Persons Article 6 to 17 Case Briefs

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS  ARTICLE VI: WAIVER WAIVER OF RIGHTS RIGHTS CASE BRIEFS PEFTOK VS. NLRC “QUITCLAIMS”

PONENTE: Justice Purisima, 1998 FACTS: The Labor Arbiter’s Decision orders petitioner PEFTOK to pay the 12 employees the amount of about P340,000 in total. According to the Sheriff’s report, PEFTOK has partly executed the decision by giving 50% to those private respondent employees who quitclaimed and waived 50% of the benefits adjusted in their favor. A few years after, the said employees executed another quitclaim, renouncing whatever claims they may have against PEFTOK, and an affidavit which states that they were forced to sign the earlier quitclaim on fear that their salary would not be given on time and worst, get terminated.

ISSUES: Petitioner PEFTOK PEFTOK filed a petition for Certiorari to dismiss the decision of NLRC dismissing the appeal of  said petitioner. W/N the First Quitclaim executed by the employees are valid and should be executed. RULING: The court dismissed the petition. The Court held that “ It is decisively clear that they (guards) affixed their signatures to subject waivers and/or quitclaims for fear that they would not be paid their salaries on pay day or worse, still, their services would be terminated if they did not sign those papers. In short, there was no voluntariness in the execution of the first quitclaim or waivers in question. Quitclaims are looked upon with disfavour in court.”

VALDERAMA VS. MACALDE “Right of First Refusal”

PONENTE: Justice Callejo, Sr., 2005 FACTS: Private Respondent Macalde rents two-thirds of a parcel of land owned by Albano; while, Petitioner Valderama rents one-third the said parcel of land. A few years later, PD No. 1517 was issued which provides the right of first refusal to tenants who had been residing in the land for more than ten years.

Petitioner expressed expressed her desire to purchase the parcel of land to Albano. She suggested to the later that they discuss the price, the terms and conditions of the sale. The latter gave no response. A few months later, Albano informed private respondent that she had already sold the land. The latter did not divulge the buyer; but, petitioner, in a way, found out o ut that it was petitioner Valderama. Valderama. Parties went to the Barangay but the said dispute was not settled. Albano alleged that the said parcel of land was not covered by PD 1517; while, petitioner alleged that Macalde waived their preferential right to buy the property since they failed to exercise the right when Albano first offered the property to them, since, she was informed, before she decided to purchase the land, that Albano had already offered the property to the Macaldes but refused. Private Respondent filed a Complaint against Albano and Valderama for annulment of sale, cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages with the Regional Trial Court. RTC ruled in favor of the Macaldes. Petitioner filed petition and motion for reconsideration to the Court of Appeals which were denied. ISSUES: Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals W/N Private Respondent’s Right of First Refusal Holds?

RULING: The court dismissed the petition. Waiver of right of first refusal requires a note or memorandum. Verbal offer may not be sufficient basis to support alleged waiver. For a waiver of rights to exist, three elements are essential: (a) existence of a right; (b) the knowledge of  the evidence thereof; and (c) an intention to relinquish such right. There must thus be persuasive evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. Mere silence of  the holder of the right should not be easily construed as surrender thereof; the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the existence existence and validity of o f such waiver Thus, the petitioners and Albano failed to adduce sufficient, competent and credible evidence that the respondents had waived their right of first refusal to buy the property. DM CONSUNJI VS. CA “Compensation “Compensation under Labor Code vs. Civil Code”

PONENTE: Justice KAPUNAN, 2001

FACTS: Deceased Mr. Juego, a construction worker of petitioner DM Consunji, fell 14 on a building, constructed for the latter, which caused his death. An Investigation made by the police revealed negligence on the part of the said company. Private Respondent Mrs. Juego, widow of deceased Mr. Juego, filed a charge for damages to the company. In defense, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits from the State Insurance Fund provided under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceased’s employer damages under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, RTC rendered a judgment in favor of Mrs. Juego ordering the Company to pay her for damages. CA affirmed the decision of RTC. Petitioner seeks the reversal of the CA Decision on grounds that respondent is precluded from recovering damages under the Civil Code. ISSUES: W/N Mrs. Juego’s availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund under the Labor Code bars her from claiming damages against DM Consunji under the Civil Code.

