Patterson 2005 Turn to Agency

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Thomas C. Patterson

 Patterson, Thomas C.(2005) 'The Turn to Agency: Neoliberalism, Individuality, and Subjectivity in Late-Twentieth-Century Anglophone Anglophone Archaeology', Rethinking Marxism, 17: 3, 373 — 384 10.1080/08935690500122172 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08935690500122172

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RETHIN RETHINKIN KING G MARXIS MARXISM M

VOLUM VOLUME E 17 NUMBER NUMBER 3

(JUL (JULY 2005) 2005)

The Turn to Agency: Neoliberalism, Individuality, and Subjectivity in Late-Twentieth-Century Anglophone Archaeology Thomas Thomas C. Patters Patterson on 9 0 0 2  r  e b  m  e  c  e  D 3 1 3 2  : 0 0  :  t  A ]  t  n  u  o  c  c  A  s l  a  n  r  u  o  J  L  D  C [  :  y  B d  e d  a  o l  n  w  o  D

The aim of this paper is to consider why the idea of agency  */which which was elaborated by  Roy Bhaskar, Anthony Giddens, and others in the 1970s */was adopted by and became so popular among archaeologists in the 1990s. This involves examining not only the idea of agency itself, itself, but also its connections connections with an array of closely closely related notions in everyday and philosophical discourse: the individual, subject, self, and person. It also requires consideration of the sociopolitical and ideological contexts in which agency theory was developed and how changing notions of choice, determination, individuality, and subjectivity are implicated. Key Words:  Neoliberalism, The Individual, Agency, Subjectivity, Identity

The Individual: Socially Determined, Free Agent, or Something Else? Karl Marx characterized the interconnections of the individual, society, and history in quite modern terms in the 1850s when he wrote that ‘‘in the social production of their life, life, men [and [and women] women] enter enter into into defini definite te relati relations ons that that are indisp indispens ensabl able e and inde indepe pend nden entt of thei theirr will will’’’ (197 (1970, 0, 20) 20) and and that that,, whil while e they they ‘‘mak ‘make e thei theirr own own history . . . [the [theyy do so] so] un unde derr circ circum umsta stanc nces es dire direct ctly ly en enco coun unte tere red, d, give given n and and transmitted from the past’’ (1963, 15). The relation between structure and agency is still a central concern for social theorists today. Anthony Giddens, among others, has pointed out that theorists concerned with this relation fall into two groups. Action theorists, like Max Weber, focus on the individual and individual actor, occasionally to the point where it is difficult difficult to explain explain social institutio institutions. ns. Functionalists Functionalists,, like E´mile Durkheim, emphasize structures and systems, often to the point where the ability of the individual to act seems completely shaped by those institutions. Not far below the surface of this typology, typology, as you might imagine, are wider philosophical and theological issues. Two are particularly important for our purposes. One pits determinism against freedom, predestination against free will, causality against choice. Another explores what is actually meant by the term ‘‘individual’’ and its relation to the ideas of ‘‘agency’’ and ‘‘choice,’’ on the one hand, and their connections with seemingly ISSN 0893-5696 print/1475-8059 online/05/030373-12 – 2005 Association for Economic and Social Analysis DOI: 10.1080/089356905 10.1080/08935690500122172 00122172

