Persons Case Summaries - Requisites to Voidable Marriages

Topic

Requisites

Case

Pugeda vs Trias

Cause of Action

Facts

Sison vs Te Jay Li

SEE BELOW.

Villar v Paraiso

In the general elections held on November 13, 1951, Villar and Paraiso were candidates for mayor in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. After the canvassing, Paraiso was proclaimed mayor. However, Villar contended that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office as mayor because he was then a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and such was disqualified to be a candidate under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code. Respondent in his answer denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines on August 21, 1951 and such resignation was accepted. Villar further contended that on April 7, 1951, respondent applied for and was granted a license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries as minister of the new church up to the end of April, 1952. Such license has never been cancelled, nor respondent has requested for its cancellation.

Formal Requisites

Aranes v Occiano

Effects of Absence of Authority-Form

Martinez v Tan

Effects of Absence of AuthorityMarriage Certificate Macua v Avenido

Abbas v Abbas

Petitioner Syed Abbas claimed that he was forced to undergo a ceremony but was not told its naturethat of a marriage, supposedly. . He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.For her part, respondent Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola. Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on Janu

Borja-Manzano vs Sanchez

Ninal v Bayadog

Decision

[1] W/N Paraiso actually resigned as minister before the date of the elections, and his resignation was duly accepted, as claimed, thereby removing his disability.

Separate Opinion

Dissenting Opinion

Additional Notes

Paraiso was disqualified when he ran for mayor while he was still holding a religious position granting him the power to solemnize marriages

[1] Whether or not the marriage of Martinez and Tan is valid

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely

[1] YES. The evidence in support of that decision is: First. The document itself, which the plaintiff admits that she signed. Second. The evidence of the defendant, who testifies that he and the plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named, together with the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, and that they all signed the document above mentioned. Third. The evidence of Zacarias Esmero, one of the above­named witnesses, who testifies that the plaintiff, the defendant, and Pacita Ballori appeared before the justice at the time named and did sign the document referred to. Fourth. The evidence of Pacita Ballori, who testified to the same effect. Fifth. The evidence of Jose Santiago, the bailiff of the court of the justice of the peace, who testified that the plaintiff, the defendant, the two witnesses above­named, and the justice of the peace were all present in the office of the justice of the peace at the time mentioned. While the plaintiff alleges she signed it under duress and did not appear The judgment of the court below acquitting the before the justice of the peace, witnesses disagree AND letters addressed to Tan prove the shakiness of this defendant of the complaint is affirmed, with the evidence. costs of this instance against the appellant.

Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, the Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez married, having one child- Domingo de Leon. Eulogio died. Flaviana, complaint dismissed, and the defendants upon her widowhood, cohabited with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. They had a child, Melecio Madridejo, [1] YES. it does not appear that the essential requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, absolved with costs against the appellee without who was baptized as Melecio Perez, with no mention of the father. On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, [1] Whether the marriage of Flaviana and Pedro is valid, despite the parish priest failing and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites. [2] NO. It is evident prejudice to any right he may have to establish or being at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by the parish priest to send a copy of the marriage certificate [2] Whether Melecio is a legitimate son of that Melecio Madridejo has not been acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily or by compel his acknowledgment as the natural son of of Siniloan. Flaviana and Pedro compulsion, before or after their marriage, and therefore ore said marriage did not legitimate him. Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez. So ordered. Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification3 was issued by the LCR. She had 4 children with Eustaquio, who left her and their family in 1954. n 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous — an action she sought to protect the rights of her children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.

Marriage License

Held and Ratio

Petitioner Mercedita Aranes charges Judge Occiano with gross ignorance of the law because he solemnized her marriage to her deceased groom Dominador Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur, which is outside his territorial jurisdiction. Because of this, she cannot inherit Orobia's estate. Respondent judge averred that upon examining the documents, he detected the [1] YES. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this absence of the license. He advised the couple to reschedule their wedding but because of their earnest [1] Whether or not Judge Occiano is liable for gross neglience for solemnizing the respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law. pleas and laid-out plans, he agreed to officiate. He also agreed to officiate the marriage in an area marriage despite the lack of a marriage license [2] Whether or not Judge Occiano is liable [2] NO. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human outside his jurisdiction due to Orobia's inability to travel far. for gross neglience for solemnizing the marriage outside his territorial jurisdiction compassion. HOWEVER, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.

