Natres Cases 1

Solicitor General: The decision of the land registration court was null and void because the land registration court had no  jurisdiction over the case. The land in question was not alienable and disposable.

COLLADO v. CA FACTS: Petitioner Edna Collado applied for registration of a parcel of land (120 hectares in Antipolo, Rizal) with the land registration court. She attached a technical description of the Lot, signed by Robert Pangyarihan1, stating ―this survey is inside IN-12 IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.‖ About a year later, Collado amended the application to include additional co-applicants and more applicants joined (―petitioners‖). (―petitioners‖). The Republic through the SG, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through the Municipal Attorney and Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners’ application. ISSUES: 1.

WON Petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.

Petitioners: They have occupied the Lot for a long time and their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of one of their predecessors-in-interest 2 as early as 1902. There have been 9 transfers of rights among them and their predecessors-in-interest. Also, they have declared the Lot for taxation and paid all the real estate taxes. The land is not covered by any form of title or any public land application. It is also not within any government reservation. Private rights were vested on Leyva before the issuance of EO 33 (establishing the Marikina Watershed Reservation). Since EO 33 contains a saving clause that the reservations are subject to existing private rights, the Lot is excluded from such reservation.

3.

RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT: Petitioners presented sufficient evidence to establish their registrable rights over the Lot. RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: CA annulled the decision of the Trial Court. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of public domain belong to the State. An applicant for registration of a parcel of land has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. The petitioners failed to present evidence that the Lot has been segregated from the public domain and declared by competent authority to be alienable and disposable. The technical description which the petitioners attached to their application said that the survey is inside in the Mariquina Watershed. This has been confirmed by the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds in a Report. RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: Petition is DENIED. 1.

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 Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands  Sesinando Leyva

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Also, even if the Lot were alienable and disposable prior to the issuance of EO 33, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Thus, ever since, the land has become non-disposable and inalienable public land. The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 could no longer be counted because the

WON the petition for annulment of judgment should have been given due course.

Petitioners: The petition for annulment of judgment was filed long after the decision of the land registration court had become final and executor and is no longer available because of res judicata. The land registration court had  jurisdiction over the case, which involves private land. The Republic is stopped from questioning the court’s jurisdiction because the Republic participated in the proceedings before the court.

PETITIONERS HAVE NO REGISTRABLE TITLE OVER THE LOT.

Petitioners failed to complete the require period of possession under CA 1413 (Public Land Act) or under the amendment by RA 19424  and PD 10735  (the law prevailing at the time the petitioners applied for registration. When EO 33 was issued (1904), Leyva had been in possession of the Lot for only 2 years. There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33, the petitioners had acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed, acquisitive prescription, or any other mode of acquisition from the State.

Assuming no private rights attached prior to the issuance of EO 33, the President had subsequently segregated the Lot from the public domain and made the Lot alienable and disposable through Proclamation No. 1283. They say that the proclamation expressly excluded an area of 3780 hectares from the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-Boso Townsite Reservation. They contend that the Lot in question is part of the excluded town site are and that under CA 141, town sites are considered alienable and disposable. 2.

WON the petition-in-intervention is proper. (more on procedural)

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 Possession and occupation of lands of public domain since July 26, 1894. 4  A simple 30-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. 5  Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exc lusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure.

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Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. CA 141 only applies to alienable and disposable public agricultural land and not to forest lands, including watershed reservations. Possession of forest lands or other inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private ownership.

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Proclamation No. 1283 has been amended by Proclamation No. 1637, revising the area and location of proposed townsite. The new proclamation excluded the Lot in question and reverted it to MWR coverage. The certification presented by the petitioners that says that the Lot is covered by the reclassification is contradicted by the several documents submitted by the Solicitor General. In a Report, the Administrator of National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration confirmed that the Lot forms part of MWR and re commended the dismissal of the application for registration. Also, in a Letter, the Deputy Land Inspector of the DENR, confirmed that it is within the MWR. Lastly, Collado’s application attached a technical description stating that the Lot is inside the Mariquina Watershed. Once a parcel of land is included within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, there is the presumption that the land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent declassification is shown. 2.

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ALL PROCEEDINGS OF THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT INVOLVING THE LOT ARE NULL AND VOID.

