Parker Gibson Curriculum Package Watermarked TP 21

January 24, 2024 | Author: Anonymous | Category: N/A
Share Embed Donate


Short Description

Download Parker Gibson Curriculum Package Watermarked TP 21...

Description

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce Parker-Gibson

All-In-One Curriculum Package

A university consortium dedicated to developing the theory and practice of negotiation and dispute resolution. Harvard | MIT | Tufts

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package Instructor’s Guide

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

The Program on Negotiation (PON) is a consortium program of Harvard University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Tufts University and serves as an interdisciplinary research center dedicated to developing the theory and practice of negotiation and dispute resolution in a range of public and private settings. The Teaching Negotiation Resource Center (TNRC) at PON offers a variety of teaching materials, including role-play simulations, videos, books, periodicals and case studies. Role-play simulations provide useful ways to facilitate experimentation, introducing participants to new negotiation and dispute resolution tools, techniques and strategies. The All-In-One Curriculum Package from PON brings a new, interactive learning experience to teaching negotiation. This easy to use package includes background reading lists, pre- and postsimulation surveys on learning points, a PowerPoint presentation to use while debriefing the simulation with participants, and a guide for the instructor. If you have questions about the simulation package or other PON teaching materials, please contact [email protected].

This instructor’s guide was written by Monica Giannone and Lara SanPietro for the Program on Negotiation. Copies are available from the Teaching Negotiation Resource Center (TNRC), online at www.pon.org, by email: [email protected], or by telephone at 800-258-4406. This exercise may not be reproduced, revised or translated in whole or in part by any means without the written permission of the TNRC Coordinator, Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, 501 Pound Hall, Cambridge, MA 02138. Please help to preserve the usefulness of this case by keeping it confidential. Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Instructor’s Guide

2

Table of Contents Parker Gibson Curriculum Package

1

Parker Gibson Overview

3

Contents Overview and Game Sequencing

4

The Negotiation Setting

5

Mechanics to Run the Case

6

Indicative Class Timeline

7

Guidance for Participants in a Negotiation Simulation

7

Optional Reflection Assignment

8

Part II: Concepts

9 9

ZOPA

9

Anchoring

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

BATNA

Distributive Negotiation Part III: Debrief Appendix

10 10 12 18

Appendix A: Package Detailed Contents

18

Appendix B: Pre- and Post-Negotiation Surveys Answer Key

19

Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Instructor’s Guide

3

This section of the guide provides instructors with (1) information about the All-In-One Curriculum Package, (2) an administrative overview of the Parker-Gibson simulation, (3) a description of how this Instructor’s Guide fits within the entire All-In-One Curriculum Package, and (4) a description of the components of the Instructor’s Guide to provide instructors with the ability to determine how to get the most out of this guide. Most importantly, instructors should feel free to adapt these materials to fit the context of their class and specific teaching goals. And enjoy Parker-Gibson!

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

Parker Gibson Overview Teaching Objectives • Practice and build negotiation style with a two-party, single-issue, distributive negotiation simulation exercise. • Acquire competencies in negotiation preparation and negotiation concepts such as claiming value, BATNA, ZOPA, and managing concessions. Exercise level of difficulty • This exercise is simple and would work well as a first negotiation exercise. • Participants to do not need to have prior knowledge of role-play simulations or negotiation theory. Suggested schedule*: This case requires a minimum of 90-minutes of class time, and is best run in a 2.5/3 hour class 5 – 20 minutes: Introduction, core concepts 10 – 15 minutes: Individual Preparation and Pre-Survey 10 – 30 minutes: Negotiation, outcome form, post-survey 30 – 75 minutes: Debriefing *Time schedule can vary significantly depending on whether or not students read and prepare for the case in advance outside of class

Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Instructor’s Guide

4

Contents Overview and Game Sequencing The package will provide the following teaching tools, grouped here in the order that will maximize their usefulness (please refer to Appendix A for a detailed list and description of all course package materials):

Pre-Game • Instructor •



Student



Post-Game

Review Pre-Survey results and integrate into Class Presentation Deck, if desired





Review Outcome Forms and integrate into Class Presentation Deck, if desired Debriefing - Class Presentation Deck Feedback Survey (after debrief)

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce



Instructor’s Guide (this document) Instructor Background Readings Student Background Readings Confidential Instructions Pre-Survey Student Background Readings

Game

• •

• • •

Play Exercise Outcome Form Post-Survey



Instructor’s Guide Objectives

The objective of this Instructor’s Guide is to assist you in teaching your negotiation course seamlessly. It will show you how to: 1. Leverage the tools included in this course package to maximize student learning 2. Teach the core negotiation concepts that are embedded in the case by following the Program on Negotiation (“PON”) guidelines 3. Debrief the case with students The Instructor’s Guide is organized into three parts:





Part I: Pre-Game Introduction to the Negotiation Setting of Parker-Gibson Leveraging the tools of this package

• • •

Part 2: Concepts BATNA ZOPA Anchoring • Distributive Negotiation





Part 3: Game Debriefing Discussion on concepts/themes after the simulation exercise Debriefing the case with analytics and graphs

Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Instructor’s Guide

5

Part I: Pre-Game Before the game, instructors should become familiar with the negotiation simulation ParkerGibson and the different components of the Curriculum Package. This section of the Instructor’s Guide leads instructors through a general overview of Parker-Gibson and provides step-by-step detailed instructions on how to fully utilize the Curriculum Package. Instructors who are already familiar with Parker-Gibson or the Curriculum Package can refer to only those pieces which are helpful.