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rela relate ted d co conc ncep epts ts such such as the the subj subjec ect, t, self self,, and and soci social al bein being, g, on the the othe otherr. It is important to keep in mind that the notion of freedom (free will) has strong ethical and moral overtones, especially with regard to the responsibility of individuals for their actions. What is at issue in the first debate is the capacity to choose. As Roy Weatherford notes, the mental states, decisions, and actions of socially determined individuals ‘‘are ‘are eff effect ectss nec necess essita itated ted by preced preceding ing causes causes’’’; their their ‘‘futur ‘futures es are fixed fixed and unalterable’’ (1995, 292). They are contrasted with individuals who possess freedom or free will */that t hat is, the innate capacity or ability to choose among an array of possibilities. These free individuals have the power to launch new causal chains of events that originate when they choose and decide freely among alternative courses of action and are not compelled or coerced to adopt a particular one. In this instance, free freedo dom m me mean anss eith either er (1) (1) volu volunt ntar arin ines esss or (2) (2) volu volunt ntar arin ines esss plus plus orig origin inat atio ion n (292  /293).1 The concept of agency emphasizes the freedom or free will of those actors who possess the power to choose or to act otherwise as opposed to things or human beings that do not. Agency involves choice, and choice is the ‘‘domain of voluntary action [that] is created beyond the reach of ordinary causal explanation.’’ Individuals are agents because they possess internal capacities or powers, which, when exercised, allow them to be active entities that continually intervene in the flow of events around them (Barnes 2000, 25). Thus, the notion of agency ‘‘capture[s] the ele eleme ment nt of ‘indet ‘indeterm ermina inacy’ cy’ or ‘conti ‘continge ngency ncy’’ in social social life, life, the ‘proce ‘processu ssual al moment’ wherein the potential for ‘transformation’ and not merely ‘reproduction’, lies’’ (Lo´pez 2003, 4  /5). In short, choice is equated with autonomy, which yields the undetermined individual. This view presumes the ontological priority of the atomistic individual, who is a naturally occurring, discrete unit (the biological organism). This human atomic unit is indivisible and cannot be reduced to or explained in terms of other phenomena. It also also make makess the the on onto tolo logi gica call pres presum umpt ptio ion n that that this this indi indivi vidu dual al is auto autono nomo mous us,, independent, and in possession of knowledge, free choice (freedom to act otherwise), motivation, reflexivity, and agency. It further presumes that the source of the individual’s knowledge as well as its capacity to act rationally reside in the individual itself. The individual’s theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge (know-how) of how to fol follow low rules rules allow allow it to optimi optimize ze pleasu pleasure re or utilit utilityy. Thu Thus, s, the reflex reflexive ive,, inte interp rpre reti tive ve,, mo moti tiva vate ted, d, desi desiri ring ng indi indivi vidu dual al who who is free free to act act othe otherw rwis ise e is simu simult ltan aneo eous usly ly an agen agentt and and a subj subjec ectt in the the sens sense e that that it co cont ntin inua uall llyy make makess assessments of its social and natural environment. Thus, agency and subjectivity become indisputable facts of personhood. This, as Nick Mansfield observes, is the Enligh Enlighten tenmen ment’ t’ss com common mon-se -sense nse notion notion of the subjec subject: t: the unique unique,, autono autonomou mouss indi indivi vidu dual al who, who, thro throug ugh h ex expe peri rien ence ce and and educ educat atio ion, n, ‘‘dev ‘devel elop opss as part part of [its [its]] spontaneous encounter with the world’’ (2000, 11). The Th e Enli Enligh ghte tenm nmen entt view view of the the on onto tolo logi gica call indi indivi vidu dual al,, whic which h co conf nfla late tess the the autonomous, self-made person with agency and subjectivity, is the foundation for the rational economic man of utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham (see Morris 1991). This 1. Other formulations of the relationship between structure and agency are possible.

