PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS.pdf

Persons and Family Relations Tañada vs. Tuvera (1986) GR No. 63915 FACTS: Lorenzo Tañada (petitioner) invoked due process in demanding for the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which were claimed to be not published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was required, it is not needed when the decrees provide that they are effective immediately upon approval. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect and ordered the respondents to publish such in the Official Gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances. The petitioners advocate that no distinction shall be made between laws of general applicability and those which are not. Publication means complete publication, and such must be made in the Official Gazette. The Solicitor General asserted that the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the New Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not mandatory, and that the publication when necessary, need not be made in the Official Gazette. ISSUE: W/N laws requires publication for them to be effective HELD/RATIO: Yes. Art. 2 of the Civil Code provides that “Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.” And in this case, it was ruled that the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” pertains to the date of effectivity of the law, and not on the requirement as to its publication. Therefore, laws, even if it state effectivity upon approval, must be published in the Official Gazette in order to be effective.

De Roy vs. Court of Appeals (1988) GR No. 80718 FACTS: The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop owned by the family of private respondents which injured them and caused the death of Marissa Bernal. - Petitioners warned the private respondents to vacate their shop but failed to do so. - The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the petitioners guilty of gross negligence and thus awarded damages to private respondents. On the last day of the 15day period of filing an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate court. They again filed for a motion for reconsideration but was also denied. - The Court of Appeals applied the rule laid down in Habulayas v. Japzon that the 15-day period for filing an appeal or a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. Counsel for petitioner contends that the said case should not be applied due of its non-publication in the Official Gazette.

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Persons and Family Relations ISSUE: - W/N the Supreme Court’s decisions, in this case the Habaluyas case, should be published in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. HELD/RATIO: - No. There is no law prescribing the publication of Supreme Court’s decisions in the Official Gazette. It is the duty of the counsel to keep abreast of the decisions by the Supreme Court particulary where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advanced reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law journals.

Navarro vs. Domagtoy (1996) GR No. 961088 FACTS: - Dapa, Surigao del Norte Mayor Navarro filed a complaint against respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in office and ignorance of the law. - As for the first act complained, it was alleged that Judge Domagtoy solemnized the marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja despite the lack of summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of Ida Peñaranda, Tagadan’s first wife. Respondent states that the joint affidavit presented by Tagadan stating the fact that he and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven (7) years is sufficient proof of Peñaranda’s presumptive death, and therefore, he could rightfully solemnize the marriage. - Second, it was alleged that Judge Domagtoy performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction. The judge holds his office and therefore has jurisdiction in Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa. ISSUE: - W/N the respondent judge acted with gross misconduct and in gross ignorance of the law. HELD/RATIO: - Yes. As in the first issue, the respondent judge solemnized the wedding despite the declaration in the certified true copy of the marriage contract between Tagadan and Borga stating that Tagadan’s civil status is separated. Furthermore, he also maintained that the joint affidavit stating that the first wife, Ida Penaranda, has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years thereby giving rise to her presumptive death, is enough reason to proceed with the marriage. These of course are in disagreement with Art. 41 of the Family Code which provides that for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse, and therefore, by reason that no such summary proceeding was made by Tagadan, made their marriage void. - As for the second issue, it is covered by Art. 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus: “Art.7 Marriage may be solemnized by:

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Persons and Family Relations (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction. Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel, or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul, or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Art. 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.” Accordingly, Art. 7 could not justify the judge’s action for the reason that his jurisdiction covers only the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, thus he is without authority to administer the wedding in Dapa, Surigao Del Norte. Furthermore, the judge could not cite Art. 8 to validate his actions as this would only demonstrate his lack of understanding of the basic principles of the civil law since the parties did not fall under any of the exceptions aforementioned in the provision.

Beso vs. Daguman (2000) GR No. 991211 FACTS: - Zenaida Beso charged Judge Juan Daguman, Jr. of solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction and of negligence for failure of retaining a copy and registering the marriage contract in the Local Civil Registrar. - On August 28, 1997, Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman, got married and such was solemnized by the respondent in the his residence in Calbayog City, Samar despite the fact that defendant’s jurisdiction is in Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar. - Yman abandoned Beso after the wedding. - When Yman left, the complainant inquired to the City Civil Registrar regarding her marriage contract. It turned out that her marriage was not registered. She inquired to the respondent regarding the marriage contract, and she found out that all the copies were taken by Yman and no copy was retained by the respondent. - The respondent stated that he solemnized the marriage because of the urgent request of the petitioner and Yman. He also asserted that because Beso was a Filipino overseas worker she deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy; - Respondent claims that the failure to file the marriage contract was beyond his control because Yman run away and took with him the missing copies of the marriage certificate, and that he tried to recover the missing documents. - The Office of the Court Administrator found the respondent Judge guilty of non-feasance in office ISSUE(S): (a) W/N respondent Judge is liable for solemnizing the marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction. (b) W/N respondent Judge is negligent in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage certificate in the Local Civil Registry. HELD/RATIO: (a) Yes. The Court held that the judge solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction, and should therefore be administratively liable. The case falls under Art. 7(1) and 8 of the Family Code which provide that: “Art.7 Marriage may be solemnized by:

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Persons and Family Relations (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction. Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel, or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul, or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Art. 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.” (b) Yes. The judge committed negligence since the loss was occasioned by the carelessness on the Judge’s part. Pursuant to Article 23 of the Family code, such duty to register the marriage is the duty of the solemnizing officer. There is no justification for missing records except in case of fortuitious events.

Chu Jan vs. Bernas (1916) GR No. 10010 FACTS: - A cockpit match was held which declared the defendant’s cock winner, and thus causing the plaintiff to bring a suit against the defendant asking that his rooster should be declared as the winner. - The justice of peace decided that the bout was a draw. The defendant appealed this decision praying for the defendant to abide and comply with the rules and regulations governing cockfights, to pay stipulated wager of P160 and to return the other amount which is in the safekeeping of the cockpit owner, Tomas Almonte. - Defendant denied allegations and moved to dismiss cost against plaintiff. - Court of First Instance dismissed the appeal without special findings on the ground that he is not familiar with the rules governing cockfights and duties of referees ISSUE: - W/N the lower court erred in dismissing the case on the ground that he is not familiar with the rules governing cockfights and duties of referees HELD/RATIO: - Yes. Art. 9 of the New Civil Code provides that “No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.” Ignorance of the court regarding the law applicable to a case submitted to him for decision shall not excuse the court for dismissing the case without deciding on the issue. In a case where no law would be applicable, the Civil Code provides that Customs of the place shall be observed and in absence thereof, the general principles of law.

People vs. Veneracion (1995) GR No. 119987-88 FACTS:

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The body of a young girl later identified as Angel Alquiza, wrapped in a sack and yellow table cloth tied with a nylon cord with both feet and left hand protruding was seen floating in Binondo, Manila. Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey and Henry Lagarto y Petilla were later charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information dated August 8, 1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The trial court rendered a decision finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with the “penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law.” City Prosecutor of Manila filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the Decision be “modified in that the penalty of death be imposed” against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua) which was denied by the court.

ISSUE: - W/N the judge is given the discretion to impose a penalty other than what is prescribed by law

HELD/RATIO: - No. A government of laws, not of men, excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of law and ought to protect and enforce without fear or favor, resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs. In this case the respondent judge must impose the death penalty in spite of his personal contrary beliefs. This is consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code Article 9 that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.

People vs. Purisima (1978) GR No. 42050-66,46229-32,46313-16,46997 FACTS: - There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, which are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law. - Before those courts, information were filed charging the accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. - On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them — the details of which will be recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing the information, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime. ISSUE: - W/N the petitioners’ arguments as to the intention and scope of PD No. 9 (3) are correct HELD/RATIO:

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No. The Supreme Court reiterates that the intention of PD No. 9 (3) is to penalize the acts which are those related to the desired result of Proclamation No. 1081 and Gen. Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are to suppress those who commit or abet lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts and the like. And so, such law should be interpreted as will not produce such absurd, unreasonable, and insensible results.

Martinez V. Van Buskirk FACTS: - Carmen Ong de Martinez was riding in a carromata on Calle Real in Ermita, Manila. She and her child were severely wounded when the delivery wagon of William Van Buskirk ran into the carromata that they were riding. - The servant of the defendant ran away. ISSUE: - W/N the force of custom is above the law. HELD/RATIO: - No. It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver merchandise and leave the horses in the manner in which they were left. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without objection. Thus, in the absence of proof that such custom is contrary to law, public order or policy, it shall be respected.

Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales FACTS: - Sy-Kiat, a Chinese national died in Caloocan City where he was then residing. He left behind real and personal properties in the Philippines. - Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresity Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition asserting that they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. They do not recognize Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee, and thereby nominated Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased. - The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that: Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat, the other oppositors are legitimate childeren of the deceased with Yao Kee, and Sze Sook Wah who is the eldest among should be the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat. - The court found that Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee; that Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chum Yen are the legitimate children of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat; and Aida Sy-Gonzales and her siblings are acknowledged as illegitimate children of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego. - The probate court rendered judgment in favor of the herein plaintiffs which was modified and set aside by the CA and held that both sets of children were acknowledged natural children. Both parties moved for partial reconsideration. ISSUE: - W/N the respondent Court of Appeals erred in declaring the marriage of Sy-Kiat to Yao Yee as not have been proven valid in accordance with laws of China HELD/RATIO: - No. The Court held that because the plaintiff failed to present evidence as to the validity of foreign law or custom vis-a-vis the validity of the marriage in accordance with the proposed custom, the marriage cannot be recognized. The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence." The Court stated that "a local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established

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Persons and Family Relations by competent evidence like any other fact." The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom. In the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as ours.

Garcia v. Recio FACTS: - Rederick Recio (Filipino) was married to Editha Samson (Australian citizen) in Malabon, Rizal in 1987 and lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, their marriage was dissolved by decree of divorce issued by the Australian Family Court. - In 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" from the Australian government. - In 1994, Recio married petitioner Grace Garcia (a Filipina) in Cabanatuan City where the respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino" - In 1995, Recio and Garcia lived separately without prior dissolution of marriage and their conjugal properties were divided in 1996 in Australia. - In 1998, Garcia filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of "bigamy" because Recio was alleged to have a subsisting marriage at the time of his marriage with Garcia in 1994. Garcia claimed that she only knew about the previous marriage in 1997. ISSUE(S): (a) Whether or not the divorce between Recio and Samson was proven (b) Whether or not Recio has legal capacity to remarry HELD/RATIO: (a) Yes. Samson and Recio's divorce appeared to be authentic as issued by an Australian family court. Compliance with the Family Code is not necessary since Recio, having acquired Australian citizenship in 1992, was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with a political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. By becoming an Australian, Recio severed his allegiance to the Philippine and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws. (b) No. The court held that respondent’s presentation of a decree or an interlocutory decree, a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce, showed that the divorce obtained may have been restricted; it did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to national law. Respondent also failed to submit a Certificate of Legal Capacity together with the application for a marriage license required by Article 21 of the Family Code which would have been admitted as a prima facie evidence of his legal capacity to marry. The Court finds no absolute evidence that proves that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994.

Van Dorn v. Ronillo, Jr., et al FACTS: - Alicia Reyes (petitioner) is a Filipino citizen while the private respondent is an American citizen. The two were married in Hongkong in 1972; then established their residence in the Philippines. The parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. Alicia Reyes re-married in Nevada this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Private respondent filed suit against Alicia Reyes Van Dorn stating that petitioner's business (Galleon Shop) in Ermita, Manila is a conjugal property of the parties and asking that the petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.

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Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property". The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree had no bearing in the case.

ISSUE: - W/N the Galleon Shop is a conjugal property of the petitioner and the private respondent even after their divorce obtained in USA

HELD/RATIO: - No. Pursuant to the national law of the private respondent, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is bound by the decision of his county, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him. He is also estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. To maintain that the private respondent is still married to the petitioner is unjust. Petitioner should not be subject to a wife's obligation. The private respondent should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.

Barreto v. Gonzales FACTS: - Plaintiff and defendant are Filipino citizens and residents of Manila. They were married in 1919 in Manila and lived together as husband and wife until 1926. - It was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her support and that of her children, P500 monthly (to be increased in case of illness or necessity), and the title of certain properties to be put in her name. - Husband went to Reno, Nevada and secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion in 1927 and on the same date married another Filipina (with whom he had 3 children). He then lived in California and returned to the Philippines in 1928 where he has since remained. When the defendant left he reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support of his wife and 4 minor children and has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony. - After his return, the wife brought action in the Court of First Instance of Manila praying that the court confirm and ratify the decree of divorce issued in Nevada: “The decree of divorce shall dissolve the community of property as soon as such decree becomes final, but shall not dissolve the bonds of matrimony until 1 year thereafter.”

ISSUE: -

W/N the divorce obtained in Nevada, USA be recognized and approved by the Philippine courts.

HELD/RATIO: - No. Art. 11 provides that “... The prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those intended to promote public order and good morals, shall not be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything done or agreements entered into a foreign country.” The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted to this court, in which both parties prayed for the ratification and confirmation of the Reno divorce, clearly indicates a purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippines regarding divorce and to secure themselves a change

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Persons and Family Relations of status for reasons and under conditions not authorized under our law. At all times the matrimonial domicile of the couple has been within the Philippines and the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband of the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not grant jurisdiction upon the Court of that State to dissolve the bonds if matrimony in which he had entered in 1919.

Government v. Frank FACTS: - On April 17, 1903, in Chicago, the defendant through a representative of the Insular Government of the Philippines, entered into contract for a period of two (2) years with the plaintiff by which the defendant was to receive a salary of $1,200 per year as a stenographer in the service of the said plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be paid in advance the expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and 1/2 salary during said period of travel. - Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of the defendant, he should become liable to the plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by way of expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and 1/2 salary paid during such period - The defendant entered upon the performance of his contract upon April 30, 1903, and was paid his salary from the date until June 4, 1903, the date of his arrival in the Philippines. - On February 11, 1904, the defendant left the service of the plaintiff and refused to make a further compliance with the terms of the contract - On December 3, 1904, the plaintiff filed an action in the Court of First Instance in Manila to recover from the defendant a certain sum. - It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80 and 224 should constitute a part of said contract. - Lower court rendered a judgment against the defendant who shall pay the plaintiff a certain amount. - Defendant claims that he was an adult when he left Chicago but was a minor when he arrived at Manila; that he was an adult when he made the contract but was a minor at the time the plaintiff attempted to enforce the contract, more than a year later ISSUE: - W/N the contract between the plaintiff and defendant was valid under Philippine laws HELD/RATIO: - Yes. The defendant being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place and time the contract was made, he cannot plead infancy as defense at the place where the contract is being enforced. The law of the country wherein the said contract was executed shall govern as was provided by Art. 17 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Barnuevo v. Fuster FACTS: - On 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Contanza Barnuevo, both citizens of Spain, got married in a Catholic ceremony in Malaga, Spain. - On 1892, Gabriel Fuster came to the Philippines and acquired real and personal property. Towards the middle of 1896, Contanza came to Manila and lived with her husband in conjugal relations until April 1899. - On April 4, 1899, they made an agreement in a public document by which they "resolved to separate and live apart, both consenting to such separation, and by virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to move to Spain, there to reside in such place as the said lady pleases" - Fuster undertook in the same document to send his wife a sum of 300 pesetas monthly for her support, payable in Madrid from June 1899, but he only complied until August 1899.

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Contanza Barnuevo returned to Manila in 1909 to file a divorce against her husband on the ground of adultery committed by Fuster. Fuster denied that either he or his wife was a resident of the city of Manila. He argued that they had their domicile in Barcelona, Spain and he alleged that both of them were natives and subjects of Spain. - Fuster denied Barnuevo's statements concerning the possession of real and personal property of the conjugal partnership, the statement of their amount, and their qualification as being all conjugal property. - The Court of First Instance of Manila decreed the suspension of life-in-common between Barnuevo and Fuster and directed the communal property to be divided between the parties. ISSUE(S): (a) W/N the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction over the divorce filed by Barnuevo against Fuster who are citizens of Spain (b) W/N the the Philippine courts has jurisdiction over the partition of properties of a Spanish couple who were married in Spain obtained their divorce in the Philippines HELD/RATIO: (a) Yes. The CFI did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic subjects, they were residents of Manila and had their domicile herein. The defendant had not proved that he had elsewhere a legal domicile other than which he manifestly had in the Philippines during the 17 years preceding the date of the complaint. He had kept open house and had acquired in the city of Manila quite a little real property which is not the object of conjugal society. The plaintiff is without proof to the contrary that his wife resided in Manila from middle of 1896 until April 1899. (b) Article 36 of the Civil Code: "Spaniards who change their domicile to a foreign country, where they may be considered as natives without other conditions than that of residents therein, shall be required in order to preserve the Spanish nationality, to state that such is their wish before the Spanish diplomatic or consular agent, who must record them in the registry of Spanish residents, as well as their spouses, should they be married, and any children they may have."

Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (1985) FACTS : - Alice Reyes Van Dorn (petitioner), a Philippine citizen, and Richard Upton (respondent), a U.S. citizen, were married in Hongkong in 1972, and afterwards established their residence here in the Philippines. They got divorced in Nevada, U.S., in 1982. The petitioner also re-married in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. - On June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Pasay City RTC. According to him, the business property of the parties is conjugal, and he was asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business and for him to be declared rightful in managing said property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings in Nevada court where the respondent acknowledged he had no “community property” with petitioner as of June 11, 1982. Court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines and therefore the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. - The denial was submitted as a subject to Certiorari proceeding, wherein petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American court that they had no community of property, that Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent’s claim is barred by prior judgment. Respondent on the other hand

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Persons and Family Relations stated that divorce decree issued by Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy, that the acts and declarations of a foreign court cannot divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction. ISSUE: - W/N the divorce decree obtained in Nevada is valid and binding in the Philippine jurisdiction as it is contrary to local law and public policy. HELD/RATIO: - Yes. The divorce decree obtained in Nevada is valid and binding in Philippine jurisdiction. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad and may be recognized in the Philippines provided that they are valid in their national law. In accordance with respondent’s national law, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue as the petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision does not repudiate him, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

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Persons and Family Relations TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHANAN v. BOHANAN, et al. (1960) FACTS: - The testator C.O. Bohanan was born in Nebraska and therefore was a citizen of that state. Notwithstanding long residence of the decedent in the Philippines, his stay here was merely temporary and he remained a US citizen. - Magdalena Bohanan and her two children questioned the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing the estate, claiming that they have been deprived of their legitime. Out of the total estate of P211, 639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one half of all shares of stock of several mining companies to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each. The will has not given the wife, Magdalena, any share in the estate. - Magdalena argued that the trial court erred in recognizing the Reno divorce secured by the testator from her, and that said divorce should be declared null in this jurisdiction. - The court refused to recognize such claim on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allowed him to dispose all of his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife. To add, the right of the former wife to a share in the testator’s estate had already been passed upon adversely against her in an order which had become final and which she did not appear to question its validity. When she filed for a motion to withdraw a sum from the funds of the estate, court in its said order found that there existed no community property owned by decedent and former wife at the time of the decree of divorce was issued. ISSUE(S): - W/N the testamentary dispositions, which is short of the children’s supposed legitime accorded by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid HELD/RATIO: - Yes. The Court held that the testamentary dispositions are valid. Art. 16 of the Civil Code provides that “Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.” It is not disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will. The failure of the testator to give his children two thirds of the estate left by him at the time of his death is in accordance with the national law of the testator.

