Petitioner_TC 9 (1)
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TEAM CODE - 09
IN THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDUS PETITION DRAWN AND FILED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF INDUS
IN THE MATTER OF:
KINGBIRD PRIVATE LTD AND ANR..……………………….................................PETITIONERS v. UNION OF INDUS……………………….……………………...............................RESPONDENT
MATTER CONCERNING:
VALIDITY OF DILLI PRADESH PROHIBITION ORDER, 2016
AND
VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT U/ART. 14, 19 R/W ART. 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDUS.
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS DRAWN AND FILED BY THE COUNSELS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
10th NALSAR - JUSTICE B.R. SAWHNY MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016
TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................................... III INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... IV STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ............................................................................................... VII STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................... VIII STATEMENT OF ISSUES ..............................................................................................................X SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ..................................................................................................... XI ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ........................................................................................................... 1 I.
THAT THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE. .................................................. 1 A.
THAT THE COMPANY THROUGH THE MANAGING DIRECTOR CAN FILE A WRIT PETITION
UNDER ART. 32. ...................................................................................................................... 1
B.
THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
OF THE
COMPANY
AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS HAVE
BEEN VIOLATED BY THE PROHIBITION ORDER PASSED BY THE LT. GOVERNOR. ...................... 2
II. THAT LT. GOVERNOR DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO PASS THE DILLI PRADESH PROHIBITION ORDER 2016. ..................................................................................................... 3 A.
THAT THE N.C.T. O F DILLI PRADESH IS NOT AMENABLE TO ART. 239. ................. 3
B.
THE LT. GOVERNOR IS BOUND
TO TAKE THE AID AND ADVICE OF THE
COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS OF N.C.T. OF DILLI PRADESH. ........................................................................... 4 i.
The Legislative Assembly has the power to make laws with respect to matters
enumerated in the State List. .............................................................................................. 4 ii.
The Executive Power of the Lt. Governor to be exercised after the aid and advise of
the Council of Ministers. .................................................................................................... 5 C.
THE DILLI PRADESH PROHIBITION ORDER 2016 IS INVALID..................................... 7
III. THAT THE PROHIBITION ORDER PASSED BY THE LT. GOVERNOR IS VIOLATIVE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER
ART. 14 AND ART. 19(1)( G) OF THE I NDIAN
CONSTITUTION ......................................................................................................................... 9 A.
THAT
IT VIOLATES THE
RIGHT
TO
EQUALITY
UNDER
ART. 14
OF
CONSTITUTION
OF
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(i) The classification is not reasonable. ........................................................................... 9 (ii) That there is no rational nexus between the classification and the object sought to be achieved by the act. .......................................................................................................... 10 (iii) That the impugned order is arbitrary........................................................................ 12 B.
THAT
IT VIOLATES THE
RIGHT
TO
FREEDOM
TO PRACTICE ANY PROFESSION, OR
CARRYING ANY TRADE OR BUSINESS UNDER ART. 19(1)(G)................................................... 12
(i) That there is a fundamental right to trade in liquor. ................................................ 12 (ii) That the order imposes unreasonable restriction on the Fundamental Right to Trade. 13 (iii) That the order is arbitrary in nature. ........................................................................ 14 C.
THAT IT VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND LIBERTY UNDER ART. 21. ...................... 15
PRAYER FOR RELIEF .............................................................................................................. XII
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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ABBREVIATION
DEFINITION
&
And
¶
Para
§
Section
U/
Under
i.e.
That is
AIR
All India Reporter
Anr.
Another
Approx.
Approximately
Art.
Article
Const.
Constitution
Hon'ble
Honourable
Lt.
Lieutenant
Ltd.
Limited
M.P.
Madhya Pradesh
N.C.T.
National Capital Territory
Ors.
Others
Pvt.
Private
SC
Supreme Court
SCC
Supreme Court Cases
SCR
Supreme Court Reporter
U.P.
Uttar Pradesh
v.
Versus
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES -CASES1.
Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemicals Works Ltd., (1997) 5 SCC 51616
2.
Anil Kumar & Ors. v. State (GNCT of Delhi & Anr.), 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3255 ..... 14
3.
B. Krishna Murthi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2005 (2) ALT 342. ................................ 17
4.
Bennett Coleman & Co .& Ors., v. Union of India & Ors., (1972) 2 SCC 788. .............. 11
5.
Chiranjit Lal Choudhuri v. Union of India, 1950 SCR 869 ............................................. 17
6.
D.S. Nakara & Others v. Union of India, 1983 SCR (2) 165 ........................................... 17
7.
Devji Vallabhai Tandel v. Admin. of Goa, Daman Diu & Anr., (1982) 2 SCC 222. ...... 14
8.
Dharam Dutt v. Union of India, (2004) 1 SCC 712. ........................................................ 18
9.
