People v. Nelmida

DOCTRINE: Our repeated ruling is that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It is as though each one performed the act of each one of the conspirators. Each one is criminally responsible for each one of the deaths and injuries of the several victims. The severalty of the acts prevents the application of Article 48. The applicability of Article 48 depends upon the singularity of the act, thus the denitional phrase !a single act constitutes t"o or more grave or less grave felonies.# This is not an original reading of the la". In $eople v. %on. $ineda, the &ourt already recogni'ed recogni'ed the !deeply rooted ( ( ( doctrine that "hen various victims e(pire e(pire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.# As "e observed in $eople v. Tabaco, clarifying the applicability of Article 48 of the )*evised $enal $enal &ode+, )this &ourt+ further stated in )%on.+ $ineda that !to apply the rst half of Article 48, ( ( ( there must be singularity of criminal act singularity of criminal impulse is not "ritten into the la".# People v Nelmida, September 11, 2012 *T&- ouble murder "ith multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder &A A/rmed *T& 0&- 1no comple( crime2 3 counts of murder and  counts of attempted murder Aggravating circumstances alleged- Treachery, abuse of superior strength. 5itigating circumstances- none Victims: $O6 e la &ru'1deceased2  T70gt. acoco1deceased2 $rivate irst &lass %aron Angni $& 9apor 9a por Tomanto Tomanto  :uanito Ibonalo 5osanif Ameril 5acasubar Tandayao 5ayor :ohnny Ta"anta"an  :un $alanas acts: On :une ;, 3enceslao ?elmida and *icardo Ajo@, together "ith =< other accused, allegedly ambushed the victims, they "ere  in total and 3 of them, namely $enceslao shooting directly at them "hile in a sDuatting position by the side of the road. On the other hand, *icardo and >enceslao interposed the defense of alibi. Hoth the *T& and &A did not appreciate their defense. Hoth courts ruled that the defense of alibi, absent the presentation of other evidence proving the same, is not entitled to any "eight in the eyes of the la". That they "ere also not su/ciently able to prove their physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime "hen the same occurred.

 Thus, the *T& sentenced the accused "ith reclusion perpetua, applying Art. 48. The &A a/rmed the same. Appellants then appealed their case to the &ourt. The &ourt ruled that they "ere guilty beyond reasonable ground of the crime but modied the sentence imposed declaring that the application of Art. 48 on &omple( crimes "as erroneous.

Iss!e: >O? Art. 48 is applicable in the case at bar. SC R!li#%: ?o. The concept of a comple( crime is dened in Article 48 of the *evised $enal &ode "hich e(plicitly states thatA*T. 48. $enalty for comple( crimes.  >hen a single act constitutes t"o or more grave or less grave felonies, or "hen an oGense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its ma(imum period. In a comple( crime, t"o or more crimes are actually committed, ho"ever, in the eyes of the la" and in the conscience of the oGender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed.  There are t"o @inds of comple( crime. The rst is @no"n as compound crime, or "hen a single act constitutes t"o or more grave or less grave felonies "hile the other is @no"n as comple( crime proper, or "hen an oGense is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic e(ample of the rst @ind is "hen a single bullet results in the death of  t"o or more persons. A diGerent rule governs "here separate and distinct acts result in a number @illed. eeply rooted is the doctrine that "hen various victims e(pire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. Evidently, there is in this case no comple( crime proper. And the circumstances present in this case do not t e(actly the description of  a compound crime. rom its factual bac@drop, it can easily be gleaned that the @illing and "ounding of the victims "ere not the result of a single discharge of  rearms by the appellants and their coBaccused. To note, appellants and their coBaccused opened re and rained bullets on the vehicle boarded by 5ayor Ta"anBta"an and his group. As a result, t"o security escorts died "hile ve 1;2 of them "ere "ounded and injured. The victims sustained gunshot "ounds in diGerent parts of their bodies.

