PALS Criminal Law

PEOPLE v PANCHO (416 SCRA 506) November 27, 2003 G.R. 136592-93

CRIMINAL LAW BOOK 1 (ARTICLES 1-99, RPC)

Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, but does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. There is no attempted rape in this case because the accused just dragged the victim and held her feet, which are not indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the victim.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA PADILLA v. DIZON (158 SCRA 127) The respondent-judge has shown gross ignorance of the law in holding that to convict the accused for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960 i.e., smuggling of foreign currency out of the country, the prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law. The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses punished by special laws, which are mala prohibita.

PEOPLE v ORANDE (415 SCRA 699) November 12, 2003 G.R. No. 141724 The trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape due to the fact that the latter did not succeed in inserting his penis in the victim’s vagina. There is no such crime as frustrated rape. Instead, the accused is guilty of consummated rape since perfect penetration is not essential for the consummation of rape.

IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES INTOD ET. AL. v CA (215 SCRA 52) G.R. No. 103119

VALENZUELA v PEOPLE (525 SCRA 306)

Intod fired at Palangpangan's room, although in reality, the latter was not present in his room; thus, Intod failed to kill him. The factual situation in the case at bar presents an inherent impossibility of accomplishing the crime. Under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

The accused argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft for taking cartons of detergent from the supermarket since he was immediately apprehended by the security guard. Thus, was not able to freely dispose of the said stolen articles. Theft cannot have a frustrated stage and the accused is guilty of consummated theft since he has obtained possession over the stolen item and the presumed inability of the offender to freely dispose of the stolen property does not negate the fact that the owners have already been deprived of their right to possession upon the completion of the taking. Unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing. The ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of the crime of theft.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts even if completed, would not amount to a crime. PEOPLE v DOMASIAN (219 SCRA 245) The accused illegally detained a child and sent a ransom note to the latter's parents, but the child was rescued even before the ransom note was received. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means, and the delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been consummated when the accused deprived the child of his liberty.

CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL PEOPLE v RECONES, ET. AL. (310 SCRA 809) July 20, 1999 G. R. No. 129535

STAGES OF EXECUTION

Three (3) accused were charged with murder. The first one hit the victim repeatedly with a stone marker, the second one pummeled the victim with his fists while the third only watched and acted as lookout in case others will try to intervene. All of them, including the lookout, are guilty of murder and are accountable for the death of the victim on the principle that the act of one is the act of all.

PEOPLE v LAMAHANG (91 Phil 703) The accused was caught in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store, and succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall. The crime committed was not attempted robbery but only attempted trespass to dwelling, since based on the facts established, his intention was to enter by means of force into the said store against the will of its owner.

Proof of a previous agreement to commit a felony is not necessary to establish conspiracy, it being sufficient that the acts of the accused, before, during, and after the commission of the felony, demonstrate its existence.

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PEOPLE v CANTUBA (183 SCRA 289) G. R. No. 79811

ILAGAN v COURT OF APPEALS (239 SCRA 575) G.R. No. 110617

The accused was correctly convicted as a co-conspirator. His knowledge of the plot to assassinate the victim, the fact that he had been ordered to scout for a man who could do the job and his knowledge of the place, date and time of the assault are sufficient to show unity of purpose. At the very least, therefore, he had to know the plot and decided to join the execution. From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution.

The series of acts committed against the seven (7) lot buyers were not the product of a single criminal intent. The misrepresentation or deceit was employed against each lot buyer on different dates and in separate places, hence, they originated from separate criminal intents and consequently resulted in separate felonies. COMPOUND CRIMES PEOPLE v CASTROMERO (280 SCRA 421) G.R. No. 118992

The degree of actual participation in the commission of the crime is immaterial in conspiracy.

The rape victim jumped from a window of her house to escape from the accused; as a result, she suffered serious physical injuries specifically a broken vertebra which required medical attention and surgery for more than ninety days. Here, the rape was complexed with the crime of serious physical injuries, in accordance with the settled principle that a person who creates in another’s mind an immediate sense of danger that causes the latter to try to escape is responsible for whatever injuries the other person may consequently suffer.

CONTINUING CRIMES PEOPLE v TUMLOS (67 PHIL 320) April 13, 1939 G.R. No. 46248 The theft of the thirteen (13) cows committed by the defendant took place at the same time and in the same place. Consequently, he performed but one act. The fact that eight (8) of the said cows belong to one owner and five (5) to another does not make him criminally liable for two (2) distinct offenses for the reason that to be liable for two (2) distinct offenses, the act must be divided into two (2). In this case, the act is not susceptible of division. The intention was likewise one, namely, to take for the purpose of appropriating or selling the thirteen (13) cows which he found grazing in the same place.

PEOPLE v COMADRE (431 SCRA 366) June 8, 2004 G.R. No. 153559 The accused dropped a hand grenade inside a house, killing one and causing 4 others to suffer shrapnel wounds on their bodies. The accused was found guilty of the complex crime of murder with multiple attempted murder under Article 48, and the penalty for the most serious crime (murder) shall be imposed.

PEOPLE v JARANILLA (55 SCRA 563) February 22, 1974 G.R. No. L-28547

PEOPLE v MELECIO ROBINOS (382 SCRA 581) May 29, 2002 G.R. No. 138453

The taking of the six fighting cocks from their coop should be characterized as a single offense of theft as the assumption is that the accused were animated by a single criminal impulse. The taking of the fighting cocks in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to separate crimes of theft.

The accused stabbed his pregnant wife with a knife, causing the instantaneous death of the latter and the fetus inside her womb. He was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, and the penalty to be imposed on him should be that for the graver offense which is parricide.

SANTIAGO v GARCHITORENA (228 SCRA 214) G.R. No. 109266

When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed.

Public prosecutors filed thirty-two (32) Amended Informations against Santiago for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by giving "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program. The thirty-two (32) Amended Informations charged the accused with what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and hence, there should only be one information to be filed against Santiago. The concept of delito continuado is applicable to crime penalized under special laws.

PEOPLE v BALOTOL (84 Phil 289) The accused stabbed the victim at the back with the use of a bolo. The bolo pierced through the victim's abdominal region which also wounded another person, resulting to the death of both victims. The crime committed was double murder, defined and penalized in Article 248, in relation to Article 48, of the Revised Penal Code.

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COMPLEX CRIME PROPER

PEOPLE v PATOTOY (261 SCRA 37) G.R. No. 102058

PEOPLE v TALO October 25, 2000 G.R. No. 125542

The accused admitted to having killed the victim but claims to have done so in self-defense. The victim appeared to draw something from his waist during their confrontation. The victim's alleged act of drawing "something" from his waist certainly is not the "unlawful aggression" meant in the law that would justify a fatal strike at him and no veritable physical force on the part of the latter has been shown that could have really endangered the life of the accused. Hence, self-defense cannot exist in this case.

The accused forcibly took the victim from her parents' house and, in a ricefield about 800 meters away, forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. The accused was found guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, as the crime of forcible abduction was a necessary means for committing the crime of rape. PEOPLE v SABREDO (331 SCRA 663) May 11, 2000 G.R. 126114

Without unlawful aggression, self-defense cannot exist nor be an extenuating circumstance.

The accused, using a blade, forcibly took away the victim from Cebu to Masbate, and eventually raped her. The crime committed is simple rape only since the information failed to allege that the forcible taking of the victim was done with lewd designs (an element of forcible abduction). Hence, the crime of rape may absorb forcible abduction.

PEOPLE VS. GENEBLAZO (361 SCRA 572) July 20, 2001 G.R. No. 133580 Assuming that the version of the accused of the incidents is true, that unlawful aggression emanated from the victim and his companion by throwing stones at him, the aggression ceased to exist when the victim and his companion ran away. There was no longer any real danger to the life or personal safety of the accused. When the perpetrator does not persist in his purpose or when he discontinues his attitude to the extent that the object of his attack is no longer in peril, an act of aggression is not unlawful aggression warranting selfdefense.

PEOPLE v BARBAS (60 PHIL 241) The defendant, a public officer, altered the duplicates of the cedulas by erasing the names originally written on them and replacing the same with new names for the purpose of selling them to other people and misappropriating the money. The falsification of public documents was, therefore, the means which the defendant availed himself of in committing the crime of malversation.

PEOPLE V. BAUTISTA (424 SCRA 63) February 27, 2004 G.R. No. 139530

CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES

There is no self-defense in this case because even if the accused believed that the victim did try to kill him when he saw him raise his bolo, such aggression ceased when accused succeeded in grabbing the bolo and he was not hit by the stone hurled at him by the victim; hence, the accused no longer faced any danger to his life and limb. When an unlawful aggression no longer exists, the one making a defense has no right to kill or even injure the former aggressor.

PEOPLE v ABRAZALDO (397 SCRA 137) While the accused admitted the commission of the crime in order to preserve his own life, he maintained that the victim accidentally stabbed himself while they were grappling for the knife. The justifying circumstance of selfdefense cannot be appreciated considering the accusedappellant’s flight from the crime scene, his failure to inform the authorities of the incident and his failure to surrender the knife to the authorities. The aforesaid circumstances are inconsistent with having a clean conscience and, instead, indicate his culpability to the crime charged.

PEOPLE v ESCARLOS (410 SCRA 463) September 10, 2003 G.R. No. 148912 Even assuming arguendo that there was an altercation before the stabbing incident and that some danger did in fact exist, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment the accused disarmed the victim by seizing the knife from the latter. After the accused had successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the need to kill the victim. Hence, the accused became the unlawful aggressor when he stabbed the victim.

PEOPLE v TAC-AN (182 SCRA 601) G.R. Nos. 76338-39 The accused killed the victim but claimed self-defense. The victim previously uttered some threatening words against him. Assuming that the victim uttered those words, such utterances cannot be regarded as the unlawful aggression which is the first and most fundamental requirement of self-defense, and such statements could not reasonably inspire the "well grounded and reasonable belief" claimed by Renato that "he was in imminent danger of death or bodily harm."

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PEOPLE v APOLINAR C.A., 38 O.G. 2870

included the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor’s cunning and shrewdness.

The accused, while looking over his land and believing that the victim had stolen his palay, shouted for the latter to stop, fired his gun in the air and then at the victim, causing the latter’s death. Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to life and it can be invoked only as a justifying circumstance when it is coupled with an attack on the person of the one entrusted with the said property.

U.S. V. TANEDO (15 PHIL 196) The accused, while hunting fired a shot at wild chickens; however, the slug recoiled and fatally hit another man. A person who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it, is not criminally liable.

BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME

PEOPLE v FALLORINA (428 SCRA ___) May 4, 2004 G.R. No. 137347

PEOPLE v GENOSA September 8, 2010 G.R. No. 135981

The accused claims that the victim's death was caused by his gun accidentally going off. The Court convicted him for the victim's death due to his failure to prove with clear and convincing evidence his defense of accident. The following proved otherwise that the accused accidentally shot the victim: (1) his refusal to answer clarificatory questions of the prosecutor, which casted doubt on his defense; (2) his refusal to surrender himself and his firearm after the shooting; and (3) other pieces of evidence which belie his claim that the death of the victim was accidental and that he was not negligent.

Marivic Genosa, charged with parricide for the killing of her husband, anchored her defense on the theory of battered woman syndrome (BWS), which constituted a form of cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. The Court convicted Genosa as the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising from BWS: (1) each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner; (2) the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life; (3) at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter.

PEOPLE v AYAYA (52 PHIL 354) The accused, in order to prevent the door from crushing her son's head, jabbed her husband with her umbrella which later led to her husband's death. The Court concluded that in thrusting her umbrella in the opening of the door in question, the accused did so to free her son from the imminent danger of having his head crushed or being strangled and if she consequently caused her husband's injury, it was by a mere accident, without any fault or intention to cause it.

EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES PEOPLE v DOMINGO (580 SCRA 436)

PEOPLE V. GENITA (425 SCRA 343) March 11, 2004 G.R. No. 126171

The accused asserted that he was insane or completely deprived of intelligence during the commission of the crimes and presented the results of a medical examination showing that he was suffering from Schizophrenia. The medical examination was taken four years after the crimes were committed. The alleged insanity of an accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed, not at any time thereafter. Medical findings of mental disorder referring to a period after the time the crime was committed will not exempt him from criminal liability.