Rosalia Martinez and Angel Tan purportedly got married, the proof being an expediente de matrimonia civil signed by both the plaintiff and defendant, stating that they mutually agree to a contract of marriage. This was followed by a document signed by the justice of the peace and their witnesses (a marriage certificate).

Madridejo v De Leon

Issue

The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias are the children of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer with her first husband Mariano Trias, while the defendants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda are children of the plaintiff with said deceased Maria C. Ferrer. The [1] YES. When the question as to whether or not a mar riage has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage plaintiff-appellee, Fabian Pugeda, alleged that during Maria Ferrer's lifetime, they acquired in their may be proved by evidence of any kind. Testimony by one of the parties or witnesses to the marriage, or by the conjugal partnership lots in the San Francisco de Malabon estate. As such, he is owner of one-half of the person who solemnized the same, is admissible. Public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged estate. The defendants Trias, however, alleged that the property is owned by them in trust with the marriage, birth and baptismal certificates of children borne by the alleged spouses, and a statement of such plaintiff and were inherited from their deceased father Mariano Trias and their mother. They also denied marriage in subsequent documents are competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage. In this case, Ricardo The division of the properties of the deceased for lack of knowledge and belief the claim of plaintiff in his complaint that he was married to Maria C. Ricafrente testified that he celebrated the marriage. Other witnesses were also introduced and the baptismal Maria C. Ferrer among her eight children and Ferrer and that the marriage continued up to the death of the latter in 1934. The defendants Pugeda [1] Whether or not the marriage of Fabian Pugeda and Maria Ferrer exist despite the certificates of the Pugeda children were seen as solid evience. [2] NO. As indicated in Section 16 of Act 1120, if a plaintiff, is hereby modified in the sense that all joined the plaintiff in the latter's claim that the properties mentioned in plaintiff's complaint were joint absence of record [2]Whether the claim of the plaintiff to the friar lands he purportedly holder of a certificate dies before the payment of the price in full, the sale certificate is assigned to the widow, but of her properties be divided among her eight co-owns with Maria Ferrer is valid children at the rate of one­-eighth per child. properties of the plaintiff and the defendants. if she passes away, the certificate passes to their heirs.

[1] Whether or not respondent's marriage can be overturned by the presumption of petitioner's marriage

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA­G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage [1] YES. In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of Adelina, between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted fact of the birth within the cohabitation of Tecla and Eustaquio of four (4) the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby children coupled with the certificates of the children’s birth and baptism; and the certifications of marriage issued declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol. costs.

Whether or not a valid marriage license is issued by the couple

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA­G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, [1] NO. The respondent did not present proof that there is a valid marriage license; neither did her witnesses. She 2005 in Civil Case No. 03­ 0382­CFM annulling the also did not elaborate as to why she filed for the marriage license in Carmona, Cavite despite her and petitioner not marriage of petitioner with respondent on residing in it. January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

Petitioner avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children were born out of that marriage.2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.3 When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated.” Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. e therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits5 of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code. Whether Judge Sanchez is liable for solemnizing the marriage between Manzano and Paya

[1] YES. Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.

JOHNS, J., dissenting: I dissent and the judgment of the lower court should be affirme

ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born [1] YES. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as “husband and wife.” (NOTE THAT WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt THIS WAS A TIME WHEN CIVIL CODE WAS APPLICABLE) [2] YES. For other purposes, such as but not limited to assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their [1] Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs’ deceased father with defendant is determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma null and void ab initio [2] Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly T­639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father’s death instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. is ordered REINSTATED.

Republic v Albios

Presumption of Marriage

Perido v Perido

Lucio Perido of Hima maylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3 ) children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia, and Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943. On August 15 , 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document denominated as “Declaration of Heirship and Extra­judicial Partition,” whereby they partitioned among themselves Lots Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513­B, 807, and 808, all of the Cadastral Survey of Hima maylan , Occidental Negros. The children belonging to the first marriage had second thoughts about the agreement. They argued that that the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all ille gitimate and therefore had no successional righ ts to the estate of Lucio [1] Whether or not the five children of Perido and Baliguat are legitimate [2] Whether or Perido.Trial court ruled that all children were legitimate.Petitioners appealled to a higher court. not the marriage between Perido and Baguilat is valid

[1] YES. They were born during the marriage of the two. [2] YES. To protect the sanctity of marriage, there is presumption of marriage and legitimacy.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.

[1] NO. This statutory provision in the civil colde plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its perf ormance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant­appellant acquitted, with costs de officio so ordered.

