t h e n m a r r i e d h i s 4 t h wife Neng, e x c l u d i n g t h e w i v e s h e d i v o r c e d . T h e y w e r e c h i l d l e s s . Abdula died without leaving a will. HELD: Abdula died intestate on December 1993. It is the Muslim Code which should determine the identification of the heirs in the order of intestate succession and therespective shares of the heirs. T h e M u s l i m C o d e t o o k e f f e c t o n F e b r u a r y 4 , 1 9 7 7 . I f a M u s l i m d i e d b e f o r e t h e effectivity of the Muslim Code, the order of succession shall be governed by the Civil Code. The status and capacity to succeed on the part of the individual parties who entered into each and every marriage ceremony will depend upon the law in force at the time of the performance of the marriage rite. If the Muslim marriage

took

place

during

the

effectivity

of

the

Civil

Code and

before the

e f f e c t i v i t y o f t h e M u s l i m C o d e , h e cannot marry again because under the Civil Code, only one marriage is valid. But when the marriage took place when the Muslim Code has taken effect, subsequent marriages are allowed and valid.The right of the spouses to inherit

will

depend

on

whether

or not

they

have been

validly

married. If t h e y a r e n o t v a l i d l y m a r r i e d , t h e n t h e y d o n o t h a v e suc cessional rights over their partner. The status and capacity to succeed of the children w i l l d e p e n d u p o n t h e l a w i n f o r c e a t t h e t i m e o f conception or birth of the child. A s t o p r o p e r t y r e l a t i o n s , i t i s t h e C i v i l C o d e t h a t determines 62

and governs the property relations of the marriages in this case, for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the marriages in question, the Civil Code was the only on marriage relations, including property relations between spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Uy vs. CA (GR No. 109557, November 29, 2000) FACTS: Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his functions. She further contest that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that would require her to sell their property in Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings. The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the petition made by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading on “Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife” contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in their case. During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law. Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular accident rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements. 63

HELD: SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, trial court found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. The law provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as administrator of the conjugal property, must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under FC. SC further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due process.

Partosa-Jo vs CA (GR 82606, December 18, 1992) FACTS: The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent. The latter admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a complaint against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for support which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite disposition of the complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property. Jose elevated the decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the separation of property was dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the

64

initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to be separated permanently. She even returned to him but the latter refused to accept her. ISSUE: Whether or not

there is

abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial

separation of conjugal property. HELD: SC is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary modification instead of dismissing the case filed. For abandonment to exist, there must be an absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. The fact that Jo did not accept her demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to Prima. Hence, the physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court ordered the conjugal property of the spouses be divided between them, share and share alike. The division will be implemented after the determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership including those that may have been illegally registered in the name of the persons.

65

De la Cruz vs. De la Cruz G.R. No. L-19565 30 January 1968

FACTS: On 01 February 1938, Estrella and Severino married in Bacolod City. During their union, six (6) children were born, and seven (7) parcels of land from Bacolod Cadastre and three (3) parcels of land from Silay Cadastre were acquired. These lands were assessed at P45,429 and P43,580, respectively. The hacienda in Silay had a net profit of P3,309.49 in 1957. Aside from these properties, the spouses also owned a number of varied businesses and subdivisions. On 22 July 1958, Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint alleging that her husband had not only abandoned her, but also mismanaged their conjugal partnership properties. According to Estrella, since 1955, Severino had not lived in their conjugal home, but instead had lived in his office and thereafter had been living in Manila with his concubine, Nenita Hernandez. This was supported by notes and letters written by Nenita which Estrella found hidden in the pocket of her husband’s polo shirt and then in his iron safe thereafter. When confronted, Severino denied of abandoning his wife and children. He reasoned that he was only living in his office to teach a lesson to his quarrelsome and extremely jealous wife. He further averred that he never failed to give his family financial support as evidenced by the allowance drawings of the wife in the amounts ranging from P1000 to P1500 from the office, which was corroborated by Marcos Ganaban, the assistant general manager of Philippine Textboard Factory.

66

Furthermore, Estrella insists that her husband refused and failed to inform her of the status of their various business concerns. She further claims that such actuations are tantamount to an abuse of administrative powers over the conjugal partnership properties. However, no evidence from the plaintiff was presented. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitute abandonment in law and would justify a separation of the conjugal partnership properties?

2. Whether the defendant’s failure and/or refusal to inform the plaintiff of the state of their business enterprises such an abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership as to warrant a division of matrimonial assets?

HELD: 1. NO, THE DEFENDANT IS NOT GUILTY OF ABANDONMENT. The Court held that the plaintiff’s prayer that her plea for separation of conjugal partnership properties under Articles 167 and 178 of the new Civil Code requires a presentment of real abandonment and not mere separation. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion. Physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term “abandonment”, if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. The Court further believed that the defendant did not intend to leave his wife and children permanently despite his absence from the conjugal home, as shown by the evidence on record that he continued to give support to his family. Furthermore, the evidence on record fails to preponderate in favour as to whether Severino kept Nenita as a concubine. Credible evidence is needed, which the plaintiff failed to show and is negatived by her testimony that she had not seen Nenita’s handwriting before. 2. NO, THE DEFENDANT IS NOT GUILTY OF ABUSING HIS POWERS OF ADMINISTRATION OVER THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTIES.

67

There is no evidence on the record to show that he has squandered the conjugal assets. The refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the family businesses does not constitute in abuse.

BA Finance Corp vs. CA (GR 61464, May 28 1988) FACTS: Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as a representative of A&L Industries. Augusto presented an alleged special power of attorney executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who managed the business and under whose name the said business was registered, purportedly authorized the husband to procure the loan and sign the promissory note. 2months prior the procurement of the loan, Augusto left Lily and their children which in turn abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation became due and demandable, Augusto failed to pay the same.

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The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment alleging that said spouses were guilty of fraud consisting of the execution of Deed of Assignment assigning the rights, titles and interests over a construction contract executed by and between the spouses and A. Soriano Corporation. The writ hereby prayed for was issued by the trial court and not contented with the order, petitioner filed a motion for the examination of attachment debtor alleging that the properties attached by the sheriff were not sufficient to secure the satisfaction of any judgment which was likewise granted by the court. ISSUE: Whether or not A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband.

HELD: A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered owner is Lily Yulo. The said proprietorship was established during the marriage and assets were also acquired during the same. Hence, it is presumed that the property forms part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband. However, for the property to be liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The obligation was contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because at the time he incurred such obligation, he had already abandoned his family and left their conjugal home. He likewise made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of the company to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, there must be the requisite showing that some advantage accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto against his conjugal properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of attachment cannot be issued against the said properties and that the petitioner is ordered to pay Lily actual damages amouting to P660,000.00.