RULING: The Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts. However it ordered that should the award of the RTC be greater than the Employee’s Compensation Commission (ECC), payments received by private respondents under the Labor Code shall be deducted from the trial court’s award of damages. In Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company , the SC ruled that “an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the em ployer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen’s Compensation Act (precursor o f  Article 173 of the Labor Code) or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.” When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar. Waiver is an act of understanding understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. Waiver requires knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. Ignorance of Fact nullifies the election of a remedy. Also, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation, the SC made an exception to the decision it held in Pacana. It ruled in Floresca that “The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under

the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of  supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.”

In the case at bar, Mrs. Juego filed an application for benefits from ECC. 10 days after, the result of the police investigation on the incident came out, and the investigator suggested to her that the company may be held liable for negligence. Two days after, she filed the instant case against petitioner for damages. The foregoing presents an exemption as was shown in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation.

 ARTICLE VII: REPEAL REPEAL OF LAWS CASE BRIEFS MECANO VS. COA

PONENTE: Justice CAMPOS JR, 1992 FACTS: Petitioner Mecano is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) requesting reimbursement from Respondent Commission on Audit (COA) for the medical and hospitalization expenses he incurred from treatment of his cholecystitis pursuant to Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. However, COA denied his claim on the grounds that Section 699 of 1917 RAC was repealed by 1987 RAC for the reason that the same section was not re-enacted in the 1987 RAC. However, COA commented that his claim may be filed with the Employee’s Compensation Commission (ECC) pursuant to 1987 RAC. Petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari, seeks to nullify the decision of the COA denying his claim for reimbursement under Sec 699 of 1917 RAC. ISSUES: W/N 1987 RAC repealed or abrogated Sec 699 of 1917 RAC. RULING: The court granted the petition. pet ition. COA is ordered to give due c ourse to petitioner’s claim for benefits.

1987 RAC repealing clause reads: Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. SC categorized the aforementioned repeal as an implied repeal. Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect.

The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.

Two categories of Repeal by Implication: 1. Provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict. 

Court held with this regard that the New Code does not cover nor to attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the Old Code. Moreover, there can be no conflict because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by the petitioner has not been restated in the 1987 RAC.

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The court also held that “the fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of  the prior act, since the new statute may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. What is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal.”

2. Later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. 

This is only possible if the revised statute or code was intended to cover the whole subject to be a complete and perfect system in itself. It is the rule that a subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole subject subject matter of  the former statute.

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According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear is the intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization and procedure, understandably because of the many changes that transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the RAC decades of years ago.

Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored.

SOLANGON VS. SALAZAR “We have held that a Central Bank  Circular cannot repeal a law. Only a law can repeal another law.”

PONENTE: Justice SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, 2001 FACTS:

Petitioners Petitioners executed a real estate mortgage of a parcel of o f land to private respondent to secure payment of a loan of P60,000.00 payable in 4 months, with 6% interest per month. The following year, petitioners executed another real estate mortgage of the same parcel of land to private respondent to secure payment of a loan of P136,512.00 payable in 1 year, with interest thereon at the legal rate (the maximum interest rate, set by statute that may be charged on a loan). The following year, petitioners executed another real estate mortgage of the same parcel of land to private respondent to secure payment of a loan of P230,000.00 payable in 4 months, with interest thereon at the legal rate. The action was initiated to the RTC by the petitioners to prevent the foreclosure of the mortgaged property. They contend that they obtained only one loan from respondent for the amount of  P60,000.00; and that the subsequent mortgages were merely continuations of the first one, which is null and void because it provided for unconscionable rate of interest. Moreover, private respondent assured them that he will not foreclose the mortgage as long as they pay the stipulated interest upon maturity or within a reasonable time thereafter. Private respondent allege that there were three separate loans, and that the first two was paid, but the last was not. He denied having said that he will not foreclose the mortgage. mortgage. RTC rendered a decision in favor of private respondent, dismissing the complaint of petitioners. Petitioners Petitioners filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of RTC. Hence, this petition for Certiorari ISSUES: W/N the interest rate of 6% per annum is valid. RULING: The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and modified the interest rate of 72% per annum to 12% per annum. Supplemental Information