Fiel v Banawa

People vs Mendoza

People vs Aragon

Tolentino v Paras

Wiegel v Sempio-Dy

On August 5, 1936, the appellant and Jovita de Asis were married in Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941, during the subsistence of the first marriage, the appellant was married to Olga Lema in the City of Manila. On Febrauary 2, 1943, Jovita de Asis died. On August 19, 1949, the appellant contracted another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba. The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941 is null and void and, therefore, nonexistent, having been contracted while his first marriage with Jovita de Asis August 5, 1936 was still in effect, and that his third marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on August 19, 1949 cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place after the death of Jovita de Asis. On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu. While his mariage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused, under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo City.Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City on August 5, 1939 After Maria Gorrea’s death, and seeing that the coast was clear in Cebu, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she worked as a teachernurse. The accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu.

The records disclose that Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with private respondent herein, Maria Clemente, at Paombong, Bulacan, on November 1, 1948, while his marriage with petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, celebrated on July 31, 1943, was still subsisting.In Special Proceedings No. 1587­M for Correction of Entry, petitioner sought to correct the name of the surviving spouse in the death certificate from “Maria Clemente” to “Serafia G. Tolentino”, her name. The lower Court dismissed the petition Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia’s previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union.

[1] Whether or not the appellant is liable for bigamy

[1] Whether the defendant could legally contract marriage with Jesusa Maglasang

It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the [1] YES. It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, marriage was a valid one and appellant’s the last marriage was a valid one and appellant’s prosecution for contracting this marriage can not prosper. (SEE: prosecution for contracting this marriage can not Ruling on People vs Mendoza) prosper.

[1] Whether or not petitioner should be declared as the surviving spouse of Tolentino

WHEREFORE, the Order, dated October 21, 1975, of respondent Court is hereby set aside and petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, hereby declared the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado Tolentino. Let the corresponding correction be made in the latter’s death certificate in the [1] YES. Marriage of Tolentino with defendant is void ab initio. The second marriage that he contracted with private records of the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. Bulacan.

[1] Whether or not petitioner's second marriage is valid

[1] NO. The presence of force that made her enter into her first marriage only makes the marriage voidable thereby, it was still in effect when she married petitioner.Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia’s previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage for claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are forced to enter said marital union. hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Donato v Luna

Leonilo Donato was charged with bigamy based on a civil case filed by Paz Abayan who stated that she [1] NO. A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a consented to entering into a marriage with him, which was petitioner Donato’s second one, since she had logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June requisites of a prejudicisJ question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the 30,1978. Petitioner Donato’s answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second Juvenile and Domestic Reiations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, petitioner Donato’s guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. nother event which militates against petitioner’s intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner’s consent to contentions is the fact that it was only when Civil Case No. E­02627 was filed on September 28,1979, or more than the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent or second marriage, petitioner and private the lapse of one year from the solemnization of the second marriage that petitioner came up with the story that his respondent had lived together and deported themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of consent to the marriage was secured through the use of force, violence, intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them on [1] Whether or not there is a prejudicial question based on the civil case Paz Abayan filed also continued to live with private respondent until November 1978, when the latter left their abode upon learning petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We September 26,1978 leading to the suspension of the criminal case against petitioner that Leonilo Donato was already previously married. make no pronouncement as to costs.

Terre v Terre

In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with “grossly immoral conduct,” consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting. Respondent was able to evade the summons for three years. On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order. In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her representation that she was single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968. Petitioner averred that respondent aggressively courted her despite knowing that she was married and explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as such; they were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977. All through their married state up to the time he disappeared in 1981, complainant supported respondent, in addition to the allowance the latter was getting from his parents; she was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found out later that respondent married a certain Vilma Malicdem.

Void Marriages

Republic v Granada

Republic v Cantor

[1] Whether or not respondent's marriage to petitioner is void ab initio

REYES, J., dissenting: I, dissent. Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishes with prison mayor "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved".

Reyes dissent: same logic as in People v Mendoza

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of [1] NO. The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant’s place, respondent has not rebutted complainant’s evidence as to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith of Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complainant into believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio. and shall be circularized to all the courts of the Respondent should know that a judicial declaration of the marriage being void ab initio is essential. land.