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

The Negotiation Setting The Parkers and Gibsons are neighbors. A vacant parcel of land, now owned by the Parkers, sits between their two house lots. The vacant parcel is smaller than the minimum required by zoning for a building lot, but potentially has value to abutters for "accessory uses" or simply as a buffer. The Parkers bought the land 15 years ago for $20,000 thinking that they might build a tennis court on it, but never went ahead with this project. The Parkers recently sold their house, but the purchasers are not very interested in buying the extra land. As a result, the Parkers have approached the Gibsons to see if they would like to acquire the parcel. As it happens, there is a large bargaining range in this case. The Parkers are moving out of state and will reluctantly sell the land for $15,000 to the purchaser of their home if the Gibsons aren't interested in buying the lot. Unbeknownst to the sellers, the Gibsons are very interested in purchasing the land to expand their house. They recently received an inheritance, and are willing to pay up to $40,000 for the land. The case was written to illustrate the dynamics of single-issue bargaining. To the extent possible, other issues have been suppressed. For example, the parties have a polite but distant relationship; with the Parkers’ departure, there is no realistic prospect of future dealings. Likewise, the relatively small amount of money involved argues against elaborate deal structuring. 2 parties: • The Parkers • The Gibsons

Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Instructor’s Guide

6

2 sets of instructions: • Confidential Instructions for the Parkers • Confidential Instructions for the Gibsons

Mechanics to Run the Case The Curriculum Package provides everything you need to run Parker-Gibson. An individual Instructor may choose to vary the sequence of the following steps – specifically with regard to the elements contained in the pre-negotiation phase (including, but not limited to the Student Background Readings and Pre-Negotiation Survey), but the suggested order is as follows:

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

The main steps are as follows: 1. Assign recommended Student Background Readings. The short student background readings will provide students with an introduction to concepts covered in the Parker-Gibson simulation. In addition to the short readings provided, students are also given suggestions on potential longer readings to further deepen their learning. 2. Distribute roles before class and ask participants to prepare individually in advance of the negotiation. 3. Distribute Pre-Negotiation Survey and instruct participants to complete (and hand in) prior to the negotiation. The Pre-Negotiation Survey begins with three brief questions from the Student Background Readings to gauge student learning and understanding of the basic concepts. The Survey then asks a series of questions specifically about the role to which they have been assigned, their approach to the simulation, and their understanding of how to apply the negotiation concepts to the simulation. The Instructor may choose to hand out the reading questions before the simulation questions, if preferred. These surveys should be collected prior to the negotiation so the Instructor can use the results in the debriefing. The simulation questions contained in the Pre-Survey mirror those in the Post Survey so an instructor can gauge how students understanding of these questions, concepts, and strategies might change through their participation in the negotiation. All Pre- and Post-Surveys as well as the correct answers are provided for Instructors in Appendix B of this Instructor Guide. 4. In class, introduce the negotiation concepts and Parker-Gibson exercise via the Class Presentation Deck. The negotiation concepts build upon what the students read in the Student Background Reading and were quizzed on in the Pre-Negotiation Survey. Note: This case can be prepared in class in about 20 to 30 minutes. However, the shorter the preparation time allowed, the more likely that participants will resort to positional bargaining.

Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Instructor’s Guide

7

5. In class, divide participants into teams of two and allow 20 to 30 minutes for them to negotiate. You may want to review the roles with the Parkers and the Gibsons separately before the negotiation. 6. Collect the Agreement Forms of the negotiating groups for use in the debriefing. 7. Distribute Post-Negotiation Survey and collect results, to integrate into in-class debriefing, if desired. 8. In-class debriefing via Class Presentation Deck.

Indicative Class Timeline Note: The minutes in the left column are indicative only and are based on a 2-3 hour long class

10 – 15' 10 – 30’ 30 – 75’

Class Presentation (Concepts) Logistics & Negotiation Rules Students read Confidential Instructions and Prepare for Negotiation Students complete Pre-Negotiation Survey One-on-one Negotiation Complete Agreement Outcome Form Post-Negotiation Survey Class Presentation (Debrief)

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

5 – 20’

Guidance for Participants in a Negotiation Simulation

Advance Distribution: Participants should prepare in advance to negotiate the exercise. Without making any judgment as to how one should negotiate in order to be most effective, a premise of negotiation training is that a negotiator is more effective when acting purposely rather than by simply reacting to the other party or parties. Towards this goal, the participants should be encouraged to prepare for the negotiation by thinking about potential outcomes and ranking them. The Pre-Survey will include questions to stimulate this type of preparation. Guidance for Instructors: Before participants begin negotiating, make it clear that the vacant lot between the Parkers’ and Gibsons’ homes is under discussion, not the Parkers' house lot. Emphasize that the parties should not exchange their physical Confidential Instructions during the negotiation. People can reveal as much or as little of their confidential information as they see fit, but must establish their credibility with their words or other actions. Also, you may ask people not to swap sheets even after they have come to agreement, so you can reveal the key information during the debriefing.

Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Instructor’s Guide

8

Emphasize that the negotiation is taking place under a tight deadline: ten to twenty minutes really will suffice. By the same token, people should be encouraged to make good use of the time they have; tell them that they will get more out of the exercise if they do not rush to agreement in the first few minutes. Through the pre-survey instructors will be able to capture the privately recorded goals of each student. This will make it possible to explore the possible connection between aspirations and success. It will also demonstrate how, for some people, standards of success are relative, not absolute. A seller may be very happy with a $20,000 deal, for example, until he or she learns that the buyer had much more to spend. Guidance for Students: A version of these guidelines is also provided in the Debriefing Class Presentation Deck for you to use in your introduction to Parker-Gibson.

• • • • •

You will receive confidential instructions for your role Please read your role carefully, and prepare for your negotiation using the Pre-Survey questions provided to you Information included in the respective confidential instructions must remain confidential. You may choose to share information throughout the negotiation, as your role permits and as fits your strategy Do not begin negotiating until instructed to do so The in-person negotiation will run for the exact time instructed by your professor Play your role faithfully and remain “in role” until the debrief begins Note: Do not share your confidential information with your counterpart after the negotiation ends, unless specifically instructed to do so

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

• •

Optional Reflection Assignment

Instructors may want to assign students a one-page journal reflection to complete upon finishing the negotiation. Instructors can prompt students to capture what the highlights of the negotiation were as well as an explanation of what they think they did well and what they think they did poorly. This practice will encourage students to think reflectively and analytically about their performance, especially if there is time between the simulation and the game debriefing session. It also introduces the important concept of journaling, game reflection, and feedback. Instructors may choose to have students submit their journal responses ahead of the debriefing session, if they wish.

Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Instructor’s Guide

Part II: Concepts Parker-Gibson is an exceptional negotiation simulation for students who are just learning negotiation and have not had much experience with negotiation concepts and role-play simulations. Because of this, this Curriculum Package includes a reading list that will provide students with an overview of important negotiation concepts and frameworks. In addition to the suggested readings for students, the suggested Instructor Background Reading List will allow instructors to explore and engage with these concepts more deeply.