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notion has been called into question on many grounds */for example, by Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche in the nineteenth century and, more recently, by psychoanalysts, phenomenologists, existentialists, and poststructuralists (Bowie 1996; Critchley and Dews Dews 1996). 1996). If Marx Marx wrote wrote about about the con conseq sequen uences ces of aliena alienatio tion n and Nietzs Nietzsche che pointed to the destructive drives of the individual, psychoanalysts brought to the fore the the impa impact ct of ne neur uros oses es and and the the un unco cons nsci ciou ous. s. If the the phen phenom omen enol olog ogis ists ts (Mar (Marti tin n Heidegger, for instance) focused attention on intersubjectivity (the subject as partly defined through the views it perceives others hold), existentialists (like Jean-Paul Sartr Sartre) e) saw saw the the subj subjec ectt (sel (self) f) as co cons nstru truct cted ed,, situ situat atio iona nal, l, and and impe imperm rman anen ent. t. Poststru oststructu ctural ralist ists, s, mo most st notabl notablyy Michel Michel Foucau Foucault, lt, argued argued that that the subje subject, ct, the psyche, and consciousness come into existence only through the interplay of language and power as lodged in impersonal disciplinary institutions like prisons, academic fields fields,, or punish punishme ment. nt. The twenti twentieth eth-ce -centu ntury ry challe challenge nge to the com common mon-se -sense nse Enlightenment notion of the subject also involved anthropologists such as Edward Sapir, Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, and Clyde Kluckhohn who, with others, laid the foundations for culture and personality studies in the 1930s and for psychological anthropology after the Second World War. Alth Althou ough gh soci social al co comm mmen enta tato tors rs may may draw draw clea clearr line liness betw betwee een n the the soci social ally ly determ determine ined d indivi individua duall and the free free agent, agent, their their distin distincti ctions ons are often often blurre blurred d in everyday discourse where we sometimes regard an agent as simultaneously free and socially determined and an action as simultaneously chosen and caused. This results in some interesting, internally contradictory notions, like those of the restricted free agent in professional sports or the hungry proletarian opting to choose something else instead of participation in the labor market. While philosophers and some social scientists, including anthropologists, have been attentive to nuanced discussions of subjec subjectiv tivity ity,, indivi individua dualit lityy, and agency agency,, most most eco econom nomist istss (and (and more more than than a few archaeologists, I believe) have not. They continue to view subjectivity and agency in terms terms of the action actionss of ration rational, al, motiva motivated ted,, selfself-ref reflex lexive ive indivi individua duals ls who make make deci decisi sion onss in orde orderr to opti optimi mize ze or maxi maximi mize ze some some desi desire red d go goal al.. Th This is is rati ration onal al econ ec onom omic ic man man whos whose e root rootss lie lie with with Th Thom omas as Hobb Hobbes es ne near ar the the begi beginn nnin ingg of the the Enlightenment tradition, whose image was polished by the utilitarians at the end of the eighteenth century, and whose likeness was dusted off again and recycled by the neoclassical economists at the end of the nineteenth century.

Neoliberalism: Its Ideology and Political Economy Social Social com commen mentat tators ors of varyin varyingg politi political cal and theore theoretic tical al persua persuasio sions ns agree agree that that marked changes occurred in U.S. society in response to a structural crisis begun in the late 1960s and early 1970s (see Harvey 1989; Jameson 1984a, 1984b, 1991; Phillips 1981 1981). ). Th They ey agre agree e abou aboutt the the many many feat featur ures es of this this cris crisis is:: high high infl inflat atio ion, n, high high unem un empl ploy oyme ment nt,, fall fallin ingg rate ratess of prof profit it,, a decl declin ine e in indu indust stri rial al prod produc ucti tion on,, the the intern internali alizat zation ion of eco econom nomic ic relati relations ons (espec (especial ially ly financ finance e and invest investmen ment), t), the breakdown of the unwritten compact between labor and capital that had appeared in 1947, the concentration of wealth, the decline of the middle class, the rise to prominence of various financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and

