Persons Digests for 09.06.13

G.R. No. 89667 October 20, 1993 JOSEPHINE B. BELCODERO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al., respondents. VITUG, J.: Case involves the question of ownership over a piece of land acquired by a husband while living with a paramour and after having deserted his lawful wife and children. The property had been bought by the husband on installment basis prior to the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1950 but the final deed, as well as the questioned conveyance by him to his common law spouse, has ensued during the latter Code's regime. FACTS: Alayo D. Bosing, married Juliana Oday on 27 July 1927. On 1946, he left the conjugal home, and he forthwith started to live instead with Josefa Rivera with whom he had a child (petitioner Josephone Belcodero). On 23 August 1949, Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment basis from the Magdalena Estate, Inc. In the deed, he indicated his civil status as, "married to Josefa R. Bosing," the common-law wife. In a letter, dated 06 October 1959, which he addressed to Magdalena Estate, Inc., he authorized the latter to transfer the lot in the name of his "wife Josefa R. Bosing." The final deed of sale was executed by Magdalena Estate, Inc., on 24 October 1959. A few days later, or on 09 November 1959, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 48790 was issued in the name of "Josefa R. Bosing, . . . married to Alayo Bosing”. Alayo died on 11 march 1967. About three years later, or on 17 September 1970, Josefa and Josephine executed a document of extrajudicial partition and sale of the lot in question, which was there described as "conjugal property" of Josefa and deceased Alayo. On 30 October 1980, Juliana Oday and her three legitimate children filed with the court a quo an action for reconveyance of the property, trial court ruled in their favour and CA affirmed the decision. ISSUE: Whether the property in question belongs exclusively to Juliana Oday and her three legitimate children HELD/RATIO: The property was still part of the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407), "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the

husband or to the wife." Josefa is not the owner simply because the title is in her name, she recognized Alayo's ownership when, three years after the death of Alayo, she and Josephine executed the deed of extrajudicial partition and sale in which she asserted a one-half (1/2) interest in the property in what may be described as her share in the "conjugal partnership" with Alayo.

NOTE: There were two other less related issues in the case (1) whether prescriptive period for an action seeking a reconveyance of the property has passed; and (2) whether there is “new evidence” and therefore a need for a new trial. The court held: (1) NO, prescriptive period is 10 yrs (Art 1144, CC) and since the property involved in this case is a realty titled under the Torrens System, the prescriptive period is to be counted from the time the transaction affecting the property is registered with the corresponding issuance of a new certificate of title; (2) NO, as CA said, the “new evidence” referred to is not new. [G.R. No. 111547. January 27, 1997] SPS. TRINIDAD S. ESTONINA and PAULINO ESTONINA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. CELSO ATAYAN and NILDA HICBAN and CONSUELO VDA. DE GARCIA, REMEDIOS, ELVIRA, OFELIA, VIRGILIO, MARILOU, and LOLITA all surnamed GARCIA, and HEIRS OF CASTOR GARCIA and of SANTIAGO GARCIA, JR., respondents. FRANCISCO, J.: FACTS: A lot was owned by Santiago Garcia, who has 9 children and a wife named Consuelo Garcia. Santiago already died when this controversy arose. Petitioners, the spouses Estonina, filed a case against Consuelo Garcia and was able to obtain an attachment over the land. While the case was pending, the 9 children sold their 1/10 share in the lot to Spouses Atayan, who are the respondents here. Estonina were able to obtain a favorable judgment against Consuelo Garcia. The land was sold at public auction and a TCT was issued in the name of Estonina. Atayan however filed a complaint for annulment of the sheriff sale and the TCT claiming that they own 9/10 of the land. The RTC said that the land was presumed to be conjugal hence Consuelo Garcia owned 50% of the land plus 5% as her share in the intestate estate of her husband Santiago Garcia. RTC ordered the amendment of the TCT to show that Estonina owns 55% while Atayan owns 45%.

Both parties appealed. The CA modified the judgment. The CA held that lot was the exclusive property of Santiago Garcia and not conjugal. It held that Estonina only owns 1/10 or 10% and Atayan owns 9/10 or 90%. ISSUES: (1) Is the property exclusive or conjugal? (2) What’s the real share of Estonina and Atayan? HELD/RULING: (1) Property is the exclusive share of the deceased Santiago (2) 10% and 90%, respectively. SC affirms CA. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Here, Estonino failed to present any proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Estonino merely relies on the certificate of title which was issued during the marriage. The TCT does not suffice to establish the conjugal nature of the property. Acquisition of property and registration of title are two different acts. Registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. Thus, the property is the exclusive property of the deceased Santiago and when he died leaving 10 compulsory heirs, each one got 10% of the lot. Hence, what the Estonino spouses purchased in the public auction was merely the rights of Consuelo Garcia consisting of 10% of the lot. Quiao v Quiao FACTS:  Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation, awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.  Brigido’s share was forfeited in favor of the common children because he is the offending spouse (bad faith)

 Petitioner filed for a Motion for Clarification 9 months after the promulgation of the decision asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned”.  RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.”  It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. ISSUES: 1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case. 2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over ½ of the properties in the conjugal partnership. 3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of “net profits” earned in the absolute community? Held: 1. – NCC shall govern since it was the law operative when the two got married. Default rule in NCC is that in absence of marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains shall govern the property relations between the husband and wife. However, Art. 129 shall be applicable in the case insofar as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned (this is allowed bec. FC can take retroactive effect as long as it won’t impair vested rights). 2. NO. The petitioner did not acquire vested rights under Art 143 of the Civil Code. While one may not be deprived of his vested rights, he may lose the same as long as there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. Petitioner was accorded his right to due process as shown by the proceedings held in the lower court. 3. NO.

