Natres Digest

Carquelo Omandam and Rosito Itom, petitioners, vs. Cou rt of Appeals, Blas Trabasas and A mparo Bonilla, respondents Case Digest Digest (349 SCRA 483)

compla int f or recovery of p ossession, ossession, already prescribe prescribed. d. Petitioners Petitioners f iled

This petition for review seeks seeks for reversal reversal of the decision decision dated October

Hence, this petition for review. review.

a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied.

29, 1996, of the Court of Appeals reversing and setting aside the decision decision of the Region al Trial Trial Court of Zamboanga Zamboanga d el Sur, Branch 23, dated

ISSUES:

November November 15, 1996, 1996, and the resolution resolution of the Co urt o f Appea ls da ted Febru ary 21, 1997, denying denying the petitione petitioners' rs' motion motion for reconsid eration .

Wh at is the effect effect of the trial court's decision decision in a p ossesso ry action on the o rder o f the Bureau of Lands regar ding ding a homestead applicatio application n an d

FACTS:

decision of the DENR on th e protest over over homestead patent?

On January 29, 29, 1974, the Bureau Bureau of Lands issued a homestead homestead paten t i n

RULING:

favor of Camilo Lasola for a certain land in Sagrada, Tambuling, Zamboanga del Sur. The The Reg ister ister of Deeds Deeds also issued an Origi nal Title

Commonwealt Commonwealth h Act 141 141 as amended, otherwise know n as the Public

Certificate Certificate in h is name.

Land Act, gives in its Section Section 3 and 4 to th e Director of Lands primarily and to the Secretary Secretary of the DENR ultimately ultimately the au thority to dispose

On April 28, 1983, Blas Trabasas Trabasasbought the land from a certain Dolores

pu bli c lands. lands. In t his regard, the courts courts have no ju risdiction risdiction to in quire in to

Sayson w ho claimed claimed to be the owner. owner. In 1984, Trabasas Trabasas discovered that

the valid ity of th e decree decree of registratio registration n issued issued by th e Director Director of Lands.

peti tio ners ners Carquelo Omandam Omandam an d Rosito Itom ha d occupied t he lan d.

On ly the Secr etary etary of the DENR can review, on appeal, su ch decree. Thus ,

Meanwhile, on July 19, 1987, Omandam protested Lasola's homestead

reversal of the RTC of the award given given by the Director Director of Land to Lasola

pat en t before th e Bureau of Lands and prayed for the cancellation cancellation of the

was in error.

OCT. Upo n Sayson's Sayson's advice, advice, Trabasas Trabasas repurchased repurchased the land from Lasola, wh o executed executed a Deed of Sale dated September 24, 1987. O n Augu st 9,

DENR's jurisdiction jurisdiction over public lands does not nega te th e au tho rity of

1989, 1989, Trabasa acquired a new Transfer Certificate of Title.

the courts of justice to resolve questions of possession and their decisions stand in the meantime that the DENR has not settled the

On April 16, 1990, Blas Trabasas an d Ampar Ampar o Bonilla Bonilla fil ed a complaint complaint for

respective rights of public public land claim claimant ants. s. B ut on ce DENR has decided,

the recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land with

particularly with the grant of homeste homestead ad patent patent and issuan ce o f an OCT

the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Zamboanga d el Su r. They all eged that they

and then TCT later, later, its decision prevails.

are th e tru e owners of the land and that the petitioners petitionersshould vacate vacate it. Petition Petition w as denied and the decision of the CA was affirmed. Petiti oners, on the o ther hand, alleged alleged that they purchased the land from one Godofred Godofredo o Sela wh o h ave been in possession for almost twenty years. After the parties parties were duly heared, heared, the RTC issued a decisi on on November 15, 1993, d eclaring eclaring that n either either Trabasas and Bonilla, nor their

Francisco Chavez vs Public Estates Autho rity (July 2002) 2002)

predecessor-inpredecessor-in-int intere erest st were ever ever in possessio n of the land . The court ordered the Trabasas Trabasas and Bonilla Bonilla to reconvey the title title of th e land in the name of the petitioners.