BATNA

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

This section provides a basic explanation of some of the concepts that can be taught and debriefed through Parker-Gibson to best fit their course. A version of these concepts is presented in the Class Presentation for the instructors to use in their introduction to ParkerGibson. These concepts, as well as a less theoretical and more applied approach, should also be used to guide the post-negotiation debrief.

Your Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement or BATNA answers the question: What would you do if there were no deal today? Knowing your own BATNA will help you not accept a deal that is suboptimal to your likely walkaway alternative. Your BATNA can help you plan the point at which you will walk away from a deal (your reservation point). Knowing your counterpart’s BATNA will help you estimate the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) Student Reading on BATNA: https://www.pon.harvard.edu/category/daily/batna/page/2/

ZOPA

The Zone Of Possible Agreement or ZOPA is the area between two parties’ walkaway points (reservation points) Example: If you want an hourly wage between $19 and $24 dollars and your potential employer wants to pay between $17 and $21 dollars, the ZOPA is between $19 and $21

Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

9

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Instructor’s Guide

10

Employer’s Preferred Wage

[ THE ZOPA ]

$17

$19

$21

$24

Your Preferred Wage

Anchoring

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

By estimating the ZOPA prior to a negotiation you can avoid taking a deal that is worse for you than your next best (realistic) alternative. You can then start to think creatively about what other issues might be added to the agenda to reshape the ZOPA. You can use your knowledge of the ZOPA to try to anchor more effectively Student Reading on ZOPA: https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/businessnegotiations/how-to-find-the-zopa-in-business-negotiations/

The first offer in a negotiation is called the anchor. An anchor has a tendency to be “sticky” so it is important to anchor carefully after analyzing your BATNA and estimating the other side’s BATNA and ZOPA. You should anchor first when you have a good sense of the ZOPA. If the other party anchors first, avoid the “stickiness trap.” Use your knowledge of your BATNA and the estimated ZOPA and try to move the anchor in the negotiation. The better prepared you are in a negotiation, the higher the likelihood you’ll know if a counterpart’s offer is fair, and you’ll be able to respond appropriately Student Reading on Anchoring: https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/negotiation-skillsdaily/what-is-the-anchoring-bias/

Distributive Negotiation Distributive negotiation is when parties claim value in a negotiation and can be imagined as dividing up a pie. Negotiators can become better distributive negotiators through a mix of preparation and at-the-table strategies such as: 1) Analyzing their own and the other side’s BATNA 2) Trying to strengthen their BATNA and weaken the BATNA of the other side 3) Estimating the ZOPA 4) Managing the rate and scope of their concessions

Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Instructor’s Guide

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

Student Reading on Distributive Negotiation 1: https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/dealmaking-daily/what-is-distributive-negotiationstrategies/ Student Reading on Distributive Negotiation 2: https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/negotiation-skills-daily/what-is-distributive-negotiation/

Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

11

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Instructor’s Guide

12

Part III: Debrief The Class Presentation will provide you with the conceptual support and frameworks to run the debrief of the negotiation exercise. The debrief is more beneficial to the students if class participation is high and the instructor leads a strong interactive discussion. This section will provide instructors with the ability to lead an interactive debrief to illuminate the core lessons of Parker-Gibson.

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

The instructor can choose to display the results that they have collected from the outcome forms, alternatively instructors can choose to ask students to present their final deals as a basis for class discussion. When the outcomes of the negotiating groups are displayed to the class, the wide range in possible outcomes for this negotiation will be apparent. The instructor may also use the results from the Pre- and Post-Negotiation Surveys to stimulate class discussion in the debrief.

Begin by asking who came to agreement. Perhaps one in 20 pairs will have been stalemated; if there is a stalemate, make sure at the end of the debriefing to find out why the parties got stuck. Next, ask people to raise their hands if they are satisfied with the agreements that they reached; almost everyone will do so. If you so choose, you can compile the results from the Agreement Outcome Form into the Class Presentation for use in debriefing. To maintain suspense, you might ask first how many people settled in the $25,000 range (that is $25,000-$25,999), and then move up a bracket ($26,000) and down ($24,000), until you have included all the outcomes. The midway point between the two reservation levels is $28,000, but for reasons that are discussed below, the typical median is several thousand dollars less. If you are working with a small group, you might want to compare the results your group produces with results for a larger sample of participants. As you reveal the results, you often will get gasps or laughter, particular as you get toward either extreme. When the full distribution is displayed, you might ask whether participants are still satisfied with their agreements. Some people will answer “yes” -- because they sold high or bought low, or they are not relativists -- but some others might admit to remorse. You may choose at this point to explore the so-called "winner's curse." People should consider not only their own standards for satisfaction, but also how the people with whom they are dealing measure success. Negotiations are often stymied when people have unrealistic assumptions about what others can afford.

Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Instructor’s Guide

13

Early in the discussion, you might also step back from the problem and ask whether the wide range of results is realistic. One of the fundamental points of the exercise is that even when people have identical instructions, the differences in how they negotiate may produce very different outcomes. Whether the bargaining range is big or small (or exists at all) will depend on the situation. In a purely competitive market, there will be no range; but for many commodities – cars come to mind – there is some play in the numbers. The more unusual the subject matter and the smaller the number of available substitutes, the less certain the parties can be about the nature of the bargaining range.

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

One of the lessons in this particular exercise is that negotiators should be careful not to impose their assumptions and perceptions on the other side. The Parkers are desperate sellers and the Gibsons cannot walk away from this unique parcel of land as easily as they might leave a car dealer's showroom. If either family focuses exclusively on their own needs, they will miss an opportunity to do much better than their respective BATNAs (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). The variation in results invites rich discussion. If you don't mind going out on a limb, you have an 80 percent chance of being right by predicting that in the pair that reached the lowest price, the seller put the first serious number on the table i.e., anchored (and conversely). Cover yourself, of course, by noting that your prediction is an educated guess. On occasion you will run into an extreme result that instead is explained by an even more extreme initial demand. In any event, the high and low outcomes should be juxtaposed. If the prediction proves right, it demonstrates the risk of making the first offer, namely that one gives away part of the bargaining range. If, for example, the Gibsons start the conversation with a bid of $23,000, it is highly unlikely the property will be sold for less than that. What had been a range between $23,000 and $27,000 instantly becomes truncated. It is essential that you emphasize another aspect of such a bid: it fundamentally shifts the bargaining power of the parties. Going into the negotiation, each party is in a position of equal ignorance, knowing his or her own BATNA but in the dark as to the other side's. (Indeed, neither can be sure that there is any range at all.) The moment the seller offers $23,000, however, the seller knows that a deal will be made. The only question is at what amount. He or she must determine if the $23,000 is a take-it-or leave-it number or something the buyer is prepared to improve. The seller must also determine how much he or she can fairly extract (or whether fairness even comes into the question). Many sellers in that situation will report that they rapidly recalculated their standards of success. Initially, a $23,000 deal might have seemed like a straight-A outcome, but now their Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Instructor’s Guide