When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And when the couple’s marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned. On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals. In the case at bar, it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties thus there is nothing to return to any of them. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. ORPIANO vs TOMAS (2013; DEL CASTILLO, J.) FACTS: Petitioner Estrella Aduan Orpiano (Estrella) is the widow of Alejandro Orpiano (Alejandro). Part of their conjugal estate is an 809.5-square meter lot in Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-23468 (the lot). In 1979 Estrella was declared an absent spouse, and Alejandro was granted the authority to sell the lot. On March 19, 1996, Alejandro sold the lot on installment basis to the Tomas Spouses (respondents), the very same day a title was issued in the name of the Tomas Spouses. They had until December to complete paying for the land. On Oct 28, 1996 Alejandro filed a case at the QC RTC, seeking collection of the amount unpaid by

the Tomas spouses, with damages. While the case was still pending Alejandro passed away, his heirs, including Estrella were substituted in his stead in the case. Estrella moved to amend the complaint to one for annulment of sale and cancellation of title, but the court denied her motion. She moved to be dropped as a party plantiff but was also denied. On June 11, 2005 Estrella filed a case for annulment of sale and cancellation of title against the Tomas Spouses, claiming the declaration of absence and Alejandro’s authority to sell the lot are null and void. The Tomas spouses prayed for the dismissal thereof on the ground of forum shopping. RTC ruled in favour of the Tomas spouses and dismissed the annulment (of sale) case. CA affirmed the decision. ISSUES: Whether there was forum shopping HELD/RATIO: YES. Although the Court believes that Estrella was not prompted by a desire to trifle with judicial processes, and was acting in good faith in initiating the annulment case, still the said case should be dismissed because it produces the same effect which the rule on forum shopping was fashioned to preclude. If the collection case is not dismissed and it, together with the annulment case, proceeds to finality, not only do we have a possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered; an unfair situation, as envisioned by the Tomas spouses, might arise where after having paid the balance of the price as ordered by the collection court, the cancellation of the TCT and return of the property could be decreed by the annulment court. Court says that“the absence of the consent of one (spouse to a sale) renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.” However while Estrella is raring to file the annulment case, she has to first cause the dismissal of the collection case because she was by necessity substituted therein by virtue of her being Alejandro’s heir; but the collection court nonetheless blocked all her attempts toward such end. There exists a just cause for her to be dropped as party plaintiff in the collection case so that she may institute and maintain the annulment case without violating the rule against forum shopping. Estrella had the right to maintain the annulment case as a measure of protecting her conjugal share (but the issue of whether the sale should be annulled is a different matter altogether). Despite all these reasons, Estrella is still not allowed to take prodecural short cuts.

NOTES: In case ma’am asks, a summary of the parties’ contentions:

his wife, however, left the property in August 1985 for personal reasons.

Estrella argues that were merely substituted in the case as his heirs by operation of law; thus, she should not be bound by the collection case. She further adds that there is obviously no identity of parties, cause of action, or reliefs prayed for between the collection and annulment cases; the two involve absolutely opposite reliefs. She stresses the fact that she is seeking annulment of the sale with respect only to her conjugal share, and not those of her co-heirs.

February 1988, Romeo learns from godmother of his wedding that son of godmother, Virgilio Castro (VC, petitioner), who happens to be Romeo’s neighbor, that the Paco property was being sold to VC. A thirty thousand peso downpayment was made by godmother to Moises for her son.

Tomas spouses emphasize that the rule prohibiting forum shopping precisely seeks to avoid the situation where the two courts – the collection court and the annulment court – might render two separate and contradictory decisions. If the annulment case is allowed to proceed, then it could result in a judgment declaring the sale null and void, just as a decision in the collection case could be issued ordering them to pay the balance of the price, which is tantamount to a declaration that the sale is valid.

[G.R. No. 143297. February 11, 2003] SPOUSES VIRGILIO and MICHELLE CASTRO, MOISES B. MIAT and ALEXANDER V. MIAT, petitioners, vs. ROMEO V. MIAT, respondent. PUNO, J.: FACTS: Father of two children, Moises, widower (wife died in 1978), originally intended his two properties, one in Paco and the other in Paranaque for his offspring but reverted to keeping the latter for himself while in Dubai, UAE. He modified the original agreement upon return to the Philippines in 1984. Proof of this was given by Moises’ brother, Cerefino Miat, who said testified the original agreement that Paco would go to Moises’ sons. This was reiterated at the death bed of Moises’ wife and affirmed upon Moises’ return to the Philippines. The Paco property, being the land in dispute, was paid for on an installment basis from May 17, 1977 to December 14, 1984. Full payment was made on the latter date and title was secured under Moises name as widower. Romeo and Alexander, sons of Moises, lived on the property with their wives and paid its realty taxes and fire insurance premiums. Alexander and

April 1988, Alexander agrees to sell his share of the Paco property for P42,750.00; a partial payment was made in the sum of P6,000 by Romeo but Alexander did not execute a deed of assignment in favor of his brother because “he had lots of work to do and the title was already in Romeo’s possession.” Downpayment information corroborated by Virgilio Miat (brother of Moises) and Pedro Miranda (who worked with Moises in two hotels: Bayview Hotel and Hotel Filipinas) but Alexander later said that he did not consider the money to be a downpayment but a personal debt due to Romeo. Romeo had possession of the title because he borrowed it from his father when he mortgaged the land to his friend Lorenzo. But when Moises ran into financial difficulties, he mortgaged for P30,000.00 the Paco property to parents of petitioner VC. December 1, 1988, Romeo and VC met in MTC Manila to discuss status of Paco property. On the 16th, a letter from petitioner’s lawyer informed Romeo that the Paco property had been sold to VC by Moises by virtue of a deed of sale dated Dec. 5, 1988 for P95,000.00. Buyer, petitioner, VC admitted that the title of the property was with Romeo but bought it anyway on the assurance of Moises that he’d be able to retrieve it from his son. Romeo files in the RTC action to nullify sale and compel Moises and Alexander to execute deed of conveyance/assignment. RTC ordered (1) Alexander to pay the remaining balance due his brother, (2) Romeo to recognize sale made by Moises, (3) dismissal of defendant’s counterclaim and (4) defendants to pay the costs of suit. Both parties appealed to the CA which modified the decision by saying that: (1) the deed of sale was nullified, (2) Moises and Alexander had to execute a deed of conveyance, and (3) for defendants to pay cost of suit (as applied for by the petitioner). VC subsequently brings the action to the SC.

ISSUES/HELD/RATIO: (1) WON Paco property is conjugal or capital. Although petitioners allege that property was paid for by Moises and at the time it was paid, his wife had long been dead, the SC disagrees on the grounds of the new Civil Code (which was applicable because marriage was celebrated before FC): Art 153 (1) “The following are conjugal partnership property: (1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; x x x.” Records show that property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage out of the common fund. It is clearly conjugal property. Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” This article does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.

Secondly, Romeo and his witnesses, Ceferino Miat and Pedro Miranda, who testified regarding the sale of Alexander’s share to Romeo, were intensely questioned by petitioners’ counsel. (3) WON Castro spouses were buyers in good faith. Ruling of the CA which was affirmed by the SC: “In the case at bench, the said spouses have actual knowledge of the adverse claim of plaintiffappellant. The most protuberant index that they are not buyers in good faith is that before the sale, Virgilio Castro talked with Romeo Miat on the supposed sale. Virgilio testified that together with Romeo, Alexander and Moses Miat, they went to Judge Anunciacion of Manila in order to find out if Romeo has a right over the property. Romeo told Virgilio in that meeting that Romeo has a right over the Paco property by virtue of an oral partition and assignment. Virgilio even admitted that he knew Romeo was in possession of the title and Romeo then insisted that he is the owner of the property. “Virgilio Castro is further aware that plaintiff is in possession of the property, they being neighbors. A purchaser who was fully aware of another person’s possession of the lot he purchased cannot successfully pretend to be an innocent purchaser for value.”

