People vs. Takad

December 12, 2017 | Author: AsHervea Abante | Category: Mortgage Law, Foreclosure, Search And Seizure, Search Warrant, Arrest
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Legal Writing-Trial Memoranda...


Republic of the Philippines REGIONAL TRIAL COURT National Capital Judicial Region Branch 123 Pasig City



versus –

CRIM.CASE NO.12345 – H


x --------------------------------------------- x


Defendant, by counsel, respectfully submits its memorandum in the case:

The Case

Plaintiff, through the Public Prosecutor, filed charges against herein accused for violation of the Anti – Carnapping Act by claiming that the latter, with intent to gain and without the consent of the plaintiff, stole and drove away a Kawasaki motorcycle with side car, colored black, bearing plate No. TU – 9952, with a value of P 80,000, belonging to the plaintiff.

The Facts

At the trial, the plaintiff presented her own version of facts. She narrated that she is an account officer of the Bayan Development Corporation (BDC) and as such, the corporation extends loans to various Tricycle Operators and Drivers Association (TODA) including the one where the accused was a member of. She stated that sometime in May 2003, she extended a loan to Ma. Teresa Lacsamana in the amount of P80,000 as part of a group loan extended to the TODA and was evidenced by a Kasunduan, a promissory note and a chattel mortgage. The agreement, according to the above - mentioned documents, was that the loan would be paid over a period of thirty months. However, Ms. Lacsamana defaulted in her payment of the loan despite the extension given to

her resulting to the forfeiture and repossession of the tricycle in favor of BDC. According to the plaintiff, the accused Takad was with Ms. Lacsamana at that time and when the plaintiff refused the said payment, she heard the accused saying “Huwag na huwag kong makikita ang tricycle sa Pasig.” A few days after the incident, the tricycle was reported stolen by Carlos Parlade along with several witnesses identifying Takad as the main culprit.

The accused, for his part, told a different side of the story. While admitting to the fact that Ms. Lacsmana indeed defaulted in her payment of the loan, the accused belied the contention that the BDC pulled out the tricycle from Ms. Lacsamana. He contended that he, together with Ms.Lacsamana, were the ones who brought the said tricycle to the house of Mr. Marasigan, the treasurer of the TODA, for safekeeping as per agreement contained in the Kasunduan executed between their group and BDC. Subsequently, BDC took the tricycle from the treasurer of the group on October 18, 2002 and not on November 18, 2002 as stated by the plaintiff. The accused also belied the contention of the plaintiff alleging that he threatened the plaintiff by saying “Huwag na huwag kong makikita ang tricycle sa Pasig”. The accused contented that he has no such intention of threatening the plaintiff. What he meant by those words is the fact that he does not want Ms. Lacsamana to have hurt feelings regarding the repossession of the tricycle. He was therefore misconstrued when he said those words.

The Issues

The Court defined the issues in this case in this case in its pre – trial order as follows: 1. Whether or not the identity of the person of the accused was clearly established 2. Whether or not there was lawful warrantless arrest. 3. Whether or not the elements of carnapping punished under the Anti – Carnapping Act was proven beyond reasonable doubt 4. Whether or not the terms and conditions of the Kasunduan executed between the parties was strictly followed 5. Whether or not it was clearly established that it was BDC who actually owns the tricycle subject of the crime Arguments I. THE IDENTITY OF TAKAD AS THE ACCUSED WAS NOT CLEARLY ESTABLISHED A. The police line-up identification of Takad is tainted with impermissible suggestion, violating the accused due process rights. The Prosecution claims that it was the accused Takad who took the tricycle from the residence of Carlos Parlade. It presented several witnesses who claimed they saw the accused herein as the person who actually took the tricycle without the consent and against the will of Carlos Parlade. However, this position does not hold water due to the following contention:

The eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution did not positively identify respondent Takad as the person who took the tricycle in question. Rather, it based its contention that it was Takad who took the tricycle on mere circumstantial evidence without positive identification as can be gleaned from the affidavit executed by Carlos Parlade as can be seen below: Q: Please go over your sworn statement and tell us if you gave to the police those descriptions of the accused that you mentioned? A: I said here, in answer to #14, “medyo maigsi ang buhok” Q: But the other description that he is of light complexion and has pronounced jaws, did you put that in your statement? A: No, sir. And another in this manner: Q: You said that you shouted at the man on the tricycle and he looked but suddenly started the motor and drove away with the tricycle, is that right? A: yes,sir Q: Since the purpose of the man was to flee from you, he merely glanced back, is that right? A: Hindi po, opo, medyo matagal po Q: What is really your answer? A: Opo Q: I understand that you went back to the police station on November 21, at 5:30 in the afternoon? A: Yes, sir Q: The police had told you that Takad had been arrested and you have to come back and identify him, is that right? A: Yes, sir Q: When you went to the police station, they led you into a room and the investigator pointed out Takad to you, is that right? A: Yes, sir Q: And he asked you if he was the one who took the tricycle? A: Yes, sir Q:In other words, you were not shown the accused Takad in a police lineup with other persons of the same built so you could try to pick him out as the tricycle thief?

A: No, sir. Thus, there is doubt in the regularity of the identification by Carlos Parlade of the accused. From his testimony, it is clear that he did not positively identify the accused-appellant. At the time of the incident, he only made a very fleeting glance on the person. At that moment, he had an impression that the accused had a light complexion and a well-built body (Medyo malapad). During the proceedings in the police station where he was supposed to identify the assailant, he identified Takad as allegedly the person who stole the motorcycle, not because he was certain that Takad was really the assailant but because he was the only person in the station and because he was pointed by the investigator as their suspect. The fact is that the accused was not identified in a police line-up, but rather he was directly pointed. From all indications, the identification of accused-appellant by Carlos Parlade was suggested by the police and this is objectionable. As can be gleaned from the case People vs Baconguis, the identification process was surrounded by circumstances which were clearly tainted by improper suggestion. While there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification, as even without it there could still be proper identification as long as the police did not suggest the identification to the witness, the police in both cases did even more than suggest to the complainant. In People vs Baconguis, the Supreme Court held that: Thus, by Lydia's own account, she arrived at the cell where appellant was detained. It was the police officer who pointed the accused and told Lydia that the appellant was the suspect. A show-up, such as what was undertaken by the police in the identification of appellant by Lydia, has been held to be an underhanded mode of identification for "being pointedly suggestive, generating confidence where there was none, activating visual imagination, and, all told, subverting their reliability as an eyewitness." Lydia knew that she was going to identify a suspect, whose name had priorly been furnished by her brother-policeman, when she went to the police station. And the police pointed appellant to her, and told her that he was the suspect, while he was behind bars, alone. (People vs Baconguis, G.R. No. 149889, December 2, 2003) In the case at bar, Carlos Parlade went to the police station for the purpose of identification after he was informed that the accused was arrested. He never met Takad previously and he only knew Takad due to Zenny Aguirre’s statement that Takad warned Zenny in seeing the tricycle in Pasig. In People v. Acosta, this Court rejected the identification by a witness of the accused while the latter was alone in his detention cell. There, this Court held that the identification of the suspect, which was tainted by the suggestiveness of having the witness identify him while he was incarcerated with no one else with him with whom he might be compared by the witness, was less than objective to thus impair the trustworthiness of their identification. The unusual, coarse and highly singular method of identification, which revolts against accepted principles of scientific crime detection, alienates the esteem of every just man, and commands

neither respect nor acceptance. (People v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-24424, March 30, 1970) More importantly, the police denied Takad his right to counsel during the line-up, contrary to Section 12(1) of the Constitution which provides: Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. In People v. Escordial (G.R. Nos. 138934-35. January 16, 2002), the Court pertinently ruled: As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest. However, the cases at bar are different inasmuch as accused-appellant, having been the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial investigation when these out-of-court identifications were conducted by the police. An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that purpose. During custodial investigation, these types of identification have been recognized as “critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution” which necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This is because the results of these pretrial proceedings “might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.” The SC have thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him. As stated in Escordial, generally, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a part of custodial investigation. An exception to this rule is when the accused had been the focus of police attention at the start of the investigation. The lineup in this case squarely falls under this exception. It was established that Takad was already a suspect prior to the police line-up. In fact, even before Takad’s apprehension, the police had already zeroed in on Takad as the sole suspect. As such, Takad was entitled to counsel during the police line-up. In the same manner, Mario Mankas testified that he did not directly identified Takad as the person who took the tricycle. This can be gleaned from the following: Q: You said that the tricycle was running at a very fast rate. If the driver of the tricycle was driving very fast, you will agree with me that you only had a brief glance of the driver. Is that right?