The Lot is proven to be not alienable and disposable public land. The Land Registration court has no jurisdiction over nonregistrable properties. The doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental ights. Estoppel or laches does not validate an act that contravenes law or public policy. Res judicata must be disregarded if its application would sacrifice justice to technicality. Also, the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of public properties registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe. Mateo Carino (plaintiff in error) vs. Insular Government of the Philippines (defendant in error)

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Plaintiff, an Igorot, possessed the land for more than 30 years before the treaty of Paris. He and his ancestors had held the land for years. The local community recognizes them as the owners of the said land. His grandfather lived upon it and maintained fences around the property. His father raised cattle on the property and he had inherited the land according to Igorot custom. Although no title was issued to them from the Spanish Crown. He tried twice to have it registered during the Spanish occupation but to no avail. In 1901 he filed a petition alleging ownership of the land but he was only granted a possessory title. Premilinary issues. o Whether the mode of reaching the US supreme court was right (this was a writ of error, some were saying that it should have been an appeal)  –   Holmes said that the mode was correct. Writ of error was the general rule, appeal is the exception. He saw no reason not to apply the general rule to this case. o Another issue was that even if Carino was able to have a title over the land, he could not have it registered because Benguet was one of the excluded provinces in the Philippine Commission’s act no. 926 (AN ACT PRESCRIBING RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE HOMESTEADING, SELLING, AND LEASING OF PORTIONS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS…). But that law dealt with acquisition of new titles and perfecting of titles begun under the Spanish law. Carino argued that he could register the land under Philippine Commissions Act no. 496 which covered the entire Philippine archipelago. Holmes held that he could register the land if ownership can be maintained Main issue: whether Carino owns the land. Government’s argument: Spain had title to all o the land in the Philippines except those it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired. That there was a decree issued by Spain that required registration within a limited time. Carino’s land wasn’t registered and so in effect it became public land. USSC: Whatever the position of Spain was on the issue, it does not follow that the US would view plaintiff to have lost all his rights to the land  –   this would amount to a denial of native titles throughout Benguet just because Spain would not have granted to anyone in the province the registration of their lands. Organic act of July 1, 1902 provides that all the property and rights acquired there by the US would be for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof. This same statute made a bill of rights embodying the safeguards of the constitution, it provides that ―'no law 

212 US 449, 41 Phil Justice Holmes How it reached the court: -

Facts:

Plaintiff applied for registration of a certain land. Initially it was granted by the court, but the Government of the Philippines and the government of the United states appealed to the Court of first instance of Benguet (they were taking the property for public and military purposes. The CFI dismissed the application (for registration) and this was affirmed by the Philippine Supreme Court. This was brought to the US Supreme court by writ of error.

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shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws‖. It would be hard to believe that that ―any person‖ didn’t include the inhabitants of Benguet. Nor it meant ―property‖ to refer only to those lands which had become such under a ceremony(of registration) many of the people of the land may have not even heard of. Although in sec. 14 of the organic act, it is said that the Philippine commission may prescribe rules and regulations for perfecting titles to public lands, it should be noted that this section refers to those cases where the land was admitted to be public land. The US SC hesitates to suppose that it was intended to declare every native who had not a paper title, a trespasser. The question still remains: what property and rights did the US acquire? in cases like this one, the presumption would and should be against the government. As far back as memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it was never public land. It would not be proper to just let the conqueror to dictate how to deal with the Philippine tribes if it really meant to use the rights acquired by them ―for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof‖. The natives were recognized by the Spanish laws to own some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. They didn’t intend to turn all the inhabitants into trespassers. Principle of prescription was admitted: that if they weren’t able to produce title deeds, it is sufficient if they show ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription. although there was a decree in June 25, 1880 that required everyone to get a document of title or else lose his land, it does not appear that it meant to apply to all but only those who wrongfully occupied royal lands. IT doesn’t appear that the land of Carino was considered as Royal land nor was it considered to have been wrongfully occupied. Two articles of

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the same decree provided that titles would be attributed to those who may prove possession for the necessary time. There were indications that registration was expected but it didn’t mean that ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof was not to confer title to them but to establish it. ―Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain. ― Judgment reversed

Lee Hong Kok vs. David G.R. No. L-30389, Dec. 27, 1972

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Distinction between IMPERIUM and DOMINIUM

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Only the government can question a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a government grant.

FACTS: This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto, pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application. After approval of his application, the Director of Lands issued an order of award and issuance of sales patent, covering said lot by virtue of which the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent. The Register of Deeds then issued an original certificate of title to David. During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor file any adverse claim. ISSUE:

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Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the government grant

HELD: Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings afterclaiming it as their private property. The fact that the grant was made by the government is

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undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government. IMPERIUM vs.

Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. is the recipient of a Sales Patent issued by the Bureau of Lands over two parcels of land in Bataan. An OCT was thereby issued. The Solicitor-General filed an action for reversion on the ground that the lots were forest lands and therefore inalienable.