Dr. Subramaniam Swamy v. Director, CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682. ..................................... 18
10. Express Newspaper (Private) Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1958 SC 578 11 11. F.N. Balsara v. State of Bombay & Anr., AIR 1951 SC 318 ........................................... 18 12. Govt. of N.C.T. Delhi v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 4308. .......................... 11 13. Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. UoI & Ors, (1985) 1 SCC 641 .......................................................................................................................................... 16 14. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narian, AIR 1975 SC 2299. ................................................ 15 15. Javed v. Haryana, (2003) 8 SCC 369. .............................................................................. 19 16. Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala, 1962 AIR 723. ............................................... 18 17. Kerala Hotel Bars Association v State of Kerala, 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1385............... 21 18. Kerala Hotel Bars Association v. State of Kerala, 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1385.............. 20 19. Khoday Distilleries Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (1995) 1 SCC 574 ... 18, 22 20. Krishna Kumar Narula v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., AIR 1967 SC 1368. ....... 18 21. Krishna Kumar Narula v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (1967) 3 SCR 50. ...................... 21 22. Laxmi Khandsari v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 873; ..................................................... 19 23. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248..................................................... 23 24. N.D.M.C. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1997 SC 2847. ........................................................... 12 25. Narain Swadeshi Weaving Mills v. The CEPT 1955 SCR 952. ...................................... 21 26. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180. ................................. 24 27. Om Parkash Pahwa & Ors. v. State of Delhi & Ors.,75 (1998) DLT 3 (DB). ................. 14 28. Parvej Aktar v. Union of India, (1993) 2 SCC 221. ......................................................... 18 29. R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248. ......................................................... 10 iv | P a g e WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER -
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30. Reliance Energy Ltd. & Anr. v. MSRDC & Ors., (2007) 8 SCC 1. ................................ 22 31. S.K. Chakraborty v Union of India, (1988) 3 SCC 575. .................................................. 17 32. S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab & Ors, (2001) 7 SCC 126 .......................................... 15 33. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India, (1962) 3 SCR 842. ............................... 11 34. Shashikant Laxman Kale & Anr. v. Union of India, 1990 AIR 2114. ............................. 17 35. Shiv Kirpal Singh v. V.V. Giri, 1970 AIR 2097. ............................................................. 12 36. Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. v. State of U.P. , (2011) 3 SCC 193. ...................................... 10 37. Special Courts Bill, 1978, In re, (1979) 2 SCR 476. ........................................................ 17 38. State of Andhra Pradesh & others v McDowell & Co. & others, (1996) 3 SCC 709 ...... 18 39. State of Haryana v. Jai Singh, (2003) 9 SCC 114 ............................................................ 19 40. State of Kerala & Ors. v. Kandath Distilleries, (2013) 6 SCC 573 .................................. 18 41. State of M.P. & Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors., (1986) 4 SCC 566 ............................... 18 42. State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Subanayagan & Anr. (1998)1 SCC 318. ................................ 16 43. Tej Bahadur Singh & Ors. v. State Through Data Din, 1954 CriLJ 1399. ...................... 17 44. U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd v Ayodhya Prasad Mishra, (2008) 10 SCC 139. ........................ 18 45. Welfare Asson, ARP v. Ranjit P. Gohil, (2003) 9 SCC 358 ............................................ 19
-STATUTES REFERRED1. The Constitution of India, 1950 2. The Delhi Excise Act, 2009. 3. The Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Act, 1991. 4. The Industrial Act (Development and Regulation Act), 1951. 5. Transaction of Business of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Rules, 1993. -BOOKS REFERRED1. C.K. THAKKER, M.C. THAKKER & V.G. RAMACHANDRAN, LAW OF WRITS, Vol. 1 & 2, (6th ed., 2006). 2. DURGA DAS BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, Vol. 1 & 2. (14th ed., 2009). 3. H.M SEERVAI., Constitutional Law of India, Vol. 1 & 2 (4th ed., 2006). 4. L.M SINGHVI & JAGDISH SWARUP, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Vol. 1, 2 & 3 (2nd ed., 2007). 5. JAIN M.P., Indian Constitutional Law (6th ed., Lexis Nexis Buttersworth, 2010). 6. BASUDr.DURGA DAS, The Indian Constituional Law (3rd Ed Kamal Law House, 2011). v|Page WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER -
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-LEXICONS & DICTIONARIES1. Bryan A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2001) 2. Oxford English Dictionary, (2nd Ed. 2009) 3. Webster’s New International Dictionary (1926) -ARTICLES REFERRED1. Shubhomoy Sikdar, Drunk Driving Behind 70% Accidents In Delhi: Survey. The Hindu, June 16, 2016. 2. Dara Lee Luca, Emily Owens & Gunjan Sharam, The Effect of Alcohol Regulation on Violence Against Women: Evidence from India, Social Science Research Network. 3. Chapter 5, Crime in India 2015 Statistics, National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs. 4. Murthy Pratima, Culture and Alcohol Use In India. World Cultural Psychiatry Research Review, 2015.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The writ petition has been filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indus under Art. 32seeking appropriate remedy for violation of Fundamental Rights guaranteed u/Art. 14, 19(1) g and 21 of The Constitution of Indus.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court has suo motu transferred the petition pending before the High Court of Dilli Pradesh under Art. 139A of The Constitution of Indus.
ART. 32, CONSTITUTION OF INDUS, 1950 READS: ___________________________________________________________________________ Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part – 1) The right to move the Supreme Com by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. 2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto&certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part. 3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1)&(2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction ill or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2). The right guaranteed by this Article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS ~ Introduction to Indus and Dilli Pradesh ~ Indus is a Republic in the continent of Asia which is divided into various states and union territories. Dilli Pradesh is situated in the central part of Indus. It has very rich cultural and historical importance. It also enjoys special status under the Constitution of India under Art. 239AA. Dilli Pradesh has a legislative assembly and is empowered to enact laws under this Art.. Dilli Pradesh is currently being run by Aap Ki Party. ~ Menace of Alcohol in Dilli Pradesh ~ There have been many incidents in Dilli Pradesh due to heavy consumption of alcohol, since 2015. The issue was raised by the citizens, NGOs and various international organizations. The government took notice of the matter. The Health Minister of Dilli Pradesh, in his public announcements declared that the government was in deliberations to address the grievances of all in the best possible manner. ~ The General Election of 2016 ~ In the general elections held in March 2016, the Moody Janta Party secured all the eight seats in Dilli Pradesh. It had promised in its manifesto to deal with the menace of alcohol in Dilli Pradesh. It should be noted that there is no Central Act which restricts the production, sale or consumption of alcohol. The Union Government collects excise duty on the manufacture of alcohol beverages which contributes to the exchequer. ~ Issuance of The Prohibition Order~ The Central Government of Indus issued a notification, through the Lt. Governor of Dilli Pradesh, in July, 2016. It was called the Dilli Prohibition Order, 2016. The order was notified and came into effect from 1 August 2016. It ordered for complete prohibition on the sale, distribution, marketing and consumption of whisky, wine, rum, vodka, gin, tequila or any other alcohol within the territory of Dilli Pradesh. It did not prohibit beer and any other alcoholic beverage where the alcohol content is less than 5%.