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Persons and Family Relations Bellis v. Bellis (1967) FACTS: - Amos G. Bellis was born in and a citizen of Texas. He had five legitimate children with his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife and three illegitimate children. - August 5, 1952 – Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in an order and manner he specified. He wanted 1) his first wife to get $240,000.00; 2) his three illegitimate children to get P120,000.00 (or P40,000.00 each); and after these two have been satisfied, 3) the remainder to go, in equal shares, to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives. - July 8, 1958 – Amos died a resident of Texas. September 15, 1958 - His will was admitted to probate at the Court of First Instance, Manila. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, as the will executor, paid all bequests to the first wife and three illegitimate children. Their respective legacies were released from time to time as how the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances. - January 8, 1964 – Executor submitted and filed a report regarding the satisfaction of the legacies of the first wife and three illegitimate children, and the project of partition on the division of the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the legitimate children. January 17, 1964 – Two illegitimate children, Maria Cristina and Miriam Palma, filed oppositions to the project of partition, saying that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and thus compulsory heirs of the deceased. - Lower court overruled their oppositions and their motions for reconsideration have been denied. ISSUE: - W/N the national law of Amos Bellis should apply in the execution of the will HELD/RATIO: - Yes. The national law of Amos Bellis should apply. The decedent was both a citizen of Texas and a resident thereof at the time of his death. Even if there was a conflict of law between domicile and nationality rule, it would still refer back to Texas law and would not result to the doctrine of renvoi. Given that the decedent executed two wills, even if it is assumed that the intention of executing one as a separate Philippine will was so that the Philippine law would govern, properties would still not be distributed according to Philippine law as such is illegal and void; national law cannot be ignored regarding those matters. Consistent with the provisions of Art. 16 of the Civil Code which provides that “Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.”

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Persons and Family Relations

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Persons and Family Relations

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Persons and Family Relations AZNAR v. GARCIA (1963) FACTS: - Edward Christensen, a US citizen, was domiciled in the Philippines. - He made a will which was executed in the Philippines acknowledging his natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir. He left an amount of money to Maria Helen Christensen, his daughter which the Supreme Court later on declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his, even if he declared in the will that she was not in any way related to him. He declared that the remainder and residue of his income, real and personal property, etc., was to be given to Maria Lucy. - Helen filed an opposition to the partition, stating that it deprived her of her legitime as acknowledged natural child of the deceased. According to her, the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and that she was entitled to one-half of the estate in full ownership. The Court of First Instance ruled that as Edward was a citizen of the United States and the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions of his will are to be governed by the law of that state. ISSUE: -

W/N the validity of the testamentary dispositions of the deceased is to be governed by the law of the State of California wherein the deceased was a citizen

HELD/RATIO: - YES, the law of the State of California governs, as it is the national law of the deceased. But the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his death. There is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children.

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Persons and Family Relations DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CA (1994) PETITIONERS: Development Bank of the Philippines DEFENDANT: Court of Appeal, the Estate of the late Juan B. Dans represented by Candida G. Dans & the DBP Mortgage Redemption Insurance Pool FACTS: - May 1987 – Juan Dans, together with his wife Candida, son and daughter-in-law, applied for a loan with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Basilan Branch. As the principal mortgagor, Dans, 76 years of age, was advised by DBP to obtain a mortgage redemption insurance (MRI) with the DBP Mortgage Redemption Pool (DBP MRI Pool). - A loan in a reduced amount was approved by DBP on August 4, 1987 and released on August 11, 1987. From the proceeds of the loan, DBP deducted P1,476.00 as payment for the MRI premium. On August 15, 1987, Dans accomplished and submitted the MRI Application for Insurance and the Health Statement for DBP MRI Pool. On August 20, 1987, the MRI premium of Dans, less the DBP service fee of ten percent, was credited to DBP to the savings account of the DBP MRI Pool. DBP MRI Pool was advised of the credit. - September 3, 1987 – Dans died of cardiac arrest. DBP relayed information to the DBP MRI Pool. - September 23, 1988 – DBP MRI Pool notified DBP that Dans was not eligible for MRI coverage, because he was over the acceptance age limit of 60 years old at time of application. - Ocober 21, 1987 – DBP told Candida Dans of disapproval of her late husband’s MRI application. DBP offered to refund the premium which deceased has paid, but the wife refused to accept it, demanding payment of face value of the MRI or an amount equivalent to the loan. She also refused to accept an ex gratia settlement DBP later offered. February 10, 1989 – respondent Estate, through Candida Dans, filed a complaint with RTC against DBP and insurance pool for “Collection of Sum of Money with Damages.” Respondent Estate alleged that Dans became insured by the DBP MRI Pool when DBP, with FULL KNOWLEDGE of Dans’ age at the time of application, required him to apply for MRI, and later collected the insurance premium. Respondent Estate prayed: 1) that the sum of P139,500.00 it paid under protest for the loan be reimbursed; 2) that the mortgage debt of the deceased be declared fully paid; and 3) that damages be awarded. March 10, 1990 - the trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent Estate and against DBP. The DBP MRI Pool, however, was absolved from liability, after the trial court found no privity of contract between it and the deceased. The trial court declared DBP in estoppel for having led Dans into applying for MRI and actually collecting the premium and the service fee, despite knowledge of his age ineligibility. ISSUE: (a) W/N there was a perfected contract of insurance for DBP MRI Pool to be held liable. (b) WON the DBP exceeded the scope of its authority when it accepted Dan's application for MRI by collecting the insurance premium, and deducting its agent's commission and service fee. RATIO & RULING (a) NO, the DBP MRI Pool cannot be held liable. While the power to approve MRI applications is lodged with the DBP MRI Pool, it, however, did not approve the application of Dans. There is also no showing that it accepted the sum of P1,476.00, which DBP credited to its account with full knowledge that it was payment for Dan's premium. There was, as a result, no perfected contract of insurance. (b) YES, the DBP exceeded its authority. DBP, as a matter of policy and practice, required Dans, the borrower, to secure MRI coverage. DBP compelled him to apply with the DBP MRI Pool for MRI coverage. In dealing with Dans, DBP was wearing two legal hats: the first as a lender, and the second as an insurance agent. As an

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Persons and Family Relations insurance agent, DBP made Dans go through the motion of applying for said insurance, thereby leading him and his family to believe that they had already fulfilled all the requirements for the MRI and that the issuance of their policy was forthcoming. Apparently, DBP had full knowledge that Dans’ application was never going to be approved. The DBP is not authorized to accept applications for MRI when its clients are more than 60 years of age. Knowing all the while that Dans was ineligible for MRI coverage because of his advanced age, DBP exceeded the scope of its authority when it accepted Dans’ application for MRI by collecting the insurance premium, and deducting its agent's commission and service fee. The liability of an agent who exceeds the scope of his authority depends upon whether the third person is aware of the limits of the agent's powers. There is no showing that Dans knew of the limitation on DBP's authority to solicit applications for MRI. Thus, Dans had been deceived by the non-disclosure thereof by the agent, and the latter is liable for damages to him. The rule that the agent is liable when he acts without authority is founded upon the supposition that there has been some wrong or omission on his part either in misrepresenting, or in affirming, or concealing the authority under which he assumes to act. The DBP's liability, however, cannot be for the entire value of the insurance policy. While Dans is not entitled to compensatory damages, he is entitled to moral damages.

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Persons and Family Relations UYPITCHING v. QUIAMCO (2006) PETITIONERS: Ernesto Ramos Uypitching & Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc. DEFENDANT: Ernesto Quiamco FACTS: - 1982 – Respondent was approached by three men; Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso, to settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him a red Honda motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration. The three never came back when asked for the original certificate of registration. - Turned out that on October 1981 – The motorcycle was sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc. which was owned and managed by the petitioner. When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the payments. In September 1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments and told the petitioner corporation’s collector that motorcycle had been “taken by respondent’s men.” Petitioner, accompanied by policemen, went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. Police team also tried to find the respondent. Uypitching paced back and forth inside the establish ment, saying “Quimco is a thief of a motorcycle.” The respondent was not found. On petitioner’s instructions and over the clerk’s objection, the police took the motorcycle. - Petitioner filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against respondent. Respondent moved for the dismissal because the complaint did not charge an offense because he neither stole nor bought the motorcycle. The complaint was dismissed and petitioner was denied motion for reconsideration. Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioner for the following: 1) unlawful taking of the motorcycle; 2) utterance of a defamatory remark (that respondent was a thief); and 3) precipitate filing of a baseless and malicious complaint. Such acts humiliated and embarrassed the respondent and injured his reputation and integrity. - The Trial Court rendered a decision finding petitioner was motivated with malice and ill will when he did aforementioned actions against respondent. ISSUE: - W/N the petitioner abused its right as seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default. PROVISION & ELEMENTS Article 19 of the Civil Code Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. HELD/RATIO: - YES, the petitioner corporation abused the exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee. While it is true that a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure right, there is, however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure. Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.

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Persons and Family Relations VILLALVA v. RCBC SAVINGS BANK (2006)

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Persons and Family Relations PETITIONERS: SPS. Mario & Corazon Villalva DEFENDANT: RCBC Savings Bank FACTS: - Petitioner spouses issued 48 checks to cover installment payments due on promissory note executed in favor of Toyota, Quezon Avenue for the purchase of a Toyota Corolla. - The promissory notes were secured by a Chattel Mortgage executed by the petitioner spouses on the vehicle in favor of Toyota Quezon Ave. Under the Deed of Chattel Mortgage, the petitioners were to insure the vehicle against loss or damage. - The promissory notes and chattel mortgage were assigned to RCBC Savings Bank. Evidence showed that the petitioner spouses faithfully complied with the obligation of insuring the mortgaged vehicle from 1993 to 1996. From August 14, 1996 to August 14, 1997, the petitioners procured the necessary insurance but did not deliver such to the respondent until January 17, 1997. As a consequence, the respondent had the mortgaged vehicle insured from October 21, 1996 to October 21, 1997. - The insurance policy obtained by respondent was cancelled due to the insurance policy secured by the petitioner spouses over the mortgaged vehicle, and the respondent was reimbursed by Malayan Insurance Company. The premium paid by respondent bank exceeded the reimbursed amount. - Respondent sent a letter of demand to petitioners for an amount of money allegedly representing their unpaid obligations on the promissory notes and mortgage as of January 31, 1999. Respondent demanded petitioners to surrender the vehicle within five days of notice. Petitioners ignored the demand letter. - Complaint was filed by respondent for Recovery of Possession with Replevin with the MTC of Pasay. Petitioner spouses answered with Compulsory Counterclaim, and asserted that they insured the mortgaged vehicle in compliance with the Deed of Chattel Mortgage. ISSUE: - W/N petitioners failed to comply with their obligation to insure the subject vehicle under the Deed of Chattel Mortgage. HELD/RATIO: - No, petitioners did not fail to comply with their obligation. In the case at bar, respondent failed to demand that petitioners comply with their obligation to secure insurance coverage for the mortgaged vehicle. Petitioners had not defaulted on their obligation to insure mortgaged vehicle and the condition sine qua non for respondent to exercise its right to pay the insurance premiums over the subject vehicle has not been established. The petitioner spouses, contrary to what the respondent contends, were not unjustly enriched when the latter obtained insurance coverage for the mortgaged vehicles as the former had already obtained the required insurance coverage from August 14, 1996 to August 14, 1997.

PILAPIL vs. IBAY-SOMERA (1989) GR No. 80116 Petitioner: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, wife

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Persons and Family Relations Respondents: Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera, Presiding Judge of RTC of Manila, Br. XXVI, Hon. Luis C. Victor, City Fiscal of Manila, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, husband FACTS: - On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen was married to private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national in the Federal Republic of Germany. - After 3 and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiated a divorce proceeding against the petitioner in Germany and on January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the petitioner. The records show that under the German law, said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. - On June 27, 1986 or more than 5 months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed for two complains of adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to said respondent, petitioner had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and with Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. - The respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia” was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge while the other case entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua” was assigned to Judge Cruz of Branch XXV. - The Secretary of Justice in response to the petition filed by the petitioner directed the respondent city fiscal to defer any arraignment proceedings if the accused has not yet been arraigned and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. Consequently, Judge Cruz suspended the proceedings in the case against Pilapil and Chua while the respondent judge on the other hand, merely reset the date if the arraignment in the case against Pilapil and Chia. In an order dated September 8, 1987, the respondent Judge denied the motion to quash filed by the petitioner and directed the arraignment of Pilapil and Chia. On October 21, 1987 this Court issued a TRO enjoining the respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with the criminal case. On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. - Petitioner argues that the court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense, since the complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing of the criminal complaint.

ISSUE: - W/N it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the filing of the criminal action. HELD/RATIO: Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence an adultery case on the ground that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit. The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Thus, it follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action, and by this it meant that he is still married to the accused spouse at the time of the time of the filing of the complaint.

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Persons and Family Relations In this case, the fact that the private respondent obtained a valid divorce in Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as the private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law regarding the status of persons. in addition, the allegation of the private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of disassociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS (2007) GR No. 133743 and GR No. 134029 Petitioners: Edgar San Luis and Rodolfo San Luis Respondent: Felicidad Sagalongos (alias Felicidad San Luis) FACTS: - Felicisimo T. San Luis, the settlement of whose estate is involved in the present case has contracted three marriages during his lifetime. First Marriage.On March 17, 1942, he married Virginia Sulit and they had six children. Virginia died on August 11, 1963. Second Marriage. Five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, an American Citizen, with whom he had a son. However, the latter filed a divorce in Hawaii, USA and a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody was subsequently issued. Third Marriage. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis in California, USA. He had no children with her but he lived with her for 18 years up to his death on December 1992. - Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. Consequently, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City praying that said letters of administration be issued to her. - Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis who was later joined by Linda, children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed motions to dismiss which the trial court denied. Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis separately filed motions for reconsideration. The petitioners have the following arguments:  The petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence, the latter being the Governor of the said province.  The respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.  Paragraph 2, article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 of the Family Code. -

Respondent on the other hand, has the following oppositions:  She submitted documentary evidence that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in Alabang, Metro Manila.  She presented the decree of absolute divorce issued in Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved.

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Persons and Family Relations 

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She claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court. The petitioners filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied. Hence, the current case appealing the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES: (a) W/N the venue was properly laid (b) W/N respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration

HELD/RATIO: (a) The Court found that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court. It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that “residence” for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with “domicile.” For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the “residence” of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. (b) The Court held that the provisions of the Family Code need not retroactively apply, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudence allowing to rule in the affirmative. Notwithstanding the insufficiency of evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage if respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the USA, it is found that the respondent has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation. The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved and therefore, this case must be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree and the subsequent marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. The respondent would qualify as an interested person who has direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo. Her legal capacity to file the letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Art. 144 of the Civil Code or Art. 148 of the Family Code.

REPUBLIC vs. IYOY (2005) GR No. 152577 Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the Office of the Solicitor General) Respondent: CRASUS L. IYOY FACTS:

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Persons and Family Relations -

Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City and had five children. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. - On March 25, 1997, respondent Crasus filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 22. Conversely, Fely filed her answer and counterclaim with the RTC on June 5, 1997. - Respondent Crasus alleges the following:  Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant”  Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.  Respondent Crasus also questioned the personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages. - Fely on the other hand, alleges the following:  She was already an American citizen since 1988 and that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality.  Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint and that she left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job. - On October 30, 1998, the RTC declared the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio on the ground that it finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. - Petitioner Republic filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, saying in addition that Fely has undoubtedly acquired her American husband’s citizenship and thus Art. 26 par (2) of the Family Code shall apply. ISSUE(S): (a) W/N the totality of the evidence presented by respondent Crasus during trial is sufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely. (b) W/N Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar. (c) W/N the Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages. HELD/RATIO: (a) The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely; marriage of Crasus and Fely remains valid and subsisting. This Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Article 36 of the Family

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Persons and Family Relations Code contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. Th is C ou rt s u s tai n s th e va lid ity an d ex i st en c e of t h e m arr ia ge b et we e n re sp on d en t Cr a su s an d F ely . A t mo st, F ely’ s ab an d on m en t, s exu al in fid e lity , an d b ig a my, gi v e r e sp on d en t Cra su s g ro u n d s to fi l e fo r le ga l s e p arat io n u n d er A rt ic le 5 5 of t h e Fa m ily C od e o f th e Ph il ip p in e s , b u t n ot fo r d e c lara tio n o f n u ll ity of ma rr iag e u n d er Art ic l e 36 of th e sa m e Cod e. (b) Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is not applicable to the case at bar b e ca u s e a t th e t i m e F e ly ob t ain ed h er d i vo rc e , sh e wa s st il l a Fi lip in o cit iz en . Al th ou gh th e exa ct d at e wa s n o t e st ab li sh ed , F ely h e r s el f ad m itt ed t h at sh e ob tain ed a d i vor c e f ro m r e sp on d en t C ra su s s o m eti m e a ft er sh e l e ft f or th e Un it ed S tat e s in 198 4. In th e s am e An s we r, sh e a ll eg ed th at sh e h ad b e en an A m er ica n c iti z en sin c e 1 9 8 8. At t h e ti m e sh e fi l e d fo r d i v or ce , F e ly wa s st il l a Fi lip in o ci tiz en , a n d p u r su an t t o th e n atio n al ity p rin cip l e e mb od i ed i n A rt ic le 1 5 o f the C iv il Co de o f th e Ph il ip p i n e s, sh e wa s sti ll b ou n d b y Ph i lip p i n e la w s on fa mi ly ri gh t s an d d u t i es , st atu s, c o n d iti on , an d l e gal cap a cit y , e v en wh en sh e w a s alr ea d y li v in g ab road . Th u s, F ely cou l d n o t h av e va lid ly ob ta in e d a d iv or ce fro m re sp on d en t Cr as u s . (c) The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages. That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Furthermore, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which became effective on 15 March 2003, as issued by the Supreme Court recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts.

