Non-Imprisonment for Debt Digests

CHAPTER 16: NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT DEBT GEORGE H. GANAWAY, petitioner, vs. J. W. QUILLEN, Warden of Bilibid Prison FACTS: The petitioner in this original action in habeas corpus asks that he be released from Bilibid Prison because of imprisonment for debt in a civil cause growing out if a contract. The return of the Attorney-General alleges as the reason for petitioner's incarceration in Bilibid Prison an order of the Hon. George R. Harvey, judge of First Instance of the city of Manila, issued under authority of Chapter XVII of the code if Civil Procedures. As standing alone the petition for habeas corpus was fatally defective in its allegations, this court on its motion, ordered before it the record of the lower court in the case entitled Thomas Casey et al. vs. George H. Ganaway. The complaint in the civil case last mentioned is grounded on a contract, and asks in effect for an accounting. That this is true is shown by the phraseology of the complaint which repeatedly speaks of an agreement entered into by the plaintiffs and the defendants, by Exhibit A, relating to the publication of a book named "Forbes' Memoirs," and which describes itself as "this contract," by the receipt attached to Exhibit

A, which mentions "the contract," and by the order of the trial judge on demurrer which says that "the plaintiffs allege a contract with the defendant and a breach of the contract by the defendant. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF NON-IMPRISONMENT OF DEBT WAS VIOLATED. RULING: The "debt" intended to be covered by the constitutional guaranty has a well-defined meaning. Organic provisions relieving from imprisonment for debt, were intended to prevent the commitment for debtors to prison for liabilities arising from actions ex contractu. The inhibition was never meant to conclude damages arising in actions ex delicto, for the reason that the damages recoverable therein do not arise from any contract entered into between the parties, but are imposed upon the defendant for the wrong he has done and are considered as a punishment therefor, nor to fines and penalties imposed by the courts in criminal proceedings as punishments for crime. It is clear that the action ending in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in which Thomas Casey et al. are plaintiffs and George H. Ganaway is the defendant, is one predicated on an obligation arising upon a contract.

Consequently, the imprisonment of the petitioner is in contravention of organic law. It is for us in the Philippine Islands to let no obstacle interfere with a reasonable enforcement of the enlightened principle of free government relating to imprisonment for debt. It may, however, be appropriate to remark that our holding need not be taken as going to the extent of finding Chapter XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure invalid and should be understood as limited to the facts before us and as circumscribed by the various exception to the constitutional prohibition. This court has, heretofore, in a minute order, directed the discharge from imprisonment of the petitioner and this decision is in explanation thereof. The minute order will therefore, stand as the authoritative adjudication of the court. Costs de officio. So ordered. SERAFIN VS. LINDAYAG Facts: Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500 Carmelito Mendoza, then municipal secretary and his wife Corazon Mendoza and therefore an estafa case was filed against her. Complainant admitted complaint. Now complainant filed a case against respondent Judge for not dismissing the case and issuing a warrant of arrest as it falls on the category of a simple indebtedness, since elements of estafa are not

present. Further she contended that no person should be imprisoned for non-payment of a loan of a sum of money. Two months after respondent dismissed plaintiff’s case. (Judge here committed gross ignorance of law. Even if complainant desisted case was pursued.) Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation committed by the judge when it ordered the imprisonment of plaintiff for non-payment of debt? Held: Yes. Since plaintiff did not commit any offense as, his debt is considered a simple loan granted by her friends to her. There is no collateral or security because complainant was an old friend of the spouses who lent the money and that when they wrote her a letter of demand she promised to pay them and said that if she failed to keep her promise, they could get her valuable things at her home. Under the Constitution she is protected. Judge therefore in admitting such a "criminal complaint" that was plainly civil in aspects from the very face of the complaint and the "evidence" presented, and issuing on the same day the warrant of arrest upon his utterly baseless finding "that the accused is probably guilty of the crime charged," respondent grossly failed to perform his duties properly. SURA v. MARTIN

Facts: Vicente S. Martin, Sr. was ordered by the CFI Negros Occidental to recognize his natural son and to provide support at P100 per month. Martin appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter court affirmed said decision. A writ of execution was issued but it was returned unsatisfied. The Sheriff's return of service stated: "The judgment debtor is jobless, and is residing in the dwelling house and in the company of his widowed mother, at Tanjay, this province. Debtor has no leviable property; he is even supported by his mother. Hereto attached is the certificate of insolvency issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Tanjay, Negros Oriental, where debtor legally resides." For failure to satisfy the writ of execution, plaintiff's counsel prayed that defendant be adjudged guilty of contempt of court. The trial court granted the prayer and ordered the arrest and imprisonment of Martin. Issue: 1. Whether or not the orders of arrest and imprisonment of Martin for contempt of court for failure to satisfy the decision requiring him to support his natural son due to insolvency were violative of his constitutional right against imprisonment for debt.