The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the cen tral implementin g ag ency

The decision w as appealed appealed to the Co urt urt of Appeals. Pending Pending appeal, the

tasked to undertak undertake e reclamat reclamation ion projects nati onw ide. It took over the

DENR dis missed Omandam's protest protest previously filed with the Bu reau of

leas in g and selling selling functions of the DE NR (Department of Environmen tal

Lands. It said that Omandan Omandan failed to prove prove th at Lasola Lasola committed committed f raud

and Natural Resources) Resources) inso far as reclaimed or a bou t to be reclaimed

an d misrepresentation misrepresentation in acquiring the patent, hence hence there is no g rou nd for the revocation revocation an d cancellation of its title.

foreshore lands are concerned. PEA sough t th e transfer to the Amari Amari Coastal Bay and Development Development

On Octo ber29, 1996, 1996, the Court Court of Appeals reversed an d set aside th e decision of the RTC and ordered the p etition ers to vacate th e sub ject land and su rrende rrenderr it to B las Trabasas Trabasasand Amparo Bonilla. Bonilla. The Court of Appeals declared that the collateral attack on the homestead title to def eat p rivate rivate res pondents pondents'' a ccion publiciana, publiciana, was n ot sanctioned by law;

Corp oration, a private corporati corporation, on, of the ownership of 77.34 h ectares ectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari. ISSUE: ISSUE: Wh ether or not the transfer is valid. valid.

th at th e patent ha d already become indefeasible indefeasible since April 28, 1977; and that petitioner petitioners' s' action for reconveyance reconveyance i n th e n ature of th eir pro test

HELD: HELD: No. To allow vas t areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain domain to

with the Bureau of Lands and counterclaim in their answer to the

be tran sferred sferred to Amari as private private lands lands will sanction sanction a gross violation of

th e con stitutional ban on pr ivate corporations fr om acquiring an y kind of alienable land of the public domain. The Sup reme Court affirmed that th e 157.84 hectares of recla imed lan ds

Reso urces (CENRO-DENR), which stated that th e subject property was “verifi ed to b e within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Class ification Map No. 3013 established u nder Project No. 20 -A and appro ved as such under FAO 4-1656 on Ma rch 15, 1982.” O n 3 December 2002, th e RTC app roved the application for registration.

comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas o f Man ila B ay remain in alien able natu ral resources of the public domain. The transf er (as embodied in a  joi nt venture agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ow ne rsh ip o f 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to

The Rep ub lic interposed an a ppeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Mala banan had fa iled to prove that the property bel onged to th e alie na ble and d isposable land of the p ublic domain, a nd that the RTC had erred i n f inding tha t he h ad been in po ssession of the p roperty in th e mann er and for the length of time required by law fo r con firmation of imperf ect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Ap peals reversed the RTC ru ling a nd dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.

Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution wh ich p rohibits private corporations from acquiring an y kind of alienab le land of th e public

ISSUES:

domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to tra n sfer to Amari ow nership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, su ch transfer is void f or being con trary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

1. In o rder th at an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may b e reg istered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, oth erwise known as the Property Registration Decree, sho uld the land be class ifi ed as al ienable an d disposable as of June 12, 1945 o r is it s ufficient tha t su ch classification occu r at an y time prior to the filing of the app licant for reg istration provided that it is es tablished that the applicant ha s be en in open, continuous, exclusive and no torious possession of th e lan d und er a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

HEIR S OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES HEIR S OF M ARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No. 179987 April 29, 2009 en banc

2. F or p urposes of Se ction 14(2) of th e Property Registration Decree may a pa rcel o f la nd cla ssified as alienable and disposable be d eemed private lan d an d therefore su sceptible to acquisition by pres cription in accord ance with the Civil Code? 3. May a p arcel o f la nd established as a gricultural in character either because of its use o r because its slope is b elow that of forest lands be regi strable under Section 14(2) of th e Property Registration Decree in relat ion to the provisions of the Civil Code on acqui sitive prescription?