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the World Bank, the stalling of the civil rights movement, the appearance of new social social moveme movements nts rooted rooted in identi identity ty politi politics, cs, devalu devaluati ation on of the dollar dollar,, and the increa increasin singg implem implement entati ation on of neo neolib libera erall auster austerity ity progra programs ms from from the mid-19 mid-1970s 70s onward both at home and abroad. The broadly Keynesian economic policies of the U.S. government from the late 1930s onward were based on state ownership and state intervention in the market; the federal government was simultaneously a producer, a consumer, a promoter, and a regula regulator tor of eco econom nomic ic activi activity ty,, scient scientifi ificc resear research, ch, and educat education ion progra programs. ms. Through social security and various other health, housing, educational, and social welfar welfare e progra programs, ms, the govern governme ment nt attemp attempted ted to guaran guarantee tee the well-b well-bein eingg of its citizens. Keynesianism underpinned the postwar economic growth and modernization theories theories that acknowle acknowledged dged the existence existence of the noneconomic noneconomic realms of society society and offered offe red at least some support support for them. them. If the Keynesia Keynesian n commentat commentators ors were unable unable to provide an adequate explanation of the crisis of the 1970s, then their neoliberal crit critic icss had had an ex expl plan anat atio ion: n: the the ec econ onom omic ic slow slowdo down wn,, high high un unem empl ploy oyme ment nt,, and and increa increasin singg inflat inflation ion result resulted ed from from the govern governmen ment’ t’ss interv intervent ention ion in the market market,, which which distor distorted ted the incent incentive ivess of eco econom nomic ic agents agents and obscur obscured ed market market signal signalss (Vlachou and Christou 1999, 1). The policy implications of their theory were that the govern governmen mentt should should withdr withdraw aw from from the marke market, t, roll roll back back regula regulator toryy polici policies, es, and privatize state-owned enterprises. One practical effect of the implementation of neoliberal policies was the withdrawal of state support for health, education, and welfare program. For example, the cost of higher education was shifted from the state to students and their families. The City University of New York charged tuition for the first time in the mid-1970s, and the University of California raised its fees from $85.00 per year in 1960 to nearly $6,000 per year for residents and more than $20,000 per year for nonresidents in 2003. 2 Neol Neolib iber eral alis ism m is base based d on the the me meth thod odol olog ogic ical al indi indivi vidu dual alis ism m of ne neoc ocla lass ssic ical al microeconomic theory and on the approach of the new classical economists, both of which make at least five questionable assumptions about the individual, human nature nature,, and societ societyy. The first first assump assumptio tion n is that that indivi individua duall hum human an beings beings always always pursue their own interests and make rational choices in order to maximize or optimize pleasure or utility subject to constraints such as income or resource endowment; thus, needs, preferences, and abilities are part of the innate nature of individuals. The second assumption is that economic agents always rely on the best information available to make rational choices. The third is that these rational choices occur in an instantaneously clearing market in which an equilibrium between supply and demand is achieved simultaneously in all markets by price movements. The fourth is that social relations */regardless of whether they are construed in terms of structures, practi practices ces,, or instit instituti utions ons */are a re the the un unin inte tend nded ed co cons nseq eque uenc nces es of indi indivi vidu dual al or collective agents (firms) pursuing a goal. Social phenomena are not only emergent 2. Econom Economist istss Richar Richard d Wolf olfff (1999) (1999) and Anwar Anwar Shaikh Shaikh (1999) (1999) have have noted noted that that Keyne Keynesia sian n economic theory rose to prominence in the late 1930s and early 1940s because of the failure of neoclassical economists to explain persistent high unemployment during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Since neoclassical economic theory is the foundation of neoliberalism, there is a certain irony in the theoretical shift from the 1970s onward.

