NPC vs De guzman - Equal Protection

NPC (NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION) vs DE GUZMAN

FACTS: RA 6975, otherwise known as "An " An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government", took effect on January 2, 1991. RA 6975 provides for a uniform retirement system for PNP membe rs. Section 39 reads: "SEC. 39.Compulsory Retirement.  —  Compulsory retirement, for officer and non-officer, shall be upon the attainment of a ge fifty-six (56); Provided, That, in case of any officer with the rank of chief superintendent, director or deputy director general, the Commission may allow his retention in the service for an unextendible period of one (1) year. Based on the above provision, p rovision, petitioners sent notices of retirement to private respondents who are all members of the defunct de funct Philippine Constabulary and have reached the age of fifty-six. Private respondents filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for the issuance of an ex  parte restraining order and/or injunction before the RTC of Makati. They aver that the age of  retirement set at fifty-six (56) by Section 39 of RA 69 75 cannot be applied to them since they are also covered by Sec. 89 thereof which provides: "Any provision hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, and within the transition  period of four (4) years following the effectively of this Act, Act, the following members of the INP shall be considered compulsorily retired: "a)Those who shall attain the age of sixty sixt y (60) on the first year of the effectivity of this Act. "b)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine (59) on the second year of the effectivity of this Act. "c)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight (58) on the third year of the effectivity of this Act. "d)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven (57) on the fourth year of the effectivity of this Act." Respondents added that the term "INP" " INP" includes both the former members of the Philippine Constabulary and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the Integrated  National Police (INP) by virtue of PD 765 in 1975. On the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners that the 4-year transition period provided in Section 89 applies only to the local police forces who previously retire, compu lsorily, at age

sixty (60) for those in the ranks of Police/Fire Lieutenant or higher, while the retirement age for  the PC had already been set at fifty-six (56) under the AFP law. Respondent judge De Guzman issued a restraining order followed by a writ of injunctio n. He declared that the term "INP" in Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all members of the present Philippine National police, irrespective of the original status of the present me mbers of the Philippine National police before its creation and establishment, and that Section 39 thereof shall  become operative after the lapse of the four-year transition period. Thus, the preliminary injunction issued is made permanent. Moreover, he observed, among others, that it may have  been the intention of Congress to refer to the local police forces as the "INP" but the PNP Law failed to define who or what constituted the INP. The natural recourse of the court is to trace the source of the "INP" as courts are permitted to look to prior laws on the same subject and to investigate the antecedents involved. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all members of the present Philippine National police, irrespective of the original status of its present members and that Section 39 of RA 6975 shall become applicable to petitioners only after the lapse of the four-year  transition period. HELD: From a careful review of Sections 23 and 85 of RA 6975, it appears that the use of the term INP is not synonymous with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute could have just made a uniform reference to the members of the whole Ph ilippine National police (PNP) for retirement  purposes and not just the INP. The law itself distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that "INP" as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC. Contrary to the pronouncement of respondent judge that “the law failed to define who constitutes the INP”, Sec. 90 of RA 6975 has in fact defined the same. Thus, "SEC. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP.  —  Upon the effectivity of this Act, the present National police Commisdion and the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated  National police shall cease to exist. The Philippine Constabulary, which is the nucleus of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National police shall cease to be a major service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Integrated National  police , which is the civilian component of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National  police, shall cease to be the national police force and lieu thereof, a new police force shall be establish and constituted  pursuant to this Act." It is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the le gislature failed to define who the members of the INP are. In this regard, it is of no moment that the legislature failed to categorically restrict the application of the transition period in Sec. 8 9 specifically in favor of the local police forces for it would be a mere superfluity as the PC component of the INP was already retirable at age fifty-six (56).

Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court need not have belabored on the supposed dubious meaning of the term. Nonetheless, if confronted with such a situation, courts are not without recourse in determining the construction of the statute with do ubtful meaning for they may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations may be adopted. Courts should not give a literal interpretation to the letter of the law if it runs counter to the legislative intent. The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that Section 89 of R.A. 6975 is applicable only to the local police force is clear. The question now is whether the classification is valid. The test for this is reasonableness such that it must conform to the following requirements: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) It must apply equally to all members of the same class (People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 [1939]).

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of injunction issued on January 8, 1992 is hereby LIFTED and the assailed decision of respondent judge is REVERSED and SET ASIDE