People v Escordial

PEOPLE v ESCORDIAL Ponente: Mendoza, J. Date: January 16, 2002 How the case reached the SC: Automatic review of a decision of the RTC FACTS: Name of Accused: Anthony Escordial Name of Offended party: Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gallaver Facts Petitioners were all living in the ground floor of a boarding house. On the night of the crime (December 27, 1997), a jeep was parked in front of the boarding house where children (later witnesses) were playing. They were told to go home by a man who would be later identified as the accused. While the three were sleeping, Erma was awakened by the presence of a man. This man had his head covered with a t-shirt to prevent identification and carried a knife about four inches long. He asked for her money and was able to get P500 from her. She then turned to the other petitioners who were already awake by that time and was able to take P3100 from Michelle and none from Teresa because her bag was in the other room. After taking the money, they were told to blindfold one another. He then proceeded to have carnal knowledge with Michelle. Michelle said that although she was blindfolded and could not see, she could feel that the man had no cover on his face when he was raping her. She felt that his chest was rough and had some scars. When he placed her hands on his nape, she felt that it was also rough (keloid). On the other hand, Erma claimed she was able to see through her blindfold and that she saw the man’s face. After he finished raping Michelle, he sat down on the bed and talked to the women. He then raped Michelle for the second time, threatening her so she’d concede that it would be much worse if he’d call others (companions) from outside to rape her. After which (about 12:30am) he left. PO3 Tancinco was one of those who responded to the crime. A report was made in the police station. Subsequent searches, through the descriptions of the petitioners, the children playing in the jeep in front of the boarding house, and others led to the pinpointing of accusedappellant. Accused was playing in basketball when the police “invited” him to the Pontevedra police station for questioning. At the station Michelle saw him and she identified him as his alleged robber and rapist. He was also brought to the Bacolod police station so that the other witnesses could identify him. They picked him out of four in the line-up. Accused claims that he went home to Pontevedra, Negros Occidental at the time of the incident as testified by three other witnesses for the defense. Procedural: RTC: Guilty of Robbery with rape Automatically reviewed (by Certiorari) by SC. DECISION: Acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. HELD WON the warrantless arrest was valid? It was invalid but was cured due to accused-appellants failure to question warrantless arrest before arraignment (waiver).

Valid warrantless searches are enumerated under Rule 113, §5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: (a)

When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b)

When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c)

When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In these cases, the crime took place on December 27, 1996. But, accused-appellant was arrested only on January 3, 1997, a week after the occurrence of the crime. As the arresting officers were not present when the crime was committed, they could not have “personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the commission of the crime”. Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must be based upon “probable cause” which means “an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.” (Reasonable: in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts) WON evidence should have been excluded by the RTC for failure to apprise him with his right to remain silent and his right to counsel? No. He has not shown that, as a result of his custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement from him – whether inculpatory or exculpatory - which was used in evidence against him. WON evidence regarding the identification of accused was inadmissible because of absence of counsel? OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION: This should have been inadmissible because identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him. However, again, failure to object when these pieces of evidence were presented constituted a waiver. TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES (regarding the identity of the accused): should be regarded as inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. In court. IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION: inadmissibility of these out-of-court identifications does not render the in-court identification of accused-appellant inadmissible for being the “fruits of the poisonous tree.” As it was not derived or drawn from the illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a consequence thereof, it is admissible as evidence against him. (Credibility of the witnesses were also discussed)