DOMINIUM: CA

The government authority possessed by the State which is appropriately embraced int eh concept of sovereignty comes under the heading of imperium; its capacity to own or acquire property under dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the State in i ts proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.

ruled,

FACTS:  Petitioners in this appeal by certiorari seek to reverse a decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming a lower court  judgment dismissing their complaint to have the Torrens Title of respondent Aniano David declared null and void. According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffs appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. David acquired lawful title pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application in accordance with which an order of award and for issuance of a sales patent was made by the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892 containing an area of 226 square meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre, On the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City to defendant-appellee Aniano David on October 21, 1959. ISSUE: Can petitioners bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent? RULING: NO. Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title i ssued pursuant to a void patent Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government. Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. vs. CA G.R. No. 50464, Jan. 29, 1990

the

Solicitor-General's contention.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not land is alienable

HELD: The

PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE HONG HOK, ROSITA LEE HONG HOK and LEONCIO LEE HONG HOK, petitioners, vs. ANIANO DAVID, THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. No. L-30389. December 27, 1972.

upholding

SC

affirmed.

Our adherence to the Regalian Doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the State. Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural purposes, there must be a positive act from the Government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer any validity on such title if the property covered by the title or patent is part of the public forest.

G.R. No. L-60413 October 31, 1990 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO, Judge, Br. I, C I, Nueva Vizcaya, HEIRS OF CASIANO SANDOVAL, HEIRS OF LIBERATO BAYAUA, JOSE C. REYES, and PHILIPPINE CACAO AND FARM PRODUCTS, INC., respondents. NARVASA, J.: Sought to be annulled and set aside in this special civil action of certiorari is the decision of respondent Judge Sofronio G. Sayo rendered on March 5, 1981 in Land Registration Case No. N-109, LRC Record No. 20850, confirming, by virtue of a compromise agreement, the title of the private respondents over a tract of land. The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an original application for registration of a tract of land identified as Lot No. 7454 of the Cadastral Survey of Santiago, BL Cad. 211 (July 17, 1961) and having an area of 33,950 hectares. The land was formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province of Isabela, but had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic Act No. 236.

FACTS:

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Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, and some others, including the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua.  1 In due course, an order of general default was thereafter entered on December 11, 1961 against the whole world except the oppositors.

The respondents maintain, on the other hand, that the Solicitor General's arguments are premised on the proposition that Lot 7454 is public land, but it is not. According to them, as pointed out in the application for registration, the private character of the land is demonstrated by the following circumstances, to wit:

The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until March 3, 1981 when a compromise agreement was entered into by and among all the parties, assisted by their respective counsel, namely: the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (who had since died), the Bureau of Lands, the Bureau of Forest Development, the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, and the Philippine Cacao and Farm Products, Inc. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (as applicants) renounced their claims and ceded — 

1) the possessory information title of the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest;

1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an area of 4,109 hectares; 2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development, 12,341 hectares; 3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, 4,000 hectares; and 4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc., 8,000 hectares. The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was, under the compromise agreement, adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area, 1,500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees. In consideration of the areas respectively allocated to them, all the parties also mutually waived and renounced all their prior claims to and over Lot No. 7454 of the Santiago Cadastre. In a decision rendered on March 5, 1981, the respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance wi th its terms. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, has taken the present recourse in a bid to have that decision of March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void and rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor General contends that —  1) no evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for registration; 2) neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest Development had legal authority to enter into the compromise agreement; 3) as counsel of the Republic, he should have been but was not given notice of the compromise agreement or otherwise accorded an opportunity to take part therein; 4) that he was not even served with notice of the decision approving the compromise; it was the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino Province that drew his attention to the "patently erroneous decision" and requested him to take immediate remedial measures to bring about its annulment.

2) the fact that Lot 7454 was never claimed to be public land by the Director of Lands in the proper cadastral proceedings; 3) the pre-war certification of the National Library dated August 16, 1932 to the effect that the (Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896 and appearing in the Bureau of Archives, the property in question was registered under the 'Spanish system of land registration as private property owned by Don Liberato Bayaua, applicants' predecessors-in-interest; 4) the proceeding for registration, brought under Act 496 (the Torrens Act) presupposes that there is already a title to be confirmed by the court, distinguishing it from proceedings under the Public Land Act where the presumption is always that the land involved belongs to the State. Under the Regalian Doctrine 2  all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence it is that all applicants in land registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. 3 Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain . 4 The applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title. 5 In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document relied upon and presented by the applicants for registration, to prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of their application, was a photocopy of a certification of the National Library dated August 16, 1932 (already above mentioned) to the effect that according to the Government's(Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued i n 1896, the property in question was registered under the Spanish system of land registration as private property of Don Liberato Bayaua. But, as this Court has already had occasion to rule, that Spanish document, the (Estadistica de Propiedades,) cannot be considered a title to property, it n ot being one of the grants made during the Spanish regime, and obviously not constituting primary evidence of ownership. 6 It is an inefficacious document on which to base any finding of the private character of the land in question. And, of course, to argue that the initiation of an application for registration of land under the Torrens Act is proof that the land is

