napocor vs agro digest

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. MANUBAY AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J .: How much just compensation should be paid for an easement of a right of way over a parcel of land that will be traversed by highpowered transmission lines? Should such compensation be a simple easement fee or the full value of the property? This is the question to be answered in this case. The Facts The CA summarized the antecedents of the case as follows: "In 1996, [Petitioner] NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, a government-owned and controlled corporation created for the purpose of undertaking the development and generation of hydroelectric power, commenced its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power  Transmission Project. The project aims to transmit the excess electrical generating capacity coming from Leyte Geothermal Plant to Luzon and various load centers to interconnect the entire country into a single power grid. Apparently, the project is for a public purpose. "In order to carry out this project, it is imperative for the transmission lines to cross over certain lands owned by private individuals and entities. One of these lands, only a portion will be traversed by the transmission lines, is owned by MANUBAY AGROINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. "Hence, on 03 December 1996, filed a complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City against in order to acquire an easement of right of way over the land which the latter owns. The said land is situated at Km. 8, Barangay Pacol, Naga City, Camarines Sur and described with more particularity, as follows: "On 02 January 1997, [respondent] filed its answer. Thereafter, the court a quo issued an order dated 20 January 1997 authorizing the immediate issuance of a writ of possession and directing Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff to immediately place in possession of the subject land. Likewise, for the purpose of determining the fair and just compensation due to [respondent], the court appointed three commissioners . . "Accordingly, the commissioners submitted their individual appraisal/valuation reports recommended recommended the price of P115.00 per  square meter. On the other hand, Commissioner Bulao, recommended recommended the price of P550.00 per square meter. the total amount of P12,628,940.50 5 for the entire area affected." affected." Ruling of the Regional Trial Court The trial court opined that the installation thereon of the 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project would impose a limitation on the use of the land for an indefinite period of time, thereby justifying the payment of the full value of the property. 6

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Further, the RTC held that it was not bound by the provision cited by petitioner -- Section 3- A 3- A of Republic Act 6395 639 5 , as amended by Presidential Decree 938. This law prescribes as just compensation for the acquired easement of a right of way over an expropriated property an easement fee in an amount not exceeding 10 percent of the market value of such property. The trial court relied on the earlier pronouncements of this Court that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. Thus, valuations made by the executive branch or the legislature are at best initial or preliminary only. Ruling of the Court of Appeals  Affirming the RTC, RTC, the CA held that RA 6395, as amended by PD No. 938, did not preclude expropriation. Section Section 3-A thereof  allowed the power company to acquire not just an easement of a right of way, but even the land itself. Such easement was deemed by the appellate court to be a "taking" under the power of eminent domain. The CA observed that, given their nature, high-powered high- powered electric lines traversing respondent’s property would necessarily diminish -if not damage entirely -- the value and the use of the affected property; as well as endanger lives and limbs because of the hightension current conveyed through the lines. Manubay was therefore deemed entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the property taken. Accordingly, the appellate found the award of P550 per  square meter to be proper and reasonable. 8 Hence, this Petition. Petition. Issues How much just compensation should be paid for an easement of a right of way over a parcel of land that will be traversed by h ighpowered transmission lines? Should such compensation be a simple easement fee or the full value of the property? The Court’s Ruling Sole Issue: Just Compensation 