The appellant's claim that he "accidentally shot" the two victims is incredible. In this case, it is clear that the requisites of accident as an exempting circumstance were not proven: (1) appellant's manner of carrying his rifle negates his claim of due care in the performance of an act since he should have seen to it that its safety lock was intact; (2) the fact that both victims sustained more than one wound shows that the shooting was not merely accidental; (3) appellant manifested an unmistakable intent to kill the victims when he reloaded his rifle after his first unsuccessful attempt to kill them.

LLAVE v PEOPLE (488 SCRA 376) April 26, 2006 G.R. No. 166040

PEOPLE v CASTILLO (526 SCRA 215) June 29, 2007 G.R. No. 172695

The accused (a minor), with methodical fashion, dragged the resisting victim behind a pile of hollow blocks to ensure that passersby would not discover his acts. When he was discovered, he hastily fled from the scene to escape arrest. The Court ruled that he acted with discernment when he had carnal knowledge with the victim. Based on the circumstances, the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstances

Appellant contends that assuming he was the one who killed his wife, the same was accidental and not intentional. However, the Court does not agree. By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a

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deadly sling and arrow be considered as performing a lawful act. Thus, on this ground alone, appellant’s defense of accident must be struck down because he was performing an unlawful act during the incident.

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

PEOPLE v BANDIAN (63 PHL 530) September 30, 1936 G.R. No. 45186

The deceased placed his hand on the upper portion of the woman's thigh without her consent, which led to the woman stabbing the neck of the deceased to defend her honor. The means employed in the defense of her honor was excessive and she cannot be declared completely exempt from criminal liability. However, the fact that she had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against her a few moments before, and upon such provocation as to produce passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and self-control, should be considered as mitigating circumstance in her favor.

PEOPLE v JAURIGUE (C.A. NO. 384)

The mother who went to the thicket to respond to the call of nature but, instead, gave birth therein is not criminally liable for infanticide for leaving the child behind. She should not be blamed for the act of abandonment because it all happened by mere accident, she was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility (also considered as an insuperable cause). Any person who acts and behaves under such circumstances is exempted from liability.

U.S. v AMPAR (37 Phil 201) The accused, a 70-year old man, killed the deceased for telling him, "Come here and I will make roast pig of you." The offense which the defendant was trying to vindicate would be considered a mere trifle to the average person but it was evidently a serious matter to be made the butt of a joke for the old man. Hence, he was given the benefit of a mitigating circumstance.

PEOPLE v MORENO (77 PHIL 548) The accused admitted to having killed the victim but claimed that he should be exempted from liability because he did so in obedience to an order given him by Japanese officers of the navy. The latter informed him that the victim was one of those who were encountered by the Japanese in a mountain and wounded a Japanese soldier. The accused was held guilty because the law provides that to be exempted from criminal liability, it is not enough to prove that the act was committed in obedience to an order, it must also be established that the order being followed is lawful.

PEOPLE v IGNAS (412 SCRA 311) September 30, 2003 G.R. No. 140514 The accused killed his wife's lover 2 weeks after he discovered his wife's extramarital dalliance, but the court did not consider the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation because for the same to be well founded, the following requisites must concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity. The period of two weeks between the discovery of his wife’s extramarital dalliance and the killing of her lover was sufficient time for appellant to reflect and cool off.

JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006 (R.A. NO. 9344); ALSO REFER TO CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE (P.D. 603, AS AMENDED) VALCESAR ESTIOCA v PEOPLE (556 SCRA 300) June 27, 2008 G.R. No. 173876 The accused was 14 years old at the time he committed the robbery which occurred in 2001. Although R.A. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took effect only on May 20, 2006, the said law should be given retroactive effect in favor of the accused who was not shown to be a habitual criminal (penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal).Hence, the accused was exempt from criminal liability.

PEOPLE v BENITO (74 SCRA 271) December 17, 1976 G.R. No. L-38091 The accused (who had a pending case with the Civil Service) contended that the victim insulted him when he (the victim) remarked that a thief was loitering in the premises of the Civil Service Commission and further argued that that remark "was tantamount to kicking a man already down and to rubbing salt into a raw wound" and that, as it was made publicly and in a loud voice, he was exposed to ridicule in the presence of his officemates. Assuming that the remark was directed at the accused, the Court did not apply the mitigating circumstance of vindication for a grave offense for the killing of the victim because the accused had more than sufficient time to suppress his emotion over said remark if he ever did resent it.

JOEMAR ORTEGA v PEOPLE (562 SCRA 450) August 20, 2008 G.R. No. 151085 The accused was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the rape and under R.A. No. 9344 (which was applied retroactively), he is exempted from criminal liability. Section 64 of the law further provides that cases of children 15 years old and below, at the time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate Local Social Welfare and Development Officer (LSWDO).

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U.S. V. HICKS (14 PHIL 217)

must be spontaneous, accompanied by an acknowledgment of guilt, or an intention to save the authorities the trouble and the expense that search and capture would require.

The accused and the victim illicitly lived together for 5 years. After they separated, the accused killed the victim for living with another man. No mitigating circumstance was considered in his favor, not even the loss of reason and self-control produced by jealousy as alleged by the defense, inasmuch as the only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are those which originate from legitimate feelings and not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.

PEOPLE v ABOLIDOR (423 SCRA 260) February 18, 2004 G.R. No. 147231 The accused surrendered to the authorities more than one year after the incident in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of the victim. The Court did not consider the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender because: (1) the facts of the case do not show repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor intention to save the government the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture; and (2) at the time of his surrender, there was a pending warrant of arrest against him.

U.S. V. DELA CRUZ March 29, 1912 G.R. No. L-7094 The accused, in the heat of passion, killed his former lover upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance. The accused was entitled to the mitigating circumstance because in this case, the impulse upon which defendant acted and which naturally "produced passion and obfuscation" was not that the woman declined to have illicit relations with him but the sudden revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another.

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES PEOPLE v CALISO (58 PHIL 283) July 1, 1933 G.R. No. L-37271

PEOPLE v RABAO (67 PHIL 255) April 10, 1939 G.R. No. L-46530

In the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of confidence was present since the appellant was the domestic servant of the family and was sometimes the deceased child's "amah". The circumstance that the crime had been committed in the dwelling of the offended party which was considered by the lower court as another aggravating circumstance should be disregarded as both the victim and the appellant were living in the same house.

The accused and his wife had a heated argument because the wife wanted to give their sick child a bath which was against the wishes of the accused. The Court considered mitigating circumstance in his favor since, although he transgressed the law by an unjust attack on his wife, the accused did not really have the intention of committing so grave a crime as parricide, and the quarrel that led to the aggression had its origin from the natural and justifiable desire of the accused, as a father, to prevent his child, which was then ill, from being given a bath.

PEOPLE v LORA (113 SCRA 366) March 30, 1982 G.R. No. L-49430 The accused was charged for the crime of serious illegal detention with murder for illegally detaining a 3-year old child, and attacking the same, which resulted to the child's death. There are three aggravating circumstances in this case, namely: (1) lack of respect due to the tender age of the victim; (2) cruelty, for gagging the victim's mouth with stockings thereby causing slow suffocation; and (3) abuse of confidence since the main duty of the accused in the household was to take care of the minor child.

PEOPLE v DAWATON (389 SCRA 277) September 17, 2002 G.R. No. 146247 In trying to avail of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the accused argues that he was not arrested but "fetched" as he voluntarily went with the policemen when they came for him. That he did not try to escape or resist arrest after he was taken into custody by the authorities did not amount to voluntary surrender and it is also settled that voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated where the evidence adduced shows that it was the authorities who came looking for the accused.

PEOPLE v LAGUARDIA (148 SCRA 133) February 27, 1987 G.R. No. L-63243 The following aggravating circumstances were present in this case of robbery with homicide: (1) despoblado or uninhabited place since evidence shows that the accused lay in wait for the truck being driven by the victim at an isolated portion of the highway, choosing that particular spot where they could commit the crime without disturbance or discovery and with easy opportunity for escape; and (2) use of motor vehicles because the

PEOPLE v VIERNES (372 SCRA 231) December 13, 2001 G.R. No. 136733 Going to the police station “to clear his name” does not show any intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities. The act of surrender

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conspirators took the vehicle of the victim to facilitate their escape and to prevent the other passengers from reporting the offense to the authorities. The following aggravating circumstances were rejected: (1) nighttime because it was not especially sought, as the victim's trip schedule and not the discretion of the culprits determined the time of its commission; (2) evident premeditation because it is inherent in the crime of robbery and was not proved in the commission of the killing; and (3) treachery, as there is no evidence of its employment since none of the witnesses actually saw the shooting.

Conrado held her hands placing them behind her body. Thereafter, they raped the victim one after the other. Hence ,the Court was correct in imposing on each of the accused of the penalty corresponding to two crimes of rape because each of them (accused) cooperated in the commission of the rape perpetrated by the others, by acts without which it would not have been accomplished. PEOPLE v CASTILLO (17 SCRA 721) July 26, 1966 G.R. No. L-19238

PEOPLE v ZETA (549 SCRA 541) March 27, 2008 G.R. No. 178541

After his son had fatally hacked the victim with a bolo and was about to strike the victim a second time, the accused shouted: "You kill him." The accused is not guilty as principal by inducement because in determining whether the utterances of an accused are sufficient to make him guilty as co-principal by inducement, it must appear that the inducement was of such nature and was made in such a way as to become the determining cause of the crime and that such inducement was uttered with the intention of producing the result.

The span of thirty minutes or half an hour from the time the accused showed their determination to kill the victim (2:00 in the morning of 28 October 1995) up to the time the accused shot to death the victim (2:15-2:30 in the morning of 28 October 1995) could not have afforded them full opportunity for meditation and reflection on the consequences of the crime they committed. The Court held that the lapse of thirty minutes between the determination to commit a crime and the execution thereof is insufficient for a full meditation on the consequences of the act. Hence, the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case.

PEOPLE v DUMANCAS (320 SCRA 584) December 13, 1999 G.R. No. 133527–28 The accused cannot be held guilty as principal by inducement when she told the policemen to "take care of the two" victims, who were later killed by the said policemen. There are 2 ways of directly inducing another to commit a crime, namely: (i) by giving a price, or offering reward or promise, and (ii) by using words of command and in this case, there is no evidence that the accused offered any price or reward should they kill the victims, nor can the remark of the accused be deemed as a command required by law to justify a finding that she is guilty as a principal by inducement.

ACCESSORIES PEOPLE v ORTIZ AND ZAUSA (55 PHIL 993) August 27, 1986 G.R. No. L-3507 Ortiz and Zausa were charged with conspiracy to kill the victim but Ortiz contends that he should be acquitted because he did not take part in the attack. The Court ruled that Ortiz cannot be convicted either as principal or as accessory, for it has been shown that there was neither plan nor agreement between him and Zausa to commit the crime, and that he took no part in the latter's attack with the spear.

CARINO v PEOPLE (7 SCRA 900) April 30, 1963 G.R. No. L-14752 The accused cannot be held guilty as an accomplice in the crime of rebellion through his acts of sending or furnishing cigarettes and food supplies to a famous Huk, as well as changing $6,000 to Philippine money or in helping Huks to open accounts (which were said to be part of his functions as an employee of a bank). These acts by themselves do not and cannot carry or prove any criminal intent of helping the Huks in committing the crime of insurrection or rebellion and they cannot be said to constitute acts of cooperation in the execution of the act of overthrowing the government.

VINO v PEOPLE (178 SCRA 626) October 19, 1989 G.R. No. 84163 The information was correct. An accused can be validly convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an information charging him as a principal. Also, the trial of an accessory can proceed without awaiting the result of the separate charge against the principal for the corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice and accessory are distinct from each other.