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~ Impact of the order on exchequer of Dilli Pradesh ~ The Prohibition Order was criticized by the State Government for being counter-productive to the economy of the country. There was an adverse impact on the state exchequer due to loss of indirect taxes. The Lt. Governor had acted beyond its powers in issuing the order. This claim of State Government was supported by various legal scholars as the Dilli Pradesh Government had the sole prerogative to enact law in this regard. ~ Impact on King Bird Liquor Pvt. Ltd. ~ Due to the complete embargo on the sale, distribution, marketing and consumption of certain types of alcohol like whisky, vodka, gin, tequila etc, King Bird Liquor Pvt. Ltd that had its manufacturing unit in Dilli Pradesh was seriously affected. The company was in the business of manufacture of premium whiskies and vodkas. ~ Filing of the Present Petition ~ King Bird Pvt. Ltd. has filed a petition under Art. 32 of the Indus Constitution as the order violates their Fundamental Rights under Art. 14 and 19. The State Government of Dilli Pradesh had also filed a petition under the Art. 226, before the High Court of Dilli Pradesh challenging the competency of the Lt. Governor to issue the order. The Supreme Court suo moto transferred the petition pending before the High Court and tagged both the petitions. Hence, the present petition.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.
II.
WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION THE HON ’BLE COURT UNDER MAINTAINABLE ?
FILED BY KING BIRD INVOKING JURISDICTION OF ART .
32
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDUS
IS
WHETHER THE PROHIBITION ORDER PASSES BY THE LT. GOVERNOR IS VIOLATIVE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER ART. 14 AND ART. 19(1)(G) OF THE CONSTITUTION?
III. WHETHER THE LT. GOVERNOR WAS NOT LEGISLATIVELY COMPETENT TO ENACT THE DILLI PRADESH PROHIBITION ORDER, 2016?
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.
THAT THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY KING BIRD LIQUOR PVT. LTD. INVOKING JURISDICTION OF THE HON’BLE COURT UNDER ART. 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDUS IS MAINTAINABLE.
It is submitted that the Writ Petition filed by King Bird under Art. 32 in the Hon’ble Supreme Court is maintainable. Firstly, the Managing Director of the Company can file a Writ Petition under Art. 32. Secondly, the Fundamental Rights of the Company and its shareholders guaranteed have been violated by the Prohibition Order passed by the Lt. Governor. II.
THAT THE PROHIBITION ORDER PASSES BY THE LT. GOVERNOR IS VIOLATIVE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER ART. 14, ART. 19(1)(G) AND ART. 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION.
The Prohibition Order passed by the Lt. Governor violates the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Art. 14, 19(1)(g) & 21 of the Indus Constitution. Firstly, it violates Art. 14 as the classification done under the order is not reasonable, there is no rational nexus between the classification and the objects sought to be achieved by the order and it is arbitrary in nature. Secondly, the Order violates the Petitioner’s Fundamental Rights under Art. 19(1)(g) as there is a fundamental right to trade in liquor which has been infringed upon by the unreasonable and arbitrary nature of the Order. Thirdly, the order violates the Petitioner’s Right to Life and Liberty as the order has caused a loss of livelihood to the Petitioner and those dependent on the sale, distribution and marketing of alcohol in Dilli Pradesh. III. THAT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE LT. GOVERNOR DID NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO PASS THE DILLI PRADESH PROHIBITION ORDER 2016.
The Order passed by the Lt. Governor is ultra vires, as he was not capable of passing such order under the Indus Constitution and other related provisions. Firstly, Dilli Pradesh is not amenable to Article 239. Secondly, the Lt Governor is bound to take the aid and advise of the Council of Ministers of N.C.T. Dilli Pradesh as the Legislative Assembly has the power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in the State List and the Executive power is subject to the aid and advise. Thirdly, the Dilli Pradesh Prohibition Order 2016 is invalid. xi | P a g e WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER -
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I.
THAT THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE .
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the present petition is maintainable before the Supreme Court as the aforesaid petition has been filed by the Managing Director of King Bird Liquor Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the King Bird). It is submitted that [A]the company through the Managing Director can file a writ petition under Art. 32 and [B]that the Fundamental Rights of the Company and its shareholders have been violated by the Prohibition Order passed by the Lt. Governor. A.
That the company through the Managing Director can file a writ petition under Art. 32.
A Company is a juristic person and has a personality of its own. It is a legal entity in the eyes of law on equal footing as a natural person. Art. 14 of the Constitution of Indus states that, the state shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection of law under the territory of Indus. Therefore it is submitted that the Company is entitled to claim right u/Art. 14 of the Constitution.1 In addition to this, a legislative measure may impair the rights of the Company alone and not of its shareholders, or it may impair the rights of the shareholder along with the Company and in such scenario, the Court shall not refuse to grant relief merely upon the technical operation of the action.2 In the present case, the Writ Petition has been filed by the Managing Director, for asserting his fundamental rights because of unreasonable restrictions imposed by the aforesaid legislation.3 Reliance for the same is placed upon the landmark Judgement of R.C. Cooper v.Union of India4 where it was held that “…the fundamental rights of share-holders as citizens are not lost when they associate to form a company. When their fundamental rights as shareholders are impaired by State action their rights as shareholders are protected.”
