People v Maceren

People v. Maceren (1977) Doctrine:The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. FACTS: 1. In 1969, Buenaventura et. al were caught “electro fishing” in the waters of barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz. They were charged with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. 2. Municipal court quashed the complaint. CFI affirmed dismissal. Case came to SC on appeal by the prosecution under RA 5440. 3. Said law penalizes: (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deep-sea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations. 4. As a defense, they argued that the law only contemplated the use of “any obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing,” and that use of an electric current was not punishable under it. “(6) Other violations”, was construed by the SC to only be acts analogous to the five preceding it). a. Fisheries Law does not expressly punish electro fishing. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resource’s Fisheries promulgated AO 84, which expressly prohibited electro fishing in all Philippine waters. b. This provision was later amended by Fisheries AO 87, which limited the regulation to fresh water fisheries. Buenaventura et. al. now contest the validity of said orders. ISSUE: WON the Fisheries Administrative Order 84 was within authority of Secretary to promulgate (NO) RATIO: NO, the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources cannot penalize it. The AOs are devoid of legal basis.  The rule is that law-making bodies cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself, in consideration of the fact that the legislature cannot be expected to contemplate all possible details and scenarios.

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However, these rules cannot extend the law to include something it clearly does not contemplate. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law In RA 5440, electric fishing was not one of the penalized acts. In fact, an amendatory law PD 704 (promulgated 1975) would later include electric fishing as a punishable act. This was held to demonstrate that RA 5440 was deficient in that it failed to contemplate that mode of fishing. AO 84 in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense falls within the category of “other violations” because the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, and is not the same as the penalty for “other violations” of the law and regulations fixed in the Fisheries Law. While there is no questioning the authority of the Secretary to promulgate the orders, since this is clearly established in Sec. 4 of the Fisheries Law, it is apparent that he exceeded his authority in promulgating FAO 84. UST v. Board of Tax Appeals: The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. The case of State v Miles offers a similar situation where a person was charged with displaying game (a deer), but the law only penalized taking game. The doctrine was that in a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order is one which falls within the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be scrutinized with special care. Since the Department Head exercise the rule-making power by delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he should NOT transcend the bounds demarcated by the statute for the exercise of such power in his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body.

DISPOSITIVE: Case dismissed

Toledo v. CSC (1991) Doctrine: The power vested in the rule making bodies is to implement the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply perceived omissions in it. The rules cannot amend an act of Congress. FACTS: 1. In 1986, Augusto Toledo (57) was appointed by COMELEC Chairman Ramon Felipe as Manager of the Education and Information Department of COMELEC. 2. No prior request for exemption from the provisions of Sec. 22 xxx was secured. 3. He had already been reporting to work when the CSC learned of his age, prompting them to file a resolution declaring Toledo’s appointment as void. 4. The CSC posits that he was in violation of Section 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP), which states: “SEC. 5. No person shall be appointed, reinstated, or re-employed in the service if he is already 57 years old, unless the President, or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in the case of employees in the judiciary, determines that he possesses special qualifications urgently needed by the hiring agency.” When Toledo’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied, he goes to the SC by certiorari. ISSUE: WON Sec. 22 Rule III of the CSRPAP was a valid exercise of the CSC’s rule-making authority. NO 5.

RATIO: NO, Said section had no basis in law, and thus cannot stand.  There is no provision at all in the law regarding any manner with the appointment, reinstatement or re-employment in the Government service of any person of any particular age. The provision on 57 years of age was purely a creation of the Commission, having no reference to any provision in the decree intended to be implemented.  The first iteration of Sec. 22 Rule III was in the first CSRPAP (1962), then found in Sec. 5 Rule VI. This version reads: o “SEC. 5. No person shall be appointed or reinstated in the service if he is already 57 years old, unless the President of the Philippines, President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as the case may be, determines that he