[1] NO. The appellate court noted that a petition for declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) at Sumida is a summary judicial proceeding under the Family Code. Hence, the RTC Decision therein is immediately final and Electric Philippines, an electronics company in Parañaque where both were then working. The two executory upon notice to the parties, by express provision of Article 247 of the same Code. The decision is therefore eventually got married at the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in the birth of not subject to ordinary appeal, and the attempt to question it through a Notice of Appeal is unavailing. Taken their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada. Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not [1] Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and received any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is executory. testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail. After immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to [2] NO. The Republic’s arguments are well­-taken. Nevertheless, the Court is constrained to deny the Petition. The WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead. RTC ruled ordinary appeal [2] Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her “well­founded belief” that her absent spouse Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 23 Granada as presumptively dead.On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no January 2009 and 3 April 2009 in CA­G.R. CV No. the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. on the evidence that respondent presented longer be modified or reversed. 90165 are AFFIRMED.

The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the respondent’s inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the respondent’s father. After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts. On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the respondent filed before the RTC a petition4for her husband’s declaration of presumptive death, docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. She [1] Whether certiorarilies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a 41 of the Family Code are allowable [2] Whether the respondent had a well-founded point to check the patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. belief that Jerry is already dead.

[1] By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment ina summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. Viewed in this light, we find that the petitioner’s resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question the RTC’s order declaring Jerry presumptively dead was proper [2] WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While assailed decision dated August 27, 2008 of the her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquiredabout the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, Court of Appeals, which affirmed the order dated these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information from Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions. hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The Essential Requisites for the Declaration of Presumptive Death Under Article 41 of the Family Code 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has a wellfounded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee

Topic

Case

Jones v Hortiguela

Subsequent marriage upon reappearance of absent spouse

In December, 1914, Marciana Escaño married Arthur W. Jones in the suburban catholic church of San Nicolas, Province of Cebu. On January 10, 1918, Jones secured a passport to go abroad and thereafter nothing was ever heard of him. In October, 1919, the court issued an order declaring Jones an absentee from the Philippine Islands. On May 6, 1927, Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escaño were married before the justice of the peace of Malitbog, Leyte, and they signed the certificate of marriage. Now, Angelita Jones contends that the declaration of absence must be understood to have been made not in the order of October 25, 1919, but in that of April 23, 1921, and that from the latter date to May 6, 1927, the date of the celebration of the marriage, only 6 years and 14 days elapsed; and in accordance with section III, paragraph 2, of General Orders, No. 68, the marriage so contracted by Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escaño is null and void.

Issue

Held and Ratio

Decision

Separate Opinion

Dissenting Opinion

Additional Notes

CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion: Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Evidence; Bigamy; Court has consistently ruled that if the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, there is no crime of bigamy.–For more than 75 years now, this Court has consistently ruled that if the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, there is no crime of bigamy. CALLEJO: Since the second marriage is null and void ab initio, such marriage in contemplation of criminal law never existed and for that reason, one of the essential elements of bigamy has disappeared.

elements of bigamy: that the offender has been legally married; that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity

WHEREFORE, the court reverses the appealed order of March 14, 1935, in so far as it set aside the order of January 10, 1933, relative to the administrator's fees and the order of June 26, 1933, approving the final account and the project of portion, and in so far as said order of March 14, 1935, required the presentation of a new project of partition; denied the appointment of Angelita Jones husband as administrator; affirms the order of May 9, 1932, relative to declaration of heirs; and holds it unwarranted to make a finding as to whether or not the properties of this [1] YES. In accordance with the foregoing legal provision, the absence of Marciana Escaño's former husband should be intestate estate are paraphernal properties of the counted from January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from deceased Marciana Escaño reserving to the said date to May 6, 1927, more than nine years elapsed. Said marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful. parties the right to discuss which are paraphernal [1] Whether or not Felix Hortiguela's marriage to the deceased Marciana Escano is valid For and which are conjugal properties

no cause of action

`Republic v CA & Molina

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start. In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.

whether or not the CA made an erroneous interpretation of psychological incapacity

YES. On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The constitutes psychological incapacity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the subsists and remains valid. decision SO

Choa v Choa

Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union two children were born, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan

Republic v QuinteroHamano

On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero­Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common­law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child. On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. The trial court rendered their marriage null and void.

Whether or not respondent's spouse was truly psychologically incapable

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby NO. We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997 of incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. ASIDE.

Republic v Encelan

On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two children, Maricar and Manny.6 To support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991,7 Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity. Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an associate in her promotions business. She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her mother­inlaw.