The Usury Law is Act 2655, as amended by PD 116, provides that in the absence of express contract as to the rate of interest in loans/mortgages, it shall be set in default at 12% per annum. Any amount in excess of that fixed by the law is considered usurious, therefore therefore unlawful. However, pursuant to Central Bank Circular No. 905, the Supreme Court declared that the Usury law is now “legally inexistent”. It should be clarified that CB Circular No. 905 did not repeal nor in anyway amend the Usury Law but simply suspended the latter's effectivity. Interest can now be charged as lender and borrower may agree upon (Source: http://phbar.org/wikilaw/index.php?title=Usury )

In the case at bar, the court held that the Usury Law ceiling on interest rates was lifted by C.B. Circular No. 905, nothing in the said circular grants lenders carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets. In the case at bar, the 6% interest rate per month cannot be considered usurious; nevertheless it is definitely outrageous and inordinate (exceeding reasonable limits). THORNTHON VS. THORNTON “Habeas Corpus”

PONENTE: Justice CORONA, 2004 FACTS: Petitioner’s wife left the family home with their daughter without his knowledge. The respondent wife told their servants that she was bringing the latter to Basilan.

Petitioner filed a petition for Habeas Corpus but was dismissed because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner went to Basilan but did not find them there. He was able to secure a Certification from the Barangay that respondent was no longer residing there. Petitioner gave up his search when he discovered of respondent’s phone bill showing calls from different provinces. Petitioner then filed another Writ for Habeas Corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ enforceable in the entire country. CA denied the petition on ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case on grounds of lack of   jurisdiction and lack of substance, substance, that RA 8369 8369 gave family family courts exclusive exclusive jurisdiction jurisdiction over over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 which provides CA the power to issue the writ. Petitioner filed t his instant petition for review of the said CA’s decision. ISSUES: W/N RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned? RULING: Court granted the petition, reinstated and remanded the instant case to the Court of Appeals. Section 5 of RA 8369 reads as follows: Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court.  – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear

and decide the following cases:

b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter. The Court held that a literal interpretation of the word "exclusive" will result in grave injustice and negate the policy "to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children" under the Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the provisions of RA 8369. Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored. The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue. LLEDO VS. LLEDO “Dismissed Employee to claim GSIS Reimbursement”

PONENTE: Justice NACHURA, 2010 FACTS: Petitioner Lledo filed an administrative administrative case to her husband, respondent Atty. Lledo, charging him with immorality, abandonment, and conduct unbecoming of a public official. In the investigation, it was established that Atty. Lledo had left his family to live with another woman with whom he also begot children, and that he failed to provide support for his family. RTC rendered a decision dismissing Atty. Lledo from service and forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and leave credits. A few years have passed, Atty. Lledo’s son wrote a letter to CJ Panganiban relating that his father had been bedridden after suffering a severe stroke and acute renal failure, and that he had been abandoned by his mistress, and had been under his care. He appealed to the court to reconsider its decision specially the forfeiture of leave cre dits, which money would be used to pay for his father’s medical expenses. He also asked the Court for retroactive application of the Court’s ruling subsequent to his father’s dismissal, wherein the Court ruled that despite being dismissed from the service, government employees are entitled to the monetary equivalent of their leave credits since these were earned prior to dismissal. Treating the letter as motion for reconsideration, the court granted the same. Further, Atty. Lledo’s son wrote another letter and asked for judicial clemency in connection with his father’s claim for refund of the latter’s personal contributions to GSIS.