PEOPLE v DELA CERNA (21 SCRA 569) October 30, 1967 G.R. No. L-20911

PEOPLE v FERNANDEZ (183 SCRA 511) March 22, 1990 G.R. No. L-62116

The accused furnished the gun that was used to kill the victim Casiano, however, he cannot be held liable as an accomplice because he merely conspired with the principal to kill another victim, Rafael. The accused here was not aware that the principal would use the gun to kill Casiano. Hence, for other acts done outside the

The accused entered the bathroom together with accused Fernandez. In the bathroom, the latter tied a piece of cloth around the victim’s neck while accused

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contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the necessary and logical consequences of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable.

mayor and not more than 4 years 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional, plus the corresponding accessory penalties provided for by law.

DURATION OF PENALTIES

MEJORADA v SANDIGANBAYAN (151 SCRA 399) June 30, 1987 G.R. Nos. L-51065-72

PEOPLE v ALVARADO (275 SCRA 727) July 21, 1997 G.R. No. 117402

The Sandiganbayan imposed eight penalties for the eight informations (for violating Section 3E of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) filed against the accused. The penalties totaled to fifty-six years and eight days of imprisonment which the accused impugns as contrary to the three-fold rule and insists that the duration of the aggregate penalties should not exceed forty (40) years. The accused is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set forth in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code since this article is to be taken into account not in the imposition of the penalty but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed. It merely provides that the prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times the most severe of these penalties the maximum of which is forty years.

The Supreme Court reiterated the ruling in People v. Lucas, January 9, 1995, where it was clarified that “Although Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. Reclusion perpetua, therefore, retains its nature as having no minimum, medium and maximum periods and is imposed in its entirety regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the crime. PEOPLE v MANTALABA (654 SCRA 188) July 20, 2011 G.R. No. 186227

PEOPLE v ALFREDO BON (506 SCRA 168) October 30, 2006 G.R. No. 166401

The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority was appreciated in fixing the penalty necessarily reducing the penalty from reclusion perpetua to reclusion temporal, which is one degree lower. The ISLAW is also applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Hence, the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal.

In view of the statutory disallowance of the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346, "death," as provided in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties. In the case of the accused, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Therefore, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal but prision mayor. PROBATION LAW

PEOPLE v ESCARES (102 PHIL 677) December 23, 1957 G.R. Nos. L-11128-33

FRANCISCO v CA (243 SCRA 384) April 6, 1995 G.R. No. 108747

It should be noted that the imposable penalty in each of the six cases where appellant pleaded guilty in accordance with paragraph 5, Article 294, of the Revised Penal Code, is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, which should be applied in its minimum period in view of the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, not offset by any aggravating circumstance, or from 4 years 2 months and 1 day to 6 years one month and 10 days. In applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant should be sentenced for each crime to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall not be less than 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor nor more than 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, and the maximum shall not be less than 4 years 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional nor more than 6 years 1 month and 10 days of prision mayor. The trial court; however, committed an error in applying the proper penalty by using the threefold rule. Hence, the penalty imposed upon appellant by the trial court should be modified in the sense that he should suffer in each of the six cases an indeterminate penalty of not less than 4 months and 1 day of arresto

The accused who was found guilty by the MeTC of grave oral defamation in 4 of the 5 cases filed against him and sentenced to a prison term of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months of prision correccional in each crime committed appealed his case before the RTC but eventually applied for probation. The Court, in ruling that the accused is no longer eligible for probation, listed the following reasons: (1) Sec. 4 of the Probation Law clearly mandates that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction;" (2) the penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable, hence, there was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the probationable period (multiple prison terms should not be added up); (3) the accused appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct the penalties imposed by the MeTC, but to assert his innocence; (4) the application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law, in this case was filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner had been

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issued . . . (and) almost two months after (his) receipt of the Decision" of the RTC.

BALA v JUDGE MARTINEZ (181 SCRA 459) January 29, 1990 G.R. No. L-67301

SORIANO v CA (304 SCRA 231) March 4, 1999 G.R. No. 123936

Petitioner violated the terms and conditions of his probation but contends that there was no valid reason for its revocation since his probation period had already terminated on August 10, 1983 (although no order of final discharge was issued as the probation officer had not yet submitted his final report). The Supreme Court, in holding that the probation is revocable before the final discharge of the probationer by the court, held that: (1) the expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically terminate probation; (2) nowhere in the provisions of the probation law can be found the ipso facto termination of probation; (3) probation is not coterminous with its period; (4) there must first be issued by the court of an order of final discharge based on the report and recommendation of the probation officer and only from such issuance can the case of the probationer be deemed terminated.

Petitioner, whose probation was revoked since he was not able to comply with one of the conditions of probation which is to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P98,560.00, asserts that his non-compliance was due to his poor financial condition and that his enjoyment of probation should not be made to depend on the satisfaction of his civil liability. The Supreme Court, in ruling that the revocation of probation was lawful and proper, held that his continued refusal to submit a program of payment creates the impression that he wants to completely avoid paying his civil liability and that the conditions of probation must be satisfied in order that the purposes of probation be fulfilled, which include promoting the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized treatment, and providing an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence.

JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006 (REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9344) PEOPLE v SARCIA (599 SCRA 20) September 10, 2009 G.R. No. 169641

TOLENTINO v JUDGE ALCONCEL (121 SCRA 92) Petitioner Tolentino, who pleaded not guilty to the charge of violation of Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, changed his plea of not guilty to the lesser offense of illegal possession of marijuana, which Judge Alconcel allowed, sentencing petitioner to imprisonment of 6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months plus fines. The Supreme Court, in upholding the decision of Judge Alconcel to deny Tolentino's subsequent application for probation on the ground that "probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed", held that the potentiality of the offender to reform is not the sole or primordial factor that should be considered and that the demands of justice and public interest must be observed in the grant or denial of an application for probation.

If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary consideration. In this case, since the accusedappellant is about 31 years of age, the suspension of sentence has become moot and academic but he is still entitled to confinement in agricultural camps and other training facilities under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344.

CABATINGAN v SANDIGANBAYAN (102 SCRA 187) January 22, 1981 G.R. No. L-55333

PEOPLE v HERMIE JACINTO (645 SCRA 590) March 16, 2011 G.R. No. 182239

Sandiganbayan, in denying the application for probation by the petitioner, merely relied on a report of the probation officer which in itself, was mostly hearsay, and did not give the petitioner a chance to be heard before it issued its resolution denying the application for probation. The Supreme Court held that respondent court appears to have wholly relied on the probation report and did not make its own determination as to whether or not probation would serve the ends of justice and the best interest of the public and the applicant. It was not enough for the respondent court to deny petitioner's application solely on the report that she was involved in "maisiao" and that she was facing another preliminary investigation for the "additional shortage" of the funds of which she had already pleaded guilty.

The benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply to appellant who is now 25 years old since the suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. However, the offender shall be entitled to the right of restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No. 9344 in order that he/she will have the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

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PADUA v PEOPLE (559 SCRA 519) July 23, 2008 G.R. No. 168546

YAPDIANGCO v BUENCAMINO (122 SCRA 713) June 24, 1983 G.R. No. L-28841

The suspension of sentence under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344 could no longer be retroactively applied for petitioner’s benefit as Section 38 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence. Section 40 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years. However, since petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over, he could no longer be considered a child for purposes of applying Rep. Act No. 9344.

On February 1, 1965, the fiscal filed an information for slight physical injuries (with a prescriptive period of 60 days) allegedly committed by the petitioner on December 2, 1964. Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the criminal prosecution on the ground that the information having been filed on the sixty first day following the commission of the offense, the sixty days prescriptive period had lapsed. The Supreme Court (in disagreeing with the lower court's denial of the motion to quash due to the fact that the 60th day fell on a Sunday and considering the rule that when the last day for the filing of a pleading falls on a Sunday, the same may be filed on the next succeeding business day) held that "where the sixtieth and last day to file an information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day period cannot be extended up to the next working day for prescription has automatically set in”.

REMIENDO v PEOPLE (603 SCRA 274) October 9, 2009 G.R. No. 184874

PEOPLE v BAYOTAS (236 SCRA 239) September 2, 1994 G.R. No. 102007

The accused, being above 15 and under 18 years of age at the time of the rape, and having acted with discernment, claimed for the benefits of R.A. No. 9344 in view of Section 40, which provides that "if the child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years." However, the application of Section 40 is rendered moot and academic since the accused was already 22 years old and could no longer be considered a child for the purposes of applying R.A. No. 9344.

The Supreme Court held that the death of the accused Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. The Court ruled that: (1) death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon; (2) the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict, such as law, contracts, quasi-contracts or quasi-delicts; (3) where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; and (4) the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action for in such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case.

MODIFICATION AND EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY DAMASCO v LAQUI (166 SCRA 214) September 30, 1988 G.R. No. 81381 The petitioner was charged with the crime of grave threats (the crime was committed on 8 July 1987 and the information was filed only on 17 September 1987 or after the lapse of 71 days), but was only found guilty by the court of light threats (with a prescriptive period of 2 months or 60 days). The Supreme Court, in agreeing with petitioner's contention that he cannot be convicted of light threats since it had already prescribed, held that where an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible with the graver offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense if it has already prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to sanction a circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense.

SERMONIA v CA (233 SCRA 155) June 14, 1994 G.R. NO. 109454 Petitioner, in contending that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by prescription, insists that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record and constitutes notice to the whole world. Hence, the offended party is considered to have had constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975 and that prescription commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was registered. The Supreme Court held that unlike in the case of real property, the principle of constructive notice should not be applied in regard to the crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the

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fact that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous subsisting marriage and that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a married person in order to conceal his legal impediment to contract another marriage.

PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES DEL CASTILLO v TORRECAMPO (394 SCRA 221) December 18, 2002 G.R. No. 139033

CABRAL V. PUNO (70 SCRA 606) April 30, 1976 G.R. No. L-41692

10 years after the petitioner was found guilty for violating the Election Code (whereby he was never apprehended and remained at large), he filed before the trial court a motion to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription of the penalty imposed upon him. He based his claims on Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the period of prescription shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence. The petition must be denied since under Article 93, prescription shall commence to run from the date the felon evades the service of his sentence, which is inapplicable in the case at bar since the petitioner was never brought to prison and cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.

Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification (with a prescriptive period of 10 years) for allegedly forging a document that was registered in the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948. The complaint of respondent, filed on September 24, 1974, was dismissed on the ground of prescription since the respondent had actual if not constructive notice of the alleged forgery upon its registration in the Register of Deeds. Act No. 3326, As Amended

PANGAN v GATBALITE (449 SCRA 144) January 21, 2005 G.R. No. 141718

ZALDIVIA v REYES (211 SCRA 277) July 3, 1992 G.R. No. 102342

Petitioner, who failed to appear during the promulgation of the decision in the MTC on August 9, 1991, questioned his arrest on January 24, 2000 on the ground that the same was illegal since the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3, Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal Code. In ruling against the petitioner, the Court held that the prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code applies only to those who are convicted by final judgment and are serving sentence which consists of deprivation of liberty. Hence, the period for prescription of penalties begins only when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.

The prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner (quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal) commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326 and it was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.

PARDON BY OFFENDED PARTY

PCGG v DESIERTO (527 SCRA 61) July 9, 2007 G.R. No. 140231

PEOPLE v TADULAN (271 SCRA 233) April 15, 1997 G.R. No. 117407

The respondents were charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019 (amending said law, Section 4, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 increased the prescriptive period from 10 to 15 years), and the applicable law in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, which provides that "prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment". Records show that the act complained of was discovered in 1992 and the complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman on April 5, 1995, or within three (3) years from the time of discovery. Thus, the filing of the complaint was well within the prescriptive period of 15 years.

The supposed pardon of the accused was allegedly granted only by the mother (BBB) without the concurrence of the offended minor, AAA. Hence, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the initial desistance of the said mother from taking any action against the accused constitutes pardon, it is clear that upon the authorities cited above, such pardon is ineffective without the express concurrence of the offended minor herself. PEOPLE v LIM (206 SCRA 176) February 13, 1992 G.R. No. 95753 The accused, who was charged with the crime of rape, insists that he was pardoned by the offended party when she executed an Affidavit of Desistance, stating that the rape case arose out of a mere misunderstanding. The Supreme Court did not agree and held that to warrant the dismissal of the complaint, the victim's retraction or

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pardon should be made prior to the institution of the criminal action. Hence, the alleged pardon could not be considered in his favor since the Affidavit was executed after the present case was filed.

transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government. PEOPLE v PEREZ (83 PHIL 314)

PARDON BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 7 counts of treason were filed against Perez for recruiting, apprehending and commandeering numerous girls and women against their will for the purpose of using them to satisfy the immoral purposes of Japanese officers. The Supreme Court held that his "commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the entertainment held in their honor was not treason even though the women and the entertainment helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the women themselves would have been if they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized the entertainment.