Whether or not the CA is correct in ruling that Lolita is not psychologically incapable

NO. In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET dates when he learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home,24 as well as his ASIDE the October 7, 2005 amended decision of continued financial support to her and their children even after he learned of the affair,25 but he merely mentioned the Court of Appeals in CA­G.R. CV No. 75583. in passing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling. In any event, sexual Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological Encelan’s petition for declaration of nullity of his incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. They are not signs of a disordered personality. marriage to Lolita Castillo Encelan.

A judicial declaration based solely upon that presumption may not be made.

Barcelona v Court of Appeals and Tadeo Bengzon

Effect of Nullity

Yaptinchay v Torres

Fujiki v Marinay

On July 13, 1965, herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay sought in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, her appointment first as Special Administratrix and then as regular administratrix of the estate of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay who died in Hongkong on July 7, 1965 on the basis that the deceased live with her publicly and openly as husband and wife for nineteen years.To the petition of Teresita C. Yaptinchay, an opposition was registered by Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife, e, and Finding no error in the disputed orders of Ernesto Y. Yaptinchay and other children, of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay, upon the ground that respondent judge, the herein petition for said Teresita C. Yaptinchay, not being an heir of the decedent, had no right to institute the petition.This certiorari is hereby dismissed, and the writ of time, petitioner filed in another branch (Pasig Branch) of the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for NO. . Said Article 144 says that: "When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not preliminary mandatory injunction17 issued by this replevin and for liquidation of the partnership supposedly formed during the period of her cohabitation Whether or not Teresita Yaptinchay has right to the properties of Isidro Yaptinchay on the married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their Court is hereby dissolved and set aside. Costs with Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and for damages. basis of their 19 years of conjugal living work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co­ownership." against petitioner. Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other. In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign case from its active civil docket on the rule that only the husband or wife of said marriage can invoke judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign nullity. citizen on the ground of bigamy

YES. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. (Also to recognize Japanese Family Court Ruling, you need a proof of fact.)

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q­11­68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

Garcia-Quiazon v Belen

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M­3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of [1] No. Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.— If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the estate settled, in the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in the province in which he resides at the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, Court] of any province in which he had estate.. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. While the recitals in death certificates can be petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate,6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of on the courts [2] No. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratrix of Eliseo’s estate. In validating the making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog23 applicable four­square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, to therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages. Contrary WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the [1] Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that letters of administration was correctly filed to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the in Las Pinas [2] Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Amelia was not legally married sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was to Eliseo Garcia-Quiazon due to a preexisting marriage [3] Whether or not the CA officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac[3] NO. Elise is as an interested party and and 7 August 2009 Resolution, are AFFIRMED in denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009. overlooked the fact that Elise has shown no interest in the letters of administration stands to benefit as an heir of Eliseo. toto

Republic v Olaybar

Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. [4] She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.[5] Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case. She claimed that she could not have appeared before the solemnizing officer because she was then working asa a medrep in Makati.She completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal No. The court thus made a categorical conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate was not circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport.[6] Respondent also presented as witness a certain hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was was celebrated. Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was respondent.[7] Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage not even aware of such existence.While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of contract was forged.Judgment was ruled in favor of respondent. However, Petitioner, however, moved marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the DENIED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of [1] Whether or not respondent should have filed a petition for declaration of annulment there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519­CEB, are the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio. of marriage rather than a Rule 108 proceeding by the evidence. AFFIRMED.

Who can invoke nullity

Procedure in declaring the nullity of a marriage

Wiegel v Sempio-Dy Terre v Terre

Morigo v People

Tenebro v CA

Requisite for valid remarriage

Facts

Pleading under oath that she is the lawful wife of Nicolas Szatraw, a Polish citizen, to whom she was married in Manila on November, 1936, whom she bore a child named Alexis Szatraw born on 8 September 1937, with whom she had lived from the time they were married until February, 1940, when her husband, on the pretext that he would call on some friends, departed from the conjugal abode carrying the child along with him and never returned, about whose whereabouts she made inquiries from among her husband's friends and countrymen and learned that her husband and child had left for Shanghai, where, according, however, to information obtained from Polish citizens who had arrived from that place, he and the child had not been seen and could not be found; that all her efforts to know the whereabouts of her husband and child were in vain; and that, because of her husband's absence for more than seven years during which she has not heard any news from him and about her child, she believes that he is dead, Consuelo Sors prays that her husband be declared dead and that her parental authority over her child, should the latter be alive and later on appear, be preserved.