The GSIS Board said that Cesar is not entitled to the refund of his personal contributions of the retirement premiums because "it is the policy of the GSIS that an employee/member who had been dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits cannot recover the retirement premiums he has paid unless the dismissal provides otherwise." ISSUES: W/N a government employee, dismissed from the service for cause, be allowed to recover the personal contributions he paid to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) RULING: The court granted A tty. Lledo’s son’s petition and directed GSIS to return to Atty. Lledo his own premiums and voluntary deposits, if any, plus interest of three percent per annum, compounded monthly. The court re-examined the laws governing the GSIS. Section 11(d) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended reads: (d) Upon dismissal for cause or on voluntary separation, he shall be entitled only to his own premiums and voluntary deposits, if any, plus interest of three per centum per annum, compounded monthly. Two laws were passed amending Commonwealth Act No. 186. These are PD 1146 and RA 8291. The repealing clause of P.D. No. 1146 reads: Section 48. Repealing Clause. All laws or parts of law specifically inconsistent herewith shall be considered amended or repealed accordingly. On the other hand R.A. No. 8291’s repealing clause states:

SEC. 3. Repealing Clause.  – All laws and any other law or parts of law specifically inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly: Provided, That the rights under existing laws, rules and regulations vested upon or acquired by an employee who is already in the service as of the effectivity of this Act shall remain in force and effect: Provided, further, That subsequent to the effectivity of this Act, a new employee or an employee who has previously retired or separated and is reemployed in the service shall be covered by the provisions of this Act. Following the decision in Mecano vs. COA, the court classified the two clauses as implied repeals and ruled that none of the said laws substituted the provision of Section 11 (d) of the Commonwealth Act No. 186. Therefore, the said act should apply to the instant case.

 ARTICLE VIII: JUDICIAL JUDICIAL DECISIONS DEEM DEEM PART OF THE THE LAW CASE BRIEFS DE ROY VS. CA “Reglementary Period”

PONENTE: Justice CORTES, 1988 FACTS: The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioner De Roy collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting to injuries to private respondents and the death of private respondent’s daughter. Petitioner had warned the private respondents to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the latter failed to do so. RTC rendered judgment in favor of the private respondents, holding petitioner guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondent. Petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration on the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, which was by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was also denied by the CA. Petitioner filed this instant petition for certiorari which seeks to declare null and void two resolutions of  CA. ISSUES: RULING: Court denied the petition for lack of merit. Court held that CA correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended to wit: Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court , stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained

the operation of the grace period, to wit: In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.

Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still within the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed. In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration reconsideration within the reglementary reglementary period. Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals. PESCA VS. PESCA “Psychological “Psychological Incapacity” "Legis interpretado legis vim obtinet" - that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.” 

PONENTE: Justice VITUG, 2001 FACTS: Petitioner Lorna Pesca and Respondent Zosimo Pesca marriage relationship turned sour, and the former sued respondent before RTC for the declaration declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity on grounds that the latter was a habitual drinker, at one time chased petitioner petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children, and in another instance, she was battered back and blue by her husband. RTC rendered a decision and declared their marriage null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. partnership. Respondent filed a petition to CA. CA reversed the decision of RTC and declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting. Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.

ISSUES: W/N to Affirm the decision of RTC on the grounds of “psychological incapacity” claim of petitioner.

RULING: Court denied the instant petition of the petitioner. "Psychological incapacity," incapacity," as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, has been explained by the Court, in Santos and reiterated in Molina: The use of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of  'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The- "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim - "legis interpretado legis vim obtinet" - that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. Petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

 ARTICLE X to XII: XII: LAWMAKING BODY BODY INTENDED JUSTICE JUSTICE TO PREVAIL AND CUSTOMS CASE BRIEFS MARTINEZ VS. VAN BUSKIRK 

PONENTE: Justice MORELAND, 1910 FACTS: Martinez was riding a carromata when suddenly a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant came along the street towards the t he petitioner’s direction at a great speed. Petitioner stopped in order to allow the delivery wagon to pass by, unfortunately, unfortunately, the wagon ran over the petitioner with her child, severely wounding the petitioner by making a serious cut upon her head and damaging the carromata. In defense, respondent presented evidence that the cochero, who was driving her wagon, was a good, reliable, and safe servant. That, the cochero tied the driving lines lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon, went back inside the wagon to unload the forage, when suddenly another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made noises which frightened the horses which caused them to run and crash to the petitioner’s carromata. Court of First Instance found the defendant guilty of negligence and was order to indemnify the petitioner for damages. Petitioner filed the instant case for review. ISSUES: RULING: The Court reversed the ruling of RTC, and ruled defendant does not need to indemnify petitioner. It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several years and the other five or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which they were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers. The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable unreasonable or performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have, imprudent. Acts the performance therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, cannot

be held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial

It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without objection.  ALONZO VS. PADUA PADUA “14 Years?”

