People v Marcaida

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-953 September 18, 1947 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO Marcaida, defendant-appellant. D. Victoriano H. Endaya for appellant. Assistant Attorney General Mr. Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Mr. Esmeraldo Umali Attorney representing the Government. PAUL, J.: This is an appeal by Pedro Marcaida who was convicted of the crime of treason after the corresponding view, to life imprisonment with the accessories prescribed by law and to p ay a fine of P10, 000 and the costs of Juico. The appellant points out three errors incurred, according to him, the Court of Pueblo.1. Stating that the accused CITIZENSHIP and loyalty were sufficiently tested, 2. Giving credit to the testimony of prosecution witnesses, and 3. To convict the defendant of the charge No. 3.

The defense contends that the evidence of re cord does not prove citizenship and Philippine government accused the alliance of the Commonwealth. The transcript of the shorthand notes says that the defendant is natural Lopez (a native of Lopez). The defense argues that the witness testified in Tagalog saying: "Taga Lopez" and said "ay sa panganak Lopez." No such thing perishes in the record. If true, it is strange that the lawyer did not request the court to order the court reporter to do so stated in his notes. When a party not satisfied with your translation of a statement from a witness should be asked to enter in cars ne only translation but also translated the original statement, in its absence, it shall be presumed correct official interpreter's translation.

But even accepting - says the defense - that the defendant was natural for Lopez, Quezon province, their Philippine citizenship is not properly tested. In support of this contention invoked Article IV of the Constitution, which came into force on November 15, 1935. (Article XVI, Section 6, Constitution.) The hearing of this case took place on July 15, 1946. If the defendant was I born, for ex ample, a day after the Constitution came into force on the day of the hearing was not more than ten years and eight months old, and then committed the offense at the age of about nine years. Although the record shows sunacimiento date, we are sure, however, that was not a child of that age when I walk into view. It would not have sued the prosecutor of a seri ous crime. Certainly, not born before and after en tering into force the Constitution. Can not be accepted, therefore, its provisions.

Article 2 of the Jones Act approved by Congr ess on August 29, 1916, 1916 , provides as follows: "That all the people of the Philippines that the April 11th of 1899 were Spanish subjects and who then resided in these islands, and their children born after that date will be considered and taken as citizens of the Philippine Islands, excepting those who have preferred to retain their loyalty to laCorona o f Spain, according to the provisions of the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain, s igned in Paris on December 10 of 1898, and with the exception of those that after that date have been from another country CITIZENS: ....

Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the Philippines dated 1 July 1902, reads as follows: "All inhabitants of  the Philippines residing therein and that the April 11 of 1899 were Spanish subjects residents of these islands and their children born after that date will be considered and t aken as citizens of the Philippines and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, excepting those who have chosen to retain their loyalty to the Crown of Spain, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain signed in Paris on December 10 of 1898. "

The defendant is called Pedro Marcaida. By its name, can be Filipino, Spanish or South American. There is no proof that he was a resident of the Philippines and Spanish subject on April 11, 1899. If a resident was not Spanish subject and could not acquire Filipino because CITIZENSHIP would remain abroad.

If it was Spanish subject and resided in the Philippines on April 11, 1899, automatically became a Filipino citizen with unless you have opted to retain the Spanish CITIZENSHIP, but since no such evidence, the presumption is that he's Filipino.

If born after the April 11, 1899 to parents who were Spanish subjects follow the nationality of those Spanish, if their parents have wanted to retain their loyalty wing Crown of Spain, and Filipino, if they chose to lose. No evidence presented in one way or another: can then be Spanish or Filipino.

If born after the April 11, 1899 of Filipino parents is Filipino.

It may happen that a descendant of a South American has been established in the province of Quezon after the signing of the Treaty of Paris, when his father refused to use the provisions of the naturalization law, then the defendant is abroad: is the nationality of his father.

