Ms# P-059 Project # 47 Tank Losses

AIM/

eKr

s

KS

# P-059

Burkhart M L RLHILLER11f Genieralmajor Qhef of Staff of Third P& izer Army

Koenigetein/Ts

3.0 Nov 31950

PROJECT # 47

GNRMAN~ TAINK LOSSiES

Translator: IEditort Reviewers

HISTORICAL

EUROFiRA1

DI VISION

COM sAD

M. FRIK G; VAN1'DRSTADT Cat ]3,X, HUFFORD

MS

P-059

INDEl2X CONTAINED) IN~ THE G I 's" COPY

MS # P-459 File No 72

12 Dec 1950

C

MOAI"Ui

FORt

Chief,

Operational History (Germ) Branch

Lt Col

NAWLOCK1Y

MS f P.059, Project

SUBJECT:

#

47,

TA1NK LOSSES

The following Questions are not answered fully: lb

Tank strength within Feldheer, listed by theater,.

2b

Tank losses and replacement for Polish, Norwegian, French, etc, campaigns,

2c

The topic Breakdown of losses by causative agents~ leader states that he cannot answer these questions more fully,

No information at all is given on the bases used in predicting tank losses (question 2d) and the answer to question 2e (guidance furnished tank producers...) is so vague that it can hardly be called an answer at all. introduction, the topic leader refers to a conIn his tribution by Emil LD , the former chief of the Army Armament Office, This contribution contains very much the same informat; ion embodied

in

the

study but also

the names

gives

and.

present

addresses of persons who should be able to give more detailed information on product ion and so forth, He further states that of the TIGER Panzer and of the model developed an illustration by PORSCHE*, the ELEPHANT Panzer on a demonstration trip (No 20) was printed in the September issue of the PINGUIN**,

Professor PORSCHE, the designer **

of the Volkswagen

Good illustrations and descriptions

types are to be found in FORCE S,

H,

of all German panzer

the HANDBOOK

HEI TiA n1

Consultant & Analyst

ON GERMA1O MILITARY

MS # ?-059

The Author

Herman -Burkhart

U

Gene ralajr, Born.,- 26 Dec 1904,

in

ERHILL BA1Ifl,

Dieuze,

;iU: +L+' -HILLeZeBRAN the Ohrdruf Officer

Lorraine,

received training Candidate School

in 1925 after having served

since April

1923 in the 16th Cavalzry Regiment, and. later underwent further training at the Hannover Cavalry School in 1925/26 and at the Berlin War College in 1934/368 II broke out, on Just before World far 15 September 1939, he was transferred of Army Organization Division from the 93 Inf Div as OperStaff to the Officer, On . October 1940 he was ations assigned. as adjutant to the Chief of Army General

General Staff end in ed Chief

April 1942

as

appoint-

of Organization Division of Army

In 1944, after two brief General Staff. Officer Reserve and an in the OKH spells assignment as Commander of 24th Panzer I'D was assigned +LER-HIa B Regiment, NI as Chief of Staff to

Ukraine and Poland,

XJOXVI Panzer Corps

remaining in

in

that position

to the as Chief of Staff until transferred During the Wear he served. Third Panzer Army, in France, Italy and on the east front and captured near Schwerin, Mecklenburg was finally

on 2 May l945

MS

P-059 F

CONTENTS

COHN3iNS 6

RU A

o

ON G'B.AN TAX K LO SSEiS

RY A KS

y

Pg

r

.V"" 4

v

a

v

$

a

.

6O'

MD,,

t

2

aai

Gere.n Nomenclature and Abbreviations used in the Text 1,

V. ICLi3

TYPEiS AND AIu A1: T OF ARM'OREDf a.,

Types

b*

Tak

c.,

Assault Guns and Je. .panzers

d.,

Antitank Cannon on Self'--Propelled

of' Tank Carriages *f

f

.4

"

"

.

$

$

s

*

,

90

a

3

"

4

*

.

..

.

*

.

.

a

."

,

6

e, Nomenclature of' Weapons and Their Abbreviations f,

2;p

3,

TANK

~

Performaceof Kw Kand Pak~

STREiNGTH

aW

a

a

m

"

.

vs

9

a

b

r

10

.

