Oblicon Digest

SPOUSES RAYOS RAYOS VS. REYES ET AL G.R. NO. 150913 FEBRUARY 20, 2003 FACTS: 3 parcels of unregistered land in Pangasinan were formerly owned by the spouses Tazal who on 1 September 1957 sold them to respondents’ predecessorininterest! "eyes! with right to repurchase within two # years from date thereof by paying to the $endee the purchase price and all e%penses incident to their recon$eyance& 'fter the sale the $endee a retro too( physical possession of the properties and paid the ta%es thereon&  The otherwise otherwise inconse)uential inconse)uential sale became contro contro$ersial $ersial when when # of the 3 parcels were again sold by Tazal in fa$or of petitioners’ predecessorin interest "ayos without *rst a$ailing of his right to repurchase the properties& +n the meantime! the con$entional right of redemption in fa$or of spouses  Tazal  Tazal e%pired e%pired without without the right right being e%ercised e%ercised by by either the Tazal spouses spouses or the $endee "ayos& 'fter the e%piration of the redemption period! Tazal attempted to repurchase the properties from "eyes by asserting that the 1 September 1957 deed of sale with right of repurchase was actually an e)uitable mortgage and o,ering the amount of P7#-&.. to pay for the alleged debt& /ut "eyes refused the tender of payment and $igorously claimed that their agreement was not an e)uitable mortgage& 3 0n 9 ay 192. rancisco Tazal *led a complaint with the 4+ "eyes for the declaration of the 1 September 1957 transaction as a contract of e)uitable mortgage& e also prayed for an order re)uiring defendant amerto "eyes to accept the amount of P7#-&.. which he had deposited with the trial court as full payment for his debt! and canceling the supposed mortgage on the three 63 parcels of land with the e%ecution of the corresponding documents of recon$eyance in his fa$or&

ISSUE: 8hether or not the consignation is $alid

HELD: +n order that consignation may be e,ecti$e the debtor must show that  6a there was a debt due:

6b the consignation of the obligation had been made because the creditor to whom a $alid tender of payment was made refused to accept it: 6c pre$ious notice of the consignation had been gi$en to the person interested in the performance of the obligation: 6d the amount due was placed at the disposal of the court: and! 6e after the consignation had been made the person interested was noti*ed thereof& +n the instant case! petitioners failed& irst! to o,er a $alid and unconditional tender of payment: Second! to notify respondents of the intention to deposit the amount with the court: and third! to show the acceptance by the creditor of the amount deposited as full settlement of the obligation! or in the alternati$e! a declaration by the court of the $alidity of the consignation& The failure of petitioners to comply with any of these re)uirements rendered the consignation ine,ecti$e& 4onsignation and tender of payment must not be encumbered by conditions if they are to produce the intended result of ful*lling the obligation& +n the instant case! the tender of payment of P7#-&.. was conditional and $oid as it was predicated upon the argument of Tazal that he was paying a debt which he could do at any time allegedly because the 1 September 1957 transaction was a contract of e)uitable mortgage and not a deed of sale with right to repurchase& The ostensible purposes of o,ering the amount in connection with a purported outstanding debt were to ev!e "#e $"%&'("e! )e!e*&"%+ &e)%+! in the deed of sale which had already e%pired when the tender of payment was made and the 4i$il 4ase was instituted! and as a corollary! to a$ail of the thirty 63.day grace period under 'rt& 12.2 of the Civil Code within which to e%ercise the right to repurchase& "eyes was therefore within his right to refuse the tender of payment o,ered by petitioners because it was conditional upon his wai$er of the two 6#year redemption period stipulated in the deed of sale with right to repurchase& oreo$er! petitioners failed to pro$e in the 4i$il 4ases that any form of notice regarding their intention to deposit the amount of P7#-&.. with the 4+ had been ser$ed upon respondents& This re)uirement is not ful*lled by the notice which could ha$e ensued from the *ling of the complaint in the ci$il case or the stipulation made between Tazal and "eyes regarding the consignation of P7#-&..& The latter constitutes the second notice re)uired by law as it already concerns the actual deposit or consignation of the amount and is di,erent from the *rst notice that ma(es (nown the debtor’s intention to deposit the amount! a re)uirement missing in the instant case& 8ithout any announcement of the intention to resort to consignation *rst being made to the persons interested in the ful*llment of the obligation! the consignation as a means of payment is $oid&