PEOPLE v SALLE (250 SCRA 581) December 4, 1995 G.R. No. 103567 The accused was granted conditional pardon, but for the said pardon to take effect, he must first withdraw his appeal. The conditional pardon granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon the grant of such withdrawal and in case of non-compliance with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back into his custody the said accused, for which purpose he may seek the assistance of the Philippine National Police or the National Bureau of Investigation.

PEOPLE v ADRIANO (78 PHIL 561)

PEOPLE v BACANG (260 SCRA 44) July 30, 1996 G.R. NO. 116512

Adriano was convicted for the crime of treason for being a member of the Makapili, a military organization established and designed to assist and aid militarily the Japanese Imperial forces in the Philippines in the said enemy's war efforts and operations against the United States and the Philippines. The Supreme Court in upholding the conviction held that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort and that being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. Hence, it is not necessary, except for the purpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendant actually went to battle or committed nefarious acts against his country or countrymen.

The conditional pardons were granted to accusedappellants during the pendency of their appeal. The Court held that such conditional pardons are void since the “conviction by final judgment” limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court and any application therefor, if one is made, should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn.

PEOPLE v MANAYAO (78 PHIL 721)

BOOK II (ARTICLES 114-365, RPC) AND SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED SPECIAL LAWS

Manayao argues that he cannot be charged with treason because he had already lost his Filipino citizenship when he joined the Makapili, having considered himself a member of the Japanese armed forces. Manayao cannot divest himself of his Philippine citizenship, otherwise, his very crime would be the shield that would protect him from punishment and would essentially place himself beyond the arm of our treason law.

CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY (ARTS. 114- 123) TREASON LAUREL v MISA (77 Phil. 856)

CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy, giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation, cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason for the reasons that: (1) the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ruled that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not

ARBITRARY DETENTION UMIL v RAMOS (187 SCRA 311) Subversion is a continuing crime. As such, authorities, upon determination of probable cause may execute a valid arrest pursuant to Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. PEOPLE v BURGOS (144 SCRA 1) When the accused is arrested on the sole basis of a verbal report, the arrest without a warrant under Section 6(a) of Rule 113 is not lawful and legal since the offense

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must also be committed in his presence or within his view. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime for an essential precondition under the rule is that the crime must in fact or actually have been committed first.

UMIL v RAMOS (187 SCRA 85) July 9, 1990 G.R. 81567 Being a member of the New People’s Army, an outlawed organization, is punishable. Subversion like rebellion or insurrection is perceived as a continuing offense and unlike other so called “common” offenses i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc. which generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing organized government is attained.

DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS EXPULSION VILLAVICENCIO v LUKBAN (39 Phil 778) The forcible taking of the women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties and deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. There is no law expressly authorizing the deportation of prostitutes to a new domicile against their will and in fact Article 127 punishes public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compel any person to change his residence.

PEOPLE v LOVERDIORO (250 SCRA 389) November 29, 1995 G.R. 112235 In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for the courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive of the act should be conclusively demonstrated as it is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven otherwise if no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion.

SEARCH WARRANTS MALICIOUSLY OBTAINED STONEHILL v DIOKNO (20 SCRA 383) Search warrant authorizing the seizure of books and records “showing all the business transactions” of certain persons regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal is a general warrant which contravenes the Constitution and the Rules of Court which require that the things to be seized should be particularly described.

PEOPLE v GERONIMO (100 PHIL 90) October 23, 1956 G.R. L-8936 Not every act of violence is deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion solely because it was committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion. If the killing, robbing, etc. were done for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, the crime would be separately punishable and would not be absorbed by the rebellion and the individual misdeed could not be taken with the rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to each other. The individual crime would not be a means necessary for committing the rebellion, as it would not be done in preparation or in furtherance of the latter.

BURGOS v CHIEF OF STAFF (133 SCRA 800) When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, the application and/ or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or intending to publish since mere generalization will not suffice. Also, ownership is of no consequence and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized.

SEDITION PEOPLE v UMALI (96 PHIL 185) November 29, 1954 G.R. L-5803

OFFENDING THE RELIGIOUS FEELINGS PEOPLE v BAES 68 Phil 203

Where the purpose of the raid and acts of the raiders in rising publicly and taking up arms, were not exactly against the Government and for the purpose of doing the things defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code under rebellion, but rather, by means of force and intimidation, to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public official, the crime committed is sedition. The raiders did not even attack the seat of the local government rather, the object was to attain by means of force, intimidation, etc. one object, to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public official.

Whether or not the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholic and not those of other faithful ones. It is possible that certain acts may offend the feelings of those who profess a certain religion, while not otherwise offensive to the feelings of those professing another faith. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER REBELLION, INSURRECTION, COUP D’ ETAT

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PEOPLE v CABRERA (43 PHIL 64) March 6, 1922 G.R. 17748

the disposition to remain loyal to the government, is a scurrilous libel against the Government. The violent and provocative statements made by the accused against the state was neither constructive nor with reason. It, instead, went beyond the ambit of criticism legally permitted since it had the dangerous tendency of appealing to the common mind and suggesting or inciting rebellious conspiracies and riots against the duly constituted government.

Seventy-seven members of the Philippine Constabulary who rose publicly and tumultuously in order to attain by force and outside of legal methods the object of inflicting an act of hate or revenge upon the police of the City of Manila were found guilty of the crime of sedition as defined and punished by Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.

MENDOZA v PEOPLE (90 PHIL 524) December 17 1951 G.R. L-2990

The Philippine Law on sedition (Act No. 292), makes all persons who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of five objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of the Insular Government or of a provincial or municipal government, guilty of sedition. In order to be a violation of paragraph 3 of section 5 of Act No. 292, it is not necessary that the offender be a private citizen and the offended party a public functionary since the law makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies.

A published writing which calls our government one of crooks and dishonest persons ("dirty") infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators, and which reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the government, is a scurrilous libel against the Government. Any citizen may criticize his government and government officials and submit his criticism to the "free trade of ideas" but such criticism should be specific and constructive, specifying particular objectionable actuations of the government. It must be reasoned or tempered and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up.

PEOPLE v HADJI (9 SCRA 252) October 24, 1963 G.R. L-12686

VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY MARTINEZ v MORFE (44 SCRA 22) March 24, ___ G.R. L-34022

The rule in this jurisdiction allows the treatment of the common offenses of murder etc. as distinct and independent acts separable from sedition. Where the acts of violence were deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion, the same does not apply in the crime of sedition.

The members of the legislature are privileged from arrest on civil process during the session of that body, and for a reasonable time before and after, to enable them to go to and return from the same. Prosecution for a criminal offense is excluded from this grant of immunity. It would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same.

INCITING TO SEDITION US v TOLENTINO (5 PHIL 682) March 6, 1906 G.R. L-1451 The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of the time, place, and manner of its presentation, was to inculcate a spirit of hatred and enmity against the American people and the Government of the United States. The principal object and intent of its author was to incite the people of the Philippines to open armed resistance to the constituted authorities, and to induce them to conspire together for the secret organization of armed forces, to be used when the opportunity present itself, for the purpose of overthrowing the present Government and the setting up another in its stead. The manner and form in which the drama was presented at such a time and under such conditions renders absurd the pretense that it was merely or even principally a literary or artistic production.

ILLEGAL ASSOCIATION PEOPLE v EVANGELISTA (57 PHIL 372) October 26, 1932 G.R. L-36277 The principal defense that the Communist Party of the Philippines is not an illegal association in that it preaches only a social but not an armed revolution is obviously useless, since a mere reading of the constitution of the Communist Party will show that the purpose of such association is to incite class struggle and to overthrow the present government by peaceful means or by armed revolution. Therefore, the purpose of such association is to alter the social order and to commit the crimes of rebellion and sedition. An association having such an object must necessarily be illegal.

ESPUELAS v PEOPLE December 17, 1951 G.R. L-2990 A published writing which calls our government one of crooks and dishonest persons ("dirty") infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators, and which reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with

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PEOPLE v RODIL (109 SCRA 306) November 20 1981 G.R. L-35156

the other offense involved is not one of those enumerated under RA 8294, then the separate case for illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted. The constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not apply since these offenses are quite different from one another, with the first punished under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a special law.

While the evidence definitely demonstrated that the appellant knew because the victim, who was in civilian clothing, told him that he was an agent of a person in authority, he cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in authority for the simple reason that the information does not allege the fact that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a person in authority. Such knowledge must be expressly and specifically averred in the information, otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the required knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although proven, would only be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.

DIRECT ASSAULT PEOPLE v BELTRAN (138 SCRA 521) September 13, 1985 G.R. L-37168-69 Shooting the mayor and a policeman on duty is attempted murder with assault. Considering that Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat. Rolando Tolentino is a policeman who at the time was in his uniform, and both were performing their official duties to maintain peace and order in the community, appellants are guilty of attempted murder with direct assault.

PEOPLE v TAC-AN (182 SCRA 601) February 26, 1990 G.R. 76338-39

PEOPLE v DOLLANTES (151 SCRA 592) June 30, 1987 G.R. 70639

The last paragraph of Article 152 shows that while a teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in authority," such teacher or professor is so deemed only for purposes of application of Articles 148 (direct assault upon a person in authority), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person) of the Revised Penal Code. A teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school cannot be regarded as a "public authority" within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.

When a barangay Captain is in the act of trying to pacify a person who was making trouble in the dance hall, he is therefore killed while in the performance of his duties. As the barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay and if in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him, the crime committed is murder with assault upon a person in authority.

ILLEGAL POSSESION OF FIREARMS (PD 1866, AS AMENDED BY RA 8294 AND RA 9516)

JUSTO v COURT OF APPEALS (99 PHIL 453) June 28, 1956 G.R. L-8611

PEOPLE v QUIJADA (259 SCRA 191) July 24, 1996 G.R. 115008-09 The killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm cannot serve to increase the penalty for homicide or murder but rather, by express provision of P.D. No. 1866, shall increase the penalty for illegal possession of firearm. When an accused is prosecuted for homicide or murder and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm, the constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not apply since these offenses are quite different from one another, with the first punished under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a special law.

The character of person in authority is not assumed or laid off at will, but attaches to a public official until he ceases to be in office. Assuming that the complainant is not actually performing the duties of his office when assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of the crime of assault upon a person in authority, so long as the impelling motive of the attack is the performance of official duty.||| Also, where there is a mutual agreement to fight, an aggression ahead of the stipulated time and place would be unlawful since to hold otherwise would be to sanction unexpected assaults contrary to all sense of loyalty and fair play.

CELINO v CA (526 SCRA 195) June 29, 2007 G.R. 170562

PEOPLE v RECTO (367 SCRA ___) October 17, 2001 G.R. 129069

When the other offense is one of those enumerated under RA 8294, any information for illegal possession of firearms should be quashed because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’ etat and conversely, when

The victim is considered a mere bystander even if he is a Barangay Chief Tanod, an agent of a person in authority, if he is not acting and had no occasion to act in the performance of his official duties. As such, the attacks on him do not amount to direct assault.

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RESISTANCE AND DISOBEDIENCE TO A PERSON IN AUTHORITY OR THE AGENTS OF SUCH PERSONS

VIOLATION OF CONDITIONAL PARDON TORRES v GONZALES (152 SCRA 272)

VYTIACO v CA (19 SCRA 744) April 24, 1967 G.R. L-20246-48

A convict granted conditional pardon with an undertaking that he would “not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines” who is recommitted should be convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a distinct and substantive felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the prescribed penalty.