In re Szatraw

Psychological Incapacity

Cause of Action

SEE ABOVE. SEE ABOVE. Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates during college. They lost touch- however, Lucia wrote to Lucia from Singapore. They became sweethearts. In 1990, Lucia came back to the PH and proposed to Lucio, saying he should come with her in Canada. They got married at the Iglesia de Filipino Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. Lucia then went back to Ontario without Lucio. She filed for divorce at the Ontario Trial Court and it was granted. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago4 at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol. On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint sought among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT YES. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. As such, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued. INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. one of the elements of bigamy is not present. Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu­lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984­1988, with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman. Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two­tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA­G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty. SO ORDERED.

NO. First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes and (2) a letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married. Villareyes also provided a marriage certificate as evidence. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. rriage had all the requisites for validity. Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the verify the non­existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed non­existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil decision of the Court of Appeals in CA­G.R. CR Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico dated after the accused’s marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case. As such, this Court rules that Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four bigamy. The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration20 of the (4) years and two (2) months of prision nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and Whether or not the CA erred in convicting the petitioner with bigamy despite the non- subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is existence of the first marriage the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. AFFIRMED in toto.

Capili v People

On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. MedinaCapili and without said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo. Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second NO. The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina­Capili; (2) in the event that the has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is question in the instant criminal case. Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the DENIED. The Decision dated February 1, 2008 and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated. The Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of ground that the second marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared void by whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of Appeals in CA­G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby the RTC. for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy nullity, the crime had already been consummated AFFIRMED

People v Odtuhan

The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.37 It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immalure.38 What makes a On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina).3 On October 28, 1993, respondent married person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon).4 Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his marriage valid marriage.Thus, as held in Antone: To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between The Court of Appeals Decision dated December with Modina.5 On February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent’s petition and petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the 17, 2009 and Resolution dated March 4, 2010 in declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.6 On November 10, purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following CA­G.R. SP No. 108616 are SET ASIDE. Criminal 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of Case No. 05­235814 is REMANDED to the Regional of respondent’s previous marriage with Modina.7 She thus filed a ComplaintAffidavit8 charging whether or not respondent is guilty of bigamy despite the fact that his first marriage was exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 for further respondent with Bigamy. annulled which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence proceedings. SO ORDERED.

Topic

No confession of judgment

Voidable Marriages: Fraud

Voidable marriages: force, intimidation and undue influence

Impotence Procedure in annulment

Case

Cause of Action

Facts

Issue

Go-Bangayan v Bangayan

On 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III. In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go­Bangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered. Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During their period of cohabitation, they acquired properties. The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non­existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally . The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sally’s claim for spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for support. As for the properties, the trial court ruled that all of them were either from Benjamin's inheritance or were paid for from Benjamin's earnings. Sally also acted in bad faith knowing that Benjamin was previously married. On the properties under TCT Nos. N­193656 and N253681, these properties are under co­ownership of the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan.

Held and Ratio

Decision

Whether or not Benjamin is guilty of bigamy

NO. In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and Court of represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Appeals in CA­G.R. CV No. 94226. SO ORDERED.

Jocson v Robles

On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced in the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court an action for the annulment of her marriage to Ricardo R. Robles (Civ. Case No. E­00013), on the ground that it was bigamous. It was alleged in the amended complaint that previous to his marriage to plaintiff on May 27, 1958, defendant Robles had contracted a f irst marriage with Josef ina ina Fau sto had instituted a criminal action for Bigamy against the same defendant in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Crim. Case No. 64124). Plaintiff also demanded from the defendant moral and exemplary damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, claiming that during' their cohabitation, she was subjected to physical maltreatment by her husband, resulting in the premature birth of their f irst child, who died three days later. Respondent, on the other hand, also assailed the validity of the marriage because she compelled him by force despite the knowledge that he is a married man.Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, on the ground that no genuine issue of fact is involved in the case.

whether or not the Court of Domestic Relations is correct in denying the motion for summary judgment

YES. Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, expressly prohibit the rendition of a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. before it can pass upon plaintiff's prayer for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to defendant, there is necessity for proof that when he contracted marriage with plaintiff, defendant Robles had a previous and subsisting valid marriage. The evidentiary FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, this proceeding is requirement to establish these facts, according to the court, was not met in the motion for summary judgment. hereby dismissed, conformable to Section (a) of Defendant's plea to have his marriage declared as having been brought about by force and intimidation, was also Revised Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, and the denied, the court finding indications of collusion between the parties in their attempt to secure the nullification of judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs said marriage. against the appellant.