14

aspirations are higher. This is a very good time to explore the dynamic nature of success, specifically the connection between substance and process. You can make good reference to Neale and Bazerman's findings that negotiators often devalue concessions of the other side, once they are made. (See Negotiator Cognition and Rationality.) Explore the interpersonal and communication dimensions of these exchanges, as well. Often the sellers will report being startled by the buyer's generous offer. Sometimes they have a toogood-to-be true reaction, which is surely not in the buyer's interest. Many of the buyers will be unaware that their numbers have triggered such thoughts and claim that their sellers had poker faces. Perhaps this is so, but without videotape, you can't be sure: Some buyers may have been so absorbed in their own calculations that they did not look for a response.

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

Ask people to consider how this negotiation would have been different if it had been conducted by phone or email. People usually will volunteer that they would have missed the nonverbal cues, but if you push hard, you'll probably discover that some people made much more of them than did others. Push hard on how people interpreted language, as well. If the buyer who initially offered $15,000 was eventually "talked up" to a higher figure, find out just how that happened. Did the seller say that number was "totally unacceptable"? If so, you have good fodder for discussing the ethics of negotiation. (Ethics aside, it is also a risky strategy, as the buyer may be making a good faith offer.) If, as is much more likely, he or she said something less explicit (such as "I really am looking for more"), ask the would-be buyer how he or she interpreted that. The experienced negotiator may well hear such a statement as not being a firm “no”. It is important to stress that this is not a lesson in why you should never make the first offer, or anchor. If people take that from the exercise, they can be sure of two things: first, they will never get burned; second, they will never make a deal. At some point, silence must be broken and someone has to get serious about a reasonable price. People should be cautioned about throwing out a number before getting an impression of the other person's situation, but as noted below, there can be advantage in talking from your own number. Psychological anchors come into play here. In any case, people who put the first number on the table should be asked how they arrived at their numbers and what assumptions they were making. The Parkers don't know about the Gibsons' recent inheritance; the Gibsons are unaware of the Parkers' imminent move. Negotiators who glean that information before discussing dollars are in a much stronger position.

Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Instructor’s Guide

15

In the course of debriefing particular cases, the instructor should explicitly establish a vocabulary of negotiation analysis. Key concepts include bargaining range, BATNA, offer patterns, winner's curse, and the like. You might note that although the problem is necessarily fictitious and simplified, it does allow us to see what is seldom apparent in real life: namely, the range of outcomes that might have been. In practice, we must negotiate with incomplete information and uncertainty. It behooves us to have a clear sense of our non-agreement alternatives, but we should be modest about what we really know about the other side. In debriefing the problem, we can see both ends of the bargaining range clearly, while in practice, all but our end of it may be obscure.

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

It's also worth noting that persuasion is an important part of negotiation, so the bargaining range may move in the course of conversation. In ordinary sales situations, the seller will try to convince the buyer of the value of what he or she is offering; if this pitch is successful, the range is extended. You can explain the coyness with which many people negotiate single-issue cases in terms of each side's reluctance to make offers that are too generous or to reveal information that betrays the party's true need to make a deal. This reluctance can carry a big cost. At best, it wastes valuable time. At worst, parties who convincingly feign disinterest, each waiting for the other side to pounce, may miss profitable agreements. If you have time, you might invite the buyer who paid the least and the seller who received the most to come forward and participate in a championship playoff. Having explained all the dangers of the “dance of offers and counter-offers,” tell them that you have spared them that problem. Each knows exactly what the other's situation is: Parker can see $40,000 in cash bulging out of Gibson's pocket; Gibson knows that if there is no deal, Parker will turn around and sell the vacant lot for $15,000. You will stand by as a “truth officer” just in case either one starts bluffing or lying. Give the two parties a couple of minutes to see if they can reach a deal, and have them talk loudly enough so that everyone can hear. Prod them to get past the pleasantries and into the heart of the negotiation quickly. You may have to count down the final seconds. About a third of the time, the parties will split the difference. In another third, one player will stand firm on a favorable number and the other will capitulate. In the other cases, the parties will be unable to come to agreement in spite of the fact that they both can see the large bargaining range. Even when the parties agree, you usually will be able to illustrate the tug-and-pull of singleissue cases. As the problem is written, it is hard to find joint gains. A dollar more for one party necessarily means a dollar less for the other. It is often clear that ego may be more important Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Instructor’s Guide

16

than dollars. The same people who did well in the first round may be disinclined to bend when up against one another. Splitting the difference is a convenient face-saving device, but there is nothing inherently “fair” about this approach. If a billionaire investor is the seller and a nonprofit charitable organization is the buyer, the parties will have very differently uses for the same dollar bill.

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

The result in this demonstration may give you a chance to comment on the distribution of results for the group as a whole. Typically the curve will be asymmetrical, with the median closer to the seller's end. Ask the group to propose explanations. One might be that sellers feel some sort of obligation to put a price on the thing that they are offering, and then will be more likely to give away part of the bargaining range. Some may suggest that the sellers feel more pressure to make a deal, given their undesirable alternative, and if people believe this is true, then it is. However, the buyer shouldn't be cavalier about missing the chance to buy a piece of property that is uniquely valuable to him/her. This last comment suggests a somewhat different way of starting the debriefing. Instead of predicting that the extreme cases are explained by first offers, you might instead ask people to suggest their own theories about the distribution. Possibilities might include the truncated bargaining range, psychological anchors, gleaned information, different aspirations, the interaction of particular pairings, differing notions of fairness, etc. You can then analyze the various transactions to see which of these factors were in place and how they worked against one another. However you proceed, you should point out that the case was designed to be single issue. Relatively few real-life problems have this quality, but it is important to acknowledge their existence. There is a much larger set of multi-issue problems in which one issue dominates; often that issue is cash. The problem nicely sets up a comparison with more complex cases. The Tendley Contract simulation (also available from the Program on Negotiation Teaching Negotiation Resource Center) presents a nice contrast, as its notes indicate. The same hard bargaining approach that sometimes prevails in single-issue cases will be disastrous in others. There is, moreover, no firm line between those two kinds of cases. Indeed, an effective negotiator often succeeds by transforming zero-sum, win-lose transactions into ones in which there is possible joint gain. If you do set up such a comparison, you should later revisit Parker and see if there is any realistic way of finding joint gains. Future dealings are assumed away, as noted earlier, and this really doesn't seem to be a case for seller financing. There might well be advantage, however, in further subdividing the half-lot. The Gibsons' interest lies particularly in that portion of the land Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Instructor’s Guide

