Paramattha and Pannatti in Abhidhamma Dhammavada - Huifeng

PARAMATTHA & PAÑÑATTI IN ABHIDHAMMA DHAMMAVĀDA

M ORSBORN (SHI HUIFENG) ID# 2006936639 04 MAY 2007

Paramattha and Paññatti in Abhidhamma Dhammavāda

CONTENTS: Introduction:....................................................................................................... 2 1. The Abhidhamma:......................................................................................... 3 The Āgama Tradition ...................................................................................................... 3 The Texts of the Theravāda Abhidhamma ................................................................... 4 Seven Canonical Texts............................................................................................. 4 Post-Canonical Texts ............................................................................................... 5 Other Abhidharma Texts and Traditions ..................................................................... 6

2. Dhammavāda:................................................................................................. 8 The Dhammas .................................................................................................................. 8 Dhamma Classification........................................................................................... 8 Analysis and Synthesis ........................................................................................... 9 Later Systematization.................................................................................................... 11

3. Dhammas as Paramattha or Paññatti:...................................................... 13 Paramattha and Sabhāva Dhammas............................................................................ 13 Avoiding Substance & Quality Dualism ............................................................ 13 Paññatti and Asabhāva Dhammas .............................................................................. 14 Nāma Paññatti and Attha Paññatti.............................................................................. 16 The (Non-)Reality of Words and Language....................................................... 17 The (Non-)Reality of Space and Time................................................................. 18 Metaphysical or Salvific Psychology?.......................................................................... 19

4. Teaching and Truth as Paramattha or Sammutti: .................................. 20 Nītattha and Neyyattha ................................................................................................ 20 Paramattha and Sammutti............................................................................................ 21 Sammutti or Saṃvṛti?............................................................................................ 22

Conclusions: ..................................................................................................... 23 Bibliography ..................................................................................................... 24 Canonical and Post-canonical Works ......................................................................... 24 Other Works ................................................................................................................... 24

Appendix – Dhamma Classification Chart: ............................................... 26

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INTRODUCTION: Although the Buddha Dhamma has several unique features, most distinguish it from the plethora of other religious and philosophical systems that are the product of India’s rich spiritual heritage. There is moreover, one particular doctrinal issue which has been at the forefront of the majority of internal developments within the Buddhist fold. This doctrine is that known as dhammavāda, or “dhamma theory”, and is most fully expressed in the Abhidhamma and its exegetical traditions, that arose in the centuries ensuing the Teacher’s parinibbāna. Two further doctrinal matters are an immediate consequence of the dhamma theory, and are inextricably bound up with it. The first is the division of dhammas into either paramattha or paññatti, “ultimate” or “designated” dhammas. The second is the division of doctrines as either paramattha or sammutti, “ultimate” or “conventional”. This two-fold development of dhamma theory also indicates the multi-valency of the word “dhamma”, which includes the meanings of both “phenomena” or “things”, as well as “doctrines” or “teachings”, respectively. Firstly, this essay will provide a basic background on the Abhidhamma tradition in general, setting it in the context of the earlier Āgama tradition, and the finalization of the five nikāyas. We shall cover those few Abhidhamma traditions that are extant to the present day, although the Theravāda tradition in Pāli shall be our focal point. Secondly, we shall investigate the key salient points of dhamma-vāda “dhamma theory”, as classification via analysis and synthesis. This includes a discussion of the notion of sabhāva, or “own-nature”. This shall also be briefly compared with the original intentions behind the Buddha’s use of the term dhamma. Moreover, we shall look the dhamma theory’s general directive towards Buddhist praxis. Thirdly, we shall examine the distinction of specific dhammas as phenomena into the categories of either paramattha or paññatti. This shall in turn be related to the theories of sabhāva and asabhāva. From this, we shall see the implications of such a distinction, from the epistemological, ontological and soteriological perspectives. Fourthly, an investigation of how the dhamma-vāda relates to the division of doctrinal statements as either paramattha or sammutti, based upon the related early Buddhist notion of nītattha and neyyattha teachings. In particular, we shall ask whether this implies any hierarchal distinction between doctrines, or poses any dilemmas. With the above four matters in hand, we shall attempt a brief conclusion as to the position of paramattha and paññatti within the Abhidhamma dhammavāda, and in the broader context of the Buddha Dhamma as a whole.

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1. THE ABHIDHAMMA: The Āgama Tradition Although the Buddha’s teachings were first formally rehearsed in toto during the council following his parinibbāna, there are certain Suttas which indicate such rehearsals were already underway during his lifetime, albeit in abbreviated format. The Saṃgīti and Dasuttara Suttas 1 recited by Sāriputta, being two such examples. This tradition, or Āgama, was passed on orally for several centuries, until 83 B.C., when during the reign of the Simhala (Śrī Lanka) King Vatta Gāmani Abhaya, it was first committed to the written word. 2 The arrangement of the teachings into the Nikāyas, as well as further stylistic embellishments continued into the time of the common era. The Āgama uses several systems for the classification of dhammas, the most important being divisions into: 1. nāma-rūpa; 2. the five khandhas; 3. the six dhātus; 4. the twelve āyatanas, and; 5. the eighteen dhātus. 3 Each system uses mutually exclusive categories to encompass the entirety of conditioned dhammas. Due to the difference in pedagogical application of these five systems, there is a difference in analytical depth with regards certain types of dhammas in any given system. There were additionally other complete and partial descriptions of certain processes for the explanation of other doctrinal points, such as the nidānas of paṭicca- samuppāda, or the cetasikas involved in perception and cognition. Each of these explanations provided further depth within its own limited scope of application. These five systems, appear to have been sufficient for the Buddha to lead a great many of his disciples, and their disciples in turn, to reach the fruits of the ārya path. It was thus soteriologically efficacious, and experientially verifiable in regards this goal. This was the main matter of import, according to the Teacher himself.

1 2 3

Digha Nikāya 33 & 34. Nārada Mahāthera: The Buddha and His Teachings, (Buddha Education Foundation), XV. Karunadasa, Y: The Dhamma Theory, Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma, (BPS, 1996), pp. 3~4.

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The Texts of the Theravāda Abhidhamma The practice of elucidating and elaborating on the Buddha’s teachings is already evident in the Āgamas, and shows the Buddha’s willingness to let his disciples expound the doctrine, once comprehension was full. As long as their presentation conformed with the key features of the doctrine, such elucidation and elaboration was considered a worthy deed for the benefit of both oneself and others. After his parinibbāna, many continued on in this way, based on the salient points which were captured in the first rehearsal. In addition to the formalization of the Āgamas over the centuries before the common era, commentarial works also appeared which provided almost word by word explanations of the Suttas. 4 It is also quite conceivable that there may have been other legitimate and sanctioned teachings that were not given the official approval during the early rehearsals. This is due to the mendicant lifestyle of the Saṇgha, and the relative isolation of even entire groups in ancient times. Unfortunately, we have little space to devote to this fascinating yet complex topic here!