FACTS: 4. Are p etiti oners ent itled to the registration of the subject land in t heir On 20 Febr uary 1998, Mario Malabanan fi led an application for land regi stration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a pa rcel of land situ ated in Sil ang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed t ha t he had purchased th e property from Eduardo Velazco, and th at h e an d his predecessors-in-interest had been in op en, notorious, an d con tinuous adverse and peaceful possession o f the land for more th an thirty (30) years. Velazco testified th at the property was originally belo nged to a twenty -two hectare property owned by h is greatgra nd father, Lino Velazco. Lin o had four sons– Be nedicto, G regorio, Edu ardo and Esteban–the fourth bei ng Aristedes’s gra ndfather. Upon Lino ’s de ath, hi s four sons i nherited the pr operty and divided it among th emselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife,  Magdalena, had become the admin istrator of all th e properties inherited by th e Velazco sons from th eir f ather, Lin o. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virg ilio su cceeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, w hi ch originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It w as th is pr operty that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. Among th e evidence presented by Ma labanan during trial was a Certi fication dated 11 June 2001, iss ued by the Community Environment & Natu ral R esources Office, De partment of Environment an d Natural

na mes un der Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of th e Property Registration Decree or both? HELD: The Pertition is d enied. (1) In con nection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “th ose wh o by th emselves or t hrough their pr edecessors in interest have been in ope n, co ntinuous, exclusive, and n otorious possession and o ccupation of alie na ble and di sposable lands of th e public domain, under a b ona fide claim of acqu isition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” h ave acquired ow ne rship of, a nd registrable title to, such lands based on the length and qu alit y of th eir possession. (a) Si nce S ection 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 Ju ne 1945 an d do es not require that the lands should have been alienable an d disp osable during the entire period of p ossession, the p ossessor is ent itle d to secure judicial confirmation of hi s title thereto as s oon a s it is decla red alienable and disposable, subject to the ti meframe imposed by

VERNON T. REY ES,

Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

G.R. No . 141924 Petitioner, Present:

(b) The r igh t to register granted under Section 48(b) of th e Public Land Act is fu rth er confirmed by Section 14(1) of th e Property Registration Decree. -

PUNO, C.J ., Chair  SANDOVAL-GUTI CORONA, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ .

versus -

(2) In complyin g with Section 14(2) of the Pro perty Registration Decree, con sid er that under the Civil Code, pr escription is recognized as a mod e of acqu iring ownership of patrimonial property. However, p ublic do main lan ds b ecome only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that th ese ar e alienable or disposable. Ther e must also be an exp ress gover nment manifestation that the pro perty is a lready patrimonial or no lon ger retained for pu blic service or the d evelopment of n ational wealth, un der Article 422 of th e Civil Code. And only when the property h as beco me patr imonial can the p rescriptive period for the acqui sition of

REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Promulgated: Janu ary 23, 2007

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

property of the public dominion begin to run.

DECISION

(a) Pat rimon ial property is private property of th e government. The pers on acq uires ownership of p atrimonial property by pre scription under th e Civil C ode is en titled to se cure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of th e Property Registration Decree.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J .:

(b) The re are tw o kinds of prescription by wh ich patrimonial property may b e acqu ired, one ord inary and other extraordinary. Under o rdinary

Certiorari [1] assailing the Decision [2] dated October 21, 1999 and

acqu isitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a pat rimonial pro perty through possession f or at least ten (10) years, in g ood faith and w ith just t itle. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s un in terrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at lea st th irty (30) years , reg ardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on

Resolution[3] dated February 15, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57156, entitled Vernon T. Reyes, applicant-appellee, versus Republic of the Philippines, oppositor-appellant .