REPUBLIC vs. ORBECIDO III (October 5, 2005) GR No. 154380 Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent: CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

FACTS:

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Persons and Family Relations -

-

-

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Article 26 (2) of the Family Code. Although he admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case, he insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The OSG contends that Article 26 (2) of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.

ISSUE: - W/N respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code

HELD/RATIO: - The Court held that Article 26 (2) of the Family Code should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. Article 26 (2) should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. The basis is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. The naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

NIÑAL vs. BAYADOG (March 14, 2000) GR No. 133778 Petitioner: ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR. Respondent: NORMA BAYADOG FACTS: - On September 26, 1974, Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones. However, on April 24, 1985, Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death.

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One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license stating in an affidavit that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died. Petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code. Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu dismissed the petition saying that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father’s marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code.

ISSUES: (a) W/N plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her especially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead (b) W/N the second marriage of plaintiffs’ deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio HELD/RATIO: (a) Yes. Petitioners have a cause of action. Article 47 of the Family Code cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage because such provision pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Furthermore, the Court cited that a void marriage, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts. (b) The cohabitation between respondent and Pepito Niñal was not the cohabitation contemplatedby law thus it cannot be covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license and is void ab initio lacking such element. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".

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Persons and Family Relations VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS (2006) GR No. 132955 Petitioner: ORLANDO VILLANUEVA Respondent: HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA

FACTS: - On April 13, 1988, Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage. - Petitioner alleges the following:  That threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988  That respondent Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in not granting the annulment of marriage, the consent of petitioner having been vitiated by fraud and intimidation and that there was no cohabitation  The there were harassing phone calls from the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by appellee and who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her and that he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. - Private respondent on the other hand refutes petitioner’s allegations arguing that the latter freely and voluntarily married her thus praying for the dismissal of the petition and for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs. ISSUES: (a) W/N the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent (b) W/N petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs HELD/RATIO: (a) No. Petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between him and his wife since lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. The Court is disturbed by the circumstance that it was only on November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to have the same marriage annulled. The prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando in the hope that the annulment may bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy against him. As to the appellant’s allegation on the lack of cohabitation, the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds that may vitiate consent, hence the validity of his marriage must be upheld.

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Persons and Family Relations (b)Private respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees but the award of moral and exemplary damages is deleted for lack of factual and legal basis. There is no reference to any testimony of private respondent detailing her alleged physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to moral damages. Also, as private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not entitled to exemplary damages since no exemplary damages can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages.

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Persons and Family Relations SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS (1995) GR No. 112019 Petitioner: LEOUEL SANTOS Respondent: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA BEDIA-SANTOS FACTS: - On September 20, 1986, Leouel Santos and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exchanged vows before Judge Lazaro of the Municipal Trial Court of Iloilo City, followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. - On May 1998, Julia left for the United States to work as a nurse despite Leouel’s pleas to dissuade her. She promised him through a phone call seven months later that she would return home but she never did. When Leouel went to the US for a training program, he desperately tried to locate Julia but his efforts were of no avail. - Leouel filed with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for “Voiding of Marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code” on the ground that Julia’s failure to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. ISSUE: - W/N the wife’s failure to communicate or at least to get in touch with his husband would constitute psychological incapacity under Art 36 of the Family Code and would therefore render their marriage void. HELD/RATIO: - The Court held that the facts of the case at bench do not come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. The Court cited the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee and said the use of the phrase “psychological incapacity” under Art 36 of the Family Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses, as likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.

ANTONIO V. REYES Petitioner: Leonilo Antonio Respondent: Marie Ivonne Reyes FACTS: - CA had reversed the judgment of the Makati RTC declaring the marriage of Leonilo Antonio and Marie Ivonne Reyes, null and void. - Barely a year after their first meeting, Antonio and Reyes got married. After almost 2 ½ years of being together, the petitioner petitioned to have

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their marriage declared null and void. Basing his petition on Article 36 of the Family Code, he alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which existed at the time of celebration of their marriage and still subsists up to the present. Petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, to wit:  Respondent concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, and introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She confessed the truth when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage;  She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters;  She altered her pay slip to make it appear that she earned a higher income; and  She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over her husband to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. Petitioner presented a psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that respondent’s persistent and constant lying to the petitioner was abnormal or pathological. The lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything had been duly established. Such ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. Respondent filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals regarding the ruling of the lower court. CA ruled that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: - W/N the state of facts as presented by the petitioner satisfies the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code HELD/RATIO: - YES. The petitioner, in an action for declaration of nullity under Art. 36, was able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence, which was further corroborated by the witnesses he presented. In addition, the root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, as proven by experts. Such incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. The gravity of respondent’s incapacity is sufficient to prove her inability to perform the essential marital obligations.

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Persons and Family Relations REPUBLIC V. QUINTERO-HAMANO FACTS: - Respondent and Toshio, who is a Japanese national, started a common-law relationship in Japan and later lived in the Philippines. Respondent gave birth to their child. After 2 years, they were married by a judge in the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. - Unknown to the respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities which became manifest only after the marriage. - Toshio returned to Japan one month after the marriage and promised to return soon. He stopped giving financial support after two months. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child. - Respondent filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband on the ground of psychological incapacity. ISSUE(S): - W/N abandonment by one spouse can be deemed as psychological incapacity, and therefore a valid ground for declaration of nullity HELD/RATIO: - No. The Court held that mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychologically incapacity. The totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. His act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. No other evidence, besides Toshio abandoning them, was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.

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Persons and Family Relations LANDICHO V. RELOVA FACTS: - Landicho (petitioner) was charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense, of bigamy. - It was alleged that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia." - A couple of months later, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character. - Petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant, Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal. - Petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending the decision on the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit. Respondent Judge denied the motion for lack of merit. Thereafter, a motion for reconsideration to set aside the above order was filed, and was likewise denied. ISSUE(S): - W/N the validity of his marriage is a prejudicial question to warrant a suspension of petitioner’s bigamy charge HELD/RATIO: - No. The Court held that the validity of the marriage is not a prejudicial question, and thus may not suspend the bigamy case. Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. There is no occasion to indulge in the probability that the third-party complaint against the first wife brought almost 5 months after the prosecution for bigamy was started could have been inspired by the thought that he could thus give color to a defense based on an alleged prejudicial question. The above judicial decisions preclude a finding that respondent judge abused, much less gravely abused, his discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by the petitioner.

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Persons and Family Relations DONATO V. LUNA FACTS: - Petitioner Leonilo Donato was charged with bigamy in the lower court in Manila. This was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan. - Before the petitioner’s arraignment, Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz consented to entering into the marriage which was Donato’s second since she had no previous knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping. - Donato defensed that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. - Prior to the solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit executed by them, and for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code. ISSUE(S): - W/N a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Instance of Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question. HELD/RATIO: - No. The Court held that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato’s guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. A case of annulment of marriage can be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, only if it is proved that the petitioner’s consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation. Furthermore, it was petitioner’s second wife, Abayan, who filed the complaint for annulment on the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit, not knowing that petitioner’s first marriage was still subsisting. A prejudicial question – one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case. It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. There is no pivotal issue that must be preemptively resolved in the civil case before proceedings in the criminal action for bigamy can be undertaken.

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Persons and Family Relations WEIGEL V. SEMPIO-DY FACTS: - Respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff) asked for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilia’s previous existing marriage to one Eduardo Maxion. - Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that such marriage was null and void: she and the first husband having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. - Lilia also alleged that Karl was married to another woman before their marriage. ISSUE(S): - W/N Lilia’s first marriage, which was contracted with force, is void HELD/RATIO: - NO. The Court held that their marriage is not void, but is voidable. The presence of force only makes a marriage voidable, not void. Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration before he can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilia’s marriage are regarded void under the law.

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Persons and Family Relations ROBERTO DOMINGO V. CA, ET AL. FACTS: - Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property before the Pasig RTC. - She did not know that Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz. She came to know about the previous marriage when the latter filed a bigamy suit against her. - Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been disposing some of her properties administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. - Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage. - The petition of Soledad Domingo prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage. - Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that it does not state a cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is unnecessary. He also added that Soledad has no property which is in his possession. ISSUE(S): - W/N a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary only for purposes of remarriage. HELD/RATIO: - Yes. The Court held that the declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for the purpose of remarriage. There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent, celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is void from the beginning. A judicial declaration of the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is required for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void (Art. 40). Art. 40 denotes that such final judgment declaring previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. There are also other instances where a party might well invoke the nullity such as for purposes of liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between spouses, as well as action for custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters’ presumptive legitimes (Art. 43). In such cases, evidence need not be limited solely to a final judgment declaring previous marriage void. CA ruled that the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity may be raised together with other incident of their marriage such as the separation of properties. Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless

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Persons and Family Relations BELTRAN V. PEOPLE FACTS: - After 24 years of marriage and four children, Meynardo Beltran (petitioner) filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code. - Petitioner’s wife, Charmaine Felix, answered by alleging that it was the petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. - Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage under Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour, who in a Resolution found probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information against them, - Six months after the filing, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. - Petitioner argued that the pendency of civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. ISSUE(S): - W/N the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife HELD/RATIO: - No. The Court held that the pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. Article 40 of the Family Code provides that in a case for concubinage, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can present evidence in the criminal case of nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involving an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Assuming that the first marriage was null and void, such fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity is so declared can it be held as void. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman other than his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage could be prosecuted for concubinage.

Mercado vs. Tan (2000) G.R. No. 137110 FACTS: -

Dr. Vincent Mercado (petitioner) was married to Ma. Thelma Oliva (first wife) on April 10, 1976. Mercado, who has a subsisting marriage with Oliva, sought a second marriage with Ma. Consuelo Tan (second wife) in a civil marriage on June 27, 1991, further confirmed by a church ceremony on June 29, 1991.

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On October 5, 1992, Tan filed for a bigamy case against Mercado. On November 13, 1992, Mercado (petitioner) filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Oliva, more than a month after the bigamy case was filed against him. On May 6, 1993, the marriage between Mercado and Oliva was declared null and void.

ISSUE(S): (a) W/N judicial declaration of nullity of marriage must be obtained first before a person can remarry. (b) W/N Mercado was guilty of bigamy. HELD/RATIO: (a) Yes. It is expressly provided in Art. 40 of the Family Code that, “The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purpose of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.” In this case, while the previous marriage was judicially declared null and void, such was made only after the subsequent marriage was contracted, thus the subsequent marriage shall be deemed to be null and void. (b) Yes. Mercado was guilty of bigamy since all the elements of the crime under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code were present, namely: 1. That the offender has been legally married; 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. In this case, the petitioner contracted the second marriage prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage, which at that time was still valid and subsisting. The court ruled that bigamy is committed if a subsequent marriage is contracted by a person without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity. In addition, bigamy is determined not by the fact that the first marriage is void but by virtue of contracting a subsequent marriage absent a judicial declaration of nullity of such previous marriage.

Republic vs. Nolasco (1993) G.R. No. 94053 FACTS: -

Gregorio Nolasco (respondent), a seaman, got married to Janet Monica Parker, a British subject he met in a bar in England, on January 15, 1982 in San Jose, Antique. After their marriage, Nolasco obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in Antique. Sometime in January 1983, he received a letter from his mother informing him that his wife had given birth and had also left Antique. He returned in Antique on November 1983, about nine months after his knowledge of his wife’s disappearance. He secured another employment contract in London, and tried to look for his wife whenever his ship docked there.

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He sent letters to his wife addressed to the bar in England where they first met, but such were all returned to him. He did not report his wife’s disappearance to the Philippine authorities. He filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife (Parker), or in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void, on August 5, 1988, and such petition for declaration of presumptive death was granted on October 12, 1988 by the trial court, and was furthermore affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE(S): (a) W/N there existed a well-founded belief on the part of Nolasco that Parker was already dead (b) W/N the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s declaration of presumptive death of Parker. HELD/RATIO: (a) No. Art. 41 of the Family Code prescribes a well-founded belief that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death may be granted. Based on the facts, the court held that the respondent failed to conduct a search for his wife with such diligence as to give rise to a “well-founded” belief that she is dead. The investigation he had done to ascertain his wife’s whereabouts was too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. Moreover, the court did not give much credence to his assertion that he had inquired from their friends her whereabouts since he did not identify those friends in his testimony. Also, respondent failed to explain his failure to ask for help from the authorities of London and Liverpool. The court found it difficult to regard the claim of a “well-founded” belief of death under the circumstances of Parker’s departure and respondent’s subsequent behaviour. (b) Yes. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s declaration of presumptive death of Parker was reversed and hereby nullified by the Supreme Court by virtue of the respondent’s failure to establish that he had a well-founded belief required by law that his wife was already dead.

Armas vs. Calisterio (2000)

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Persons and Family Relations G.R. No. 136467 FACTS: -

On April 24, 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land. Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta Calisterio (respondent), who was previously married to James Bounds on January 13, 1946. Teodorico and Marietta got married on May 8, 1958, 11 years after the disappearance of Bounds, without Marietta having secured a judicial declaration of presumptive death of her first husband. Antonia Armas (petitioner), the surviving sister of Teodorico, petitioned to be the sole surviving heir of Teodorico, and asserted that the marriage between Teodorico and Marietta is bigamous, therefore null and void. Armas prayed that her son be appointed administrator of the estate and that the inheritance be adjudicated to her. Marietta opposed the petition claiming that her first marriage had been dissolved due to Bound’s absence for eleven years before she contracted a second marriage.

ISSUE(S): (a) W/N the marriage between Teodorico and Marietta was valid despite the absence of judicial declaration of presumptive death. (b) W/N Marietta is the rightful heir of the estate as the surviving spouse. HELD/RATIO: (a) The marriage between Teodorico and Marietta was solemnized on May 8, 1958 in which the law in effect at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on Aug. 3, 1988. Art. 256 of the Family Code limited its retrospective governance only to cases not prejudicial to acquired/vested rights in accordance with Civil Code or other laws. The Court ruled that the applicable provision in this case is Art. 83 of the New Civil Code which provides: “Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (1) XXX (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Art. 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by competent court.” Accordingly, the Court held that a judicial declaration of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met, and that the present spouse contracted the second marriage in good faith to render the subsequent marriage as valid. Thus, the second marriage having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code should be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive

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Persons and Family Relations death. (b) The properties of Teodorico and Marietta pertain to them in common (Absolute Community of Property) absent a property regime, and thus should be divided equally- one portion to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. Therefore, having considered their marriage as valid, Marietta is entitled to one-half of the estate, and the other-half goes to Armas.

Manuel vs. People (2005) 476 SCRA 461 FACTS: -

Eduardo Manuel (petitioner) was charged with bigamy. Eduardo was first married to Rubylus Gana on July 28, 1975. Eduardo contracted a second marriage with Tina Gandalera on April 22, 1996; in their marriage contract, it appeared that Manuel was “single.” Tina inquired and learned from the NSO that Eduardo was previously married. Eduardo asserted that he declared “single” in his marriage contract because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid; that Rubylus (first wife) was imprisoned in 1975 and never saw her again three months after he visited her; that he believed that his previous marriage was no longer valid since he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.

ISSUE(S): -

W/N Eduardo Manuel is guilty of bigamy.

HELD/RATIO: -

In this case, the Court ruled in favor of the prosecution which proved that Eduardo was married to Rubylus in 1975, and that such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. It was also proven that Eduardo married Tina in 1996, when the Family Code was already in effect. As provided in Art. 41 of the Family Code: “A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Art. 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.”

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Persons and Family Relations The Court held that it was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he contracted the subsequent marriage, he was of wellgrounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years, and that he should have instituted a judicial declaration for presumptive death so as not to be held guilty of bigamy. However, as was stated, no judicial declaration of presumptive death was instituted by Eduardo, thus making his previous marriage to be valid and subsisting. Moreover, elements of bigamy can be gleaned from the case, such being the (1) existence of an undissolved marriage; (2) a subsequent marriage with all the essential requisites of validity. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Morigo vs. People (2004) 422 SCRA 376 FACTS: -

On August 30, 1990, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete got married at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional. On September 8, 1990, Barrete returned to Canada to report back to her work On Aug. 19, 1991, Barrete filed with the Ontario Court in Canada a petition for divorce against Morigo which was granted on January 17, 1992 and took effect on Feb. 17, 1992. On Oct. 4, 1992, Morigo married Maria Lumbago. On Sept. 21, 1993, Morigo filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On Oct. 19, 1993, Morigo was charged with Bigamy.

ISSUE(S): -

W/N Morigo committed bigamy, and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.

HELD/RATIO: -

The elements of bigamy are: 1. That the offender has been legally married; 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is presumed dead according to the Civil Code; 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent; 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

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In this case, the trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer, but merely signing of marriage contract without the presence of a solemnizing officer, thus making the marriage void ab initio. The first element of bigamy that the accused must be legally married was therefore absent. Hence, the Supreme Court held that the mere signing of marriage contract cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which the petitioner might be liable for bigamy, and thus, under the circumstances, the petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, the petitioner’s defense of good faith for relying on the divorce decree of Ontario Court, and lack of criminal intent in contracting the second marriage, has been declared as moot and academic.

Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals (2004) 423 SCRA 272 FACTS: -

Veronico Tenebro (petitioner) contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990 before a judge of city trial court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been married to Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986; showed her a photocopy of their marriage certificate; and left their conjugal dwelling. On January 25, 1993, Tenebro contracted another marriage with Nilda Villegas before a judge of Cebu City RTC. Ancajas, after the confirmation of Villareyes of their marriage through a handwritten letter, filed a complaint for bigamy against Tenebro. During trial, Tenebro denied the validity of marriage claiming that no marriage ceremony took place and merely signing of marriage contract, and that no record of such marriage was recorded in the Civil Register of Manila as confirmed by his brother. The RTC of Lapu-lapu City convicted him of the crime of bigamy which was also affirmed by the Court of Appeals (respondent).