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of private ownership, not pertaining to the public domain, is to beg the question. It is precisely the character of the land as private which the applicant has the obligation of establishing. For there can be no doubt of the intendment of the Land Registration Act, Act 496, that every applicant show a proper title for registration; indeed, even in the absence of any adverse claim, the applicant is not assured of a favorable decree by the Land Registration Court, if he fails to establish a proper title for official recognition. It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a quo is based solely on the compromise agreement of the parties. But that compromise agreement included private persons who had not adduced any competent evidence of their ownership over the land subject of the registration proceeding. Portions of the land in controversy were assigned to persons or entities who had presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any part of the land. What was done was to consider the compromise agreement as proof of title of the parties taking part therein, a totally unacceptable proposition. The result has been the adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons w ho had not submitted any substantiation at all of their pretensions to ownership, founded on nothing but the agreement among themselves that they had rights and interests over the land.

such evidence and the law may warrant. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 129401

February 2, 2001

FELIPE SEVILLE in his capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of JOAQUIN ORTEGA and/or FELIPE SEVILLE, EMILIA ESTRADA, MARIA S. TEUDER, MA. ISABEL SEVILLE, MA. TERESITA LICARDO, FRANCISCO SEVILLE, RAMON O. SEVILLE, JOSE MARIE SEVILLE, GEMMA ALVAREZ-ASAYAS, ANNABELLE ALVAREZ-GONZALES, SYLVIA ALVAREZ-LIOK, ADOLFO O. ALVAREZ JR., DIANA ALVAREZDABON, MARIA SALVADOR O. POLANCOS and JOAQUIN ORTEGA II as successors-in-interest of JOAQUIN ORTEGA and his estate, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LEYTE SAB-A BASIN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATED SMELTING AND REFINING CORPORATION, LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO., PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTIUZER CORPORATION, CALIXTRA YAP and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LEYTE, respondents. PANGANIBAN, J.:

The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the absence of evidence of title required of the private respondents. As to the informacion posesoria invoked by the private respondents, it should be pointed out that under the Spanish Mortgage Law, it was considered a mode of acquiring title to public lands, subject to two (2) conditions: first, the inscription thereof in the Registry of Property, and second, actual, public, adverse, and uninterrupted possession of the land for twenty (20) years (later reduced to ten [10] years); but where, as here, proof of fulfillment of these conditions is absent, theinformacion posesoria cannot be considered as anything more than prima facie evidence of possession. 7 Finally, it was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the execution of the compromise agreement and its submission to the Court for approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who is the principal counsel of the Government; this is the reason for our holding that "Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of the Solicitor General in l and registration cases, are not binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor General." 8 It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the  judgment approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared null and void, and set aside. Considerations of fairness however indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that the private parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by competent evidence their respective claims to the property. WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge complained of is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Land Registration Case No. N-109 subject of the petition is REMANDED to the court of origin which shall conduct further appropriate proceedings therein, receiving the evidence of the parties and thereafter rendering judgment as

Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person, that piece of land remains part of the public domain. Hence, occupation thereof, however long, cannot ripen into ownership. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the November 29, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals1 (CA), as well as the May 19, 1997 CA Resolution 2 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads as follows: "WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Another judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint. The counterclaims of appellants are denied. Costs against plaintiffs-appellees." 3 The Facts The appellate court narrated the undisputed facts in this manner: "1. By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 625, Leyte Sab-A Basin Development Authority (LSBDA) was created to integrate government and private sector efforts for a planned development and balanced growth of the Sab-a Basin in the [P]rovince of Leyte, empowered to acquire real property in the successful prosecution of its business. Letter of Instruction No. 962 authorized LSBDA to acquire privately-owned lands circumscribed in the Leyte Industrial Development Estate (LIDE) by way of negotiated sales with the landowners.