17

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

that will allow them to expand their house. Not every square foot of that parcel is of equal value to them. Face with the choice of getting the entire property for $20,000 (let us say) or half of it for $15,000, they plausibly might prefer the latter; this would get them all the land they actually need and leave them with $5,000 more to spend on their expansion. The buyers of the Parker house, in turn, might be willing to pay more than half of their earlier offer of $15,000 for the remaining portion. If so, the Parkers will clear more than they could get just from the Gibsons. There are other approaches, as well; perhaps a variance or re-zoning would create more value.

Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Instructor’s Guide

18

Appendix Appendix A: Package Detailed Contents Component Name Instructor’s Guide

Description Guide for instructors on negotiation concepts, simulation logistics, and debriefing simulation participants.

Instructor Background Reading List Student Background Reading List Confidential Materials Class Presentation

List of background readings for instructors to complete before using the simulation to gain a better understanding of the negotiation concepts. List of background readings for students to complete before the simulation to gain understanding of the negotiation concepts.

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

In-Class Debrief

Simulation

Pre-Simulation

Instructor Preparation

Phase

Pre-Negotiation Survey

Agreement Outcome Form

Confidential role-specific materials for participants in the exercise. First part of PowerPoint slide deck for the instructor to use to introduce negotiation concepts, how to participate in a negotiation simulation, and Parker-Gibson. After completing the background reading and/or presentation of the negotiation concepts, participants complete the online PreNegotiation Survey to benchmark their understanding of the key learning points the game is intended to teach. Participants reporting the results of any agreements reached in the simulation.

Post-Negotiation Survey

After finishing the simulation, but before the debrief, participants fill out the Post-Negotiation Survey so Instructors can gauge participants understanding of the issues and concepts.

Class Presentation

Second part of PowerPoint slide deck for the instructor to use in debriefing the simulation with participants.

Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Instructor’s Guide

19

Appendix B: Pre- and Post-Negotiation Surveys Answer Key Where applicable, the “correct” answer to a survey question is in bold below. Pre-Survey 1–4 5 – 11 Post-Survey 1 – 10

Reading Questions Preparation Questions Agreement Questions Both Parties: Parkers and Gibsons

2

3

4

1

Post-Survey Did you reach an agreement? • Yes • No

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

1

Pre-Survey What is distributive negotiation? • Value creating stage of negotiation • Value claiming stage of negotiation • Another word for integrative negotiation

The best negotiators in a distributive negotiation are often those who… • Always anchor first • Spend a lot of time preparing • Do not focus on the other party’s BATNA What are effective strategies for value claiming? • Avoid making unilateral concessions • Label concessions • Avoid silence • Determine the ZOPA How can you avoid being anchored? • Anchor first • Counteroffer and/or reanchor

2

If yes, what was the amount? Please round to the nearest whole number in the following format “XX,XXX”.

3

How would you describe the outcome? • Marginally satisfactory • Satisfactory • Very Satisfactory • Optimal

4

Compared to the pre-survey, did your standards for satisfaction…? • Go up • Go down • Stay the same

Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Instructor’s Guide

20



5

It’s very hard to avoid being anchored Please fill in the settlement 5 amount which would result in the following levels of satisfaction for you: Please round to the nearest whole number in the following format “XX,XXX”

Please explain your answer above.

Marginally Satisfactory (this must equal the bottom line you’ve been given in your Confidential Instructions): Satisfactory:

6

What do you think your counterpart’s reservation point (bottom line) was? Please round to the nearest whole number in the following format “XX,XXX”

7

Very Satisfactory:

7

What do you think the ZOPA, or bargaining range, was in this exercise?

8

Optimal:

8

What was your best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA)?

9

What do you think your counterpart’s BATNA was?

9

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

6

Is there any amount which, though seemingly even better for you than the Optimal figure you just listed, you would reject as being unfair to the other side? • Yes • No 10 Please explain your answer above.

10 What was your strategy in this negotiation and how did it change during the negotiation?

11 What is your strategy for this negotiation?

Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package Instructor Background Reading List In addition to the readings assigned for the students, these readings provide an overview to negotiation and the concepts covered in Parker-Gibson including: the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA), the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA), anchoring, and managing concessions.

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

The Mind and the Heart of the Negotiator Leigh L. Thompson Chapter 3, Distributive Negotiation: Slicing the Pie Available here: https://www.amazon.com/Mind-Heart-Negotiator-5th/dp/0132543869 Thompson outlines the key attributes of distributive negotiation and explains fundamental negotiation concepts central to success in value-claiming situations. She then outlines nine strategies for effective distributive negotiation including: assessing your BATNA and the BATNA of your counterpart, determining your reservation point, how (and when to) anchor and reanchor, planning concessions, providing support for your offers, and appealing to fairness. Negotiator Cognition and Rationality: A behavioral decision theory perspective Max Bazerman and Margaret Neale Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Volume 51, Issue 2, March 1992 Available here: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/074959789290009V Bazerman and Neale argue that negotiators may be able to most significantly improve negotiation performance by focusing on research into human decision-making. Specifically, negotiators have been found to be irrational, assume negotiations are fixed sum, devalue concessions of the other side, and anchor their offers based on irrelevant information. This work highlights how systematic errors in judgment occur when processing demands increase either from two to multi-party or with increased complexity. Being able to target specific individual changes, negotiators are able to strengthen their ability to engage in effective decision-making. This theoretical study will provide instructors with additional background in order to lead a robust debriefing of Parker-Gibson.