ISSUE(S): (a) W/N there exists a first marriage with Villareyes. (b) WON the judicial declaration of nullity of subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity will not make the petitioner liable for bigamy. HELD/RATIO: (a) The petitioner presented certification from NSO and City Civil Registry of Manila that such offices have no record of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. However, the prosecution was able to present sufficient evidence to prove the existence of the first marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. A copy of marriage contract as certified by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila, and a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas confirming that Tenebro was legally married to Villareyes were presented as evidences. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer, or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Hence, the certified copy of the marriage contract issued by the public officer in custody thereof was admissible as the best evidence. As such, the Court ruled that there was sufficient evidence presented to prove the

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Persons and Family Relations first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy being: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2) that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code. (b) The court held that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippine penal laws are concerned. As such, and consistent with Art. 41 of the Family Code, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the marriage is void ab initio. Pertinently, Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of judgment rendered in proper proceedings.” It can be inferred that this provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Sarao vs. Guevarra ( 1940) G.R. No. 47063; 40 OG 263 FACTS: Felix Sarao (plaintiff) and Pilar Guevarra (defendant) were married in Manila on June 3, 1936. In the afternoon of the same day, Sarao tried to have carnal knowledge of Guevarra, but the latter showed reluctance and begged him to wait until evening. When night came, the plaintiff again approached the defendant and tried to have carnal act with her, but she complained of pains in her private parts and he noticed some purulent matter offensive to the smell coming out from her genital. Every attempt on plaintiff’s part to have carnal act with his wife failed because she would complain of pains in her genital organs, and he did not want her to suffer. Upon the advice of a physician, defendant submitted to an operation on Aug. 7, 1936, and as her uterus and ovaries were affected with the tumor, these organs were removed with the consent of the plaintiff. The removal of said organs rendered defendant incapable of procreation, but not of copulation. Plaintiff, however, declared that from the time he witnessed the operation he lost all desire to have carnal act with her, and has tried not to do it since then. ISSUE(S): -

W/N incapacity to procreate can be construed as “physically incapable of entering into the married state,” and is a valid ground for annulment.

HELD/RATIO:

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Persons and Family Relations -

No. Under the marriage law at that time, and as consistently applied in the provision in Art. 45 (5) of the Family Code, marriage may be annulled if “either party was, at the time of marriage, physically incapable of entering into the married state, and such incapacity continues, and appears to be incurable.” It is held that the test of impotency is not the ability to procreate, but the ability to copulate. In this case, the defendant was not impotent at the time the marriage was celebrated, as supported by the opinion of the doctor that the existence of fibrous tumor in the ovaries did not necessarily render her incapable of copulation or even procreation. The removal of her uterus and ovaries rendered her sterile but did not make her unfit for sexual intercourse. Thus, the defendant’s sterility cannot be a ground for annulment since what the law provides as a ground for annulment is the incapacity to copulate, and not to procreate.

Buccat v. Buccat (1941) Petitioner: Godofredo Buccat Respondent: Luida Mangonon de Buccat FACTS: -

Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon met on March 1938 and were engaged on September 19 of the same year. On November 26 of the same year, they got married in the Catholic Cathedral of Baguio City. Eighty-nine (89) days after the marriage, Luida gave birth to a child of nine months on February 23, 1939. Petitioner left the respondent and filed a Complaint for annulment in the lower court on the grounds of fraud against respondent for concealing to her husband-to-be that she was not a virgin and that she was pregnant by a man other than her husband at the time of the marriage.

ISSUE(S): - W/N Luida is guilty of fraud for concealing her pregnancy, and thus should be a ground for annulment HELD/RATIO: - No. Annulment requires clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner, however, failed to present reasonable evidence on account of fraud that he was indeed unaware of the pregnancy of respondent. At the time of their marriage, respondent was already more or less six months pregnant and it would be uncommon, lest ridiculous, that petitioner was unaware of the said pregnancy.

Aquino v. Delizo (1960) Petitioner: Fernando Aquino Respondent: Conchita Delizo FACTS: - On December 27, 1954, Fernando Aquino was married to Conchita Delizo. - About four (4) months after their marriage, respondent gave birth to a child.

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Persons and Family Relations -

-

Petitioner filed on the Court of First Instance of Rizal a complaint for annulment of his marriage with respondent Conchita Delizo on the ground of fraud wherein respondent, on the date of their marriage, concealed from petitioner the fact that she was pregnant by another man. Defendant, however, claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff. Trial Court dismissed the complaint on June 1695 noting that no birth certificate was presented to show that the child was born within 180 days after the marriage between the parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff does not constitute such fraud as would annul a marriage. Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, hence this petition.

ISSUE: - W/N can validly invoke concealment of the pregnancy of the respondent as constituting fraud, and thus a ground for annulment HELD/RATIO: - No. Wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. However, it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse before they got married and therefore the child could be their own.

Tuason v. Court of Appeals (1996) Petitioner: Emilio R. Tuason Respondents: Court of Appeals and Maria Victoria Tuason

FACTS: - Maria Victoria Tuason and Emilio Tuason were married on June 3, 1972 and had two children. - Maria Victoria Tuason filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati a petition for annulment of her marriage to petitioner. - Private respondent, in her complaint, alleged that at the time of her marriage, petitioner was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations for the following reasons:  violent fights between husband and wife  petitioner inflicted physical injuries on private respondent  petitioner used prohibited drugs and has not been rehabilitated  petitioner was a womanizer  left the conjugal dwelling, cohabited with three women in succession, and gave minimal support to the family  petitioner became a spendthrift and abused his administration of the conjugal partnership

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Persons and Family Relations  -

-

attempts of reconciliation were made but they all failed because of petitioner's refusal to reform

Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. His defense:  it was only in 1982 that they began to have serious personal differences when his wife did not accord the respect and dignity due him as a husband  1984, he temporarily left the conjugal home for a "cooling-off period"  it is private respondent who had been taking prohibited drugs and had a serious affair with another man  petitioner's work as owner and operator of a radio and television station exposed him to malicious gossip During the trial, private respondent presented four witnesses and submitted documentary evidence proving her allegations against petitioner. Petitioner failed to appear on the hearing. Court declared petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented. Trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of private respondent's marriage to petitioner and awarding the custody of the children to private respondent. No appeal was taken from the decision by the counsel for petitioner. Private respondent filed a Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties Petitioner opposed to the motion. Through new counsel, he filed with the trial court a petition for relief from judgment of the decision. Trial court denied the petition. Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals the order of the trial court denying his petition for relief from judgment, but such was also dismissed and the order of trial court affirmed.

ISSUE: - W/N Order of Makati RTC has become final and executory, thus, a petition for relief from judgment is not valid. HELD/RATIO: - Yes. The decision annulling petitioner's marriage to private respondent had already become final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal during the reglementary period. Trial court did not err in granting the declaration of annulment of marriage on the grounds that there was no collusion between parties or that evidence was not fabricated or suppressed. The decision of the trial court was not in violation of his right to due process, thus it is not null and void. After failing to appear on two scheduled hearing, the trial court deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence for private respondent. Counsel of petitioner did not inform the trial court of petitioner's confinement for rehabilitation. And when the court rendered its decision, the same counsel was out of the country for which reason the decision became final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom. Petitioner failed to give any reason why his former counsel did not inform the court of the scheduled hearings. This led the trial court to order the case deemed submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence.

CORPUS V. OCHOTORENA (2004)

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Persons and Family Relations Petitioner: Margie Macias Corpus (Mrs. Macias) Respondent: Judge Wilfredo Ochotorena FACTS: - A complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage against Mrs. Macias by Mariano Joaquin S. Macias, her husband and incumbent presiding Judge of RTC, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, was filed before the respondent’s court - Petitioner was informed of such complaint through the publication of Summons; she filed a Motion to Dismiss which she set for hearing on April 20, 2001. - Instead of first acting upon the motion, the respondent judge set the hearing on April 19, 2001. - On April 19, 2001, respondent judge denied the Motion to Dismiss and re-set the hearing. - Various motions and manifestations were filed by the counsel of Mrs. Macias opposing the hearing on the merits of the case before the respondent judge. - Public Prosecutor Arturo Paculanag filed a Certification with the respondent judge's court stating that he appeared in behalf of the Solicitor General during the ex-parte presentation of plaintiff's (Mr. Corpus) evidence, cross-examining plaintiff and his witness. - After the scheduled hearings, respondent judge terminated the proceedings and declared the case submitted for decision declaring absolute nullity of marriage of Mrs. Macias and Mr. Macias. - Mrs. Macias filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. - Mrs. Macias also filed an instant Complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator against Respondent Judge. - Without waiting for the OCA’s Indorsement, respondent judge submitted his Comment/Answer. - Respondent Judge insists that his Decision in the Civil Case (declaring the nullity of marriage of Mrs. Macias and Mr. Macias) is valid and prays for the dismissal of the instant Complaint for lack of merit. - Respondent judge retired. - CA favored Mrs. Macias (Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction - In his case, Mrs. Macias now asserts before the Court that the respondent judge’s actuations constitute bias, partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge. Conclusive from the records, the respondent is grossly ignorant of the law and procedure and that the Court should sanction him. ISSUE: -

W/N respondent judge acted with bias, partiality and violation of judicial conduct in declaring the nullity of marriage in civil case

HELD/RATIO: - Yes. The Court found the respondent judge to have acted with bias, partiality and violation of judicial conduct in declaring the nullity of marriage in civil case. Respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Marcia’s right to due process when he proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to Dismiss, which was filed within the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending resolution. Respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Rules on Civil Procedure: “After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial.” Considering that the last pleading was Mrs. Macias’ Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge should have first resolved the motion and then waited for Mr. Macias’ motion to set the case for pre-trial. Rail-roading

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Persons and Family Relations or procedural short-cut – instead of resolving the Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge completely ignored it and proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case by receiving Mr. Macias’ evidence ex-parte. Respondent judge compounded his blunder when, after denying Mrs. Macias’ Motion to Dismiss, he continued with the reception of Mr. Macias’ evidence ex-parte, ordered the termination of the trial and thereafter, considered the case submitted for decision despite Mrs. Macias’ filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying her Motion to Dismiss. In holding the trial of the case up to its completion, the respondent judge had acted utterly oblivious to the pending Motion for Reconsideration. Even if Mrs. Macias failed to file her answer to the complaint after the period therefor had elapsed, the respondent judge was not authorized to conduct a hearing of the case on its merits. The Rules of Court prohibits default proceeding in cases involving declaration of nullity of marriage. Mrs. Macias had already filed her Motion to Dismiss where she indicated her address and, hence, can be notified by the Public Prosecutor of his investigation.

CERVANTES v. FAJARDO (1989) Petitioners: Nelson L. Cervantes and Zenaida Carreon Cervantes Respondents: Gina Carreon Fajardo and Conrado Fajardo FACTS: - Angelie Anne C. Cervantes was born on 14 February 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common -law husband and wife. - The child was then known as Angelie Anne Fajardo. - Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, who took care and custody of the child when she was barely two weeks old. - An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by petitioners was also executed by respondent Gina Carreon on 29 April 1987. - The petition for adoption was filed by petitioners over the child before the RTC of Rizal on 20 August 1987, which granted the petition. - The court ordered that the child be "freed from parental authority of her natural parents as well as from legal obligation and maintenance to them and that from now on shall be, for all legal intents and purposes, known as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a child of herein petitioners and capable of inheriting their estate." - Petitioners received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150, 000.00; otherwise, they would get back their child. - While petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina Carreon took the child from her "yaya" at the petitioner's residence and brought the child to her house. - Petitioners demanded the return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had exectued was not fully explained to her. She will, however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount.

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Persons and Family Relations -

ISSUE: -

Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who had conducted the case study on the adoption and submitted a report thereon to the RTC of Rizal in the adoption case, testified before the Executive Judge, RTC Pasig declaring that she had interviewed respondent Gina Carreon and that respondent manifested to the social worker her desire to have the child adopted by the petitioners.

W/N the custody and care of minor Angelie Anne Cervantes should be granted to the petitioners.

HELD/RATIO: - Yes. The Court affirmed the decision of RTC granting petitioners of custody and care of minor Angelie Anne Cervantes and ruled that the petition for writ of Habeas Corpus be granted. In all controversies regarding custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. Provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under 5 years of age will not apply where the court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. Petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her. The minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child. The adopting parents have the right to care and custody of the adopted child (Art. 189(2) of Family Code) and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him (Art 17, PD 603).

Espiritu v. CA (1995) Petitioner: Reynaldo Espiritu and Guillerma Layug Respondent: Court of Appeals and Teresita Masauding FACTS: - In 1984, Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding entered a common law relationship in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. - Rosalind Therese, their daughter, was born on October 7, 1987. - While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, Reginald was born on January 12, 1988. - The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in 1990. - Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California where she used to work as a nurse. - Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh and had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family. - Teresita returned to the Philippines and on 1992 she filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children. - On 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over the two children and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with visitation rights to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court.

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Persons and Family Relations -

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and gave custody to Teresita and visitation rights on weekends to Reynaldo. The Court of Appeals invoked provisions of the Civil Code and Family Code as basis of granting custody to respondent.

ISSUE: - W/N the Court of Appeals erred in holding that child custody should be given to respondent Teresita. HELD/RATIO: - Yes. The Court held that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that child custody should be given to respondent. The findings and conclusions of the regional trial court is sustained because it gave greater attention to the choice of Rosalind and considered in detail all the relevant factors bearing on the issue of custody. Court of Appeals resolved the question of custody over the children through an automatic and blind application of the age proviso of Article 363 of the Civil Code and of Article 213 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals was unduly swayed by an abstract presumption of law rather than an appreciation of relevant facts and the law which should apply to those facts. The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to be determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child's interests. Discretion is given to the court to decide who can best assure the welfare of the child, and award the custody on the basis of that consideration. In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by compelling reasons. If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.

Mangonon v. CA (2006) Petitioners: Ma. Belen B. Mangonon, for and in behalf of her minor children Rebeccas Angela Delgado and Regina Isabel Delgado Respondents: Court of Appeals, Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Federico C. Delgado and Francisco C. Delgado

FACTS: - Petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married. - At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent Civil Code provides, it was later on annulled.

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Persons and Family Relations -

On March 25, 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. Private respondents had totally abandoned them. On March 17, 1994, petitioner filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Petitioner compels that private respondent Federico support the education of their children since petitioner's monthly income can hardly support Rica and Rina's education. Petitioner likewise demands Federico's father, Francisco for general support. Trial court orders respondents to provide a monthtly support pendente lite of P5,000 each or a total of P10,000 for the education of Rica and Rina. Unsatisfied with the Order of the trial court, petitioner brought the case to the CA. CA affirmed the holding of the trial court

ISSUE: - W/N Francisco is obliged to give support to their children HELD/RATIO: - Yes. There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their children's college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco. Under Art. 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their parents. It having been established that respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters' education, he, in lieu of petitioner and respondent Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite. Moreover, Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, the obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give support. Thus, he may give the determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay in the family dwelling.

FRANCISCO v. TAYAO (1927)

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Persons and Family Relations Plaintiff and appellant: Juanaria Francisco Defendant and appellee: Lope Tayao FACTS:

-Francisco (plaintiff) and Tayao (defendant) contracted marriage in Manila in 1912 - They got separated in 1917. - The husband then moved to Zamboanga,and thereafter had an affair with a married woman named Bernardina Medrano who was the wife of Ambrosio Torres. - Torres filed a criminal case against Tayao and his wife. They were then sentenced to suffer three years, six months, and twenty-one days imprisonment (prision correccional), and to pay costs. - Relying on this criminal case, Francisco filed to sever the bonds of their marriage in the Court of First Instance of Manila, and was later denied by its judge basing on the fact that Francisco was not an innocent spouse within the meaning of Sections 1 and 3 of the Divorce Law. ISSUE(S): - W/N Francisco can secure a divorce from Tayao, where the latter has been convicted of adultery and not of concubinage, although the acts for which he was convicted of adultery may also constitute concubinage HELD/RATIO: - No. Francisco could not secure a divorce because she was not the innocent spouse who filed the criminal case against Tayao. Tayao was convicted of the crime of adultery, not concubinage, which is the only cause of action for filing a divorce against a husband. The institution of a criminal case by the injured wife is essential for the proper initiation of a prosecution for concubinage, and subsequently, for the proper filing of legal separation. What Francisco was asking from the Court was to convict the defendant of the crime of concubinage, although she had not established a prosecution for the same.

GANDIONCO vs PEÑARANDA (1987) Petitioner: Froilan Gandionco Respondents: Hon. Senen Peñaranda (Presiding Judge of the RTC of Misamis Oriental) and Teresita Gandionco FACTS: - On May 29, 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental, presided over by judge respondent, a complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. - On October 13, 1986, private respondent also filed with the Municipal Trial Court of General Santos City, a complaint against petitioner for concubinage as criminal case. - Respondent Judge ordered the payment of support pendente lite. - Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto (support and damages) should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him. To support his argument, petitioner cites Art. 111, Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states: “Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense… the following should be

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Persons and Family Relations observed: (a) After a criminal action has been commenced, the pending civil action arising from the same offense shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. ISSUES: - whether or not the civil action for legal separation on the ground of concubinage is inextricably tied to the criminal action, and thus have to be suspended to await conviction or acquittal for concubinage in the criminal case. HELD/RATIO: The amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure states that a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one “to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense” even if the civil and criminal actions arise from the same offense. This civil action for legal separation is intended to acquire the right to live separately, with other legal consequences appended to it, like dissolution of conjugal partnership of properties, custody, among others. Besides, a decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, maybe issued upon preponderence of evidence. Conviction in the criminal offense is not necessary to decide on the judgment of the civil case. This is a far cry from the doctrine made in Francisco vs Tayao, which as modified in the present Civil Code (and now amended by EO No. 229 or the Family Code).