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possesses special qualifications and his services are needed.” While the statute itself (RA 2260) contained no provisions prohibiting appointment for reasons of age, it did allow the CSC to, “with the approval by the President, to prescribe, amend, and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of ... the Civil Service Law.” In 1975, PD 807 repealed and amended RA 2260. The assailed CSRPAP was promulgated to implement this new law. However, PD 807 makes no mention whatsoever of age limitations in Government service. Respect for the legislature necessary involves the belief that thenPresident Marcos knew of the age prohibition but chose not to include it. This demonstrates the intention not to continue the provision in effect. Thus, the inclusion of the provision in the CSRPAP was an act of “supererogation” since the rule has no relation to or connection with any provision of the law supposed to be carried into effect. The section was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The power vested in the CSC is to implement the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply perceived omissions in it. The rules cannot amend an act of Congress. CSRPAP was not properly promulgated and thus not binding on Toledo. Even assuming it were valid, the provisions therein only allows the President and the CJ of the SC as the bodies that can allow the hiring of those past 57. This was taken to mean that the provision only considers those offices under the direct supervision of the President and the SC, which naturally excludes the independent COMELEC.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition Granted

Commission of Internal Revenue v. CA (1995) Doctrine: A rule that restricts the scope of a law is invalid. FACTS: 1. In 1986, EO 41 was promulgated, granting a tax amnesty on unpaid income, estate, donor’s and business taxes from 1981-1985. 2. ROH Auto Products was assessed as deficient in tax payments by the CIR, and thus availed of this amnesty, and paid the amnesty dues. 3. When ROH made notice that it had already availed of the amnesty and asked that the assessment be withdrawn, the CIR refused. 4. It cited Revenue Memorandum Order No. 4-87, dated 09 February 1987 (which implemented EO 41). Said order construed the amnesty coverage to include only assessments issued by the BIR after the promulgation of the EO on 22 August 1986 and not to assessments theretofore made. 5. ROH protested this, and the CTA and CA ruled in ROH’s favor. The CIR now asks the SC to uphold the Memorandum Order. ISSUE: WON the memorandum order was valid RATIO: NO, the memorandum order unduly restricted the scope of EO 41 to assessments made after its promulgation, since there is no mention of this in the law proper.  Issuances of the Minister of Finance (now Secretary) must not override, but must remain consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, not to supply nor to modify, the law.  The relevant provisions of EO 41 read as follows:  “Sec. 1.Scope of Amnesty. — A one-time tax amnesty covering unpaid income taxes for the years 1981 to 1985 is hereby declared.  The scope of the law expressly considers all unpaid income taxes from 1981 to 1985. If, as the Commissioner argues, Executive Order No. 41 had not been intended to include 1981-1985 tax liabilities already assessed (administratively) prior to 22 August 1986, the law could have simply so provided in its exclusionary clauses. It did not. The conclusion is that the EO has been designed to be in the nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted by it.  Obiter: “It might not be amiss to recall that the taxable periods covered by the amnesty include the years immediately preceding the 1986 revolution during which time there had been persistent calls for civil disobedience, most particularly in the payment of

taxes, to the martial law regime. It should be understandable then that those who ultimately took over the reins of government following the successful revolution would promptly provide for a broad, and not a confined, tax amnesty.” Disposition: Decision of CA, sustaining that of CTA, is affirmed in toto.

Land Bank of the Philippines v. CA (1995) Doctrine: The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. FACTS: 1 Petitioners DAR and LBP, filed their respective motions for reconsideration for a decision denying their petition for review on certiorari contending mainly that, the opening of trust accounts in favor of the rejecting landowners is sufficient compliance with the mandate of Republic Act 6657. 2 Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under CARL. 3 Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and LBP with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land, private respondents filed petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for PMI. 4 Respondents question the validity of DAR AO No. 6 s. 1992 [provides formulas for the valuation of land expropriated] and DAR AO No. 9 s. 1990 [provides for the opening of trust accounts in the LBP instead of depositing in an accessible bank, in cash and bonds, the compensation for land expropriated by the DAR]; 5 Ps sought to compel DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and LBP to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively reserved and deposited for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. 6 In the CA, DAR maintained that a AO No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to RA6657. b "the deposit contemplated by Section 16(e) of Republic Act 6657, absent any specific indication, may either be general or special, regular or irregular, voluntary or involuntary (necessary) or other forms known in law, and any thereof should be, as it is the general rule, deemed complying." 7 CA granted the petitions for certiorari and mandamus and declared AO No. 9 null and void; ordered LBP to immediately deposit in the name of the landowners the just compensation… Issue 1: WON AO No. 9 is valid. NO. 