A: Yes, sir Q: And apart from the fact that the tricycle was running at a very fast speed, you could not have seen much of the person driving it because, as you said in your affidavit, “hindi ko gaanong namukhaan dahil nakayuko ako”. Is that right? A: Yes, sir. Q: Now, because you only had a glance of the man and because your head was bowed down, when you were asked by the police to describe the man on the tricycle, you could only describe his built. Is that right? A: Yes, sir From the foregoing, none of the witnesses positively identified the Takad as the person who allegedly stole the tricycle. It is a basic tenet of law that circumstantial evidence is the weakest form of evidence that can be presented in court. The only instance that it would prove either the guilt or innocence of the accused is if the circumstances would clearly point to the accused as the person who indeed committed the crime. The testimony of the witnesses presented by the prosecution proved only the fact that there was a lack of identification with respect to the identity of Takad as the main culprit in the case. Clearly, mere glances at the person who committed the crime does not amount to a positive identification of the person. In People v. Rodrigo (G.R. No. 176159, September 11, 2008), the Court, speaking thru Justice Arturo Brion, acquitted the accused for failure of the prosecution to identify the accused as the perpetrator of the crime, which identification is extremely crucial to the prosecution’s burden of proof. Stressing the importance of a proper identification of the accused, most especially “when the identification is made by a sole witness and the judgment in the case totally depends on the reliability of the identification,” the Court held: The greatest care should be taken in considering the identification of the accused especially, when this identification is made by a sole witness and the judgment in the case totally depends on the reliability of the identification. This level of care and circumspection applies with greater vigor when, as in the present case, the issue goes beyond pure credibility into constitutional dimensions arising from the due process rights of the accused. B. The in-court identification of the accused did not cure the flawed out-of-court identification. The in-court identification of the accused was flawed due to the following: (1) a serious discrepancy exists between the identifying witness original description and the actual description of the accused; (2) the limited opportunity on the part of the witness to see the accused before the commission of the crime; A. Discrepancy between original description and actual description

Since in the sinumpaang salaysay of Parlades, he was not able to give a description of the accused. Thus, there is reasonable doubt as to whether he identied the accused during the commission of the crime. Now, we will focus on the statements made by Mario Mankas which are contained in his Sinumpaang Salaysay. In his sworn statement, which was executed barely hours after the commission of the crime, Mario Mankas was able to recall the features of the suspect; as follows: Q: You said that the tricycle was running at a very high speed. If the driver of the tricycle was driving very fast, you will agree to me that you only had a brief glance of the driver? A: Yes sir. Q: And apart from the fact that the tricycle was running very fast, you could not have seen much of the person driving it, because as you said in par. 5 of the affidavit, “hindi ko gaanong namukhaan dahil nakayuko ako.” Is that right? A: Yes Sir. Q: Now because you only had a glance of the man and because your head was bowed down, when you were asked to describe the man on the tricycle, you could only describe his built. Is that right? A: Yes Sir. XXX Q: What was abnormal about his body? A: Medyo maskulado sir. XXX Q: What is the difference between the batok of the that man on the tricycle and the batok of other men? A: The nape of this man was longer.

However, Takad’s physical features during the court identification are nowhere close to Mankas description of being muscular during the time of the commission of the crime. Thus, considering that Mankas had only a glance of the man and his head was bowed down, the discrepancy between Mankas description given before the police and the actual physical appearance of Takad severely weakens the credibility of Mankas in identifying the real culprit. B. Limited opportunity for both Parlades and Mankas to see the accused There is no dispute that Parlades and Mankas do not know the accused. They saw the person for the first time during the taking of the vehicle and they saw Takad for the first time during the police-line up. In Rodrigo, the Court observed:

This fact can make a lot of difference as human experience tells us: in the recognition of faces, the mind is more certain when the faces relate to those already in the minds memory bank; conversely, it is not easy to recall or identify someone we have met only once or whose appearance we have not fixed in our mind. Aside from the fact that both witnesses do not know Takad, both of them saw the accused very briefly during the taking. In fact, according to Mankas, he merely had a glance at the accused and his head was bowed down. There is doubt as to whether the witnesses could accurately remember the identity of the perpetrator of the crime due to the swiftness by which the crime was committed and the physical impossibility of memorizing the face of the perpetrator whom the witnesses saw for the first time and only for a brief moment due to the use of the motor vehicle to get away quickly.