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"2. On June 14, 1980, [Respondent] Calixtra Yap sold to LSBDA Lot No. 057 SWO 08-000047 consisting of 464,920 square meters, located at Barangay Sto. Rosario, Isabel, Leyte, covered under Tax Declarations Nos. 3181, 3579, 3425, 1292 and 4251 under the name of said vendor.1âwphi1.nêt "3. On June 1, 1982, appellant LSBDA fired a Miscellaneous Sales Application with the Bureau of Lands covering said lot together with other lots acquired by LSBDA with an aggregate area of '442,7508 square meters.' "4. After due notice and investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 9353 was issued in the name of [Respondent] LSBDA on the basis of which Original Certificate of Title No. P-28131 was transcribed in the Registration Book for the [P]rovince of Leyte on August 12, 1983 in the name of [Respondent] LSBDA. On December 14, 1989, LSBDA assigned all its rights over the subject property to its [Corespondent] National Development Company (NOC) as a result of which a new Transfer Certificate of Title "vas issued on March 2, 1990 by the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Northern Leyte in the name of NDC. The subject property was leased to [Respondents] Philippine Associated Smelting & Refining Corporation (PASAR), Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (PHILPHOS) and Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., Inc. (LEPANTO). "5. On November 29, 1988, the Estate of Joaquin Ortega represented by judicial administrator Felipe Seville filed with the Regional Trial Court (Branch 12) of Ormoc City, a complaint for recovery of real property, rentals and damages against the above-named [respondents] which complaint was later on amended on May 11, 1990. [Respondents] filed their respective Answers. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: 'WHEREFORE, [a] decision is hereby rendered for [petitioners] and against [respondents]. '1. The Deed of Sale executed by Calixtra Yap on June 14, 1980 in favor of LSBDA, (Exhibit PP and 25) conveying the subject property to said LSBDA is declared NULL and VOID ab initio;

issue 8 new title to the said portion in the name of the Intestate Estate of Joaquin Ortega; '4. [Respondents] LSBDA, NDC, PASAR, are ordered to pay jointly and severally to [petitioners] the sum of FOUR MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SIX PESOS (P4,784,846.00) as rentals due from 1979 to the present, plus accrued interest pursuant to par. 2 of the Lease Contract between NDC and PASAR. (Exhibit 54) '5. [Respondents] LSBDA, NDC, and PHILPHOS are also ordered to pay jointly and severally [petitioners] the sum of TWO MILLION EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT PESOS AND SIXTY CENTAVOS (P2,086,398.60) as accrued rentals of PHILPHOS from 1979 to present, plus the accrued interest for nonpayment pursuant to paragraph 2 of the same Lease Contract cited above; '6. [Respondents] are ordered to pay jointly and severally [petitioners] P200,000.00 as indemnity for the value of the ancestral home; '7. [Respondents] are also ordered to pay jointly and severally [petitioners] the sum of P250,000.00 as reimbursement for attorney's fees and the further sum of P50,000.00 as expenses for litigation; '8. Finally, [petitioners] and [respondents] are ordered to sit down together and discuss the possibility of a compromise agreement on how the improvements introduced on the landholding subject of the present suit should be disposed of and for the parties to submit to this Court a joint manifestation relative thereto. In the absence of any such compromise agreement, such improvements shall be disposed of pursuant to Article 449 of the New Civil Code. 'Costs against [respondents]. 'SO ORDERED.'"4

'2. The intestate estate of JOAQUIN ORTEGA is declared the owner in fee simple of the 735,333 square meters real property subject of the present action and defendant NDC is ordered to segregate the same area from OCT P-28131 and CONVEY the same to the Estate of Joaquin Ortega; '3. Upon the segregation of the 735,333 square meters from OCT No. P-28131 the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte is ordered to

Ruling of the Court of Appeals Citing the Regalian doctrine that lands not appearing to be privately owned are presumed to be part of the public domain, the CA held that, first, there was no competent evidence to prove that the property in question was private in character.Second, possession thereof, no matter how long, would not ripen into ownership, absent any showing that the land had been classified as alienable. Third, the property had been u ntitled before the issuance of the Miscellaneous Sales Patent in favor of LSBDA. Fourth, petitioners were guilty of laches, because they had

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failed to apply for the judicial confirmation of their title, if they had any. Fifth, there was no evidence of bad faith on "the part of LSBDA in dealing with Yap regarding the property.

be granted, because it is based on a wrong premise and amounts to a collateral attack, which is not allowed by law. Public Character of the Land

Hence, this

Petition.5

The Issues In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for the consideration of the Court: 6 "A. Whether or not the sale by Calixtra Yap of the Estate of the Late Joaquin Ortega in favor of LSBDA was null and void. "B. Whether or not the issuance of a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and an Original Certificate of Title in favor of LSBDA was valid. "C. Whether or not petitioners are guilty of laches. "D. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the remedy of reconveyance and the damages awarded by the trial court." In the main, the Court is called upon to determine the validity of LSBDA's title. In resolving this issue, it will also ascertain whether, before the issuance of the title, the land was private or public. The Court's Ruling

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.8 In Menguito v. Republic,9 the Court held that "[u]nless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, 'occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.' To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable." A person in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of a public land for more than thirty years acquires an imperfect title thereto. That title may be the subject of judicial confirmation, pursuant to Section 48 of the Public Land Act, which provides: "SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest thereon, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