Seven Canonical Texts The traditional interpretation of the Abhidhamma is that of the teachings that the Buddha gave to his deceased mother in the Tuṣita heaven, which were subsequently taught to the disciple Sāriputta, the foremost in wisdom. Modern scholarship attributes it, however, to the efforts of later scholars during the last centuries BCE. 5 Some, such as Bhikkhu Bodhi, 6 indicate the position of the mātikā as type of protoAbhidhamma, a matrix, schedule or blueprint, for the ensuing methodology. These mātikā encapsulated the key elements of the Suttas and Vinaya, for ease of memorization and recitation. Certain mātikā-dhāras or “matrix holders” specialized in these methodologies, and must have been the early Abhidhammikas. Others, such as Bhikkhu Dhammajoti, also add the upadeśa scriptures, and to a lesser extent, the vedalla, as important factors. 7 These methods are also seen, for instance, in the vibhanga, salāyatana, dhātu, sacca, and other analysis type formats of the Majjhima Nikāya; certain aspects of the analytical Saṃyutta Nikāya, such as the nidāna,

4 5

6 7

Warder, A K: Indian Buddhism, (Motilal Banarsidass, 2004), pp. 195ff. Mahāthera Nārada: The Buddha and His Teachings, (Buddha Education Foundation), XV. Bhikkhu Bodhi: A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, (Buddhist Publication Society, 2000), pg. 10. Bhikkhu Bodhi: A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, (Buddhist Publication Society, 2000), pg. 7. Bhikkhu Dhammajoti: “Abhidharma and Upadeśa” in Journal of Buddhist Studies Vol 3, (Centre for Buddhist Studies, 2005), pp. 112ff.

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khandha, and dhātu saṃyuttas; and the ascending numerical classification and grouping of dhammas which forms the structure of the Anguttara Nikāya. These are not the only examples, but typify the situation well. The Abhidhamma is therefore “pertaining to dhamma”, in all senses of the word dhamma – eg. dhamma as doctrine, as elements of experience, and also factors of training in the path. The Abhidhamma texts themselves indicate a natural development from the aforementioned Suttas, and “pertain” to them as exegetical clarifications. The seven canonical texts of the Theravāda are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Dhammasaṅgaṇī (Classification of Dhamma) Vibhanga (Divisions) Dhātukathā (Discourse on Elements) Puggala Paññatti (The Book on Individuals) Kathāvatthu (Points of Controversy) Yamaka (The Book of Pairs) Paṭṭhāna (The Book of Causal Relations)

The Dhammasaṅgaṇī, Vibhanga and Patthāna are often considered the oldest of the group. Bhikkhu Bodhi indicates the distinctive nature of the style and scope of these works, when compared with the bulk of the Suttas, as follows: Unlike the Suttas, these are not records of discourses and discussions occurring in real-life settings; they are, rather, full-blown treatises in which the principles of the doctrine have been methodically organized, minutely defined, and meticulously tabulated and classified. 8 This is obviously different from the Suttas and Vinaya, which were very much in “real-life settings”. Bhikkhu Bodhi then concludes that these treatises were first orally transmitted, and only later written down together with the Vinaya and Sutta piṭakas. 9 It could be the fact of their being written down together, that led later generations to conclude that the Abhidhamma was equally the word of the Buddha, alongside the Sutta and Vinaya Piṭakas.

Post-Canonical Texts Of course, once the process of elucidation and further elaboration has begun, further commentaries upon these seven canonical works themselves, was a natural result.

8 9

Bhikkhu Bodhi: A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, (Buddhist Publication Society, 2000), pg. 2. Bhikkhu Bodhi: A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, (Buddhist Publication Society, 2000), pg. 2.

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Each of the seven canonical works has it’s own commentary (kathā), and many of these have sub-commentaries (ṭīkā) as well. These all range from even larger treatises, such as the Viśuddhimagga, to smaller more concise works, such as the Abhidhammatha-sangaha. The Nettippakarana, Petakopadesa and Milindapañha occupy positions as postcanonical, yet pre-commentarial texts. They can both be considered as Abhidhammic in the broader sense, in terms of their methodology and format.

Other Abhidharma Texts and Traditions The above mentioned scriptures comprise the Abhidhamma of the Theravāda school, in effect originating in Śrī Lanka and later spreading throughout South East Asia. Due to the use of the Pāli language, considered very close to Māgadhī and the Gangetic dialects of the Buddha’s time, 10 rather than Sanskrit, as well as other factors, this is considered by many as perhaps the oldest Abhidhamma tradition. 11 In addition to the Theravāda school, the Buddhist scholastic period contained many other schools and systems. They are traditionally considered eighteen in number, though possibly more, depending on different scriptural sources, and the grounds and criteria for such divisions. The majority of these schools, their tenets, (and Tripiṭaka – if any, which is somewhat a matter of speculation), are largely lost to the present age. The Sarvāstivāda and Puggalavāda (including the later Vatsīputrīya and Sammitīya), are of particular importance here. The reasons being that they appear within the Theravāda Kathāvatthu, and are criticized for their views, and that their respective Abhidharmas have been at least partically retained, in Chinese, Tibetan and Sanskrit scriptures. In addition, a text known as the Śāriputra Abhidharma, 12 which appears very ancient in format, yet is not associated to any particular school of the sectarian period, is also preserved in the Chinese. Further study of this text may prove to hold hitherto lost gems of knowledge. The Patisaṃbhidamagga is another hoary Abhidhamma type text, also attributed to Sāriputta. The term sarvāstivāda itself indicates the views of this school, ie. “the theory of all exists”, which states the “existence of all dharmas in past, future and present”. 13

10 11 12 13

See Bhikkhu Ñānamoli: The Path of Purification, (Buddha Educational Foundation, 2005), pp. xxi. Karunadasa, Y: The Dhamma Theory, Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma, (BPS, 1996), pg. 2. 《舍利弗阿毘曇論》she-li-fo a-pi-tan lun (CBETA, T28, no. 1548) de la Vallee Poussin, Pruden: Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣyām, (Asian Humanities Press, 1988). pg. 807.