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Johnson & Johnson (Phils.) Inc. vs. Court Of Appeals and Alejo M. Vinluan (G.R. No. 102692 23 September 1996) FACTS: On several occasions in 1982, the defendant, Delilah Vinluan, purchased products of Johnson & Johnson, as she was also engaged in the business of retailing Johnson products, among others. The defendants, under the name and style of “Vinluan Enterprises,” thus incurred an obligation of P235,880.89 for which she issued seven Philippine Banking Corporation checks of varying amounts and due dates. However, the checks were dishonoured for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Several extensions were given to the spouses to settle the obligation. On 05 January 1983, the defendant spouses made a partial payment of P5,000.00, but made no further payments afterwards. The trial court found that Alejo Vinluan, had no privity of contract, whether direct or indirect, regarding those obligations incurred by his wife, as he only became a co-owner of Vinluan Enterprises after the obligations involved in this action had been incurred by Delilah. In addition, said obligations were contracted without the husband’s knowledge or consent, and that the conjugal partnership never derived benefit therefrom. The trial court decided that Alejo should not be held liable for the obligations incurred by his wife without his knowledge or consent. However, when notices of levy on execution were issued, these covered not only Delilah’s exclusive or paraphernal properties, but also the real and personal properties of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Vinluan. This has caused Alejo to file a third-party claim, which was denied by the trial court.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the trial court denying private respondent’s third-party claim and motion to quash levy on execution in effect amended the dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision which had long become final and executory. HELD: NO, THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT, IN THE GUISE OF DECIDING THE THIRD-PARTY CLAIM, REVERSE ITS FINAL DECISION. In order to bind the conjugal partnership and its properties, the law provides that the debts and obligations contracted must be for the benefit of the conjugal partnership; and that the husband must consent to his wife’s engaging in business. The text of the trial court’s decision points to no other person liable but Delilah Vinluan, and in fact made a rather lengthy discussion on the exemption from liability of the conjugal partnership; hence, there can be no ambiguity to speak of in the decision. And even more clearly, the body of the decision of the trial court expressly exempted private respondent from liability by categorically ruling that “the defendanthusband cannot, together, with the co-defendant legally be made liable for the obligations contracted by the wife.”

Spouses Laperal vs Spouses Katigbak (GR 16991, March 31, 1964) FACTS:

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CFI Manila declared the property covered by TCT No.57626 as separate or paraphernal property of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak. The spouses Laperal disagree with this finding reiterating that its improvements and income are conjugal assets of the Spouses Katigbak. When the spouses Katigbak got married, neither of them brought properties unto the marriage. Ramon’s occupation rendered him a monthly income of P200.00. The property in question was registered in the name of “Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak married to Ramon Katigbak”. The latter declared that her mother was the one who bought the property for her and had placed it only in her name as the practice of her mother in buying properties and placing them directly in the names of her children. The husband having no interest with the property only signed the document for the purpose of assisting his wife. In August 1950, the Laperals filed a case and was granted by the trial court against the Katigbaks in recovery of P14,000 and jewelry amounting to P97,500 or in lieu thereof, to pay such amount. A month after the decision was rendered, Evelina filed a complaint against her husband for judicial separation of property and separate administration which was granted by the court and was sought for annulment by the Laperals. ISSUE: Whether or not the property in question constitutes the paraphernal property of Evelina. HELD: All properties acquired during the marriage are presumed conjugal. It is however not conclusive but merely rebuttable, unless it be proved that the property belong exclusively to the husband and wife. In the case at bar, the deed of the land is under the name of the wife. At the time it was purchased, the property was of substantial value and as admitted, the husband by himself could not have afforded to buy considering the singular source of income. Hence, the property covered by TCT 57626 is considered a paraphernal property of the wife.

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Villanueva vs. IAC (GR No. 67582, October 29, 1987) FACTS: Modesto Aranas, husband of Victoria, inherited a land from his father. Dorothea and Teodoro, Modesto’s illegitimate children, borrowed money from private respondent Jesus Bernas, mortgaging as collateral their father’s property. In the loan agreement, Aranas described themselves as the absolute co-owners. Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay the loan resulting to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage in 1977 and thereafter Bernas acquired the land as the highest bidder. Aftewards, the Aranases executed a deed of extrajudicial partition in 1978, in which they adjudicated the same land unto themselves in equal share pro-indiviso. Bernas then consolidated his ownership over the lot when the mortgagors failed to redeem it withn the reglementary period, and had the title in the name of Modesto cancelled and another TCT issued in his name. In 1978, petitioner Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against respondents spouses Jesus and Remedios Bernas, for the cancellation of the TCT under the name of the Bernases, and they be declared co-owners of the land. Petitioner alleged that spouses Modesto and Victoria in 1987 and 1958 executed 2 separate wills: first bequeathing to Consolacion and Raymundo and to Dorothea and Teodoro, in equal shares pro diviso, all of said Victoria’s shares from the conjugal partnership property; and second

73

Modesto’s interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as his separate properties bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro. Trial court dismissed the complaint, declaring herein respondents as the legal owners of the disputed property. IAC likewise affirmed the lower court’s decision. ISSUE: Whether or not Villanueva had a right over the land and the improvements thereon made by Victoria who rendered the lot as conjugal property. HELD: The land was not a conjugal partnership property of Victoria and Modesto. It was Modesto’s exclusive property since he inherited it from his parents. Moreover, since Victoria died ahead of Modesto, Victoria did not inherit said lot from him and therefore had nothing of the land to bequeath by will of otherwise to Consolacion. Article 158 of the Civil Code says that improvements, whether for utility or adornment made on the separate property of the spouses through advancements from the partnership or through the industry of either spouse belong to the conjugal partnership, and buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same. There was no proof presented by Villanueva. Such proof is needed at the time of the making or construction of the improvements and the source of the funds used thereof in order to determine the character of the improvements as belonging to the conjugal partnership or to one spouse separately. What is certain is that the land on which the improvements stand was the exclusive property of Modesto and that where the property is registered in the name of one spouse only and there is no showing of when precisely the property was acquired, the presumption is that is belongs exclusively to said spouse. It is not therefore possible to declare the improvements to be conjugal in character. Furthermore, Bernas’ mode of acquisition of ownership over the property appears in all respect to be regular, untainted by any defect whatsoever. Bernas must therefore be deemed to have acquired indefeasible and clear title to the lot which cannot be defeated or negated by claims subsequently arising and of which he had no knowledge or means of knowing prior to their assertion and ventilation. BPI vs. Posadas (GR No. 34583, October 22, 1931) 74

FACTS: BPI, as administrator of the estate of deceased Adolphe Schuetze, appealed to CFI Manila absolving defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, from the complaint filed against him in recovering the inheritance tax amounting to P1209 paid by the plaintiff, Rosario Gelano Vda de Schuetze, under protest, and sum of P20,150 representing the proceeds of the insurance policy of the deceased. Rosario and Adolphe were married in January 1914. The wife was actually residing and living in Germany when Adolphe died in December 1927. The latter while in Germany, executed a will in March 1926, pursuant with its law wherein plaintiff was named his universal heir. The deceased possessed not only real property situated in the Philippines but also personal property consisting of shares of stocks in 19 domestic corporations. Included in the personal property is a life insurance policy issued at Manila on January 1913 for the sum of $10,000 by the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Manila Branch. In the insurance policy, the estate of the deceased was named the beneficiary without any qualification. Rosario is the sole and only heir of the deceased. BPI, as administrator of the decedent’s estate and attorney in fact of the plaintiff, having been demanded by Posadas to pay the inheritance tax, paid under protest. Notwithstanding various demands made by plaintiff, Posadas refused to refund such amount. ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds of the insurance.

HELD: SC ruled that(1)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute community property, and belong one-half to the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; (2)if the premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in part; and (3)the proceeds of a lifeinsurance policy payable to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the 75

testamentary administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under probate administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or outside. Hence, the defendant was ordered to return to the plaintiff one-half of the tax collected upon the amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, after deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first premium.