,

10

Tank s

b,

Assault Guns and Jagdpanzers (Tank Destroyers),

C,

Pak

,.

a .

a.~. v

..

.r

eafvavo

on Self- ropelled. IMounts,

TANK LOSSS ANDB 2PLAC MNT

.,

6

8

,

,

a,

,

7

*

..

10 10

,

0

0

9

4 4

"

(Tank Destroyers). Mount

I

.

0

$

17

M4S

# p-059

Franz EALDEIHR Genobst a )

Koenigstein/l

COMMET~itS

0N GBRA

(Project

TANK

~ 4'?;

LOSSES

MS # pO59)

thorough study of the subject,

the topic

Genmaj Butrkhart Mueller-Hillebrextd, has

succeeded. in

After

the

a

uestions

in

covering the years 1940,

answering most of

1943, 1944 and 1945,

could

and these do not provide as comprehensive a picture as to the

on strength,

of tank losses types of loss

former

allocation of tanks to theaters of operation,

incomplete data only,

statistics

leader,

detail,

For question ib,

be obtained,

7 Nov 1950

according to campaign (whether

(question 2 c),

it

As for the breaking down

production and losses,

permanent

or

(question temporary)

2

b),

according to

and according

to cause

was impossible to procure data useful in the preparat-

ion of statistics,

The

topic leader was able) however,

remaining question

pertaining

replies are given in dices),

to

to anwer in greater detail the

strength,

production and losses,

the form of tables ani. graphic charts (See

They are of great value because of

The

appen-

their completeness and the

clearness with which they have been presented and in this respect are perh-aps unique,

In regard

to the text, I am in full accord with the author.

(signed)

Franz HALDER

Genobst a

Dl

they

MS j p-059

PREFATORY

REMARKS

Principal sources of information available to the author were the monthly bulletins published by the German Army Ordnance Office under the title, Suirve

of Army armament,

These served as the

al statistical basis for the German Wehrmacht,

offici In

addition, the original documents of the Inspector General of the Tank Forces were made available to the author, and these contained the data for his reports to the

FuIehrer, 'These

sources may be regarded as

reliable. In addition, Gen d Art a D

Leeb, the former

Chief of the Army Ordnance Office, also made a study

available to the author,

MS #PO59

In conformity with the original manuscript, German nomenclature and abbreviations have been retained throughout the translation, In order to facilitate the reading of

this study

and attached

statistics, the German nomenclature and abbreviations used in the text have been consolidated on this page,

Flakc

Plug zeuga bwehrkano ne

antiaircraft gun

K

Kanone

cannon

Kwk

Kampfwagenkanone

tank gun

MG

Maschinengewehr

machine gun

Pak

Panzerabwehrkenone

antitank

Pak/ Sf1

Panzerabwehrkenone auf Selb stfahrlafet te

antitank gun on selfpropelled mount

Pz Bef W

Penzerbef ehl swagen

armored command car

Pz Kpfw

Panz erkampfwagen

tank

Stu Gesch

Sturmgeschuetz

assault gun

gun

(self-propell-

ed) Stu H

Sturmhaubit ze

assault howitzer (selfpropelled)

Stu K

St urmka none

assault cannon (self-* propelled)

Stu Ps

Sturmpanzer

assault tank

Jagdpanzer

tank destroyer

HJiashorn"

Panzer

"'rhinoceros" tank

MS # p-0O59

1, TYPES AND AR M NET

a, Types of Tank

Abbreviation:

Carriages:

Panzerkanipfwagen .Ltank/

Panzer Carriages:

OF ABMORL) VEHICLE~S

Pz Kpfw

Beofehl swagen Larmnored command carj:

I to VI,

35 (t),, 38

(t).

Pz Bef W~

The two latter types were

taken from the Ozechoslovakian Army and were produced in Ozechoslovakian factories,

b~

Tanks:

Type*

Principal Weapon**

Date Indtroduced to Troop Units

Pz Kpfw I

MG

already

Ps Kpfw II

Kw K 38, 20 mm

II

Flame thrower

Kpfw 35 (t)

Kw K 37 mm

Ps Kpfw 38 (t) Ps Kpfw III

Pz Kpfw

Pz

*

II (F)

if

to

,

'I

Ii

Bt

if

i,

II

Kw K 3? mm

if

i

Kw K 3? mm

is

if

Kw K 50 mm L 42

Jan 1941

Kw K 50 mm L 60

Jan 1942

Kw K 75 mm L 24

July 1942

Designation of ti'e includes designation of carriage. e tror abbreviations of weapor nomenclature.