If a descendant of a Spanish citizen who has begun to live in the Philippines after the Treaty of Paris, Spanish would remain there unless naturalized. Nor is there evidence to that effect, then is Spanish abroad.

Paz Chua Uang by the mere fact of being born in the Philippines was declared because there w as underling Philippine Spanish or daughter of a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899. (Chua v. Secret ary of  Labor, 68 Phil. 649.) This doctrine implicitly revoked Roa against Insular Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 321) and subsequent. (Insularde Manager vain against Customs, 23 Phil. 491; United States against Tianse Ong, 29 Phil. 352; United States against Ang, 36 Phil. 915, Go Julian against Government of the Philippine Islands, 45 Jur . Fil. 301; Haw against Insular Collector of Customs, 59 Phil. 646.) in the case of  Torres and Gallofin against Tan Chim vezla adopted another theory is sitting on the Roa issue, but the Court was divided in the proportion four three. The cu rrent President of the Imperial Court and Judge were dissenters. The judge felt that the simple Villareal philippines birth makes one not Filipino, but concurred in part because the doctrine of Ro a was applying for more than 20 years. The pr inciple of  stare decisis is the main reason that prompted most to re -adopt the theory of Roa. In his dissent, the current President of the Court said:

The Majority says nothing in support of the correctness of theRoa ruling, and seeks simply to justify its continued observance upon the fact That it "had been adhered to and accepted for more than 20 years before the adoption of the Constitution," and That not " Also only this Court but lower courts had consistently and invariably Followed it, the executive and administrative agencies of theGovernment had theretofore abide by it, and the public ge nerally had acquiesced in it. I do not yield to this court policy. If we induced the Government and the public to follow and accept an error for some time, it does not seem to be a good policy to continue inducing them to follow and accept the same err or discovered eleven. The rule of stare decisis does not apply to the Ext ent of perpetuating an error (15 CJ p. 918.) It is the duty of every court to review r eview its own decisions without fear and reluctance to revise them (Baker vs. Lorillard, 4 NY , 257.) As was well said in a case, "I hold itto be the duty of this court to examine its freely own decisions, and, When That It Has Fallen satisfied into a mistake, to corre ct the error by overruling its own decision . An Acknowledged mistake must be more venerable and more inveterate than it can be made by any single decision before it can claim upon the principle of Impunity stare decisis. "(Vs. Leavitt. Blatchaford, 17 NY, 521, 523.)" Precedents are to Be Regarded As the great storehouse of experience, not always to be Followed, but to be looked t o as beacon lights in the progress of judicial investigation. "(Per Bartley, CJ in Leavitt vs. Morrow, 6 Ohio St., 71, 78 .) Their "authority must yield to the force Often of reason, and to the Paramount Demands of justice as well as to the decencies of civilized society, and the law ought to speak with a voice responsive to These demands." (Norton vs. Randolph, 176 Ala., 381, 383, 58 S. 283.) "(Torres and Gallofin against Tan Chim, 69 Phil. 518.)

In matters of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, p. 249, ante, and Lam Swee Sang v. Commonwealth of the Philippines, p. 249, ante, we have stated definitively abandoned this theory and adopted the deChua v. Secretary of Labor. The reason is simple. The theory of jus soli in America is absolute: the simple American birth According to its constitution and the decision in United States v.. Wong Ki m Ark (169 U.S.649). The American Constitution never came into force in the Philippines. The theory of jus soli in the Philippines in accordance with the law of 1 July 19 02, passed by the U.S. Congress that, under the Treaty of Paris, is the one to de termine the conditional born in the Philippines is considered if a resident Filipino and Spanish subject or a resident and son of Spanish subject on April 11, 1 899. If a foreigner or child of an alien in this date can not be Filipino citizen.

The defendant then, according to the evidence of record, may be Filipino or foreigner.