PONENTE: Justice CRUZ, 1987 FACTS: Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal shares a parcel of land from their deceased parents, in which two of them sold their share of land, in 1963 and 1964, to petitioner spouses Alonzo. Thus, two-fifths of  the land was owned by spouses Alonzo, in which they built a fence, and with their consent, their son in 1975 built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area. In 1976, one of the co-heirs sought to redeem the area sold to spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed because he was an American Citizen. Citizen. In 1977, another co-heir filed her own complaint, respondent, invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her brother. RTC also dismissed the petition, on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual  knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. Respondent Padua filed an appeal to Respondent Court of Appeals (CA) which granted her petition. In reversing the RTC decision, CA declared that the notice required by the said article was written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute. Petitioner spouses Alonzo filed this petition for review, and seeks to annul the decision of the CA. ISSUES: RULING: The Court reversed the decision of CA and affirmed and reinstated the decision of RTC. 1088 of the Civil Code: According to Article 1088

Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.

The law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice. The purpose of the law is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.

 ARTICLE XIII: XIII: LEGAL PERIODS CASE BRIEFS  ARMIGOS VS. VS. CA “4PM TO 4PM”

PONENTE: Justice PADILLA, 1989 FACTS: An RTC judgment was rendered in favor of private respondent and against the petitioner. Copy of  decision of was received by petitioner on June 8, filed a notice of appeal a day after, and completed the other requirements, 16 days after receipt of decision. RTC dismissed the appeal because it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Petitioner filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals against the resolution made by RTC. Petitioner contends that computation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour he received copy of  decision, so that the first of the 15-day period comprising 24 hours is from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 9 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 10 June 1977 and the last day, from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 23 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 24 June 1977. CA rejected the novel interpretation and dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration reconsideration but was also denied. Petitioner filed this instant petition for review and seeks to annul the resolutions made by the Court of  Appeals. ISSUES: RULING: The Court denied the petition.

The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that "In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included" is similar, but not Identical to Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided that "Unless otherwise specially provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last; and if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday it shall be excluded", as well as the old Rule 28 of the Rules of Court which stated that "In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, by

order of a court, or by any other applicable statute, the day of the act, event or default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of  the next day which is neither a Sunday or a legal holiday." In applying this rule, the Court considered the day as synonymous with the date and we find no cogent reason to adopt a different view. While it is true that rules of procedure are to be interpreted liberally so that the real matter in dispute may be submitted to the judgment of the court, and that the trial court is vested with discretion to allow or admit an appeal filed out of time, this discretion is not unconditional. In the instant case, the petitioner failed to prove, or even claim, that his failure to appeal on time was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. NAMARCO VS. TECSON “Leap Year Dilemma”

PONENTE: Chief Justice CONCEPCION, 1969 FACTS: Petitioner NAMARCO as successor, as successor to all the properties, assets, rights, and chooses in action of the Price Stabilization Corporation, as plaintiff in that case and judgment creditor therein, filed, with the same court, a complaint complaint against the same defendants, for the revival of the judgment rendered. Respondent and then Defendant Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of lack of   jurisdiction over the subject subject matter matter thereof thereof and prescription prescription of action. action. Tecson contends that the Decision became final and executory in Dec. 21, 1955, and that since 1960 and 1964 were both leap years. Thus the present case, where it was field on Dec. 21, 1965, was filed two days late. Petitioner filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which the latter certified the case to this court. ISSUES:

RULING: The Court ruled in favor of the respondent. The court held that the term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it shall be understood that years are of  three hundred sixty-five days." Although some members of the Court are inclined to think that this legislation is not realistic, for failure to conform with ordinary experience or practice, the theory of plaintiff-appellant herein cannot be upheld without ignoring, if not nullifying, Art. 13 of our Civil Code, and reviving Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Administrative Code, thereby engaging in judicial legislation, and, in effect, repealing an act of Congress.