 Therefrom, it cannot be gainsaid that more than one bullet had hit the victims. 5oreover, more than one gunman red at the vehicle of the victims. As held in $eople v. Jalde', each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective rearms, aiming each particular moment at diGerent persons constitute distinct and individual acts "hich cannot give rise to a comple( crime. Obviously, appellants and their coBaccused performed not only a single act but several individual and distinct acts in the commission of the crime. Thus, Article 48 of the *evised $enal &ode "ould not apply for it spea@s only of a Ksingle act.K  There are, ho"ever, several rulings "hich applied Article 48 of the *evised $enal &ode despite the fact that several acts "ere performed by several accused in the commission of the crime resulting to the death and7or injuries to their victims. In $eople v. Ca"as, the members of the %ome 9uard, upon order of  their leader, Ca"as, simultaneously and successively red at several victims. As a result, ;< persons died. It "as there held that the @illing "as the result of a single impulse as there "as no intent on the part of  the accused to re at each and every victim separately and distinctly from each other. If the act or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal impulse, it constitutes a single oGense. %o"ever, Ksingle criminal impulseK "as not the only consideration in applying Article 48 of the *evised $enal &ode in the said case because there "as therein no evidence at all sho"ing the identity or number of persons @illed by each accused.  There "as also no conspiracy to perpetuate the @illing, thus, collective criminal responsibility could not be imputed upon the accused. 0ince it "as impossible to ascertain the number of persons @illed by each of  them, this &ourt "as KforcedK to nd all the accused guilty of only one oGense of multiple homicide instead of holding each of them responsible for ;< deaths. 0ignicantly, there "as no conspiracy in $eople v. Ca"as. %o"ever, as this &ourt held in $eople v. *emollino, the Ca"as doctrine is more of an e(ception than the general rule.  There is conspiracy "hen t"o or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and then decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, e(pressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forth"ith decide to pursue it. Once established, each and every one of the conspirators is made criminally liable for the crime actually committed by any one of them. In the absence of any direct proof, the agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from

the mode and manner of the commission of the oGense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. As such, it does not matter "ho inFicted the mortal "ound, as each of the actors incurs the same criminal liability, because the act of one is the act of all.  The Information led against appellants and their coBaccused alleged conspiracy, among others. Although the trial court did not directly state that a conspiracy e(isted, such may be inferred from the concerted actions of the appellants and their coBaccused, to "it- 1=2 appellants and their coBaccused brought 0amuel to a "aiting shed located on the left side of the road "here the yello" pic@Bup service vehicle boarded by 5ayor Ta"anBta"an and his group "ould pass 132 appellants and their coBaccused, thereafter, assembled themselves on both sides of the road and surreptitiously "aited for the aforesaid yello" pic@Bup service vehicle 162 the moment the yello" pic@Bup service vehicle passed by the "aiting shed, appellants and their coB accused opened re and rained bullets thereon resulting in the @illing and "ounding of the victims 142 immediately, appellants and their coB accused ran to"ards the house of 0amuels aunt to get their bags and other stuG 1;2 0amuel follo"ed appellants and their coBaccused and 1L2 appellants and their coBaccused Fed. &onspiracy is very much evident from the aforeBenumerated actuations of the appellants and their coBaccused. &learly, their acts "ere coordinated. They "ere synchroni'ed in their approach to riddle "ith bullets the vehicle boarded by 5ayor Ta"anBta"an and his group. They "ere motivated by a single criminal impulse M to @ill the victims. Indubitably, conspiracy is implied "hen the accused persons had a common purpose and "ere united in its e(ecution. 0pontaneous agreement or active cooperation by all perpetrators at the moment of  the commission of the crime is su/cient to create joint criminal responsibility. >ith the presence of conspiracy in the case at bench, appellants and their coBaccused had assumed joint criminal responsibility M the act of  one is the act of all. The ascertainment of "ho among them actually hit, @illed and7or caused injury to the victims already becomes immaterial. &ollective responsibility replaced individual responsibility.  The Ca"as doctrine, premised on the impossibility of determining "ho @illed "hom, cannot, to repeat, be applied. Interestingly, in $eople v. e los 0antos, $eople v. Abella, $eople v. 9arcia and $eople v. $incalin, this &ourt also applied Article 48 of the *evised $enal &ode even though several acts "ere performed by the accused and conspiracy attended the commission of the crime.