Under the Treason Act No. 292 of the Civil Commission, any resident in the Philippines, owing allegiance to the UnitedStates or the Government of the Philippines, I do them formare war or common cause with their enemies and helping them socorriendoles within or outside those Islands, the crime committed treason. The section 1 of the Act is simple transplantation over the provisions of the Criminal Code which reads as American FOLLOWING: "Whoever, Owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adhere to Their enemies, giving them aid and comfort Within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason. "(Sec. 1, Crim. Code: RS, sec. 5331; Mar. 4.1909, c. 321, 321 , sec. 1, 35 Stat., 1088.)

"Treason against the United States," says the American Constitution, "shall Consist only in levying against them, or in adhering to Their Enemies, giving them aid and comfort." (Section 3 [1], Article III.)

In both American and domestic foreigners can commit the crime of treason. Foreigners owe allegian ce to the government of America during the time of his residence. (Carlisle vs. U.S. 21 Law. Ed. 426; Raditch vs. Hutchins, 24 Law. Ed. 409.) The British hold the same theory. (De Jager vs. Attorney General of Natal, 8 Ann. Cas., 76.) Need not be a U.S. Ci tizen for them to commit the crime of treason. But the Revised Penal Code have excluded the foreign nationals can only commit. Article 114 reads: "Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States or the G overnment of the Philippine Islands, sinser of foreign nationality, I do them formare war or common cause with their enemies, helping or socorriendoles inside or outside these Islands shall be punished with the penalties of reclusion temporal to death and a fine not exceeding twenty thousand dollars. "Executive Order No.44, recognizing that it was not possible under the Revised Penal Code punish for the crime of treason to foreign residents Philippines that have helped the enemies, amended Section 114, by adding a paragraph the wording FOLLOWING: "Likewise, any alien, residing in the Philippine Islands, who commits acts of treason as defined in paragraph 1 of this

article Shall be punished by imprisonment most to death and Shall pay a fine not to Excee d 20,000 pesos. "(Executive Order No. 44, May 31, 1945.)

If the defendant is Filipino, owing allegiance to the Commonwealth Government and must be condemned for treason, but if a foreigner can not be punished for acts committed prior to the amendment of Article 114 of the Revised P enal Code. As the evidence clearly est ablished that a defendant is Filipino, can not be criminally responsible for the crime of treason.

It reverses the judgment appealed. He ordere d his immediate release the costs of trade.

Moran, CJ, and Brown, M., concur. Bengzon, M.: In accordance with the result. Separate Opinions PERFECTO, J., concurring: Charged in the People's Court with the c rime of treason on four courts, appellant was found guilty only on count No. 3 and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with the a ccessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay a fine of P1,000 and the costs. No evidence was presented by the defense. The prosecution pr esented the testimonies of four witnesses. 1. Illuminada Zurbano, 40 years, widow, residing at Lopez, Tayabas, testified that she knows appellant as a "Japanese soldier," because "he was already carrying a revolver while going around our town, and he used to arrest guerrillas and took them to the garrison." On April 13, 1944, appellant was in the company of San Juan "and they arrested my brother Epimaco Zurbano, in front of the Cine and they took my brother to the g arrison." The witness brought food to her brother from April 13 to the 23d. After that she was told by the Japanese that her brother was no longer in the garrison. Since then s he did not hear anything from her brother. When he made the arrest, appellant a ppellant "was in civilian clothing, but always carried a revolver around his waist." There was an organization in Lopez known as "Yoin," founded by San Juan and appellant. The members of the organization "used to go around the houses of  the guerrillas and watched them." The witness saw the arr est because "we were in the theater looking at the people going out. I was outside the theater. Outside the building." There were many people; around eighty. The arrest was made about 7 o'clock in the evening. There were lights. Besides Lamberto San Juan, Alejandro Enguanso was also in the company of appellant. The witness did not know whether the weapon carried by appellant was a revolver or a pistol because "it was hidden." When the arrest was made, the witness was at about twelve meters away from appellant. The witness was accompanied by