ONG vs ONG (2006) Petitioner: Ong Eng Kiam (aka William Ong) Respondent: Lucita Ong FACTS: - William Ong and Lucita Ong were married on July 13, 1975 in Manila. They have three children all of whom are of legal age. - On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a complaint for legal separation under Art. 55 Paragraph 1 of the Family Code before the Regional Trial Court, insisting that her life with William was embedded with physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct. - Lucita claims her marriage life with William is filled with quarrels almost everyday. William corroborates this claim, but disagrees on the account that he places harm on his wife. - Some of the violence inflicted on Lucita by William: throwing a steel chair at her and their children; slapping and uttering insulting words at her; using his belt in hitting their children; pinning Lucita against the wall almost strangling her. William would hit her and their children because of petty reasons, such as when he could not find something, he would take it on them. - On December 14, 1995, Lucita could not take it anymore. After receiving the worst (according to her) beating from his husband—he even pointed a gun at her and ordered her to leave the house—Lucita decided to go to her sister’s house to seek help. - William obviously denies all of the accusations. He claims that the reason as to why Lucita wanted to divorce him is that she could take control of their conjugal properties, and give the same to her family. - Court of Appeals sided with the decision of the RTC to grant the legal separation. HELD/RATIO: The Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals. Unlike the RTC and CA, the Supreme Court has no opportunity of observing the deportment of witnesses on the stand, it has to rely heavily on the persuasive decisions of the lower courts. In this case, the witnesses and accounts posited by Lucita are indeed sufficient to grant her the legal separation.

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Persons and Family Relations BUGAYONG vs GINEZ (1956) Plaintiff and appellant: Benjamin Bugayong Defendant and appellee: Leonila Ginez FACTS: - Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, married Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949 in Pangasinan. - They lived together with Bugayong’s sisters. Bugayong had to leave to report for duty, but he and Ginez had come into an agreement that she would continue living with his sisters. - Ginez and Bugayong’s sisters moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, or about July 1951, Ginez left the house of her sisters-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Pangasinan. - The same month and year, Bugayong claimed that he began receiving letters from his sister and from anonymous writers telling him that his wife is committing infidelity. He also claimed that Ginez admitted that a certain Eliong had kissed her. - In August 1952 (one year after he allegedly received news of his wife’s infidelity), Bugayong went back to Pangasinan and sought his wife. She came along with him to his cousin’s house. They spent two nights and one day together as husband and wife. - On the second day, Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the allegations against her. Instead of answering him, Ginez packed her things up and left. Bugayong took this as confirmation of her acts of infidelity. - On November 18, 1952, Bugayong filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife. Ginez, on her part, denied the allegations the she committed adultery. - The lower courts denied Bugayong’s petition because the acts committed by Ginez have been condoned by him during those two nights they spent together in Pangasinan. ISSUES: Whether or not the husband’s decision to sleep with his wife for two nights despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him, amount to condonation of her supposed adulterous acts. HELD/RATIO: The lower courts failed to be persuaded that Ginez actually committed infidelity, but for the purposes of this case (Bugayong failed to present the letters that allegedly informed him of his wife’s adultery, and that the identity of Eliong could not be confirmed), they still decided on whether or not they would grant the legal separation to Bugayong whose under the assumption that his wife committed adultery. The Court is convinced that there was clearly a condonation on the part of Bugayong for the supposed acts of infidelity committed by Ginez. In Shackleton vs Shackleton, it has been held that “condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after knowledge of the other infidelity. Such acts necessarily implied forgiveness.” Thus, the two nights Bugayong and Ginez spent together deprive him of obtaining legal separation. A legal separation cannot be granted for adultery where the spouses continue to live together as husband and wife after becoming knowledgeable of the acts amounting to adultery.

LAPUZ vs EUFEMIO (1972) Petitioner-appellant: Carmen Lapuz Sy, represented by her substitute Macario Lapuz Respondent-appellee: Eufemio S. Eufemio (aka Eufemio Sy Uy)

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Persons and Family Relations FACTS: - Carmen Lapuz Sy and Eufemio S. Eufemio were married civilly on September 21, 1934, and canonically on September 30 of the same year. - In 1943, Eufemio abandoned Carmen. - They had no child, but they had acquired properties during their marriage. - Carmen discovered that his husband had been cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok, and that they had obtained marriage celebrated according to Chinese law and customs. - On August 18, 1953, Carmen filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio, also asking that Eufemio be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. - Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen, on the ground of his marriage to Go Hiok. - On May 31, 1969, before the case could even be finished, Carmen died in a vehicular accident. - On June 9, 1969, Eufemio moved that the case for legal separation be dismissed on the ground, among others, that Carmen’s death abated the action for legal separation. - On June 26, 1969, Macario Lapuz, Carmen’s father, substituted Carmen as petitioner. ISSUES: Whether or not the death of Carmen, before the final judgment of action for legal separation, abate the action. HELD/RATIO: Following the idea that the action for legal separation is pure personal, the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself—actio personalis moritur cum persona. Furthermore, Eufemio’s petition for declaration of nullity ab initio also becomes moot and academic. Now when it comes to the liquidation of the conjugal properties of the spouses, the heirs of the appellant can raise the proper action for partition in a separate proceeding, not in the annulment proceeding.

Arroyo v. Vasquez (1921) G.R. No. L-17014 Plaintiff-Appellant : Mariano Arroyo, Defendant-Appellee : Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo, FACTS:

- Mariano Arroyo (husband) and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo (wife) were married for 10 years. - The wife went away from their common home with the intention of living separately from her husband Mariano. - The husband made efforts inducing the wife to resume marital relations but to no avail. - The husband initiated an action to compel his wife to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. - The wife admitted the fact of marriage and that she left home without his consent but she averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave because of cruel treatment imposed by her husband. Thus, she in turn prayed for affirmative relief, to consist of: (1) decree of separation; (2) liquidation of conjugal property; (3) and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. RIVERA 2013

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Persons and Family Relations - The lower court gave judgement in favour of the defendant-appellee (the wife). The lower court reached the conclusion that the husband was more to be blamed than the wife due to his continued ill-treatment which is a sufficient justification of her abandonment of the conjugal home. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the wife absented herself from the marital home with sufficient justification (2) Whether or not the wife can be compelled to live with her husband HELD: (1) The wife absented herself from the marital home WITHOUT sufficient justification. (2) The wife CANNOT be compelled to live with her husband. RATIO: 1. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court. As based on evidence, it is the opinion of the high court that the wife’s abandonment of the marital home was without sufficient justification because the wife was rather afflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree. 2. It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. The experience of other countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus, the court cannot order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile but he is entitled to judicial declaration that wife’s abandonment of marital home is without sufficient justification and that it is her duty to return home.

Ligeralde v. Patalinghug (2010) G.R. No. 168796 Petitioner : Silvino Ligeralde, Respondents : May Ascension Patalinghug and Republic of the Philippines, Respondents FACTS: -

Silvino (husband) and May (wife) were married and blessed with four children. The husband caught his wife for several times having extra-marital affairs with other men. But the husband, for the sake of their children, wanted to reconcile with her wife and to start a new life. The couple started a new life but few months later, the wife continued a promiscuous behaviour. The wife confessed that she does not love him anymore. The husband realized that their marriage was hopeless. They then lived separately. The husband filed a complaint. RTC declared their marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity based on the Psychological Report of Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio. Later, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision on the ground that May’s alleged sexual infidelity and emotional immaturity do not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code and the psychologist failed to identify and prove the root cause thereof that the incapacity was medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

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Hence, this petition seeks to set aside the CA decision which reversed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not sexual infidelity automatically constitute psychological incapacity. HELD: No. Sexual Infidelity DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY constitute psychological incapacity. Ratio: (1) Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by: a) gravity; b) juridical antecedence; and 3) incurability. (2) The psychological incapacity must be: a) grave or serious that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; b) medically or clinically identified and shown to be permanent or incurable; and c) existing at the “time of the celebration.” (3) The psychologist failed to identify and prove the root cause thereof that the incapacity was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. (4) The husband failed to establish that the unfaithfulness of the respondent is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.

Jarillo v. People of the Philippines (2009 G.R. No. 164435 Petitioner : Victoria S. Jarillo Respondent : People of the Philippines FACTS: - Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy. - Emmanuel Uy filed against Jarillo a civil case for annulment of marriage before the RTC of Manila. Thereafter, Jarillo was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City. - Jarillo also filed against Alocillo before the RTC of Makati for declaration of nullity of their marriage. - RTC of Manila finds Jarillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy. Jarillo was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 6 years of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum. The motion for reconsideration was denied. - Hence, this petition for certiorari was filed by Jarillo, Petitioner.

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Jarillo argues that her marriage to Alocillo was null and void because the latter was married to another woman at the time of their marriage. Furthermore, she argued that her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of valid marriage. She also insisted that the action had prescribed since Uy knew about the marriage to Alocillo for 20 years. While the said petition for certiorari was pending, RTC of Makati City declared her marriage with Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. Thus, petitioner invoked this as ground for the reversal of her conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can be acquitted from conviction of Bigamy after the subsequent marriage was declared void ab initio. HELD: No. RATIO: 1. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. 2. All that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. 3. A marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. 4. The declaration of nullity of marriage shall first be secured before another marriage be contracted.

Ablaza v. Republic of the Philippines (2010) G.R. No. 158298 Petitioner : Isidro Ablaza Respondent : Republic of the Philippines FACTS: - Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. Petitioner argued that marriage was celebrated without a marriage license, thereby rendering the marriage vid ab initio. - Petitioner insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest. The determination of the validity of marriage is necessary in the determination of the properties he is entitled to. - The petition was dismissed by RTC on the ground that it was filed out of time and of being a non-party to the marriage. A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied. - The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but the petition was also dismissed. Though the CA expressed that the declaration of marriage void ab initio does not prescribe, the petitioner is still not a party to the said marriage. Hence, the dismissal of the petition. - Hence, this petition for certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court.

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Persons and Family Relations ISSUE: Whether or not a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother in order to determine and avail a substantial right. HELD: Yes. RATIO: 1. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under conditions stated in Articles 1001 and 1003 of the Civil Code. 2. The right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (whether legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s surviving heir. 3. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of RTC and CA in order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may not be prejudiced. 4. The Court however noted that the petitioner should have implead Leonila, the wife of the petitioner’s brother. Her participation in this action is made all the more necessary in order to shed llight on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage license and whether the marriage might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.

SPOUSES REX and CONCEPCION AGGABAO v. DIONISIO Z. PARULAN, JR. and MA. ELENA PARULAN Petitioner: Rex and Concepcion Aggabao Defendant: Dionisio Parulan, Jr. and Ma. Elena Parulan Facts: -

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The case involves two parcels of land located in No. 49 Miguel Cuaderno Street, Executive Village, BF Homes, Parañaque City and registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 63376 and TCT No. 63377 in the name of respondents Spouses Maria Elena A. Parulan and Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr. Respondent spouses have been estranged from one another. Real estate broker Atanacio offered the property to petitioners. The petitioners already met with Ma. Elena and made payment arrangements. On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final amount of P700,000.00 to Ma. Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor. However, Ma. Elena did not turn over the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376, claiming that said copy was in the possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong. She assured them that the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376 would be turned over after a week. The petitioners learned that the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT No. 63376 had been all along in the custody of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who appeared to hold an SPA executed by his brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell both lots. They recalled that Atty. Parulan “smugly demanded P800,000.00” in exchange for the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT No. 63376, because Atty. Parulan represented the current value of the property to be P1.5 million. As a counter-offer, however, they tendered P250,000.00, which Atty. Parulan declined. Atty. Parulan decided to call them on April 5, 1991, but they informed him that they had already fully paid to Ma. Elena. Dioniso, through Atty. Parulan, commenced the action.

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Persons and Family Relations Issues: 1. Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should apply to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio? 2. Whether or not the petitioners be considered in good faith at the time of their purchase of the property Held/ Ratio: 1. Art. 124 of the Family Code prevails.  Art. 173 of the Civil Code was already repealed by the Family Code.  The sale was made on 1991, after the effectivity of the Family Code.  According to Art. 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired.  Petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding the administration over the property, had delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the property, considering that they did not present in court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan the authority for the administration.  The petitioners’ insistence that Atty. Parulan’s making of a counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting ratified the sale merits no consideration because a transaction without Dionisio’s written consent would be void. There was nothing to be ratified. 2. Due diligence is required in verifying vendor’s title and agent’s authority to sell property.  The petitioners knew fully well that the law demanded the written consent of Dionisio to the sale, but yet they did not present evidence to show that they had made inquiries into the circumstances behind the execution of the SPA purportedly executed by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena.  The final payment of P700,000.00 even without the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT No. 63376 being handed to them by Ma. Elena indicated a revealing lack of precaution on the part of the petitioners.  They did not take immediate action against Ma. Elena upon discovering that the owner’s original copy of TCT No. 63376 was in the possession of Atty. Parulan, contrary to Elena’s representation.

PIMENTEL v. PIMENTEL Petitioner: Joselito R. Pimentel Defendant: Maria Chrysantine L. Pimentel and People of the Philippines Facts: -

Private respondent filed an action for frustrated parricide against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Petitioner was summoned in the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings in RTC QC on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

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The RTC QC ruled that the case in RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of criminal case before it. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. RTC QC denied it. Petitioner assails the decision of RTC QC in Court of Appeals. The petition was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner. Held/Ratio: 1. Annulment of Marriage is not a prejudicial question in criminal case of parricide. a. The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder or homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. b. Even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent. 2. Tenebro v. Court of Appeals cannot be applied to this case. a. The issue in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. b. Also, the Court declared in that case that “a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.”

BOLOS v. BOLOS Petitioner: Cynthia S. Bolos Defendant: Danilo T. Bolos Facts: -

Petitioner Cynthia filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo under Art. 36 of the Family Code. The RTC granted the petition for annulment on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent. Respondent Danilo filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC denied it due to failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial. He filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of appeal, which was likewise denied. The RTC declared the decision to be final. Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children. The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the orders of the RTC. 1. Cynthia sought for motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration. The CA denied this.

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Persons and Family Relations Issue: Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is applicable to this case Held/Ratio: The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages is not applicable to this case.  As per section 1 which indicates the scope of the statute, the coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration considering that the reglementary period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-extendible.  The rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with.  The 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution. Its permanence and inviolability is emphasized by Article 1 of the Family Code.  Petitioner’s earlier motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration.

BACCAY v. BACCAY Petitioner: Noel Baccay Defendant: Maribel Baccay and the Republic of the Philippines Facts: -

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The petitioner and private respondent were schoolmates at Mapua Institute of Technology. The two became sweethearts. Noel considered Maribel as the snobbish and hard-to-get type. Noel’s family was aware of their relationship for he used to bring her to their house. Noel observed that Maribel was inordinately shy when around his family. During special occasions, he would invite her to come with his family but he would always try to avoid his invitations. Noel talked to her about her attitude towards his family and she said she would change, but she never did. Noel decided to break up with Maribel. Maribel refused and offered to accept Noel’s relationship with another woman only if they would not sever their ties. They remained friends. Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly friendly, they had several romantic moments together. Noel took their sexual relations casually since Maribel never demanded anything aside from his company. Maribel told Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Upon the advice of his mother, Noel grudgingly agreed to marry Maribel. They got married. After the marriage ceremony, Noel and Maribel agreed to live with Noel’s family in their house at Rosal, Pag-asa, Quezon City. During all the time she lived with Noel’s family, Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them.

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Noel noticed that he never observed any symptoms of the pregnancy of Maribel. He asked her officemates and they confirmed that she does not manifest such signs. Maribel did not go home for a day, and when she came home she announced to Noel and his family that she had a miscarriage and was confined at the Chinese General Hospital where her sister worked as a nurse. When Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage, it escalated into an intense quarrel that led Noel’s parents to ask them to leave her house. Maribel left and went to her family, and she rejected any efforts of Noel to try to communicate with her. After less than two years of marriage, Noel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Despite summons, Maribel did not participate in the proceedings. The marriage was declared null and void in the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City. However, the OSG appealed, and the CA reversed the decision of the lower court.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage between the parties is null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Held/Ratio: The totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated.  Noel’s evidence merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage.  He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.  The report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage.  The same psychologist testified that Maribel was capable of entering into a marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one. Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by law.  Psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.

AGRAVIADOR v. AGRAVIADOR Petitioner: Enrique Agraviador y Alunan Defendant: Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador Facts: -

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Petitioner was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of Customs while the respondent was a 17-year old waitress when they first met at a beerhouse where the respondent worked. They got married and had four children. The petitioner’s family was apprehensive about this marriage because of the nature of the respondent’s work and because she came from a broken family. The petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the respondent, under Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she was carefree and irresponsible,

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and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities. He also claimed that the respondent refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she became “very close” to a male tenant in their house. Aside from the petitioner’s testimony, he also presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract and the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac. The RTC nullified the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent in its decision. It saw merit in the petitioner’s testimony and Dr. Patac’s psychiatric evaluation report. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC resolution, and dismissed the petition.

Issue: Whether or not there is basis to nullify the petitioner’s marriage to the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations. Held/Ratio:  The petitioner’s testimony failed to establish that the respondent’s condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that makes her completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. o Petitioner merely showed that the respondent had some personality defects that showed their manifestation during the marriage o Petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of the respondent’s condition; neither did he mention that the respondent’s malady was incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the respondent’s means to undertake  The Court finds that Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short in proving that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. o Dr. Patac relied only on the information fed by the petitioner, the parties’ second child, Emmanuel, and household helper.

ANTONE v. BERONILLA Petitioner: Myrna P. Antone Defendant: Leo R. Beronilla

Facts: -

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Petitioner Myrna P. Antone executed an Affidavit-Complaint for Bigamy against Leo R. Beronilla before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. She alleged that her marriage with respondent in 1978 had not yet been legally dissolved when the latter contracted a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo in 1991. Respondent moved to quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. He argued that his marriage with petitioner was declared null and void by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran.

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After a hearing on the motion, the court quashed the Information. Applying Morigo v. People, it ruled that: The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. The prosecution, through herein petitioner, moved for reconsideration of the said Order. The court denied it. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. CA dismissed the petition. She requested for a motion for reconsideration. It was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion when it sustained respondent’s motion to quash on the basis of a fact contrary to those alleged in the information. Held/Ratio: The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when, in so quashing the Information in Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM, it considered an evidence introduced to prove a fact not alleged thereat disregarding the settled rules that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts stated in the information; and that facts not alleged thereat may be appreciated only under exceptional circumstances, none of which is obtaining in the instant petition.  It would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to dismiss the information on the basis only of the petitioner’s evidence. The Court sees no apparent defect in the allegations in the Information in the case at bar.  The documents showing that: (1) the court has decreed that the marriage of petitioner and respondent is null and void from the beginning; and (2) such judgment has already become final and executory and duly registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar of Naval, Biliran are pieces of evidence that seek to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the Information ˗ that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time the respondent contracted a subsequent marriage. This should not have been considered at all because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.  The issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense.