The Petition has no merit.  x x x

xxx

xxx

Main Issue: Validity of LSBDA

Petitioners argue that LSBDA's title to 73 hectares of the 402hectare Leyte Industrial Development Estate was void, having allegedly been obtained from Calixtra Yap who had no right to it. They maintain that they acquired title to the disputed property by acquisitive prescription, because they and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of it for more than thirty years.7 Although it w as the subject of settlement proceedings, petitioners further claim that Yap sold the same to LSBDA without the permission of the trial court. Disputing these contentions, respondents and the appellate court maintain that petitioners have not shown that the land had previously been classified as alienable and disposable. Absent such classification, they argue that possession of i t, no matter how long, could not ripen into ownership. We agree with respondents and the appellate court. First, there was no showing that the land had been classified as alienable before the title was issued to LSBDA; hence, petitioners could not have become owners thereof through acquisitive prescription. Second, petitioners' challenge to LSBDA's title cannot

(b) those who by themselves or through their predecessor in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall he entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter." Under Section 4 of P residential Decree (PD) No. 1073,10 paragraph "b" of the aforecited provision applies only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The provision reads: "SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act, are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945."

8

It should be stressed that petitioners had no certificate of title over the disputed property. Although they claim that their title was based on acquisitive prescription, they fail to present incontrovertible proof that the land had previously been classified as alienable. They simply brush aside the conclusion of the CA on this crucial point by saying that it was "without factual basis."11  Instead, they maintain that the private character of the land was evidenced by various tax declarations, Deeds of Sale, and Decisions of the trial court and even the Supreme Court.12 Petitioners' arguments are not convincing. Tax declarations are not conclusive proofs of ownership, let alone of the private character of the land. At best, they are merely "indicia of a claim of ownership."13 In Spouses Palomo v. CA,14 the Court also rejected tax declarations as proof of private ownership, absent any showing that the forest land in question had been reclassified as alienable. Moreover, the Deeds of Sale of portions of the disputed property, which Joaquin Ortega and several vendors executed, do not prove that the land was private in character. The question remains: What was the character of the land when Ortega purchased it? Indeed, a vendee acquires only those rights belonging to the vendor. But petitioners failed to show that, at the time, the vendors were already its owners, or that the land was already classified as alienable. CA,15 in

Also misplaced is petitioners' reliance on Ortega v. which the Supreme Court allegedly recognized the private character of the disputed property .In that case, the sole issue was "whether the respondent judge x x x acted in excess of jurisdiction when he converted Civil Case No. 1184-O, an action for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of sale, and annulment of tax declaration of a parcel of land, into an action for the declaration of who is the legal wife, who are the legitimate children, if any, and who are the compulsory heirs of the deceased Joaquin Ortega." 16 The Court did not at all make any ruling that the property had been classified as alienable. In any event, Ortega arose from a suit for quieting of title, an action quasi in rem that was binding only between the parties.17 The present respondents as well as the Bureau of Lands, which subsequently declared that the land was public, are not bound by that ruling, because they were not impleaded therein. While petitioners refer to the trial court proceedings supposedly recognizing the private character of the disputed property, they make no claim that these cases directly involve the classification of the land, or that the Bureau of Lands is a party thereto. Clearly, the burden of proof that the land has been classified as alienable is on the claimant. 18 In the present case, petitioners failed to discharge this burden. Hence, their possession of the disputed property, however long, cannot ripen into ownership. LSBDA's Title

Equally unmeritorious is the argument of petitioners that the title of LSBDA is void. As earlier stated, they claim that such title was derived from Calixtra Yap, who was allegedly not the owner of

the property. Petitioners assume that LSBDA, having acquired the rights of Yap, resorted to a confirmation of her imperfect title under Section 48 of the Public Land Act. This argument is devoid of factual or legal basis. Petitioners fail to consider that the title of LSBDA was based, not on the conveyance made by Yap, but on Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 9353 issued by the director of the Bureau of Lands. In fact, after LSBDA had filed an application for patent, the Bureau of Lands conducted an investigation and found that the land was part of the public domain. After compliance with the notice and publication requirements, LSBDA acquired the property in a public auction conducted by the Bureau of L ands.19 Petitioners insist, however, that LSBDA was estopped from claiming that the land was public, because the Deed of Sale executed by Yap in its favor stipulated that "the seller is the absolute owner in fee simple of the x x x described property." 20It is scarcely necessary to address this point. To begin with, the power to classify a land as alienable belongs to the State, not to private entities. Hence, the pronouncements of Yap or LSBDA cannot effect the reclassification of the property. Moreover, the assailed misrepresentation was made by Yap as seller. Hence, objections thereto should be raised not by petitioners but by LSBDA, the contracting party obviously aggrieved. In any case, the actions of LSBDA after Yap's conveyance demonstrated its position that the disputed land was part of the public domain. That this was so can be inferred from LSBDA's subsequent application for a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and, in a public auction, its purchase of the property from the Bureau of Lands. Indeed, Yap merely conveyed a claim, not a title which she did not have. Collateral Attack 