Wong vs. IAC (GR No. 70082, August 19, 1991) FACTS: Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3 children however, even during the early years of their marriage, the spouses had been most of the time living separately. During the marriage or on about January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of land in Angeles from his father using the money borrowed from an officemate. Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered an agreement with Anita Chan where the latter consigned the former pieces of jewelry valued at P321,830.95. Katrina failed to return the same within the 20 day period thus Anita demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in September 1972, check of P55,000 which was dishonored due to lack of funds. The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money against Katrina and her husband Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed was only in behalf of Katrina. Trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public auction to Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before such 76

redemption, Romarico filed an action for annulment of the decision including the writ and levy of execution. ISSUE: Whether or not debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be satisfied through the conjugal property. HELD: The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the business deal with Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor authorized her to enter into such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage with unclear proof where the husband obtained the money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to belong in the conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of the husband and even though they had been living separately. A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for support of the family. The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico and the execution of judgments extends only over properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrina’s obligations as she exclusively incurred the latter without the consent of her husband nor they did redound to the benefit of the family. There was also no evidence submitted that the administration of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by Romarico before said obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far as Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute the debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively. AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO MAGSAJO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING, respondents. [G.R. No. 118305. February 12, 1998] FACTS : Philippine Blooming Mills loan from petitioner Ayala Investment. As an added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching – Exec. VP, executed security agreements and making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to Ayala Investments, PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, Ayala Investments filed a case for sum of money against PBM and Alfredo Ching. The lower court issued a writ of execution of pending appeal. Thereafter, deputy sheriff Magsajo caused issuance and service upon respondentsspouses of a notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties. 77

Private respondents, spouses Ching, filed a case of injunction against petitioners alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against conjugal partnership levied on the ground that the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. Upon application of private respondents, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order to prevent Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale of the said properties at public auction. ISSUE : Whether or not loan acquired by PBM from Ayala Investments as guaranteed by Alfredo Ching be redounded to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. RULING : The husband and the wife can engage in any lawful enterprise or profession. While it is but natural for the husband and the wife to consult each other, the law does not make it a requirement that a spouse has to get the prior consent of the other before entering into any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity. The exercise by a spouse of a legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity is always considered to redound to the benefit of the family. But an isolated transaction of a spouse such as being guarantor for a third person’s debt is not per se considered as redounding to the benefit of the family. Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, “if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety orguarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership”. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM. Therefore, to hold the absolute community or the conjugal partnership property liable for any loss resulting from such isolated activity, proofs showing a direct benefit to the family must be presented.

Carlos vs. Abelardo GR No. 146504, April 4, 2002 FACTS: Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of the $25,000 loan used to purchase a house and lot located at Paranaque. It was in October 1989 when the petitioner issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in conducting their married life independently. The seller of the property acknowledged receipt of the full payment. In July 1991, the petitioner inquired from spouses status of the amount loaned from him, the spouses pleaded that they were not yet in position to make a definite settlement. Thereafter, 78

respondent expressed violent resistance to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner. In 1994, petitioner made a formal demand but the spouses failed to comply with the obligation. The spouses were separated in fact for more than a year prior the filing of the complaint hence spouses filed separate answers. Abelardo contended that the amount was never intended as a loan but his share of income on contracts obtained by him in the construction firm and that the petitoner could have easily deducted the debt from his share in the profits. RTC decision was in favor of the petitioner, however CA reversed and set aside trial court’s decision for insufficiency of evidence. Evidently, there was a check issued worth $25,000 paid to the owner of the Paranaque property which became the conjugal dwelling of the spouses. The wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign. ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged against the conjugal partnership. HELD: Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the same served as their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. Abelardo’s contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the construction firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders that will entitle him to the profits and income of the company. Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount of $25,000 plus legal interest including moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Mariano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101522 May 28, 1993 Facts: Francisco Gosiengfiao is the registered owner of a residential lot located at Ugac Sur,Tuguegarao, Cagayan recorded in the Register of Deeds of Cagayan.The lot in question was mortgaged by the decedent to the Rural Bank of Tuguegarao.The loanbeing unpaid, the lot in dispute was foreclosed by the mortgagee bank and in the foreclosuresale to the mortgagee bank as the highest bidder; third-party defendant Amparo Gosiengfiao-Ibarra redeemed the property.Plaintiffs Grace Gosiengfiao, et al. filed a complaint for "recovery of possession and legalredemption with damages" against defendants Leonardo and Avelina Mariano. Plaintiffs allegedin their complaint that as co-heirs and co-owners of the lot in question, they have the right torecover their respective shares in the same, and property as they did not sell the same, and theright of redemption with regard to the shares of other co-owners sold to the defendants. ISSUE : Whether or not a co-owner who redeems the whole property with her own personal funds becomes the sole owner of said property and terminates the existing state of co-ownership. Property; co-ownership; right of legal redemption.  79

A co-owner who redeems the whole property with her own personal funds does not become the sole owner of saidproperty; the redemption inures to the benefit of all the other co-owners. Hence, a childof a decedent whose mortgaged land was auctioned in the foreclosure sale remains aco-owner of the property with right of redemption, notwithstanding the fact that the land was redeemed by a co-heir and co-owner. (M ariano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.101522 M ay 28, 1993)

Ching vs CA • A (Alfred Ching) is the Vice-President of PBM Inc., w h i c h obtained a loan from ABC Bank. A executed a continuingg u a r a n t e e w i t h t h e b a n k b i n d i n g h i m s e l f t o j o i n t l y a n d s e v e r a l l y guarantee the loan.• PBM Inc. defaulted on the loan, and as a consequence the deputysheriff of the trial court levied ona t t a c h m e n t t h e 100,000 common shares of C Corporation in A ' s name.• A ' s w i f e E f i l e d a M o t i o n t o S e t A s i d e t h e l e v y o n t h e attachment. She alleged that the stocks were a c q u i r e d b y her and her husband during their m a r r i a g e o u t o f conjugal funds and therefore cannot be usedto pay off her husband’s exclusive liability. LESSONS: • All properties acquired during marriage are presumed t o b e l o n g to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proven that the property is exclusively the husband’s or the wife’s.• Whoever claims that the property acquired by the spouses duringtheir marriage is not conjugal partnership property but is exclusive owned by one of them as his personal property is burdened to provet h e s o u r c e o f t h e m o n e y u t i l i z e d t o p u r c h a s e t h e p r o p e r t y . I t i s necessary to have clear, satisfactory andconvincing evidence to overcome the presumption of the conjugalnature of the property acquired duringthe marriage.• F o r t h e c o n j u g a l p a r t n e r s h i p t o b e l i a b l e f o r a n o b l i g a t i o n , t h e r e must be some showing that somea d v a n t a g e a c c r u e d t o t h e s p o u s e s . T h e b e n e f i t s m u s t b e t h o s e directly resulting from the obligation. T heycannot merely be a by-product or spin-off of the obligation. Buado vs. CA, 586 SCRA 397, April 24, 2009 a. Facts i. April 30, 1984 – Civil case for damages that arose from slander filed bysps. Buado against Erlinda Nicolii. April 6, 1987 – RTC ruled that Erlinda is liable and ordered her to pay fordamages, which was affirmed by CA and SCiii. Oct 14, 1992 – Trial court issued writ of execution, directing the sheriff tocollect the indemnification from Erlindaiv. Finding Erlinda’s personal properties insufficient, sheriff deigned to issuea notice of levy on real property on execution, and thereafter, a notice of sheriff’s sale was issued v. Two days prior to the bidding, a Third Party Claim was received at the sheriff’s office from one Arnulfo Fulo, prompting spouses Buado to put up asheriff’s indemnity bond. 80

