PFR Case Digest (Uribe's Outline)

1  TITLE I: MARRIAGE MARRIAGE BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY Cabague v. Auxillo 11/26/1952 Facts:  There was an agreement agreement to marry between between Cabagues’s son and Auxillo’s daughter . The consideration of which is for Cabague to improve the house of Auxillo and spend for the wedding feast and the needs of the bride. When Auxillo’s daughter daughter refused to carry out the agreement, agreement, Cabague Cabague filed an action for damages. Issue: Whether or not the agreement may be proved in court. Held:  The rules of court court applicable applicable at the time time provides that, “ any agreement made upon the consideration of marriage, other than mutual promise to marry should be in writing, or in any notes or memorandum and subscribed subscribed by parties, parties, otherwise otherwise it shall be unenforceable. unenforceable. In this case, the action for damages for the breach of promise to marry may prosper and evidence of  such mutual promise is admissible. admissible. But the agreement between Cabague and Auxillo may not prosper , since such agreement is oral and may not be proven in court.

Domalagan v. Bolifer Facts: Domalagan and Bolifer entered into a contract to marry their son and daughter upon a consideration that Domalagan will pay Bolifer P500. And So Domalagan paid P500 and P16 as token of future marriage. But, Bolifer’s daughter got married with another man. Domalagan filed an action for damages, and demanded the return of the money he has given. Issue: Whether or not damages may be recovered. Held:

Damages may be recovered for the breach of  promise to marry although the same is made orally.  The rules of court applicable applicable at the time provides that, “ any agreement made upon the consideration of marriage, other than mutual promise to marry should be in writing, or in any notes or memorandum and subscribed subscribed by parties, parties, otherwise otherwise it shall be unenforceable.

Hermosisima v. CA Facts: Soledad Cagigas, a teacher and 10 years older than Francisco Hermosisima, they were regarded as engaged. She got pregnant and she told Francisco that she was in the family way, and this was when Francisco promised to marry her. But, subsequently he married other woman. Issue: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable for breach of promise to marry. Held: Moral Damages cannot be recovered. In the case of De of  De Jesus vs. Syquia , 58 Phil., 866, the supreme court ruled that breach of promise to marry is not actionable, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced upon the faith of such promise. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of  the American States. An award of moral damages may be recovered in case there is seduction upon showing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiffappellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code. but in this case Francisco cannot be liable for seduction, , not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who

2 around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant complainant "surrendered "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy ." ."

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code.

Wassmer v. Velez Facts:  They decided to get married. married. Two days before before their wedding day, Wassmer received a telegram from Velez to postponed the wedding because his mother opposes it, and yet he reassured Wassmer that nothing has changed. But on their wedding day, he did not show up. Despite the fact that Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances, acquaintances, The bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased, Dresses for the maid of  honor and the flower girl were prepared, A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought, Bridal showers were given and gifts received. Issue: Whether or not damages may be recovered based on the beach of promise to marry. Held: It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." Surely this is not a case of  mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described above-described preparation and publicity, publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

 Tanjanco v. Ca Facts: Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that in consideration consideration of defendant's promise of marriage marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge, as a result of which the latter conceived a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff  became unable to support herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's fees. Issue: Whether or not damages may be recovered under Article 21. (seduction) Held: Damages may not be recovered.  The Court of Appeals Appeals seems seems to have overlooked overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; marriage; it connotes essentially essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior

3 power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595). It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case ( supra) that —  To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement .  The facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, Araceli a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with apolonio tanjanco, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises.

Baksh v. Ca Facts: Baksh was an Iranian citizen and an exchange student taking a medical course. He later courted and proposed to marry Marilou Gonzales, a 22 yearold, Filipina and a waitress in a luncheonette, with a reputation duly respected in their community. Baksh visited Marilou’s parents to secure their consent. With the consent of Marilou’s parents they lived together but defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff  became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents.

Issue: Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Held: Damages may be recovered. Gen. Rule:  The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Rationale: Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of  the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:  The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of  action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of  the American states. . . .  This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict  in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report: But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule: Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. An example will illustrate the

4 purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of  marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.  Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.  Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of  herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of  the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was

above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.