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They also had seven canonical works in their Abhidhamma, though attributed these to the Buddha’s direct, and later disciples, rather than the Buddha himself. They compiled their tenets in the Mahāvibhāṣa (T27, n1545; T28, n1546 / n1547), an enormous compendium covering a huge range of subjects, not all of which are in agreeance, from their council held in the North West. Their works are most fully retained in Chinese, somewhat in the Tibetan, and in scant Sanskrit fragments. It was after the compilation of this compendium that they became known as the Vaibhāṣikas. Their defining thesis came under strong criticism from the Sautrāntika movement. The Sautrāntikas stressed the sūtras over the Abhidharma, and were possibly originally a group within the Sarvāstivāda fold. However, they later rejected the “all exists” theory, and maintained the Vaibhajjavāda position, which “makes a distinction” as to which dharmas existed, and which did not. 14 In this sense, they were similar to the Theravāda, who also rejected the “all exists” theory. However, the term Vaibhajjavāda covers broad ground, and they are not to be considered identical on this ground. The Puggalavāda were also Vaibhajjavāda, but it was due to their “thesis of an [existent] individual” that they merited the criticism of not only the Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika, but virtually all others in the Buddhist camp. Their puggala, or “individual”, was propounded as being “neither identical to, nor different from, the five khandhas”. It was the Sāmmitīyas, a group of Puggalavādins, who are known to have had their own Abhidhamma tradition. The debates amongst these Abhidhamma groups is most fascinating, however, it lies outside our scope here, so we shall set it aside for the meantime.

14

Bhikkhu Dhammajoti: “Sarvāstivāda, Dārṣṭāntika, Sautrāntika and Yogācāra – Some Reflections on their Interrelation” in Journal of Buddhist Studies Vol 4, (Centre for Buddhist Studies, 2006), pp. 184ff.

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2. DHAMMAVĀDA: The Dhammas Several scholars have pointed out that the locus classicus of the Abhidhamma is the dhammavāda, or “dhamma theory”. Some have gone so far as to claim that this is the fundamental theory of early Buddhism, per se, 15 though this may be overstating the fact. Although as previously noted, the term “dhamma” has many meanings, we shall leave it untranslated here, that we may develop an understanding of the term within its own particular context. The first two books of the Abhidhamma, the Dhammasaṅgaṇī and Vibhanga, are the earliest source for the Abhidhamma dhammavāda.

Dhamma Classification The Dhammasaṅgaṇī begins with an outline of some 81 conditioned dhammas – one citta (mind), 52 cetasika (mental concomitants), and 28 rūpa (form or materiality). Nibbāna as the 82nd and unconditioned dhamma, shall be set aside for our discussion. The basic layout of these dhammas follows a four-fold taxonomy: 16 1. Nibbāna (1) 2. Citta (1)

The unconditioned. Mind or consciousness, further divided into 89 or 121 states, depending upon the various cetasikas involved in a moment of cognition. 3. Cetasika (52) Mental States the pentad of sense-contact; the factors of absorption; the faculties; path factors; powers; wholesome roots; wholesome ways of action; guardians of the world; the six pairs; the helpers; the paired combination; the last dyad; and a “whatsoever other” miscellany. 4. Rūpa (28) Form, divided into primary form of the elements, secondary form of the physical sense organs and sense objects, and other qualities and characteristics of form. The list is one of various formulations of dhammas in terms of both doctrinal aspects, and expressions of the path for Buddhist praxis. All are taken directly from the Suttas themselves. They are grouped together by type, and those dhammas that are

15 16

Stcherbatsky, T: The Central Conception of Buddhism, (Motilal Banarsidass, 2001), pp. 73ff. Adapted from Bhikkhu Nyanaponika: Abhidhamma Studies, (Wisdom, 1998), pp31ff. And, Rhys Davids, CAF: Psychological Ethics, (Pāli Text Society, 1900), Book I, II.

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synonymous, occurring either with the same or another name in other categories, are usually omitted, although several are repeated. For example, citta as synonymous with manas and viññāna; paññā as ñāṇa, vijjā, sammā diṭṭhi, etc.; sammā sankappo as cetaso abhiniropanā; and so forth. This shows the over-lapping nature of the categories. 17 Moreover, that form includes both primary and secondary aspects also indicates that although distinctions are made in terms of distinct but self-contained categories as above, a distinction can be made as to which are contained within which. At this point however, these primary and secondary aspects are all presented in a parallel fashion. 18 At this stage in the text, we can consider that the Abhidhamma method is one of classification, rather than analysis per se. The definition of Abhidhamma as “towards dhamma”, is to be understood in the sense of dhamma as doctrine, rather than phenomena, although this is sometimes the case. This is because the various categories tend to be more doctrinal, rather than elemental in nature. By phenomena, we of course do not imply noumena in the Kantian sense, 19 somewhat antithetical to the Buddha’s teaching of non-self. Forms, mental events, and the various doctrinal categories to be developed on the path, are the very “foundations” of the path. This also reflects the meaning of dhamma from √dhṛ, “to uphold”, “to support”. This shows the practical nature of the dhammavāda at this stage, to systematically guide the practitioner along the path, by means of the various expressions of the path.

Analysis and Synthesis Nyanaponika seems to basically paraphrase Russell’s “A complete description of the existing world would require not only a catalogue of the things, but also a mention of all their qualities and relations”, when he deems that “A complete description of a thing requires, besides its analysis, also a statement of its relations to other things”, making analysis and synthesis the system and methodology of the Abhidhamma. 20 (Radical studies of the Abhidhamma using structuralist and other modern or post-modern philosophical methods, may certainly disagree. For example, Lusthaus

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Adapted from Bhikkhu Nyanaponika: Abhidhamma Studies, (Wisdom, 1998), pp31ff. And, Rhys Davids, CAF: Psychological Ethics, (Pāli Text Society, 1900), Book I. Adapted from Bhikkhu Nyanaponika: Abhidhamma Studies, (Wisdom, 1998), pp31ff. And, Rhys Davids, CAF: Psychological Ethics, (Pāli Text Society, 1900), Book II. Bhikkhu Nyanaponika: Abhidhamma Studies, (Wisdom, 1998), pg. 20. Russell, B: Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy, (Open Court, 1914), pg. 51; as quoted in Bhikkhu Nyanaponika: Abhidhamma Studies, (Wisdom, 1998), pg. 3. See also pp. 21ff.