TITAN DAVID

CONSTRUCTION

In the case at bar (as opposed to petitioner’s reliance on Lorenzo v. Nicolas), Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property during their marriage — Moises did not bring it into their marriage, hence it has to be considered as conjugal.

15 MARCH 2010

(2) WON valid oral partition between Moises and his sons involving the said property is valid.

FACTS

DOCTRINE property

2.

3.

4. We also hold that the oral partition between Romeo and Alexander is not covered by the Statute of Frauds. It is enforceable for two reasons. Firstly, Alexander accepted the six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos given by Romeo as downpayment for the purchase of his share in the Paco property.

v

Ponente: Justice Del Castillo

1. Yes. The validity of the agreement is apparent in (a) latter of the father to his sons (the one which stated that he didn’t favor any of his sons), (b) the testimony (see above) of Moises’ brother, Ceferino, and the oral agreement between the brothers to divide the property between themselves (attested to by extended Family members).

CORPORATION

5.

|

Presumption

of

conjugality

of

1957 – marriage of Manuel and Martha David 1970 – spouses acquired 602 m2 in White Plains, transfer certificate of title registered under “Martha married to Manuel etc” 1995 – Martha sold property to Titan Construction, discovered by Manuel in the same year 1996 – Manuel filed a complaint for annulment of contract and reconveyance Titan claimed to be a buyer in good faith, relying on a special power of attorney Manuel signed allowing Martha to dispose of the property

6. 7.

Manuel claimed that the special power of attorney was forged RTC DECISION: annulled sale to Titan, ordered reconveyance, declared that: a. Being named under “Martha married to Manuel” did not negate the conjugal nature of the property b. Special power of attorney was forged

ISSUES 1.

Whether or not the property is Martha’s paraphernal property or the spouses’ conjugal property

10. RTC: ordered sureties to pay Metrobank 11. CA: dismissed appeal 12. RTC: order of execution, with sherriff levying Imani’s property which was sold at public auction to Metrobank 13. Petitioner argued that property was conjugal, and cannot be used to levy indebtedness of CPDTI, and cannot be sold at public auction 14. RTC denied Metrobank’s motion for Imani spouses to surrender their owner’s copy of the TCT for the property, granted spouses motion to cancel sale of property 15. CA reversed the decision of RTC ISSUES

RULING 1.

Property is conjugal, sale is void a. Civil Code applies to this case, as marriage was celebrated prior to FC b. Even if Manuel is unable to show that he had income to help pay for the property, it is assumed that the property was acquired by both spouses conjugally c. Conjugal properties require consent of both spouses prior to sale

2.

RULING 2.

IMANI v METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY 17 NOVEMBER 2010 Ponente: Justice Nachura

DOCTRINE | Presumption of conjugality of property is held only when property is sufficiently proven to have been acquired during marriage

Whether or not the property is conjugal

Property is not conjugal, CA decision affirmed a. Party claiming property is conjugal must show proof that the property was acquired during marriage b. Petitioner merely presented affidavits showing the payments she and husband made on the property; rules on evidence dismiss this as hearsay unless affiants were presented as witnesses c. Photocopies of the checks had no probative value either d. Title being registered under the name of “Evangelina Dazo-Imani married to Sina Imani” is not enough proof that property was acquired during marriage

DEWARA v LAMELA 11 APRIL 2011

FACTS 8.

9.

Ponente: Justice Nachura 1981 – petitioner and co-sureties signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement with Metrobank, binding themselves to pay any indebtedness incurred by CP Dazo Tannery Inc (CPDTI), not exceeding 6M CPDTI acquired loans of 100k and 63k, the payment of which the sureties defaulted

DOCTRINE | Presumption of conjugality property overturned only by proper evidence

of

FACTS 16. Eduardo Dewara and Elenita Dewara married before the FC took effect,

17.

18. 19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

separated in fact because Elenita worked in California, Eduardo in Bacolod 1985 – Eduardo, while driving jeep, hit Lamela, who filed and won a case of serious physical injuries against Eduardo Court ordered Eduardo to pay 62k as civil indemnity and 10k as moral damages Eduardo could not pay so the sheriff levied a parcel of land registered under Elenita’s name, which was bought by Lamela at a public auction Elenita’s attorney-in-fact (tangina siya na) claimed that land was paraphernal property of Elenita and could not be used to pay for personal liabilities of her husband Respondents claim that property was conjugal as it was bought using Eduardo’s money, Elenita being a simple housewife at the time of purchase of the land RTC declared property as paraphernal and ruled in favor of the petitioner, tracing the ownership of the property to Elenita’s grandfather, Exequiel Magallanes, and was sold to her by her father and her aunt for a much lower price, indicating that it was a donation to Elenita alone CA reversed the decision, claiming that Eduardo and Elenita acquired the property during their marriage

ISSUES 3.

Whether or not the property is conjugal

RULING 3.

Property is not conjugal, CA decision affirmed a. Registration under the name of one spouse alone does not prove that property is not conjugal b. Separation-in-fact without judicial approval, does not affect conjugal nature of property c. Elenita was unable to show that property was sold to her as a donation, as she failed to show evidence that her payment was much less than the value of the property d. Gross disparity in price does not affect the contract of sale, may merely signify a defect in consent e. Despite conjugal nature, property may not necessarily be used to pay for the liabilities of one

spouse – said spouse must first be shown to have no property of his own, only in such a case can the conjugal property be used G.R. No. L-16991

March 31, 1964

ROBERTO LAPERAL, JR., ET AL., plaintiffsappellants, vs. RAMON L. KATIGBAK, ET AL., defendantsappellees. DOCTRINE: All properties acquired during the marriage are, by law, presumed conjugal. (Art. 160, Civil Code) The presumption, however, is not conclusive but merely rebuttable. FACTS: Spouses Laperals instituted a case for recovery of a sum of money against spouses Katigbak (husband) and Kalaw (wife). Trial court found for the Laperals. About a month after this decision was rendered, Kalaw filed a complaint against her husband Katigbak, for "judicial separation of property and separate administration". The Laperals instituted another complaint seeking among other things, annulment of the proceedings for "judicial separation of property and separate administration," to enforce the judgment on the fruits of Kalaw's paraphernal property, and to secure a ruling declaring the real property as conjugal property of Katigbak and Kalaw. TC and, later on, SC dismissed the complaint. In conclusion we hold that while the fruits of the paraphernal property of Kalaw are not liable for the enforcement of the obligations contracted by Katigbak, nevertheless, the conjugal properties are.1äwphï1.ñët The background facts for the decision are as follows: Spouses Ramon Katigbak and Evelina Kalaw were married in 1938 and neither of them had brought properties unto the marriage. Ramon's occupation was that of Asst. Atty. of the Bank of the Phil. Islands wherein his monthly salary P200.00. TThe property in question was registered in the name of "Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak, married to Ramon Katigbak" only two years after marriage. The court is led to believe that, as Evelina declares, her mother Pura Villanueva was the one that had bought property for her and had placed it only in

her name. Ramon Katigbak, in the same year 1939, that is, long before the spouses had come to the parting of ways, made a manifestation that he had no interest in the properties.

to sign a general power of attorney which authorized Conchita Evangelista to administer the house and lot together with the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.