Sale proceeded with the sps. Buado emerging asthe highest biddervi.A year after the sale, Romulo Nicol, husband of Erlinda, filed a complaintfor annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunctionagainst petitioners and the deputy sheriff, and alleged that the property wasdirectly levied upon without exhausting the personal properties of Erlindab. Issue – WON the husband considered subsidiarily liable for indemnification of wife’s civil liability via disposal of conjugal propertyc. Ruling - Article 122 of the Family Code16 explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriageshall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redoundedto the benefit of the family. Unlike in the system of absolute community wherel i a b i l i t i e s i n c u r r e d b y e i t h e r s p o u s e b y r e a s o n o f a c r i m e o r q u a s i - d e l i c t i s chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded inthe system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains hasno duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. Case isremanded to the lower court for further proceedings Valdes vs. RTC 260 SCRA 221 FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer. Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father. ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having 81

contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

Francisco vs. Master Iron Works Construction Corporation GR. No. 151967, February 16, 2005 FACTS: Josefina Castillo was 24 years old when she and Eduardo Francisco got married on January 1983. The latter was then employed as Vice President in a Private Corporation. Josefina acquired two parcels of land where Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina, married to Eduardo. An affidavit of waiver was executed by Eduardo where he declared that prior to his marriage with Josefina, the latter purchased the land with her own savings and that he waived whatever claims he had over the property. When Josefina mortgaged the property for a loan, Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed. In 1990, Eduardo who was then a General Manager, bought bags of cement from defendant but failed to pay the same. The latter filed a complaint for recovery and trial court rendered judgment against Eduardo. The court then issued a writ of execution and the sheriif issued a notice of levy on execution over the alleged property of Josefina for the recovery of the balance of the amount due under the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a third party claim over the 2 parcels of land in which she claimed as her paraphernal property. ISSUE: WON the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo. HELD: The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was the sole owner. The Deed of Absolute Sale on record showed it was issued after her marriage. Their case fall under Article 148 and since they got married before the Family Code, the provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested rights. Petitioner likewise failed that she had any vested right. Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that invalidates such marriage, Art 148 should be applied. In the absence of proof that the wife/husband has actually contributed money, property, or industry to the properties acquired during such union the presumption of co-ownership will not arise. 82

The petition was denied for lack of merit. The decision of CA that the property was conjugal was affirmed.

ABING V. WAEYAN (Coownership) 497 July

SCRA 31,

202 2006

Facts: In 1986, petitioner and respondent cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together, they bought a house erected on a lot owned by Dino in Benguet. The tax declaration was thereafter transferred to respondent’s name. In 1995, they decided to partition their properties as their relationship soured. Eventually, petitioner demanded respondent to vacate the annex structure when respondent failed to pay petitioner’s share in their properties. Petitioner alleged that he alone paid for the construction of the annex structure. Issue: Whether or not the property subject of the suit pertains to the exclusive ownership of petitioner. Held: Any property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. And under this regime, they owned their properties in common “in equal shares.” Being herself a co-owner of the structure in question, respondent, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.

Agapay vs. Palang GR No. 116668, July 28, 1997 FACTS: Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950. The trial court found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan. The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On the 83

other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child Herminia. Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. They sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision. ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay.

HELD: The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. However, their marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective contributions. It is required that there be an actual contribution. If actual contribution is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store. However, she failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed money to but the subjected riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only around 20 years old compared to Miguel who was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US Government. Considering his youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed the P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased and Carlina. It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of Herminia. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation 84

in the marriage settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was not specifically for separation of property and should not be so inferred. With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property revealed the falshood of Erlinda’s claim that she bought such property for P20,000 when she was 22 years old. The lawyer testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase price and directed Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee. The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of the law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code, expressly provides that the prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

uaniza vs Jose GR. No. L50127-28, March 30, 1979 FACTS: Eugenio Jose, a registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the PNR that took place in November 1969 resulted in the 7 deaths and 5 physical injuries of its passengers. That time, Eugenio was married to Socorro but had been cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo, defendant-appellant for 16 years as husband and wife. Trial court decision rendered them jointly and severally liable to pay damages to the heir of the deceased, Victor Juaniza. A motion was prayed for by Rosalia for the decision to be reconsidered. ISSUE: WON Eugenio and Rosalia are co-owners of the jeepney. HELD: The co-ownership provided in Article 147 applied only when the parties are not incapacitated to marry. Hence, the jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership with the lawful wife. The common-law wife not being the registered owner cannot be held liable for the damages caused 85

by its operation. There is therefore no basis for her liability in the damages arising from the death of and physical injuries suffered by the passengers.

Tumlos vs. Fernandez Case Digest Tumlos vs. Fernandez G.R. No. 137650 April 12, 2000 Facts: Spouses Fernandez filed an action of ejectment against petitioner Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their complaint, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through tolerance they had allowed the defendants-private respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last 7 years without the payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few months, Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was not complied with by the said defendants. They have demanded several times that the defendants vacate the premises, as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building. Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the complaint. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a covendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez. She then asked for the dismissal of the complaint. Upon appeal to the RTC, petitioner and the two other defendants alleged in their memorandum on appeal that Mario and petitioner had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the property in question as their "love nest." It was further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for around 10 years, and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is the co-owner of the property in litis. Ruling: Petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with respondent Mario. Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition. Clearly, there is no basis for petitioner’s claim of co-ownership. The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents.

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Docena vs. Lapesura Case Digest Docena vs. Lapesura G.R. No. 140153 March 28, 2001 Facts: Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on occupation since time immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and the intervenor Abuda. The CA reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the petitioners to vacate the land they have leased from Casiano. The Complaint in Intervention of Abuda was dismissed. A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners with the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge in issuing the Orders and of the sheriff in issuing the Writ of Demolition. Issue: Whether or not joint management or administration does require that the husband and the wife always act together. Ruling: Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases. It is believed that even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband alone could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect. The signing petitioner here made the certification in his behalf and that of his wife. The husband may reasonably be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his wife of any action or claim similar to the petition for certiorari and prohibition given the notices and legal processes involved in a legal proceeding involving real property

Martinez vs Martinez GR No. 162084, June 28, 2005 FACTS:

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Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land. The former executed a last will and testament directing the subdivision of the property into 3 lots bequeathed to each of his sons namely Rodolfo, Manolo (designated as administrator of the estate), and Daniel Jr. In October 1997, Daniel Sr. died. Rodolfo then found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on September 1996 where it appears that the land was sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila and was also issued to them. Rodolfo filed a complaint against his brother Manolo and sister-in-law Lucila for the annulment of the deed of sale and cancellation of the TCT. Spouses wrote Rodolfo demanding him to vacate the property which the latter ignored and refused to do so. This prompted the spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo. This matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation and settlement but none was reached. It was alleged in the position paper of the spouses that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made but the same proved futile. ISSUE: WON spouses Martinez complied with the requirements of Art 151 of the Family Code. HELD: No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but the same have failed. Lucila Martinez, the respondent’s sister-in-law was one of the plaintiffs in the case at bar. The petitioner is not a member of the same family as that of her deceased husband and the respondent. Her relationship with the respondent is not one of those enumerated in Article 150. It should also be noted that the petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against the respondent for unlawful detainer in the katarungan Pambarangay in compliance with PD1508 and that after due proceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived at resulting in the barangay chairman’s issuance of a certificate to file action.

Hontiveros vs. RTC GR No. 125465, June 29, 1999 FACTS: Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case. In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single. They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of and income from the land. On the contrary, according to the private respondents, the possession of the property in question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession. Trial court denied petitioner’s 88

motion that while in the amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in Article 151. ISSUE: WON the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted towards a compromise as stated in Article 151. HELD: SC held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article 151. Under this provision, the phrase “members of the same family” refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effects in this jurisdiction. Teodora and Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros’ are regarded as strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151.

Manalo vs CA GR No. 129242, January 16, 2001 FACTS: Troadic Manalo who died on February 1992, was survived by his Pilar and his 11 children. The deceased left several real properties in Manila and a business in Tarlac. In November 1992, herein respondents, 8 of the surviving children, filed a petition with RTC Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for appointment of their brother Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof. Hearing was set on February 11, 1993 and the herein petitioners were granted 10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition. ISSUE: WON the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition. HELD: It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief were sought in the complaint or petition, shall be 89

controlling. The careful scrutiny of the petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement and distribution of the estate belies herein petitioners’ claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The provision of Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. It is clear from the term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or enforcement of a right. It is also the intention of the Code Commission as revealed in the Report of the Code Commission to make the provision be applicable only to civil actions. The petition for issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate is a special proceeding and as such a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. Hence, it must be emphasized that herein petitioners are not being sued in such case for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was pronounced therein.