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and his Husserlian phenomenological approach. It is interesting to note that a far amount of modern Abhidhammic related research still takes this as basic assumption, which reflects the empirical rationalism of the early and mid 20th century.) The Dhammasaṅgaṇī then methodically analyzes each of these factors, and elucidates them in terms of a range of expositional factors. Citta and cetasika are analyzed in terms of wholesome states in the sensuous, form and formless spheres – the latter being the levels of jhāna; in the mundane and supra-mundane spheres; in addition to analysis in terms of unwholesome states and indeterminate states. Form is analyzed in terms of singular, dual, triple, etc. to eleven-fold aspects. The various groupings for the defilements, bonds, etc. are then analyzed, with the view of their elimination. The unconditioned dhamma is also investigated analytically. This is the basic methodology of the first two books of the Abhidhamma. The seventh book, the Paṭṭhāna, deals with twenty-four types of conditioned relation. This system of conditioned relations provides the necessarily synthetic means to tie together the otherwise distinct and unconnected dhammas. Although this elucidation of the uniquely Buddhist doctrine of paṭṭica-samuppāda, is a critical aspect of the Abhidhamma and the Buddha’s teachings in general, we shall skip lightly over it here. This is because we have sufficient details within the analytical approach detailed above, to continue with our deeper examination of paramattha and paññatti.

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Later Systematization The above methods became further defined in the later Abhidhamma tradition. The Kathāvatthu indicates how the Theravādins led by Moggaliputtatissa, came to further refine their dhammavāda in the light of the rather unorthodox views (in the eyes of the Theravādins) of the Puggalavādin Sautrāntika, and the Sarvāstivāda (both mentioned briefly above). The Puggalavāda claimed that the individual person was apprehendable and existed in the real and ultimate sense, based upon the Buddha’s teaching of the “bearer of the burden”, as expressed in the Sutta thus: “I will teach you the burden, the carrier of the burden, the taking up of the burden, and the laying down of the burden. … What is the burden? … the five aggregates. What is the carrier of the burden? … the person.” 21 They thus posited that there was a puggala, real and distinct from the khandhas, that was in some way responsible for bearing or supporting the aggregates. Mindful of the Buddha’s clear anattā doctrinal refutation as regards any form of attā entity, they cleverly formulated their puggala theory as “the substance of the puggala is neither the same as, nor different to, the khandhas”. 22 Here, “substance” (dravya) indicates a real entity in the ultimate sense. Theravāda opposition towards the Sarvāstivāda tenets indicates what they considered to be another extreme view. Rather than maintaining that something that was further analyzable (the khandhas) was in fact paramattha (the puggala), like the Puggalavāda position above, the Sarvāstivāda maintained that dhammas existed (asti) throughout the past, future and present. They theorized that dhammas merely took the aspect of being in one particular timeframe, rather than being eternal, (which of course would be contrary to the Buddha’s categorical statement that “all conditionings are impermanent”).

21

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Karunadasa, Y: The Dhamma Theory, Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma, (BPS, 1996), pp. 10ff, regards Kathāvatthu point 1. See also, Bhikkhu Bodhi: “III. The Burden”, in 22. Khandhasaṃyutta, Saṃyutta Nikāya, (Wisdom, 2000), pp. 871~872. See Abhidharmakośabhāṣyaṃ, T29, n1558: 《阿毘達磨俱舍論》卷 29： 「然犢子部執有補特伽羅其體與蘊不一不異。」(CBETA, T29, no. 1558, p. 152, c9-10) “The Vātsīputrīya’s maintain the existence of the pudgāla, the substance of which being neither identical with, nor other than, the [five] skandhas.” (Translation mine.)

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The tri-temporal existence of these paramattha dhammas was known as sabhāva, own-being or own-existence. As such, their sarvāsti “all exists” thesis bore at least very close resemblance to two non-Bauddha views: Firstly, inherent existence or being – the sabhāva view. Secondly, substance and characteristic distinctions – the sarvāsti notion as temporal aspect. Regards this, they thus later made great efforts to justify their position in terms of causal efficacy of “past” dhammas, and placed greater emphasis on explaining the dependent origination of these dhammas, in the face of mounting critiques. 23 In addition, the Sarvāstivāda also had the tendency to reify as dhammas, what many others, such as the Sautrāntikas, considered to be paññatti dhammas. For example, the three aspects of conditioned existence, namely arising, abiding and cessation; names, words, and sentences; the attainment of both cessation, and non-perceptual states. 24 Such reification of non-ultimate dhammas caused same rather awkward situations, such as avoiding the situation of infinite regress regarding the “arising of arising”, and so forth. We shall see below how the Theravāda carefully avoided this mistake, in their explanation of the distinctions between paramattha and paññatti dhammas, sabhāva and asabhāva, and so forth.

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Bhikkhu Dhammajoti: Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, (Center for Buddhist Studies, Śrī Lankā, 2002), pp. 109~143, regarding the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of the four causes and six conditions. Stcherbatsky, T: The Central Conception of Buddhism, (Motilal Banarsidass, 2001), pp. 105~106.

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3. DHAMMAS AS PARAMATTHA OR PAÑÑATTI: Paramattha and Sabhāva Dhammas Against the Puggalavāda position, the Theravāda responded by stating that it was the khandhas or dhammas alone that were “real and ultimate”, the puggala was merely a “designation” for the assembled khandhas. This marked the beginning of the usage of the term paramattha to describe the dhammas of the Dhammasaṅgaṇī and Vibhanga, as ultimate realities. The Theravāda notion of paramattha is thus defined as “not further analyzable”, ie. the khandhas, and not the puggala. 25 With regards the Sarvāstivāda thesis, the Theravāda never adhered to the “all exists” position, but remained as Vibhajjavādins, “those who make a distinction” regarding which dhammas exist, and which do not. They maintained that the dhammas were momentary in the present, and on this account, avoided the empirically unverifiable stance that dhammas had some sort of existence in the past or future. In this sense, their vibhajjavāda was different again to the Kāśyapīyas, who held that “present dhammas exist, future dhammas do not exist, past dhammas that have yet to yield results also exist, but past dhammas that have already yielded their result do not exist”.

Avoiding Substance & Quality Dualism The notion of sabhāva first appeared in the Abhidhamma when the Sarvāstivāda proclaimed that “dhammas bear their own nature”. 26 As per the puggala thesis, this may lead to the problem of having the dhamma as “bearer” on one hand, and its qualities as that “borne” on the other. Therefore, these issues required further redefinition by the Theravāda, in the attempt to remove any possibility of such substance versus quality dualism from creeping into their dhammavāda. They said that in the same way one may speak of the “burden” and the “bearer of the burden”, where the second is purely a designation for the “burden” itself, likewise, when referring to the dhamma and the sabhāva of the dhamma, the sabhāva is merely another expression for the dhamma itself. Three definitions were finally ascertained. The first definition was called agency

25 26

Karunadasa, Y: The Dhamma Theory, Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma, (BPS, 1996), pp. 19ff. See Abhidharmakośabhāṣyaṃ, T29, n1558:《阿毘達磨俱舍論》卷 1： 「釋此名者能持自相。故名為法。」 (CBETA, T29, no. 1558, p. 1, b8-9) “The explanation of the name [Abhidharma] is – ‘that which is able to uphold it’s own characteristics (lakṣaṇa)’ is known as a ‘dharma’.” (Translation mine.)