DOLINA v. VALLECERA Petitioner: Cherryl B. Dolina Defendant: Glenn D. Vallecera Facts: -

-

Petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City for alleged woman and child abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) 9262. Dolina also prayed for financial support from Vallecera for their supposed child, which she based on the child’s Certificate of Live Birth which listed defendant as the father. Petition also asked the RTC to order Philippine Airlines, Vallecera’s employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem appropriate. Vallecera argued that the petition was just for financial support and not for protection against abuses, that the signature on the Certificate of Live Birth is not his, and that he has never lived with Dolina. The RTC dismissed the petition.

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Persons and Family Relations Issue: Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolina’s action for temporary protection and denied her application for temporary support for her child. Held/Ratio: Dolina filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. 1. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence. Issuance of a protection order can include a grant of legal support for the wife and child. 2. It became apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this was not the case since, contrary to her claim, because neither she nor her child ever lived with Vallecera. The abuse cannot just be assumed. 3. To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. Vallecera denied the allegation. 4. The child’s remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition.

Title: Marable v. Marable (GR no. 178741, Jan 17, 2011) New Civil Code: Article 36 Petitioner: ROSALINO L. MARABLE, Respondent: MYRNA F. MARABLE Facts: -

-

Petitioner and respondent met in 1967 while studying at Arellano University. Petitioner courted respondent and they eventually became sweethearts even though petitioner already had a girl friend. On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison and their marriage was blessed with five children. As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels became common occurrences. They fought incessantly and petitioner became unhappy because of it. Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with another woman. Respondent learned about the affair, and petitioner promptly terminated it. When he could not bear his lot any longer, petitioner left the family home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City. He gave up all the properties which he and respondent had accumulated during their marriage in favor of respondent and their children. Later, he converted to Islam after dating several women. On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds. On said date, he filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential responsibilities of marital life.

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Persons and Family Relations -

-

He pointed that he constantly longed for affection coming from a miserable childhood experience. In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist from the National Center for Mental Health, stating that petitioner is suffering from “Antisocial Personality Disorder,” characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse. It was Dr. Tayag’s conclusion that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioner’s marriage to respondent on the ground of petitioner’s psychological incapacity. Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the RTC decision. The CA held that the circumstances related by petitioner are insufficient to establish the existence of petitioner’s psychological incapacity. i. The appellate court emphasized that the root cause of petitioner’s psychological ii. incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. iii. In addition, the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

Issues: b. c.

Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC’s decision Whether or not Petitioner is really Psychologically Incapacitated enough to bring disability to perform his essential marital obligations

d.

Petitioner completely relied on the psychological examination conducted by Dr. Tayag on him to establish his psychological incapacity. The result of the examination and the findings of Dr. Tayag however, are insufficient to establish petitioner's psychological incapacity. i. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there was no factual basis stated for the finding that petitioner is a socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful. ii. There was no established link between petitioner’s acts to his alleged psychological incapacity. It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself The records would show that the petitioner acted responsibly during their marriage and in fact worked hard to provide for the needs of his family, most especially his children. Their personal differences do not reflect a personality disorder tantamount to psychological incapacity. Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father, was one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that he became unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his personal history. i. . It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity Santos v. Court of Appeals, the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage The totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to establish petitioner’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations.

Held/Ratio:

e. f.

g. h.

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Persons and Family Relations B. Disposition: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The February 12, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 and its Resolution dated July 4, 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

Title: Dino v. Dino (GR. No. 178044, Jan. 19, 2011) A. Petitioner: ALAIN M. DIÑO B. Defendant: MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO Facts: -

-

-

-

Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the petition, was already living in the United States of America. After no response from the espondent, petitioner learned that she had alrady filed for a divorce/dissolution of their marriage which was granted by theSuperior Court of California, and that on Oct. 5, 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years, long-lasting, hence incurable The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity, however, declaring that: A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. i. Petitioner partially appealed to this order which ten led the court to modify it as: 1. A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code b. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.

Issues: The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code Held/Ratio:

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Persons and Family Relations c. d.

The court agrees with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides: a.

Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

b.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership Therefore, it is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage

c. d. e.

Title: Yambao v. RP and Yambao (GR No. 184063, Jan. 24, 2011) New Civil Code: Article 36 A. Petitioner: CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO B. Defendant: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and PATRICIO E. YAMBAO

Facts: -

Petitioner and respondent were married on December 21, 1968 at the Philamlife Church in Quezon City. On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC, Makati City, praying that the marriage be declared null and void by reason of respondent’s psychological incapacity, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. In her petition before the RTC, petitioner narrated that, since the beginning, her and respondent’s married life had been marred by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to the latter’s inability to comply with the essential obligations of married life Petitioner averred that through all the years of their married life, she was the only one who earned a living and took care of the children. Petitioner also claimed that, when their children were babies, respondent did not even help to change their diapers or feed them, even while petitioner was recovering from her caesarean operation, proffering the excuse that he knew nothing about children In his Answer, respondent denied that he has refused to work. He claimed that he had been trying to find a decent job, but was always unable to because of his old age and lack of qualifications As to the care of their children, respondent countered that no fault should be attributed to him because that is the duty of the household help

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Persons and Family Relations -

On February 9, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit The court said that, even as petitioner claimed to be unhappy in the marriage, it is incontrovertible that the union lasted for over thirty years and the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood without suffering any major parenting problems In a Decision*26+ dated April 16, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. The CA held that petitioner failed to show that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage

Issues: Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations based on evidence presented by the petitioner

Held/Ratio: a. b. c. d. e.

f.

g.

h.

C.

The petition has no merit and, perforce, must be denied. The Court reiterates its recent pronouncement that each case for declaration of nullity under the foregoing provision must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections, or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[45] the Court held that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition On the contrary to petitioner’s allegations, respondent’s efforts, though few and far between they may be, showed an understanding of his duty to provide for his family, albeit he did not meet with much success. Whether his failure was brought about by his own indolence or irresponsibility, or by some other external factors, is not relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in showing an awareness to provide for his family, even with his many failings, does not suffer from psychological incapacity Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will.[51] This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Respondent may not have turned out to be the ideal husband, or may have failed to meet petitioner’s exacting standards. Yet this Court finds it impossible to believe that, as petitioner alleges, there was nothing but heartache and strife in their over 35 years (prior to filing the petition for declaration of nullity) of marriage Certainly, the marriage was beset by difficulties, or as petitioner puts it, “marred by bickerings, quarrels, and recrimination.” It is a fact, however, that all marriages suffer through the same trials at one point or another, with some going through more rough patches than others; that they had gone through 35 years together as husband and wife is an indication that the parties can, should they choose to do so, work through their problems

Disposition: WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 16, 2008 and the Resolution dated August 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262 are AFFIRMED

Title: Aguete v. PNB (GR No. 170166, Apr. 6, 2011) RIVERA 2013

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Persons and Family Relations A. Petitioner: JOE A. ROS and ESTRELLA AGUETE B. Defendant: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK- LAOAG BRANCH Facts: a.

b.

c. d. e.

f.

g.

h. i. j. k. l.

On January 13, 1983, spouses Jose A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB, Laoag Branch before the Court of First Instance, Ilocos Norte docketed as Civil Case No. 7803. The complaint was later amended and was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Laoag City The averments in the complaint disclosed that plaintiff-appellee Joe A. Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974 and as security for the loan, plaintiff-appellee Ros executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land – Lot No. 9161 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag, with all the improvements thereon described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9646 Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder After the lapse of one (1) year without the property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB, Laoag Branch on August 10, 1978 Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property – a complaint was filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property – interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family In its answer, PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action, and insists that it was plaintiffs-appellees’ own acts [of]omission/connivance that bar them from recovering the subject property on the ground of estoppel, laches, abandonment and prescription On 29 June 2001, the trial court rendered its Decision5 in favor of petitioners. The trial court declared that Aguete did not sign the loan documents, did not appear before the Notary Public to acknowledge the execution of the loan documents, did not receive the loan proceeds from PNB, and was not aware of the loan until PNB notified her in 14 August 1978 that she and her family should vacate the mortgaged property because of the expiration of the redemption period PNB filed its Notice of Appeal7 of the trial court’s decision on 13 September 2001 The trial court allowed petitioners to occupy the subject property with the condition that petitioners would voluntarily vacate the premises and waive recovery of improvements introduced should PNB prevail on appeal On 17 October 2005, the appellate court rendered its Decision13 and granted PNB’s appeal. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, and dismissed petitioners’ complaint The appellate court declared that Aguete affixed her signatures on the documents knowingly and with her full consent Assuming arguendo that Aguete did not give her consent to Ros’ loan, the appellate court ruled that the conjugal partnership is still liable because the loan proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family

Issues: Whether or not Ros’ loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership, which debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership

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Persons and Family Relations

C.

Ruling+ Ratio: The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the appellate court a. b.

c. d. e.

f.

g. h. i. j. k. l.

The Civil Code was the applicable law at the time of the mortgage. The subject property is thus considered part of the conjugal partnership of gains There is no doubt that the subject property was acquired during Ros and Aguete’s marriage. Ros and Aguete were married on 16 January 1954, while the subject property was acquired in 1968.15 There is also no doubt that Ros encumbered the subject property when he mortgaged it for P115,000.00 on 23 October 1974.16 PNB Laoag does not doubt that Aguete, as evidenced by her signature, consented to Ros’ mortgage to PNB of the subject property The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife The same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a notary public, hence they are public documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged and certified as provided by law may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved.18 The execution of a document that has been ratified before a notary public cannot be disproved by the mere denial of the alleged signer A notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and it has in its favor the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to the falsity of the certificate Furthermore, an allegation of forgery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the same Ros himself cannot bring action against PNB, for no one can come before the courts with unclean hands. In their memorandum before the trial court, petitioners themselves admitted that Ros forged Aguete’s signature The application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively “for additional working *capital+ of buy & sell of garlic & virginia tobacco.” Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term “x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership

Title: Flores v. Lindo (GR No. 183984, Apr. 13, 2011) A. Petitioner: ARTURO SARTE FLORES B. Defendant: SPOUSES ENRICO L. LINDO, JR and EDNA C. LINDO

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Persons and Family Relations Facts: -

-

On 31 October 1995, Edna Lindo (Edna) obtained a loan from Arturo Flores (petitioner) amounting to P400,000 payable on 1 December 1995 with 3% compounded monthly interest and 3% surcharge in case of late payment. To secure the loan, Edna executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage4 (the Deed) covering a property in the name of Edna and her husband Enrico (Enrico) Lindo, Jr. (collectively, respondents). Edna also signed a Promissory Note and the Deed for herself and for Enrico as his attorney-in-fact. Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the loan. All checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds, prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage with Damages against respondents In its 30 September 2003 Decision,6 the RTC, Branch 33 ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The RTC, Branch 33 found that the Deed was executed by Edna without the consent and authority of Enrico Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order7 dated 8 January 2004, the RTC, Branch 33 denied the motion for lack of merit The RTC, Branch 42 ruled that the RTC, Branch 33 expressly stated that its decision did not mean that petitioner could no longer recover the loan petitioner extended to Edna Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order before the Court of Appeals In its 30 May 2008 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the 22 July 2005 and 8 February 2006 Orders of the RTC, Branch 42 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one on a judgment upon the merits in any one is available ground for the dismissal of the others The Court of Appeals ruled that on a nonpayment of a note secured by a mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor, that is recovery of the credit with execution of the suit The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner had only one cause of action against Edna for her failure to pay her obligation and he could not split the single cause of action by filing separately a foreclosure proceeding and a collection case. By filing a petition for foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner had already waived his personal action to recover the amount covered by the promissory note.

Issues: whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in dismissing the complaint for collection of sum of money on the ground of multiplicity of suits

Held/Ratio: The petition has merit a.

The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the debt. The mortgagecreditor has the option of either filing a personal action for collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security.

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Persons and Family Relations b.

c. d. e.

f.

g. h.

i.

j. k.

The real estate mortgage executed by petition Edna Lindo over their conjugal property is undoubtedly an act of strict dominion and must be consented to by her husband to be effective. In the instant case, the real estate mortgage, absent the authority or consent of the husband, is necessarily void Indeed, where a mortgage is not valid, the principal obligation which it guarantees is not thereby rendered null and void. In case of nullity, the mortgage deed remains as evidence or proof of a personal obligation of the debtor and the amount due to the creditor may be enforced in an ordinary action. In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were executed on 31 October 1995. The Special Power of Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract However, The Court of Appeals stated that petitioner merely relied on the declarations of these courts that he could file a separate personal action and thus failed to observe the rules and settled jurisprudence on multiplicity of suits, closing petitioner’s avenue for recovery of the loan. Nevertheless, petitioner still has a remedy under the law The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another without just cause or consideration. The principle is applicable in this case considering that Edna admitted obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same has not been fully paid without just cause. The Deed was declared void erroneously at the instance of Edna, first when she raised it as a defense before the RTC, Branch 33 and second, when she filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch 93. Petitioner could not be expected to ask the RTC, Branch 33 for an alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he should have done, because the RTC, Branch 33 already stated that it had no jurisdiction over any personal action that petitioner might have against Edna Considering the circumstances of this case, the principle against unjust enrichment, being a substantive law, should prevail over the procedural rule on multiplicity of suits Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich herself because of the erroneous decisions of the two trial courts when she questioned the validity of the Deed

Title: Sultan v. Macalinog Abdulla (AM No. SCC-11-16-P) A. Petitioner: SULTAN PANDAGARANAO A. ILUPA B. Defendant: MACALINOG S. ABDULLAH Facts: -

The complainant alleges in support of the charge that the respondent exhibited ignorance of his duties as clerk of court when he issued a certificate of divorce, (OCRG Form No. 102) relying mainly on an illegal “Kapasadan” or Agreement He claims that the respondent took away his beautiful wife by force or had a personal interest in her The complainant believes that the respondent should not have issued the divorce certificate because divorce is not recognized in the country and the “Kapasadan” or separation agreement had already been revoked by Philippine civil law

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Persons and Family Relations -

To save his marriage with Nella Rocaya Mikunug — originally solemnized on May 19, 1959, based on the Maranao culture, and later renewed through a civil wedding before a Marawi City judge — the complainant filed a petition for restitution of marital rights with the SCC, Marawi City To his dismay, the judge dismissed the petition without any notice or summons to him. He suspects that the dismissal was due to the respondent’s “hukos-pukos” or manipulation The respondent argues that contrary to the complainant’s claim, there was a divorce agreement, in the Maranao dialect, attached to the divorce certificate. The complainant even signed both pages of the agreement. Although the agreement was not labeled as such, its essence indicates that the couple agreed to have a divorce and it was so understood also by their children and the witnesses who signed the agreement On the complainant’s claim that there is no divorce in the Philippines, the respondent points out that this is true only as far as the civil law is concerned, but not under the Muslim Law which recognizes divorce In compliance with the Court’s Resolution dated August 25, 2010, Executive Judge Gamor B. Disalo of the RTC, 12th Judicial Region, Marawi City, investigated the complaint, and submitted a Report and Recommendation dated January 19, 2010 The complainant’s non-cooperation prompted Judge Disalo to close the investigation and to conclude, based on the facts gathered by the OCA and on the cited applicable laws, that sufficient grounds existed to dismiss the complaint

Issues: Whether or not the issuance of a certificate of divorce is within the respondent’s duties, as defined by law

Held/Ratio: We agree with the OCA and Judge Disalo that the complaint is devoid of merit a.

Evidently, respondent Clerk of Court merely performed his ministerial duty in accordance with the foregoing provisions. The alleged erroneous entries on the Certificate of Divorce cannot be attributed to respondent Clerk of Court considering that it is only his duty to receive, file and register the certificate of divorce presented to him for registration b. Further, even if there were indeed erroneous entries on the certificate of divorce, such errors cannot be corrected nor cancelled through [his] administrative complaint. The issue is judicial in nature which cannot be assailed through this administrative proceeding c. On the allegation that the respondent Clerk of Court manipulated the dismissal of his petition for restitution of marital rights, we find the same unsubstantiated. d. Aside from complainant’s bare allegation, there was no substantial evidence presented to prove the charge. e. It is a settled rule in administrative proceedings that the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in his or her complaint with substantial evidence. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail (Rafael Rondina, et al. v. Associate Justice Eloy Bello, Jr., A.M. No. CA-5-43, 8 July 2005.

Aurelio v Aurelio G.R. No. 175367, June 6, 2011

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Persons and Family Relations Petitioner:Danilo A. Aurelio Respondent:Vida Ma. Corazon P. Aurelio Facts: -

-

-

On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. Respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective essential marital obligations and such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and during the time of the marriage ceremony. Respondent said that psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the husband, lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife, exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife, alteration of moods, arrogance, and insensitivity, among others. The husband, petitioner, suffers from passive aggressive(negativistic) personality disorder that renders him immature and irresponsible to assume to normal obligations of a marriage. Respondent claims that she is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely, has low tolerance for boredom. She claims that she is emotionally immature. She also cannot stand frustration or disappointment and cannot delay to gratify her needs. She suffers from a Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features. On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition. Petitioner argued that petition failed to state cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code. On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed that the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals(CA) via petition for certiorari.CA dismissed the petition.

Issues: 1. Whether or not Court of Appeals violated the applicable law and jurisprudence when it held that the allegations contained in the petition for declaration of the nullity of marriage are sufficient for the court to declare the nullity of the marriage between Vida and Danilo; 2. Whether or not the a Court of Appeals violated the applicable and jurisprudence when it denied petitioner’s action for certiorari despite the fact that the denial of his motion to dismiss by the trial court is patiently and utterly tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction Held/Ratio: 1.

No. The Court of Appeals did not violate the applicable law and jurisprudence. 



Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. The manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. An expect psychologist clinically identified the same root causes. The illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.

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Persons and Family Relations  2.

The essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the petition.

No. The Court of Appeals did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. The CA properly dismissed the petitioner’s petition. 

As a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss is not reviewable for certiorari. Petitioner’s remedy is to reiterate the grounds in his motion to dismiss as defenses in his answer to the petition for nullity of marriage, proceed trial and, in case of an adverse decision, appeal the decision in due time.

Lucas v Lucas (2011) G.R. No. 190710 Petitioner:Jesse U. Lucas Respondent:Jesus S. Lucas Facts: -

1.