Albano vs. Gapusan AM No. 1022-MJ, May 7, 1976 FACTS: Redentor Albano filed a complaint against Judge Gapusan seeking disciplinary action involving latter’s malpractice in his notarization of a separation agreement between Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. Likewise, a complaint was filed alleging that said Judge influenced Judge Crispin of CFI-Ilocos in deciding two criminal cases. In the abovementioned separation agreement, it was stipulated that the spouse guilty of adultery or concubinage shall be barred to file an action against the other. Respondent judge denied that he drafted the said agreement and explained that the spouses had been separated for a long time when they signed it and the wife had begotten children with her paramour. He further added that there was a stipulation in the said agreement that the spouse would live together in case of reconciliation. ISSUE: WON Judge Gapusan should be reprimanded because of notarizing the void agreement between the spouses. HELD: A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudically dissolving the conjugal partnership. There is no question that the stipulation contained in the said separation agreement is contrary to law, morals and good customs. The family is a basic social institution which public policy 90

cherishes and protects. To preserve the institution of marriage, the law considers void any contract for personal separation between husband and wife and every extra-judicial agreement for the dissolution of the partnership. SC held the action of respondent judge Gapusan as contrary to law.

MODEQUILLO VS. BREVA 185 SCRA 766 FACTS: On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 600 square meters with a market value of P34,550.00 and assessed value of P7,570.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87008-01359, registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur; and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 3 hectares with a market value of P24,130.00 and assessed value of P9,650.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87-08-01848 registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur. A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. As to the agricultural land although it is declared in the name of defendant it is alleged to be still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority was not approved by the proper government agency. An opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs. In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year). ISSUE: Whether or not the property in dispute is deemed to be a family home. 91

HELD: The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect. Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited? No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code. As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made by the sheriff shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

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Manacop vs. CA GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992 FACTS: Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between petitioner’s corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached property is a family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from attachment. ISSUE: WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment. HELD: The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioner’s included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not exempt form attachment. The petition was dismissed by SC.

VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA vs. JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA, G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008 Facts: 93

John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed Special Civil Action No. 03-0010 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 254, Las Piñas City (RTC) against Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola (petitioners) for judicial partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola (the decedent Fidel). Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel with his first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel with his second wife, petitioner Vilma. On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 (84191) left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3) each without prejudice to the rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any; 2. Attorney's fees in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS is hereby awarded to be reimbursed by the defendants to the plaintiff; 3. Costs against the defendants. Issue: Whether or not the sale in public auction is valid? Held: One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution of the family home from the time of its occupation as a family residence, without need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the November 30, 2006 Decision and April 30, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED in that the house standing on the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 is DECLARED part of the coownership of the parties John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola but EXEMPTED from partition by public auction within the period provided for in Article 159 of the Family Code. Nocosts. SO ORDERED.

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Angeles vs. Maglaya (2005) Gr 153798 September 2,2005 Facts: Corazon Angeles-Maglaya, herein respondent, filed a petitionfor letters of administratix and her appointment as administratixof the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles. She claims thatshe is the sole legitimate heir of Francisco Angeles andGenoveva Mercado, and together with Belen Angeles, hereinpetitioner and 2nd wife of Francisco, they are the surviving heirsof the decedent. Franscisco died intestate in 1998 leavingbehind 4 parcels of land and a building. Belen opposed thispetition and prayed that she, instead of Corazon, be proclaimed the admistratrix of Francisco‘s estate. After establishing the circumstances of her marriage to Francisco(i.e. married before a Judge and ratified two months later inreligious rites; Francisco presented himself to be single thattime), Belen attacked the legitimacy of Corazon, saying thather birth certificate was not signed by Francisco. She has alsofailed to present the marriage contract between her parents,Francisco and Genoveva. Furthermore, Belen averred that sheand Francisco legally adopted Concesa Yamat during theirmarriage. 95

Respondent‘s reply: (a) records of parents‘ marriage in the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga were destroyed. (b) Shehas been in open and continuous possession of the status oflegitimate child as testified by 4 witnesses. (c) Her birth certificate was presented containing a handwritten word ―Yes‖under the question ―Legitimate?‖ Trial court dismissed petition for lack of proof of filiation aslegitimate child, but the Court of Appeals reversed this on the grounds that petitioner‘s motion being a demurrer (under Sec 1 Rule 33) thereby waived her right to present opposingevidence, and that respondent has sufficiently established herfiliation. Issue: WON Corazon is a legitimate child of Francisco andGenoveva? Held: NO.RATIO:Article 164: Children conceived or born during the marriage ofthe parents are legitimate.

Andal vs. Macaraig GR No. 2474, May 30, 1951 FACTS: Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Duenas, filed a complaint for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land owned by Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas. Eduvigis Macaraig, herein defendant, donated the land by virtue of donation propter nuptias in favor of Emiliano. The latter was suffering from tuberculosis in January 1941. His brother, Felix, then lived with them to work his house and farm. Emiliano became so weak that he can hardly move and get up from his bed. Sometime in September 1942, the wife eloped with Felix and lived at the house of Maria’s father until 1943. Emiliano died in January 1, 1943 where the wife did not attend the funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria gave birth to a boy who was, herein petitioner. ISSUE: WON Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the deceased. HELD: Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the former is presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because he was born within 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the 96

first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife includes absence during the initial period of conception, impotence which is patent, and incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Maria’s illicit intercourse with a man other than the husband during the initial period does not preclude cohabitation between husband and wife. Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son of the deceased making him the owner of the parcel land. Benitez-Badua vs. CA GR No. 105625 January 24, 1994 FACTS: Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties located in Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 while his husband died in 1989. Vicente’s sister and nephew prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate in favor of the nephew, Victoria Benitez On the other hand Marissa Benitez-Badua opposed the petition alleging that she is the sole heir of the deceased spouses and was raised and cared by the spouses since childhood, though not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted. The latter to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses submitted documents such as her certificate of live birth where the spouses name were reflected as her parents. She even testified that said spouses continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. The relatives of Vicente declared that said spouses were unable to physically procreate hence the petitioner cannot be the biological child. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s certificate of live birth will suffice to establish her legitimacy. RULING: The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit on the ground that Articles 164, 166, 170, and 171 of the Family Code do not contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not to be the child by nature or biological child of a certain couple. The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.

Concepcion vs. CA 97

GR No. 123450 August 31, 2005 FACTS: Gerardo Concepcion and Theresa Almonte, private respondent, were married in December 1989, and begotten a child Jose Gerardo. The husband filed a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom according to the husband was still alive and living in Quezon City. Trial court ruled that the son was an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law granting “visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child”. She further wanted to have the surname of the son changed from “Concepcion to Almonte”, her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use his mother’s surname. Theresa’s contention was to have his son be declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario but her illegitimate child with Gerardo. ISSUE: Whether or not the mother can declare her child illegitimate RULING: In this case, the mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, she is not permitted by law to question the son’s legitimacy. Under Article 167 of the Family Code, “the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress”. Having the best interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court. As a legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames of Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot then impose his surname to be used by the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child is not related to him in any way, Considering that her marriage with him was void ab initio, the latter never became the former’s husband and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child.

Liyao vs. Liyao GR No. 138961 March 7, 2002 FACTS: Corazon G. Garcia is legally married but has been living separately from Ramon Yulo for more than 10 years. She cohabited with William Liyao from 1965 upto his death and gave birth to William Liyao Jr who had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/ or acknowledge child of William Liyao by the latter’s direct and overt act

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William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother (Corazon), filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to recognize and acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to be entitled to all successional rights. As an opposition, one of the chidren of the deceased stated that her mom and the deceased were legally married and that her parents were not separated legally or in fact. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner William Jr. can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of the deceased as illegitimate son. RULING: Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the reason that he was the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produced and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of proceedings. The child himself cannot choose his own affiliation – if the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child if fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s paramour. Hence, it was then settled that the legitimacy of the child can only be impugned in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law. Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.