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NAPOCOR ARGUES contends that the valuation of the expropriated property -- fixed by the trial court and affirmed by the CA -- was too high a price for  the acquisition of an easement of a mere aerial right of way, because respondent would continue to own and use the subject land anyway. argues that in a strict sense, there is no "taking" of property, but merely an imposition of an encumbrance or a personal 10 easement/servitude under Article 61 4 of the Civil Code. Such encumbrance will not result in ousting or depriving respondent of the beneficial en joyment of the property. And even if there was a "taking," NAPOCOR points out that the loss is limited only to a portion of the aerial domain above the property of respondent. Hence, the latter should be compensated only for what it would actually lose. NAPOCOR averred in its Complaint in Civil Case No. RTC 96-3675 that it had sought to acquire an easement of a right of way over  11 portions of respondent’s land -- a total area of 22,961.71 square meters. In its prayer, however, it also sought authority to enter the property and demolish all improvements existing thereon, in order to commence and undertake the construction of its Power  Transmission Project. In other words, the expropriation was not to be limited to an easement of a right of way. In its Answer,MANUBAY alleged that it had already authorized NAPOCOR to take possession of the affected portions of the property and to install electric towers thereon. Granting arguendo that what petitioner acquired over respondent’s property was purely an easement of a right of way, still, THE COURT cannot sustain its view that it should pay only an easement fee, and not the full value of the property. The acquisition of  such an easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. This conclusion finds support in similar cases in which the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private 13 14 property condemned for public use. Republic v. PLDT  held thus: "x x x. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through 15 expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way." True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis . As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of  normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor  16 less than the monetary equivalent of the land. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to which the owner of a condemned property is entitled is generally the market value. Market value is "that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner  18 willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." However, these values may serve 19 as factors to be considered in the judicial valuation of the property . The parcels of land sought to be expropriated are undeniably undeveloped, raw agricultural land. But a dominant portion thereof has 20 21 been reclassified by the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Naga -- as residential, per the August 8, 1996 . . The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner. In fixing the valuation at P550 per square meter, the trial court had considered the Report of the commissioners and the proofs submitted by the parties. These documents included the following: (1) the established fact that the property of respondent was located along the Naga-Carolina provincial road; (2) the fact that it was about 500 meters from the Kayumanggi Resort and 8 kilometers from the Naga City Central Business District; and a half kilometer from the main entrance of the fully developed Naga City Sports Complex -- used as the site of the Palarong Pambansa -- and the San Francisco Village Subdivision, a first class subdivision where lots were priced at P2,500 per square meter; (3) the fair market value of P650 per square meter proffered by respondent, citing its recently concluded sale of a portion of the same property to Metro Naga Water District at a fixed pric e of P800 per square meter; (4) the BIR zonal valuation of residential lots in Barangay Pacol, Naga City, fixed at a price of P220 per square meter as of 1997; and (5) the fact that the price of P430 per square meter had been determined by the RTC of Naga City (Branch 24 21) as just compensation for the Mercados’ adjoining property, which had been expropriated by NPC for the same power  transmission project. Factors considered in arriving at a reasonable estimate of just compensation for respondent were the location; the most profitable likely use of the remaining area; and the size, shape, accessibility as well as listings of other properties within the vicinity. Averments pertaining to these factors were supported by documentary evidence. The price of P550 per square meter appears to be the closest approximation of the market value of the lots in the adjoining, fully developed San Francisco Village Subdivision. 25 Inasmuch as the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function , and the trial court apparently did not act capriciously or arbitrarily in setting the price at P550 per square meter -- an award affirmed by the CA -- we see no reason to disturb the factual findings as to the valuation of the property.

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G.R. No. L-42334

October 31, 1936

NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO., plaintiff-appellant, vs. SERAFIN HIDALGO, defendant-appellee.

Hilado and Hilado for appellant. Simeon Bitanga for appellee. Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso and DeWitt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile as amici curiæ.

RECTO, J.:

It appears that the NNSC the owner of a site in which is located its sugar central, with its factory building and residence for its employees and laborers, known as the "mill site." It also owns the adjoining sugar plantation known as Hacienda "B egoña." Across its properties the NNSC constructed a road connecting the "mill site" with the provincial highway. Through this road NNSC allowed and still allows vehicles to pass upon payment of a toll charge of P0.15 for each truck or automobile. Pedestrians are allowed free passage through it. Immediately adjoining the above-mentioned "mill site" is the hacienda of Luciano Aguirre, known as Hacienda "Sañgay," where the defendant has a billiard hall and a tuba saloon. Like other people in and about the place, defendant used to pass through the said road of the plaintiff, because it was his only means of access to the Hacienda "Sañgay" where he runs his billiard hall and tuba saloon. Later on, by order of NNSC, every time that the defendant passed driving his automobile with a cargo of tuba NNSC gatekeeper would stop him and prevent him from passing through said road. HIDALGO in such cases merely deviated from said road and continued on his way to Hacienda "Sañgay" across the fields of Hacienda "Begoña," likewise belonging to the plaintiff.