In the morning of November 21, 2003, Takad was arrested by police officers, which according to Takad he was just awakened when police officers arrived at their home. At the time of he has no knowledge of the allegations against him, because according to him he was just sleeping at the time of the said incident. He was brought to the police station of Pasig City. Takad was presented to Mr. Carlos Parlade for identification alone and not with the lineup of other persons of the same built. Mr. Carlos Parlade confirmed that the man presented in the police station to be the person who he saw taking his tricycle. Assuming that Takad was only invited by the Police officers for identification purposes only, still, caution must be observed when acceding to police invitation. No less than our Supreme Court recognized that there are cases where the invitation is used as a guise to effect a warrantless arrest. This situation arises when the person invited is suspected and investigated as perpetrator of the crime and is asked incriminating questions. In one case where a person went to the police station upon invitation, and later police officers investigated him for allegedly committing a crime, our Supreme Court declared that such invitation is equivalent to arrest. It is covered by the proscription on a warrantless arrest because it is intended for no other reason than to conduct an investigation (People vs. Olivares, G.R. No. 77865, December 4, 1998). Thus, it is highly advisable to ask assistance from a lawyer when acceding to police invitation in order to ensure that your legal rights are respected. The same is also intended to protect the person from the inherently coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of a police investigation following the arrest of a person (People vs. Rodriguez, G.R. 129211, October 2, 2000). In the case at bar, Takad was taken to the police station for the main purpose of asking concerning an alleged crime and for identifying him However,

Takad was already an alleged suspect in the eyes of the Police officers. In fact, even before Takad’s apprehension, the police had already zeroed in on Takad as the sole suspect. Arguing that Takad consented to the arrest and freely went with the police is misplaced due to the intimidating circumstances and authority of the police officers. Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. It must be recalled that Takad was taken by the police officers and brought him to the police station. In People vs Sucro (G.R. No. 93239, March 18, 1991), the SC held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, since the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto or caught immediately after the consummation of the act. The arrest of Takad is obviously outside the purview of the aforequoted rule since he was arrested on the day following the alleged commission of the offense. On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it. Hence, there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. Aside from the sense of immediacy, it is also mandatory that the person making the arrest must have personal knowledge of certain facts indicating that the person to be taken into custody has committed the crime. Again, the arrest of Takad does not comply with these requirements since, as earlier explained, the arrest came a day after the consummation of the crime and not immediately thereafter. As such, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time the accused was arrested. Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense since they were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware of his identity only from Zenny Aguirre. Such warrantless arrest, therefore, amounts to a violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, which provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of

whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The police investigation work in this case, which led to the unlawful warrantless arrest of the accused, is unwarranted since they chose to rely solely on the statement made by Zenny Aguirre that Tatad warned her about the vehicle being seen in Pasig. Carlos Parlade did not even knew the accused prior to the incident. III THE ELEMENTS OF CARNAPPING AS PUNISHED UNDER THE ANTI – CARNAPPING ACT WAS NOT CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THUS FAILING TO PROVE THE GUILT OF TAKAD BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two (2) things: 1. The fact of the crime, i.e. the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged; and (2) the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. It has been discussed in the first argument that the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime has not been established. However, assuming arguendo, that the identity has been established, the elements of the crime imputed still needs to be present which is clearly missing here. Under Republic Act 10883 otherwise known as the New Anti – Carnapping Act of the Philippines, “Carnapping” is committed by the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence or intimidation against persons, or by using force upon things. In People v Lagat (G.R. No. 187044 September 14, 2011) the elements of carnapping are: 1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle; 2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself; 3. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; and 4. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle. As can be gleaned from the facts of the case, as well as the testimony of the witnesses, the prosecution failed to establish all the elements of carnapping which would prove the guilt of the accused. The prosecution failed to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of the all the following elements as second and fourth element. There is no unlawful taking of a motor vehicle Regarding the second element, based on the Kasunduan entered into by and between the TODA and BDC, the ownership of the tricycle, in case of failure to pay the loan on the scheduled date, will be under the supervision or safekeeping of the TODA and not by the BDC nor shall the ownership and