ISSUE: The issue is whether or not the property disputed, for the reason that it was acquired during the marriage, is conjugal.

On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages and for annulment of said general power of attorney, and thereby enjoining its enforcement. Petitioner also sought to be declared as the administratrix of the properties in dispute. In due course, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondents. It held that the petitioner failed to adduce proof that said properties were acquired during the existence of the second conjugal partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. Hence, the court ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that he has the capacity to administer them.

HELD: Court rules in favor of Katigbak and Kalaw. There is no denying that all properties acquired during the marriage are, by law, presumed conjugal. (Art. 160, Civil Code) The presumption, however, is not conclusive but merely rebuttable, ("unless it be proved that the property belongs exclusively to the husband or the wife.") The deed to the disputed land is in the name of the wife. At the time of its purchase, the property was already of such substantial value as admittedly, the husband, by himself could not have afforded to buy, considering that singular source of income then was his P200.00 a month salary from a Manila Bank. As in the Casiano case, supra, the defendant herein testified, and was believe by the trial court, that the purchase price was furnish by her mother so she could buy the property for herself. Furthermore, it was established during the trial that it was a practice of defendant's parents to so provide their children with money to purchase realties for themselves. Francisco vs CA, 1998 Ponente: Quisumbing Nature: Petition for review on certiorari Facts: Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio) by his second marriage. Private respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco are children of Eusebio by his first marriage. Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10, 1962, she and Eusebio have acquired the following: (1) a sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, and an apartment house, all situated at Col. S. Cruz St., Barangay Balite, Rodriguez (formerly Montalban), Rizal, and; (2) a house and lot at Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal. Petitioner further avers that these properties were administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer, thereby, rendering him unfit to administer them. Petitioner also claims that private respondents succeeded in convincing their father

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition. Issue: WoN the appellate court committed reversible error in affirming the trial court’s ruling that the properties are not conjugal but the capital properties of Eusebio exclusively. Held: No error. FC cannot be invoked without impairing vested rights, hence, New Civil Code will be used to resolve the issue at hand, Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio. Regarding land Rizal—petitioner failed to refute the testimony of Eusebio that he inherited the same from his parents. Interestingly, petitioner even admitted that Eusebio brought into their marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of a possessor only as it was not yet registered in his name. Whether Eusebio succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to his second marriage is inconsequential. The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of law, pursuant to Article 148 of the New Civil Code.

Essentially, property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and brought to the marriage, is considered his or her separate property. Acquisitions by lucrative title refers to properties acquired gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse during the marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it be assumed that Eusebio’s acquisition by succession of the land took place during his second marriage, the land would still be his “exclusive property” because it was acquired by him, “during the marriage, by lucrative title.” Regarding sari-sari store, etc—the fact that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the property is conjugal or not. Regarding property in Rizal—the fact that the land was registered in the name of “Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco”, is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. *Insofar as the administration of the subject properties is concerned, it follows that Eusebio shall retain control thereof considering that the assets are exclusively his capital. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the properties are conjugal, petitioner cannot administer them inasmuch as Eusebio is not incapacitated. Contrary to the allegation of petitioner, Eusebio, as found by the lower court, is not suffering from serious illness so as to impair his fitness to administer his properties. That he is handicapped due to a leg injury sustained in a bicycle accident, allegedly aggravated when petitioner pushed him to the ground in one of their occasional quarrels, did not render him, in the Court’s view, incapacitated to perform acts of administration over his own properties. Veloso vs Martinez, 1914 *Dapat may kasamang dispute over land, but because defendant withdrew her appeal over the recovery of the land, recovery of jewelry na lang yung mode. Yung land, lower court found na plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of it yadayada. Issue: “The only question remaining, therefore, for this court to decide is as to the ownership and right of possession of said jewels.” Facts:

It is admitted that the jewels in question, before the possession of the same was given to the plaintiff, belonged to the defendant personally and that she had inherited the same from her mother. The defendant, Lucia Martinez, is the widow of Domingo Franco, and after the death of her husband she was appointed administratrix of his estate. A short time before the death of Domingo Franco he borrowed from the plaintiff the sum of P4,500 and gave as security for the payment of said sum the jewelry described in the complaint. The jewelry was contained in a box which remains closed after the jewels were shown to Mariano Veloso. The document further admits that the key shall remain in possession of Domingo Franco. After the death of Domingo Franco it appears that said jewelry was found in the same “caja” and that the key was in the possession of the defendant. From the facts, it is doubtful whether the plaintiff ever obtained the actual possession of the jewelry. His possession, however, seems to be admitted by the defendant in the present action. So far as the record shows the jewelry was in the same box where it was found at the time of the execution and delivery of said Exhibit C and that the defendant still has the key to said box. During the trial the plaintiff attempted to show that the jewels in question were pawned to him by Domingo Franco, with the full knowledge and consent of the defendant. The defendant positively denies that she knew that her husband had pawned her jewels or that she promised to redeem the same by paying the amount due. No explanation is contained in the record why the jewels were placed in said box (presumably a money safe). Held: The Court finds that the defendant is entitled to the possession of said jewels, or to their value, amounting to P6,000. In view of the fact that the record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife, acquired from her mother, and in the absence of further proof, we must presume that they constituted a part of her paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property she exercised dominion over the same. (Article 1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive control and management of the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with the intent that the husband might administer it properly. (Article 1384, Civil

Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had ever delivered the same to her husband, in any manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she could not be deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without her consent, and without compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code above cited.

The retirement benefits were then decided by GSIS to be distribut ed among the heirs in the ff. manner: 77/134 – for his widow 10/134 – for his 4 legitimate children 5/134 – for his acknowledged natural child 4/134 – for his 3 illegitimate children

Berciles vs GSIS, 1984

Both families appealed the GSIS decision. Hence this petition.