The extraordinary remedy of injunction will not be granted to prevent or remove a nuisance unless there is a strong case of  pressing necessity, and not because of a trifling discomfort. (De Ayala vs. Barretto, 33 Phil., 538.) The existence of a right violated is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. . . . A permanent injunction should not be awarded except in a clear case and to prevent irreparable injury. (32 C. J., 34-36.)

None of these requisites is present in the instant case. There has been a failure to establish either the existence of a clear  and positive right of the NNSC specially calling for judicial protection through an extraordinary writ of the kind applied for, or that the defendant has committed or attempts to commit any act which has endanger or tends to endanger the existence of said right, or has injured or threatens to injure the same. The deduction from plaintiff's evidence is, that the real damage which it seeks to avoid does not consist in defendant's taking tuba with him while traversing the former's property, as there is no causal relation between the act and any resultant damage , but in the fact that tuba is disposed of at the Hacienda "Sañgay" to which plaintiff's laborers have access. What should, therefore, be enjoined, if it were legally possible, is defendant's sale of tuba at the Hacienda "Sañgay," and not its conveyance across plaintiff's estate. But if, as plaintiff concedes (brief, p. 16), the former cannot legally enjoined, least of all can the latter be restrained as long as

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the public in general is free to go about the said property and it has not been shown that the defendant, in passing through, it has occasioned damage thereto or has committed any act infringing plaintiff's property rights or has refused to pay the required road toll.

Defendant's sale of tuba at the Hacienda "Sañgay" is nothing more than the exercise of a legitimate business, and no real damage to the third persons can arise from it as a natural and logical consequence. The bare possibility that plaintiff's laborers, d ue to the contiguity of the Hacienda "Sañgay" to its property, might come to the defendant's store to imbibe tuba to drunkenness, does not warrant the conclusion that the defendant, in thus running this business, impinges upon plaintiff's property rights and s hould thereby be judicially enjoined. It is said that the plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendant, not from selling tuba at his store in the Hacienda "Sañgay," but from passing through its property to introduce tuba to said hacienda (plaintiff's brief, p. 16.) The legal rule, however, is that what the law does not authorize to be done directly cannot be hone indirectly. If the plaintiff cannot judicially enjoin the defendant from selling tuba at the Hacienda "Sañgay," neither can it obtain said injunction to prevent him from passing over its property to transport tuba to that place as long as the defendant is ready to pay the transit fees required by the plaintiff and does not sell the said goods inside the said property. ISSUE: WON A PRIVATE ROAD OPEN TO PUBLIC USE MAY BE SUBJECT TO INJUNCTION AGAINST ONE PERSON. When a private road has been thrown open to public use, no action for trespass is maintainable against any person who desires to make use thereof; consequently, an injunction suit likewise does not lie. Private roads, except where laid out under constitutional provisions authorizing the condemnation of private property for a private use, are public roads in the sense that they are open to all who see fit to use them, and it is immaterial that the road is subject to gates and bars, or that it is merely a cul de sac. Being thus considered as a public road, it necessarily follows that the owner of the land through which the road is laid out cannot maintain an action of trespass against any person using it; . . . (50 C. J., pp. 397, 398.) B.

In its brief, plaintiff states:

In transporting the tuba which he sells in his saloon in Hacienda "Sañgay" the defendant used to pass thru the private road of  the plaintiff which connects its sugar central with the provincial road. On this private road the NNSC has put up a gate under the charge of a keeper, and every time that the defendant passed with a cargo of tuba the gatekeeper would stop him and remind him that the tuba was not permitted entry into the private properties of the company, but instead of heeding this prohibition the defendant would simply deviate from the road and continue on his way to hacienda "Sañgay" by way of the fields of Hacienda "Begoña." which is also the private property of the plaintiff. If an injunction should lie in the instant case, it should be in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, to enjoin the latter  from obstructing the former to pass over the road in question to convey tuba to the Hacienda "Sañgay." It is indeed strange t hat it is the plaintiff and not the defendant that should have applied for the remedy. C.