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but also have no autonomy or explanatory value of their own, to paraphrase Margaret Thatcher, a leading exponent of neoliberal policies, who remarked once that there is ‘‘no such thing as society, only individuals and families.’’ The fifth is that changes in human hum an nature nature are initia initiated ted by factor factorss that that are exo exogen genous ous to the eco econom nomy; y; such such changes have unintended consequences, the effects of which are resolved instantaneously neously in the equilibriu equilibrium-se m-seekin ekingg market market (Callinic (Callinicos os 1988, 1988, 12  /9; Fine 2001, 7  /9; Lukes 1973, 110  /9; Vlachou and Christou 1999, 2  /3). Finance capital and its neoliberal policy-makers believe that the market, through the competition it creates, is the most efficient means of allocating scarce resources in ways that they see as most beneficia beneficiall to the society society as a whole. Individuals, Individuals, acting acting as individuals rather than as subjects enmeshed in complex webs of social relations, acquire the goods and services they desire through buying and selling in the market. The neoliberals do not discern differences between individuals; they perceive them instead as if they were equals on a level playing field. If individuals fail to achieve particular goals in the market, it is their fault; the individuals are victims of their own irrational behaviors or have some deficit over which they have no control. Thus, neolib neo libera erals ls are able able to ‘‘blame ‘blame the victim victims’ s’’’ by ignori ignoring ng histor historyy, the effec effects ts of inherited wealth, class differences, and power differentials in the market. For them, the the mark market et of life life is eith either er an aren arena a of harm harmon onyy or the the plac place e wher where e the the trul trulyy meritorious come to the surface. When they pay attention to culture, society, and history, they want these accounts simple so they can use them as lessons for the pres presen entt and and to ch char artt co cour urse sess of acti action on in the the futu future re.. Cons Conseq eque uent ntly ly,, they they find find explan explanati ations ons that that univer universal salize ize histor historyy or reduce reduce the com comple plexit xityy of cul cultur tures es and societies to a few underlying, guiding principles particularly attractive. This raises questions about the source of the rules that individuals follow. In the view view of ne neol olib iber eral al poli policy cy-m -mak aker ers, s, the the theo theore reti tica call and and prac practi tica call kn know owle ledg dge e of individuals is treated unproblematically as innate or learned. Rational human beings have the ability to assess critically various options and to rank order the desirability of each. each. As Steven Steven Lukes Lukes (1973 (1973,, 73) notes, notes, these these univer universal sal featu features res determ determine ine the beha behavi vior or of the the indi indivi vidu dual al and and spec specif ifyy its its ne need edss and and inte intere rests sts.. Th The e rule ruless that that individuals follow are set in the market. The market is independent of them and does not determine behavior; it provides the social setting in which individuals can deploy their knowledge to best fulfill their needs. Here, they compete with one another to satisfy preferences for a variety of scarce things; their ability to satisfy these desires depends on the price of the items and ultimately on the size of their orig origin inal al co cont ntri ribu buti tion onss to the the mark market et.. ‘‘The ‘The pric price e me mech chan anis ism m refl reflec ects ts [the [their ir]] responses’’ (Pleasants 1999, 93). Above all else, these individuals appear concerned with or consumed by consumption. Neoliberal perspectives tend to treat the market unproblematically, even as they assert that the functioning of the market can be and has been distorted at various times and places (see DeMartino 2000).

Neoliberalism: The Individual, the Agent, and the Subject I beli believ eve e this this is the the gist gist of a ne neol olib iber eral al theo theory ry of the the indi indivi vidu dual al,, agen agency cy,, and and subjectivity. Let us consider five consequences of neoliberalism with respect to the

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develo developm pment ent of con contem tempor porary ary social social theory theory.. First, First, this this indivi individua dualis listic tic,, subje subjectctcentered, essentially Kantian view of the individual is also shared by Bhaskar, Bhaskar, Giddens, and critical theorists like Ju ¨rgen Habermas (Pleasants 1999, 159  /60). It should not be surprising that they are theorists of neoliberalism since all of them are grappling in different ways with contemporary issues. What is surprising is their commitment to ontological and epistemological individualism in light of comments they have made about shared public worlds (culture) or shared intersubjective language (communication) as preconditions for knowledge (Lukes 1973, 109). In this view, the individual is prior to and set apart from any community and only becomes part of the community by virtue of association and exchange in the market. Furthermore, the individual so described is often no more than a physical body with desires. Second, in a series of contradictory moves, this effectively microeconomic theory of the indivi individua duall has simult simultane aneous ously ly underw underwrit ritten ten claim claimss that that the eco econom nomyy and production were unduly privileged in earlier theories of society (e.g., Keynesian or modernization) and that more attention should be paid to consumption and culture (Fine 2001, 12; Miller 1995). Theories of the commodity, like those of Jean Baudrillard (1981) (1981),, blur blur import important ant distin distincti ctions ons betwee between n produc productiv tive e con consum sumpti ption on and final final consumption by focusing on the meanings attributed to a particular use value by the final consumers. In the process, they remove the commodity, both culturally and materi materiall allyy, from from the social social relati relations ons involv involved ed in its produc productio tion, n, exc exchan hange, ge, and distribution; they focus more on the symbolic than the material properties of the commodity (Fine 1995; Fine and Leopold 1993, 264  /73); however, there is more to commo com modit dities ies than than their their symbol symbolic ic exc exchan hange ge value value or their their signif significa icatio tion n of status status,, symbol, or ritual. The cultural theories of consumption that have appeared in the past twenty-five years also attribute power to the final consumer. The question is: Power to do what? To purchase a use value? To create a commodity? To attribute meaning, symbolic or otherwise, to its consumption? Thir Th ird, d, afte afterr em emph phas asiz izin ingg the the impo import rtan ance ce of mark market et rela relati tion ons, s, a nu numb mber er of neoliberal theorists have drawn a sharp line between the economic and noneconomic realms of behavior. Thus, activities associated with the market are economic and nonsoc non social ial,, and, and, con conver versel selyy, those those not associ associate ated d with with the market market are social social and noneconomic. This allows them to reintroduce what they excluded theoretically in the first place */namely, namely, the idea that the social, the cultural, and the symbolic exist and that these epiphenomena (in their view) might be important. By extension, they have adopted and promoted the view that capital is fluid and that it exists in myriad forms besides the purely economic */such such as social, cultural, or symbolic. While the forms of capital shift as they move or are exchanged between the economic and social realms, for most rational choice continues to dictate how the various forms will be deployed by individual and collective actors influenced by and in the contexts of their networks of social relations.3 It is noteworthy that the same (market) rationality 3. Pierre Bourdieu’s Bourdieu’s (1986) differentiation of economic, social, cultural, and symbolic capital in light of particular activities, social relations, and historical context in twentieth-century France is often implicated in discussions of social capital. However, his approach was quite different from those of neoliberal theorists, and he was generally quite critical of their work (cf. Fine 2001, 53  /64, 98  /105).