2. 3. 4.

On July 26, 2007, petitioner Jesse U. Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Valenzuela City. - According to the petitioner, in 1967, his mother Elsie Uy migrated to Manila and eventually got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas and an intimate relationship developed between the two. Elsie got pregnant and give birth to petitioner on March 11, 1969. - The name of petitioner’s father was not stated in petitioner’s certificate of live birth. However, Elsie told petitioner that the respondent is the father. On August 1, 1969, petitioner was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue, Pasay City. - Responent allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and petitiober for a period of about two years. When the relationship of Elsie and petitioner ended, Elsie raised the petitioner on her own. When petitioner was growing up, attempts were made to introduce petitioner to respondent but all attempts were in vain. Attached in the petitioner were the following: a. Petitioner’s certificate of live birth b. Petitioner’s baptismal certificate c. Petitioner’s college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology d. His Certificate of Graduation from the same school e. Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music; f. Clippings of several articles from different news papers about petitioner as a musical prodigy. Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. On August 29, 2007, his counsel went to the trial court and obtained a copy of the petition. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. On September 3, 2007, the RTC issued the Order setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to file his opposition. On September 4, 2007, unaware of the issuance of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a Special Appearance and Comment. He manifested that:

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Persons and Family Relations 1) 2) 3) 4) 5.

he did not receive the summons and a copy of the petition; the petition was adversarial in nature and summons should be served on him as respondent; should the court agree that summons was required, he was waiving service of summons and making a voluntary appearance; and notice by publication of the petition and the hearing was improper because of the confidentiality of the subject matter. After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed for a motion for reconsideration that the petition was not due in form and substance because petitioner could not have personally known that matters were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioner’s father. At the same time, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence. 6. On July 30, 2008, the RTC acting on the respondent’s motion for reconsideration dismissed the case. 7. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC resolved in his favor, setting aside the previous order of dismissing the case. 8. On October 20, 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration and for Dismissal of Petition. 9. On January 19, 2009, the RTC denied the motion and rescheduled the hearing. 10. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On September 25, 2009, the CA decided the petition for certiorari in favor of the respondent. The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent as no summons has been served on him. The CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish illegitimate filiation. 11. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 17, 2009, the CA denied the motion for lack of merit. Issues: 1.

Whether or not a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order

Held/Ratio: YES. Thus,during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. Herrara v. Alba -applied by RTC and CA -four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case -procedural aspects are only applicable during trial when parties have presented their evidence and not during the initial stage of proceedings, such in this case that the petition to establish filiation has only been filed. -CA erred in observing that that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case—the first procedural aspect in a paternity case prima facie case -built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading Section 4 of the Rule on DNA evidence Rule on DNA Evidence -enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system -“prescribed parameters on the requisite

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Persons and Family Relations elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence -merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing Court order for blood testing equivalent to “search” under the Constitution. -there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the test The Supreme Court of Louisiana explained: “Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.” The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits.

Teves v. People (20011) G.R. No. 188775 Petitioner: Cenon R. Tevez Respondent: People of the Philippines and Danilo Bongalon Facts: -

-

Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the January 21, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Malolos City which found petitioner Cenon R. Tevez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. On November 26, 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Tevez and Thelma Jaime-Tevez at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila. After the marriage, Thelma worked abroad. In 2002, she came home to the Philippines for vacation and she was informed that her husband had contracted marriage with a certain Edita Calderon. Based on the copy of Certificate of Marriage from the National Statistics Office, Cenon and Edita married on December 10, 2001 at the Divine Trust Consulting Services, Meycauayan, Bulacan.

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Persons and Family Relations -

1.

2. 3. 4.

On February 13, 2006, the uncle of Thelma, Danilo Bongalon, filed before the Provincial Prosecutor of Malolos City a complaint accusing petitioner of committing bigamy. - Petitioner was charged with bigamy on June 8, 2006. On May 4, 2006, the Regional Trial Court Branch 130 in Caloocan City rendered a decision declaring the marriage of petitioner and Thelma null and void on the ground that Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. On June 27, 2006, said decision became final by virtue of a Certification of Finality. On August 15, 2007, the trial court rendered its decision finding Cenon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. Petitioner appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals contending that the court erred in not ruling that his criminal action or liability has already been extinguished. On January 21, 2009, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: 1. Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy

Held/Ratio Yes. Petitioner has committed bigamy Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, “there is in effect no marriage at all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of.”He differentiates a previous valid or voidable marriage from a marriage null and void ab initio, and posits that the former requires a judicial dissolution before one can validly contract a second marriage but a void marriage, for the same purpose, need not be judicially determined. Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tanis inapplicable in his case because in the Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy was initiated before the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed. In petitioner’s case, the first marriage had already been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy case was filed in court. The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. Thus, the CA was correct in affirming the conviction of petitioner. A marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void. The remarrying spouse must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10 December 2001 when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage.

Cabreza Jr., et al. v Cabreza (2012) G.R. No. 181962 RIVERA 2013

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Persons and Family Relations Petitioner: Ceferino S. Cabreza, Jr., BJD Holdings Corp. Respondent: Amparo Robles Cabreza Facts: 1. Respondent Ceferino S. Cabreza, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner Amparo Robles Cabreza. 2. On January 3, 2001, the petition was granted. Marriage of petitioner and respondent is nullified pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. Conjugal partnership is dissolved and is to be liquidated in accordance with Art. 129 of the Family Code. 3. Cerefino moved that their only conjugal property, their conjugal home be sold and proceeds distributed as mandated by law. 4. On May 26, 2003, the RTC granted his motion. Such motion became final when the Supreme Court dismissed on technicalities, Amparo’s petition questioning said Order. 5. Ceferino thereafter filed an Omnibus Motion (1) to approve the Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed of Sale); (2) to authorize petitioner-movant to sign the Deed of Sale for and on behalf of Amparo; and (3) to order the occupants of the premises to vacate the property. Despite notice to Amparo, only Ceferino and his counsel appeared during the scheduled hearing on the Motion. On October 2, 2003, the RTC granted the Omnibus Motion. 6. Ceferino then executed the Deed of Sale in favor of BJD Holdings Corporation. He then filed a Motion for Writ of Possession and to Divide the Purchase Price. RTC Br. 70 then issued a Writ of Possession followed by a June 30, 2004 Notice to Vacate. 7. Amparo filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate, arguing that (1) the parties had another conjugal lot apart from the conjugal dwelling; and (2) under Article 129 of the Family Code,the conjugal dwelling should be adjudicated to her as the spouse, with whom four of the five Cabreza children were staying. RTC Br. 70 denied her Motion and the Court of Appeals upheld the denial, prompting her to file with the file with the SC a Petition for Review of this CA Decision, docketed as G.R. No. 171260. 8. On September 11, 2009, the SC in G.R. No. 171260 denied Amparo’s petition since the May 26 2003 Order of RTC Br. 70 is already final, authorizing the sale of the family home. 9. On January 26, 2005, during the pendency of the CA Petition which culminated in G.R. No. 171260, Amparo filed with Pasig RTC Br. 67a complaint to annul the Deed of Absolute Sale for being void due to lack of her consent thereto. RTC Br. 67 dismissed the Complaint with prejudice, on the basis of litis pendentia and forum shopping. 10. Amparo appealed to the CA, which reversed the Resolution of RTC Br. 67. Holding that there was no litis pendentia and therefore no forum shopping, the appellate court directed that the case be remanded for trial on the merits. 11. Ceferino moved for consideration of the CA ruling but his Motion was denied. He then filed the present petition. Issues: 1. Whether or not litis pendentia was properly invoked as a ground for dismissing the action

Ruling + Ratio: No. Litis pendentia was not properly invoked in dismissing the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale.

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Persons and Family Relations Regarding the first requisite, there is no dispute that the two cases have substantially the same parties. Regarding the second requisite, the CA correctly noted that to determine whether there is identity of the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for grounded on the same facts and bases, the following tests may be utilized: (1) whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and the second causes of action; or (2) whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other. The CA held that using the first test, the evidence in the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale would be the Deed of Sale itself; while in the case impugning the Writ of Possession, it would be the trial court’s Order applying Article 129 of the Family Code.The CA failed to consider that RTC Br. 70 issued an Order dated 2 October 2003, which granted authority to Ceferino to sign the Deed of Sale on Amparo’s behalf. This same Order also contained, in its dispositive portion, a directive that “(a)fter the sale of the subject property shall have been consummated, all the occupants thereof shall vacate and clear the same to enable the buyer to take complete possession and control of the property.” Thus, using the first test, the same evidence – the 2 October 2003 Order of RTC Br. 70 – would defeat both Amparo’s Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale and her Petition impugning the Writ of Possession. Notably, Amparo failed to timely question RTC Br. 70’s Order dated 2 October 2003. The CA also held that, using the second test, the defenses raised in one case will not necessarily be used in the other. It reasoned that although the grant of the Petition impugning the Writ of Possession would result in the nullification of the Deed of Sale, the denial of the Petition would not bar a ruling on the Complaint for nullification of the Deed of Sale, which was based on Amparo’s lack of consent thereto. As to the last requisite, a final judgment on the merits by a court that has jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject matter in the Petition to nullify the Writ of Possession would have barred subsequent judgment on the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale based on the principle of res judicata. The Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale cannot prosper, because, like the Petition to nullify the Writ of Possession, it effectively seeks the modification of an already final Order of RTC Br. 70.

Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr., et al. v Servacio and Go (2011) G.R. No. 157537 Petitioners:Heirs Of Protacio Go, Sr. and Marta Barola, namely: Leonor, Simplicio, Protacio, Jr., Antonio, Beverly Ann Lorrainne, Tita, Consolacion, Leonora and Asuncion, all Surnamed Go Respondents: Ester L. Servacio and Rito B. Go

Facts:

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Persons and Family Relations 1. 2. 3.

4. 5. 6.

7.

On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with a total area of 17,140 square meters situated in Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go, Jr. Twenty three years later, on May 29, 1999, Protacio Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver that it was his father who purchased the land. On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died, wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners. On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go (joined by Rito’s wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of the property with an area of 5,560 square meters to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio) for ₱5,686,768.00, On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand. After barangay proceedings failed to resolve the dispute, they sued Servacio and Rito in the Regional Trial Court in Maasin City, Southern Leyte (RTC) for the annulment of the sale of the property. The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void. Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property because he had purchased it with his own money. On October 3, 2002,the RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina); that the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta; that under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the property was acquired, all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained exclusively to the husband or to the wife; and that Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation was grossly insufficient to rebut the legal presumption. The RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property. The RTC’s denial of their motion for reconsiderationprompted the petitioners to appeal directly to the Court on a pure question of law.

Issue: 1. 2.

Whether or not Article 130 of the Family Code is the applicable law; Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without prior liquidation.

Held: Appeal lacks merit. 1.

No.

Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is “without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” This provision gives reason not to declare the sale as entirely void. Such declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio who had already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the property subject of the sale. 2.

No.

In Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that: From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one coowner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

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Persons and Family Relations The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra]. Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. xxx Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her. The following observations of Justice Paras are explanatory of this result, viz: xxx [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really would pertain to the share of the surviving spouse, then said transaction is valid. If it turns out that there really would be, after liquidation, no more conjugal assets then the whole transaction is null and void. But if it turns out that half of the property thus alienated or mortgaged belongs to the husband as his share in the conjugal partnership, and half should go to the estate of the wife, then that corresponding to the husband is valid, and that corresponding to the other is not. Since all these can be determined only at the time the liquidation is over, it follows logically that a disposal made by the surviving spouse is not void ab initio. Thus, it has been held that the sale of conjugal properties cannot be made by the surviving spouse without the legal requirements. The sale is void as to the share of the deceased spouse (except of course as to that portion of the husband’s share inherited by her as the surviving spouse). The buyers of the property that could not be validly sold become trustees of said portion for the benefit of the husband’s other heirs…

Spouses Araceli Oliva-De Mesa, et al. v Spouses Claudio D. Acero, Jr., et al. (2012) G.R. No. 185064 Petitioner:Spouses Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto S. De Mesa Respondent: Spouses Claudio D. Acero, Jr. and Ma. Rufina D. Acero,Sheriff Felixberto L. Samonte and Registrar Alfredo Santos Facts: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Claudio D. Acero Jr., being the highest bidder, acquired the ownership of a parcel of land formerly owned by petitioners Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto S. De Mesa. The property was sold at a public auction after Spouses De Mesa failed to pay the loan they secured from Acero. Thereafter, respondents Acero and his wife Rufina leased the subject property to its former owners who then defaulted in the payment of the rent. Unable to collect the rentals due, Spouses Acero filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) against Spouses De Mesa. The MTC ruled in Spouses Acero’s favor. Spouses De Mesa filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking to nullify the MTC ruling in favor of Spouses Aceroon the basis that the subject property is a family home which is exempt from execution under the Family Code, and thus, could have not been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying their unpaid loan.

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Persons and Family Relations 6.

The RTC dismissed their complaint. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s Decision.

Issue: Whether or not the family home is exempted from execution

Held/Ratio: Petition DENIED. Family Home -sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime -from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, is generally exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment -a right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment andcannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases -right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the property as a family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter Article 153 of the Family Code -exception stated is a personal right -incumbent upon Spouses De Mesa to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family home

ANTONIA R. DELA PEÑA and ALVIN JOHN B. DELA PEÑA v. GEMMA REMILYN AVILA and FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO. (FEBTC-BPI) (2012) GR No. 197490

FACTS:  Antonia R. Dela Peña (married to Antegono A. Dela Peña) executed a “Deed of Real Estate Mortgage” over the 277 square meter parcel of land located in Marikina City in favor of Aguila for the purpose of securing a loan.  Parcel of land: mortgaged for the purpose of securing the payment of the loan obligation.  Antonia executed a notarized Deed of Absolut Sale over the property in controversy in favor of Gemma Avila (respondent) for the consideration of 600,000 php. Thus, Avila is now the owner of the subject in question.  Avila, as the new owner of the property, constituted a real estate mortgage over said parcel of land located in Marikina in favor of Far East Bank & Trust Co. (now BPI) for purposes of securing a loan.

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Persons and Family Relations 

Gemma issued several promissory notes: Promissory Note Date BDS#970779 BDS#970790 BDS#980800 BDS#980805 BDS#980817 BDS#980821

  

12/02/97 12/15/97 01/16/98 02/06/98 02/27/98 03/10/98

Amount

Maturity

P300,000.00 P100,000.00 P100,000.00 P100,000.00 P150,000.00 P450,000.00

04/30/98 04/14/98 04/30/98 04/30/98 04/30/98 04/30/98

FEBTC-BPI caused the Extra Judicial Foreclosure of the said property due to Avila’s failure to pay the secured loan. Being the highest bidder, the property in controversy now belongs to FEBTC-BPI when the latter caused the property to be entitled to its name. Antonia filed an Adverse Claim to that effect, amongst others, that she was the true and lawful owner of the property in question. Antonia with the son (Alvin) filed a petition for the annulment of the deed of sale against Gemma Avila.  Contention: 1. The questioned property is CONJUGAL. o The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed by Antonia in favor of Aguila was NOT CONSENTED by Antegono, who by then was already dead, thus, the REM is not valid. o The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Antonia because she was misled by Avila into believing that the transfer to the latter was necessary to secure a loan (which Avila promised to secure on Antonia’s behalf).  Deed of Absolute Sale:  SIMULATED  DEROGATORY OF ALVIN’S SUCCESIONAL RIGHTS.

ISSUE:  W/NOT THE PROPERTY IN CONTROVERSY IS A CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF ANTONIA AND ANTEGONO DELA PEÑA. HELD:  The said property was NOT A CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF ANTONIA AND ANTEGONO DELA PEÑA. It was the PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY OF ANTONIA thus, the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Gemma Avila is VALID. RATIO:  According to Art. 160 of the Civil Code, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. In this case, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired duringthe marriage.  Proof of acquisition during marriage: a condition necessary for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugality (conjugal partnership) (Francisco v. CA)  Dela Peña’s failure to establish that the questioned property was acquired during the marriage of Antonia and Antegono caused the non-applicability of the presumption of conjugality in the case at bar. Their failure constituted that such property was the paraphernal property of Antonia.

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Persons and Family Relations 

The contention of Dela Peña that the registration of the said property in the name of “Antonia R. Dela Peña, of legal age, married to Antegono Dela Peña” is sufficient proof to establish conjugality is bereft of merit.  The phrase “married to” is merely descriptive of the civil status of the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered owner of such property because it is possible that it was acquired by the wife when she was still single but only registered after she was married. Thus, this will not be a sufficient proof to establish conjugal partnership. (Ruiz v. CA)

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN vs. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE (2012) GR No. 183622 FACTS:  Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the US from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a subsequent marriage with Merope De Catalan, the petitioner.  (2004) Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.  (2005 February 25) Merope De Catalan filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando at RTC-Burgos, Pangasinan. (Special Proceeding No. 228)  (2005 March 3) While Spec. Proc No. 228 was pending, Louella Catalan-Lee, respondent, one of the children of Orlando in his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC. (Spec. Proc. No. 232)  These two special proceedings were consolidated. o Louella Catalan-Lee’s contention:  Merope De Catalan is not considered an interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of administration of the estate of Orlando.  In support thereof, she alleged that a criminal case for BIGAMY was filed against De Catalan before RTC-Alaminos, Pangasinan.  Felicitas Amor, first wife of Orlando, filed a complaint for BIGAMY, alleging that De Catalan contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite being married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959. (Crim. Case No. 2699-A) o On 6 August 1998, RTC had acquitted De Catalan of BIGAMY.  Orlando and De Catalan’s marriage was NOT VALID since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since DIVORCE WAS NOT RECOGNIZED UNDER PHILIPPINE JURISDICTION.  De Catalan, in the first place, had never been married to Eusebio Bristol.  (2006) RTC-Burgos, Pangasinan: dismissedthe petition of De Catalan for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando and granted such to Catalan-Lee. o (contrary to the findings of Crim. Case No. 2699-A) RTC-Burgos, Pangasinan held that the marriage between De Catalan and Eusebio Bristol was valid andand subsisting when she married Orlando. o De Catalan was not an interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration.  De Catalan filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. But CA dismissed the petition for lack of married and subsequently denied her motion for reconsideration.  Hence, a petition for review filed at the Supreme Court.