Mariano Catan. She said: "My companion was Mariano Catan," her brother-in-law. The witness does not know where the "Yoin" was organized. "What I know was that he c ame to our place tog ether with other people to organize it." Epimaco was 23 years old, a guerrillero under G eneral Gaudencio Vera. The witness was at the place because the moon "was then bright and "we were having a walk." 2. Marianito Catan, 34 years, married, merchant, testified that "I remember that on April 13, 1944, while I was in front of the Cine in Lopez, Tayabas, my brother (Epimaco Zurbano) was arrested by the accused." The arrest was made by appellant and Lamberto San Jaun. The witness did not as k why. "I simply followed my brother and then went home and reported the case to my parents."His brother was taken to the Japanese garrison, and since his arrest on April 13, the witness has not heard of his brother. The witness did not hear about the organization known as "Yoin." Epimaco Zurbano "is my brother-inlaw." He was arrested at 7 o'clock p.m. "in front of th e cine" and, answering the question whether he was "the only person present" when the arrest took place, said: "I was the only one there. I was taking a walk." Only Lamberto San Juan and appellant were the persons who arrested Epimaco, and the witness was sure that there was"no other." The witness was about ten meters away from them. About half an hour elapsed from the moment of the arrest to the time the witness reported the incident to his parents. Lamberto San Juan was carrying an exposed revolver on his rig ht hip. It had a shell handle. Appellant was also carrying a revolver "on his right hip," also visible because "it was outside the polo shirt." Appellant was wearing a polo shirt. Illuminada Zurbano said that appellant was carrying his revolver "on his left hip" and was covered by his"camisa china," and that Alejandro Enguanso "was always with" Lamberto San Juan and appellant. On re-direct examination, Marianito Catan emphasized that he was the only one who was present at the place of the arrest, adding: "I am sure of that. I was the only one who was in front of cine." No one entered the cine. "A polo shirt is different from a camisa china. "The witness knows Alejandro Enguanso who was not in the company of Lamberto San Juan and appellant. Answering also questions from one  judge, the witness repeated that he did not see his sister-in-law Illuminada Zurbano in the place of the arrest. 3. Domingo Villasoto, 34, married, farmer, testified that he knows appellant because the same arrested his father Sixto Targa on August 12, 1944, because the ysuspected him of being b eing a guerrilla. "We took food to him (to his father), but after one month we did not know where he wa s taken. He did not return any more." The witness heard about the "Yoin" which is the "same as Ganap soldiers of the Japanese." Sixto Targa was the father-in-law of the witness. The arres t of Sixto Targa took placeat 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Appellant was accompanied by four companions, but he was the only one who went up the house. They were all Ganaps. Those present at his arrest were Pastora Targa, wife of the witness, Porfirio Targa, his brother-in-law and his wife, Flora Salvacion, and Silveria Abmes, wife of Sixto. The witness did not try to follow his father-in-law after his arrest. 4. Luisa de Mondragon. — The testimony of this witness was vigorously objected to by the defense, because she is not mentioned in the information as one of the witnesses for the prosecution. The lower court allowed her to testify, and she t estified that she is 48 years old, widow, and that at about 7 o'clock of April 13, 1944, "I came from the house of the mayor because I was looking for my husband" who was missing because the Japanese took him. She saw appellant in Real Street watching for people. Epimaco Zurbano was looking around Real Street. Appellant arrested him. Appellant was accompanied by Enguanso and another person. The witness knows Pio Tabien, Dominador Argosina Jr., Mamerto Canlar, Felipe Marquez and Miguel Marquez. All of them were arrested and kille d by the