Tolentino v Villanueva

On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to private respondent Helen Villanueva, alleging that his consent was obtained through fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration, he discovered that private respondent was pregnant despite the fact that he had no sexual relations with her prior to the marriage ceremony; and that they did not live as husband and wife as immediately after the marriage celebration, Helen Villanueva left his house and her whereabouts remained unknown to him until January, 1962 when he discovered that she is residing in San Francisco, Cebu.

whether or not Tolentino can have his marriage annulled based on evidence provided

NO. Petitioner refuses to submit himself for interrogation. Refer to Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code. See above.

Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the petition is without merit. WHEREFORE, THE ORDER DATED JULY 29, 1963 IS HEREBY AFFIRMED AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.

Buccat v Buccat

The applicant seeks the annulment of his marriage been with the defendant Luida Mangonon of Buccat the November 26, 1938, in the City of Baguio, on the grounds that, by consenting to the marriage, he did it because the defendant had assured him that she was a virgin.The plaintiff met the defendant March 1938. After several interviews, both were committed on 19 September of the same year. On 26 November the same year, the claimant married the defendant in the Roman Catholic Cathedral of the City of Baguio. After living space cohabiting for eighty-nine days, the defendant gave birth to a child nine months, on 23 February 1939.

whether or not defendant's cause for annulment is valid

NO. It is unlikely that he was unaware of her state at the time of marriage. ALSO, marriage is a very sacred institution is that is foundation upon which the society rests. To do away with it, one must come up with grave reasons.

Finding the original ruling in accordance with law, it must be confirmed, as hereby confirm it, in its entirety, with costs against the appellant. So it is ordered.

Aquino v Delizo

Defendant Conchita Delizo, herein respondent, at the date of her marriage to plaintiff, herein petitioner Fernando Aquino, on December 27, 1954, concealed from the latter the fact that she was pregnant by another man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about four months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer, defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff. At the trial, the attorneys for both parties appeared and the court a quo ordered Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco to represent the State in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only the plaintiff however, testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Def endant neither appeared nor presented any evidence despite the reservation made by her counsel that he would present evidence on a later date.On June 16, 1956, the trial court—noting that no birth certificate was presented to show that the child was born within 180 days after the marriage between the parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by plaintiff does not constitute such fraud as would annul a marriage—dismissed the complaint.

whether or not Aquino can annul his marriage on claims of fraud

Anaya v Palaroan

The complaint in said Civil Case No. E­00431 alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on 4 December 1953; that defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation.Aurora's counterclaim; that (per paragraph IV) while the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated "to settle the judgment," Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had pre­marital relationship with a close relative of his; and that "the nondivulgement to her of the aforementioned pre­marital secret on the part of defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage.Fernando claimed that he escaped the day after the marriage whereas Aurora claimed he pretended to be in love with her in order to marry her. He ended up cohabiting with his distant relative and having children with her.

whether or not the non­disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre­marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage

NO. "ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article: Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties; Non­disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more; Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband." These do not include nondisclosure of the husband. Also, it is enough to point out that any secret intention on the husband's part not to perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the wife soon after the marriage: hence her action for annulment based on that fraud should have been brought within four years after the marriage.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is hereby affirmed. No costs.

Sison v Te Lay Li

Plaintiff claimed that she only went through with the marriage to Te Lay Li because her father forced her. Plaintiff and defendant were married on April 1949 through civil and Chinese rites. Plaintiff claimed that her father threatened to kill her should she not marry defendant. In addition to this, she cilaimed that although she lived with her husband in his parent's home after their marriage, she had always considered him a stranger. They only had sex once and only because he forced her to. When she tried to leave the house, she attemped to bring 1,248 which was her own money and 9 rings from her dowry. Defendant claimed that petitioner was free to go whenever she pleased and would do so without informing him of her whereabouts.

whether plaintiff has grounds of annulment based on claims of her forced consent

YES. Nowhere in the defendant's claims does he countern her claims of force. It is also suspicious to note that her father was absent from testifying from the defense, thus lending credence to the plaintiff's complaint.The marriage was also not ratified by cohabitation.

Decision is affirmed, with defendant having to return Php 1248 to petitioner rather than Php 1200.