On February 5, 1996, Vernon T. Reyes, herein petition er, fi led w ith th e

It is clea r th at th e evidence of p etitioners is insufficient to establish that Mala banan ha s acquired ownership over the su bject pr operty under Sectio n 48(b) of th e Pub lic Land Act. The re is n o substantive evidence to

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City, B ranch 18 an application for

esta bli sh that Malabanan or petitioners as h is predecessors-in-interest ha ve been in possession of t he property since 12 June 1945 o r earlier. The ear lies t that petitioners can date back their po ssession, according to

located in Silang, Cavite containing an area of 43, 514 square meters.

their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they p resented in particular—is to th e year 1948. Thus, they ca nnot avail themselves of re gistration under Sectio n 14(1) of t he Property Registration Decree.

Petitioner alleged inter alia in hi s application that on December 24, 1992,

conf irmation and registration of his imperfect title o ver a parcel of land

he and th e other grandchildren of the late Euse bio Vicente execu ted a Deed of E xtra-Judicial Settlement wherein th e land was adjudicated in his

Neith er can pet itioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for regi stration. While the su bject property was declared as alienable or

favor.

dis posable in 1982, there is n o competent evidence th at is no longer in ten ded fo r public use service or f or the development of the national eviden ce, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The

On April 4, 1997, after h earing, the trial court rendered its

class ifi cation of the su bject property as alienable and disposable land of th e pu blic domain does not ch ange its st atus as pro perty of the p ublic domin ion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thu s, it is in susceptible to acq ui sition by prescription.

Judgment [4] approving petitioners application.

Respondent Republic of the Philippines in terposed an ap peal to th e Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated October 21, 1999, th e app ellate court reversed the RTC Judgment and d ismissed p etitioners applicatio n

FIRST DIVISION

for registration. The court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated Febru ary 15, 2000.

Hence, the present petition.

Petiti oners bare as sertions of po ssession and occupation by his Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in hold ing that he

pred ecessors-in-interest since 1943 [6] are general statements which are

failed to present incontrovertible evidence to p rove that he has been in

mere

possession of the land in question for the l ength of time required by law.

Resp ondent Republic, on the other hand, maintains that petitioner failed to sa tisf y the requisite quantum of evidence in support of h is application.

Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended (Public Land Act), and Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree 1529, othe rwise known as the Property Registration Decree, req uire that the appli cants must prove that the land is alienab le an d d isposa ble p ub lic land ; and that they or through their predecessors in i nterest, have been in o pen , continuous, exclusive, and no torious possession and occupation of th e alienable and dis posable land of the public domain, under a bon a fide claim of acquisition or ow nership, since Jun e 12, 1945.

Accordingly, applicants for confirmation and registratio n of imperf ect title must prove: (a) that t he land forms part of the alienable lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same u nder a bona fide claim of ow nersh ip eith er sin ce time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. [5] The Cou rt of Appeals found that while the subj ect p roperty is par t of the disposable and a lienable la nds of th e public domain, h owever, petitioner failed to prove that he and his predecessors -in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ow nership either since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Petitioner had been in possessi on of the lan d since December 24, 1992 when it was adjudicated to him b y virtue of an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of his gran dfath er, E useb io Vicente. He filed h is application in 1996. Clearly, he w as in p ossession of the la nd for only four years. To bridge the gap, he proceeded to ta ck his pos session to that of hi s late grandparents. However, he did not pre sen t witnesses to substantiate his claim that th ey had possessed the land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.Obviously, these are findings of fact.

We d efer to the appellate courts findings of fact since they a re supported by the record.

conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of poss ession. [7]

It is do ctrin ally settled that a per son who seeks confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title to a piece of land on the basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest shoulders the

Jesusa,[3] B enjamin an d Delfin. Toge ther w ith his s hare, F lorentino became the o wner of Lot Nos. 1104-A&C and had them tax declared in his name. Florencias share, a portion of Lot No. 1104-B, w as pu rchased by Mercedes who in turn bartered the same with the share acquired by Santiago, another private respondent in this case. A portion of Santiagos property was boug ht by his daughter, Asu ncion Ceniza, married to private respondent Atillano Bongo and w ho successfully obtained a tax declaration therefor.