Plaintiff's action is frivolous and baseless.

6. That, in addition, the plaintiff, in the exercise of it property rights, does not want to allow the entry of the defendant in any part of its estate above mentioned in order to avert any friction or ill-feeling against him. The plaintiff, in petitioning the courts for an injunction to avert "friction or ill-feeling" against the defendant, invoking its sacred property rights, attempts to intrust to them a mission at once beyond those conferred upon them by the Constitution and the laws, and unbecoming of their dignity and decorum. D.

Plaintiff has not established the existence, real or probable of the alleged damage against which the injunction is invoked.

 As has been seen, the allegations of the amended complaint do not justify the granting of an injunction. The said allegations only state, as the basis of plaintiff's action, that the defendant insists in passing or "making incursions" on plaintiff's property to take tuba to the Hacienda "Sañgay," and the plaintiff wants to avoid "friction and ill-feeling against him." Such allegations do not imply the existence, of any real damage to plaintiff's rights which should be enjoined, and do not, therefore, constitute a legal cause of action. (CENTRAL REASONING AS STATED IN THE TESTIMONY OF GATE KEEPER) Q. Why does the Central prohibit the entry of  tuba? — A. The Central prohibits the entry of tuba there because the laborers, generally, buy tuba, drink it and become drunk, and are unable to work, and sometimes they fight because they are drunk. (S. t., p. 5.)

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Coming into Equity with Clean Hands. — The maxim that he who comes into equity must come with clean hands is, of course, applicable in suits to obtain relief by injunction. Injunction will be denied even though complainant shows that he has a right and would otherwise be entitled to the remedy in case it appears that he himself acted dishonestly, fraudulently or illegal in respect to the matter in which redress is sought, or where he has encouraged, invited or contributed to the injury sought to be enjoined. However, the general principle that he who comes into equity must come with clean hands applies only to plaintiff's conduct relation to the very matter in litigation. The want of equity that will bar a right to equitable relief for coming into court with unclean hands must be so directly connected with the matter in litigation that it has affected the equitable relations of the parties arising out of the transaction in question. (32 C. J. pp. 67, 68.)  A peaceful citizen who passes through a private road open to the public does not commit the crime of trespass. Although the prohibition to the accused to be in a private property should be manifest, if the latter is not fenced or uninhabited, the mere fact that the accused is found on the place in question, for a lawful purpose, does not constitute the crime of trespass defined and punished under article 281 of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: DETERMINATION OF THE KIND OF EASEMENT IN THIS CASE It is undisputed the road in question was constructed by the plaintiff on its own land, and that it connects the central or the "mill site" with the provincial road. We have also the admission that the plaintiff made this road accessible to the general public, regardless of class or group of persons or entities. Its use has been extended to employees and laborers of the plaintiff; and so also to all those who have a mind to pass through it, except that, in cases of motor vehicles, a passage fee of P0.15, each should be paid. There is no contention here that the defendant had refused to pay said tolls whenever he wanted to drive his car along the road in question. We, therefore, have the case of an easement of way voluntarily constituted in favor of a community. Civil Code articles 531 and 594 read:  ART. 531. Easements may also be established for the benefit of one or more persons or of a community to whom the encumbered estate does not belong. xxx

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 ART. 594. The owner of an estate may burden it with such easements as he may deem fit, and in such manner and form as he may consider desirable, provided he does not violate the law or public order. There is nothing in the constitution of this easement in violation of law or public order, except perhaps that the right to open roads and charge passage fees therefor i the State's by right of sovereignty and may not be taken over by a private individual without the requisite permit. This, however, would affect the right of the plaintiff to charge tolls, but not that of the defendant or of any other person to make use of the easement.  As may be seen from the language of article 594, in cases of voluntary easement, the owner is given ample liberty to establish them: "as he may deem fit, and in such manner and form as he may consider desirable." The plaintiff "considered it desirable" to open this road to the public in general, without imposing any condition save the payment of a fifteen-centavo toll by motor vehicles, and it may not now go back on this and deny the existence of an easement. Voluntary easements under article 594 are not contractual in nature; they constitute the act of the owner. If he exacts any condition, like the payment of a certain indemnity for the use of the easement, any person who is willing to pay it may make use of the easement. If the contention be made that a contract is necessary, it may be stated that a contract exits from the time all those who desire to make use of the easement are disposed to pay the required indemnity.