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operates in both the economic and noneconomic realms. Once again, this attributes power to the individual actors, but power to do what? This view contrasts markedly with that of Pierre Bourdieu (1998, 113), who writes that the capitalist economy creates oppositional ‘‘anti-economic sub-universes’’ devoid of economic capital and in which other sentiments (love, obligation, or honor) prevail. Bourdieu differs from the the ne neol olib iber eral al theo theori rist stss in anot anothe herr way; way; he has has a prof profou ound nd resp respec ectt for for and and appreciation of the significance of sociocultural complexity and historical specificity. Fourth, crystallizing at the same time as neoliberal thought were identity politics and the new social movements, such as the women’s, gay rights, antiwar, environment me ntal al,, or reli religi giou ouss fund fundam amen enta tali list st as well well as vari variou ouss ethn ethnic ic,, sepa separa rati tist, st, or nationalist movements. While they are often oppositional to features of hegemonic cultural, cultural, social, social, or political political-eco -economi nomicc structures, structures, neol neolibera iberall commentat commentators ors have tend tended ed to view view the the part partic icip ipan ants ts in each each of thes these e mo move veme ment ntss as shar sharin ingg some some fundamental property or characteristic that makes them similar (identical) to one another and different from nonparticipants. Simply put, all other constituents of an individual’s individual’s identity are reduced to t o and described by reference to this single property. property. These largely urban, decentralized movements are said to draw their members from various social classes and express diverse perspectives, ideas, and values. They often give voice to the grievances and sentiments of individuals and collectivities whose identi identitie tiess are weakly weakly develo developed ped,, subord subordina inated ted,, or suppre suppresse ssed d by the domina dominant nt cultural, social, and political systems. Their grievances and the identities they seek to construct focus on cultural and social issues that often involve the expression of personal, intimate aspects of everyday life, such as sexual preference or abortion rights rights.. Chanta Chantall Mou Mouffe ffe writes writes that that these these movem movement entss are rooted rooted not in the class position of their participants but rather in the appearance of antagonisms that are ‘‘always discursively constructed’’ (1988, 95). Neoliberals see the identity politics attributed to the new social movements as self-referential and self-representational. It is the individual who elects to participate in them. However, if the identities are not related to class position, then who really constitutes them: a plural subject, a popular force, or some external agency? The class-based demands of demonstrators which were clearly articulated with other issues at the meeting of the World Trade Organization in Seattle and in subsequent venues call into question how new social movements have been identified and characterized. Fifth, there have been social commentators during the past thirty years who have challenged neoliberal thought even as they used parts of its conceptual framework. As already mentioned, Pierre Bourdieu was one critic; Michel Foucault was another. The latter wrote that the individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against which it happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes. In fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals  . . .  The individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is an element of its articulation. The individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle. (1980, 98)