bu rden o f proving by clear and convincing evidence compliance with the requirements of Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. [8] Unfortunately, petitioner failed to discharge that burden.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV 57156. Costs against p etitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No . 127060. No vember 19, 2002]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FLORENTINO CENIZA, SANTIAGO CENIZA, ESTANISLAO CENIZA, ROMEO SIMBAJON, PABLO RAMOS, ATILANO BONGO, EDGAR ADOLFO, EM MA ADOLFO, JERRY ADOLFO, GLEN N ADOLFO, GINA ADOLFO, LORNA ADOLFO, CHONA ADOLFO, EVELYN ADOLFO, in her own behalf and as guardian of the minors HUBERT and AMIEL ADOLFO, and ELNITA ADOLFO in her own behalf and as guardian of minors DAVID and PRESTINE MAY ADOLFO, respondents. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the d ecision [1] dated September 28, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 31728, affi rming the decision[2] in LRC Case No. N-46 of the Regional Trial Court in Man daue City, Branch XXVIII, which declared private respon den ts a s the owners entitled to the registration of the lots in question. The antecedent facts of the case are as follow s: Apolin ar Ceniza was the declared owner in 1948 of Lot No. 1104, located at Cabancalan, Mandaue City, u nder Tax Declaration No. 01686. When h e died, his heirs took p ossession of the property and in 1960 par titioned the same through a deed of extrajudicial par tition. Apo lin ars chi ldre n, namely, Santiago, Estanislao, Florencia, Manuela, Mercedes an d Florentino, all surnamed Ceniza, each got 1/8 share of th e property. His gran dchildren, namely, the siblings Remedios Ado lfo, Melecio Cen iza, and Con stancia Zanoria, each got 1/24 share, wh ile Apolinars other grandchildren, namely, the siblings Concepcion Suico, Benjamin Ceniza, Lilia Ceniza and Delfin Ceniza, each got 1/32 share. Private respondent Florentino Ceniza purchased th e shares of his sisters Manuela and Mercedes and the share pertain ing to th e sib ling s

From the po rtion purchased by Asuncion Ceniza, ano ther private respondent, Romeo Simbajon, purchased an area of 270 squ are meters. Romeo also acquired a tax declaration in his na me. He was the h usb and of Felicitas Ceniza, another daughter of Santiago. The share acquired by Estanislao, anoth er child of Ap olin ar, w as also a portion of Lot No. 1104-B. He also caused the tax declaration pertaining to the said lot transferred in his name. The siblin gs Remedios Adolfo and Constancia Zano ria, married to private respondent Pablo Ramos, bough t the share of their brother, Melecio Ceniza. Remedios share, in turn, was transferred to her heirs, private respondents Edgar, Emma, Jerry, Glenn , Gina, Lorna, Chon a, Evelyn , Hu bert, Amiel, all surnamed Adolfo, an d the heirs of their brothe r Leoncio Adolfo, namely, h is wife Elenita Adolfo, and children David and Prestine May Adolfo. On November 4, 1986, private respondents applied for re gistration of the ir res pective titles over th e property the y inherited from Apolinar Cen iza, w ith the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28. Petitio ner Republic of the Ph ilippines, represented by th e Office of the Soli citor General opposed the application on th e following gr ounds: 1. Tha t n either t he applicant/s n or their precedessors-in-interest have been in open continuous exclusive and n otorious possession and occu pation of the la nd in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48 [b], C.A. 141, a s amended by P.D. 1073). 2. That t he mu ni ment/s or title and/or the tax declaration/s and tax paymen t/s receipt/s of applicant/s if any, a ttached to o r alle ged in th e app lication, do/es not constitute competent and su fficient evidence of a bon a fi de acquisition of the lands applied for or of the ir open, con tinu ous, exclusive and n otorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner, since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto. Sa id mun iment/s of title do/es not appear to be genuine and the tax decla ration/s a nd/or tax p ayment rece ipts ind icate pr etended possession of a pplicants to b e of recent vintage. 3. That th e claim of ownership in f ee simple on the basis of Spa nish title or gra nt can n o longer be availed o f by the applicants who have failed to fil e an appropriate application for registration within the period of six (6) mont hs from February 16, 1976 as r equired by Presidential Decree No. 892. F rom th e records, it appears that the instant application was filed on October 25, 1996. 4. That t he p arcel/s applied for is/are portions of the public domain belo nging to the R epublic of th e Philippines not subject to private appropriation. In a decisio n dated February 28, 1990, the Regio nal Trial Cou rt o f Man daue City granted the application. [4] It held that since the app licants possession of the land for more than th irty (30) years was contin uou s, peaceful, adverse, public and to the exclusion of everybod y, the same was in th e concept of owners. Since the land wa s n either encu mbered nor subject to any oth er application for registration, the trial court ordered th at, upon the finality of its decision, the d ecrees o f registratio n should be issued in favor of the applicants. The Solicit or General in terposed an appeal for petitioner R epu bli c of the Philippines before the Court of Appeals.