MARRIAGE CONTRACT NOT SUBJECT TO STIPULATION Selanova v. Mendoza Facts:  Judge Alejandro E. Mendoza was charged with gross ignorance of the law for having prepared and ratified a document , extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza. One condition of the liquidation was that either spouse (as the case may be) would withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each had filed against the other and that they waived their "right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity" either one would commit against the other. Issue: Held: that instrument Judge Mendoza divided the two pieces of conjugal assets of the spouses by allocating to the husband a thirteen-hectare riceland and to the wife the residential house and lot. The last paragraph of the instrument, which licensed either spouse to commit any act of infidelity, was in effect a ratification of their personal separation. The agreement in question is void because it contravenes the following provisions of the Civil Code:têñ.£îhqw⣠ART. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect: (1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife; (2) Every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of  gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife; xxx xxx xxx Even before the enactment of the new Civil Code, this Court held that the extrajudicial dissolution of  the conjugal partnership without judicial approval was void.

5 Lichauco de leon v. Ca

this document, a pleading being intended by them to embody and evidence their agreement:

Facts: Issue:  Jose Vincent and Sylvia Lichauco were married. A de facto separation between the spouses occured due to irreconcilable marital differences, with Sylvia leaving the conjugal home. Sylvia went to the United States where she obtained American citizenship. Sylvia filed with the Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco, a petition for dissolution of  marriage against Jose Vicente. In the said divorce proceedings, Sylvia also filed claims for support and distribution of properties. It appears, however, that since Jose Vicente was then a Philippine resident and did not have any assets in the United States, Sylvia chose to hold in abeyance the divorce proceedings, and in the meantime, concentrated her efforts to obtain some sort of property settlements with Jose Vicente in the Philippines. , Sylvia succeeded in entering into a LetterAgreement with her mother-in-law, private respondent Macaria De Leon, which We quote in full, as follows: Obligations of Jose Vicente de Leon and/ or yourself  in a joint and several capacity: 1. To deliver with clear title free from all liens and encumbrances and subject to no claims in any form whatsoever the following properties to Sylvia Lichauco-de Leon hereinafter referred to as the wife Obligations of the wife: 1. To agree to a judicial separation of property in accordance with Philippine law and in this connection to do all that may be necessary to secure said separation of property including her approval in writing of a joint petition or consent decree. On the same date, Macaria made cash payments to Sylvia in the amount of P100,000 and US$35,000.00 or P280,000.00, in compliance with her obligations as stipulated in the aforestated Letter-Agreement. On March 30, 1977, Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of their conjugal partnership, the main part of which reads as follows (pp. 37-38,Rollo): 5. For the best interest of each of them and of their minor child, petitioners have agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership and to partition the assets thereof, under the following terms and conditions-

Whether or not the Letter-Agreement is valid. The third paragraph of the Letter-Agreement. Held: Sylvia insists that the consideration for her execution of the Letter-Agreement was the termination of property relations with her husband. Indeed, Sylvia and Jose Vicente subsequently filed a  joint petition for judicial approval of the dissolution of their conjugal partnership, sanctioned by Article 191 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, Macaria and Jose Vicente assert that the consideration was the termination of marital relationship. “the parties contemplated not only to agree to a  judicial separation of property of the spouses but likewise to continue with divorce proceedings”  This Court, therefore, finds and holds that the cause or consideration for the intervenor Macaria De Leon in having executed Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2' was the termination of the marital relationship between her son Jose Vicente De Leon and Sylvia Lichauco de Leon. Article 1306 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. If the stipulation is contrary to law, morals or public policy, the contract is void and inexistent from the beginning. Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:  Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy; xxx xxx xxx (7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.  These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived.

6 But marriage is not a mere contract but a sacred social institution. Thus, Art. 52 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulations... From the foregoing provisions of the New Civil Code, this court is of the considered opinion and so holds that intervenor's undertaking under Exhibit 'E' premised on the termination of marital relationship is not only contrary to law but contrary to Filipino morals and public Policy. As such, any agreement or obligations based on such unlawful consideration and which is contrary to public policy should be deemed null and void. (emphasis supplied) Additionally, Article 191 of the Civil Case contemplates properties belonging to the spouses and not those belonging to a third party, who, in the case at bar., is Macaria. In the petition for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, it was made to appear that the said properties are conjugal in nature. However, Macaria was able to prove that the questioned properties are owned by her. Neither Sylvia nor Jose Vicente adduced any contrary evidence. Granting, in gratia argumenti, that the consideration of the Letter-Agreement was the termination of  property relations, We agree with the respondent court that (pp. 46-47, Rollo): ... the agreement nevertheless is void because it contravenes the following provisions of the Civil Code: Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect: (1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife; (2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of  gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife;