Eceta vs Eceta GR No. 157037 May 20, 2004 FACTS: Rosalina Vda de Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta where they had a son named Vicente. The couple acquired several properties. The husband died leaving Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory heirs. However, the deceased has an illegitimate daughter named Theresa. Theresa filed a case before the RTC of Quezon City for "Partition and Accounting with Damages" against Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her father’s death, she became Rosalina’s co-heir and co-owner of the property. In her answer, Rosalina alleged that the property is paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively. ISSUE:

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Whether or not certified photocopy the certificate of live birth is competent evidence to prove the alleged filiation of the respondent as an "illegitimate daughter" of her alleged father Vicente Eceta RULING: Under the Civil code the filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by:(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresa’s birth certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. Hence, the Court granted 1/8 share of the land to Theresa.

Constantino vs. Mendez GR no 57227 May 14, 1992 FACTS: A m e l i t a C o n s t a n t i n o , p e t i t i o n e r m e t I v a n M e n d e z , r e s p o n d e n t in a restaurant in Manila where she was working as a waitress. Ivan invited him at his hotel and through promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Amelita, afterwards, he admitted being a married man. In spite of that, they repeated their sexual contact. Subsequently, she became pregnant and had to resign from work. A m e l i t a p l e a s f o r h e l p and support to Ivan but failed. She then filed for the recognition of the child Michael Constantino as his illegitimate child a n d monthly support from Ivan Mendez including Amelia’s complaint on damages ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support. RULING: 100

S C d i s m i s s e d t h e p e t i t i o n . Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino. Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974. A t f i r s t , s h e s a i d s h e r e m e m b e r e d d u r i n g c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n . Later in her response, she said she doesn’t remember. This is relevant because the child Michael is a full term baby. He was conceived approximately s o m e t i m e i n t h e 2 n d week of November. She wrote to Ivan asking for support around February s t a t i n g t h a t s h e was four months pregnant. This means, she thinks she conceived the child on October. More so, Amelita admitted that she was attracted to Ivan p o s s e s s e d c e r t a i n t r a i t s n o t p o s s e s s e d b y h e r b o yf r i e n d and their repeated sexual intercourse indicated that passion and not alleged promise to marriage was the moving force to submit herself with Ivan. she also conf ided that she had a quarr el wit h her boyf riend resulting to her leaving work.

BERNABE VS. ALEJO G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002 Facts: Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary, Carolina Alejo. The son was born and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal died as well as his legitimate wife, leaving Ernestina Bernabe the sole surviving heir. Carolina, in behalf of her son, filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged child of the deceased and also be given the share of Bernabe’s estate. RTC dismissed the complaint and that the death of the putative father had barred the action. CA ruled that Adrian be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Petitioner Ernestina averred CA’s ruling to be of error due to RTC’s ruling based on Article 175. Issue: Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner for recognition and partition with accounting after the putative father’s death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter. Ruling: SC ruled in affirmative. an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The FC makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that “illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. The putative parent

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should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead. Jison vs. CA Case Digest G.R. No. 124853 February 24, 1998 Facts: Monina alleged that Francisco had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison. At the end of 1945, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza Amolar, who was then employed as the nanny of Francisco’s daughter. As a result, Monina was born in Iloilo, and since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts and that of his family. Monina further alleged that Francisco gave her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a CPA and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of Francisco's refusal to expressly recognize her, Monina prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that Francisco support and treat her as such. Francisco alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since then. Further, he never recognized Monina, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special defenses, Francisco contended that MONINA had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription. He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages due to the malicious filing of the complaint. Issue: Whether or not Monina Jison is the recognized illegitimate daughter of Francisco Jison by the latter's own acts and those of his family. Ruling: SC affirmed the decision of CA in recognizing Monina as illegitimate daughter of Francisco. All told, Monina's evidence hurdled "the high standard of proof" required for the success of an action to establish one's illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding "open and continuous possession'' or "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws". Moreover, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence. CONDE VS. ABAYA 13 Phil 249 Facts: Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia died on the 1899. Paula Conde, as the mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom she states she had by Casiano Abaya moved the settlement of the intestate succession. An administrator has been appointed for the said estate. However, Roman Abaya brother of Casiano, came forward and opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of the deceased. The court declares Roman Abaya to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the property of said estate. Paula Conde filed a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya but that she considered her right was superior to his and moved for a hearing 102

on the matter. She prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner may enforce an action in the acknowledgment of the natural child from Casiano Abaya. Ruling: The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal character and generally pertains exclusively to him. Only the child may exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As exception, and in three cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit: if he or she died during his or her minority, or while insane, or after action had already been instituted. Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his or her legitimacy lasts during his or her whole lifetime, he or she may exercise it either against the presumed parents or his or her heirs. The right of action which the law concedes to the natural child is not transmitted to his ascendants or descendants. MARQUINO vs. IAC G.R. No. 72078 June 27, 1994 Facts: Respondent Bibiana Romano-Pagadora filed an action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support, and Damages against petitioner Eutiquio Marquino on the CIF of Negros Occidental. Also impleaded as defendants, were the wife of Eutiquio Marquino and their legitimate children all surnamed Terenal-Marquino. The records show that Bibiana was born of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of Eutiquio Marquino. At that time, Eutiquio was still single. Bibiana became personally known to the Marquino family when she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete City. She always received financial assistance from them. Thus, she claimed that she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of her father and his family. The Marquinos, on the other hand, strongly denied her allegations. During the pendency of the case and before respondent Bibiana could finish presenting her evidence, she died. Her heirs were ordered substituted for her as parties-plaintiffs. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss. They averred that the action for recognition is intransmissible to the heirs being a personal act. The trial court dismissed the case. Respondents appealed to the respondent IAC. Eutiquio Marquino died while the case was pending appeal. Issue: Whether or not the right of action to compel recognition is intransmissible in character. Ruling: The child can bring the action during his or her entire lifetime, not during the lifetime of the parents, and even after the death of the parents. In other words, the action does not prescribe as long as he lives. In the case at bench, it is evident that Bibiana was a natural child. She was born out of wedlock of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of Eutiquio Marquino who at that time was single. Bibiana 103

sued for compulsory recognition while Eutiquio was still alive. Sadly, she died before she could present her proof of recognition. Her death tolled the action considering its personal nature and intransmissibility.

Abadilla vs. Tabiliran 249 SCRA 447 Facts: Complainant Abadilla, contends that respondent had scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Respondent allegedly shamefacedly contracted marriage with the said Priscilla Baybayan. Complainant claims that this was a bigamous union because of the fact that the respondent was then still very much married to Teresita Banzuela. In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that respondent caused to be registered as "legitimate", his three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan by falsely executing separate affidavits stating that the delayed registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight, when in truth and in fact, respondent knew that these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate. Complainant manifests that the commission by the respondent of the foregoing acts renders him unfit to occupy the exalted position of a dispenser of justice. Respondent, in his comment, declared that his cohabitation with Priscilla Baybayan is not and was neither bigamous nor immoral because he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only after his first wife had already left and abandoned the family home and, since then, and until the present her whereabouts is not known and respondent has had no news of her being alive. Issue: Whether or not respondent commited deceitful conduct in legitimating his three illegitimate children born out of adulterous relationship. Ruling: SC ruled that respondent commited deceitful conduct and orders his dismissal from the service. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife. Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations.