In a decision d ated September 28, 1994, the Court of Appeals affi rmed the decision of the trial court. It held that the rulin g in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, [5] th at be fore public land could be registered in the n ame of a private individual, it must first be establish ed th at th e land had been classified alienable and disposable, refers to pub lic lan ds and not to those which have acquired the n ature of a private property in view o f th e continuous possession thereof by its claimants. The Court of Appeals held:

Fin ally, w e note that no op position was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and For estry to contest the application of appellees on th e ground that the pro perty still for ms part of t he public domain. Nor is th ere any showing tha t the l ots in question are f orestal land, unlike the ca se of Director of Land s vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701, whe rein the Director of Lan ds qu estioned the petition for registration f iled by the applicant th erein on the cl aim th at the pr operty applied fo r registration in his fa vor was class ifi ed an d proven to be f orestal land.

In th is cas e, it was suf ficiently established by appellees that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and no torious possession of th e su bje ct lots even b efore th e year 1927, or fif ty ni ne (59) years before the app lication was filed (TSN, April 13, 1989, pp. 3-4; February 6, 1989, p. 711; Ju ne 2, 1988, pp. 3, 8-9). Thi s period more than sufficiently satisfies th e 30 years requ irement of the Public Land Act for property to be con sid ered a s p rivate la nd. Significantly, S ection 4, Presidential Decree No. 1073 pro vides:

Petiti oner f iled a motion fo r reconsideration, which w as denied in a reso lu tion dated October 29, 1996. Traversing petitioners arg ument th at under Section 2, Article XII of the Con stitution, all lan ds of the p ublic domain are owned by the State, the Cou rt of App eals stated that sa id provision further states that agricultural lands are excluded from tho se lands that may not be alienated. It fu rther ruled:

Sec. 4. The pro visions of Section 48(b) an d Section 4(c), Ch apter VIII, o f the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these pro visions shall ap ply on ly to alienable and disposable lands of the public domai n which h ave been in o pen, continuous, exclusive and no torious pos session and occupation by th e applicant himself or thru h is pred ecessor-in-interest, under a bonafide claim of o wnership, since June 12, 1945. Appe llant was thus n o longer required to prove that the pr operty in qu esti on is classified as alienable and disposable land of t he public domai n. Clearly, th e property no longer forms part of the public domain. The lo ng an d continuous possession thereof by appellees converted said pro perty to a private one. This finds support in the ruli ng in Director of Lands vs. Bengzon, 152 SCRA 369, to wit: x x x alien able public land held by a pos sessor, personally or through his pred ecessor-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively fo r the pres cribed statutory period (30) years u nder the Public Lan d Act, as amen ded is con verted to private property by th e mere lapse or complet ion of said period, ipso jure. The abo ve is a reaf firmation of th e prin ciple established in t he earlier cases of Ca rio v. In sular Government, Su zi v. Ra zon, a nd Herico v. Dar, that open exclusive and undisputed pos session of al ienable public land for the p eriod pres cribed by law create s th e legal fiction w hereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure an d without th e need of judicial or other san ction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. x x x In in terp reting the provisions of Section 48 (b) of Co mmonwealth Act No. 141, this Court said in Herico v. Dar, x x x wh en the conditionsas speci fied in th e foregoing provision are complied w ith, th e possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a rig ht to a grant, a gover nment grant, without the necessity of a cer tificate of title being issu ed.The land, therefore, ceases to be of the p ublic domain, and beyon d the authority of the Di rector of Lands to dispose of. The app lication for confirmation is a mere fo rmality, the lack of w hich does no t aff ect th e leg al sufficiency of th e title as w ould be evidenced by the pat en t and the torrens title to be issued upon the strength of the patent. The Court of Appeals then cited Director of Lands v. Intermediate  Appellate Court . [6] In that case, this Court ruled that alienable public land held by a p ossessor, personally or through his predecessors -in-interest, ope nl y, continuously an d exclusively fo r the prescribed statu tory p erio d (30 years u nder the Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to pri vate property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Moreover, appellant Republics claim that the property in question remains to be public land un der the Constitution, is refuted by this Courts pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court  that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights. The Court of Appeals concluded its decision with the f ollowin g observations:

In th e in stant case, among the documents presented by appellees are Real Esta te tax receipts that su fficiently sh ow that the subject land i s main ly ut ilized for agricultural purposes devoted to the planting of coconut, corn x x x an d su gar cane x x x asi de from using the same for resid ential purposes x x x. It is n otice able that appellant failed to present an y proof to establish its claim th at th e land in qu estion is not ali enable. Although on Jul y 10, 1989, the court a quo issu ed an order directing the Bureau of Forest Develo pment [BF D] to su bmit xx within thirty (30) days from its r eceipt of [said o rder ] a report on the s tatus of the la nd xx to de termine whether said lan d or any portion th ereof is w ithin the forest zone xxx (Record, p. 63), th e BF D fa iled to comply. Mor eover, appellant never contested app ellees application nor did it may (sic) any man ifestation that th e land in qu estion is no t alienable. Lik ewise, the pr osecutor representing the Rep ub lic of the Philippines during the trial did not even contest the class ifi cation of the land as sta ted in the evidence of a ppellees. Their bela ted objection should therefore not prejudice appellees who o penly an d in good faith presented all the d ocuments pertinent to th eir claims. Presid ential Decree No. 1073 extended th e period within which a qu alified person may apply for confirmation o f an imperfect or in complete title by j udicial legalization to December 31, 1987. The f iling of t hi s case in October, 1986 was therefore seasonable. Under the decree, thi s rig ht is available to a per son who ha s been in open, continuous, exclu sive and notorious possession and occupation, by himself an d thr ou gh his predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acqu isition of ownership since June 12, 1945. We reiterate that appellees ha ve proven th emselves to h ave been in possession of the sub ject land even prio r to June 12, 1945. Hence, th is petition for review, alleging that the Court of Appeals erred in: (1) holding that private responden ts h ave registera ble title to the lots in question, and (2) ordering the registration thereof in their names. [7] The issues raised before us are: (a) wh ether there is a n eed for priva te respondents to esta blish that the land subject of their application was al ienable and disposable despite proofs sho win g their possessi on the reof f or more th an 30 years; an d (b) whether private respondents were able to meet the period required by th e Public Lan d Act, as a mended. Petitioner contends that before a public land can be registered in the na me of a private individual, it must be shown first that (a) the land has been classified alienable and dispo sable, and (b) the ap plican t, b y himself or through h is predecessors-in-interest, has been in continu ous , exclu sive and notorious possession and occupation of th e same u nd er a bona fide claim of own ership since Jun e 12, 1945 or prior thereto. Petitioner claims that private respondents failed to meet th e said requi rements. They did not cite any offi cial p roclamation or p resented the la nd classification map covering the su bject parcels of la nd to p rove that th ey are alienable and disposable public land s. Neither did private respondents adduce evidence to show that they h ad been in possess ion

of the land since June 12, 1945. Although they were able to show possession by Apolinar, their predecessor -in-interest, since 1948, and private respondents actual possession beginning in 1960, n o proof was presented to show possession prior to 1948. Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to have the subject parcels of land registered in their names.