There is another reason for denying the present Petition. Petitioners insist that they "are not seeking the re-opening of a decree under the Torrens system." Supposedly, they are only "praying for the segregation of 735,333 square meters of land, or 73 hectares more or less from the OCT No. P-28131 issued to LSBDA."21 This disputation is mere quibbling over words, plain and simple. Semantics aside, petitioners are effectively seeking the modification of LSBDA's OCT, w hich allegedly encompassed even a parcel of land allegedly belonging to them. Hence, the present suit, purportedly filed for the "recovery of real property and damages," is tantamount to a collateral attack not sanctioned by law. Section 48 of PD 1529, the Property Registration Decree, expressly provides: "SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. -- A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law." It has been held that a certificate of title, once registered, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified,

9

enlarged or diminished, except in a direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, the reliance on registered titles would be lost.22 Moreover, the title became indefeasible and incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from the time of its registration and issuance.23 Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that "[u]pon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or other persons responsible for the fraud." Although LSBDA's title was registered in 1983, petitioners filed the amended Complaint only in 1990. Reconveyance

Petitioners also claim that the disputed property should be reconveyed to them. This cannot be allowed. Considering that the land was public before the Miscellaneous Sales Patent was issued to LSBDA, petitioners have no standing to ask for the reconveyance of the property to them. The proper remedy is an action for reversion, which may be instituted only by the Office of the Solicitor General, pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act, which reads as follows: "SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the [Republic] of the Philippines."

G.R. No. 73974, May 31, 1995



Regalian Doctrine



Burden of Proof of private ownership rests on plaintiff



Doctrine of indefeasibility of Torrens title, exception

FACTS: Petitioner was awarded a 17-hectare parcel of land, by virtue of which he was issued an OCT. Through an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, it was found that the free patent acquired by Petitioner was fraudulent. A case for falsification of public documents was filed by Petitioner was acquitted of the crime. Subsequently, the Solicitor-General filed a complaint against Petitioner, praying for the declaration of nullity of the Free Patent and the OCT. Petitioner's main contention was that the land in question was no longer within the unclassified public forest land because by the approval of his application for Free Patent by the Bureau of Lands, the land was already alienable and disposable public agricultural land. He also claimed that the land was a small portion of Lot 5139, an area w hich had been declared disposable public land by the cadastral court. ISSUE:

Verily, the prayer for reconveyance and, for that matter, the entire case of petitioners rest on the theory that they have acquired the property by acquisitive prescription; and that Yap, without any right or authority, sold the same to LSBDA.



Whether or not the land is alienable and disposable public land

Conclusion

HELD:

In the light of our earlier disquisition, the theory has no leg to stand on. Absent any showing that the land has been classified as alienable, their possession thereof, no matter how l engthy, cannot ripen into ownership. In other words, they have not become owners of the disputed property. Moreover, LSBDA's title was derived from a Miscellaneous Sales Patent, not from Yap. Finally, petitioners cannot, by a collateral attack, challenge a certificate of title that has already become indefeasible and incontrovertible.

Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise clearly appearing to be privately-owned are presumed to belong to the State. Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they under the Constitution become private properties. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.

If petitioners believe that they have been defrauded by Yap, they should seek redress, not in these proceedings, but in a proper action in accordance with law. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.1âwphi1.nêt

The task of administering and disposing lands of the public domain belongs to the Director of Lands, and ultimately the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Classification of public lands is, thus, an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.

SO ORDERED.

Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public agricultural lands, the burden of overcoming the presumption of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant.

Jun 14, 2008 Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City

In the present case, Petitioner failed to present clear, positive and absolute evidence to overcome said presumption and to support

10

his

claim.

Moreover, the fact the Petitioner acquired a title to the land is of no moment, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of title issued under the Torrens System. The indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured the same by means of fraud. Fraud here means actual and extrinsic -- an intentional omission of fact required by law. Petitioner committed fraud by his failure to state that the land sought to be registered still formed part of the unclassified forest lands.

On May 8, 1990, the Regional Director ordered respondent to vacate the land in question, but respondent refused. On July 24, 1990, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Basilan province, a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession with preliminary injunction of the subject parcel of land. In Answer to the complaint, respondent alleged that the land occupied by him belonged to the Republic of the Philippines, and that he had introduced improvements thereon such as coconut and other fruit trees.