Ponente: Guerrero Nature: Petition for certiorari Facts: Judge Pascual G. Berciles of the Court of First Instance of Cebu died in office on August 21, 1979 at the age of sixty-six years, death caused by “cardiac arrest due to cerebral vascular accident.” Having served the government for more than 34 years, 26 years in the judiciary, the late Judge Berciles was eligible for retirement so that his heirs were entitled to survivors benefits amounting to P311,460.00. Other benefits accruing to the heirs of the deceased consist of the unpaid salary, the money value of his terminal leave and r epresentation and transportation allowances, computed at P60,817.5 2, and the return of retirement premiums paid by the retiree in the amount of P9,700.00 to be paid by the GSIS. Such benefits are now being claimed by two families, both of whom claim to be the deceased’s lawful heirs: Illuminada Ponce Berciles (petitioner) and the legitimate children filed for survi vors benefits which was duly supported by the required documents (i.e. marriage certificate) Flor Fuentebella, who also claims to be married to Berciles. The natural child and the illegitimate children also filed the same claim. As proof of her marriage to Berciles, the ff. were presented: -Flor claimed that their marriage certificate was destroyed due to the war. Instead, she presented sworn statements of ot her people attesting to her marriage to Berciles -For the children, a baptismal certificate and certifications that the birth certificates of the other children were destroyed due to the war. -Family pictures, letters from Berciles

Issue: Validity of the GSIS decision contained in its Resolution No. 43, finding private respondent Pascual Voltaire Berciles as an acknowledged natural child of the late Judge Pascual G. Berciles and the other private respondents, namely Maria Luisa Berciles Villareal, Mercy Berciles Patacsil and Rhoda Berciles as illegitimate children of the deceased, and thus, upon this finding, disposed the retirement benefits in the manner and proportion set forth in said resolution after considering said benefits as partly conjugal and partly exclusive. Held: In fine, We hold and rule that the respondent GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion in approving Resolution No. 431 which adopted the erroneous recommendation of the Committee on Claims Settlement, a recommendation which has no legal or factual basis to stand on. Accordingly, the disposition made by respondent GSIS of the retirement benefits due the heirs of the late Judge Pascual G. Berciles is consequently erroneous and not in accordance with law. Petitioners are the lawful heirs entitled to the distribution of the benefits which shall accrue to the estate of the deceased Judge Berciles and will be distributed among the petitioners as his legal heirs in accordance with the law on intestate succession. *Pano nila nalaman na petitioners yung lawful heirs?  Judge’s alleged marriage to Flor Fuentebella was not sufficiently proved and therefore the children begotten with her are either natural or illegitimate children depending on whether they have been bor n before or after the marriage with Iluminada Ponce.

-We have examined carefully this birth certificate and We find that the same is not signed by either the father or the mother. The mere certificate by the registrar without the signature of the father is not proof of vol untary acknowledgment on his part. -As to the baptismal certificate, the rule is that although the baptismal record of a natural child describes her as a child of the decedent, yet, if in the preparation of the record the decedent had no intervention, the baptismal record cannot be held to be a voluntary r ecognition of parentage. IN SHORT: Although illegitimate kiddies are entitled to support and successional rights, there must be admission or recognition of paternity of child! In this case, wala. How the Court divided the shiz: According to Article 996 of the New Civil Code which provides that “If a widow or Widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children,” and Article 980 which provides that “The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares,” the retirement benefits shall be distributed equally to the five (5) heirs: Iluminada Ponce Berciles, Ilona Berciles Alvarez, Ellery P. Berciles, England P. Berciles and Ione P. Berciles. As to the retirement premiums totalling P9,700.00, the same is presumed conjugal property, there being no proof that the premiums were paid from the exclusive funds of the deceased Judge (Article 160, New Civil Code). Such being the case, one-half of the amount belongs to the wife as her property in the conjugal partnership and the other half shall go to the estate of the deceased Judge which shall in turn be distributed to his legal heirs.--> parang ito lang yung part na may relation sa CPG. O_O With respect to the terminal leave pay, unpaid salary and allowances accruing to the deceased, since petitioners are the only lawful heirs of

the deceased Judge, only they are entitled to share thereto. *Acquired by redemption/exchange AMALIA PLATA, petitioner, vs. HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V; BENITO MACROHON, Sheriff of Quezon City and The Spouses CESAREA E. VILLANUEVA and GREGORIO LEAÑO respondent 1964 Ponente: JBL Reyes Nature: Writ of certiorari against CFI of Rizal Facts: In 1954, Amalia Plata purchased a parcel of land in Caloocan, Rizal, for which the Provincial Register of Deeds issued Torrens Certificate of Title in her name. On February 1958, she sold the property to one Celso Saldaña who obtained TCT therefor; but on September 1958, Saldaña resold the same property to Amalia Plata, and a new certificate of Title was issued to the her. On the same day, Plata, in consideration of a loan of P3,000, mortgaged to Cesarea Villanueva married to Gregorio Leaño, the identical property and its improvements "of which the mortgagor declares to be hers as the absolute owner thereof." The mortgage was also signed by Plata’s husband, Gaudencio Begosa, as co-mortgagor. For failure to pay the mortgage, the same was extrajudicially foreclosed under Act 3135, and sold on 12 April 1960 to the mortgagee as the highest bidder; on 13 May 1961, the Sheriff issued a final deed of sale on the strength of which the Register of Deeds issued the buyer TCT. Subsequently, the respondent, Villanueva, sued Gaudencio Begosa alone for illegal detainer and obtained final judgment against him. A writ of execution was duly issued, but Amalia Plata resisted all efforts to eject her from the property, and she filed a third party claim, averring ownership of the property. Upon motion of the judgment creditors, the CFI cited both Begosa and Plata for contempt. Issue: WoN Plata is bound by the detainer judgment against her husband, Begosa. Argument ni Plata: She says was never lawfully married to Begosa, and that she had acquired the property while still single, and was in possession