Blo ck-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 da ted December 9, 1980. [17] This is su fficient evidence to s how the real ch aracter of the lan d subject of private respon den ts ap plication . [18] Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence,[19] which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:

In th eir comment, private respondents cite Section 48(b), [8] before it w as amended by PD No. 1073, and Section (50)[9] of the Pu blic Lan d Act as th e applicable law in this case. They maintain that the la nd sub ject o f their application is an agricultural land devoted to corn and oth er roo t crops. Further, they have been in possession of the lan d since 1927. Estan islao Ceniza, one of th e children of Apolinar an d w ho wa s alre ady ten years old at that time, testified that his father was the one in possession of the land, appropriating its fruits an d paying its realty taxes. When their father died in 1947, Apolinars chidren took possession of the lan d. They also appropriated the fruits and paid realty taxes th eref or. In 1960, Apolinars hei rs partitioned the property, declared the ir respective shares in their names for tax purposes an d paid the r ealty taxes.

no opp osition was filed by th e Bureaus of Lan ds an d Forestry to contest the a ppl ication of appellees on th e ground that the property still fo rms part o f th e public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in qu estion are forestal land.... [20]

Apart fro m this, private respondents claim tha t the land in que stion has long been a private one, it being a part of Hacienda de Mandau e de Cebu, which in turn w as recognized as a private land by the Court of First Ins tance of Ce bu in several de cisions dated February 27, 1934, March 27, 1935, May 6, 1937 and August 6, 1937. Indeed , before one can be granted a confirmation of title to land s of the public domain, the Public Land Act requires th at the applicant must p rove (a) th at the la nd is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continu ous, exclusive and notoriouspossession and occupa tion of the same must eith er be since time immemorial or for the p eriod p rescribed in th e Public Land Act. Only wh en these cond itions are met may the possessor of the land acquire, by operation of law , a righ t to a gra nt, a government grant, without th e necessity of a certificate o f title b eing issued. [10] Conclusively, the Court of Appeals erred wh en it held that mere adver se po ssession in accordance with law for a p eriod likewise provided for by law w ould automatically entitle the possessor to the right to register public land in h is name. The applicant ha s to estab lish first the disposable and alienable character of th e public lan d. O therwise, all public lands, regardless of their classification, can be subject of regi stration of private titles, as lo ng as the applicant shows that he meet s th e requ ired years of possession. Worth noting is th e case of Bracewell v. Court of Appeals, [11] where the applicant had been in possessi on of th e property since 1908 but it was conclus ively show n b y the g overnment that th e land was classified as alienable or disposable on ly on 27 March 1972. The Court said: x x x. Thu s, even granting th at petitioner and his p redecessors-in-interest ha d occu pied the sa me since 1908, he st ill cannot claim title th ereto by virtu e of s uch possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet alie na ble land at th at time nor capable of private appropriation. The adverse po ssession which may be th e basis of a grant of title or con fir mation of an imperfect title refers only to al ienable or d isposable portio ns of the public domain. [12] (Italics su pplied) To prove that the land subject of an application for reg istration is alien able, an applicant must establish the existen ce of a p ositive a ct of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; [13] a n ad ministrative action; [14] investigation reports of Bureau of Lands in vestigators; [15] and a legislative act or a st atute. [16] In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. In ting, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, statin g that the lots in volved were found to be within the alienable an d dispo sable (sic)

Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere pos session of public land fo r the period requi red by law w ould en title i ts occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in rulin g in favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of th e Pub lic Land Act is concerned, for they we re able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of their application. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respo nden ts were able to prove their open, continu ous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land even before th e year 1927. As a rule, we are bou nd by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. [21] Although there a re exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is o ne of the m. [22] WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DE NIED an d the d ecision, as w ell as the resolution, of the Court o f Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 31728 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.