The accused cannot be held liable when the evidence shows that the Constabulary Soldier was in civilian clothes, did not exhibit any badge and simply identified himself verbally after the petitioner had wrested his gun from him since before a person can be held guilty of the crime of resistance or disobedience to a person in authority or the agent of such person it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the accused knew that the person he disobeyed or resisted is a person in authority or the agent of such person who is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties. Moreover, the refusal of petitioner to return the Constabulary Soldier's gun was but a continuation of his efforts to defend himself from whatever harm that could come from.

QUASI-RECIDIVISM PEOPLE v DIOSO October 23, 1964 G.R. L-38346-47

DELIVERY OF PRISONERS FROM JAIL

When the accused is a quasi-recidivist, having committed the crime charged while serving sentence for a prior offense, the maximum penalty prescribed by law for murder is death, regardless of the presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstance such as voluntary surrender and plea of guilty or the complete absence thereof.

ALBERTO v DELA CRUZ (98 SCRA 406) June 30, 1980 G.R. L-31839 The crime delivering prisoners from jail under Article 156 is usually committed by an outsider who removes from jail any person confined therein or helps him escape and not by a jailer of the province and by an assistant provincial warden since if the offender is a public officer who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner. However in Article 223, it is necessary that the public officer had consented to, or connived in, the escape of the prisoner under his custody or charge.

CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST COUNTERFEITING PEOPLE v KONG LEON (48 O.G. 664) The making of false coins of a foreign country is punishable under Article 163, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code even if said country has withdrawn the coins from circulation therein.

EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE TANEGA v MASAKAYAN (19 SCRA 564) February 28, 1967 G.R. L-27191

FORGERY DEL ROSARIO v PEOPLE (3 SCRA 650)

Prescription shall only begin to run when he escapes confinement. When the accused is never placed in confinement, prescription of penalty will not run in his favor.

Possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines any of "the figures, letters, words or signs contained" in which had been erased and/or altered, with knowledge of such erasure and alteration, and with the intent to use such notes of the Philippines, is punishable under Art. 168 in relation to Art. 166, subdivision (1) of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippine Government where one of the digits of the penultimate had been altered and changed from 9 so as to read 0 is punishable.

PEOPLE v ABILONG (82 PHIL ___) November 26, 1948 G.R. L-1960 Although destierro does not constitute imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. Thus, if a person sentenced to destierro by virtue of final judgment and prohibited from entering the City of Manila enters said city within the period of his sentence, he is guilty of evasion of sentence under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code.

FALSIFICATION SIQUIAN v PEOPLE (171 SCRA 223) Falsification of public document is committed when the accused issues a certification which states that funds are available for the position to which a person is appointed

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and the accused knows that, in reality, the position itself does not even exist and no funds had been appropriated therefor. The existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not necessary when the falsified document is a public document. In falsification of public documents, the controlling consideration is the public character of a document and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial.

LUAGUE v CA (112 SCRA 97) If the accused acted in good faith when she signed her spouse's name to the checks and encashed them to pay for the expenses of the spouse’s last illness and burial upon the belief that the accused is entitled to them and considering that the government sustained no damage due to such encashment, criminal intent may not be ascribed, and the accused should be acquitted to such crime.

PEOPLE v VILLALON (192 SCRA 521)

PEOPLE VS SENDAYDIEGO (81 SCRA 120)

The charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document has sufficient basis to exist in fact and in law since falsification of a public document may be a means of committing estafa because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial documents. The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa and not by the falsification of the document, hence, the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit the estafa.

If the falsification is resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the falsification and malversation are separate offenses. Thus, where the provincial treasurer, as the custodian of the money forming part of the road and bridge fund, effected payments to his co-accused for construction materials supposedly delivered to the province for various projects when in fact no such materials were delivered, and to camouflage or conceal the defraudation, the accused used six vouchers which had genuine features and which appear to be extrinsically authentic but which were intrinsically fake, the crimes committed are not complex but separate crimes of falsification and malversation and the falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one continuing offense impelled by a single criminal impulse.

US v CAPULE (24 PHIL 12) January 2, 1913 G.R. L-7447

USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENT

A person who, taking advantage of the occasion when a power of attorney is presumably being drawn up, prepares instead thereof, contrary to the wishes of the interested parties and with malice aforethought, an instrument of sale in his own favor, using deceit as to the parties and the witnesses, and afterwards induces a notary to certify falsely that the supposed vendors actually appeared and ratified such instrument, is guilty of the falsification of a notarial or public document.

US v CASTILLO (6 PHIL 453) September 19, 1906 G.R. 2829

PEOPLE v MANANSALA (58 PHIL 796) November 18, 1933 G.R. L-38948

The Court held that the unexplained fact that the accused altered a forged check which is strong evidence tending to prove that the accused either forged the check himself or caused it to be forged when accompanied by proof of other facts, which render it difficult to understand how the check could have been forged without the intervention of the accused, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for forgery.

When a person has in his possession a falsified document and makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is justified that such person is the forger.

DAVA v PEOPLE (202 SCRA 62) G.R. 73

BERADIO VS CA (103 SCRA 567)

A blank form of the driver's license which is filled up with personal data and the signature of the registrar of the San Fernando LTC agency was affixed therein, even if the same was simulated, becomes a public document within the purview of Articles 171 and 172.The driver's license being a public document, proof of the fourth element of damage caused to another person or at least intent to cause such damage has become immaterial since the principal thing being punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth proclaimed therein.

The crime of falsification of public document cannot be imputed to the accused when it is found that no criminal intent to commit falsification can be imputed on the accused who in submitting daily time records not as a legal obligation but as a matter of practice, made entries therein that were not absolutely false but had a color of truth and who had caused no damage to the government, or to third parties but on the contrary rendered service in the interest of the public with proper permission from the superiors.

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ILLEGAL POSSESSION AND USE OF FALSE BANK NOTES

LEGAMIA v IAC (131 SCRA 478)

MARTINEZ v PEOPLE (652 SCRA ___) June 15, 2011 G.R. 194367

A woman who has been living with a married man for almost 20 years, where the latter introduced the woman to the public as his wife, assumed the role of being a wife and the family name of the man without any sinister purpose or personal material gain in mind cannot be held liable of the crime Using Fictitious Name. The absence of sinister purpose or personal material gain has removed the act from being a crime herein mentioned.

Possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal offense since the possession must be with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes. Hence, the pieces of counterfeit bills allegedly seized are not sufficient to show the element of intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments, for there must be an overt act to manifest such intent.

PERJURY DIAZ v PEOPLE (191 SCRA 86)

USURPATION

A person who stated under oath in his application to take a police examination that he had never been convicted of any crime, when as a matter of fact he has previous convictions, committed perjury. The elements of the crime of the crime of perjury are: 1) the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter 2) that the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer authorized to receive and administer oath 3) accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood 4) that a sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.

GIGANTONI v PEOPLE (162 SCRA 158) It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish by positive evidence the allegation that an accused falsely represents himself. It is essential to present proof that one actually knows at the time of the alleged commission of the offense that he is already dismissed from the service. An argument that it makes no difference whether the accused was suspended or dismissed from the service, “for both imply the absence of power to represent oneself as vested with authority to perform acts pertaining to an office to which he knowingly was deprived of” is correct only when an accused is charged with Usurpation of Official Function but not if one is charged with Usurpation of Authority.

MACHINATION IN PUBLIC AUCTIONS OUANO v CA (188 SCRA 799) Once two persons have promised to share in a property subject to an issue as a consideration for one to refrain from taking part in the public auction, and have attempted to cause and succeeded in causing another bidder to stay away from an auction in order to cause reduction of the price of the property auctioned, machination in public auctions under Art 185 of the RPC has been committed. Causing another bidder to stay away from the auction in order to cause reduction of the price of the property auctioned is an act constituting the crime of machination in public auctions.

ESTRADA v DESIERTO (445 SCRA 655) December 9, 2004 GR 156160 When a person who issued a notice has obtained an authority to issue the same, for instance being an officerin-charge of a Philippine Government or agency, a charge for Usurpation of Official Function does not apply. In order for one to be held liable for Usurpation of Official Function, there must be a clear showing that the person being charged had performed an act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any agency thereof, under pretense of official position, and without being lawfully entitled to do so.

CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER PROHIBITED DRUGS PEOPLE v LAGATA (396 SCRA ___) June 25, 2003 G.R. 135323

USING FICTITIOUS NAME

Appellant's lack of knowledge of the contents of the plastic bag becomes all the more credible considering that when the NBI agents conducted a test buy to validate the tip given to them by their confidential informant, they relied entirely on the information that a certain "Baby" and "Chinggay" were selling "shabu." Moreover, the testimony of the poseur-buyer becomes material and indispensable when the appellant denies having committed the prohibited act and without the testimony of the poseur-buyer especially if there are no other eyewitness to the illicit transaction, the non-

CA 142 AS AMENDED BY RA 6085 (ACT REGULATING THE USE OF ALIASES) HOCK LIAN v REPUBLIC (17 SCRA 188) Aside from using one name, a person using another name wherein no evidence is shown that he was baptized with the latter name or that he has been known by it since childhood or that the court has authorized the use thereof may be liable for Using a Fictitious Name.

presentation of the poseur buyer can be fatal to the case of the prosecution, thus a hearsay. 18

PEOPLE v BONGCARAWAN (384 SCRA 525)

of obscenity is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall.

The possession of dangerous drugs must be with knowledge of the accused, or that animus possidendi existed together with the possession or control of such articles but the possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession. Another is that the things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him and that to overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

PEOPLE v APARICI (52 OG 249) In a dark theater with stage dimly lit where a person is swaying to and fro with the middle part of her body, and dancing with her hips swaying and sometimes raising her feet, the Court provided that the test whether a particular act is obscene is its tendency to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, be they cultured or not.

PEOPLE v SUZUKI (414 SCRA 43) October 23, 2003 G.R. 120670

PEOPLE v PADAN (101 PHIL 749)

It bears stressing that mere possession of the prohibited substance is a crime per se and the burden of proof is upon appellant to show that he has a license or permit under the law to possess the prohibited drug. Here, appellant failed to prove that he has a license to possess the marijuana and so the Court held that such possession constitutes prima facie evidence of animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.

In an actual exhibition of a sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, there can be no redeeming features; in it there is no room for art. It is clear and an unmitigated obscenity, indecency and an offense to public morals and causing as it does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence especially on the youth of the land. FERNANDO v CA (510 SCRA 351) December 6, 2006 G.R. No. 159751

PEOPLE v CHUA (396 SCRA 657) The crime under consideration is malum prohibitum, hence, lack of criminal intent or good faith does not exempt appellants from criminal liability. Mere possession of a regulated drug without legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.

To be held liable for obscenity, the prosecution must prove that (a) the materials, publication, picture or literature are obscene; and (b) the offender sold, exhibited, published or gave away such materials; that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. A picture being obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be decided by the judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it. It is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion.

PEOPLE v CASIMIRO (383 SCRA 390) Failure to prove that the specimen of marijuana examined by the forensic chemist was that seized from the accused was fatal to the prosecution's case. The prosecution failed to prove the crucial first link in the chain of custody when the prosecution witnesses admitted that they did not write their initials on the brick of marijuana immediately after allegedly seizing it from accusedappellant outside the grocery store but only did so in their headquarters and the narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item as marijuana, was likewise not conducted at the scene of the crime, but only at the narcotics office; leading to a reasonable doubt as to whether the item allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick of marijuana marked by the policemen in their headquarters and given by them to the crime laboratory for examination.

CRIMES COMMITED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS RA 3019 AS AMENDED (ANTI GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT) TRIESTE v SANDIGANBAYAN (146 SCRA 508)

CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS

An official involved need not dispose of his shares in a corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with another. The matter contemplated in Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach.

IMMORAL DOCTRINES, OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS AND EXHIBITIONS

MEJORADA v SANDIGANBAYAN (151 SCRA 399)

PEOPLE v KOTTINGER (45 PHIL 352)

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 refers to “any public officer”. It makes no distinction or qualification and specifies the acts declared unlawful. A violation may occur when an officer takes advantage of his position and

Obscenity is something which is offensive to chastity, decency or delicacy. The test to determine the existence

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divests private parties of compensation they must receive.