Teotico vs. Del Val 13 SCRA 406 Facts: Rene Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. The testatrix Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the CIF of Manila which was set for hearing after the requisite publication and service to all parties concerned. Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds. Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, allowed the oppositor to 104

intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico. After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession. Issue: Whether or not oppositor Ana del Val Chan has the right to intervene in this proceeding. Ruling: Oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof. The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and theadopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter. Republic vs. CA and Bobiles 205 SCRA 356 Facts: Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC of Legaspi City granting the petition of herein private respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat, petitioner seeks the reversal thereof in the present petition for review on certiorari. Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six years old and who had been living with her family since he was four months old. The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued an order setting the petition for hearing. The order was duly published, with copies thereof seasonably served. A copy of said order was posted on the bulletin board of the court and in the other places it had required for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. The trial court rendered judgment disposing that the minor child, Jason Condat, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the petitioner. Issue: Whether or not CA erred in affirming the trial court's decision which granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of spouses Bobiles. Ruling: The rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition for adoption and we find no reason to disturb the same. Given the facts and circumstances of the case and considered in the light of the foregoing doctrine, SC holds that the decree of adoption issued by the court a quo would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life.

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Tamargo vs. CA 209 SCRA 518 Facts: Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings before the then CIF of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action. Issue: Whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the instant petition. Whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time. Ruling: SC granted the petition. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented would be unfair and unconscionable. Landingin vs. Republic GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006 Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption. A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption. 106

Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptee’s biological mother. Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption. In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Lim GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009 FACTS: Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit. ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt. HELD:Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

JAVIER v LUCERO 29 MARCH 1953

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FACTS: Alfredo Javier Sr. and Salud Arca had a son before they got married named Alfredo Jr. After they got married, the father went to US for he was a US Navy. Salud and her son lived with her parents while her husband is in the US. When the spouses become estrange, the husband filed a petition for divorce in the State of Alabama. After the decree was granted, he married twice in the US. An action for support was filed before the respondent judge, the latter ruled in favor of the wife when it ordered the father to give monthly allowance. The petitioner appealed the decision questioning the fact that his son was over 21 years old making him no longer entitled to be supported. ISSUE: Whether or not the son over 21 years old is still entitled for support from his father? HELD: Alfredo Jr. has reached the age of majority yet under the provision of Family Code; the support may be given beyond the age of majority in order to enable him to complete his education, for some trade and profession. If financial assistance is to be rendered only at the termination of the appeal, his education or the completion thereof would be unduly delayed. The father claimed that based on the records, the son is no longer studying. However, it must be pointed out that the son is a pre-law graduate and it is just logical to assume that he will continue up to law proper. And the support of the father is important to continue his education. The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for judgment, heretofore filed in this case, rest. So ordered.

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GOITIA v CAMPOS-RUEDA 35 PHIL 252 FACTS: Luisa Goitia and Jose Campos-Rueda were married on January 7, 1915. They stayed together for a month before the wife returned to their home. She filed a complaint against her husband for support outside their conjugal home. Her basis is that her husband demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. And when she refused, she was ,altreated by word and by deed, causing injuries to her face and different parts of her body. The trial court ruled against her and that support can only be claim in their conjugal home. ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside their conjugal home? HELD: The obligation of husband to support his wife is created in the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband is obliged to support the wife either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his home at his option. But this rule is not absolute; it admits an exception that if the wife is driven away from their conjugal home because of the wrongful acts of the husband she can still claim for support. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.

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DE ASIS v CA 15 FEBRUARY 1999 FACTS: Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action for maintenance and support against the father. Vircel later on withdrew the complaint in 1989 for the reason that Manuel denied paternity of the said minor and due to such denial; it seems useless to pursue the said action. They mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint with the condition that Manuel will not pursue his counter claim. However in 1995, Vircel filed a similar complaint against the alleged father, this time as the minor’s legal guardian/mother. Manuel interposed maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of the case. He maintained that since the obligation to give support is based on existence of paternity between the child and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to claim support. ISSUE: Whether or not the minor is now barred from action for support because of the prior judgment? HELD: The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person. The original agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in the nature of a compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by law. With respect to Manuel’s contention for the lack of filial relationship between him and the child and agreement of Vircel in not pursuing the original claim, the Court held that existence of lack thereof of any filial relationship between parties was not a matter which the parties must decide but should be decided by the Court itself. While it is true that in order to claim support, filiation or paternity must be first shown between the parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially established and declaration is vested in the Court. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of another action asking for the same relief (no force and effect). Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel was untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any compromise or waiver. WHEREFORE, the petition under consideration is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

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SALIENTES v ABANILLA 29 AUGUST 2006 FACTS: Loran Abanilla and Marie Antonette Abigail Salientes are the parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel Abanilla. They lived with the parents of Salientes, they quarreled most of the time and Abanilla suggested that they move out but Salientes refused. Abanilla left the house alone and from then on he was prevented from seeing his son. It prompted him to file a habeas corpus proceeding and was granted by the court. Salientes questioned the order stating that no child under 7 years old shall be separated from its mother. ISSUE: Whether or not Salientes has sole custody and parental authority over their son? HELD: Under Article 211[10] of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondent‘s cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 10, 2003 and the Resolution dated March 19, 2004of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75680 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. So ordered.

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ESPIRITU v CA 15 MARCH 1995 FACTS: Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law relationship of husband while in US. Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer, National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a temporary post. They begot a child in 1986 named Rosalind. After a year, they went back to the Philippines for a brief vacation when they also got married. Subsequently, they had a second child named Reginald. In 1990, they decided to separate. Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left them with his sister. When Teresita returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody of the children. ISSUE: Whether or not the custody of the two children can be awarded to the mother? HELD: In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, their welfare shall be the paramount concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated from the mother for compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is the best custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but not conclusive. At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she preferred to stay must be considered. It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt. She was found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother’s infidelity. Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the position to extend. On the other hand, the mother’s conviction for the crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the daughter. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Quezon City and presided over by the Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case No. Q-92-14206 awarding custody of the minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No special pronouncement is made as to costs. So ordered. 112

Amadora vs. CA GR No. L47745, April 15, 1988 FACTS: Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon resulting to the former’s death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students. Complaints against the students were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebu’s decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports). ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable. HELD: The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes. In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident. Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death. Petition was denied.

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Ylarde vs. Aquino GR No. L33722, July 29, 1988

FACTS: Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School in Pangasinan. Defendant Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. During that time, the school had several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop destroyed in World War II. Defendant decided to help clear the area so he gathered 18 of his male students and ordered them to dig beside a one ton concrete block in making a hole where the stone can be buried. It was left unfinished so the following day he called 4 of the 18 students including the 114

Novelito Ylarde to complete the excavation. Defendant left the children to level the loose soil while he went to see Banez for the key to the school workroom where he can get some rope. It was alleged that before leaving, he told the children “not to touch the stone”. After he left, the children playfully jumped into the pit when suddenly the concrete block slide down. Unfortunately, Novelito Ylarde was pinned to the wall causing serious physical injuries which as a consequence led to his death, 3 days thereafter. The parents of the victim, herein petitioners, filed a suit for damages against both Aquino and Soriano. ISSUE: WON both Soriano and Aquino can be held liable for damages. HELD: As held in Amadora vs CA, “it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students”. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, this is the general rule. However, in casea of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Hence, Soriano as principal cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and he did not give any instruction regarding the digging. A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his tudents should make sure that the children are protected from all harm. The excavation instructed clearly exposed the students to risk and should not be placed under the category of Work Education such as school gardening, planting trees etc. Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence where instead of availing himself of adult manual laborers he instead utilized his students. Furthermore, the warning given is not sufficient to cast away all serious danger that the concrete block adjacent to the excavation would present to the children. He is therefore ordered to pay damages to the petitioners.