The plaintiff contends that the easement of way is intermittent in nature and can only be acquired by virtue of a title under  article 539. The defendant, however, does not lay claim to it by prescription. The title in this case consists in the fact that the plaintiff  has offered the use of this road to the general public upon payment of a certain sum as passage fee in case of motor vehicles.

The cases of Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Roxas (22 Phil., 450), and Cuaycong vs. Benedicto (37 Phil., 781), are not controlling, as there the attempt was to establish that the right to an easement of way had been acquired by prescription. Here defendant's contention is, that while the road in question remains open to the public, he has a right to its use upon paying the

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passage fees required by the plaintiff. Indeed the latter may close it at its pleasure, as no period has been fixed when the easement was voluntarily constituted, but while the road is thrown open, the plaintiff may not capriciously exclude the defendant from its use.

Furthermore, plaintiff's evidence discloses the existence of a forcible right of way in favor of the owner and occupants of the Hacienda "Sañgay" under the Civil Code, article 564, because, according to said evidence, those living in Hacienda "Sañgay" have no access to the provincial road except thru the road in question. Santiago Plagata, principal witness of the plaintiff, testified thus: ISSUE : NATUR EOF THE ROAD

Having been devoted by the plaintiff to the use of the public in general, upon paying the passage fees required in the case of  motor vehicles, the road in question is charged with a public interest, and while so devoted, the plaintiff may not est ablish discriminatory exceptions against any private person.

When private property is affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only; as if a man set out a street in new building on his own land, it is now no longer bare private interest, but is affected by a public interest. (Lord Chief Justice Hale in his treatise "De Portibus Maris, quoted with approval in Munn vs. Illinois, 94 U. S., 113 [1876], and in Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U. S., 502 [1934].)

""Toll" is the price of the privilege to travel over that particular highway, and it is a quid pro quo. It rests on the principle tha t he who, receives the toll does or has done something as an equivalent to him who pays it. Every traveler has the right to use the turnpike as any other highway, but he must pay the toll. (City of St. Louis vs. Creen, 7 Mo. App., 468, 476.)

 A toll road is a public highway, differing from the ordinary public highways chiefly in this: that the cost of its construction in the first instance is borne by i ndividuals, or by a corporation, having authority from the state to build it, and, further, in th e right of the public to use the road after completion, subject only to the payment of toll. (Virginia Cañon Toll Road Co. vs. People, 45 Pac., 396, 399; 22 Colo., 429; 37 L. R. A., 711.)

Toll roads are in a limited sense public roads, and are highways for travel, but we do not regard them as public roads in a just sense, since there is in them a private proprietary right. . . . The private right which turnpike companies possess in their roads deprives these ways in many essential particulars of the character of public roads. It seems to us that, strictly speaking, toll roads owned by private corporation, constructed and maintained for the purpose of private gain, are not public roads, although the people have a right to freely travel them upon the payment of the toll prescribed by law. They are, of course, public, in a limited sense, but not in such a sense as are the public ways under full control of the state, for public ways, in the strict sense, are completely under  legislative control. (Elliott, Roads & S., p. 5.) (Board of Shelby County Com'rs vs. Castetter, 33 N. E., 986, 987; 7 Ind. App., 309.. When private property is devoted to public use in the business of a public utility, certain reciprocal rights and duties are raised by implication of law between the utility and the public it undertakes to serve, and no contract between them is necessary to give rise thereto. . . . (51 C. J., sec. 12 p. 6.)

Wherefore the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs to the plaintiff.

 Abad Santos, J., concurs.

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