Petitioners: in opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form of deposit through AO No. 9, DAR did not

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commit GAD since it merely exercised its power to promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the declared policies of RA 6657. SC: RA 6657 is clear and provides the details as to how it should be enacted. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides that deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds. It cannot be inferred that deposit can be made in any other form. The function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of caring the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment because as a rule, administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. In case there is discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails. DAR overstepped its limits. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because RA 6657 is very clear that the deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds. Implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law.

Issue 2: WON respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of the cases involving the final valuation of their properties. YES.  

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There must be full payment of JC before title to the expropriated property be transferred. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR’s valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and use of their properties, is an oppressive exercise of ED. No need to distinguish between provisional compensation and final compensation for purposes of exercising the landowners’ right to appropriate the same.

Disposition: Petition denied.

GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc (1997) Doctrine: The NTC’s (or any other similar agency) power is not vested onto the chairperson. FACTS: 1. Consolidated petitions seeking the review and reversal of the decision of CA declaring NTC to be a collegial body under EO No. 546 and ordering the NTC to heretofore sit and act en banc i.e. with the concurrence of at least two commissioners for valid dispensation of its quasi-judicial functions. 2. BellTel filed with the NTC an Application for Certificate of Public Convenience which would allow it to operate and provide telecommunication services. A hearing was conducted. Some telecom companies opposed. 3. Later on, it was found that Bell’s proposal is technically and financially feasible, and this finding was approved by 2 Deputy Commissioners of the NTC. The legal department of NTC prepared a working draft of the order granting provisional authority. 4. Commissioner Kintanar set the case for hearing. During the day of the hearing, Bell filed a motion praying for the promulgation of the working draft of the order granting provisional authority since it was already signed by the 2 DCs. 5. NTC denied the motion in an order solely signed by Kintanar. 6. BellTel now files a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Prohibition, seeking the nullification of the order denying the Motion to Promulgate. 7. CA granted the petition and orders the NTC to sit en banc to consider the petition. Hence, this appeal. ISSUES: WON the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein? (YES) RATIO: YES; the NTC is a collegial body and its powers is vested in the commission and NOT on the chairperson. It requires a majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case.

-Commissioner Kintanar is not the NTC. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body, and the three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC. -This was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of ‘Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. versus National Telecommunications Commission, 131 SCRA 200’ when it declared that: o ‘The Rules of Practice and Procedure promulgated on January 25, 1978 by the Board of Communications, the immediate predecessor of respondent NTC govern the rules of practice and procedure before the BOC then, now respondent NTC.’ -Hence, under its Rules of Procedure and Practice, the Respondent NTC, as its predecessor, the BOC, had consistently been and remains a collegial body. -Respondents’ Kintanar’s and NTC’s pose that Respondent Kintanar, alone, is vested with authority to sign and promulgate a Decision of the NTC is antithetical to the nature of a commission as envisaged in Executive Order No. 546. It must be borne in mind that a Commission is defined as: o ‘[a] body composed of several persons acting under lawful authority to perform some public service.’ o A Commission is also defined as a board or committee of officials appointed and empowered to perform certain acts or exercise certain jurisdiction of a public nature or service. There is persuasive authority that a ‘commission’ is synonymous with ‘board’ -Indeed, as can be easily discerned from the context of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 546, the Commission is composed of a Commissioner and two (2) deputy commissioners not the commissioner, alone, as pontificated by Kintanar. The conjunctive word ‘and’ is not without any legal significance. It is not, by any chance, a surplusage in the law. It means ‘in addition to’. The word ‘and’, whether it is used to connect words, phrases or full sentence[s], must be accepted as binding together and as relating to one another. To designate the two (2) other members of the Commission does not militate against the collegiality of the NTC. The collegiality of the NTC cannot be disparaged by the mere nominal designation of the membership thereof. Indeed, We are convinced that such nominal designations are without functional implications and are designed merely for the purpose of administrative structure or hierarchy of the personnel of the NTC.