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In Foucault’s view, the subject came into existence only through the interplay of langua language ge and power power lodged lodged in impers impersona onal, l, discip disciplin linary ary instit instituti utions ons like like prison prisons, s, hospitals, or schools. Nick Mansfield described Foucault’s subject as ‘‘the primary workroom of power, making us turn in on ourselves, trapping us in the illusion that we have a fixed and stable selfhood that science can know, institutions can organize and experts can correct’’ (2000, 10). Foucault’s perception of agency and subjectivity contrasts contrasts markedly markedly with neol neolibera iberall views views of selfhood. selfhood.

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The evolut evolution ionist ist-fu -funct nction ionali alist st theore theoretic tical al frame framewor works ks of the new or proces processua suall archaeology were ascendant in Anglophone countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Patterson 1995, 2003; Trigger 1984). Kent Flannery’s ‘‘Archeological Systems Theory’’ Theory’’ (1968) or his ‘‘The Cultural Evolution of Civilizations’’ Civilizations’’ (1973) were influential exampl examples es of this this trend. trend. Critique Critiquess of the new archaeol archaeology ogy began began to appear appear with with increasing regularity from the late 1970s or early 1980s onward, perhaps culminating with Elizabeth Brumfiel’s distinguished lecture, ‘‘Breaking and Entering the Ecosystem’’ (1994). Concerns with human agency or with the relation between structure and agency emerged in these critiques (Bell 1992; Hodder 1982; Johnson 1989). Dean Saitta (1994) was an early critic of how archaeologists were conceptualizing agency and its interconnections with social relations and structures. However, neither the concept of agency nor the related concepts of individuality, subjectivity, and identity were seen from a single perspective (Brumfiel 2000; Dobres and Robb 2000; Pauketat 2000, 2001). As time passed, it became increasingly apparent in the 1990s that there are, in fact, diverse understandings of each concept, of their interrelations, and of their potential relevance to archaeology. This diversity of viewpoints refracts (1) varying degrees of commitment to the tenets of processual archaeology or to one or more of the various postprocessual critiques of it, on the one hand; and (2) a healthy dose of eclecticism, on the other (Clark 2000, 107  /9; McCall McCall 1999; Patterson Patterson 1990). First, many processual processual archaearchaeologists objectify the subject; that is, they treat the subject as if it were a biological individual individual possessing possessing certain certain behaviora behavioral, l, genetic, genetic, or psychologi psychological cal characteris characteristics. tics. Second, they are also advocates of methodological individualism, which asserts that expl ex plan anat atio ions ns of soci social al phen phenom omen ena a mu must st be co couc uche hed d in term termss of fact factss abou aboutt individuals. Third, they believe that individuals act in accordance with conscious mental states and are rational in the sense that they act to maximize particular goals. Fourth, they view culture narrowly as behavioral rules or symbols that are learned and transmitted by individuals or as adaptations that help individual members sustain them themse selv lves es and and restr restrai ain n thei theirr own own self self-i -int nter eres ests ts in favo favorr of the the co comm mmon on go good od.. Keeping both the field of debate and the underlying structuring principles in mind, let us co cons nsid ider er brie briefl flyy some some of the the disp dispar arat ate e view viewss abou aboutt agen agency cy,, indi indivi vidu dual alit ityy, subjectivity, and identity. Toward the processual end of the spectrum, human agents are viewed as biological individual individualss possessing possessing certain certain psychologi psychological cal characteri characteristics. stics. Flannery Flannery (1998, (1998, 14  /5)