If public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised Administrative Code, this may be done through legislative process, not by judicial decree. QUIQUI VS. BONCAROS

PONENTE: Justice GANCAYCO, 1987 FACTS: Respondent Judge Boncaros rendered a decision in favor of the private respondents on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the case. Counsel for petitioner received received a copy of the said order on July 17, 1979. On August 17, 1979, Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of RTC dismissing the complaint. Private Respondents Respondents opposed the motion for reconsideration, stating stating that it had been filed beyond the 30-day reglementary period under the rules. RTC denied the motion of the petitioners on the ground asserted by the private respondent. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, seeking relief from the Court of Appeals on the ground that the RTC denying their complaint as well as their motion for reconsideration were contrary to law and evidence submitted. The petition was also denied by the CA. RTC denied the Notice of Appeal, including the motion to approve the Appeal Bond. Petitioner filed the instant petition praying that the RTC be ordered to approve their notice of appeal. ISSUES:

RULING: Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Appeal may be taken within 30 days from notice notice of the judgment or order of the trial court. court. In the event that the party aggrieved by the judgment or order of the trial court files a Motion to set aside the  judgment or order, i. e a Motion for Reconsideration, the time during which such Motion is pending resolution shall, as a rule, be deducted from the 30-day period. In relation thereto, the New Civil Code states that in computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day included. Under these circumstances, the order of the trial court dismissing the Complaint has become final and executory. As such, it is beyond the reach of a Motion for consideration.

Failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. A strict observance of the reglementary period within which to exercise the statutory right of  appeal has been considered as absolutely indispensable indispensable to the prevention of needless delays. For the petitioners to seek exception for their failure to comply strictly with the requirements for perfecting their Appeal, strong compelling reasons, like the prevention of a grave miscarriage of justice, must be shown to exist in order to warrant this Court to suspend the Rules. No such reasons have been shown to exist in this case. In fact, the petitioners did not even offer any reasonable explanation for their delay.

 ARTICLE XV: NATIONALITY NATIONALITY RULE CASE BRIEFS TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCANO “U.S. Divorce”

PONENTE: Justice REYES, 1965 FACTS: Tenchavez and Escano had a secret marriage, after which they had planned on running away. Unfortunately, Escano’s mother got wind of the intended nuptials and had taken Escano home. Escano spouses were surprised and disgusted because of the great scandal the marriage would provoke. Escano sought priestly advice, and the latter suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage. The Recelebration did not take place because Escano received a letter purportedly coming from her schoolmates, disclosing an amorous relationship between Tenchavez and her close friend Pacita. Escano translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Thereafter, Escano continued living with her parents while pastor returned to his job in Manila. Months after, Escano went to Misamis Occidental to escape from the scandal of her marriage. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition to annul her marriage, of which was dismissed because of her nonappearance at the hearing. Years after, Escano went to the United States. There, she filed a divorce on the ground of “extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character”. The petition was granted by the court and was the divorce was decreed “final and absolute”.

A few more years after, Escano married another man, and she currently lives with their children in the United States. A year after, Tenchavez filed a complaint against Escano and Escano spouses, asking for legal separation and claim of damages in the amount of 1 million pesos RTC’s judgment did not decree legal separation but freed plaintiff from supporting his wife and to

acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It also allowed the counterclaim counterclaim of Escano spouses to the extent of P45,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages. Hence, this instant petition ISSUES: RULING: The court modified the RTC’s decision as follows: 1. Tenchavez is entitled to a decree of legal separation. 2. Escano is ordered to pay Tenchavez the amount of P25,000.00 for damages and attorney’s fees. 3. The amount of P45,000.00 was reduced to P5,000.00 for damages against Escano spouses.

Summing up, the Court rules: (1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country. (2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law. (3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages.  ATCI OVERSEAS OVERSEAS CORP. VS. ECHIN “Termination in Kuwait”

PONENTE: Justice CARPIO MORALES, 2010 FACTS: Respondent Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI in behalf of its principal co-petitioner, co-petitioner, Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00. Within a year, Respondent was terminated for not passing the probationary period which was under the Memorandum of Agreement. Ministry denied respondent’s request and she returned to the Philippines shouldering her own fair.

Respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint against ATCI for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of respondent and ordered ATCI to pay her $3,600.00, her salary for the three months unexpired portion of the contract.

ATCI appealed Labor Arbiter’s decision, however, NLRC affirmed the latter’s decision and denied petitioner ATCI’s motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner appealed to the Court Appeals contending that their principal being a foreign government agency is immune from suit, and as such, immunity extended to them. Appellate Court affirmed NLRC’s decision. It noted that under the law, a private employment agency shall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas worker; hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this pre sent petition.

ISSUES: RULING: Court denied the petition. According to RA 8042: The obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.

 ARTICLE XVII: XVII: LAW GOVERNING REAL REAL PROPERTIES CASE BRIEFS  AMOS VS. BELLIS BELLIS

PONENTE: Justice BENGZON, 1967 FACTS: Deceased Bellis, a US Citizen, had five legitimate children on his first wife; three legitimate children on his second; and three illegitimate children (two of which are respondent in the instant case). He executed a will in the Philippines.

Years after, he died as a resident of Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance in Manila. The Bank, as executor of the will, paid all the bequest on his will. Respondent C. Bellis and P. Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children, and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. RTC approved the executor’s final ac count, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Petitioners appealed the instant petition to raise the issue of which law must apply  – Texas or Philippine Law. Petitioners contend that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of  Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code. ISSUES: W/N the Philippine Law should apply in the instant case. RULING: Court affirmed the decision of the probate court in toto. It must have been the legislative body’s purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent. It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of  legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, that a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

 ARTICLE XVII: XVII: CASE BRIEFS HASEGAWA VS. KITAMURA “Japanese Contract Executed in the Philippines”

PONENTE: Justice NACHURA, 2007 FACTS: Petitioner Nippon entered into an Independent Contract Agreement (ICA), perfected in Japan and written wholly in Japanese Language, with Respondent Kitamura. The latter was then assigned as project manager of Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) Project in the Philippines. A year after and a few days before Respondent Kitamura’s contract expiry, petitioner informed the latter that that the company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA.

Threatened with impending employment, respondent, through his lawyer, requested a negotiation and demanded that he be assigned to Bongalon-Baler Road Improvement Project (BBRI). Nippon insisted that respondent’s contract was for fixed t erm that had already expired and refused to negotiate. Respondent filed a complaint in the RTC for specific performance and damages. Petitioners moves to dismiss the complaint on grounds of lack of jurisdiction since ICA was perfected in Japan and was executed between between Japanese Nationals. RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss following the ruling in Insular Government vs. Frank  that matters connected with the performance of contracts are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of  performance.

Petitioners sought relief in the Court of Appeals, unfortunately their appeals were denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari ISSUES: W/N the Law of Japan or the Philippines shall govern in the instant case. RULING: Court denied the instant petition. The court cleared that the question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of  the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims. Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the  forum non conveniens (an unsuitable court) depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. Since the RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the civil case filed by respondent and the grounds raised by petitioners petitioners to assail that jurisdiction are inappropriate. inappropriate.

GERMANN & CO. VS. DONALDSON, SIM & CO.

PONENTE: Justice LADD, 1901 FACTS: Tornow, the sole owner of the Germann Company, executed an instrument in Germany conferring power of attorney to Kammerzell. By virtue of a general power of suits executed in Manila and purported to be a substitution of the aforementioned instrument executed in Germany, Kammerzell, on behalf of Germann Company, filed an action to recover a sum of money from defendant Donaldson. The instrument executed in Manila was authenticated by a notary with the formalities required by domestic laws; while, the other instrument was not authenticated. Respondent contends that the original power conferred upon Kammerzell is invalid under the Civil Code which provides that power of suits must be contained in a public instrument. instrument. ISSUES: W/N the Power of Attorney executed in Germany can be executed here in the Philippines. RULING: Court denied the instant petition of defendant Donaldson.

The court held that they see no reason why Article 11 of the Civil Code that the “Formal validity of contracts is to be tested by the laws of the country where they are executed” should apply.