This reading list was written by Monica Giannone and Lara SanPietro for the Program on Negotiation. Copies are available from the Teaching Negotiation Resource Center (TNRC), online at www.pon.org, by email: [email protected], or by telephone at 800-258-4406. This exercise may not be reproduced, revised or translated in whole or in part by any means without the written permission of the TNRC Coordinator, Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, 501 Pound Hall, Cambridge, MA 02138. Please help to preserve the usefulness of this case by keeping it confidential. Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Instructor Background Reading List

Student Background Reading List PREPARATION https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/negotiation-skills-daily/negotiation-skills-are-you-reallyready-to-negotiate/ BATNA https://www.pon.harvard.edu/category/daily/batna/page/2/ ZOPA

ANCHORING

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/business-negotiations/how-to-find-the-zopa-in-businessnegotiations/

https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/negotiation-skills-daily/what-is-the-anchoring-bias/ DISTRIBUTIVE NEGOTIATION

https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/dealmaking-daily/what-is-distributive-negotiationstrategies/ https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/negotiation-skills-daily/what-is-distributive-negotiation/

Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

2

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package Student Background Reading List In order to adequately prepare you for your role in this negotiation and to start building your skills as a negotiator, you are assigned the following pre-readings to complete prior to the negotiation. These articles will provide you with an overview of basic negotiation skills and have been prepared by the Program on Negotiation (PON) at Harvard Law School. For more information on the following concepts, please visit the PON website at www.pon.harvard.edu.

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

Thank you for carefully reading these free resources that are available to you. Please note that pre-survey questions will cover some of these articles’ topics. Enjoy the readings!

PREPARATION https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/negotiation-skills-daily/negotiation-skills-are-you-reallyready-to-negotiate/ BATNA https://www.pon.harvard.edu/category/daily/batna/page/2/

ZOPA https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/business-negotiations/how-to-find-the-zopa-in-businessnegotiations/ ANCHORING https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/negotiation-skills-daily/what-is-the-anchoring-bias/ DISTRIBUTIVE NEGOTIATION https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/dealmaking-daily/what-is-distributive-negotiationstrategies/ https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/negotiation-skills-daily/what-is-distributive-negotiation/

This reading list was written by Monica Giannone and Lara SanPietro for the Program on Negotiation. Copies are available from the Teaching Negotiation Resource Center (TNRC), online at www.pon.org, by email: [email protected], or by telephone at 800-258-4406. This exercise may not be reproduced, revised or translated in whole or in part by any means without the written permission of the TNRC Coordinator, Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, 501 Pound Hall, Cambridge, MA 02138. Please help to preserve the usefulness of this case by keeping it confidential. Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package Reading and Pre-Negotiation Survey: Both Parties 1

Pre-Negotiation Survey for Parker-Gibson What is distributive negotiation? Value creating stage of negotiation Value claiming stage of negotiation Another word for integrative negotiation The best negotiators in a distributive negotiation are often those who… Always anchor first Spend a lot of time preparing Do not focus on the other party’s BATNA

3

What are effective strategies for value claiming? Avoid making unilateral concessions Label concessions Avoid silence Determine the ZOPA How can you avoid being anchored? Anchor first Counteroffer and/or re-anchor It’s very hard to avoid being anchored Please fill in the settlement amount which would result in the following levels of satisfaction for you: Please round to the nearest whole number in the following format “XX,XXX” __________________ Marginally Satisfactory (this must equal the bottom line you’ve been given in your Confidential Instructions):

4

5

6

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

2

Satisfactory:

This survey was written by Monica Giannone and Lara SanPietro for the Program on Negotiation. Copies are available from the Teaching Negotiation Resource Center (TNRC), online at www.pon.org, by email: [email protected], or by telephone at 800-258-4406. This exercise may not be reproduced, revised or translated in whole or in part by any means without the written permission of the TNRC Coordinator, Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, 501 Pound Hall, Cambridge, MA 02138. Please help to preserve the usefulness of this case by keeping it confidential. Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Pre-Negotiation Survey

2

Very Satisfactory:

8

Optimal:

9

10

Is there any amount which, though seemingly even better for you than the Optimal figure you just listed, you would reject as being unfair to the other side? Yes No Please explain your answer above.

11

What is your strategy for this negotiation?

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

7

Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package Confidential Instructions for the Parkers The Parkers own a house at 43 Willow Street. Fifteen years ago, they paid $20,000 for a 10,000square foot parcel that sits between their home and the home of the Gibsons, who live at 39 Willow Street. That specific parcel is slightly less than half of the one-half acre minimum building lot size required by the local zoning. The Parkers purchased the half-lot thinking that they might someday use it for a tennis court, but they never got around to building one. They have used some of the land for a vegetable garden from time to time.

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

Now the Parkers have decided to move out of state, having elected to take a generous early retirement package. They were lucky enough to find a private buyer for their house at 43 Willow. Because they got a good price and did not have to pay a broker fee, they are netting more than they expected. The only drawback is that the buyer is not interested in purchasing the extra parcel, seeing no real use for it. At the most, the buyer will be willing to pay an additional $15,000 (over and above the negotiated price for the house and house lot) for the half-lot. This is less, of course, than the price the Parkers themselves paid over a decade ago, but lacking other bidders, they would accept this $15,000 offer. It would make no sense to hang on to this land once they live thousands of miles away. Before swallowing this loss, however, the Parkers have tried to see if they could do better by approaching their neighbors whose houses abut the half-lot and who might have some use for it. Neither the people to the north or to the south have any interest, so their last hope is the Gibsons, who live immediately to the west. As it happens, when the Parkers first acquired the parcel, they had asked the Gibsons if they wanted to buy it jointly, but the Gibsons declined. There is no animosity between the families, but they have had little contact over the years. The Gibsons may not be any more interested in the land now than they were fifteen years ago, but the Parkers feel there is no harm in asking. Perhaps they might be persuaded of the value in adding yard space or getting a bit of a buffer between them and their new neighbors. 1. In this negotiation, you are to assume the role of one of the Parkers – or, if you are more comfortable, that of a representative fully authorized to act on their behalf. 2. Your goal is to sell the vacant parcel for as much as possible. Any deal you make with the Gibsons must be more than the $15,000 offer that you already have. You should regard the $15,000 as an absolute minimum. Try hard to do much better. Remember that you paid more for it, and have had upkeep and taxes through the years. This exercise is copyrighted by the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School Copies are available from the Teaching Negotiation Resource Center (TNRC), online at www.pon.org, by email: [email protected], or by telephone at 800-258-4406. This exercise may not be reproduced, revised or translated in whole or in part by any means without the written permission of the TNRC Coordinator, Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, 501 Pound Hall, Cambridge, MA 02138. Please help to preserve the usefulness of this case by keeping it confidential. Copyright © 1993, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2006, 2016, 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Confidential Instructions for the Parkers

2

3. It is true that real estate values fell generally over the last decade, but have rebounded somewhat in recent years. That fact provides little help here, however, as this is a unique piece of property. There really is no fair market value for it. 4. You are only interested in a straight cash deal. Do not complicate matters by arranging seller financing, reserving special easements, or introducing other issues or options. A parcel plan, not to scale, is below.