PEOPLE v DELA CRUZ (612 SCRA 364) February 11, 2010 G.R. No. 187683

MALVERSATION LABATAGOS v SANDIGANBAYAN (183 SCRA 415)

In the case of a Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate. In this case, the testimony of the accused that he was married to the victim, in itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the testimony can be taken as an admission against penal interest.

When a collecting officer of a government institution assigns his or her work to another without the former being the one to misappropriate a government fund or property malversation may still be at hand. Malversation consists not only in misappropriation or converting public funds or property to one’s personal use but also by knowingly allowing others to make use of them.

PEOPLE V JUMAWAN (116 SCRA 739) September 23, 1982 G.R. No. L-50905

ILOGON v SANDIGANBAYAN (218 SCRA 766)

Presentacion should have been accused of parricide but since her relationship to the deceased, as wife, is not alleged in the information, she can be convicted of murder only qualified by abuse of superior strength.

An official custodian who fails to show possession of a public fund or property may be held liable for malversation. In malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received public funds and that he did not have them in possession when demand therefore was made; no need of direct evidence of personal misappropriation as long as there is shortage in his account and that it must be said that the return of the thing malversed is not a defense.

PEOPLE v TOMOTORGO (136 SCRA 238) April 30, 1985 G.R. No. L-47941 The fact that the appellant intended to maltreat the victim only or inflict physical injuries does not exempt him from liability for the resulting and more serious crime of parricide. Appellant is only entitled to the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong (Article 13 (3 Id).)

INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF PRISONERS RODILLAS v SANDIGANBAYAN (161 SCRA 347) Failure to undertake necessary precautions take for instance, allowing a prisoner to have lunch with family when the former should be brought to jail, failing to follow the prisoner in the restroom or assigning someone to watch over the former leading to the prisoner’s escape, will make the officer’s act as a laxity or negligence amounting to deliberate non-performance of duty. A claim that there was no connivance with the prisoner must fail considering that connivance or giving one’s consent to evasion is a distinct crime from infidelity in the custody of prisoner through negligence.

PEOPLE V GENOSA (419 SCRA 537) January 15, 2004 G.R. No. 135981 To appreciate battered woman syndrome (BWS) as selfdefense, appellant must prove the following: (1) each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner; (2) the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life; and (3) at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS (ARTICLES 246-266) PARRICIDE PEOPLE v DALAG (402 SCRA 254) April 30, 2003 G.R. No. 129895 In the crime of parricide, the prosecution is mandated to prove the following essential elements: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate which in this case, the prosecution was able to present and prove together with all the essential elements of parricide.

DEATH OR PHYSICAL INJURIES INFLICTED UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES PEOPLE v ABARCA (153 SCRA 735) September 14, 1987 G.R. No. 74433 The provision in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code that the accused shall kill any or both of them immediately after surprising his spouse and her paramour in the act of intercourse does not say that he should

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commit the killing instantly thereafter. Although about one hour had passed between the time the husband discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot, the shooting falls within the provision as the death caused was the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity.

MUTILATION AGUIRRE v SECRETARY OF JUSTICE (547 SCRA 431) March 3, 2008 G.R. No. 170723 Mutilation under the first paragraph of Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code requires (1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation and (2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately to deprive the offended party of some essential organ for reproduction. In this present petition, the bilateral vasectomy done on Larry could not have amounted to the crime of mutilation because though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of reproduction, such procedure does not deprive him, "either totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction."

PEOPLE v OYANIB (354 SCRA 196) March 12, 2001 G.R. Nos. 130634-35 To be relieved of any criminal liability, the accused having admitted the killing must prove that the death caused is the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming him after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. Further, he must have not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife nor consented to her infidelity.

RAPE

MURDER PEOPLE v ORITA (184 SCRA 105) March 3, 2008 G.R. No. 170723

PEOPLE v DELA CRUZ (612 SCRA 738) February 16, 2010 G.R. No. 188353

For the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because although the offender has commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, not all acts of execution was performed.

For the charge of murder to prosper, the prosecution must prove that: (1) the offender killed the victim, (2) through treachery, or by any of the other five qualifying circumstances, duly alleged in the Information. Generally, the elements of murder are: 1. That a person was killed. 2. That the accused killed him. 3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248. 4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.

PEOPLE v CASTRO (196 SCRA 679) May 6, 1991 G.R. No. 91490

HOMICIDE PEOPLE v PUGAY (167 SCRA 439) November 17, 1988 G.R. No. 74324

Perfect penetration, rupture of the hymen and laceration of the vagina are not essential for the offense of consummated rape as entry, to the least extent, of the labia or lips of the female organ is sufficient. Thus, the victim's remaining a virgin does not negate rape.

Having taken the can with the stinging smell of flammable liquid from the engine of the Ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, the accused knew that the can contained gasoline. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased.

PEOPLE v ACHAS (595 SCRA 341) August 4, 2009 G.R. No. 185712 The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainant’s body does not necessarily negate the commission of rape. This is because hymenal laceration is not an element of the crime of rape, albeit a healed or fresh laceration is a compelling proof of defloration.

UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION PEOPLE v SALUFRANIA (159 SCRA 401) March 30, 1988 G.R. No. L-50884

PEOPLE v CRUZ (595 SCRA 411) August 4, 2009 G.R. No. 186129

That the accused boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then strangled her is not sufficient proof to show intent to cause an abortion. Thus, the accused should not be held guilty of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion but the complex crime of Parricide with Unintentional Abortion.

Most important in a prosecution for statutory rape is to prove the following elements: 1. that the accused had carnal knowledge with a woman; and (2) that the woman was below 12 years of age. These elements were sufficiently established during trial and were not rebutted by the defense with any solid evidence to the contrary.

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PEOPLE v MANGALINO (182 SCRA 329) February 15, 1990 G.R. No. 79011

the offender to consummate his purpose. In this case, the appellant employed that amount of force sufficient to consummate rape. PEOPLE v MIRANDILLA (654 SCRA 761) July 27, 2011 G.R. No. 186417

In statutory rape, proof of intimidation or force used on the 12 year old victim, or lack of it is immaterial. Further, the absence of penetration due to the one-centimeter diameter of the victim’s hymen is also inconsequential for proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia or pudendum of the female organ is sufficient to warrant conviction.

The sweetheart theory as a defense however, necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the burden to prove only force or intimidation, the coupling element of rape.

PEOPLE v ERINIA (50 PHIL 998) January 20, 1927 G.R. No. L-26298

PEOPLE v MADSALI (611 SCRA 596) February 4, 2010 G.R. No. 179570

The crime of rape may be committed upon child of the age of 3 years and 11 months.

Delay in reporting an incident of rape due to death threats does not affect the credibility of the complainant, nor can it be taken against her such as in this case when BBB explained that she did not immediately report the abduction, rape, and detention of her daughter to the authorities because Egap threatened to kill AAA, who was then in his custody. The charge of rape is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained.

PEOPLE V ATENTO (196 SCRA 357) April 26, 1991 G.R. No. 84728 The accused was held guilty under paragraph 3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code even if the circumstances of force and intimidation or of the victim being deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious are absent. If sexual intercourse with a victim under twelve years of age is rape, then it should follow that carnal knowledge with a seventeen-year old girl whose mental capacity is that of a seven year old child would constitute rape.

CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY (ARTICLES 267-292) KIDNAPPING AND ILLEGAL DETENTION

PEOPLE v PORAS (612 SCRA 624) February 16, 2010 G.R. No. 177747

PEOPLE v MUIT (568 SCRA 251) October 8, 2008 G.R. No. 181043

Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the appellant succeeded in inserting his fingers in AAA’s vagina, this act still would not suffice to convict the appellant of rape because in 1994, the insertion of one or more fingers into a woman’s vagina without her consent did not constitute rape. It was only in 1997 that the law on rape expanded to include this act.

The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are the following: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267 is present. The totality of the prosecution’s evidence in this case established the commission of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.

DE CASTRO v FERNANDEZ (515 SCRA 682) February 14, 2007 G.R. No. 155041

PEOPLE v GUTTIEREZ (658 SCRA ___ ) October 3, 2011 G.R. No. 168552

Petitioner insists that a “finger” does not constitute an object or instrument in contemplation of RA 8353. The insertion of one’s finger into the genital of another constitutes “rape through sexual assault”. Hence, the prosecutor did not err in charging petitioner with the crime of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. It involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention, or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move.

PEOPLE v FUNESTO (655 SCRA 357) August 3, 2011 G.R. No. 182237 Jurisprudence firmly holds that the force or violence required in rape cases is relative; it does not need to be overpowering or irresistible; it is present when it allows

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PEOPLE V TOMIO (202 SCRA 77) September 30, 1991 G.R. No. 74630

GRAVE THREATS REYES v PEOPLE (27 SCRA 686) March 28, 1969 G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529

Even granting for the sake of argument that, in effect, there was created a simple loan contract between appellants and Mr. Nagao, as asserted by appellant Tomio Maeda, the deprivation of the former's liberty until the amount shall have been fully "paid" to them, is still kidnapping or illegal detention for ransom.

The demonstration led by petitioner against the complainant in front of the main gate of the naval station; the fact that placards with threatening statements were carried by the demonstrators; their persistence in trailing Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the demonstration conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice show that the threats were made with deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of Hallare the belief that the threat would be carried into effect. Indeed, Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety that he sought the protection of Col. Monzon therefore, the appellate court was correct in upholding petitioner's conviction for the offense of grave threats.

PEOPLE V LIM (190 SCRA 706) The fact of detention which is an essential element in the kidnapping was not clearly established as there was no showing that there was actual confinement or restriction on the person of the offended party. The two minors voluntarily entered the appellant's residence and there is no indication that one of the minors was locked up, physically restrained of her liberty or unable to communicate with anyone. PEOPLE V PADICA (221 SCRA 362)

CALUAG v PEOPLE (580 SCRA 575) March 4, 2009 G.R. No. 171511

Where the taking of the victim was incidental to the basic purpose of killing, the crime is only murder and this is true even if before the killing, the victim was taken from one place to another. From the acts of the accused, it cannot be inferred that the latter's purpose was actually to detain or deprive the victims of their liberty and the fact alone that ransom money was demanded did not per se qualify the crime to kidnapping in the absence of other elements.

In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not be accompanied by a condition. Considering the mauling incident which transpired earlier between petitioner and Julia’s husband, petitioner’s act of pointing a gun at Julia’s forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury on her person which constituted grave threat.

PEOPLE v RAMOS (297 SCRA ___ ) October 12, 1998 G.R. No. 118570

GRAVE COERCION TIMONER v PEOPLE (125 SCRA 830) November 25, 1983 G.R. No. L-62050

Actual restraint of the victim's liberty was evident from the moment she was forcibly prevented by accused-appellant from going to work at MERALCO and taken instead against her will to Bulacan. Further, no other logical meaning can be ascribed to the victim's statement to that "she needed P200, 000.00 immediately otherwise she might not be able to go home anymore," other than that the money was intended as ransom, i.e., as consideration for her release from captivity. KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR

Grave coercion is committed when "a person who, without authority of law, shall by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel to do something against his will, either it be right or wrong." In the case at bar, the Mayor is not guilty of grave coercion as the element that the restraint made by the Mayor upon complainant, the owner of the barbershop considered as a public nuisance, was not made under authority of law or in the exercise of a lawful right, is absent.

PEOPLE v TY (263 SCRA 754) May 12, 1978 G.R. No. L-32529

LEE v CA (201 SCRA 405) September 6, 1991 G.R. No. 90423

What is actually punishable is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate failure or refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. Said failure or refusal, however, must not only be deliberate but must also be persistent as to oblige the parents or the guardians of the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain custody.

There is nothing unlawful when petitioner demanded that the private respondent return the proceeds of the check accompanied by a threat to file criminal charges. Her lengthy stay in the bank and return of money was not due to petitioner’s threat but to show good faith. The most telling proof of the absence of intimidation was the fact that the complainant refused to sign the promissory note in spite of the alleged threats of the petitioner.

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UNJUST VEXATION

PEOPLE v CALIXTO (123 SCRA 369)

PEOPLE v REYES (60 PHIL 369)

The appellants committed robbery in band with homicide despite the fact that Cuevas was one of them and not a robbery victim, an innocent bystander or a stranger because Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code says so.