possession of the tricycle be transferred to another. Part of the Kasunduan in relation this is reproduced below: 15.1. Kapag ang isang kasapi ay hindi makabigay ng tatlong karampatang arawang hulog- bayad sa loob ng isang kinsenas o napapaloob sa isang tseke sa BDC, ang kanyan tricycle ay hahatakin ng SAMAHAN kasama ang linya(TODA) at/o ang prangkisa at ito ay pangangasiwaan ng SAMAHAN upang ang arawang kita nito ay tuwirang gagamitin ng SAMAHAN para sa darating na arawang hulog – bayad ng kasaping nagkasala 15.2. Ang nahatak na tricycle ay mananatili sa pangangasiwa ng SAMAHAN hangga’t hindi lubos na nababayaran ang nagging pagkukulang sa SAMAHAN 15.3. Ang tricycle na mula sa inutang sa BDC ay hindi maaaring isanla, ibenta o ilipat ng pagmamayari hangga’t hind pa lubusang nababayaran ang utang at pananagutan sa BDC

As can be seen from the “Kasunduan”, the ownership of the tricycle in case of default in payment shall not be transferred but will only be at the supervision of the TODA itself until the payment has been made. Failure to pay the loaned amount does not transfers the ownership of the tricycle to the TODA neither to BDC. BDC, therefore, through its representative, cannot in any way consider itself an owner of the tricycle despite the failure to pay the required amount. However, assuming arguendo that there is a stipulation that BDC may appropriate for itself the mortgage tricycle in case of failure to complete payment, the same will be invalid because Article 2088 prohibits pactum commissorium. It provides that: “The creditor cannot appropriate for himself the things given by way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose them. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void.” The Supreme Court, in Spouses FERNANDO and ANGELINA EDRALIN vs PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK G.R. No. 168523 March 9, 2011, defined pactum commissorium as "a stipulation empowering the creditor to appropriate the thing given as guaranty for the fulfillment of the obligation in the event the obligor fails to live up to his undertakings, without further formality, such as foreclosure proceedings, and a public sale." "The elements of pactum commissorium, which enable the mortgagee to acquire ownership of the mortgaged property without the need of any foreclosure proceedings, are: (1) there should be a property mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal obligation, and (2) there should be a stipulation for automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing mortgaged in case of non-payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period. In Luisa Briones – Velasquez vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 144882, February 4, 2005, the Supreme Court once again said that if there is an equitable mortgage, the creditor cannot consolidate his ownership in case the debtor

does not pay. The proper remedy is to foreclose it. The reason is founded on Article 2088, NCC which provides that the creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void.

Applying the principle of pactum commissorium specifically to equitable mortgages, in Montevergin vs. CA, 112 SCRA 641 (1982) it has been said that the consolidation of ownership in the person of the mortgagee in equity, merely upon failure of the mortgagor in equity to pay the obligation, would amount to a pactum commissorium. It was further articulated that an action for consolidation of ownership is an inappropriate remedy on the part of the mortgagee in equity. The only proper remedy is to cause the foreclosure of the mortgagee in equity. And if the mortgagee in equity desires to obtain title to the mortgaged property, the mortgagee in equity may buy it at the foreclosure sale.

Since the ownership is not transferred, the 2nd element of the crime of carnapping was not present in this case since Takad is one of the owner of the tricycle applying the rule on co-ownership in Article 147 of the Family Code because he is the lived-in partner of Lacsamana, the one who contracted the loan and purchased the tricycle. The provision states: Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. Thus, missing the second element inasmuch as Takad owns the tricycle, corollary negated is the fourth element which is intent to gain. IV THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE KASUNDUAN WERE NOT FAITHFULLY COMPLIED WITH

Based on testimony by the representative of BDC, they took the tricycle from the defendant after the latter defaulted in her payment of the loan without any authorization from the court to do so. Thus, constituting a violation of existing laws regarding appropriation of mortgaged properties. Article 2088 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines prohibits the execution of a Pactum Commisorium between the parties. It is stated that: Art.2088 – The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them. Any stipulation to the contrary shall be null and void. From the provisions of the “Kasunduan” itself, it is expressly stipulated that in case of failure to pay the amount of the loan on the date specified, the possession of the tricycle shall be transferred to the organization and not to