FAMILY CODE (ART. 7(2)) Villar v. Paraiso Facts:

Vilar obtained 1,467 votes while Paraiso garnered 1,509, and as a result the municipal board of  canvassers proclaimed the latter as the mayor duly elected with a plurality of 41 votes. However, contending that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office as mayor because he was then a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and such was disqualified to be a candidate under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, Vilar instituted the present quo warranto proceedings praying that Paraiso be declared ineligible to assume office and that his proclamation as mayorelect be declared null and void. He also prayed that he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, in lieu of respondent Paraiso. Issue: whether respondent, being an ecclesiastic, is ineligible to hold office under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, or whether he actually resigned as minister before the date of the elections, and his resignation duly accepted, as claimed, thereby removing his disability. Held: we have not found any reason for deviating from the finding of the trial court that respondent never ceased as minister of the order to which he belonged and that the resignation he claims to have filed months before the date of the elections is but a mere scheme to circumvent the prohibition of the law regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a municipal office. Indeed, if respondent really and sincerely intended to resign as minister of the religious organization to which he belonged for the purpose of launching his candidacy why did he not resign in due form and have the acceptance of his resignation registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries. 1 The importance of resignation cannot be underestimated. The purpose of registration is twofold: to inform the public not only of the authority of  the minister to discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious status. This information is necessary for the protection of the public. This is specially so with regard to the authority to solemnized marriages, the registration of which is made by the law mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil Code). It is no argument to say that the duty to secure the cancellation of the requisite resignation devolves, not upon respondent, but upon the head of his organization or upon the official in charge of such registration, upon proper showing of the reason for such cancellation, because the law likewise imposes upon the interested party the duty of effecting such cancellation, who in the instant case is the respondent himself. This he failed to do. And what is more, he failed to attach to his certificate of candidacy, a copy of his alleged

7 resignation as minister knowing full well that a minister is disqualified by law to run for a municipal office.

the justice of the peace, Jose Ballori, in the town of  Palompon in the Province of Leyte. Held:  The parties were legally married.

Aranes v. Occiano Facts: MARRIAGE CEREMONY Martinez v. Tan Facts:  There was received in evidence at the trial what is called an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is written in Spanish and consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907, signed by the plaintiff and the defendant, in which they state that they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before the justice of the peace, and ask that the  justice solemnize the marriage. Following this is a document dated on the same day, signed by the  justice of the peace, by the plaintiff, by the defendant, and by Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori. It states the presentation of the petition above mentioned; that the persons who signed it where actually present in the office of the justice on the same day named; that they ratified under oath the contents of the petition, and that they insisted in what they had there asked for. It also stated that being required to produce witnesses of the marriage, the presented Zacarias Esmero as a witness for the husband and Pacita Ballori as a witness for the wife. Following this is a certificate of  marriage signed by the justice of the peace and the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated the 25th day of September, 1907, in which it is stated that the plaintiff and the defendant were legally married by the justice of the peace in the presence of the witnesses on that day.  The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own testimony that she never appeared before the justice of the peace and never was married to the defendant. She admits that she signed the document in question, but says that she signed it in her own home, without reading it, and at the request of the defendant, who told her that it was a paper authorizing him to ask the consent of her parents to the marriage.

It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for the defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage. General orders, No. 68, section 6, is as follows: No particular form from the ceremony of  marriage is required, but the parties must declare in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife. Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the occasion in question the justice of the peace said nothing until after the document was signed and then addressing himself to the plaintiff  and the defendant said, "You are married." The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the  justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced. A mortgage took place as shown by the certificate of  the justice of the peace, signed by both contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due form, the parties before the justice of the peace declaring that they took each other as husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated in this case by the admission of the woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage certified to in the document signed by her, which admission can only mean the parties mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and signed the said document which so states before the justice of the peace who authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and write the Spanish language, and that they knew the contents of the document which they signed; and under the circumstances in this particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that what took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion amounted to a legal marriage.

Issue: whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on the 25th day of September, 1907, before

MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE

8 Madridejo v. De leon Facts: Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one child, Domingo de Leon. The wife and son survived Eulogio de Leon, who died in the year 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of  births of the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, shows that on June 1, 1917, a child was born to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which was named Melecio Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by Pedro Madridejo (Exhibit B). On June 17, 1917, a 24-day old child of Siniloan, Laguna, as a son of Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of the father (Exhibit 2). On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by the parish priest of Siniloan (Exhibit A). She died on the following day, July 9, 1920, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son by Eulogio de Leon, and the plaintiffappellee Melecio Madridejo, as well as her alleged second husband, Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died on the 2nd of May, 1928. With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.

MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM LICENSE REQUIREMENT

Borja-Manzano v. J. Sanchez Facts: Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of  the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent  Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated.”

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage should be exempt.

Held: Article 34 of the Family Code provides: No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage. For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur: 1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other; 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage. Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano

9 and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of  their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were “separated.”

Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void

Whether or not the marriage is void for lack of  marriage license.

Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar. Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the  Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent  Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

Ninal v. Bayadog Facts: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to

Issue:

Held:  The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of  the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of  public exposure and contain the source of gossip

10 arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.  The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license.  This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of  the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of  his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation

by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

 The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of  the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of  marriage. The second ground for annulment of  marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of  either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void

11 marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of  the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if  the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of  petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no  judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of  estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of  declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

 Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no  judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of  society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a  judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28

ART. 26, FAMILY CODE Republic v. Orbecido III Facts:  There was a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, celebrated in the Philippines. Later, the wife went to the US, and acquired American citizenship. After, She obtained a divorce decree and remarried an American while in the US, The Spouse left in the Philippines, orbecido, invokes art 26, par 2, to allow him to remarry. Issue: Whether or not Orbecido should be capacitated to remarry under art 26, par 2.

Held:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in

12 the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied) Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. [10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.  Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of  the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of  a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the

law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

 The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE (RULE 131, SEC 3) Perido v. Perido Facts: Lucio Perido married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong,. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat. The children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of  Lucio Perido executed a document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition,"  The heirs from the first marriage opposed the declaration of the CA that Lucio’s children in the 2 nd marriage are his legitimate chiidren.

13  The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat. The petitioners insist that said children were illegitimate on the theory that the first three were born out of  wedlock even before the death of Lucio Perido's first wife, while the last two were also born out of  wedlock and were not recognized by their parents before or after their marriage. In support of their contention they allege that Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the first three children were born, as testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido and corroborated by petitioner Leonora Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as shown on the face of the certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido married his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly established through the testimony of  petitioner Leonora Perido.

interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would he living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage." In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the five children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were born during their marriage and, therefore, legitimate.

Issue: Whether or not Lucio is actually married with his 2 nd wife. Held: Petition cannot be sustained.  This finding conclusive upon us and beyond our power of review. Under the circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first child in 1900.

With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued to him in 1923, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the statement was not conclusive to show that he was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living together husband and wife are married to each other. This presumption, especially where legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may be overcome only by cogent proof on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee 1 this Court explained the rationale behind this presumption, thus: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of  marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply

BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE People v. Aragon Facts:  The accused under another name contracted marriage with his first wife. While his first marriage was subsisting, he contracted his 2 nd marriage. The accused and his 2 nd wife did not live happily for the accused used to maltreat his 2 nd wife. During the absence of the 2 nd wife, he again contracted a 3 rd marriage. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of bigamy.

Held: It was the 2nd marriage which was bigamous.  The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant could not legally contract marriage with  Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of  such marriage, at the instance of the latter.

14  The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of  the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant’s prosecution for contracting this marriage can not prosper.

 Tolentino V. Paras Facts:  The records disclose that Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with private respondent herein, Maria Clemente,), while his marriage with petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, was still subsisting. Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy in Criminal, upon Amado's plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the corresponding penalty. After Amado had served the prison sentence imposed on him, he continued to live with private respondent until his death on July 25, 1974. His death certificate carried the entry "Name of Surviving Spouse — Maria Clemente." In Special Proceedings No. 1587-M for Correction of  Entry, petitioner sought to correct the name of the surviving spouse in the death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her name. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is the lawful surviving spouse of the deceased. Held: Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted for Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no better proof of  marriage than the admission by the accused of the existence of such marriage. 5 The second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from

the beginning and of no force and effect. 6 No  judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. 7 It can be safely concluded, then, without need of further proof nor remand to the Court below, that private respondent is not the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado, but petitioner. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar may, therefore, be validly made. Wiegel v.Sempio-Dy Facts: Respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union

Issue: Whether or not the status of the 1 st marriage was void voidable. Held:  There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).

 There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of 

15 such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of  petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. Donato v. Luna Facts: An information for bigamy was filed against Leonilo Donato by Paz Abayan. Before Leonilo’s arraignment, Paz filed a civil action for declaration of  nullity of her marriage with Leonilo. Said civil case was based on the ground that private respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping. Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Issue: Whether or not the criminal case for bigamy which is pending should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment. Held: A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. 3 It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. 4 A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case. 5

 The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.