2. Whether or not Martin's failure to satisfy the judgment amounts to disobedience to be considered indirect contempt. Held: 1. The sheriff's return shows that the judgment debtor was insolvent. Hence, the orders for his arrest and imprisonment for failure to satisfy the judgment in effect, authorized his imprisonment for debt in violation of the Constitution. 2. The orders for the arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contempt for failure to satisfy a judgment to pay past and future support are illegal because such judgment is a final disposition of the case and is declaratory of the rights or obligations of the parties. Under Section 3(b), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, the disobedience to a judgment considered as indirect contempt refers to a special judgment which is defined in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as that which requires the performance of any other act than the payment of money, or sale or delivery of real or personal property which must be enforced by proper contempt proceedings. Morever, the writ of execution issued on the judgment required "the sheriff or other proper officer" to whom it was directed to satisfy the amount out of all property, real and personal, of

the judgment debtor. The writ of execution was, therefore, a direct order to the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it was directed, and not an order to the judgment debtor. In view thereof, the judgment debtor could not, in the very nature of things, have committed disobedience to the writ. CRIME LOZANO v. MARTINEZ Facts: Batas Pambansa 22 (BP22; Bouncing Check Law) was approved on 3 April 1979. The petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under BP22. (Florentina A. Lozano vs. RTC Judge Antonio M. Martinez [Manila, Branch XX] in GR L63419, Luzviminda F. Lobaton vs. RTC Executive Judge Glicerio L. Cruz [Lemery Batangas, Branch V] in GR L-66839-42, Antonio and Susan Datuin vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 71654, Oscar Violago vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 74524-25, Elinor Abad vs. RTC Judge Nicolad A. Gerochi Jr. [Makati, Branch 139] in GR 75122-49, Amable and Sylvia Aguiluz vs. Presiding Judge of Branch 154 of Pasig in GR 75812- 13, Luis M. Hojas vs. RTC Judge Senen Penaranda [Cagayan de Oro, Branch XX] in GR 72565-67, and People vs. RTC Judge David Nitafan [Manila,

Branch 52] and Thelma Sarmiento in GR 75789]. Lozano, Lobaton, Datuin, Violago, Abad, Aguiluz, Hojas and Sarmiento moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of GR 75789 (People vs. Nitafan), wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to the Supreme Court for relief. Issue: Whether BP 22 is contrary to the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.Held: The constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt is a safeguard that evolved gradually during the early part of the nineteenth century in the various states of the American Union as a result of the people's revulsion at the cruel and inhumane practice, sanctioned by common law, which permitted creditors to cause the incarceration of debtors who could not pay their debts. At common law, money judgments arising from actions for the recovery of a debt or for damages from breach of a contract could be enforced against the person or body of the debtor by writ of capias ad satisfaciendum. By means of this writ, a debtor could be seized and imprisoned at the instance of the creditor until he makes the satisfaction awarded. As a consequence of the

popular ground swell against such a barbarous practice, provisions forbidding imprisonment for debt came to be generally enshrined in the constitutions of various states of the Union. This humanitarian provision was transported to our shores by the Americans at the turn of the century and embodied in Philippine organic laws. Later, the Philippine fundamental law outlawed not only imprisonment for debt, but also the infamous practice, native to our shore, of throwing people in jail for non-payment of the cedula or poll tax. It may be constitutionally impermissible to penalize a person for non-payment of a debt ex contractu. Organic provisions relieving from imprisonment for debt were intended to prevent commitment of debtors to prison for liabilities arising from actions ex contractu. The inhibition was never meant to include damages arising in actions ex delicto, for the reason that damages recoverable therein do not arise from any contract entered into between the parties but are imposed upon the defendant for the wrong he has done and are considered as punishment, nor to fines and penalties imposed by the courts in criminal proceedings as punishments for crime. Herein, the thrust of the law (BP 22) is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. It is

not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes, nor is it intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. Although the effect of the law may be to coerce payment of an obligation, it is intended to banish a practice (i.e. the issuance of worthless checks) considered harmful to public welfare. POLL TAX PEOPLE v. LINSANGAN Facts: Ambrosio Linsañgan was prosecuted for nonpayment of the cedula or poll tax under section 1439, in connection with section 2718, of the Revised Administrative Code. After due trial, he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for 5 days, and to pay the costs. The case was tried and decided in the trial court before the Constitution of the Philippines took effect. But while the appeal was pending, the said Constitution became effective, and section 1, clause 12, of Article III thereof provides that "no person shall be imprisoned for debt or nonpayment of a poll tax." Linsañgan appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in not declaring said sections 1439 and 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code unconstitutional and void, as the judgment of conviction violates the provision of the Philippine Autonomy Act interdicting

imprisonment for debt. Issue: Whether, in view of section 1, clause 12, of Article III of the Constitution, the judgment of conviction against Linsañgan can stand. Held: Section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly, and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the

Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution." Section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code is inconsistent with section 1, clause 12, of Article III of the Constitution, in that, while the former authorizes imprisonment for nonpayment of the poll or cedula tax, the latter forbids it. It follows that upon the inauguration of the Government of the Commonwealth, said section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code became inoperative, and no judgment of conviction can be based thereon. It results that the judgment appealed from must be reversed, and the case dismissed with costs de oficio.