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Persons and Family Relations ISSUES:  W/NOT THE MARRIAGE OF MEROPE DE CATALAN AND ORLANDO B. CATALAN MAY BE RECOGNIZED AS VALID.  W/NOT BURDEN OF PROVING AUSTRALIAN LAW FALLS UPON DE CATALAN.  W/NOT THE COURTS CAN TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAWS IN THE EXERCISE OF SOUND DISCRETION. HELD: 1.

2.

3.

THE MARRIAGE OF MEROPE DE CATALAN AND ORLANDO B. CATALAN MAY BE RECOGNIZED AS VALID.  Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. (Doctrine in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr) i. It is true that the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine Nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens my obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their nation law.  Once proven that one is no longer a Filipino Citizen when he validly obtained a divorce from the other spouse, such other spouse could very well lose her right to inherit from him. (Quita v. CA)  Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized Citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, Orlando had severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to the Philippine personal laws. YES, THE BURDEN OF PROOF DOES NOT FALL UPON DE CATALAN BUT INSTEAD TO CATALAN-LEE HAS THE BURDEN TO PROVE SUCH.  THE BURDEN OF PROOF FALLS UPON THE PARTY WHO ALLEGES THE EXISTENCE OR A FACT OR THING NECESSARY IN THE PROSECUTION OR DEFENSE OF AN ACTION. i. The burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. ii. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him. THE COURTS CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAWS.  It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.  Fact of divorce must first be proven. i. A foreign judgement is given presumptive evidentiary value; the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgement is the judgement itself. (Garcia v. Recio) ii. According to Sec. 24 and 25 of Rule 132 on Presentation of Evidence: Section 24.Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the

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Persons and Family Relations legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (25a) Section 25.What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26a) THUS, THE PETITION WAS PARTIALLY GRANTED AND THE DECISION OF THE CA (affirming the decision of RTC-Burgos, Pangasinan) WAS REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. THIS CASE IS REMANDED TO RTC-Burgos, Pangasinan FOR FURTHER RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE FACT OF DIVORCE.

PACIFIC ACE FINANCE LTD. (PAFIN) vs. EIJI YANAGISAWA (2012) GR No. 175303 FACTS:  Eiji Yanagisawa, a Japanese national, is the husband of Evelyn Castañeda, a Filipina. Their marriage was contracted on July 12, 1989.  Yanagisawa filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of BIGAMY. o Yanagisawa, during the pendency of the case, filed a motion for the issuance of a TRO against Castañeda and an application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction asking that Castañeda be enjoined from disposing or encumber all of the properties registered in her name (including the property in controversy: 152 square meter townhouse unit in Parañaque).  However, Castañeda, with her counsel, voluntarily undertook not to dispose of the property in her name during the pendency of the trial. THUS, THE ABOVECITED PETITION OF YANAGISAWA WAS DISMISSED BECAUSE IT BECAME MOOT AND ACADEMIC UPON THE VOLUNTARY STATEMENT OF CASTANEDA.

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An order was then issued with regard to the aforementioned: ORDER In view of the commitment made in open court by Atty. Lupo Leyva, counsel for the defendant [Evelyn], together with his client, the defendant in this case, that the properties registered in the name of the defendant would not be disposed of, alienated or encumbered in any manner during the pendency of this petition, the Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining Order and Application for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction scheduled today is hereby considered moot and academic.

During the pendency of the trial, Castañeda obtained a loan from PAFIN and in order to secure payment of the loan, she executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) in favor of PAFIN over the Parañaque Town House Unit (property in question).

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At the time of the mortgage, RTC-MAKATI declared the nullity of the marriage of Yanagisawa and Castañeda, Also, it ordered the liquidation of their registered properties including the property in controversy. Yanagisawa filed a complaint for the annulment of the REM against Castañeda and PAFIN for violating the October 2, 1996 ruling of RTC-MAKATI (declaration of Castañeda in open court) o RTC-Parañaque denied the petition for the annulment of REM. o CA-annulled the REM. Hence, a petition for review.

ISSUES:  W/NOT RTC-PARAÑAQUE HAS THE JURISDICTION TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERHIP.  W/NOT IT WAS IMPERATIVE FOR RTC-PARAÑAQUE TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP BECAUSE IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE REM. HELD: 1. 2.

NO, RTC-PARAÑAQUE HAS NO JURISDICTION TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP BECAUSE THE SAME ISSUE WAS ALREADY RULED UPON BY THE RTC-MAKATI AND IS PENDING APPEAL IN THE CA. NO, IT WAS NOT IMPERATIVE FOR RTC-PARAÑAQUE TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP. IT WAS NOT ESSENTIAL FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE REM.

RATIO: 1. NO, RTC-PARAÑAQUE HAS NO JURISDICTION TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP BECAUSE THE SAME ISSUE WAS ALREADY RULED UPON BY THE RTC-MAKATI AND IS PENDING APPEAL IN THE CA.  Contrary to petitioner’s stance, the CA did not make any disposition as to who between Yanagisawa and Castañeda owns the Parañaque townhouse unit. It simply ruled that the Makati RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the said question and should not have been interfered with by the Parañaque RTC.  RTC-PARAÑAQUEVIOLATED THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY OR NON-INTERFERENCE o The assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an "insurmountable barrier" to the subsequent assumption by the RTC Parañaque. By insisting on ruling on the same issue, the Parañaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati RTC’s resolution of the issue and created the possibility of conflicting decisions. o It is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court of coordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is applicable to civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The principle is essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws; and while its observance might be required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the process.(Cojuanco v. Villegas) 2. NO, IT WAS NOT IMPERATIVE FOR RTC-PARAÑAQUE TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP. IT WAS NOT ESSENTIAL FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE REM.

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Yanagisawa did not claim ownership of the Parañaque townhouse unit or his right to consent to the REM as his bases for seeking its annulment. Instead, Yanagisawa invoked his right to rely on Castañeda’s commitment not to dispose of or encumber the property (as confirmed in the October 2, 1996 Order of the RTC- Makati), and the annotation of the said commitment on TCT No. 99791. It was Castañeda and PAFIN that raised Yanagisawa’s incapacity to own real property as their defense to the suit. They maintained that Yanagisawa, as an alien incapacitated to own real estate in the Philippines, need not consent to the REM contract for its validity. But this argument is beside the point and is not a proper defense to the right asserted by Yanagisawa. o This defense does not negate Yanagisawa’s right to rely on the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC and to hold third persons, who deal with the registered property, to the annotations entered on the title. Thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint based on this defense.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (RP) VS. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA (2012) GR No. 187512 FACTS:  Yolanda Granada was married to Cyrus Granada on 3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Granada.  Cyrus Granada went to Taiwan to seek employment sometime in May 1994. From that time, Yolanda had not received any communication from him, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. o Yolanda’s brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail.  After 9 years of waiting, Yolanda filed a petition to have Cyrus declared PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD.  RTC-Lipa rendered a decision declaring Cyrus as PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD,  RP represented by OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of such decision under the same court but RTC-Lipa DENIED the motion and soon after, CA also DENIED the Motion for Recon. o RP Contention:  Yolanda failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus thus failed to prove her “well-founded belief” that he was already dead.  Hence, a rule 45 petition seeking the reversal of the Resolution of the CA (which affirmed the decision of RTC-Lipa) ISSUES:  W/NOT A PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH IS A SUMMARY PROCEEDING THUS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND NOT SUBJECT TO APPEAL.  W/NOT THERE IS A WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF ON THE PART OF YOLANDA TO DECLARE CYRUS AS PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD. HELD: 1. A PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH IS A SUMMARY PROCEEDING THUS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND NOT SUBJECT TO APPEAL.  According to Articles 41, 238, 247, and 253 of the Family Code, since the petition for the declaration of presumptive death for the purposes of remarrying is a summary proceeding, the judgment of RTC-LIPA shall be IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

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2.

In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because the judgements rendered thereunder, by express provision of Art. 247 of the Family Code, are “immediately final and executory”(Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino) THERE IS A WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF ON THE PART OF YOLANDA TO DECLARE CYRUS AS PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD.  The SC used the following cases as the authorities on the subject: 1. Republic v. Nolasco: The Family Code provision prescribes a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As noted by the Court in that case, the four requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code are as follows: 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

2. US v. Biasbas: In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining the whereabouts of his first wife, considering his admission that that he only had a suspicion that she was dead, and that the only basis of that suspicion was the fact of her absence. 3. Republic v. CA and Allegro: Republic sought the reversal of the CA ruling affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse on the ground that the respondent therein had not been able to prove a "well-founded belief" that his spouse was already dead. The Court reversed the CA, granted the Petition, and provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code: For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. 

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The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a wellgrounded belief.  The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many

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circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. (Republic v. CA and Allegro) RP’s contention that Yolanda failed to exert earnest efforts to locate her absent spouse Cyrus thus failed to prove her “well-founded belief” that he was already dead is well-taken by the court. However, SC is constrained to dent the petition since RTC-LIPA’s ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed.  “Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.”

VALERIO E. KALAW vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ (2011) GR No. 166357

FACTS:  Valerio Kalaw and Ma. Elena Fernandez were married in November 4, 1976 at Hong Kong and they had four children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay).  Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejaño who gave birth to their son in March 1983.  Malyn left their conjugal home and their four (4) children on May 1985. Soon after, Kalaw started living with Jocelyn who bore him three more children.  9 years after the de facto separation from his wife, Fernandez, Kalaw filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. o Kalaw’s contention: Fernandez was suffering from a psychological incapacity rendering her incapable of performing and complying with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. As manifested in the following acts of respondent:  she left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night;  she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and  she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in flagrante delicto. o Kalaw also presented a psychologist, Dr. Gates, and a canon law expert, Fr. Healy to testify on Fernandez’s physcological incapacity.  Dr. Gates explanation: (diagnosis: based on the facts revealed by her interviews with Kalaw)  Fernandez’s sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and frequent nights-out with friends – may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD). o NPD is present when a person is obsessed to meet her wants and needs in utter disregard of her significant others.  Fernandez’s NPD is manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.  Her personality disorder may have been evident even prior to their marriage because it is rooted in her family background and upbringing.  Fr. Healy’s testimony: (opinion: based on the facts revealed by his interviews with Kalaw)  He corroborated with Dr. Gates’ assessment.

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o

 Fernandez was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties.  Her psychological incapacity was grave and incurable. Fernandez’s defense:  She did not neglect her duties as wife and mother.  She admitted playing majong but only 2 to 3 times a week between 1-6 pm with kalaw’s permission to do such and that she would often bring the children and their respective yayas with her. (fact proven by the testimonies of their children)  She left Kalaw because the latter was a physically abusive husband.  She denied the allegation of adultery.  She contended that it was Kalaw who was suffering from Psychological Incapacity.

ISSUE:  W/NOT FERNANDEZ IS SUFFERING IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM AND COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE. HELD:  NO, Fernandez was not psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential obligations of marriage. RATIO:  Kalaw failed to prove that his wife, Fernandez, was suffering from psychological incapacity. o Burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff (Kalaw)  “he who alleges must prove the same.”  Kalaw must prove that the incapacitated party, based on her actions, suffers from a serious psychological incapacity that completely disables her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state.  Psychological Incapacity must be: o Grave o Existed at the time of the marriage; and o Incurable o The testimonies of the two supposed expert (Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy) were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of Fernandez which had not been sufficiently proven. o There was no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. The totality of the evidence presented proved that Fernandez was not psychologically incapacitated.  Fernandez did not neglect her duties as a mother and a wife. o She admitted playing majong but only 2 to 3 times a week between 1-6 pm with Kalaw’s permission to do such and that she would often bring their children and their respective yayas with her which where later corroborated by their children through their testimonies. o At the testimonies of their children, not once did they cite that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were sick and cooked food that they like. o Fernandez made real efforts to see and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father. o While Kalaw cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic shortcomings to Fernandez’s actions.

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Sexual Infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.

MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES vs. CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R. JOSON, ROSE MARIE R. CRISTOBAL and PILAR MALCAMPO (2010) G.R. No. 178902 FACTS: The case is about a husband’s sale of conjugal property, employing an alleged affidavit of consent from an estranged wife. The buyers claim valid consent, loss of right to declare nullity of the sale, and prescription.  Tarciano Roca was married to Rosario Gabriel Roca.  Tarciano offer to sell the 358 square meter lot in Zamboanga City to Manuel and Leticia Fuentes. o Agreement:  Fuentes spouses were required to pay Tarciano a downpayment of 60, 000 php for the transfer of lot’s title to him.  Within 6 months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Roca. o In line with the agreement of the parties, Atty. Plagata went to see Rosario in one of his trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent.  1989, Tarciano executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses.  Tarciano and Rosario both died sometime in 1990.  Eight years later (1997), the children of Tarciano and Rosario et al (respondent) filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC-Zamboanga City. They also prayed that the property in controversy be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano. o Rocas’ contentions:  Sale to the Fuentes spouses was VOID since Rosario did not give her consent to it.  Signature of Rosario: forged ISSUES:  W/NOT ROSARIO’S SIGNATURE ON THE DOCUMENT OF CONSENT TO HER HUSBAND TARCIANO’S SALE OF THEIR CONJUGAL LAND TO THE FUENTES SPOUSES WAS FORGED.  W/NOT ROCA’S ACTION FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THAT SALE TO THE FUENTES SPOUSES ALREADY PRESCRIBED.  W/NOT ROSARIO, THE WIFE WHOSE CONSENT WAS NOT HAD, COULD BRING ACTION TO ANNUL THE SALE. HELD: 1. ROSARIO’S SIGNATURE ON THE DOCUMENT OF CONSENT WAS FORGED.

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2.

Rosario’s signature strokes on the affidavit appears heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her specimen signatures, on the other hand, are consistently of a lighter stroke and more fluid. The way the letters "R" and "s" were written is also remarkably different. The variance is obvious even to the untrained eye.  Rosario’s specimen signatures were made at about the time that she signed the supposed affidavit of consent. They were, therefore, reliable standards for comparison. The Fuentes spouses presented no evidence that Rosario suffered from any illness or disease that accounted for the variance in her signature when she signed the affidavit of consent.  Atty. Plagata admittedly falsified the jurat of the affidavit of consent. That jurat declared that Rosario swore to the document and signed it in Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989 when, as Atty. Plagata testified, she supposedly signed it about four months earlier at her residence in Paco, Manila on September 15, 1988.  That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of Rosario’s consent does not matter. The sale is still void without an authentic consent. ROCA’S ACTION FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THAT SALE TO THE FUENTES SPOUSES HAS NOT YET PRESCRIBED.  Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Thus, the law applicable to the case at bar is the Family Code and not the Civil Code.  According to Art. 105 of the Family Code: “xxx The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.” 

3.

When Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already the Family Code.  In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void.  Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription.  But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it.  According to Art. 1410 of the Civil Code: “The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.”  The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action. ROCAS (HEIRS OF TARCIANO AND ROSARIO) HAVE THE RIGHT TO HAVE THE SALE DECLARED VOID.  Since the sale was void from the beginning, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.

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Persons and Family Relations JULIO FLORES (deceased), substituted by his heirs; BENITO FLORES (deceased), substituted by his heirs; DOLORES FLORES and VIRGINIA FLORES-DALERE, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, JIMENA TOMAS vs.MARCIANO BAGAOISAN (2010) GR No. 173365

FACTS: The case involves a 13,552-square meter portion of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-118801[2] in the name of the Heirs of Victor Flores, namely: Julio, Benito, Dolores, and Virginia, herein petitioners. OCT No. P-11880 was issued pursuant to Homestead Patent No. 138892, given on November 12, 1973. This property is located in the Municipality of Piddig, Ilocos Norte.  Flores et al, together with their mother Luisa Viernes, executed a Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim in favor of Vicento Lazo. o Through this document, petitioner’s agreed to sell, cede, convey, grant, and transfer by way of QUITCLAIM” the subject property to Lazo.  The property in controversy was then bought by Marciano Bagaoisan as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated Feb 20, 1977.  Viernes and petitioner Virginia Flores-Dalere executed an affidavit, attesting to the fact that they conveyed to Lazo the subject property through the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim.  Bagaoisan filed an action for ownership, quieting of title, partition and damages against petitioners, praying that he be declared as the true owner of the subject property and that the entire property covered by OCT No. P-11880 be partitioned among them. o Bagaoisan’s contention:  He was a tenant of Lazo and that he had been working on the subject property since time immemorial.  Since he bought the property in 1977, he possessed the land as owner and paid real property tax thereon.  Petitioners had denied his ownership of the land and asserted their ownership thereof by working and harvesting the crops thereon. o Flores et al’s reply:  They did not relinquish ownership or possession of the land to lazo.  Petitioner’s admitted that they executed a deed of confirmation and quitclaim in favor of Lazo. They contend that they were misled into signing the same. (Lazo taking advantage of their lack of education. ISSUE:  W/not the deed of confirmation and quitclaim is void and violative of sec 118 of the public land act. HELD:  THE DEED OF CONFIRMATION AND QUITCLAIM IS VOID AND VIOLATIVE OF SEC 118 OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT.  The deed of confirmation and quitclaim is void for violating the five-year prohibitory period against alienation of lands acquired through homestead patent under Sec 118 of the Public land Act.  The use of words “confirmation” and “quitclaim” in the title of the document was an obvious attempt to circumvent the prohibition imposed by law. Labeling the deed as a confirmation of non-ownership or as a quitclaim of rights would actually make no difference, as the effect would still be the alienation or conveyance of the property.  Public Land Act was enacted to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that

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the State had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it.  Basic objective: to promote public policy, that is to provide home and decent living for destitutes, aimed at providing a class of independent small landholders which is the bulwark of peace and order.  Any act which would have the effect of removing the property subject of the patent from the hands of a grantee will be struck down for being violative of the said law. Bagaoisan, respondent, failed to present sufficient evidence to surmount the conclusiveness and indefeasibility of the certificate of title.  Bagaoisan did not allege in his complaint or prove during the trial that fraud attended the registration of the subject property in petitioners’ names. In fact, there was no allegation as to how petitioners were able to secure title to the property despite the alleged ownership of respondent’s predecessor.  Bagaoisan failed to prove that he has title to the subject property. He merely asserted that his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the property since 1940.  The Public Land Act requires that the possessor or his predecessors-in-interest must be in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty years.  Bagaoisan merely established that he had been in possession of the property and that he had been paying real property taxes thereon since 1977. The only evidence on record attesting to the fact that respondent and his predecessors-ininterest had been in possession of the property since 1940 was the affidavit executed by some of petitioners. This, however, would not suffice.

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