1
Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. v. State of U.P. , (2011) 3 SCC 193. R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248. [Hereinafter referred as R.C. Cooper] 3 Moot Proposition, ¶ 7. 4 R.C. Cooper, Supra at 4. 2
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The same has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Court in the Bennett Coleman5 case. It is respectfully submitted that it is the substance and the practical result of the act of the state that should be considered rather than the pure legal form.6 Furthermore, in Express Newspapers case, no plea was raised against the maintainability of the Writ Petition on the ground that one of the petitioner happened to be a Company.7 Thus, it is humbly submitted that the Company and the Managing Director have the right to file the Writ Petition. B.
That the Fundamental Rights of the Company and its shareholders have been violated by the Prohibition Order passed by the Lt. Governor.
It is humbly submitted that the Fundamental Rights of King Bird have been violated under Art. 14 of the Constitution. The Fundamental Rights of the shareholders have been violated under Art. 14 and 19(1) (g).
5
Bennett Coleman &Co.&Ors., v. Union of India&Ors., (1972) 2 SCC 788. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd.&Ors. v. Union of India, (1962) 3 SCR 842. [Hereinafter referred as Sakal] 7 Express Newspaper (Private) Ltd.&Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1958 SC 578; Sakal, Supra at 5. 6
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II.
THAT LT. GOVERNOR DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO PASS THE DILLI PRADESH PROHIBITION ORDER 2016.
It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the notification so provided by the Central Government falls outside the vires of its competence. In the following submissions, it shall be put forth [A] that the National Capital Territory Dilli Pradesh (Hereinafter referred as N.C.T of Dilli Pradesh) is a Union Territory with a Special Status under the Constitution of Indus; [B] the Lt. Governor is not bound by the aid and advice clause of the council of Ministers. A.
That The N.C.T. Of Dilli Pradesh is not Amenable To Art. 239.
It is humbly submitted that the N.C.T. of Dilli Pradesh is governed by a special provision enumerated in order to ensure a Responsible Government in the Dilli Pradesh under the Constitution of Indus in the form of Art. 239AA8. According to Art. 1 of the Constitution of Indus, Indus is a Union of States and further Clause (2) and (3) classify the distinction between the States and Union Territories specified in the first schedule. Though according to the definition9Dilli Pradesh is not categorised as a State but on the similar hand it shall be governed by Art. 239 AA of the Constitution of Indus. As is evident from the title itself, Art. 239AA is a special provision with respect to Dilli Pradesh which was inserted by the Constitution (69th Amendment) Act, 1991 with effect from 01.02.1992, in terms of which the Union Territory of Dilli Pradesh shall be called N.C.T. of Dilli Pradesh and the administrator thereof shall be designated as the Lt. Governor. Further, as per clause (2) of Art. 239AA, there shall be a Legislative Assembly for the National Capital Territory and the seats in such Assembly shall be filled by members chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the National Capital Territory. Clause (2) further provides that the functioning of the Legislative Assembly shall be regulated by law made by Parliament. There are certain Union Territories for which there is no Legislature. The second category of Union Territories, as under Art. 239A (i.e., Puducherry), which have their legislatures conferred by the Parliament and finally the third category of Union territory, as under Art. 239AA (i.e. Dilli Pradesh)10. The difference is Art. 239 of the Constitution deals with the administration of Union Territories whereas Art. 239AA talks about the special provisions with respect to Dilli Pradesh i.e. they talk about the distinction between a body constituted by the
8
Govt. of N.C.T. Delhi v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 4308. INDIA CONST. art. 366, cl. 15. 10 N.D.M.C. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1997 SC 2847. 9
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Parliament and the Legislature created by the Constitution.11 In other words Art. 239AA constitutes a full-fledged Legislature for Delhi which is different from the body constituted by Parliament under Art. 239A to function as a Legislature for a Union Territory. Moreover a reference to Art. 239B read with clause (8) of Art.239AA shows how the Union Territory of Delhi is in a class by itself. This is also the reason why Art. 239 is also not applicable to the Union Territories. As Art. 239 of the Constitution deals with the administration of Union Territories whereas Art. 239AA talks about the special provisions with respect to a different class of Union Territory. Therefore Art. 239 of the Constitution is not applicable to the NCT of Dilli Pradesh. The powers of the Lt. Governor under Art. 239AA are different from the powers of the Administrator under Art. 239. Hence Art. 239AA is a self-contained code and not incorporated by reference under Art. 239 of the Constitution of Indus. B.
The Lt. Governor is bound to take the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers of N.C.T. of Dilli Pradesh.
It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the Lt. Governor is the Administrative Head, directed by the President, of the N.C.T. of Dilli Pradesh. The Lt. Governor is bound to take the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers of N.C.T. of Dilli Pradesh. In the following sub contentions, the same is sought to be put forth. i.
The Legislative Assembly has the power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in the State List.
It is humbly submitted that the Legislative Assembly has the power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in the State List. As according to Clause (3) of Art. 239AA the Legislative Assembly of National Capital Territory has the power to make laws for the whole or any part of the National Capital Territory with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or in the Concurrent List except matters with respect to Entries 1, 2 and 18 of the State List and Entries 64, 65 and 66 of that List in so far as they relate to the said Entries 1, 2 and 18. Furthermore, the powers so conferred on the Legislative Assembly of National Capital
11
Shiv Kirpal Singh v. V.V. Giri, 1970 AIR 2097.
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Territory to make laws are not in derogation of the powers of Parliament under the Constitution to make laws with respect to any matter for a Union Territory or any part thereof.12 In the present case, the Prohibition Order passed by the Lt. Governor, put a complete prohibition on the sale, distribution, marketing and consumption of whiskey, wine, rum, vodka, gin, tequila or any other alcohol.13 The action taken by Lt. Governor is ultra vires as the Lt. Governor did not have the authority to issue an order concerning the entry 8 of List II in the Seventh Schedule in which he is bound to take the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Moreover also the industries engaged in the manufacture of alcohol meant for potable purposes had already brought under the total and exclusive control of States in all respects.14 ii.
The Executive Power of the Lt. Governor to be exercised after the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
It is humbly submitted that the Executive Power of the Lt. Governor is to be exercised after the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers has been carried out. According to Clause (4) of Art. 239AA provides that there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Lt. Governor in the exercise of his functions in relation to matters with respect to which the Legislative Assembly has power to make laws except in so far as he is required by law to act in his discretion. This proves that the Executive power is co-extensive with the Legislative power. Hence It is humbly submitted that the Lt. Governor can act only after the aid and advise of the Council of Ministers is exercised. Since Delhi is Union Territory of a Special Category, the discretionary power of the Lt. Governor is pari materia with the Governor of a State.15The Lt. Governor can act in his discretion only with regards to those matters which fall outside the purview of the powers conferred on the Legislative Assembly but in respect of which powers or functions are entrusted or delegated to him by the President.16 The only difference between the powers of the both the authorities is in case of discretionary powers to be exercised by them. The Lt. Governor is just bound to take the aid and advise whereas the governor is bound by the aid and advise of the Council of Ministers. As seen in the case of Om Parkash Pahwa & Ors. v. State
12
INDIA CONST. art. 239AA, Cl. 3(a). Moot Proposition ¶ 7. 14 The Industrial Act (Development & Regulation), Amendment Act 2016. 15 DevjiVallabhaiTandel v. Administrator of Goa, Daman Diu&Anr., (1982) 2 SCC 222. 16 The Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi, § 41 (1991). 13
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of Delhi & Others17 that the phraseology employed by Clause (4) of Art. 239AA deserves to be compared with that employed in Art. 163. The Lt. Governor of NCT of Delhi would be aided and advised by the Council of Ministers in the exercise of his functions in relation to the matters with reference to which the legislative assembly has power to make laws. This was reiterated in the case of Anil Kumar v. GNCT of Delhi18 and held that in respect of matters which do not fall outside the purview of the powers conferred on the Legislative Assembly – in other words, which fall within the legislative competence of the Legislative Assembly, or in which he is not required by or under any law to act in his discretion or exercise his judicial or quasi-judicial functions, the Lt. Governor must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Moreover it has been state that the Lt. Governor shall in respect of matters connected with 'public order', 'police' and 'land' exercise his executive functions to the extent delegated to him by the President in consultation with the Chief Minister, if it is so provided under any order issued by the President under Art. 239 of the Constitution.19 It is respectfully submitted before the Hon’ble Court that even though the NCT of Dilli Pradesh may have maintained the Parliamentary supremacy as to legislation, it is equally important to consider that an arrangement of governance of the region through directly elected representative has been provided for. It has been provided that the Council of Ministers would ultimately be responsible for the governance. As the Supreme Court also held in S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab& Ors.20 that the very concept of responsible Government and representative democracy signifies Government by the people. In constitutional terms, it denotes that the sovereign power which resides in the people is exercised on their behalf by their chosen representatives and for exercise of those powers, the representatives are necessarily accountable to the people for what they do. The Members of the Legislature, thus, must owe their power directly or indirectly to the people. Thus due to all of the above arguments it is humbly submitted that the Executive Power of the Lt. Governor to be exercised after the aid and advise of the Council of Ministers.
17
Om Parkash Pahwa & Ors. v. State of Delhi & Ors.,75 (1998) DLT 3 (DB). Anil Kumar & Ors. v. State (GNCT of Delhi & Anr.), 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3255. 19 Transaction of Business of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Rules, Rule 45, (1993). 20 S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab & Ors, (2001) 7 SCC 126. 18
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C.
The Dilli Pradesh Prohibition Order 2016 is invalid.
It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble that Dilli Pradesh Prohibition order is invalid. As in the case of Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narian21 it was held that the separation of powers is the basic structure of the Constitution. Also though the Lt Governor enjoys some discretionary powers. But, it is contended before the court that the Lt Governor can exercise those powers only in certain circumstances as described under the Constitution of Indus, the GNCT of Dilli Pradesh Act, 1991 and the Transactions of Business Rules of Delhi. According to the Proviso to Art. 239AA (4), it was held that in the event of “a difference of opinion” between him and the council of ministers, the Lt. governor of Delhi does have the power to act on his own “where the matter, in his opinion, is so urgent that it is necessary for him to take immediate action”. But then, Art. 239AA of the Constitution also makes it clear that the Lt. Governor can invoke this urgency power only after he has referred the matter to “the President for decision” and that it “shall be competent” for him to take immediate action “pending such decision”. Since in the present case the Lt. Governor had not consulted the Chief Minister and the Council of Ministers, there could not have been any conflict. Hence, he could not have referred to the President before issuing the Prohibition order, which is a precondition for taking “immediate action”. Moreover it has been held in various cases that the executive power must always be exercised in the four corners of the law. It has been relied upon to reinforce that a piece of 'subordinate legislation' can be tested on the question of 'unreasonableness', namely, that it is manifestly arbitrary.22 In Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemicals Works Ltd23, It was held that the essential legislative function consisting determination of the legislative policy cannot be abdicated by the Legislature in favor of another though power to make subsidiary legislation can be entrusted to another body after enunciating the policy and the principles for the guidance of the delegates. The delegate has to work within the scope of its authority and cannot widen or constrict the scope of the Act or the policy laid down there under nor can it legislate on the
21
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narian, AIR 1975 SC 2299. Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors, (1985) 1 SCC 641. 23 Agricultural Market Committee vs. Shalimar Chemicals Works Ltd, (1997) 5 SCC 516 22
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field covered by the Act. Similar principles were re-stated in State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Subannayagan & Anr.24 In Hamdard Dawakhanaand Anr. v. Union of India and Ors.,25 the Supreme Court said, that the discretion should not be so wide that it is impossible to discern its limits. There must instead be definite boundaries within which the powers of the administrative authority are exercisable. Delegation should be not be so indefinite as to amount to an abdication of the legislative function. As seen in our case as there has been a major loss of the public exchequer as the Govt. of N.C.T. collects excise duty on manufacture of alcoholic beverages.26 Therefore finally it is submitted before the Court that the Lt. Governor could not have issued an order without consulting the Chief Minister and the council of Ministers of Dilli Pradesh, on matter given to Dilli Pradesh Government to legislate, by the Constitution.
24
State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Subanayagan&Anr. (1998)1 SCC 318. HamdardDawakhana&Anr. v. Union of India&Ors., AIR 1960 SC 554. 26 Moot Proposition, ¶ 5. 25
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III. THAT
THE PROHIBITION ORDER PASSED BY THE
LT. GOVERNOR
THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER THE INDIAN
ART. 14
AND
IS VIOLATIVE OF
ART. 19(1)( G)
OF
CONSTITUTION
The Dilli Pradesh Prohibition Order, 2016 passed by the Lt. Governor that the “Prohibition Order” is violative of the fundamental right as it,[A]violates the Right to Equality under Art. 1427; [B]violates the Right to Freedom to practice any profession, or carrying any trade or business guaranteed under Art. 19(1) (g), [C] consequently leading to the violation of the Right to Life and Liberty under Art. 21. A. That it violates the Right to Equality under Art. 14 of Constitution of Indus. It is humbly submitted that the principle underlying guarantee of Art. 14 is not that the same rules of law should be applicable to all persons within the Indian Territory or that the same remedies should be made available to them irrespective of differences of circumstances. 28 It only means that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.29 Equal laws would have to be applied to all in the same situation, and there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject-matter of the legislation their position is substantially the same.30 It is contended that Art.14 has been violated by the Prohibition Order on following three grounds; (i) The classification is not reasonable. Art. 14 permits reasonable classification for the purpose of disposition.31 The classification must be rational, that is to say, it must be based on some qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in others who are left out. The condition that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together must be fulfilled.32The subject matter of legislation should be a welldefined class founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes that subject matter from 27
India CONST. art. 14. Chiranjit Lal Choudhuri v. Union of India, 1950 SCR 869; B. Krishna Murthi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2005 (2) ALT 342. 29 Shashikant Laxman Kale &Anr. v. Union of India, 1990 AIR 2114. 30 D.S. Nakara & Others v. Union of India, 1983 SCR (2) 165; Tej Bahadur Singh & Ors. v. State through Data Din, 1954 CriLJ 1399. 31 S.K. Chakraborty v Union of India, (1988) 3 SCC 575. 32 Special Courts Bill, 1978, In re, (1979) 2 SCR 476. 28
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the others left out.
33
In other words, equals must be treated alike in like circumstances and
conditions34 and such classification is based in legal and relevant consideration.35 It is submitted that all the products with Alcoholic Content (except Beer) of over 5% have been prohibited for sale, distribution, marketing and consumption under the prohibition order.36 It has led to the creation of a separate class out of a homogeneous class. The process of giving licences in case of the establishment of the industries manufacturing alcohol and beer is governed by only one act.37 Thus, there is only one class which is related to manufacture of the alcoholic beverages however the “Prohibition Order” has bifurcated and created a new class on a non-intelligible premise. There is no difference between industries manufacturing alcohol and alcoholic beverages with content of less than 5% in its composition. In order to elucidate the aforesaid discrepancy, reliance is placed upon the case of Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala38, where the impugned Act gave certain benefits to those who owned plantation of rubber, tea and coffee but left those who owned pepper and areca plantation. Since there was no reasonable distinction between those two classes of plantation owners, the Supreme Court held the act ultra-wires Art. 14. Furthermore, the business in liquor as a beverage has been defined by the Hon’ble Court in respect of Potable Liquor39 and differentiation must be founded on pertinent and real differences as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones.40 It is humbly submitted that differentiation of any alcohol from beer is segregation without any rational basis or an intelligible differentia. Hence, it is ultra vires, null and void. (ii) That there is no rational nexus between the classification and the object sought to be achieved by the act. It is humbly submitted that in addition to reasonable classification, there should also be a clear
33
DharamDutt v. Union of India, (2004) 1 SCC 712. ParvejAktar v. Union of India, (1993) 2 SCC 221. 35 U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd v Ayodhya Prasad Mishra, (2008) 10 SCC 139. 36 Moot Proposition, ¶ 7. 37 Delhi Excise Act, 2010. 38 KarimbilKunhikoman v. State of Kerala, 1962 AIR 723. 39 State of Kerala&Ors. v. Kandath Distilleries, (2013) 6 SCC 573; F.N. Balsara v. State of Bombay&Anr., AIR 1951 SC 318; Khoday Distilleries Ltd.&Ors. v. State of Karnataka&Ors., (1995) 1 SCC 574; State of M.P.&Ors. v. NandlalJaiswal&Ors., (1986) 4 SCC 566; State of Andhra Pradesh & others v McDowell&Co.&others, (1996) 3 SCC 709; Krishna Kumar Narula v. State of Jammu&Kashmir&Ors., AIR 1967 SC 1368. 40 Dr. SubramaniamSwamy v. Director, CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682. 34
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nexus between the classification and the objects sought to be achieved by the act. It is part of the twin test of reasonable classification as propounded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a number of cases.41 In its public announcement after the notification of the Prohibition Order, the Lt. Governor stated that the law has been passed keeping in mind the directive principles of state policy which every Government should aim to achieve.42 It is humbly submitted that the Art. 47 states that the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption of intoxicating drinks which are injurious to health.43The aforesaid order does not establish a rational nexus between the classification and the object sought by the act. The continuation of a substitutive alcoholic beverage is only a special favour done to the beer manufacturers. The object of prohibition can not to be achieved by the act as first, the basis of classification is unreasonable and secondly, mere less content of alcohol in the beverage does not solve the problem with relation to injury to the health of the person or with regards to the menace. It is humbly submitted that having regards to being injurious to people that beer is also an intoxicating drink and is defined under the same head as Liquor44 and what differentiates beer from other alcoholic beverages is only the quantity of alcoholic content. It is to be noted that a drink is considered to be 0.5 ounces (oz) or 15 grams of alcohol, which is equivalent to 12 oz (355 millilitres [ml]) of beer thus, the same amount intoxication can be achieved by an alcoholic by drinking beer as he could have achieved by drinking any other alcoholic beverage thus, the object to either control menace or to increase the level of public health both are likely to suffer in achievement as same quantity can be drunk by people.45 Therefore, not only the classification is based on unreasonable or arbitrary grounds but also there is also no rational nexus between the object sought by the act. There cannot be a caveat to the opinion that permitting the consumption of beer is a getaway to the consumption of hard liquor, and indeed is a social malaise in itself.46
41
LaxmiKhandsari v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 873; State of Haryana v. Jai Singh, (2003) 9 SCC 114; Welfare Asson, ARP v. Ranjit P. Gohil, (2003) 9 SCC 358; Javed v. Haryana, (2003) 8 SCC 369. 42 Moot Proposition ¶ 8. 43 INDIA CONST. art. 47. 44 Delhi Excise Act, § 2(46) 2010. 45 'What is a Standard Drink?', https://www.niaaa.nih.gov/alcohol-health/overview-alcohol-consumption/whatstandard-drink, last accessed on 24 September, 2016. 46 Kerala Hotel Bars Association v. State of Kerala, 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1385.
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(iii)
That the impugned order is arbitrary.
It is humbly submitted before the Court that as classification is unreasonable and it is not have a rational nexus with the objects sought to be achieved by the act, it is arbitrary in nature. Referring to the Prohibition Order, it is submitted that the law explicitly excludes the sale, distribution, marketing and consumption all Beers (even exceeding 5% alcohol content). It is humbly submitted that the prohibition order has created a privileged class in the fermentation industry by establishing a monopoly of the manufacturers of Beer. Thus, it is carving out a special category of a homogeneous class. The order has resulted in the monopoly of beer manufacturers in “potable liquor business”and a special favour has been done by the Government to the beer manufacturers by excluding them from a class. B. That it violates the Right to Freedom to practice any profession, or carrying any trade or business under Art. 19(1)(g). It is humbly submitted before the court the Petitioner had a fundamental right to trade under Art. 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of Indus. Art. 19(1) (g) provides the citizens the freedom to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. It is humbly submitted that Art.19 (1) (g) has been violated by the Prohibition Order which will be expounded on the basis of three pronged contentions, (i)
That there is a fundamental right to trade in liquor.
It is humbly submitted that Art. 19(1) (g) of the Indus Constitution provides that all citizens shall have the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. Reasonable restriction can be imposed by the State under 19(2) to 19(6). The State Government has power to make laws relating to intoxicating liquors regarding the production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale.47 Furthermore, the Union Government has enacted IDR Act and the same act recognizes Fermentation Industries.48 Thus, it is humbly submitted that alcohol is fit for human consumption has been recognized by the Constitution of Indus as well as the subsequent statutory provisions enacted by the Parliament of Indus also approve the same.
47 48
INDIA CONST. Sch. 7, Ent. 8. The Industries Act (Development & Regulation), Act 1951.
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The word “business” connotes some real, substantial and systematic or organised course of activity or conduct with a set purpose.49 It is contended that applying this test to the trade and liquor proves that it is a business covered under Art. 19(1) (g) as liquor can be manufactured, brought or sold like any other commodity. It is consumed throughout the world, though some countries restrict or prohibit the same on economic or moral grounds. The morality or otherwise of a deal does not affect the quality of the activity though it may be a ground for imposing a restriction on the said activity. The illegality of an activity does not affect the character of the activity but operates as a restriction on it.50 Hence, it is submitted that the Petitioner has a Fundamental Right to trade in alcohol. (ii)
That the order imposes unreasonable restriction on the Fundamental Right to Trade.
It is humbly submitted that Right to Freedom under Art. 19(1) can be restricted by the provisions under Art. 19(2) to 19(6). In present case, the right conferred by the Art. 19(1)(g) is subject to reasonable restrictions under Clause (6) of Art. 19 which reads as follows: [6] Nothing in Sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the States from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said subclause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to[i] the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practicing any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or [ii] the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.51 In Kerala Hotel Bars Association v .State of Kerala52, it was held that, in the event of the state permitting of trade or business in potable liquor with or without limitation, the citizen has the
49
NarainSwadeshi Weaving Mills v. The Commissioner of Excess profits Tax 1955 SCR 952. Krishna Kumar Narula v. State of Jammu&Kashmir, (1967) 3 SCR 50. 51 INDIA CONST. art. 26, cl. 6. 52 Kerala Hotel Bars Association v State of Kerala, 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1385. 50
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right not to be discriminated against. And any regulatory measure would have to satisfy the test of Art.14.53 Thus, it is humbly submitted that the state cannot discriminate with the citizens who are equally qualified to carry on trade when the state permits the business with or without limitation. Furthermore, it can also adopt any method to sell licenses to maximise the revenue so long as the method is not discriminatory.54 Thus, in regard of the law laid by the Hon’ble Court, the prohibition order is violative as it is discriminatory and treats people similarly placed differently as the State has neither created a monopoly nor it has created totally prohibited trade in potable liquor but rather a monopoly of private beer manufacturers has been created thereby special and discriminatory treatment has been meted out by the state with regards to other citizens engaged in business in potable liquor. The State Government collects revenue under the Delhi Excise Act and the same governs both the beer and other alcoholic beverages thus, the manner of obtaining license is the same with same requirements and thus, both the manufacturers are equally qualified and hence, discriminatory treatment is violative of the principle of reasonable restriction under Art. 19(6). (iii)
That the order is arbitrary in nature.
The order also is arbitrary as it does not distinguish between the purpose for which the alcoholic product is used and having regards to this precarious fiasco of the order, It is humbly submitted that only trade in potable liquor is res extra commerciumhowever the position is entirely different with regard to alcoholic beverage used for industrial, medicinal and toilet preparations wherein the right to trade is recognised on the same footing as any other profession and the state does not have the right to prohibit the same but impose only reasonable restriction having regards to Art. 19 (6). It is also contended that Beer is explicitly excluded from the prohibition order. Thereby, the order violates 19(1)(g) by creating a privileged class in the form of Beer manufacturers. In the case of Reliance Energy Limited & Anr. v.Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation & Ors.,55 the Supreme Court of India held that Level playing field is an important
53
Khoday Distilleries Ltd.&Ors. v. State of Karnataka&Ors., (1995) 1 SCC 574.(Hereinafter referred as“Khoday”) 54 Ibid. 55 Reliance Energy Ltd.& Anr. v. Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation & Ors., (2007) 8 SCC 1.
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aspect to be considered while construing Art. 19(1)(g) of the constitution. According to the bench, “When Art. 19(1)(g) confers fundamental right to carry on business to a company, it is entitled to invoke the said doctrine of “level playing field”. We may clarify that this doctrine is, however, subject to public interest. In the world of globalization, competition is an important factor to be kept in mind. The doctrine of “level playing field” is an important doctrine which is embodied in Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. This is because the said doctrine provides space within which equally-placed competitors are allowed to bid so as to subserve the larger public interest. Decisions or acts which results in unequal and discriminatory treatment, would violate the doctrine of “level playing field” embodied in Art. 19(1)(g).” In the instant case, the order denies to Managing Director of the right to have a level playing field in the market as its products have been arbitrarily prohibited which is a violation of his fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(g). C. That it violates the Right to Life and Liberty under Art. 21. It is humbly submitted that the Petitioner’s right to live and liberty has been violated by the aforesaid Prohibition Order. As based on arbitrary order, the Fundamental Right to Trade has been infringed upon by the Order.The loss of livelihood of the Petitioner and those dependent upon the sale of alcohol within Dilli Pradesh have been left jobless without proper rehabilitation. Articles dealing with Fundamental Rights do not represent entirely separate streams of rights which do not mingle at many points. They are all parts of an integrated scheme in the constitution. Their waters must mix to constitute that grand flow unimpeded .and impartial justice (social, economic and political), freedom (not only of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship, but also of association, movement vocation or occupation as well as of acquisition and possession of reasonable property), or equality (of status and of opportunity, which imply absence of unreasonable or unfair discrimination between individuals, groups and classes), and
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of fraternity (assuring dignity-of the individual and the unity of the nation) which our Constitution visualises.56 It is humbly submitted that the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation57 has held, “The sweep of right to life conferred by Art.21 is wide and far reaching. It does not mean, merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of death sentence, except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect if the right to life. An equally important facet of the right to life is the right to livelihood because no person can live without the means of livelihood.” It is humbly submitted that the order infringes upon the Fundamental Right to Life and Liberty guaranteed under the Art. 21 of the Indus Constitution.
56 57
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore in the light of arguments advanced, authorities cited and facts mentioned the Hon’ble Court may be pleased to adjudicate by issuing an appropriate writ, direction or order that: a) The Writ Petition is maintainable b) The Fundamental Rights of the King Bird have been violated U/Art. 14 and 19 1(g) And any other relief that the Hon’ble Court may be pleased to grant in the interests of justice, equity and good conscience. All of which is humbly submitted. Sd/Counsels for the Petitioner Kingbird
Wherefore in the light of arguments advanced, authorities cited and facts mentioned the Hon’ble Court may be pleased to adjudicate by issuing an appropriate writ, direction or order that the Central Government did not have the capacity to pass the Dilli Pradesh Prohibition Order. And any other relief that the Hon’ble Court may be pleased to grant in the interests of justice, equity and good conscience. All of which is humbly submitted.
Sd/ Counsels for the Petitioner N.C.T. of Dilli Pradesh
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