G.R. No. 128017 January 20, 1999 RAMON vs. ALFREDO FALCASANTOS, respondent.

and rejected his application for free patent for lack of interest, and allowed petitioner to file a public land application for the subject land.

ITURALDE, petitioner,

PARDO, J.: The case is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals reversing that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Basilan province, and dismissing petitioner's complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land with the improvements existing thereon, situated at Barangay Upper Bañas, municipality of Lantawan, province of Basilan, with an area of 7.1248 hectares. The facts may be related as follows: On October 17, 1986, petitioner acquired by purchase from the heirs of. Pedro Mana-ay a parcel of land located at Bañas, Lantawan, Basilan Province, with an area of 6.0000 hectares, more or less, more particularly described as follows: A parcel of land, situated at Bañas, Lantawan Basilan. Bounded on the North by property of Alejandro; Marso; on the East by property of Ramon Bacor; on the South by property at Atty. Ricardo G. Mon and on the West by property of Librada Guerrero. Containing an area of 6.0000 hectares, more or less. However, on November 3, 1986, respondent applied with the Bureau of Lands in Isabela, Basilan province, for the award to him of the same parcel of land under free patent. On November 17, 1986, petitioner filed a protest to such application. On February 7, 1989, the Regional Director of Lands rendered a decision giving respondent a period of one hundred twenty (120) days to exercise the right to repurchase the land by reimbursing petitioner of all expenses he incurred in the purchase of the property in question, and held in abeyance respondent's application for free patent. On October 11, 1989, the Regional Director issued an order declaring that respondent had waived his right of repurchase,

After trial on the merits, on March 20, 1993, the trial court rendered decision declaring petitioner the owner and the possessor of the subject parcel of land with all the improvements existing thereon, situated at Barangay Upper Bañas, municipality of Lantawan, province of Basilan, with an area of 3.1248 hectares, and ordering respondent to vacate the land in question, to pay petitioner the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) as attorneys fee, the amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as litigation expenses, the three hundred pesos (P300.00) as judicial cost. In due time, petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals. On December 20, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered decision reversing the appealed decision, and entering a new judgment dismissing petitioner's complaint without prejudice to any action that petitioner may take if the subject land was declassified from forest land to alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Hence, the present recourse. Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the trial court's decision in his favor and dismissing the complaint because when the Director of Lands allowed petitioner to file a public land application for said property, it was equivalent to a declaration that said land was no longer part of the public domain. We deny the petition. The Court of Appeals correctly held that "the evidence is unrebutted that the subject land is within the Forest Reserve Area as per L.C. Map No. 1557 certified on August 13, 1951'." 1 and, hence, not capable of private appropriation and occupation. 2 In Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon , we held that "Forest land, like mineral timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they under the Constitution, become private properties. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition." 3

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In Sunbeam Convenience Foods Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we said: "Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain." 4 Hence, a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. " 5 And the rule is "Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership."  6 What is more, there is yet no award or grant to petitioner of the land in question by free patent or other ways of acquisition of public land. Consequently, he cannot lawfully claim to be the owner of the land in question.

Held: The property subject of this application was alienable and disposable public agricultural land. However, respondent failed to prove that it possesses registrable title over the property. The statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural lands does not operate against the statute unless the occupant proves possession and occupation of the same after a claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership, such possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to presumptive grant from the state. In light of the foregoing, the petition of the Republic of the Philippines is granted.

Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, Case Digest G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995 Facts

WHEREFORE, the Courts hereby AFFIRMS the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42306, dismissing the complaint of petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Basilan province, in Civil Case No. 441-63. No costs.1âwphi1.nêt SO ORDERED. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CANDY MAKER, INC. (GR.NO. 163766, June. 22, 2006)

Facts: On April, 29, 1999, Antonia, Eladia, and Felisa, all surnamed Cruz, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Candy Maker, Inc. for a parcel of land located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50m, about 900 meters away the Laguna de Bay. Candy Maker, Inc. as applicant, filed an application with the MTC of Taytay, Rizal for registration of it’s alleged title over the lot. The CENRO of Antipolo City declared the land to fall within the alienable and disposable zone. On the otherhand, the Land Registration Authority recommended the exclusion of lot no. 3138-B on the ground that it is a legal easement and intended for public use, hence, inalienable and indisposable. On July 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, the LLDA filed it’s opposition which alleged that the lot subject of the application for registration may not be alienated and disposed since it is considered part of the Laguna Lake Bed, a public land within, it’s jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether the property subject of the amended application is alienable and disposable property of the State, and if so, whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of evidence to prove it’s ownership over the property?

:

Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources. The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution…shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines.‖ and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court. Issue Are the Ruling

two

Department

Administrative

Orders

: valid? :

Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration, development and

12

utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus: Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect. Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State. Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

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