The disturbance or interruption of any ceremony of a religious character under the old Penal Code was denounced by article 571 and was punished by arrest from one to ten days and a fine ranging from 15 to 125 pesetas. But this article was omitted from the Revised Penal Code and the offense, if any was committed by the appellants, is denounced in Article 287 as an "unjust vexation" and punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos or both.

PEOPLE v QUINONES (183 SCRA 747) March 28, 1990 G.R. No. 80042 There is no crime of robbery with multiple homicide under the Revised Penal Code thus the charge should have been for robbery with homicide only regardless of the fact that three persons were killed in the commission of the robbery. In this special complex crime, the number of persons killed is immaterial and does not increase the penalty prescribed in Article 294 of the said Code.

CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY (ARTICLES 293-332) ROBBERY NAPOLIS v COURT OF APPEALS (43 SCRA 301) February 28, 1972 G.R. No. L-28865

ROBBERY WITH RAPE PEOPLE v DINOLA (183 SCRA 747) March 22, 1990 G.R. No. L-54567

It is more plausible to believe that Article 294 applies only where robbery with violence against or intimidation of person takes place without entering an inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code. When the elements of both provisions are present, the crime is a complex one, calling for the imposition – as provided in Article 48 of the Code – of the penalty for the most serious offense, in its maximum period, which, in the case at bar, is reclusion temporal in its maximum period.

If the intention of the accused was to commit robbery but rape was also committed even before the robbery, the crime of robbery with rape is committed however, if the original design was to commit rape but the accused after committing rape also committed robbery because the opportunity presented itself, the criminal acts should be viewed as two distinct offenses. In the case at bar, after the complainant was raped by the accused, the latter threatened to kill her if she did not give watch on her wrist to him and forcibly took it from her. Hence, the accused was convicted for two crimes of rape and robbery.

PEOPLE v BIRUAR (130 SCRA 513) July 25, 1984 G.R. Nos. L-32202-04 In this case, the accused, after committing the crime of robbery in band in the house of Gorgonio Mosende, went to the neighboring house of George Kalitas where they committed the crimes of Arson and Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries. Obviously, the rule enunciated in People v De Leon cannot be made applicable since the herein accused performed different acts with distinct purposes which resulted in juridically independent crimes.

PEOPLE v MORENO (220 SCRA 292) January 25, 2002 G.R. No. 140033 Accused Juan Moreno, who took no part in the rape, is guilty of robbery only under Article 294, No. 5 of the Revised Penal Code but as to appellant Reynaldo Maniquez, who had raped Mary Ann Galedo, he should be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with rape, under Article 294, No. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE PEOPLE v MANGULABNAN (99 PHIL 992) September 28, 1956 G.R. No. L-8919

ROBBERY WITH PHYSICAL INJURIES PEOPLE v SALVILLA (184 SCRA 671) April 26, 1990 G.R. No. 86163

In order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide, it is enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of the robbery and it is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident provided that the homicide produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration.

It is not a defense that appellant and his co-accused had no opportunity to dispose of the personalities taken. From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete.

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ROBBERY IN BAND

require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft.

PEOPLE v APDUHAN (24 SCRA 798) August 30, 1968 G.R. No. L-19491

ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT OF 1972 (R.A. NO. 6539), AS AMENDED BY R.A. NO. 7659

The circumstance of band is a qualifying circumstance only in robbery punished by subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of Article 294 and a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, and lesiones graves resulting in insanity, imbecility, impotency or blindness. Hence, if robbery with homicide is committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be "robbery with homicide" under Article 294(1) and not “robbery with homicide in band."

PEOPLE v DELA CRUZ (183 SCRA ___ ) March 29, 1990 G.R. No. 83798 The crime committed is Carnapping with Homicide. Carnapping is defined under RA No. 6539 as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The same law prescribes the penalty of life imprisonment to death when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed in the commission of the carnapping.

ROBBERY WITH USE OF FORCE UPON THINGS PEOPLE V JARANILLA (55 SCRA 563) February 22, 1974 G.R. No. L-28547

IZON v PEOPLE (107 SCRA ___) August 31, 1981 G.R. No. L-51370

One essential requisite of robbery with force upon things under Articles 299 and 302 is that the malefactor should enter the building or dependency where the object to be taken is found. In the instant case, the chicken coop where the six roosters were taken cannot be considered a building within the meaning of Article 302, thus, it cannot be said that the accused entered the same in order to commit the robbery by means of any of the five circumstances enumerated in Article 302.

Under the Anti-Carnapping law, any vehicle which is motorized using the streets which are public, not exclusively for private use, comes within the concept of motor vehicle. Thus, stealing a motorized tricycle running in droves along public highways going to the north like Baguio City is a crime falling under the Anti-Carnapping law and not a crime of simple robbery punishable under the Revised Penal Code.

ANTI-FENCING LAW (P.D. 1612) AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS

THEFT

DIZON-PAMINTUAN v PEOPLE (234 SCRA 63) July 11, 1994 G.R. No. 111426

VALENZUELA v PEOPLE (525 SCRA __ ) June 21, 2007 G.R. No. 160188

The elements of the crime of fencing are: 1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed; 2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime; 3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and 4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.

The elements of theft as provided for in Art. 308 of the Revised Penal Code are (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and, (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. PEOPLE v GULINAO (180 SCRA ___) December 4, 1989 G.R. No. 82264-66

RAMON TAN v PEOPLE (313 SCRA 220) August 26, 1999 G.R. No. 134298

Gulinao should have been convicted of the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code and not robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of a person under par. 5, Article 294 since the taking of the ring of Dr. Chua was merely an afterthought. The force employed in the killing of Dr. Chua has no bearing on the taking of his ring.

The crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing on the other, are separate and distinct offenses thus, the State may choose to prosecute the accused either under the Revised Penal Code or Presidential Decree No. 1612, although the preference would seem inevitable considering that fencing is malum prohibitum, and Presidential Decree No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of property. Further, the law on fencing does not

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SANTOS v PEOPLE (181 SCRA ___ ) January 29, 1990 G.R. No. 77429

PEOPLE v ONG (204 SCRA ___) December 20, 1991 G.R. No. 93849

The principal distinction between the theft and estafa is that in theft, the thing is taken while in estafa, the accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft even if the accused has possession of the property such as when he was entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical possession of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes embezzlement or estafa."

In the crime of estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that the accused-appellant had such knowledge with respect to the subject checks that he indorsed. BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (B.P. BLG. 22), PLUS ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 12-2000 RE: PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22 AND ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 13-2001 RE: CLARIFICATION OF ADMIN. CIRCULAR NO. 12-2000; AND P.D. NO. 1689 (INCREASING THE PENALTY FOR CERTAIN FORMS OF SWINDLING OR ESTAFA)

QUALIFIED THEFT EMPELIS v IAC (132 SCRA ___ ) September 28, 1984 G.R. No. L-66136

DOMAGSANG v CA (347 SCRA 75) December 5, 2000 G.R. No. 139292

The stealing of coconuts when they are still in the tree or deposited on the ground within the premises is qualified theft but when the coconuts are stolen in any other place, it is simple theft. In the case at bar, petitioners committed only frustrated qualified theft because although they were seen carrying away fifty coconuts while they were still in the premises of the plantation, they were not able to carry the coconuts away from the plantation due to the timely arrival of the owner.

B.P. Blg. 22 or "Bouncing Checks Law," enumerates the elements of the crime, to wit: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

ESTAFA THROUGH UNFAITHFULNESS OR ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE SADDUL v CA (192 SCRA ___) December 10, 1990 G.R. No. 91041

NIERRAS v DACUYCUY (181 SCRA 1) January 11, 1990 G.R. Nos. 59568-76

The accused was acquitted of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence for the following reasons: (1) Saddul received the spare parts from AFP in trust for Land Rover which authorized him to sell; (2) Saddul sold them in accordance with the authority given to him; (3) AMPI or Cuevas not being the owner of the property incurred no loss and suffered injury on account of Sadul’s retention of proceeds and; (4) no demand for return was made by AMPI or Cuevas who knew that the spare parts are to be sold for the account of Land Rover.

Deceit and damage are essential elements in Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, but are not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and hence punishable which is not so under the Penal Code.

ESTAFA THROUGH FALSE PRETENSES, FARUDULENT ACTS OR MEANS

VACA v CA (298 SCRA ___ ) November 16, 1998 G.R. No. 131714

PEOPLE v MONTANER (656 SCRA ___ ) August 31, 2011 G.R. No. 184053

While it may be true that it was the company's accountant who actually prepared the rubber check, petitioners in this case cannot pretend ignorance of the insufficiency of funds since they are the owners and officers of the company. The testimony of petitioner Nieto that after the check in question was dishonored, he instructed their company accountant to prepare a replacement check belies petitioners' claim that they had no hand in the preparation of checks and shows that petitioners were in control of the finances of the company.

The elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the post-dating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee.

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PEOPLE v NITAFAN (207 SCRA ___) April 6, 1992 G.R. Nos. 81559-60

car was actually owned by him for purposes of and at the time he obtained the loan from the latter. Indubitably, the accused was in bad faith when he obtained the said loan under such deliberate pretenses.

Acts involving the violation of trust receipt agreements occurring after 29 January 1973 (date of enactment of P.D. 115) would make the accused criminally liable for estafa under paragraph 1 (b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) pursuant to the explicit provision in Section 13 of P.D. 115. The failure, therefore, to account for the P114,884.22 balance in 1980 or during the effectivity of P.D. 115. makes the accused-respondent criminally liable for estafa.

MALICIOUS MISCHIEF TAGUINOD v PEOPLE (659 SCRA ___) October 12, 2011 G.R. 185833 The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another; (2) That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction; (3) That the act of damaging another’s property be committed merely for the sake of damaging it.

LIM LAO v CA (274 SCRA 472) June 20, 1997 G.R. No. 119178 The fact that petitioner was a signatory to the checks that were subsequently dishonored merely engenders the prima facie presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of funds, but it does not render her automatically guilty under B.P. 22. The trial court itself found that no personal notice of dishonor to petitioner Lina Lim Lao was made by the drawee bank hence, the prima facie presumption that she knew about the insufficiency of funds cannot apply.

CABALLES V DAR (168 SCRA 247) December 5, 1988 G.R. No. 78214 The private respondent cannot be held criminally liable for malicious mischief in cutting the banana trees because, as an authorized occupant or possessor of the land, and as planter of the banana trees, he owns said crops including the fruits thereof. Thus, an essential element of the crime of malicious mischief, which is "damage deliberately caused to the property of another," is absent because the private respondent merely cut down his own plantings.

IDOS v CA (296 SCRA ___) September 25, 1998 G.R. No. 110782 When there was no consideration whatsoever for the issuance of the check such as when the subject check was issued merely to evidence complainant's interest in the partnership and was not intended to apply on account or for value and when the check was issued without actual knowledge of the insufficiency of funds, there is no violation of BP 22. Further, the failure of the complainant or by the drawee bank to send a notice of dishonor to the petitioner precludes any finding of prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds.

CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY (ARTICLES 333-334, 336-346) QUALIFIED SEDUCTION PEOPLE v FONTANILLA (23 SCRA 127) June 28, 1968 G.R. No. L-25354 While deceit is an essential element of ordinary or simple seduction, it does not have to be proved or established in a charge of qualified seduction. It is replaced by abuse of confidence. Under Art. 337 of the Revised Penal Code, the seduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen years of age, committed by any person in public authority, priest, house servant, domestic guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the woman seduced is "constitutive" of the crime of qualified seduction even though no deceit intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge was voluntary on the part of the virgin.

WONG v CA (351 SCRA 100) February 2, 2001 G.R. No. 117857 When private respondent deposited the checks 157 days after the date of the checks, the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds was lost. But such knowledge could still be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence such as in this case, the trial court found that petitioner made reassurance that he would issue new checks but failed to do so, was duly notified of the dishonour of the checks and failed to make arrangements for full payment within five (5) banking days thereof.