Japanese "on orders of these people." When appellant arrested Epimaco Zurbano at about 7 o'clock on April 13, 1944, he was accompanied by Pablo Cortes and Benito Villaruz besides Enguanso. They were only four and no more. Appellant was wearing a white camisa china. "He had a revolver behind his body covered by his camisa." At the time of the arrest of Epimaco there were many people, but the witness recognized only Enguanso and appellant. From the foregoing, it appears that, although three witnesses testified as to the arrest of E pimaco Zurbano effected by appellant to be later brought to the Japanese garrison, for all legal purposes, it is the same as if no witness had testified at all. The second witness contradicted the first one on very important facts related to the arrest, and the third contradicted both the first and the second. The reciprocal contradictions between them have the effect of engaging the three witnesses for the prosecution in a veritable three-cornered fight. A striking characteristic of it is the fact that the first witness is the sister of Epimaco Zurbano, the arrested person, and the second witness is a brother-in-law of both, the first witness and the arr ested person, and both have mutually contradicted each other on the following essential facts to their credibility as witnesses: (a)

As to the presence of about eighty persons at the scene;

(b) As to whether Mariano or Marianito Catan was, as stated by Illuminada Zurbano, "my companion;" (c)

As to the presence of Illuminada Zurbano at theplace of the arrest;

(d) As to whether appellant was wearing camisa china or polo shirt; (e)

As to whether appellant had his revolver at his left or right hip;

(f)

As to whether said weapon was exposed and visible or not;

(g) As to whether Alejandro Enguanso was accompanying appellant or was not in the place at the time of the arrest. To increase the prosecution's predicament, comes Luisa de Mondragon, a third witness in discord, by further belying the first two witnesses when she testified that appellant was accompanied by Pablo Cortes and Benito Villaruz, but not by Lamberto San Juan, the one, who, according to the firs t two witnesses, was accompanying him. As a general rule, the testimony tes timony of one witness is enough, if truthful or reasonably credible, to prove the truth of a controverted fact in court. The spec ial nature of the crime of treason r equires that the accused be afforded a special protection not required in other cases, so as to avoid a miscarriage of   justice. The extreme seriousness of the crime, for which death is one of the penalties penalties provided by law, and the fact that the crime is commit ted on abnormal times, when large portions of the people are undergoing nervous hypertension, and when small differences may and in mortal enmity, which may wipe out all scruples in sacrificing the truth, the law requires th at, at least, two witnesses must testify as to overt acts of treason, if the same should be accepted by the tribunals as legal basis to condemn a person as a traitor.

These two witnesses must equally be truthful and credible. It is not enough that the testimony of one of  them can be relied upon on the existence of the overt act i n controversy, while the other cannot. The requirement of the law is not complied with because three witnesses or any greater number of them have testified as to the same overt act if among them there are no t two whose testimonies are believed, by a competent court, beyond all reasonable doubt. In the present case each and every one of the three witnesses for the prosecution testified to the effect of belying the testimonies of the other two, in such a way that it is not possible to accept the testimony of one of them without rejecting at the same time the testimonies of the other two. Even without the two-witness rule in treason cases, there is no legal basis to convict appellant upon the testimony of any one of the three witn esses, as each one is belied by the other two. Each of them is unreliable under the maxim "falsus in unus, falsus in omnibus." We vote to acquit appellant.

PARAS, J.: On the merits of the case I agree to the foreg oing concurring opinion.

TUASON, J., with whom concur FERIA, HILADO, and PADILLA, JJ ., dissenting: The findings of the People's Court are fully sustained by the testimony of two or mor e direct witnesses. The defendant did not introduce any evidence. The sole ground of the majority decision for reversing the lower court's judgment is that the defendant has not been shown to be a Filipino citizen. I disagree with this conclusion. Although there is no direct evidence of the defendant's citizenship, Luisa de Mondragon testified that she "knew him because he is a native of L opez and he is always there." This testimony has not been denied. "In the absence of proof to the contrary every man is considered a citizen of the country in which he resides." "A man is ... to be regarded as a citizen of his native state until it can be shown that he has acquired citizenship els ewhere. Every person at his birth is presumptively a citizen or a subject of the s tate of his nativity, and where his parents were then both subjects of that state, the presumption is conclusive." (11 C. J.,78 6, citing numerous authorities including decisions of the Federal Supreme Court and lower U. S. courts.)