BDC, as what their representative did. The “Kasunduan” further prohibits the transfer of the said motor vehicle to any other entity while the balance is yet to be paid. Since the said agreement is a contract freely entered into by the parties, such an agreement constituted the law between the parties and it must be complied with faithfully and in good faith. V LACSAMANA AND TAKAD OWN THE TRICYCLE - SUBJECT OF THE CRIME Due to failure to pay the August 2003 installment, Zeny Aguirre requested Lacsamana and Takad to bring the tricycle to the house of Marasigan. It was pulled out on October 2, 2003 and for more or less than 15 days the subject tricycle was placed on the custody of the treasurer. Aguirre and Lacsamana had a verbal agreement that they will be given until October 17, 2003 to redeem the said tricycle or else total permanent repossession will take place. However, Lacsamana again failed to pay. Article 1484 of the Civil Code explicitly provides: ART. 1484. In a contract of sale of personal property the price of which is payable in installments, the vendor may exercise any of the following remedies:

(1) Exact fulfillment of the obligation, should the vendee fail to pay; (2) Cancel the sale, should the vendees failure to pay cover two or more installments; (3) Foreclose the chattel mortgage or the thing sold, if one has been constituted, should the vendees failure to pay cover two or more installments. In this case, he shall have no further action against the purchaser to recover any unpaid balance of the price. Any agreement to the contrary shall be void. The aforequoted provision is clear and simple: should the vendee or purchaser of a personal property default in the payment of two or more of the agreed installments, the vendor or seller has the option to avail of any one of these three remedies — either to exact fulfillment by the purchaser of the obligation, or to cancel the sale, or to foreclose the mortgage on the purchased personal property, if one was constituted. These remedies have been recognized as alternative, not cumulative, that the exercise of one would bar the exercise of the orders. It may also be stated that the established rule is to the effect that the foreclosure and actual sale of a mortgage chattel bars further recovery by the vendor of any balance on the purchaser’s outstanding obligation not so satisfied by the sale. (Cruz v. FIFC, G.R. No. L-24772. May 27, 1968) And the reason for this doctrine was aptly stated in the case of Bachrach Motor Co. v. Millan, thus "Undoubtedly the principal object of the above amendment was to remedy the abuses committed in connection with the foreclosure of chattel mortgages. This amendment prevents mortgagees from seizing the mortgaged property, buying it at foreclosure sale for a low price and then bringing suit against the mortgagor for a

deficiency judgment. The almost invariable result of this procedure was that the mortgagor found himself minus the property and still owing practically the full amount of his original indebtedness. Under this amendment the vendor of personal property, the purchase price of which is payable in installments, has the right to cancel the sale or foreclose the mortgage if one has been given on the property. Whichever right the vendor elects he need not return to the purchaser the amount of the installments already paid, ‘if there be an agreement to that effect.’ Furthermore, if the vendor avails himself of the right to foreclose the mortgage this amendment prohibits him from bringing an action against the purchaser for the unpaid balance." (Bachrach Motor Co. v. Millan, 61 Phil. 409) Initiatively, it is clear that the BDC chooses the first option. It did not elect to cancel the sale or resort to a foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. However, the subsequent acts performed by the corporation are wholly inconsistent with the first remedy. If the first remedy is availed of, the unpaid seller cannot anymore choose other remedies, unless the first remedy becomes impossible. BDC should have accepted the payment made by Lacsamana or if the latter refused to pay, BDC should have filed a complaint before the court for collection with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Nevertheless, contrary to Art. 1484, BDC chooses rescission even if specific performance was not totally impossible. The cancellation of the sale was also contrary to law. There was no notice of rescission sent and proper action for rescission filed before the Court. BDC’s act could not have been constituted as a foreclosure of the Chattel Mortgage since the properties were not sold in a public action, rather the properties were taken by BDC itself, which is void being contrary to Article 2088 NCC, which prohibits the execution of a Pactum Commisorium between the parties.

WHEREFORE, defendant Takad respectfully prays the Court to render judgment: 1. Acquitting the accused and absolving him of all charges for failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 2. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000 and attorney’s fees in the amount of P200,000 as well as other damages the Court may deem necessary.

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