Dorothy Terre v. Atty. Jordan Terre Facts: Complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent  Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting. Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her representation that she was single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of  her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla and that the child she was then carrying ( i.e., Jason  Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in good faith that his marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem. Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows: she and respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth

16 year high school classmates in Cadiz City High School, she was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent was single respondent was aware of her marital status p. it was then that respondent started courting her but nothing happened of the courtship); they [complainant and respondent] moved to Manila were they respectively pursued their education, respondent as a law student at the Lyceum University ); respondent continued courting her, this time with more persistence ( ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come of it since she was married but he [respondent] explained to her that their marriage was void ab initio since she and her first husband were first cousins ( ibid, p. 12); convinced by his explanation and having secured favorable advice from her mother and ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage license, despite her [complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as her status explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977. Issue: Whether or not he should be guilty of gross immoral conduct. Held: Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself  by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a  judicial declaration of nullity was necessary. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.  That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other circumstances.

As noted, he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still legally single and free to marry him. He was disbarred.

Morigo v. People Facts: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were sweethearts.  They got married in the phils, but Lucia had to leave Canada for work. While in Canada, a petition for divorce was filed by Lucia. Upon learning this, Lucio got married with another woman in the phils. A year after, Sept 1993, Lucio filed a case for judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lucia on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place because what transpired is just a mere signing of marriage contract without the presence of  solemnizing officer. In Oct, 1993 L ucio was charged of bigamy. However, petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. Issue: Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if  so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.

Held:  The elements of bigamy thus:

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;

17 (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.  The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of  retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE  Jones v. Hortiguela Facts:

PHSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; Issue: Whether or not the marriage should be declared void. Held:  The marriage remains valid.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of  the law has been to confine the meaning of  'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage  Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7  Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)  juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

Republic v. Ca and Molina Facts: Respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of  which their relationship was estranged; that in

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.

18 From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of  the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

 The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of  ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the

19 Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of  Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

 The following are incapable of contracting marriage:  Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of  psychological nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

 This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of  protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.  The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

Leni Choa v. alfonso choa Facts: Petitioner and respondent were married. Respondent filed an annulment of his marriage to petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity, because allegedly that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of the latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These charges included Complaints for perjury,false testimony, concubinage and deportation. And also respondent basically complains that about three aspects of  petitioner’s personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an "intention of procreative sexuality." Issue: Whether or not the marriage should be void due to PI. Held:

In Santos v. CA,37 this Court clearly explained that "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability."38 Said the Court:

"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase ‘psychological incapacity’ under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's ‘Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,’ quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's ‘Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases’). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, ‘psychological incapacity’ should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be

20 assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union.

Barcelona v. Ca Facts: Respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana on the ground of Psychological incapacity, The petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time. 5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sister’s house or would play tennis the whole day.

6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself  and eventually refused to speak to her husband.

7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. She further insisted that she

wanted to feel a little freedom from petitioner’s marital authority and influences. The petitioner argued that he could occupy another room in their conjugal dwelling to accommodate respondent’s desire, but no amount of plea and explanation could dissuade her from demanding that the petitioner leave their conjugal dwelling.

8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondent’s pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling and reside in a condominium located in Greenhills.

9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner waived his right to the conjugal dwelling in respondent’s favor through an extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains. The separation in fact between the petitioner and the respondent still subsists to the present time. Issue: w/n the marriage should be void. Held: xxx “psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. xxx.

Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of  Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable

21 Marriages (“new Rules”).[15] Specifically, Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules provides:

a cause of action and does not violate the rule on forum shopping.

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of  void marriages –

Republic v. Quintero-Hamano

x x x.

(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of  the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

 The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of  psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. (Emphasis supplied)

Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.[16] The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that “expert opinion need not be alleged” in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root cause of  psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of  the psychological incapacity. In rendering this Decision, this Court is not prejudging the main issue of whether the marriage is void based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court must resolve this issue after trial on the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. We are merely holding that, based on the allegations in the second petition, the petition sufficiently alleges

Facts: Respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. According to the complainant, Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child. Court of appeals granted the nullity of marriage, The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. But the office of the solicitor general stated that Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina. Issue: Held: See the case of republic v. Ca and Molina, guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36.  The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately

22 establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities.  Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness.