Persons

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS Case Doctrines (Diory Rabajante) CIVIL CODE PROVISIONS I. PRELIMINARY TITLES (Articles 1-18)  Article 2 The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its Taňada vs. purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. It must be Tuvera made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after 15 days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature. (Nota Bene: Executive Order 200, dated June 18, 1987, modifying Article 2 of the Civil Code, now provides for the publication of laws either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines as a requirement for effectivity.) The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to ―fill in the details‖ of the Central Bank Act (RA 265) which that body is supposed to enforce. Circulars which prescribe a penalty for their violation should be published People vs. Que Po before becoming effective. This is based on the general principle and Lay theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provision, a law, regulation, or circular must first be published, and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and the penalties for violation thereof. - EXECUTIVE ORDERS WITH PENAL SANCTIONS; PUBLICATION IN Pesigan vs. THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE, INDISPENSABLE — Executive Order No. Angeles 626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because it was published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code and Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code. - LAWS (in Art. 2, Civil Code) INCLUDES CIRCULARS AND REGULATIONS WHICH PRESCRIBE PENALTIES — The word "laws" in Article 2 (Article 1 of the Old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. - * PURPOSE OF PUBLICATION — Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on persons affected thereby - Case at Bar: PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 Phil. under which applications to the PITC for importation from the People’s International Republic of China must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed export Trading Corp. vs. program of Philippine products. PITC barred Remington and Firestone Judge Angeles from importing products from China on the ground that they were not able to comply with the requirement of the said administrative order. Thereafter they filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against the said order of PITC in which the trial court upheld and declared to be null and void for being unconstitutional. The court contends further authority to process

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 Article 3 Delgado vs. Alonso

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People vs. Bitdu (G.R. No. L-38230)

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 Article 4 Co vs. CA  Article 6 D.M. Consunji vs. CA

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and approve applications for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has already been repealed by EO 133 issued on February 27, 1987. Hence, the PITC filed a certiorari seeking the reversal of the said decision. Issue: Whether or not PITC’s Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order; nevertheless, the said AO is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the New Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs Tuvera which states that all statues including those of local application and private laws shall be published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. The AO under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity since it is punitive in character. A person who charges usurious rates of interest cannot claim justification in his ignorance of the Usury Law. He can, therefore, be made to pay reasonable attorney’s fees of the debtor. Case at bar: The defense presented no evidence to show that the conditions prescribed by the Koran had been complied with by the parties when they obtained their divorce before Datu Cuevas. Said divorce therefore between the defendant and Halid does not satisfy the conditions prescribed by the Koran and consequently said divorce seems to be of doubtful religious validity. However, even admitting that this divorce was secured in accordance with the conditions prescribed by Mohammedan doctrines, is such divorce legal? The laws governing marriage and its incidents are moral in nature and as such they are laws relating to public policy. In the Philippine Islands we have a law (Act No. 2710) enumerating the causes and the conditions under which divorce may be secured and granted. Any divorce obtained in the Philippine Islands of causes and under conditions other than those enumerated in said law, would have no legal effect. The habits and customs of a people, the dogmas and doctrines of a religion cannot be superior to or have precedence over laws relating to public policy, because as stated above laws relating to marriage and its incidents are normal in nature and as such they affect public policy. The court therefore is of the opinion that even if the divorce alleged by the defense was secured in conformity with Mohammedan doctrines, such divorce cannot prevail against the Divorce Law of the Philippine Islands prescribing the causes and conditions under which divorce may be obtained. In this case, as above demonstrated, the divorce in question has not been obtained in accordance with the law.

Case at bar: On November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego´s widow, filed in the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased´s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow´s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the CA affirmed

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Cui vs. Arellano University [112 Phil 135]

 Article 8 Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation

 Article 15-16 Miciano vs. Brimo

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the decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner (Consunji) is negligent and should be liable. Ruling: The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmen´s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. The CA held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Scholarship grants, as pointed out by the Director of the Bureau of Private Schools in Memorandum No. 38, are awarded in recognition of merit and not to attract and keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda value. To look at such grants as a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an educational institution is not only inconsistent with sound public policy but also good morals. Consequently, the waiver signed by the student, waiving his right to transfer to another school unless he refunds to the university the equivalent of his scholarship grants, is void.

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Judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself. Article 8 of the Civil Code tells us that judicial decisions that apply or interpret laws of the Constitution form part of our legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not laws, are evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of its enactment since the Court’s application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.

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Case at bar: An alien testator (Turk) who made his will in the Philippines stated in the will that his property should be distributed in accordance with Philippine law, and not that of his nation. The provision in the will is not valid. The Turkish law should govern the disposition of his property pursuant to Article 16. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit: SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows: (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing; (b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment

Pilapil vs. IbaySomera

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Roehr vs. Rodriguez

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Garcia vs. Receio

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Bellis vs. Bellis

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United Airlines vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 124110)

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may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of private respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the proceedings nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services Office. Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said proceedings. More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. Our Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. The 4 aspects of succession that are governed by the national law of the decedent if he is a foreigner are: 1. The order of succession 2. The amount of successional rights 3. The intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions 4. The capacity to succeed. In case the testator, who is a foreigner, actually wanted to distribute his estate in accordance with Philippine laws, and so, in his will, there is a proviso to the effect that said estate shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine laws, the proviso in the will would be void. It is contrary to the provision of Article 16 which explicitly declares that it will be the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration that will govern. Neither do we agree with the conclusion reached by the appellate court that private respondents’ failure to comply with the check-in requirement will not defeat his claim as the denied boarding rules were not complied with. Notably, the appellate court relied on the Code of Federal Regulation Part on Oversales which states: 250.6 Exceptions to eligibility for denied boarding compensation. A passenger denied board involuntarily from an oversold flight

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II. Human Relations  Articles 19-22 Albenson Enterprises vs. CA -

Nikko Hotel vs. Reyes

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shall not be eligible for denied board compensation if: a. The passenger does not comply with the carrier’s contract of carriage or tariff provisions regarding ticketing, reconfirmation, check-in, and acceptability for transformation. The appellate court, however, erred in applying the laws of the United States as, in the case at bar, Philippine law is the applicable law. Although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United States, the tickets were purchased through petitioner’s agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were "rewritten" in Washington, D.C. however, such fact did not change the nature of the original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in Manila. In the case of Zalanea vs. Court of Appeals, this Court applied the doctrine of lex loci contractus. According to the doctrine, as a general rule, the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature and validity, obligation and interpretation. This has been said to be the rule even though the place where the contract was made is different from the place where it is to be performed, and particularly so, if the place of the making and the place of performance are the same. Hence, the court should apply the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued, when the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. The law of the forum on the subject matter is Economic Regulations No. 7 as amended by Boarding Priority and Denied Board Compensation of the Civil Aeronautics Board which provides that the check-in requirement be complied with before a passenger may claim against a carrier for being denied boarding: Sec. 5. Amount of Denied Boarding Compensation Subject to the exceptions provided hereinafter under Section 6, carriers shall pay to passengers holding confirmed reserved space and who have presented themselves at the proper place and time and fully complied with the carrier’s check-in and reconfirmation procedures and who are acceptable for carriage under the Carrier’s tariff but who have been denied boarding for lack of space, a compensation at the rate of: xxx

A party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is later on absolved, may file a case for damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious prosecution. The principle of abuse of rights is based upon the famous maxim suum jus summa injuria (the abuse of a right is the greatest possible wrong). However, in order that it will be actionable, the following elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 must be present: 1. There is a legal right or duty; 2. Which is exercised in bad faith; 3. For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 19 is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible."The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights

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Spouses Quisumbing vs. MERALCO

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but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Hence, Reyes invoked Article 21. Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure. Under Articles 19 and 21 the nature of the act to be able to claim damages must be intentional. It has been proven in the case, however, the Lim’s acts were otherwise. Doctrine of Violenti Non Fit Injuria (―to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury‖) pertains to the self-inflicted injury which will not entitle a person for damages because of the very fact that it in the first place it was his fault on why he was injured. This doctrine was invoked by Nikko Hotel in the petition, claiming that Reyes exposed himself to the injury of being thrown out of the party as a gate crasher. The Court, however, said that this is not applicable in this case because despite Reyes’ improper behaviour of gate-crashing, Nikko Hotel and Lim should still observe proper treatment towards him under Articles 19 and 21 as to not expose him to humiliation and shame. Case at bar: The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the owners of a house located at #94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3, 1995, defendant’s inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot inspection of all single phase meters at the house and observed as standard operating procedure to ask permission and was granted by the plaintiff’s secretary. After the inspection, it was found that the meter had been tampered with. The result was relayed to the secretary who conveyed the information to the owners of the house. The inspectors advised that the meter be brought in their laboratory for further verifications. In the event that the meter was indeed tampered, defendant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of the couple. After an hour, inspectors returned and informed the findings of the laboratory and asked the couple that unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential bill their electric supply will be disconnected. The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection. Issue: Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent manner done without due process, lack of regard for QUISUMBING’s rights, feelings, social and business reputation and therefore held them accountable and plaintiff be entitled for damages. Ruling: Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay respondent the billing differential of P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages including attorney’s fees. Moral damages may be recovered when rights of individuals including right against the deprivation of property without due process of law are violated. Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed by way of example or correction for public. SC recognized the effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use of electricity. However, any action must be done in strict observance of the rights of the people.

University of the East vs. Jader (G.R. No. 132344)

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Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA (G.R. No. 97336)

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Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. CA

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―Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric service on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board‖. During the inspection, no government official or ERB representative was present. Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. It is the school that has access to those information and it is only the school that can compel its professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations and policies with respect to the computation and the prompt submission of grades. Students do not exercise control, much less influence, over the way an educational institution should run its affairs, particularly in disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their compliance with the school’s rules and orders. Being the party that hired them, it is the school that exercises general supervision and exclusive control over the professors with respect to the submission of reports involving the students’ standing. Exclusive control means that no other person or entity had any control over the instrumentality which caused the damage or injury. Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. In civilized society, men must be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury – that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they act affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that those with whom they deal in the general course of society will act in good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society. Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to them, for without the latter, the former are useless. In the light of the laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a man’s promise to marry in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and deceit behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. Thus, when a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Art. 19 of the Code and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer

Pe vs. Pe

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Wassmer vs. Velez

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Hermosisima vs. Ca

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Constantino vs. Mendez

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St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. CA (G.R. No. L-46061)

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must be held responsible. The circumstances under which the defendant tried to win the girl’s affection cannot but lead to any other conclusion that it was he who, through an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. On the pretext of teaching her how to pray the rosary, he was able to frequent the house of the plaintiff. Because of this clever strategy, he was able to win the love of the young girl and to have illicit relations with her. The wrong he caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an act which is actionable under Article 21. Mere breach of promise to marry is not actionable wrong, but to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation therefore, only to walk out of it when the marriage is about to e solemnized is quite different. Obviously, it is contrary to good customs, and the defendant consequently must be held answerable for damages in accordance with Art. 21 of the Code. In itself, mere breach of promise to marry is not actionable. However, when there had been carnal knowledge and the woman becomes pregnant and subsequently delivers, the breach may be actionable. Even assuming the woman cannot recover moral damages for the breach, nevertheless, she can recover compensatory damages for medical and hospitalization expenses as well as attorney’s fees. Mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years old and she admitted that she was attracted to Ivan. Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual contact that he was a married man. Her declaration that in the months of September, October and November, 1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan. Case at bar: Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio. St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading ―where the heart is‖. This was republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr Aramil’s house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission and the intended house to be published. After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or apology was published despite that it was received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr. Aramil’s counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadio’s real house but nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for damages on March 29. During the April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published. Ruling: St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication. Furthermore, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".

Tenchavez vs. Escano

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The acts of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties, deserting her husband without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree of absolute divorce, and finally getting married again are acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the husband’s feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy for which No. 10 of Article 2219 authorizes an award for moral damages.

 Article 36 Spouses Yu vs. PCIB

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Donato vs. Luna

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Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in a special proceeding since the two cases are both civil in nature which can proceed separately and take their own direction independently of each other. A case for annulment can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner’s consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence, and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determined juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean the ‖prejudicial questions‖ are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of criminal case.

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III. Civil Personality  Articles 37-41 Quimiguing vs. Icao (G.R. No. 26795)

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Geluz vs. CA

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The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she was carrying and an independent cause of action for damages. This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional personality of the unborn child, which includes its right to support from its progenitors, even it is only ―en ventre de sa mere.‖ Article 742 of the same Code holds that, just as a conceived child, it may receive donations through persons that legally represent it. Readings of Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish Code also further strengthen the case for reversal of order. Additionally, ―for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused‖ per Article 21 of the Civil Code, a provision supported by Article 2219, which provides moral damages for victims of seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts. Only one with a juridical personality can die. Here the unborn child never died because it never acquired a juridical personality. Article 40 limits the provisional personality of a conceived child by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. Case at bar: Wife went to a medical clinic for abortion without the knowledge of her husband. When the latter learned of the abortion, he brought an action against the wife basing his claim upon the provision of Art. 2206 of the Civil Code, which enumerates the damages recoverable in case of death caused by a crime or quasi delict. The husband’s claim is untenable, the child being not considered alive when separated from the

De Jesus vs. Syquia (G.R. No. L-39110)  Article 43 Limjuco vs. Estate of Pedro

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Dumlao vs. Quality Plastics

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mother’s womb. The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the status The estate of a deceased should be considered an artificial or juridical person for purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which includes the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of his rights and the fulfillment of obligations which survived after his death. lack of jurisdiction over a dead person; civil personality is extinguished by death; even juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death.

IV. Citizenship and Domicile - alien woman/ man marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. becomes ipso facto a Filipina/ Filipino provided she/he is not disqualified Commission of to be a citizen of the Philippines. Immigration - the forfeiture of being a naturalized American Citizen did not and could Frivaldo vs. not have the effect of automatically restoring one’s citizenship in the COMELEC Philippines that one had earlier renounced. One must re-acquire the Philippine Citizenship again. - It must be noted that ―residence‖ is used to indicate a place of abode, Romualdezwhether permanent or temporary, while ―domicile‖ denotes a fixed Marcos vs. permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of COMELEC returning. Residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile. FAMILY CODE PROVISIONS I. Requisites of Marriage  Article 1 - A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed Tuazon vs. CA only in exception cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Marriage is not subject to stipulations, but the waiver of the husband of his right to present his evidences made the court to render judgment on the basis solely of the stipulated facts by the wife. - Escritor, a woman whose husband had already died, has been living with Estrada vs. Quilapio, who is also married, for twenty years. The cohabitation Escritor produced one child. Both Escritor and Quilapio are members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses Church. With the attestation of the church leaders, each of them signed ―Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness,‖ which, according to their church beliefs, honors their cohabitation ―before god and man.‖ This is to recognize the fact that they no longer have bonds to their marriages, and that they declare faithfulness to each other. - Is the marriage between Escritor and Quilapio (evidenced by the Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness) valid? No. The court does not recognize the validity of marriage. Declarations of Pledging Faithfulness

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda

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Balogbog vs. CA

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 Articles 2-6 Cosca vs. Palaypayon

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Enriquez vs. Velez Wassmer vs. Velez

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Silverio vs. Republic (G.R. No. 174689)  Articles 7-10 Navarro vs. Domagtoy

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Aranas vs. Judge

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are also not recognized as valid proof of their marriage. Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they make. A husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband by wrongful, illegal, and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relations and repudiate his duties thereunder. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern. An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence. Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present the same is not proof that no marriage took place. The Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government. Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. Change of gender entry in one's birth certificate to allow marriage between a man and another transgendered man is denied, as marriage is a union BETWEEN A MAN AND A WOMAN. The Court, by way of obiter dictum, held that a judge’s having solemnized a marriage outside his jurisdiction is a mere irregularity that does not render the marriage void. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority

Occiano

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Laxamana vs. Baltazar People vs Whipkey [69 O.G. No. 42, p. 9678 (1973)] People vs. Janssen

 Article 22 Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete

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The solemnizing officer is not required to investigate w/n the license was issued in the place required by law. It is sufficient to know that the license has been issued by a competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of said license that said official has complied with his duty of ascertaining whether the woman who desires to get married resides habitually in his municipality.

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Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, ―the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument" signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract‖. While a marriage may also be proved by other competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily explained. Surely, the certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented to the court. In the case at bar, the purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent evidence, there being absolutely no showing as to unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of the signature of said certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not being authorized by law, since it is not part of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay. Case at bar: Antonietta Garcia Vda De Chua, the petitioner, filed a motion alleging that she was the true wife of Roberto. However, according to Vallejo, she is not the surviving spouse of the latter but a pretender to the estate since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman and died a bachelor. The court ruled that petitioner was not able to prove her status as wife of the decedent. She could not produce the original copy or authenticated copy of their marriage certificate. Furthermore, a certification from the Local Civil Registrar was presented that no such marriage contract between petitioner and Roberto Chua was ever registered with them, attested by Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have solemnized the alleged marriage, that he has not solemnized such alleged marriage. Hence, it is clear that petitioner failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which she failed to produce.

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Vda. De Chua vs. CA

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 Article 25 Republic vs. CA

of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Art. 3, which while it may affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability (obiter dictum). The vice-mayor, by operation of law, assumes the office of the acting municipal mayor during the suspension of the mayor. A marriage performed by a minister whose authority to solemnize a marriage has expired is void ab initio.

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The certification by the Civil Registrar that the alleged marriage license

and Castro [236 SCRA 257 (1994)]

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 Article 26 Garcia vs. Recio

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Pilapil vs. IbaySomera

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Van Dorn vs.

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could not be found in his records is adequate to prove that no license was issued. Case at bar: Angelina Castro and Edwin Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony in the city court of Pasay w/o the knowledge of Angelina's parents. The marriage lasted only for a couple of mos. Angelina decided to migrate to the US but wanted to put in order her marital status bef. leaving. She consulted a lawyer regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. It was discovered that there was no license issued to Cardenas by the Civil Registrar of Pasig. The Civil Registrar certified that the alleged license no. does not appear from the records. The trial court denied the petition. The CA reversed the trial court, hence, this petition for review on certiorari. HELD: The presentation by the Civil Registrar is sanctioned by Sec. 29, R 132, ROC. The certification of due search and inability to find, issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, and pursuant to Sec. 29, R 132 of ROC, a cert. of due search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue the marriage license. There being no marriage license, the marriage of Angelina and Edwin is void ab initio A divorce decree obtained abroad by a foreigner may be recognized in the Philippine, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing national law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proved. Our Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments. Both the divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence. Therefore, before a foreign divorce can be recognized by our Philippine courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other. an American husband granted absolute divorce in his country is estopped from asserting his rights over property allegedly held in the Philippines as

Romillo [139 SCRA 139 (1985)]

Cang vs. CA Tenchavez vs. Escano [15 SCRA 355 (1965)]

Republic vs. Orbecido

conjugal property by him and his former wife. To maintain, as the husband does, that under our laws, the wife has to be considered still married to him and still subject to a wife's obligation under the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner wife should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to her husband. The husband should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. SHE SHOULD NOT BE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST IN HER OWN COUNTRY IF THE ENDS OF JUSTICE ARE TO BE SERVED. -

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Where the wife, a Filipina, deserted her Filipino husband, obtained a divorce in the U.S., married an American citizen, and later herself became an American citizen, the Filipino husband is entitled to legal separation conformably to Philippine law and to damages. (1) A foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the New Civil Code, is not entitled to recognition as valid in the Philippines, and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequenlty to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in this country. (2) Invalid divorce entitles innocent spouse to recover damages (P25,000 as moral damages; basis - 2176). (3) An action for alienation of affection against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part. Par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens but later on, one of them becomes a naturalized citizen of a foreign country and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.

II. Marriages Exempt from the License Requirement (Articles 27 – 34) - If a man and a woman have been living together as husband and wife Niňal vs. Bayadog without the benefit of marriage for at least 5 years, they are exempted from securing a marriage license to marry. But such law requires that their act of living together must be characterized by exclusivity and continuity. - There must be no legal impediment to marry one another during the 5year cohabitation immediately before the day of the marriage. Otherwise, if the 5-year period is computed without any distinction as to whether they were capacitated or not to marry, the law would then be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common-law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who live faithfully with their spouse (But see Manzano vs Sanchez). - In order that Art. 34 of the Family Code regarding legal ratification of Manzano vs. cohabitation may apply, the following requisites must concur: Sanchez 1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage (there is no mention as to whether the fact of absence of legal impediment must be present during the 5year cohabitation period). 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years. 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no

legal impediment to their marriage. -

Cosca vs. Palaypayon

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Mariategui vs. CA

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In the case at bar, not all of the aforesaid requirements are present. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated." The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar. Bocaya & Besmonte’s marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage license. They already started living together as husband and wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. However, considering that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated. On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage license was dispensed with considering that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years already before they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when they started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement. Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that ―in the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable. Case at bar: Lupo and Felipa were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo to his son who testified that ―when his father was still living, he was able to mention to him that he and his mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal.‖ The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all the requisites for its validity are present. Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman,

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deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans towards legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.

III. Void and Voidable Marriages (Articles 35-54)  Article 36 Niňal vs. Bayadog - Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting Republic vs. CA personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not and Molina enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness. - The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the

Louel Santos vs. CA

Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano [G.R. No. 149498 (2004)]

Choa vs. Choa (G.R. No. 143376)

Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. - The failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with her husband Leouel for more than five years does not constitute psychological incapacity. - Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. - ―Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. - The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. - Psychological incapacity cannot be presumed from abandonment. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. - In proving psychological incapacity, there should be no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. - Case at bar: Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and deportation which shows latter’s psychological incapacity because according to him it clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him behind bars but also to banish outside the country. - The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the case do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. The evidence was insufficient and shows grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained about three aspects of Leni’s personality namely lack of attention to children, immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and none of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity. - Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A mere

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Antonio vs. Reyes

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Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA

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Armida Ferraris vs. Brix Ferraris

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showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity. Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to identify and prove root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It just established that the spouses had an incompatibility or a defect that could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. The totality of evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified; b) alleged in the complaint; c) sufficiently proven by experts; and d) clearly explained in the decision. Psychological incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of marriage, although the manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Phils., while not controlling and decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. In the case at bar, the respondent fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before the marriage. She even concealed having an illegitimate son. The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations (Art. 68) to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support. It is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is ―to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.‖ Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say ―I could not have cared less.‖ This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.  The respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-thehouse" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but

Navarro vs. Navarro

Suazo vs. Suazo (G.R. No. 164493; 10 March 2010)

a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. These do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity. - Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. - Frequent squabbles and respondent’s refusal to sleep with petitioner and be supportive to him do not constitute psychological incapacity. The records show that petitioner and respondent were living in harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which bore them four children. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it merely introduced an abstract concept psychological incapacity that disables compliance with the contractual obligations of marriage without any concrete definition or, at the very least, an illustrative example. We must therefore apply the law based on how the concept of psychological incapacity was shaped and developed in jurisprudence. Santos v. Court of Appeals declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to ―no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.‖ It must be confined to ―the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.‖ The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the law in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina) as follows: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it ―as the foundation of the nation.‖ It decrees marriage as legally ―inviolable,‖ thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be ―protected‖ by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties or one of them was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given

here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ―the time of the celebration‖ of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their ―I do’s.‖ The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, ―mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts‖ cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts x x x (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic requirements of Santos. A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. Pesca v. Pesca clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then already pending, under the reasoning that the courts interpretation or construction establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later

overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of ―lex prospicit, non respicit.‖ On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated by the Court took effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules pertinently provides: (d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration. The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose of these pieces of evidence. Section 14(b) requires the court to consider during the pre-trial conference the advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds for the declaration of the absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. All cases involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code that came to us were invariably decided based on the principles in the cited cases. This was the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. YuTe (Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines. Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family Code did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals that, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. Te thus assumes it a basic premise that the law is so designed to allow some resiliency in its application. Te then sustained Santos doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is consistent with that of the Canon Law. Going back to its basic premise, Te said: Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts. Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity. With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards

in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that should also govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting follows Te’s lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages: To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference. Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina, merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. It is also noteworthy for its evidentiary approach in these cases, which it expounded on as follows: By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. xxxx Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting. Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of cases on Article 36 of the Family Code, what should not be lost on us is the intention of the law to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage; that the psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and

responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability requisites. This is proof of Santos continuing doctrinal validity.  Article 40 Domingo vs. CA [226 SCRA 572 (1993)]

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Morigo vs. People

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Weigel vs. Sempio-Dy

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Terre vs. Terre (211 SCRA 6)

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Valdez vs. RTC

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The nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is defective. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on a very shaky foundation. On the other hand, the clause ―on the basis solely of a final judgment delaring such marriage void‖ in Article 40 of the Code denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void is not only for purpose of remarriage. The prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. Although it is stressed in Article 40 of the family code that a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry, it should also be considered that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all its elements concur. In this case, one of the elements of bigamy that is the offender has been legally married is not present. Because legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete, with reference to the fact that there is no authority from the solemnizing officer. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. Parties are not allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such is the fact. They must file an action for declaration of nullity under Art. 40 before they remarry. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2 ),(3 ),(4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void

marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses. People vs. Aragon Mercado vs. TanMercado

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Bobis vs. Bobis

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Can Mercado invoke the absolute nullity of previous marriage to defend his innocence in the crime of bigamy? No, because the declaration of absolute nullity of his previous marriage came not before the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy was already tried in court. The declaration of nullity came only after the second marriage was instituted, hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. Mercado is guilty of bigamy. In the case at bar, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. IGNORANCE OF EXISTENCE OF ART. 40, FC: Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully invoked as an excuse. The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION: In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the

second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.  Articles 41-42 Republic vs. Nolasco

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Lukban vs. Republic

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Armas vs. Calisterio Republic vs. Alegro

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 Articles 45-46 Anaya vs. Paraloan Buccat vs. Buccat

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Due diligence is required in searching for a missing spouse. When he arrived in Antique, instead of seeking help from authorities or the British embassy, Nolasco secured another contract and went to London, a city of million people to look for his wife when in fact, the respondent met Monica in a bar in Liverpool, some 350 km. away. The non-disclosure of Monica about her personal background is too convenient an excuse to locate her. The same can be said of the letters returned to him which were allegedly lost in his voyage. The claim that he immediately asked leave from the Captain of his ship in January 1983 is doubtful as he arrived in Antique sometime in November of that year, a good 9 months thereafter. Lourdes Lukban has legal capacity to contract another marriage on the basis of declaration of presumptive death of her husband who has been absent for more than 20 years. In addition to that, the petitioner has a well-founded belief that her husband is already dead after using all the means to find him.

In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than Barangay Captain Juan Magat. The respondent even failed to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person from whom he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony. The respondent also failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Lea’s whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced the credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea’s whereabouts considering that Lea’s father was the owner of Radio DYMS. The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the NBI to locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC. Thus respondent was not able to establish that he had a well-founded belief of his wife’s death. The non-disclosure by the husband of a premarital relationship with another woman is NOT a ground for the annulment of the marriage. Even assuming that the annulment is based on the fact that at the time of the marriage, defendant was pregnant by a man other than her husband, there would still be no ground because the law is explicit. There should have been a concealment of such fact. If the defendant was already about

Aquino vs. Delizo

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Jimenez vs. Caňizares

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 Articles 48-49 Sin vs. Sin

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Ocampo vs. Florenciano

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Tuason vs. CA

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6 months pregnant at the time of marriage, there can be no possibility of concealment. At such an advanced stage of pregnancy, concealment would be impossible. Concealment of the wife the fact that at the time of the marriage she was pregnant by a man other than his husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred, because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred social institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. Where there is evidence of adultery independently of the defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of legal separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendant’s confession. Article 48 of the Family Code is inapplicable. The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.

IV. Legal Separation (Articles 55-67) An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bedLapuz-Sy vs. and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in Eufemio this jurisdiction) is purely personal. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be Gaudencio vs. issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal Penarada separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. Granting that infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the Bugayong vs wife, the act of the husband in persuading her to come along with him and Ginez the fact that she went with him and together they slept as husband and (G.R. No. L-10033; wife deprives him as the alleged offended spouse of any action for legal 1956)

Brown vs. Yambao [54 O.G. 1827 (1957)]

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Pacete vs. Carriaga (G.R. No. L-53880; 1994)

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separation against the offending wife because his said conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of Civil Code. In an action for legal separation on the ground of adultery filed by the husband, even though the defendant wife did not interpose the defense of prescription, nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation or annulment of marriage, involve public interest, and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record. Also, the husband was guilty of commission of the same offense by living with another woman. In the case at bench, the default order unquestionably is not legally sanctioned. The Civil Code provides: Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. The provision has been taken from Article 30 of the California Civil Code, and it is, in substance, reproduced in Article 60 of the Family Code. Article 101 reflects the public policy on marriages, and it should easily explain the mandatory tenor of the law. In Brown v. Yambao, the Court has observed: The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption can not be made to depend upon the parties themselves (Civil Code, Article 52; Adong vs. Cheong Gee, 43 Phil. 43; Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Goitia v. Campos, 35 Phil. 252). It is consonant with this policy that the inquiry by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further underscored by the inclusion of the following provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court: Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. — If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.

Macadangdang vs. CA [108 SCRA 314 (1981)]

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It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That other remedies, whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted.

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The death of a spouse AFTER a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the legal separation. The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the effects of such final decree, the law on intestate succession should take over the disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased spouse.

V. Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife (Articles 68-73)  Article 68 Case at bar: Erlinda Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly Potenciano vs. CA inseparable from her husband some years ago, filed a petition with the (GR No. 139789, Court of Appeals for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in 139808; 19 July consortium. Issue: Whether or not petitioner can assert Article 68 and 69 2001) of Family Code to have custody of her husband in consortium. Ruling: The Supreme Court agrees that as spouses, they are duty bound to live together and care for each other as provided by Article 68 and 69. However, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. Only the moral obligation of the spouses constitutes the motivating factor for making them observe the said duties and obligations which are highly personal. Therefore, they deny the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the Goitia vs. rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the Campos-Rueda parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant. There can be no action for damages merely because of a breach of Ty vs. CA marital obligation. Supreme Court also viewed that no damages should be (G.R. No. 127406) awarded in the present case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should they grant her prayer, they would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live Ilusorio vs. with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of Bildner habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. (G.R. No. 139789)

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That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice. The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium. The Court defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

 Article 69 Romualdez vs. COMELEC

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―Residence‖ is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, while ―domicile‖ denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.

 Article 73 Ayala Investments vs. CA

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The fruits of the paraphernal property, which form part of the assets of the conjugal partnership, are subject to the payment of the debts and expenses of the spouses (including those incurred in the legitimate exercise of industry or profession), but not to the payment of the personal obligations (guaranty agreements) of the husband, unless it is proved that such obligations were productive of some benefit to the family. There must be the requisite showing of some advantage, which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of ―obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.‖ Therefore, to hold the absolute community or the conjugal partnership property liable for any loss resulting from such isolated activity, proofs showing a direct benefit to the family must be presented.

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VI. Property Relations in Marriages  Article 87 Donation is invalid in cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman Agapay vs. who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each Palang other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void (276 SCRA 341) marriage. The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common-law Arcaba v. relationship wherein donation is not valid. Cohabitation means more than Tabancura Vda. sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and De Batocael may no longer be interested in sex –at the very least, cohabitation is the (G.R. No. 146683) assumption of men and women of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife. A partner is capacitated after obtaining a valid foreign divorce, thus Art. San Luis vs. San 147 applies. But if the validity or the extent of the divorce must be proven, Luis otherwise Art. 148 applies.  Articles 94-96 Administration does not include disposition and encumbrance. Uy vs. CA (G.R. No. 109557)  Article 101 Physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term Dela Cruz vs. "abandonment", if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from the Dela Cruz society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal

Partosa-Jo vs. CA

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 Article 102 BA Finance Corp. vs. CA (161 SCRA 608)

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Johnson & Johnson vs. CA (262 SCRA 298)

 Article 109 Spouses Laperal vs. Spouses Katigbak (90 Phil 77) Villanueva vs. IAC

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 Articles 115-116 BPI vs. Posadas -

Wong vs. IAC

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partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights. Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return, followed by a prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the meantime providing in the least for one's family although able to do so. There must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. In this case, physical separation, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for judicial separation of their conjugal property. Though it is presumed that the single proprietorship established during the marriage is conjugal and even if it is registered in the name of only one of the spouses. However, for the said property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In the case at bar, the obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal property managed by the private respondent was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because at the time he incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home. The husband cannot be held liable for the debts of the wife which were incurred without the husband’s consent and which did not benefit the conjugal partnership. Only the wife and her paraphernal property can be held liable. And since the power of the court in execution of judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone, the conjugal properties and the capital of the husband cannot be levied upon. "Where the husband is alone liable, no action lies against the wife, and she is not a necessary party defendant.‖ The husband cannot by his contract bind the paraphernal property unless its administration has been transferred to him. Neither can the paraphernal property be made to answer for debts incurred by the husband. If the properties are acquired during the marriage, the property is conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. Whether a property is conjugal or not is determined by law and not by the will of one of the spouses. No unilateral declaration by one spouse can change the character of conjugal property. Case at bar: A husband insured himself during his marriage and made his estate, not his wife, as his beneficiary. The premiums paid were borne by the conjugal partnership. Later, the husband died. The heirs of the husband as well as the wife are entitled to the proceeds of the insurance. The proceeds of a life insurance policy payable to an insured person’s estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute conjugal property, and belong one-half exclusively to the husband and the other half to the wife. If the premiums were paid partly with separate property, and partly with conjugal funds, the proceeds are in like proportion separate in part, and conjugal in part. This is the just interpretation of the article. To have the estate as the sole beneficiary would be to sanction a fraud upon the wife. The properties were acquired during the marriage and in the absence of

proof that they are exclusive property of the husband, they are presumed to be conjugal property. They cannot answer for the personal indebtedness of one spouse as his or her rights to her share are inchoate and only materialize upon dissolution of the property.  Articles 121-122 Ayala Investments vs. CA

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Carlos vs. Abelardo

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The fruits of the paraphernal property, which form part of the assets of the conjugal partnership, are subject to the payment of the debts and expenses of the spouses (including those incurred in the legitimate exercise of industry or profession), but not to the payment of the personal obligations (guaranty agreements) of the husband, unless it is proved that such obligations were productive of some benefit to the family. There must be the requisite showing of some advantage, which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of ―obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. A loan obtained to purchase the conjugal home may be charged against the conjugal partnership as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. Notwithstanding, therefore, the alleged lack of consent of the other spouse, under Art. 121, the husband shall be solidarily liable for the loan together with his wife.

VII. Property Regime of Unions without Marriage  Article 147 Art 148 provides that properties acquired through the parties joint Malilin vs. Castro contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. The determination of the contributions needs to be made in a judicial proceeding as it requires a finding of facts. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause the property of the parties Valdes vs. RTC during the period of cohabitation is governed by Art 147 or 148 as the case may be. Art 147 applies to a void marriage where the parties are capacitated to marry each other. On the other hand Art 148 applies to void marriages where the parties suffer from an impediment to marry each other. Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that Francisco vs. invalidates such marriage, apply Art. 148. Absent proof that the Master Iron wife/husband has actually contributed money, property or industry to the Works properties acquired during such union the presumption of co-ownership Construction will not arise. Corp. (G.R. No. 151967)  Article 148 An actual contribution is required under Art 148 in contrast to art 147 Agapay vs. where care and maintenance of the family and the home will suffice. Palang Absent actual proof of such contribution, no co-ownership (276 SCRA 341) A married man is the registered owner of a jeepney which was involved in Juaniza vs. Jose an accident and was held liable for damages. His common-law wife (89 SCRA 306) cannot claim co- ownership over the jeepney because Art. 144 CC (Art. 147 FC) applies only when the parties are not incapacitated to marry. Hence, the jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership with the lawful wife. The common-law wife not being the registered owner cannot be held liable for damages caused by its operation.

Tumlos vs. Fernandez (G.R. No. 137650)

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Petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with respondent Mario. Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition. Clearly, there is no basis for petitioner’s claim of coownership. The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents.

VIII. The Family as an Institution  Article 149 Unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both Docena vs. spouse is required, joint management or administration does not require Lapesura that the husband and the wife always act together. Each spouse may (G.R. No. 140153) validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases. The husband, therefore, can file against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without being joined by his wife. The reason is that it is a mere act of administration.  Article 150 As pointed out by the Code Commission, it is difficult to imagine a sadder Martinez vs. and more tragic spectacle than litigation between members of the same Martinez family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a (G.R. No. 162084) compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family and it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. Thus, a party’s failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code before filing a complaint against a family member would render such complaint premature. The phrase "members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife, Hontiveros vs. parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and RTC sisters, whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship (G.R. No. 125465) by affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction. Case at bar: private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family.  Article 151 Case: Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was Manalo vs. CA survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven children, who are all (G.R. No. 129242) of legal age. At the time of his death, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop. The eight of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo filed a petition with the respondent RTC of Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof. The trial court issued an order and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) who were granted then 10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition. Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion. Issue: Whether or not the motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate aver that earnest efforts toward a

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Albano vs. Gapusan (A.M. No. 1022MJ)

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compromise involving members of the same family have been made. Ruling: The petition was denied for lack of merit. Petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law considers as void "any contract for personal separation between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership". A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudically dissolving the conjugal partnership. Notaries were severely censured by this Court for notarizing documents which subvert the institutions of marriage and the family.

IX. The Family Home (Articles 152-162) The provision of Article 162 does not mean that Arts. 152 and 153 have a Modequillo vs. retroactive effect such that all family residences are deemed to have been Breva constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the (185 SCRA 766) effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Art. 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorder to a family home under the Code. Art. 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect. Those enumerated in Art. 154 may include the in-laws where the family Manacop vs. CA home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the law definitely (277 SCRA 941) excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code. Consequently, occupancy of a family home by an overseer is insufficient compliance with the law. X. Paternity and Filiation  Article 166 The fact that the husband was seriously sick (suffering from tubercolosis) Andal vs. is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. There are Macaraig cases where persons suffering from TB can do the carnal act even in the (89 Phil 165) most crucial stage of health because then they seem to be more inclined to sexual intercourse. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include absence during the initial period of conception, impotence which is patent, and incurable; and imprisonment, unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations. The fact that the wife had illicit intercourse with a man other than the husband during the initial period does not preclude cohabitation between said husband and wife. Articles 164, 166, 170, and 171 of the Family Code do not contemplate a Benitez-Badua vs. situation where a child is alleged not to be the child by nature or biological CA

(G.R. No. 105625)  Article 167 Concepcion vs. CA (G.R. No. 123450)

child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where the husband or his heirs denies as his own a child of his wife. -

 Articles 170-171 Liyao vs. Liyao (G.R. No. 138961)  Article 172 Eceta vs. Eceta (G.R. No. 157037)

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A child is deemed born legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The law and only the law determine, who are the legitimate or illegitimate children, for one’s legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his status for the information contained therein is merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is. A child conceived or born during a valid marriage is presumed to belong to that marriage, regardless of the existence of extramarital relationships. A child cannot impugn his or her own legitimacy. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresa’s birth certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa. The standard of proof required to establish one’s filiation is founded on the principle that an order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family of the parties, so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. An action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The FC makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that ―illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.‖ Filiation based only on testimonial evidence is allowed, only if they are of HIGH STANDARD. Material evidence for filiation must belong to the class of "FAMILY OBJECTS," as in family photos, family bibles, etc.

Constantino vs. Mendez (209 SCRA 18)

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Bernabe vs. Alejo (G.R. No. 140500)

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Jison vs. CA (G.R. No. 124853)

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 Article 173 Conde vs. Abaya (13 Phil 249)

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The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal character and generally pertains exclusively to him. Only the child may exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As exception, and in three cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit: if he or she died during his or her minority, or while insane, or after action had already been instituted. Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his or her legitimacy lasts during his or her whole lifetime, he or she may exercise it either against the presumed parents or his or her heirs. The right of action which the law concedes to the natural child is not transmitted to his ascendants or descendants.

 Article 176 Marquino vs. IAC (G.R. No. 72078)

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The child can bring the action during his or her entire lifetime, not during the lifetime of the parents, and even after the death of the parents. In other words, the action does not prescribe as long as he lives.

 Articles 177-180 Abadilla vs. Tabiliran (249 SCRA 447)

Despite the subsequent marriage, a cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate if at the time he was born, there was an existing valid marriage between a party and his / her former spouse. Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous

relations. XI. Adoption Teotico vs. Del Val (13 SCRA 406)

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the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.  Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 Family Code provisions on adoption are NOT RETROACTIVE in so far as Republic vs. CA they do not impede on the expediency of the adoption, because the prime and Bobiles consideration is the child's welfare, and should not be delayed. (205 SCRA 356) Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for Tamargo vs. CA adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or (209 SCRA 518) advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented would be unfair and unconscionable. XII. Support (Articles 194-208) Alfredo Jr. indeed has reached the age of majority yet under the provision Javier vs. Lucero of Family Code, the support may be given beyond the age of majority in (GR No. L-6706) order enable him to complete his education, for some trade and profession. If financial assistance is to be rendered only at the termination of the appeal, his education or the completion thereof would be unduly delayed. This is a good reason for immediate execution. The father claimed that based on the records, the son is no longer studying. However, it might have resulted to lack of means to support his studies The wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband, Goitia vs. without fault on her part, may maintain an action against the husband for Campos-Rueda separate maintenance when she has no other remedy, notwithstanding (35 Phil 252, 262) the provision of the law giving the person who is obliged to furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining in his home the one having the right to the same. The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a De Asis vs. De third person. Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a Asis compromise. The manifestation sent by private respondent amounted to (303 SCRA 176) renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the subject minor, the right to claim support from his putative parent, the petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and private respondent for the dismissal of the counterclaim was in the nature of a compromise, which cannot be countenanced. It violated the prohibition against any compromise of the right to support. XIII. Parental Authority - Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount criterion Espiritu vs. CA must always be the child's interest. Discretion is always given to the court (242 SCRA 362) to decide who can best assure the welfare of the child, and award the custody on the basis of that consideration. - Capuno, a student and a Boy Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade, drove a Exconde vs jeep recklessly resulting in the death of two passengers. Father was held Capuno solidarily liable for damages. SC, in an obiter, exculpated the school (not a party to the case) on the ground that it was not a school of arts and

Mercado vs CA

Palisoc vs Brillantes (41 SCRA 548)

Amadora vs. CA (160 SCRA 315)

Pasco vs CFI

trades. Justice JBL Reyes, with whom Padilla concurred, dissented arguing that it was the school authorities who should be held liable. Liability under this rule, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and 2)heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause "of establishment of arts and trades should apply only to "heads" and not to "teachers". (elaborates on the Exconde decision) - A student cut a classmate with a razor blade. Parents of victim sued the culprit's parents for damages. SC held in an obiter again (school not a party again) that the school was not liable; it's not an establishment of arts and trades. Custody requirement had not been proved as this "contemplates a situation where the student lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. - (supersedes obiter in Exconde and Mercado) A 16 year old student killed by classmate with fist blows in the school laboratory. Although wrongdoer was already of age and was not boarding with the school, head and teacher were held solidarily liable with him. The phrase "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde on w/c it relied) w/c must now be deemed to have been set aside. Note: (By JBL) Even students already of age were covered by the provision since they were equally in the custody of the school and subject to its discipline. - Case at bar: Amadora's son was shot to death by Daffon, a classmate at school auditorium. The son was in school to submit physics project. The school contends that the semester had already ended. It is immaterial whether the semester has already ended for students were there for a legitimate purpose. He was still in the custody of the school authorities. Even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the school premises is a legitimate purpose w/c would also bring him in the custody of the school. The school principal and dean are not liable because they are not teachers-in-charge, but are merely exercising general authority, not direct control and influence. But even the teacherin-charge is not liable because there is no showing that the teacher was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon nor had he waived observance of school rules and regulations. His absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him bec. he was not supposed or required to report to school on that day. So who is liable here? It's probably the dean of the boys. He had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned it to the latter w/o taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. But while he was clearly negligent, it does not necessarily link him to the shooting since it was not shown that the gun was the one used to kill petitioner's son. Who is really liable here? Nobody, since none of them was found to have been charged w/ the custody of the offending student, or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties. While the court deeply sympathizes w/ the petitioners, the court cannot extend material relief as a balm to their grief. - Art. 2180, NCC which refers to liability of teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades for damages caused by students who

(160 SCRA 784) Ylarde vs. Aquino (163 SCRA 697)

St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpetanos (G.R. No. 143363) Salvosa vs IAC (166 SCRA 274)

Tamargo vs. CA (209 SCRA 518)

are in their custody, does not apply to the school or the university itself or to educational institutions which are not schools of arts and trades. The provision concerned speaks only of "teachers or heads." - As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. xxx Under Art. 2180, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held liable. - Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student following the first par. of the provision. This is the gen. rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the gen. rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in w/c case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions, and other affairs of the students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers. Under the penultimate par. of Art. 2180, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain exten, in loco parentis (as to the student) and (is) called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the (student.) Likewise, "the phrase used in (Art. 2180)-- so long as the (students) remain in their custody' means that the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. Issue: Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents. Ruling: GRANTED. The natural parents of Adelberto should be held liable for damages caused by the child following the doctrine of IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE. The simple reason is that the child was still under their care and custody at the time of the incident. Parental liability is a consequence of PARENTAL AUTHORITY. APPLICABLE PROVISIONS: Art. 2176: Quasi-delict – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being no fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict. Art. 2180: Imputed Negligence – The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

Libi vs. IAC (214 SCRA 16)

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Luna vs IAC (137 SCRA 7)

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The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child. Absent a showing of such diligence the parents are directly and primarily liable for the damages arising from the acts of their child. The manifestation of the child Shirley that she would kill herself or run away from home if she should be taken away from the petitioners (grandparents) and forced to live w/ her natural parents is a circumstance that would make the execution of the judgment in the special proc. inequitable, unfair, unjust, if not illegal. The threat may be proven empty, but Shirley has a right to a wholesome family life that will provide her w/ love, care and understanding, guidance and counseling, and moral and material security. But what if the threat is for real. Besides, in her letters to the members of the court, Shirley depicted her biological parents as selfish and cruel and who beat her often; and that they do not lover her. To return her to the custody of the private resps. would be traumatic and cause irreparable damage to the child.

CIVIL CODE PROVISIONS Use of Surnames (Articles 364-380) legal separation does not dissolve marital bonds, thus the wife must still Laperal vs. use her MARRIED NAME and surname. Republic (G.R. No. L-18008) the doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false Llaneta vs. impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent that Agrava the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice (G.R. No. L-32504) or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general Case: Teresita's mother, Anatacia Llaneta, was once married to Serafin Ferrer w/ whom she had but 1 child. In 1942 Serafin F. died and about 4 yrs. later Anatacia had relations w/ another man out of w/c Teresita was born. Shortly after Teresita's (T) birth, Atanacia (A) brought her to Mla. where all of them lived w/ A's mother-in-law, Victoria vda. de Ferrer. T was raised in the household of the Ferrers, using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings and throughout her schooling. When she was about 20 yrs. old, she applied for a copy of her birth cert. in Irosin, Sorsogon, where she was born, as she was required to present it in connection w/ a scholarship granted to her. It was then that she discovered that her registered surname is Llaneta-- not Ferrer-- and that she is the illegitimate child of A and an unknown father. On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname of Llaneta, instead of Ferrer, w/c she had been using since she acquired reason ,would cause untold difficulties and confusion, T petitioned the court below for change of name. After trial, resp. Judge, denied her petition. Hence, the present recourse. The petition is granted. The petitioner has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember; that all her records in school and elsewhere, put her name down as T. Ferrer; that her friends and associates know her only as T. Ferrer; and that even the late Serafin F.'s nearest of kin have tolerated and still approve of her use of the surname Ferrer. Indeed, a sudden shift at this time by the petitioner

Calderon vs. Republic

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to the name of T Llaneta (in order to conform to that appearing in the birth cert.) would result in confusion among the persons and entities she deals w/ and entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new name. The petitioner has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember; that all her records in school and elsewhere, put her name down as T. Ferrer; that her friends and associates know her only as T. Ferrer; and that even the late Serafin F.'s nearest of kin have tolerated and still approve of her use of the surname Ferrer. A child may successfully petition to change his surname from the real father’s name to that of the stepfather, who has no objection thereto. An illegitimate child need not bear the stigma of illegitimacy during his whole lifetime. The change of name allowed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court does not alter one’s status, rights, duties, or citizenship. It merely changes the appellation by which a person is known, identified, or distinguished from others.