+t is also futile to argue that the deposit of P7#-&.. with the 4ourt of irst +nstance could ha$e perfected the redemption of the three 63 parcels of land because it was not appro$ed by the trial court! much less accepted by amerto "eyes or his heirs! herein respondents& e%penses that petitioners had to reimburse to respondents’ predecessorininterest aside from the P7#-&.. earlier deposited by Tazal& +n the instant case! since there is no clear and preponderant e$idence that the consignation of P7#-&.. satis*ed all the re)uirements for $alidity and enforceability! and since amerto "eyes $ehemently contested the propriety of the consignation! petitioners cannot rely upon sheer speculation and unfounded inference to construe the Decision of the 4ourt of irst +nstance as one impliedly appro$ing the consignation of P7#-&.. and perfecting the redemption of the three 63 parcels of land& +t should be recalled that one of the re)uisites of consignation is the *ling of the complaint by the debtor against the creditor& ence it is the ;udgment on the complaint where the court declares that the consignation has been properly made that will release the debtor from liability& Should the consignation be disappro$ed by the court and the case dismissed! there is no payment and the debtor is in mora and he shall be liable for the e%penses and bear the ris( of loss of the thing&

RO-AN CATHOLIC OF -ALOLOS V IAC GR 2110 NOVE-BER 1/, 1990 FACTS: 0n da$it of 'd;udication! whose $alidity and authenticity they assailed on the ground of fraud& They li(ewise maintained that the sub;ect property had not been partitioned among the heirs: thus! it was still coowned at the time it was con$eyed to Petitioner Caude& L17M Petitioners did not deny the imputed fraud in the e%ecution of the '>da$it of 'd;udication& They! howe$er! a$erred that the document had no bearing on their claim of ownership! which had long pertained to the "igonan spouses following the 19#A con$eyance from the absolute owner! Cacambra& L1AM  They theorized that the coownership o$er the property ended when the period for redemption lapsed without any action on the part of the co owners& L19M Therefore! the "igonan spouses bought the property as legitimate

$endees for $alue and in good faith! not in the capacity of redeeming co owners& L#.M Petitioners li(ewise argued that they and their predecessorsininterest had continuously owned and possessed the sub;ect property for 7# years& 'ccordingly! ac)uisiti$e prescription had allegedly set in! in their fa$or! when the case was *led in 1993& L#1M Castly! petitioners maintained that they were entitled to the e)uitable defense of laches& "espondents and their forebears were rebu(ed for not asserting their rights o$er the property for the past 7# years& They supposedly did so only after *nding that the land had been de$eloped! and that it had appreciated in $alue& L##M

I$$'e: 8hether or not respondent erred in holding that the land sub;ect matter hereof is property held in common by the eirs of ilarion Berecho and an implied trust was created by the act of repurchase&

He(!: Petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in holding that an implied trust had arisen from the 19#A repurchase by the "igonan spouses&  They argue that the sale was a con$eyance of the absolute ownership of  Cacambra o$er the land! which he had ac)uired by $irtue of a failure to redeem& Therefore! when he sold it! the spouses li(ewise ac)uired absolute ownership& 'n implied trust arises! not from any presumed intention of the parties! but by operation of law in order to satisfy the demands of ;ustice and e)uity and to protect against unfair dealing or downright fraud& L-2M @nder 'rticle 1-52 of  the new 4i$il 4ode! if property is ac)uired through mista(e or fraud! the person obtaining it is! by force of law! considered a trustee of an implied trust for the bene*t of the person from whom the property comes& 'lthough this pro$ision is not retroacti$e in character! and thus inapplicable to the 19#A purchase! it merely e%presses a rule already recognized by our courts prior to the e,ecti$ity of the 4ode& L-7M +n the present case! the implied trust arose in 19#1! when *$e of the eight coowners assumed ownership of the whole inherited property and sold

it in its entirety   to Cacambra& The sale clearly defrauded the three other co heirs who were not parties to the transaction  Herardo! 'gaton! and 0li$a  and unlawfully depri$ed them of their undi$ided shares in the inheritance&  Thus! to the e%tent of their participation! the property is deemed to ha$e been ac)uired through fraud: and the person who ac)uired it! a trustee for the bene*t of the person from whom it was ac)uired& L-AM +n the present case! Cacambra was the trustee who held the property partly for the bene*t of the three mentioned heirs 6 cestuis que trustent &  The 4'! howe$er! erred in *nding that the implied trust had arisen in 19#A! when the "igonan spouses repurchased the property from Cacambra& L-9M /y then! Petitioners "igonan were merely stepping into the shoes of  Cacambra as trustee&