thereof when the Sheriff of Rizal attempted to enforce the writ of ejectment. Counter-argument: Respondent Villanueva and her husband maintain, on the other hand, that Plata had repeatedly acknowledged being married to Begosa; that she had lived with him openly as his wife, and their marriage is presumed, ergo she is to be deemed bound by the judgment against the latter. SC: No, Plata is not bound by detainer judgment! Evidence of marriage between Plata and Begosa is weak. Despite the well-known presumption that persons openly living together as husband and wife are legally married to each other, STILL, the respondents Villanueva could not ignore the paraphernal character of the property in question, which had been unquestionably acquired by Plata while still single, as shown by TCT of Rizal (Art. 148 of the New Civil Code). The subsequent conveyance thereof to Celso Saldaña, and the reconveyance of her several months afterward of the same property, did not transform it from paraphernal to conjugal property, there being no proof that the money paid to Saldaña came from common or conjugal funds (Civ. Code, Art 153). The deed of mortgage in favor of respondents Villanueva actually recites that the petitioner was the owner of the tenement in question. It is true that Gaudencio Begosa signed the mortgage as a co-mortgagor; but by itself alone that circumstance would not suffice to convert the land into conjugal property, considering that it was paraphernal in origin. Since the property was paraphernal, and the creditors and purchasers were aware of it, the fact being clearly spread on the land records, it is plain that Plata's possession, therefore, was not derived from Gaudencio Begosa. The illegal detainer judgment against the husband alone cannot bind nor affect the wife's possession of her paraphernal, which by law she holds and administers independently, and which she may even encumber or alienate without his knowledge or consent (Civ. Code, Arts. 136. 137, 140). Hence, as she was not made party defendant in the eviction suit, the petitioner-wife could validly ignore the judgment of eviction against her husband, and it was no contempt of court for her to do so, because the writ of execution was not lawful against her.

(respondent) were married on December 1983. 1993- Darlene filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against respondent. Petitioner alleged respondent gave priority to the needs of his parents, would come home past midnight and even tried to convert her to his religion. Jesse stopped support since 1990 and abandoned the conjugal home and stopped supporting the children. Petitioner prayed for dissolution of CPG, custody of children and support of 25k monthly. 1997- RTC denied the petition for nullity but dissolving the CPG and declaring that all propertiesare conjugal. CA affirmed with modification ruling of RTC. CA rejected the argument of respondent that CPG must not be dissolved because marriage was not declared null and void. CA excluded other properties that are not conjugal in nature because it belonged to the respondent's parents. ISSUE: WON properties excluded by the CA are conjugal? HELD: No. CA is correct is exluding properties that are registered in the name of respondent's parents. CA excluded ancestral house and lot in Batangas. The property at Batangas, although "sold" to respondent are still his parents because it was proven that it was merely an accommodation so that Darlene can acquire loan at the BSP using properties as collateral. The gas station was managed by Jesse as atty in fact of his mother. Duplex house however is conjugal as there is no proof to provide otherwise that it was obtained through the income of Jeddah Caltex Station. *Declaration of nullity cannot be issued because of failure to show the seriousness of the incapacity.

MANOTOK V CA FACTS: Manotok Realty is registered owner of a parcel of land in the city of Manila. It acquired property by Testate Estate of Clara Tambunting being the highest bidder in a sale by the Probate Court.

FACTS:

Manotok subdivided it, but cannot take possession of the same becuase the whole area is occupied by several houses among which is Felipe Carillo.

Darlene Laurena (petitioner) and Jesse Laurena

Carillo contends he got the property from deed of

LAURENA v CA

assignment by Delfin Dayrit which acquired the property from Tambunting by virtue of a contract of Sale in installment basis. Dayrit failed to pay, Carillo took over the payment but spouse of Clara refused to accept any payment. Dayrit conveyed the lot to Carillo.

RTC denied motion of Ramon. CA affirmed decision of RTC.

RTC ordered Carillo to vacate the property. CA modified RTC decision declaring Carillo as a builder in good faith.

HELD: No. The lot is paraphernal. The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax declaration of the subject property is not sufficient proof to hold that said property was acquired during the marriage and is therefore conjugal.

Manotok maintains that Carillo is not bcause at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment of Dayrit to Carillo, the land was already registered under Manotok Realty. ISSUE: WON refusal of the husband of Clara Tambunting to accept payment of the land in question makes the respondent, Carillo a possessor in good faith? HELD: No. Agreement between Dayrit and Tambuntin had a specific clause which provides that "if for some reason or other the purchaser cannot pay a certain installment on the date agreed upon, it is hereby agreed that said purchases will be given maximum limit of 2 months' grace period, after which property will revert back to original owner".

ISSUE: WON auction sale of the property in dispute is null and void because of its conjugal nature which the wife cannot legally bind?

It is not properly proved that the property was acquired during the marriage. PNB v CA "When the property is registered in the name of the spouse and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, there is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse". Further, even if the property is conjugal, it may still be levied upon since the profits of the business of the wife redounds to the benefit of the family.

DELA PENA V AVILA FACTS:

The act of registration served as notice to the whole world and the title issued in favor of petitioner made his ownership conclusive upon and against all persons including Dayrit.

May 1996- Antonia obtained from A.C. Aguila a loan in the sum of 250k which was payable on or before July 7, 1996. Antonia mortgaged the property.

Further, Carillo did not even bother to inquire about the certificate of title covering the lot in question to verify who was the real owner therof.

1997- Antonia executed Deed of Sale over the property in favor of Gemma Avila for 600k. Avila became the owner of the property.

ONG V CA

November 1997- Gemma used the said property as collateral in favor of Far East bank to secure loan of 1.2M.

FACTS: 1961- Ramon Ong filed a complaint against Arsenio Camino to annul action sale of a parcel of land allegedly owned conjugally by Ramon and Teodoro Ong. Said auction was done bec. of judgment rendered in favor of Francisco Boix, ordering Teodora Ong to pay the former 2.8l. Teodora Ong had her own logging business. The loan from Francisco Boix was secured by her for the same. Teodora defaulted, Boix sued her and won. Sherriff Arsenio Camino levied on the property under the sole name of Teodora Ong in a tax declaration.

March 1998- Antonia filed Affidavit of Adverse Claim, stating that she was the lawful owner of the property in the name of Gemma and that the Deed of Abs. Sale between her and Gemma was simulated. Gemma failed to pay the loan. Far East caused for the foreclosure of the property, it was auction and Far East bought it as the highest bidder. May 1998- Antonia filed annulment of deed of sale against Gemma stating as ground that the sale was not consented by her husband Antegono who had already died. RTC found property to be conjugal in nature and

the DOAS issued for Gemma was void. CA reversed the decision. The property was paraphernal in nature for failure of Antonia to properly present evidence.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the property is conjugal and therefore the DOAS between Gemma and Antonia void? HELD: No. Article 160 of the Civil Code--> all property of marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. Proof of acquisition (when the property was acquired) is a necessary condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal partnership Case at bar, dela Peñas did not even come close to proving that subject property was acquired during the marriage. The record is bereft of any evidence from which the actual date of acquisition of realty can be ascertained. Registration of Pedra, married to _____ is merely descriptive and does not sufficiently establish conjugal nature of the property. DOAS between Antonia and Gemma is therefore valid, Far East claim of the property can now be given due course. Villanueva v. CA and Heirs of Eusebia Retuya GR No. 143286, April 14, 2004 Carpio, J. Petition for review on certiorari to reverse CA decision Facts:  1926: Eusebia and Nicolas Retuya married, 5 children, acquired 22 real properties in Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu o Nicolas co-owner of parcel of land in Mandaue, inherited from parents and hereditary shares of 8 parcels of land in Mandaue  Land earned income from coconuts + lease  1945: Nicolas stopped living with his legitimate family, cohabited with Pacita o Pacita no more occupation (full time kabit) and no properties of her own o had illegitimate son, Procopio  1985: Nicolas suffered stroke, can’t walk and talk anymore, kabits madamot.  1988: Eusebia filed complaint against her Nicolas, Pacita, and Procopio for

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reconveyance of several properties which she claims are her conjugal properties with Nicolas 1994: RTC in favor of Eusebia; solid evidence which proved that subject properties were acquired during her marriage with Nicolas; Pacita failed to prove they were paraphernal o Eusebia as sole administrator, defendants to turnover all proceeds/income of conjugal properties and to reconvey land in Mandaue to Eusebia and Nicolas 1997: CA upheld RTC ruling

Issue: WoN the subject properties are conjugal properties of Eusebia and Nicolas Held: Yes  FC provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before its effectivity o FC shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before FC without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the CC or other laws (FC 105)  If properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal o Proved by tax declarations covering subject properties and unrebutted testimony of Eusebia’s witnesses  Even if tax declarations are just under Nicolas’ name alone, the presumption that it belongs to conjugal property remains (FC 116) o Burden of proof to prove it is exclusive property rests on the party asserting it  Evidence shown was not clear and convincing  WoN a property is conjugal is determined by law and not by will of one of the spouses o Nicolas misrepresented his civil status as single to exclude Eusebia from her lawful share in the conjugal property is not allowed by law!  Even if Pacita had financial capacity, she failed to prove that she bought Lot 152

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with her own money or even contributed to acquire it o Reliance on FC 148 is misplaced. Must prove “actual joint contribution” by both live-in partners before the property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their contribution Cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even for a long period of time, does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage

Petition denied. CA decision affirmed. Mendoza v. Reyes and CA GR No. L-31618, August 17, 1983 Gutierrez, Jr., J. Review on certiorari of CA decision Facts:  1915: Ponciano and Julia Reyes married  1947: 2 parcels of land were bought from JM Tuason & Co. on installment basis o Always no money so borrow from Rehabilitation Finance Corp (RFC)  1948: Spouses jointly obtained loan of P12,000 from RFC “to complete construction of one-storey residential building in QC”  1952: Spouses secured additional loan of P8,000 “to pay balance of the lot herein offered as additional security and to defray the expenses incurred in the repairs of the building”  Spouses were able to build a house and later on a camarin/chapel as promised to RFC o Camarin leased to school, later to the Spouses Mendoza who converted it to a movie house o Received good rentals for the building, but failed to pay seasonably their obligations to the RFC (became DBP) for extension of 5 years  1961: Wife sold 2 parcels of land while her husband was absent attending his farm in Pampanga. They were living separately and not in speaking terms.  Ponciano filed complaint with CFI Rizal for the annulment of a DoS of 2 parcels of land with improvements, executed by his wife as vendor, and Spouses Mendoza as vendees.

o

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Lands are conjugal properties sold without his knowledge or consent o CFI declared lands as exclusive and paraphernal properties of wife CA reversed CFI

Issue: WoN properties in question are conjugal properties of Ponciano and Julia Held: Yes, disputed properties were acquired by onerous title during the marriage using funds that came from loans obtained by the spouses.  That which is acquired by onerous title during marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for partnership, or for only one of the spouses is part of the conjugal partnership property (CC 153)  All debts and obligations contracted by the husband and wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership (CC 161)  All property of marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife (CC 160) Petitions for review on certiorari are denied for lack of merit. Judgment of CA affirmed.

Ros and Aguete v. PNB GR No. 170166, April 6, 2011 Carpio, J. Petition for review of CA decision Facts:  1954: Joe Ros and Estrella Aguete married  1968: Spouses acquired parcel of land in Laoag  1974: Husband mortgaged land for a loan of P115,000 from PNB o Loan remained outstanding upon maturity so PNB executed extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, selling the land to the highest bidder, PNB Laoag  1978: Land was not redeemed within 1 year so the property was registered under PNB  1983: Spouses filed complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage (REM) and all legal proceedings against PNB before CFI Ilocos Norte

o

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Wife claimed she had no knowledge of the loan obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage on the conjugal property o Signature affixed on the documents was forged o The loan did not redound to the benefit of the family 2001: RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner spouses, wife did not sign the document, so husband couldn’t encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without his wife’s consent. Deed of REM declared NAV. 2005: CA reversed RTC, granted PNB’s appeal. RTC concluded forgery without adequate proof. Even if wife didn’t give consent, loan still redounded to the benefit of the family since records revealed it was used for expansion of the family’s business. Debt is chargeable against the conjugal partnership.

Issue: WoN loan obtained by the husband redounded to the benefit of the family Held: Yes, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family and must be chargeable to the conjugal partnership.  CC was applicable law at the time of the marriage, so property is considered part of CPG.  Not disputed that property was acquired during marriage  Husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the express/implied consent of the wife. o CC 173 allows wife to question husband’s encumbrance of the property, but court will not guarantee that contract will be voidable. o In present case, we follow CA’s conclusion that the wife gave her consent  Mere denial cannot disprove the execution of a notarized document  Husband admitted to forging wife’s signature  Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. o Application for loan shows that it would be used exclusively “for

o o

additional working capital of buy and sell of garlic and virginia tobacco”  Part of “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership” Benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract No actual benefit has to be proved, immaterial WoN business fails/succeeds

Petition denied. CA decision is affirmed. G.R. No. 100728 June 18, 1992 WILHELMINA JOVELLANOS, MERCY JOVELLANOS-MARTINEZ and JOSE HERMILO JOVELLANOS, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and ANNETTE H. JOVELLANOS, respondents. FACTS: Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a lease and conditional sale agreement of a property. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was still married to Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children, the petitioners herein. Leonor Dizon died on January 2, 1959. On May 30, 1967, Daniel married private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos. On December 18, 1971, petitioner Mercy Jovellanos (daughter from the first wife) and her husband built a house on the back portion of the premises. On January 8, 1975, with the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter donated to herein petitioners (children from 1st wife) the lot and bungalow. On September 8, 1985, Daniel Jovellanos died. Second wife (respondent) Annette H. Jovellanos claimed that the property was acquired by Daniel while their marriage was still subsisting, by virtue of the deed of absolute sale dated January 8, 1975, and thus formed part of the conjugal partnership of the second marriage. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the property was acquired by their parents during the existence of the first marriage under their lease and conditional sale agreement with Philamlife of September 2, 1955. ISSUE: Whether the property belongs to the conjugal partnership of the first or the second marriage HELD: The property belongs to the second marriage.

The contract entered into by Daniel and Philamlife is specifically denominated as a "Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement" with a lease period of twenty years. During the twenty-year period, Daniel had only the right of possession over the property. The lessor transfers merely the temporary use and enjoyment of the thing leased. Generally, ownership is transferred upon delivery, however, the ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of the price is made, if there is stipulation to this effect. His monthly payments were made in the concept of rentals, but with the agreement that if he faithfully complied with all the stipulations in the contract the same would in effect be considered as amortization payments to be applied to the predetermined price of the said property. He consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said amount. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law, and, under the contract, Daniel Jovellanos evidently did not possess or enjoy such rights of ownership. The deed of absolute sale was executed in 1975 by Philamlife, only after full payment of the rentals. Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in Daniel Jovellanos. Since. as early as 1967, he was already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said second wife. The lower courts correctly ordered that reimbursements should be made to the children of the first marriage in line with the pertinent provision of Article 118 of the Family Code that "any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership." G.R. No. 185063

July 23, 2009

SPS. LITA DE LEON and FELIX RIO TARROSA, petitioners, vs. ANITA B. DE LEON, DANILO B. DE LEON, and VILMA B. DELEON, respondents. FACTS: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single, and PHHC entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase of a lot. On April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon. Following the full payment of the cost price for the lot, PHHC executed, on June 22, 1970, a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Subsequently, Bonifacio, for PhP 19,000, sold the lot to his sister,

Lita, and husband Felix Rio Tarrosa, petitioners herein. The Deed of Sale dated January 12, 1974 (Deed of Sale) did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died. Three months later, the Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale. Danilo and Vilma (children of Bonifacio) filed a Notice of Adverse Claim before the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to protect their rights over the subject property, as well as, a reconveyance suit. ISSUE: Whether or not the land purchased belongs to the conjugal property HELD: The subject property is the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. For the presumption to arise, it is not even necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal. In the case at bar, the title to the property in question only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment was made more than two (2) years after his marriage to Anita. Since, the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage, the ownership is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. Petitioners’ argument that the disputed lot was Bonifacio’s exclusive property, since it was registered solely in his name, is untenable. The mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. What is material is the time when the property was acquired. The Civil Code is very explicit on the consequence of the husband alienating or encumbering any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. The sale by the husband of property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife is void ab initio, absent any showing that the latter is incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or like causes. The sale of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of the partnership is void. Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy. Therefore, even on

the supposition that Bonifacio only sold his portion of the conjugal partnership, the sale is still theoretically void, for the right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. As a matter of fairness and equity, the share of Bonifacio after the liquidation of the partnership should be liable to reimburse the amount paid by the Tarrosas. It is a well-settled principle that no person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. G.R. No. 156125

August 25, 2010

FRANCISCO MUÑOZ, JR., petitioner, vs. ERLINDA RAMIREZ and ELISEO CARLOS, respondents. FACTS: The residential lot in question was previously in the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos (respondents). On April 6, 1989, Eliseo mortgaged the property, with Erlinda’s consent, to GSIS. A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Erlinda to Francisco (petitioner) on April 30, 1992 for consideration of P602,000.00. On September 24, 1993, the spouses filed a complaint for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale, claiming that there was no sale but only a mortgage transaction. The Ramirez spouses alleged that Francisco granted them a P600,000.00 loan, to be secured by a mortgage on the property. Francisco gave Erlinda a P200,000.00 advance to cancel the GSIS mortgage, and made her sign a document purporting to be the mortgage contract. Francisco promised to give the P402,000.00 balance when Erlinda surrenders TCT No. 1427 with the GSIS mortgage cancelled, and submits an affidavit signed by Eliseo stating that he waives all his rights to the subject property. With the P200,000.00 advance, Erlinda paid GSIS P176,445.27 to cancel the GSIS mortgage and subsequently, Erlinda surrendered to Francisco the clean TCT No. 1427, but returned Eliseo’s affidavit, unsigned. Since Eliseo’s affidavit was unsigned, the petitioner refused to give the P402,000.00 balance and to cancel the mortgage, and demanded that Erlinda return the P200,000.00 advance. Since Erlinda could not return the P200,000.00 advance because it had been used to pay the GSIS loan, Francisco kept the title; and in 1993, the spouses discovered that TCT No. 7650 had been issued in the petitioner’s name, cancelling TCT No.1427 in their name.

RESPONDENT’S VERSION: There was a valid contract of sale. He alleged that the respondents sold the subject property to him after he refused their offer to mortgage the subject property because they lacked paying capacity. The sale was with the implied promise to repurchase within one year,[13] during which period (from May 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993), the respondents would lease the subject property for a monthly rental of P500.00. When the respondents failed to repurchase the subject property within the one-year period despite notice, he caused the transfer of title in his name on July 14, 1993. He then filed an ejectment case against them sixteen days before the filing of the RTC case for annulment of the deed of absolute sale. In the RTC, the spouses presented the results of the scientific examination showing that their signatures were forgeries. PETITIONERS’ VERSION: They introduced evidence on the paraphernal nature of the subject property since it was registered in Erlinda’s name; the residential lot was part of land owned Erlinda’s parents. ISSUE: (1) whether the subject property is paraphernal or conjugal; and, (2) whether the contract between the parties was a sale or an equitable mortgage. HELD: As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership. Properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be excluded from the community property and be the exclusive property of each spouse.The residential lot, therefore, is Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property. In the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan through monthly salary deductions. Considering the P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is considerably more than theP60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo through monthly salary deductions. Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda at the time she contracted with

the petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary. The NBI finding that Eliseo’s signatures in the special power of attorney and affidavit were forgeries was immaterial. (2) For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise under Article 1602 of the Civil Code, two (2) requisites must concur: (a) that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale; and, (b) that their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of a mortgage. The contract is an equitable mortgage. That the petitioner advanced the sum of P200,000.00 to Erlinda is undisputed. This advance, in fact, prompted the latter to transfer the subject property to the petitioner. Thus, before the respondents can recover the subject property, they must first return the amount of P200,000.00 to the petitioner, plus legal interest of 12% per annum, computed from April 30, 1992.