M a p

Gibson

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

The Moore Estate

H al f -Lo t

W i l l o w

Parker

St r e e t

Copyright © 1993, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2006, 2016, 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package Confidential Instructions for the Gibsons The Gibsons own a house at 39 Willow Street. They have been approached by their neighbors to the east, the Parkers, who have asked the Gibsons if they would be interested in buying the half-lot that sits between their two homes.

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

The parcel consists of 10,000 square feet, a bit less than half of the half-acre minimum building lot size set by local zoning. The Parkers purchased this parcel 15 years ago for around $20,000. At that time, the Parkers had asked the Gibsons if they would be interested in buying the land together and perhaps building a tennis court, but the Gibsons declined. The Parkers never got around to using the land for much. There are no hard feelings between the two families, but they have had little social or professional contact over the years. Now things may change. Although the Gibsons are frugal people – Bob is a teacher/coach at the local high school and Jackie is a part-time bookkeeper – they recently came into a modest inheritance from a favorite aunt. They plan to use some of the money to expand their small house. They have already talked to an architect and contractor about alternative plans. Ideally, they would like to build a new kitchen/solarium to the east, but their house sits as close to the existing property line as the zoning allows. Acquiring the half-lot would completely solve this problem. Without the parcel, the Gibsons will have to expand in another direction. Doing so would be more costly and would not produce as attractive a house. As a result, the Parkers’ inquiry came as a pleasant surprise. (It’s a small town – perhaps the Parkers got wind of the Gibsons’ building plans.) In any event, it’s good news that the land may be available. The Gibsons don’t want to be exploited on price, of course. In looking at their bank account and their construction alternatives, the Gibsons have set a firm maximum of $40,000 for the half-lot. If the Parkers insist on more, the Gibsons will pass on the deal. They would naturally prefer to pay much less than the $40,000, if possible, as they have plenty other good uses for the money. A cousin who is a real estate broker advised them that there is really no "fair market value" for this parcel. It is unique and has value only to immediate abutters; therefore, there are no comparable sales. It is true that real estate prices fell generally during the last decade, but have rebounded somewhat in recent years. 1. In this negotiation, you are to assume the role of one of the Gibsons. Or, if you are more comfortable, that of a representative fully authorized to act on their behalf. This exercise is copyrighted by the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School Copies are available from the Teaching Negotiation Resource Center (TNRC), online at www.pon.org, by email: [email protected], or by telephone at 800-258-4406. This exercise may not be reproduced, revised or translated in whole or in part by any means without the written permission of the TNRC Coordinator, Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, 501 Pound Hall, Cambridge, MA 02138. Please help to preserve the usefulness of this case by keeping it confidential. Copyright © 1993, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2006, 2016, 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Confidential Instructions for the Gibsons

2

2. Your goal is to buy the half-lot for as little as possible. The $40,000 maximum they have stipulated is an absolute upper limit. Every dollar you can shave from this cap represents an improved result. 3. You are only interested in a straight cash deal. Do not complicate matters by arranging seller financing, reserving special easements, or introducing other issues or options. A parcel plan, not to scale, is below.

M a p

Gibson

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

The Moore Estate

H al f -Lo t

W i l l o w

Parker

St r e e t

Copyright © 1993, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2006, 2016, 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package Agreement Outcome Form

1.

Agreement Outcome Form for Parker-Gibson Did you reach an agreement? Yes No [if YES, SKIP TO QUESTION 4]

3

[If NO:] Why was no agreement reached between the parties? Ran out of time Couldn’t reach agreement on the price. Other [If Other:]

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

2

Why weren’t you able to come to an agreement?

(please note that your comment is not confidential and might be presented in the case debriefing)

4

What was the agreed upon price for the Gibsons to buy the Parkers’ lot? Please round to the nearest whole number

This outcome form was written by Monica Giannone and Lara SanPietro for the Program on Negotiation. Copies are available from the Teaching Negotiation Resource Center (TNRC), online at www.pon.org, by email: [email protected], or by telephone at 800-258-4406. This exercise may not be reproduced, revised or translated in whole or in part by any means without the written permission of the TNRC Coordinator, Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, 501 Pound Hall, Cambridge, MA 02138. Please help to preserve the usefulness of this case by keeping it confidential. Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package Post-Negotiation Survey: Both Parties 1

Post-Negotiation Survey for Parker-Gibson Did you reach an agreement? Yes No If yes, what was the amount? Please round to the nearest whole number in the following format “XX,XXX”.

3

How would you describe the outcome? Marginally satisfactory Satisfactory Very Satisfactory Optimal Compared to the pre-survey, did your standards for satisfaction…?: Go up Go down Stay the same Please explain your answer above.

4

5

6

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

2

What do you think your counterpart’s reservation point (bottom line) was? Please round to the nearest whole number in the following format “XX,XXX”

This survey was written by Monica Giannone and Lara SanPietro for the Program on Negotiation. Copies are available from the Teaching Negotiation Resource Center (TNRC), online at www.pon.org, by email: [email protected], or by telephone at 800-258-4406. This exercise may not be reproduced, revised or translated in whole or in part by any means without the written permission of the TNRC Coordinator, Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, 501 Pound Hall, Cambridge, MA 02138. Please help to preserve the usefulness of this case by keeping it confidential. Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Post-Negotiation Survey

2

What do you think the ZOPA, or bargaining range, was in this exercise?

8

What was your best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA)?

9

What do you think your counterpart’s BATNA was?