BABANTO v ZOSA (120 SCRA 834) February 28, 1983 G.R. No. L-32895

OTHER DECEITS VILLAFLOR V CA (192 SCRA 680)

The complaint alleged that the accused abused his position as a policeman; that Leonida Dagohoy was of the tender age of 13; and that the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant. However, there is no allegation that the complainant was a "virgin". Although it

Appellant was guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation when, knowing that the car was then owned by the Northern Motors, Inc., still told the complainant that the

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may be true that virginity is presumed if the girl is over 12 and under 18 years of age, is unmarried and of good reputation, the accused charged with rape cannot be convicted of qualified seduction for failure to allege virginity in the complaint which is an essential element of the same.

no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

PEREZ v CA (168 SCRA 236) November 29, 1988 G.R. No. L-80838

BIGAMY

CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS (ARTICLES 347-352)

TEVES v PEOPLE (656 SCRA 307) August 24, 2011 G.R. No. 188775

There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction, namely: (1) that the offended party is a virgin, and, (2) that she must be over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age. However, Consented Abduction, in addition to the two common elements, requires that: (1) the taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender, and, (2) the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs while Qualified Seduction requires that: (1) the crime be committed by abuse of authority, confidence or relationship, and, (2) the offender has sexual intercourse with the woman.

The elements of bigamy are as follows: 1. That the offender has been legally married; 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage which has all the essential requisites for validity. NOLLORA v PEOPLE (657 SCRA 330) September 17, 2011 G.R. No. 191425

ABDUCTION, FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE

The circumstances in the present case satisy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat; (2) Nollora and Pinat’s marriage has not been legally dissolved prioir to the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of the second marriage to Geraldino; and (4) Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage.

PEOPLE v ALBURO (184 SCRA 655) April 26, 1990 G.R. No. 85822 The Court is not persuaded by the theory that appellant and Evelyn were sweethearts because if they were, surely, Evelyn would not have jeopardized their relationship by accusing him of having deflowered her and, on top of it all, filing a criminal charge against him. Moreover, appellant was not able to present any convincing evidence to substantiate his claim like love letters, notes and other symbols of affection.

PEOPLE v ARAGON (100 PHIL 103) February 28, 1957 G.R. No. L-10016 A subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse is illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages.

PEOPLE v GODINES (196 SCRA 765) May 7, 1991 G.R. No. 93410 A medical examination is not an indispensable element in a prosecution of rape. Further, the defense of alibi cannot prosper because the distance between the alleged whereabouts of the appellants at the time of the commission of the crime and the scene of the crime itself may be easily negotiated by ordinary means and in light of the positive identification of the accused as the authors of the crime.

MERCADO V TAN (337 SCRA ___ ) August 1, 2000 G.R. No. 137110 The fact that petitioner subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage after having contracted the second marriage was already immaterial since the crime had already been consummated. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed that acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

PROSECUTION OF PRIVATE OFFENSES PILAPIL v IBAY-SOMERA (174 SCRA 653) June 30, 1989 G.R. No. 80116

MORIGO v PEOPLE (422 SCRA 376) February 6, 2004 G.R. No. 145226

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner for having obtained a valid divorce decree in Germany, had

Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the petitioner and Lucia Barrete were never married "from the beginning." Thus, when

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petitioner contracted marriage with Maria Jececha, no bigamy was committed since the first element of existence and the validity of the first marriage is lacking.

GONZALES v ARCILLA (203 SCRA 609) November 18, 1991 G.R. No. L-27923

TENEBRO v CA (422 SCRA ___ ) February 18, 2004 G.R. No. 150758

"Mang-aagaw ng asawa ng may asawa," even if translated as "one who grabs another's husband," does not necessarily mean an adulteress but at most, it may imply that the person to whom it is addressed is a "flirt, a temptress, or one who indulges in enticing other husbands." Hence, it is more of an imputation of a vice, condition or act not constituting a crime. Further, the phrases "tibihon," "putang ina," "walang hiya," and "patay gutom" do not impute the commission of a crime but were uttered to impute a condition, defect, status or vice intended to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt on the offended party.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner's valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner's marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner's psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.

SAZON v CA (255 SCRA 692) March 29, 1996 G.R. No. 120715

MARRIAGE CONTRACTED AGAINST PROVISION OF THE LAW COSCA v PALAYPAYON (237 SCRA 249) September 30, 1994 A.M. No. MTJ-92-721

The test to determine the defamatory character of words was satisfied in the case at bench because the words and phrases "mandurugas," "mag-ingat sa panlilinlang," "matagal na tayong niloloko," "may kasamang pagyayabang," "ang ating pobreng super kulit." "patuloy na kabulastugan," "mastermind sa paninirang puri," etc are indisputably defamatory for they impute upon the private complainant a condition that is dishonorable and shameful, since they tend to describe him as a swindler and/or a deceiver.

The Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." This is within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.

VASQUEZ v CA (314 SCRA 460) September 15, 1999 G.R. No. 118971

CRIMES AGAINST HONOR (ARTICLES 353-364) LIBEL

Petitioner was able to prove the truth of his charges against the barangay official while the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. If the defamatory matter either constitutes a crime or concerns the performance of official duties, and the accused proves the truth of his charge, he should be acquitted.

ALCANTARA v PONCE (517 SCRA 74) February 28, 2007 G.R. No. 156183 The crime of libel, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, has the following elements: (1) imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance; (2) publicity or publication; (3) malice; (4) direction of such imputation at a natural or juridical person, or even a dead person and (5) tendency to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the person defamed.

BRILLANTE v CA (440 SCRA 541) October 19, 2004 G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571

DIAZ v PEOPLE (523 SCRA 194) May 25, 2007 G.R. No. 159787

In the cases at bar, it was proven that Brillante uttered defamatory statements during the press conference attended by some fifty journalists and caused the open letter which explicitly referred to reprehensible acts allegedly committed by Binay, Prudente and their associates, such as the use of goons to threaten Binay's opponents in the election and the plotting of Syjuco's assassination, to be published in several newspapers.

For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victims must be identifiable. Absent one of these elements, a case for libel will not prosper.

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ALONZO v CA (241 SCRA 51) February 1, 1995 G.R. No. 110088

SANTOS v CA (203 SCRA 110) October 21, 1991 G.R. No. L-45031

There was no publication when Atty. Balasabas, a third person to whom the private respondents entrusted the documents with the request that he give them to their counsel, read the complaint against Dr. Velasco and the report of the petitioner attached thereto. Where the plaintiff himself communicated or by his acts caused the communication of the libelous matter to a third person, there was no actionable publication.

Publication of a complaint, being a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding, made in good faith and without comments or remarks, is privileged and comes under Item 2 of Article 354.

BUATIS v PEOPLE March 24, 2006 G.R. No. 142509

The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed, malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition.

BORJAL v CA January 14, 1999 G.R. No. 126466

The element of publication in libel is present in this case when petitioner's subject letter-reply itself addressed to respondent states that the same was copy furnished to all concerned, its contents were dictated to his secretary and was found in the mailbox, open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public. Such publication had already created upon the minds of the readers a circumstance which brought discredit and shame to respondent's reputation.

FLOR v PEOPLE (454 S 440) March 31, 2005 G.R. No. 139987

NEWSWEEK v IAC (142 SCRA 171) May 30, 1986 G.R. No. L-63559

Where the issue of cash advances against the coffers of the provincial government was a major political topic in that locality at that time, it was clearly a legitimate topic to be discussed not only by the members of the media but by public as what was involved was the dispensation of taxpayers’ money. The inference that the accused media men drew from the note given by their source that the governor prodded some of the provincial government officials to take out cash advances may have been false but the same does not warrant a conviction for libel nor support a claim for damages.

The disputed portion of the news article which refers to plaintiff Sola and which was claimed to be libelous never singled out plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter as it merely stated that the victim had been arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the area by Pablo Sola, the mayor of Kabankalan. Hence, the report, referring as it does to an official act performed by an elective public official, is within the realm of privilege and protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press. MERCADO v CFI August 25, 1982 G.R. No. L-38753

AGUSTIN v PAMINTUAN (467 SCRA 601) August 22, 2005 G.R. No. 164938

A libel prosecution must survive the test of whether or not the offending publication is within the guarantees of free speech and free press.

Under the old rule, the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant places. To obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action from written defamation, the complaint or Information should contain allegations as to whether the offended party was a public officer or a private individual at the time the offense was committed, and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and first published should likewise be alleged.

BULLETIN PUBLISHING v NOEL (167 SCRA 255) November 9, 1988 G.R. No. 76565 No libel has been committed because the published work alleged to contain libelous statements is not founded on the late Amir Mindalano or his family and appears simply expository in character, matter-of-fact, and unemotional in tone and tenor, without any evidence of malevolent intent, either on the part of the author or the publisher of the article. Further, personal hurt or embarrassment, even if real, is not automatically equivalent to defamation; community standards not personal or family standards are the basis for evaluating a publication claimed to be defamatory.

FERMIN v PEOPLE March 28, 2008 G.R. No. 157643 Proof adduced during the trial showed that accused was the manager of the publication without the corresponding evidence that, as such, he was directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained in the said libelous article. Article 360 of the Revised

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Penal Code, however, includes not only the author but also the person who prints or published it. Thus, proof of knowledge or participation in the publication of the offending article is not required.

INTRIGUING AGAINST HONOR BETGUEN v MASANGCAY (238 SCRA 475) Article 364 of the Revised Penal Code defines "intriguing against honor" as any intrigue which has for its principal purpose to blemish the honor and reputation of a person. This felony undoubtedly falls under the coverage of crimes involving moral turpitude, the latter term having been defined as "an act of baseness, vileness, depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty and good morals."

SLANDER GONZALES v ARCILLA (203 SCRA 609) November 18, 1991 G.R. No. L-27923 Slander is oral defamation while libel is defamation in writing. In both, there is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE (ARTICLE 365) CARILLO v PEOPLE (229 S 386)

BALITE v PEOPLE (18 SCRA 280) September 30, 1966 G.R. No. L-21475

Petitioner anesthesiologist when summoned could not be readily found and when he finally appeared at 10:30 in the evening, he was evidently in a bad temper, commenting critically on the dextrose bottles before ordering their removal, a circumstance indicative that he was not disposed to attend to this unexpected call, in violation of the canons of his profession that as a physician, he should serve the interest of his patient "with the greatest of solicitude, giving them always his best talent and skill." In the crime of simple negligence, the gravamen of the offense is the failure to exercise the diligence necessitated or called for the situation which was not immediately life-destructive but which culminated, in the present case, in the death of a human being three (3) days later.

Defamatory words constitute either grave or light slander depending not only upon their sense and grammatical meaning, judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. In the case at bar, the statements of the accused, alluding to the offended party that he “has sold the union”, he “has swindled the money of the members’, he “received P6,000.00’; he is “engaged in racketeering and enriching himself with capitalist”; he “has spent funds of the union for his own personal use” are serious and insulting, and no amount of sophistry will take them out of the compass of grave oral defamation.

QUIZON v JUSTICE OF THE PEACE (97 PHIL. 342)

REYES v PEOPLE (27 SCRA 686) March 28, 1969 G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529

Damage to property through reckless negligence is not a variant of malicious mischief. “Malicious mischief”, as used in sec. 87, par. 6, of the Judiciary Act, has exclusive reference to the willful and deliberate crimes described in Arts. 327 to 331 of the Revised Penal Code and to no other.

The words, "Agustin, putang ina mo" is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic.

PEOPLE v FALLER (67 Phil. 529) Under an information for malicious damage to another’s property, the accused may be convicted of the crime of damage through reckless imprudence.

VICTORIO V CA (173 SCRA 645) May 3, 1989 G.R. Nos. L-32836-37

GAN v COURT OF APPEALS (165 SCRA 378)

Appellant-petitioner admitted having called Atty. Vivencio Ruiz, “kayabang,” “tunaw na utak,” “swapang,” and "estapador", which attributes to the latter the crime of estafa, a serious and insulting imputation. Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer when touching on his profession are libellous per se.

Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence resulting in Homicide because there was no evidence presented that would tend to prove that petitioner did have sufficient time

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to reflect on the consequences of her instant decision to swerve her car to the light without stepping on her brakes. PEOPLE v BUAN (22 SCRA 1383) The exoneration of Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal Court) of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.

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