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St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpetanos GR No. 143363, February 6, 2002 FACTS: Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident. ISSUE: WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages. HELD: CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be considered negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal connection to the accident. It must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to show such negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Futhermore, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an event over which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident. The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the 116

road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.

Tamargo vs CA GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992 FACTS: In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death. The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the tragic incident. In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such petition was granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident. ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with the biological parents. HELD: Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. “Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil code”. SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto. Petition for review was hereby granted.

Libi vs. IAC 209 SCRA 518 117

FACTS: Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up with the latter after she found out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell wanted reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to threats. One day, there were found dead from a single gunshot wound each coming from the same gun. The parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages. Trial court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence but was set aside by CA. ISSUE: WON the parents should be held liable for such damages. HELD: The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed under Art 2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code covered obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The court held that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delict of their minor children is primary and not subsidiary and that responsibility shall cease when the persons can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. However, Wendell’s mother testified that her husband owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own key. She likewise admitted that during the incident, the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. Wendell could not have gotten hold of the gun unless the key was left negligently lying around and that he has free access of the mother’s bag where the key was kept. The spouses failed to observe and exercise the required diligence of a good father to prevent such damage.

Laperal vs. Republic GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962 FACTS: The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria on March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses. Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his husband. HELD: 118

In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372.

Llaneta vs. Agrava GR No. 32054, May 15, 1974 FACTS: Atanacia Llaneta was married with Serafin Ferrer whom she had a child named Victoriano Ferrer. Serafin died and about four years later Atanacia had a relationship with another man out of which Teresita Llaneta, herein petitioner, was born. All of them lived with Serafin’s mother in Manila. Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer’s using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealing even her school records. She then applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Sorsogon as it is required to be presented in connection with a scholarship grant. Subsequently, she discovered that her registered surname was Llaneta and that she was the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father. She prayed to have her name changed from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer since not doing so would result in confusion among persons and entitites she dealt with and would entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances. ISSUE: Whether Teresita can have her surname changed to Ferrer. HELD: The Court ruled in favor of Teresita and granted her petition to change her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. In support to her petition, the mother of Serafin Ferrer and his two remaining brothers have come forward in earnest support and were proud to share the surname of Ferrer with her. Furthermore, adequate publication of the proceeding has not elicited slightest opposition from the relatives and friends of Serafin Ferrer. Ben-Hur Nepomuceno v. Archbencel Ann Lopez, represented by hermother Araceli Lopez G.R. No. 181258, March 18, 2010 Facts: 119

The Court is mindful that the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation should be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family. Respondent Archbencel Ann Lopez, filed a complaint for recognition and support of filiation against petitioner BenHur Nepomuceno. She was represented by her mother, Araceli Lopez. She assailed that she is theillegitimate daughter of Nepomuceno submitting as evidence the handwritten note allegedly written and signed by Nepomuceno. She also demanded for financial support along with filial recognition. On the other hand, Nepomucenodenied the assertions reasoning out that he was compelled to execute the handwritten note due to the threats of the National People’s Army. As the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City ruled in favor of Archbencel, Nepomuceno thereafter proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted by thetrial court stating insufficiency of evidence as the reason for dismissing the caseagainst Nepomuceno. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals and the trial court’sdecision was reversed. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the filiation of Archbencel as illegitimate daughter of Ben-Hur Nepomuceno is established by the handwritten note submitted as documentary evidence. Held: Petition GRANTED. Arhbencel’s demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to petitioner as his illegitimate daughter, falls under Article 195(4). As such, herentitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her filiation. Article 195 Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles,the following are obliged to support each other to the whole extentset forth in the preceding article 1. The spouses;2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants;3. Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate andillegitimate children of the latter;4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimateand illegitimate children of the latter; and5. Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. Herrera v. Alba summarizes the laws, rules, and jurisprudence onestablishing filiation:ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimatefiliation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimatechildren. x x x xART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established byany of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the handwritten not eexecuted by petitioner. The note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencel’s filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of Article 172(2) visà-vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent 120

concerned. The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarialagreement to sup port the child referred to in Herrera. For it is not even notarized. And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the putative father’s admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it. The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner,the latter not having signed. At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioner’s handwritten undertaking to provide financial support to her which, without more, fails to establish her claim of filiation. The Court is mindful that the best interests of tthechild in cases involving paternity and filiation should be advanced. It is however, just as mindful of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family.

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JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ “AQUINO,”represented by JE NIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ Vs RONALD PAUL S. GARCIA, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009 Facts: For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San JuanDela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino(Dominique ) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Theyresided in the house of Dominique’s parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto.Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal. On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with Dominique’s parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz “Aquino” at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth, using Dominique’s surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the child’s Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique’s father Domingo Butch Aquino. Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled “AUTOBIOGRAPHY” which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent portions of which read: AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.AUTOBIOGRAPHY I’M CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20 THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005.[5] I RESIDE AT PULANGLUPA STREETBRGY. DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I HAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHER’S NAME IS DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY MOTHER’S NAME ISRAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. xxx AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVET OGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THAT’S ALL. By letter dated November 11, 2005,[7] the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenie’s application for registration of the child’s name.In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child (either through the back of Municipal Form No.102 – Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity – or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father). (Underscoring supplied) Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA Case No. 06-539, which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof. The complaint 122

alleged that,inter alia, the denial of registration of the child’s name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255,[10] which provides: Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Issue: Whether or not the unsigned handwritten statement of the deceased father of minor Christian Dela Cruz can be considered as a recognition of paternity in a “private handwritten instrument” within the contemplation of article 176 of the family code, as amended by r.a. 9255, which entitles the said minor to use his father’s surname. Held: Petition granted. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child’s paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary. Article 176of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed,explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must be signed by the putative father. That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not “unduly expand” the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioner. First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.[20] Third, Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child These circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that “JENIE DELA CRUZ” is “MY WIFE” as “WE FELLIN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER” and “NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER.”In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor child’s best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.

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Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales vda.De Carungcong v. People GR No. 181409, February 11, 2010 Facts: Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix of petitioner intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. Wendy Mitsuko Sato’s supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney allegedly issued by the deceased Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of Wendy were attached to the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix. In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the complaint. On appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the resolution dated March 25, 1997 and directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an Information against Sato for violation of Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code Thus, the following Information was filed against Sato in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87: Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000, the total amount stated in the deeds of sale, to P22,034,000, the actual amount received by Sato. Dissatisfied with the trial court’s rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by Mediatrix, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, however, in a decision dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it. Issue: Whether or not Sato has the right to claim deceased mother-in-law’s Intestate estate. Held: Zenaida never became a co-owner because, under the law, her right to the three parcels of land could have arisen only after her mother’s death. Since Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such right came about and the mantle of protection provided to Sato by the relationship no longer existed. Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked in case of death of the spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, while the death of Zenaida extinguished her marriage with Sato, it did not dissolve the son-in-law and mother-in-law relationship between Sato and Zenaida’s mother, Manolita.

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The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates with the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties. Under this view, the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouse’s blood relatives. The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the death of one spouse when there is a surviving issue. The rationale is that the relationship is preserved because of the living issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled. The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not. Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the “tie of affinity” between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties.

JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ “AQUINO,” represented by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ, – versus – RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, FACTS 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of Dominique’s parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal. On September 4, 2005, Dominique died.[1] After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with Dominique’s parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz “Aquino” at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City. Issue: Whether or not Christian Dela Cruz “Aquino” can use his father’s surname Held: That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code, but because of the father’s death, the written affidavit made by him is sufficient enough to prove that he acknowledges the birth of the child. First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.[20] Third, Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by 125

the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child.These circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that “JENIE DELA CRUZ” is “MY WIFE” as “WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER” and “NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER.” WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED to immediately enter the surname of the late Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his Certificate of Live Birth, and record the same in the Register of Births.

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