Ruiz v Atienza

Jose Ruiz and Pelagia Atienza, both single, were sweethearts.Loving perhaps too well, she allowed him, in a moment of weakness, to have his way, with the result that nine months later she became an unmarried mother. After the baby's birth, i. e., onNovember 14,1938, Pelagia's father Jose Atienza, Atty. Villavicencio (her cousin-in-law), and three otherpersons visited Jose Ruiz at the boarding house where he lived. They convinced, him to marry Pelagia. They were married on the same day. Four days later, alleging that he had been forced into wedlock, Jose Ruiz brought this suit to secure its avoidance. His counsel has 'dramatized the visit of Jose Atienza and companions, and the "plans" drawnto force Jose Ruiz into the marriage, Jose's passive and downcast attitude, all in an effort to maintainthe proposition that Jose Ruiz went with them that afternoon "convinced" by the following"arguments": the threats of the father supported by his "balisong" ; the unveiled intimidation by Atty.Villavicencio that if he would not marry Pelagia Atienza, he would have difficulty when he would take the bar examinations due to rejection on moral grounds.

whether or not Jose Ruiz was forced to marry Atienza under duress

NO. It was not established- facts of the matter such as whether Pelagias' father had a balisong were not proven. Appellant would make it appear that that afternoon Ruiz was practically kidnapped byPelagia's relatives until after the marriage ceremony. That cannot be true. He had many occasions to escape, as pointed out in appellee's brief. Force or violence, as well, does not include mere intimidation.

Judgment affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Sarao v Guevara

On the night of their wedding, plaintiff approached defendant to have consummate the marriage with her but the latter declined and complained of pains in her lower abdomen and plaintiff saw a purulent discharge offensive to the smell. After submitting herself to checkup, a tumor was found on her uterus thus the defendant underwent operation which rendered her incapable of procreation. The plaintiff then wants to have their marriage annulled on the ground of impotency on the part of the defendant’s incapability to produce offspring.

Whether or not sterility is tantamount to impotency and is a ground for annulment of marriage

NO. Impotency is different from sterility. Impotency is not inability to procreate but inability to copulate. Inability to copulate cannot be a ground for annulment and a temporary or occasional incapacity cannot be used as a ground to nullify a marriage

Jimenez v Canizares

Plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios Cañizares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the municipal court of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was to small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married. On 29 September 1956, pursuant to the provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the State to see that the evidence for the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten days from receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the result thereof. On 14 March 1957 the defendant was granted additional five days from notice to comply with the order of 17 December 1956 with warning that her failure to undergo medical examination and submit the required doctor's certificate would be deemed lack of interest on her part in the case and that judgment upon the evidence presented by her husband would be rendered. After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 1957 the Court entered a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. On 26 April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree thus entered, upon the ground, among others, that the defendant's impotency has not been satisfactorily established as required by law; that she had not been physically examined because she had refused to be examined; that instead of annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of court

whether or not the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent

NO. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established.

Jocson v Robles

SEE ABOVE.

YES. Under the Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. the evidence sought to be Wherefore, the decision complained of is set introduced at the new trial, taken together with what has already been adduced would, in our opinion, be sufficient aside and the case remanded to the court a quo to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff. for new trial. Without costs.

People v Santiago

Tolentino v Villanueva

SEE ABOVE.

Jones v Hortiguela

SEE ABOVE.

Lukban v Republic

Lourdes G. Lukban, petitioner herein, contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on December 10, 1933 at the Paco Catholic Church, Manila. On December 27, of the same year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel and since then he has not been heard from despite diligent search made by her. . She believes. that. he is already dead because he had been absent for more than twenty years, and because she intends to marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined as widowed.

whether or not a judicial pronouncement as to the presumptive death of petitioner's husband can be made

NO. “A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. It suffers from juris tantum ( a rebuttable presumption).

Marriage when one spouse is absent

Gue v Republic

On November 20, 1957, Angelina L. Gue filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Civil Case No. 34303, alleging that she was married to William Gue; that they had a child named Anthony L. Gue; that on January 5, 1946, her husband left Manila where they were residing and went to Shanghai, China, but since then, he had not been heard of and that despite diligent efforts, she could not find him.The Trial Court ruled that she has no rights being impared so she cannot file for a judicial proceeding. She countered with Article 191 of the Civil Code that states that ""After thirty years have elapsed since disappearance of the absentee, or since he was last heard from, or ninety years from his birth, the judgment upon the petition of any party lawfully interested, shall make an order declaring that such absentee is presumed to be dead."

whether or not a judicial pronouncement as to the presumptive death of petitioner's husband can be made

No. Same ruling as In Re Szatraw.

Illegal Marriages

People v Masinsin

The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision, without pronouncement as to costs.

Separate Opinion

Dissenting Opinion

Additional Notes