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definition (kattu-sādhana), eg. “mind is that which thinks”. Here, mind is the agent, which performs the act of thinking. It is conceivable that with such a definition, this mind could have other functions, or even exist without thinking. The second definition was called instrumental definition (karaṇa-sādhana), eg. “mind is that by which thinking takes place”. It has basically the same defects as the first definition, and is open to misinterpretation. The third definition was called the definition by nature (bhāva-sādhana), eg. “mind is the mere act of thinking”. This indicates a direct identity, in the sense that the terms are synonymous, and cannot imply any duality between the two. 27 It is a breakdown of the subject predicate distinction, with identity of noun and verb. That the third definition is titled bhāva-sadhana – nature definition, gives further indication of sabhāva as synonymous with dhamma – no difference between subject and nature (or quality-function). The Theravāda rather than considering sabhāva as own-being or own-existence, which would seems at odds with the law of dependent origination, considered it more as a synonym for being a distinct dhamma “on it’s own”, implied by the “sa-” of “sabhāva”. Each and every dhamma was itself a unique nature, the characteristics and so forth of which were not shared by other dhammas (anaññasādhāraṇa). Moreover, as paramattha, these sabhāva dhammas are not reducible into other dhammas, which is also shows their unique and distinct nature. The notions of paramattha and sabhāva thus combine and complement each other, and both are synonyms for dhammas in the strict sense, rather than attributes thereof.

Paññatti and Asabhāva Dhammas How then were those phenomena that did not fall into the classifications of paramattha sabhāva dhammas, be they stated in the Suttas or not, to be understood? The term paññatti or “making known” was used to describe other conceptions or notions based upon these paramattha dhammas. It is the synthetic mental act that, based on the particular arrangement and conditions of paramattha, conceives them as another type of distinct phenomena. Furthermore, the synthesized idea with regards to that paññatti which is made known, and the act of making it known through word, term or speech, are also two distinct types of paññatti. The term paññatti is thus broad in meaning, including both the names and concepts for dhammas themselves, and also those phenomena that are comprised of dhammas. More about this below.

27

Karunadasa, Y: The Dhamma Theory, Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma, (BPS, 1996), pp. 13ff.

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Paramattha and Paññatti in Abhidhamma Dhammavāda

Anything that can be further broken down into dhammas, is thus considered as a paññatti. For example, a computer can be rendered into its components, and they in turn can be rendered into merely rūpa. Both “computer” and “components” are paññatti. Or, a “cat” consists of the physical form, the cat’s rūpa, and also its various mental states, which would correspond more or less to the nāma khandhas of a human being. In this way, paññatti is the complementary opposite to paramattha. Together, the two are mutually exclusive, yet encompass the entirety of all phenomena. Because they are non-paramattha, paññatti are also asabhāva, in the sense of “not intrinsically existent”, rather than “intrinsically non-existent”. They exist, as it were, purely as a mental function or action, either as name, word or concept. Without that mental action, they are not. For example, the basis for the name “table” exists in itself as a mass of rūpa dhammas, independent of its perception or cognition by an observer. However, the word “table” and the notion of “table” as “flat surfaced, four legged object, etc.”, or a generic mental image of table, and so forth, are both purely apperceptual and conceptual actions of the mind. Paññatti are based upon the actual paramattha sabhāva rūpa dhammas of the “table”. Just as the relation between paramattha and paññatti, just is the relationship between sabhāva and asabhāva dhammas. This appears, at least, to be quite the opposite to Platonic Ideas, where the “realities” of the world are mere inferior representations of “higher ideas” of the same objects, perceptible only the mental / spiritual plane. Because paññatti have no actual existent that corresponds to them, the three characteristics of arising, abiding and ceasing, are not predicated of them in the strict sense. The three characteristics belong only to the paramattha sabhāva dhammas proper. Rather than attributing to paññatti the phases of arising and ceasing, it is only correct to refer to the arise and cessation of their designated paramattha dhammas. For example, a “person” does not arise and cease, however their khandhas do undergo arising and cessation. We shall discuss some implications of this, below.

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Paramattha and Paññatti in Abhidhamma Dhammavāda

Nāma Paññatti and Attha Paññatti As such, the majority of mundane activity is engaged with relation to paññatti rather than paramattha objects, and further distinctions must therefore be made amongst paññatti. As “that which makes known”, paññatti is the concept, word, term or phrase to indicate or designate a particular phenomena. Due to the profusion of languages, many names and terms may refer to the same singular phenomena. A name or word may also cause a person to have a conceptual, abstract notion of the thing in question to which it corresponds. Both these names and concepts are mental actions. They make known, designate and refer to the actual dhamma in question. Hence, paññatti may be seen as including both nāma-paññatti as “designation qua name”, and also attha-paññatti as “designation qua object”. 28 Now here, the designated dhamma may itself be either another paññatti, such as when we say “cat” or conceive of “a small, furry quadruped”; or it may be an actual paramattha dhamma, such as when we say “citta” or conceive of “that which is the act of thinking”. Those names for paññatti dhammas are known as sammutti or samketa, “conventional expression”, which are simply the words that are in accepted usage amongst a people language, or place, of non-realities. There is a wide analysis of the various forms of designation in the commentaries, 29 showing that although paññattis are not ultimates, a clear a cogent understanding of them is still a very valid and important element of paññā. Designations can be of either paramatthas or paññattis, based upon (upādā) paramatthas or paññattis, in all possible categorical permutations. Those names for real paramattha dhammas are known as vijjamāna, which “know realities”. These two sometimes have synonyms, as seen in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, where like terms for dhammas are subsumed within the same dhamma category, eg. right view and paññā. Likewise, those concepts of paññatti dhammas themselves are attha paññatti, or “[conceptualized] object qua designation”; whereas those concepts that “conform to a reality” are called tajjā paññatti. 30 The two types of vijjamāna and tajjā paññatti are thus important for the designation, expression, elucidation and teaching of paramattha dhammas. This is quite a different approach from some other traditions, which tended to see paññatti as mere

28 29

30

Karunadasa, Y: The Dhamma Theory, Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma, (BPS, 1996), pp. 33ff. Bhikkhu Ñānamoli: The Path of Purification (Translation of the Viśuddhimagga), (Buddha Educational Foundation), pp. 256ff, XIII 39, n11. Karunadasa, Y: The Dhamma Theory, Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma, (BPS, 1996), pp. 33ff.

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Paramattha and Paññatti in Abhidhamma Dhammavāda

designation, and thus somewhat irrelevant for knowledge of the truth; or, who maintained that “things as they are” were “inexpressible”. 31 One could point out that the entirety of the Tipiṭaka is in fact nāma paññatti, causing the practitioner to develop clear attha paññatti, and eventually see those paramattha dhammas themselves! A chart showing the relation of these various divisions of dhammas, is found at the end of this essay, Appendix – Dhamma Classification Chart.

The (Non-)Reality of Words and Language Regarding the reality, or paramattha status, of words, language and expression, Sumanapāla notes how some schools, including the Vaibhāṣika, took the notion of negation as also having positive connotations. He states: “The opinion of the grammarians that the use of “na-not” has not only a negative meaning, but also a positive meaning (paryudāsa, prasajjaka) can also be considered as an assumption of the nature of language.” 32 The Vaibhāṣikas, 33 the later Yogācāra Abhidharmikas, 34 and some heterodox non-Buddhist schools such as the Nyāyā, took words and phrases as actual real entities, in particular in the often ambiguous category of “dharmas not conjoined

31

32

33

34

For example: Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra Tattvārtha Paṭala, T30, n1579, 0486c: “… the inexpressible range of knowledge purified of obstructions to the knowable”. (Abbreviated translation mine.) Sumanapāla, G: “The Theravada Concept of Pannatti – A Brief Comparative Analysis”, in Journal of the Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, Vol. 1, (University of Kelaniya, 1999), pp. 165ff. See Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣyaṃ: (CBETA, T29, no. 1558, p. 29, a6-7)《阿毘達磨俱舍論》卷 4： 「 心不相應行 得非得同分 無想二定命 相名身等類」 “The citta-viprayukta-dharmas: attainment (prāpti), dis-tainment (aprāpti), group homogeneity, (mikāyasabhāga), non-ideation (asamjñā), the two samāpattis (ideationless – asaṃjñi-samāpatti, and cessation – nirodha-samāpatti), the life faculty (jīvitendriya), the [three] characteristics (arising – jāti-lakṣaṇa, abiding – sthiti-lakṣaṇa, decay – jarā-lakṣaṇa, and change – anityatā-lakṣaṇa), the body of words (nāma-kāya), [body of phrases (pada-kāya), and body of syllables (vyañjana-kāya)].” (Translation mine.) See Abhidharma-samuccaya-śāstra: (CBETA, T31, no. 1605, p. 665, c17-21) 《大乘阿毘達磨集論》卷 1： 「何等名身。謂於諸法自性增言假立名身。何等句身。謂於諸法差別增言假立句身。何等文身。謂於 彼二所依諸字。假立文身。此言文者能彰彼二故。此又名顯。能顯彼義故。此復名字。無異轉故。」 “What is the body of words? It is the body of names, which are established as designations superimposed upon the svabhāva of dharmas. What is the body of phrases? It is the body of phrases, which are established as designations superimposed upon the distinctions of dharmas. What is the body of syllables? It is the body of syllables, which are established as designations superimposed, the letters / syllables based upon the two former [bodies]. Because these words and expressions are able to reveal these two [former bodies], they are also known as “that which reveals”. Because they are able to reveal the meaning of these [two], furthermore, these names and words, are not different [from them].” (Translation mine.)

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Paramattha and Paññatti in Abhidhamma Dhammavāda

with mind” (citta-viprayukta-dharmāḥ). For example, for the Vaibhāṣikas, negation did not merely imply an absence, but “non-X” may be as real as “X”, eg. “aprāpti” and “prāpti”. 35 This attributing of realistic status to words, etc., accords in some ways with the Brāhmanic notions of language, and how verbal expression has a predominant position with regards the truth. For example, that Devanāgarī Sanskrit is a divine language, and that śrūta (hearing of the teachings) is a higher pramāna than darśana (vision of the truth). The Theravāda did not accept this position, and for them, “… sound is treated as one of the material elements and verbal intimation as an extension of it.” 36 In other words, they are purely paññatti, though they may make known actual realities or other paññattis, through word or concept, as indicated above.

The (Non-)Reality of Space and Time It is also interesting to note, that in this way, the Theravāda also did not consider either space or time as paramattha dhammas. 37 This again is in contradistinction to the heterodox philosophies of contemporary India, which considered these as fundamental elements. Some systems even considered kāla (time) as a causative element. 38 Even the Buddhist Sarvāstivāda considered space as an unconditioned dharma. 39 Rather, for the Theravāda, space is merely the absence of obstructing matter, a position similar to that indicated above with regards to negations, (rather than a thing that has ‘non-obstructing’ as its nature). Time is merely a concept imputed upon the flow of momentary dhammas, as Nyanaponika skillfully translates from the commentary to the Dhammasaṇgaṅī: By time the Sage described the mind And by the mind described the time, In order to show, by such definition,

See note above, Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣyaṃ, asaṃjñā and aprāpti, each being the negation of a real paramārtha dharma, ie. saṃjñā and prāpti respectively. See also, Bhikkhu Dhammajoti: Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, (Centre for Buddhist Studies, 2002), pp. 22, 211ff. 36 Sumanapāla, G: “The Theravada Concept of Pannatti – A Brief Comparative Analysis”, in Journal of the Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, Vol. 1, (University of Kelaniya, 1999), pp. 169. 37 Karunadasa, Y: Time and Space, the Abhidhamma Perspective, (K N Jayatilleke Memorial Lecture, 2003). 38 Jayatilleke, K N: Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, (Motilal Banarsidass, 2004), pg. 28. 39 Abhidharmakośabhāṣyaṃ 《阿毘達磨俱舍論》卷 1：(CBETA, T29, no. 1558, p. 1, c2-3) 「及三種無為 謂虛空二滅 此中空無礙」 “… and the three kinds of unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) [dharmas], that is empty space (akaśa), and the two cessations (nirodha). Within these, space is ‘non-obstructing’.” 35

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Paramattha and Paññatti in Abhidhamma Dhammavāda

The phenomena there arranged in classes. 40 We can thus see how the definitions of both space and time are coherent with the Abhidhamma notion of paññatti, rather than paramattha sabhāva dhammas.

Metaphysical or Salvific Psychology? At this point we may wish to reflect on the original intention behind the Buddha’s Dharma. As is very apparent through the Four Ārya Truths, the aim of the teaching is the elimination of suffering. How do the above Abhidhamma notions of dhammavāda conform, or not, to this goal? Firstly, we can see in the truths of dukkha and samudaya, that the root cause of dissatisfaction is ignorance and wrong views, which in turn give rise to desire, aversion, and so forth. The positing of an attā, an eternal, self-existent, and autonomous entity within the five khandhas, was a view that the Buddha continually refuted. The attā view is an ontological position, and the Buddha declared it epistemologically unverifiable. He constantly stated that such an entity was not apparent, was not findable, and not appropriate within the impermanent and dissatisfying khandhas, which were described as “the world”. It appears that the original intention of the Abhidhamma was one of systematization and classification of the various doctrinal categories of the Buddha. However, when the Puggalavādins and Sarvāstivādins proposed their theories of the puggala and sabhāva sarvāsti dhammas respectively, the Theravāda saw these too as not apparent, not findable, and not appropriate within the impermanent and dissatisfying dhammas they had enumerated. Thus, the Theravāda Abhidhamma was developed to maintain right view, the keystone of the Eightfold Ārya Path, the path to liberation from dissatisfaction. Yet, it could be suggested that for those who did not have the wrong views mentioned above, the Abhidhamma method was not necessary. Later Abhidhammikas who maintained such methodology essential for liberation, may be overstating the point somewhat.

40

Bhikkhu Nyanaponika: Abhidhamma Studies, (Wisdom, 1998), pp91ff. From Atthasālinī, pg. 57.

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Paramattha and Paññatti in Abhidhamma Dhammavāda

4. TEACHING AND TRUTH AS PARAMATTHA OR SAMMUTTI: With the clarification of the two pairs of terms paramattha and paññatti, sabhāva and asabhāva, the term “dhamma” by itself once again takes on a more conventional meaning. When prefixed by any of the aforementioned four terms, the general meaning of phenomena in general becomes more specific. Although the dhammas of the Dhammasaṅgaṇī are all paramattha and sabhāva, we can still conventionally refer to paññatti and sabhāva phenomena as dhammas.

Nītattha and Neyyattha The Buddha himself taught that his teachings were either nītattha – “drawn out”, or neyyattha – “not yet drawn out”, in terms of meaning and scope. These two categories for teachings appeared in the Suttas as: “There are these two who misrepresent the Tathāgata. Which two? He who represents a Sutta of indirect meaning as a Sutta of direct meaning and he who represents a Sutta of direct meaning as a Sutta of indirect meaning.” 41 To which it is pointed out that neither is stated as having predominance over the other, it is merely confusion of the two that is “misrepresentation” of the Buddha. Yet it is the commentaries that furnish details, indicating that a nītattha teaching is one expressed in paramattha terms, whereas a neyyattha teaching is confined to the paññatti dhammas. 42

41

42

Anguttara Nikāya I 60, as quoted in Jayatilleke, K N: Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, (Motilal Banarsidass, 2004), pg. 361. Anguttara Nikāya Atthakathā II 118, as quoted in Jayatilleke, K N: Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, (Motilal Banarsidass, 2004), pp. 361~363.

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Paramattha and Paññatti in Abhidhamma Dhammavāda

Paramattha and Sammutti The neyyattha teachings are those expressed in conventional language (vohāra-vacana) referring to phenomena, whereas the nītattha are those expressed through paramattha dhammas. This in turn became the basis for two types of truths, or doctrinal statements regarding reality, the paramattha or “ultimate” truth, and the sammutti or “conventional” truth. In this way, the dhammavāda became a basis for classifying statements. This is again expressed in the commentaries as: “The Perfectly Enlightened One, the best of teachers, spoke two truths, viz. conventional and absolute – one does not come across a third; a conventional statement is true because of convention and an absolute statement is true as [disclosing] the true characteristics of things.” 43 Here, it must be pointed out, both Karunadasa and Jayatilleke indicate that this implies no hierarchal distinction between the two truths. 44

They are merely two means to establish the practitioner in the truths of the Buddha’s dispensation. A question arises, however, due to the fact that many of the Buddha’s disciples attained liberation through hearing neyyattha Suttas and sammutti teachings. Yet, if these teachings are based on paññatti dhammas, and arising or cessation in the proper sense cannot be predicated of paññatti dhammas, how could a practitioner gain an understanding of the three dhamma mudra, ie. dissatisfaction, impermanence, and non-self, and thus attain unbinding from such teachings? For instance, how could one understand impermanence or non-self from meditating on either the breath, or impurity? Although these two were the most common topics of meditation given by the Buddha himself, the two “doors to the deathless”, neither is a paramattha dhamma. One cannot, strictly speaking, realize impermanence or the like, from their observation. The later Abhidhamma dealt with this by further analysis of such meditation topics, and rendered objects of meditation and insight such as these, into paramattha dhammas. For example, they rendered ānāpānasati into the air kasiṇna, kāyagatāsati and asubha into the respective color kasiṇas. 45 Thus, one received a neyyattha

43

44

45

Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa Aṭṭhakatthā and Anguttara Nikāya Atthakathā II 118, as quoted in Jayatilleke, K N: Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, (Motilal Banarsidass, 2004), pg. 363. Karunadasa, Y: The Dhamma Theory, Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma, (BPS, 1996), pp. 37~39. Jayatilleke, K N: Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, (Motilal Banarsidass, 2004), pg. 364. Bhikkhu Dhammānando: Unpublished manuscript, translation of Dhammasaṇgaṅī Aṭṭhakathā, pg.

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sammutti teaching, but developed it by reducing it to its paramattha constituents, and gained realization from insight into these paramattha realities.

Sammutti or Saṃvṛti? A somewhat different situation of a hierarchy between these two truths, was developed in the Sanskrit Abhidharma tradition. Here, rather than sammutti as “conventional”, the term saṃvṛti, or “obscured” was used. This implies that teachings based on conventional, non-ultimate phenomena, actually obscure the true reality of things. This then furthers the northern Abhidharmikas’ viewpoint that the Abhidharma is a necessity, rather than an aid, to the path towards liberation. As the later Mahāyāna traditions tended to derive from the northern Abhidharma, either as an evolution or dialectically, this type of two truth format also became predominant throughout the Mahāyāna. More and more efforts were spent in elucidating the paramārtha-satya, and the saṃvṛti-satya eventually became relegated to categories described as “illusory”, “dreamlike”, and so forth. As noted above, certain elements that then considered the paramārtha-satya as ineffable, paved the way for both mysticism through self-contradictory dialectic (the Prajñāpāramitā), and idealism (the Vijñapti-mātratā).

200; and personal correspondence. See also Bhikkhu Ñānamoli: The Path of Purification, (Buddha Educational Foundation, 2005), III 104~133, pp. 112~121.

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CONCLUSIONS: We have seen from the preceding discussion, the importance of the dhammavāda in the Abhidhamma. Originally a classification of the various doctrinal explanations of the Buddha in the Suttas, it underwent a few developments in the face of what the Theravāda considered to be non-orthodox views held by other Buddhist schools. These developments were still within the general scope of the original teachings. These dhammas were considered to be paramattha, or ultimate, in the sense of being both sabhāva and irreducible. Sabhāva indicated their position as both distinct and independent of any imputation or conceptualization on the part of the cognizer. The converse of this, those phenomena which are the subject of conventional language and expression, were considered as paññatti and asabhāva. Paññatti indicated phenomena designated based upon the paramattha dhammas. Asabhāva indicated that in this way, their existence was purely by way of mental act or conceptualization, and was not intrinsic to that phenomena. Paññatti dhammas were further delineated as the names of either other paññatti or of paramattha dhammas, and the concepts or notions thereof. Paramattha ultimates were thus expressible, though the words or names used to express them, are not the dhamma itself. Based upon the early Buddhist notion of doctrinal statements contained within the Suttas as either nītattha or neyyattha, specific teachings were also then attributed as paramattha if expressed in terms of paramattha dhammas, or sammutti if expressed in terms of paññatti dhammas. Both remained on an equal soteriological footing, and as the word of the Buddha, were still considered capable of leading the aspirant to liberation. The Theravāda Abhidhamma thus kept up with the development and issues engaging Buddhism in greater India, particularly the North. By exercising caution, and avoiding absolute reification of qualified and conditioned aspects (vibhajja) of the Buddha’s doctrine, they avoided several of the pitfalls encountered by other contemporary Abhidharma traditions. As such, the Theravāda Abhidhamma did not become blurred with other Indian philosophical systems, and survives and flourishes to this day, as an essential part of the Buddha Dhamma. It is the Third Piṭaka, and a key element of the Dhamma Jewel!

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Paramattha and Paññatti in Abhidhamma Dhammavāda

BIBLIOGRAPHY Canonical and Post-canonical Works Abhidharmakośabhāṣyaṃ, (T29, n1558). Anguttara Nikāya. Anguttara Nikāya Atthakathā. Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa Aṭṭhakatthā. Śāriputra Abhidharma (T28, no. 1548). Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra Tattvārtha Paṭala, (T30, n1579). Bhikkhu Ñānamoli:

The Path of Purification, (Translation of Viśuddhimagga), (Buddha Educational Foundation, 2005).

Bhikkhu Bodhi:

The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, (Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya), (Wisdom, 2002).

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The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, (Translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya), (Wisdom, 2000).

Bhikkhu Dhammānando: Translation of Dhammasaṅgaṇī Aṭṭhakathā, (Unpublished manuscript). de la Vallee Poussin:

Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣyām, (Asian Humanities Press, 1988).

Rhys Davids, C A F:

Psychological Ethics, (Translation of Dhammasaṇgaṅī), (Pāli Text Society, 1900).

Other Works Bhikkhu Bodhi:

A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, (Buddhist Publication Society, 2000).

Bhikkhu Dhammajoti:

Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, (Centre for Buddhist Studies, Śrī Lankā, 2002).

–––––––––––––––––––

“Abhidharma and Upadeśa” in Journal of Buddhist Studies Vol 3, (Centre for Buddhist Studies, 2005).

–––––––––––––––––––

“Sarvāstivāda, Dārṣṭāntika, Sautrāntika and Yogācāra –

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Paramattha and Paññatti in Abhidhamma Dhammavāda

Some Reflections on their Interrelation” in Journal of Buddhist Studies Vol 4, (Centre for Buddhist Studies, 2006). Bhikkhu Nyanaponika: Abhidhamma Studies, Buddhist Explorations Consciousness and Time, (Wisdom, 1998).

of

Jayatilleke, K N:

Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, (Motilal Banarsidass, 2004), pg. 364.

Kalupahana, D: 

History of Buddhist Philosophy,    (University of Hawaii Press, 1992).

Karunadasa, Y:

The Dhamma Theory, Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma, (Buddhist Publication Society, 1996).

––––––––––

Time and Space, the Abhidhamma Perspective, (Professor K N Jayatilleke Memorial Lecture, 2003).

Mahāthera Nārada:

The Buddha and His Teachings, (Buddha Education Foundation).

Stcherbatsky, T:

The Central Conception of Buddhism, (Motilal Banarsidass, 2001).

Sumanapala, G:

“The Theravada Concept of Paññatti – A Brief Comparative Analysis”, in Journal of the Postgraduate Institute of Pāli and Buddhist Studies, Vol. 1, (University of Kelaniya, 1999).

Warder, A K:

Indian Buddhism, (Motilal Banarsidass, 2004).

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Paramattha and Paññatti in Abhidhamma Dhammavāda

APPENDIX – DHAMMA CLASSIFICATION CHART: The table below shows the various inter-relations and classifications of dhammas:

Relation between Paramattha/Sabhāva and Paññatti/Asabhāva Dhammas N Naam meess ffoorr ““D Dhhaam mm maa”” –– ““rrūūppaa””,, ““vveeddaannāā””,, ““cciittttaa””,, eettcc.. VViijjjaam maannaa--ppaaññññaattttii N Nāām maa  A Atttthhaa CCoonncceepptt ooff ““D Dhhaam mm maa”” TTaajjjāā--ppaaññññaattttii

N Naam meess ffoorr ““PPaaññññaattttii”” –– ““ttaabbllee””,, ““ccaatt””,, ““ppeerrssoonn””,, eettcc.. N Nāām maa--ppaaññññaattttii // SSaam muuttttii

N Nāām maa--ppaaññññaattttii SSaaññññāākkāārraa PPaaññññaattttii Î Î PPaarriikkaappppaa-ssiiddddhhaa

N Nāām maa & &A Atttthhaa A r e L o g i c Are Logicaallllyy IInnsseeppaarraabbllee C Coonncceepptt ooff ““PPaaññññaattttii”” A Atttthhaa--ppaaññññaattttii

A Atttthhaa--ppaaññññaattttii K Kaappppaannāā

K Kaallppāānnaa –– m meennttaall aacctt ooff ccoonncceeppttuuaalliizziinngg PPaarraam maatttthhaa Î Î SSaabbhhāāvvaa--ssiiddddhhii

A Accttuuaall D Dhhaam mm maa PPaarraam a t t h a / S mattha / Saabbhhāāvvaa

Relating to Paramattha / Sabhāva Dhammas

Relating to Paññatti / Asabhāva Dhammas

Key: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Dhammas that are paramattha / sabhāva are shown via the left column. Dhammas that are paññatti / asabhāva are indicated on the right column. The top row indicates the words and verbal expressions for these two. They are established through parikappa. The middle row indicates the concepts corresponding to the two. They are established through parikappa. The bottom row indicates dhammas themselves, from which both paramattha and paññatti derive, hence it only includes the left column. They are established through sabhāva.

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