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described them as political movers and shakers: calculating, aggressive alpha males who ruthlessly and shrewdly pursued power. In this view, I believe, some individuals in a society have power to bring about change, others do not; further, subjects are born, not made in culturally and historically contingent circumstances. As a result, the issues of subjectivity (in the sense of the inner dimensions of the individual deriving from particular vantage points, feelings, beliefs, or desires) and intersubjectivity are not particularly relevant for processual archaeologists. The issue of identity is most frequently reduced to community or ethnic affiliation, less frequently to social status (elite versus commoner) or class position. Toward the postprocessual end of the spectrum lie the perspectives of John Barrett (2000, 2001) and Lynn Meskell (1999, 2001). Barrett, for example, sees human agents as knowledgeable and reflexive people who ‘‘do not appear upon the historical stage as a given, [but] rather make themselves within and through their own specific social and cultural conditions’’ (2001, 141). In his view, ‘‘agency cannot be analyzed in terms of isolated beings  . . . [and it] is not the study of the individual  per se . Agency is always situated in the resources of time/place, a being-in-the-world, whose actions carry the past into the future and which reference to absent places in the locations of its its own own oper operat atio ions ns.. Th Thro roug ugh h thos those e acti action onss agen agency cy kn know owss itse itself lf and and is kn know own n by others’’ (Barrett 2000, 61). Here, questions about subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and identity remain relevant and challenging for archaeologists. As Meskell observes, Although some aspects of our identity are given to us as a starting point */our sex, class, ethnicity, ethnicity, etc. */this this frames the self, it does not rigidly determine the the sort sort of pers person on we might ight beco become me or ou ourr acti action onss in the the futur uture e. Unde Unders rsta tand ndin ingg soci social al iden identi tity ty ofte often n requ requir ires es a me meta tana narra rrati tive ve,, just just as awaren awareness ess of indivi individua duall selves selves requir requires es that that identi identity ty and life life experi experienc ence e be inserted into that equation. In fact, there are two levels of operation: one is the broader social level in which identities are defined by formal associations and mores; the other is the individual or personal level where a person experiences many aspects of identity within a single subjectivity, fluid over the trajectories of life. The latter is more contingent, immediate, and operat operates es at a greate greaterr freque frequency ncy,, wherea whereass societ society’ y’ss catego categorie riess and constraints take longer to reformulate. (2001, 188  /9)

Discussion Social theory from the turn of the last century */when when imperialism, finance capital, and laisse laissez-f z-fair aire e libera liberalis lism m reigne reigned d suprem supreme e and were were first first define defined d in modern modern terms */has has been reappropriated or recycled by writers during the past thirty years. This is true of neoliberal commentators whose roots lie in neoclassical economics and margin marginal al utilit utilityy theory theory;; it is also also true true of archae archaeolo ologis gists ts who have have con consci scious ously ly or unconsciously appropriated its perspectives and introduced them into discourse that operates in a distinct domain, one that is at least superficially different economics. At this point, we as archaeologists archaeologists might want to contempla contemplate te an exercise described described by economist George DeMartino. He asks us to complete the following statement: ‘‘‘A good theory is one that  . . . ’ In concluding this statement, consider what a good theory

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is to do, what features it should have, and/or what form it should take. All our lives each of us has to make choices between contending theories. I’m asking you to reflect for a moment on the criterion of theory choice that you bring to bear (or think you should bring to bear) when confronting alternative theories’’ (2000, ix). I would would submit submit that that reduct reduction ionist ist theori theories es that that distor distortt the com comple plexit xities ies of the human condition by oversimplification are not particularly useful. It is also important, I believe, not only to examine the historically specific contexts in which concepts and theories emerge, but also to consider carefully their implications.

 Acknowledgments  Acknowledgments 9 0 0 2  r  e b  m  e  c  e  D 3 1 3 2  : 0 0

This paper paper was prepared prepared for the session session ‘‘Archaeolo ‘Archaeological gical Theories as Ideologie Ideologies’ s’’’ organized by Reinhard Bernbeck and Randall McGuire for the annual meeting of the Society for American Archaeology, held 31 March  /4 April 2005, in Salt Lake City. I want want to than thank k Wendy endy Ashmo Ashmore re,, Rein Reinha hard rd Bern Bernbe beck ck,, Jose Joseph ph Chil Childe ders rs,, Step Stephe hen n Cullenberg, Cullenber g, Michael Kearney, Kearney, and Carlos Ve´lez Iba´n˜ez for their thought-provokin thought- provoking g comments.

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