10

What was your strategy in this negotiation and how did it change during the negotiation?

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

7

Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

1

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

2

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

4

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

5

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

7

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

8

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

9

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

10

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

11

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

12

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

13

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

14

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

15

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

17

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

Insight: Students enjoy starting by seeing who got an agreement and, in this exercise, the majority of groups likely will reach an agreement. Perhaps one in 20 pairs will have been stalemated; if there is a stalemate, make sure at the end of the debriefing to find out why the parties got stuck. Next, ask people to raise their hands if they are satisfied with the agreements that they reached; almost everyone will do so.

19

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

Now it's time to reveal the results to the class. The Class Debriefing presentation will automatically compile the results from each group and create a graph that reveals the results in bracketed ranges. To maintain suspense, you might ask first how many people settled in the $25,000 range (that is $25,000-$25,999), and then move up a bracket ($26,000) and down ($24,000), until you have included all the outcomes. The midway point between the two reservation levels is $28,000, but for reasons that are discussed below, the typical median is several thousand dollars less. If you are working with a small group, you might want to compare the results your group produces with results for a larger sample of participants. As you reveal the results, you often will get gasps or laughter, particular as you get toward either extreme. When the full distribution is displayed, you might ask whether participants are still satisfied with their agreements. Some people will answer “yes” -- because they sold high or bought low, or they are not relativists -- but some others might admit to remorse. You may choose at this point to explore the so-called "winner's curse." People should consider not only their own standards for satisfaction, but

20

also how the people with whom they are dealing measure success. Negotiations are often stymied when people have unrealistic assumptions about what others can afford.

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

Early in the discussion, you might also step back from the problem and ask whether the wide range of results is realistic. One of the fundamental points of the exercise is that even when people have identical instructions, the differences in how they negotiate may produce very different outcomes. Whether the bargaining range is big or small (or exists at all) will depend on the situation. In a purely competitive market, there will be no range; but for many commodities – cars come to mind – there is some play in the numbers. The more unusual the subject matter and the smaller the number of available substitutes, the less certain the parties can be about the nature of the bargaining range.

20

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

One of the lessons in this particular exercise is that negotiators should be careful not to impose their assumptions and perceptions on the other side. The Parkers are desperate sellers and the Gibsons cannot walk away from this unique parcel of land as easily as they might leave a car dealer's showroom. If either family focuses exclusively on their own needs, they will miss an opportunity to do much better than their respective BATNAs (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). Contrast this slide, perceptions of the counterpart’s BATNA, with the next slide – their actual BATNAs. Ask students what tactics and strategies they used to gauge the BATNA of their counterpart, and what might be effective in the future.

21

22

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

In this exercise, there is a very large zone of possible agreement. Drive discussion around the following questions: How did students think about the zone of possible agreement? What was possible for them to estimate based on the information they initially had? What information were they missing? How did they try to find the upper or lower limit respectively, of the ZOPA? How did this influence how confident they were in putting the first offer (anchor) on the table?

23

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

Now that you have discussed how students thought about the ZOPA prior to the exercise, you can reveal to them what the zone of possible agreement actually was.

24

25

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

The ZOPA is very large in this exercise.

27

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

Summarize the key lessons from the debriefing and add or subtract any additional concepts, strategies, or tactics. You might note that although the problem is necessarily fictitious and simplified, it does allow us to see what is seldom apparent in real life: namely, the range of outcomes that might have been. In practice, we must negotiate with incomplete information and uncertainty. It behooves us to have a clear sense of our nonagreement alternatives, but we should be modest about what we really know about the other side. In debriefing the problem, we can see both ends of the bargaining range clearly, while in practice, all but our end of it may be obscure. It's also worth noting that persuasion is an important part of negotiation, so the bargaining range may move in the course of conversation. In ordinary sales situations, the seller will try to convince the buyer of the value of what he or she is offering; if this pitch is successful, the range is extended. You can explain the coyness with which many people negotiate single-issue cases in terms of each side's reluctance to make offers that are too generous or to reveal information that betrays the party's true need to make a deal. This reluctance can carry a big cost. At best, it wastes valuable time. At worst, parties who convincingly feign disinterest, each waiting for the other side to pounce, may miss profitable agreements.

28

29

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package Feedback Survey (Circle one for each question) What is your gender? a. Female b. Male c. Other d. Prefer not to say

2.

Are you currently enrolled in or have you taken a negotiation course in the past? a. Yes b. No

3.

Overall, how much did you enjoy this exercise? a. Extremely enjoyed b. Strongly enjoyed c. Moderately enjoyed d. Slightly enjoyed e. Did not enjoy

4.

How did you prepare for this exercise? a. I didn’t really prepare b. Read the briefing c. Read the briefing and planned a strategy d. Read the briefing, read the suggested pre-readings, and planned a strategy

5.

How much did you prepare for this exercise? a. Less than 30 minutes b. Between 30 minutes and 60 minutes c. Between 60 minutes and 120 minutes d. Over 120 minutes

6.

Did you feel like you were prepared for this exercise? a. Yes, definitely b. Yes, but I would have liked more time c. No, but I didn’t put in enough work

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

1.

This survey was written by Monica Giannone and Lara SanPietro for the Program on Negotiation. Copies are available from the Teaching Negotiation Resource Center (TNRC), online at www.pon.org, by email: [email protected], or by telephone at 800-258-4406. This exercise may not be reproduced, revised or translated in whole or in part by any means without the written permission of the TNRC Coordinator, Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, 501 Pound Hall, Cambridge, MA 02138. Please help to preserve the usefulness of this case by keeping it confidential. Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

Parker-Gibson Curriculum Package: Feedback Survey

d. No, I didn’t have enough time Which concept did you learn the most about? a. BATNA b. ZOPA c. Anchoring d. Managing concessions

8.

Which concept did you learn the least about? a. BATNA b. ZOPA c. Anchoring d. Managing concessions

9.

I am satisfied with how much I learned from this exercise: a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. Neutral/neither agree nor disagree d. Disagree e. Strongly disagree

Do Re No vie tR wC ep op ro y du ce

7.

10. I am satisfied with how much I learned from the debrief: a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. Disagree d. Strongly disagree

Copyright © 2018, 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 12/21)

2

View more...

Comments

Copyright ©2017 KUPDF Inc.
SUPPORT KUPDF