>e ho"ever found no intention by this &ourt to establish as doctrine, contrary to Ca"as, that Article 48 is applicable even in cases "here several acts "ere performed by the accused and conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. In $incalin, this &ourt has already claried that- nonetheless, this &ourt further held that Kin other cases "here several @illings on the same occasion "ere perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a diGerent rule may be applied, that is to say, the @illings "ould be treated as separate oGenses, as opined by 5r. :ustice 5a@asiar and as held in some decided cases.K e los 0antos, Abella, 9arcia and $incalin, therefore, "ere e(ceptions to the general rule stated in Article 48 "hich e(ceptions "ere dra"n by the peculiar circumstance of the cases. It may be mentioned that in $eople v. 0anidad, this &ourt, once again, applied Article 48 of the *evised $enal &ode although the circumstances of the case "ere not the same as in Ca"as, e los 0antos, Abella, 9arcia and $incalin, "here this &ourt departed from the general rule. In 0anidad, suddenly and "ithout a "arning, several accused unleashed a volley of shots at the jeepney boarded by the victims. 5iraculously, all passengers, e(cept *olando Tugadi 1*olando2, survived the ambush and suGered only minor injuries. &onspiracy attended the commission of the crime. Accused "ere convicted for the comple( crime of murder and multiple attempted murder. >e there held that the case comes "ithin the purvie" of Article 48 of the *evised $enal &ode. &iting Ca"as and Abella, it "as pronounced that although several independent acts "ere performed by the accused, it "as not possible to determine "ho among them actually @illed *olando and that there "as no evidence that the accused intended to re at each and every one of the victims separately and distinctly from each other. On the premise that the evidence clearly sho"s a single criminal impulse to @ill 5arlon Tugadis group as a "hole, "e repeated that "here a conspiracy animates several persons "ith a single purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are loo@ed upon as a single act, the act of e(ecution, giving rise to a single comple( oGense.  The reliance in 0anidad, on Ca"as and Abella is incorrect.  The application of the Abella doctrine, has already been claried in $incalin, thus- "here several @illings on the same occasion "ere perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a diGerent rule may be applied, that is to say, the @illings "ould be treated as separate oGenses. 0ince in 0anidad, the @illings did not involve prisoners or it "as not a case of prisoners @illing fello" prisoners. As such, Abella

"ould not apply.  To repeat, in Ca"as, this &ourt "as merely forced to apply Article 48 of  the *evised $enal &ode because of the impossibility of ascertaining the number of persons @illed by each accused. 0ince conspiracy "as not proven therein, joint criminal responsibility could not be attributed to the accused. Each accused could not be held liable for separate crimes because of lac@ of clear evidence sho"ing the number of persons actually @illed by each of them. $roven conspiracy could have overcome the di/culty. Abuse of superior strength "as absorbed by treachery. Treachery "as ta@en as the Dualifying circumstance of the crime to elevate the crime to murder. Evident $remeditation "as not duly proven.  The prosecution "as also not able to prove that absent the fact of  medical assistance, the other victims "ould have naturally died, thus frustrated murder also cannot be upheld. >ith all the foregoing, this &ourt holds appellants liable for the separate crimes of t"o 132 counts of murder and seven 12 counts of  attempted murder.

$enalty imposed is 3 counts of reclusion perpetua for the t"o counts of  consummated murder absent any other mitigating or aggravating circumstance. And applying I0CA> and that there are no other mitigating or aggravating circumstances the medium period of the imposable penalty is applied for the attempted murders, 4 years and 3 months of  prision correccional as minimum to =< years of prision mayor as ma(imum for each count.