* Cf .Sec.

use in 1940

Iv#P-05,9

Type

Principal Weapon

Date Introduced to Troop Units

Pz Kpfw III (i')

Flamethro~rer

Feb 43

Pz

Kw K

already in use in 1940

Kp'lr IV

75 mm L.24

KW K 40, 75 mm and. 48 Pak 42, 75 mm

Pz

Kpf'w V Panther

Pz

Kpfw

L

L

43

70

April 42 Aug 44

Kw K 42, 75 mm L 70

Feb 43

Kw K 36, 88 mmL 56

June 42

Pz Kpf'w VI Tiger

Kw K 43, 88 mm L 71

Niov

Flak tank on

Flak

carriage

barreled

38 (t) and IV

Flak 37 mm, 30 mm double-barreled

Pz :8etf W (carriage

same as Pz Kpfw 1-VI

VI

Tiger I

I-VT )

mm,

20

20

mm-four-

Recovery tank (carri-' a'ge 38 (t),

Also called Komnigtiger

1Nov 43

Jun 43

III, IV, V)

*

43

LtRoyal Tigerf,

MS f p--059

C,

Asault Guns~ and. JagdpanzersLTank

Abbreviations:

Sturngeschuetz L;assault gun7: Kamrofwagenkexione

tank cannonj:

Destroyers-7

Stu~ Gesch

Kw

K

Sturmhaubitze Lasseult howitzer 7:Stu H Stu K Sturmnkanone .Lassault cannonf Sturmpanzer Lassault tanskj

Stu Pz

Principal Weapon

Type*

Stu Gesch III

Kw K 75 mm L 24 Stu K 40,

Date Introduced to Troop U~nits

already

75 nun L 48

in use Apr 42

Stui K 40, 75 mm L 48

Dec 43

Stu H 42 (carriage III)

Stu H 42, 105 mm L 28

Mar 43

Stu Pz (carriage IV)

Stu H 43, 150 mm L 12

Apr 43

Jagdpanzer 38***

?ack 39, 75 mm L 48

Apr 44

Jagd~pan~zer IV

Pack 39, 75 mm L 48

Jan 44

Jagdpant her

Pack 43/3, 88 mm L 71

Oct 43

£lefhnt (carriage VI)**

Pak 43/2, 88 mm L 71

Apr 43

Jagdtiger (carriage VI)

Pak

Stu Gesch IV

(carriage V)

80,

128 mm L 55

* **

Dlesignation of type includes designation of carriages, Cf. Sec. e for abbreviations of wee; on nomenclature,

**4s

Also

'called "Panzerjaeger

38" or "Hetzer".

Also celled "Ferdinand" or "18.8 $tu Gesch, it,

Feb 44

in 1940

MS # PO'59

d~.

Ant ita k Cannon on Self -Pro elled Mount

Abbreviation:

Panzerabwehrkerione auf Selbstfahrlafette:

Type*

Weapon

Pak/ Sfi

Date Introdiuced to Troop Unit s

7:05 Pak 40/Sfl II

Pak 40, 75 rm

71b Pak 4U / Sfl 38 (t)

Pek

40, 75 mm

from Feb

7,5 Peik

Pak 40,. 75 mm

from Apr

76, 2

from Apr

40/ Sfl Lorraine**

7,62 Pek/

Sfl II

mm Pak 36 or

from Feb

76,2 mm K (r)*** 7,62 Pakf Sf1 38 (t)

76,2 mm 76,2

Nashorn/ Sf± III or IV

Pak 36 or

88 mm Pak 43/41,

L

from Apr 42

mmKIL(r) from Feb 42

71

Designation of type includes designiation of carriage, French carriage, Captured Russian gun.n, After rebuilding they were called K (r)"r', 36" : prior rebuilding thaeir designa~tion was Caliber length unknown.

117;62

117.62

Pak

M4S # P-.059

e, Nomenclature of Weapons anid their Abbreviations

Abbreviation

Nomenclature (Germani)

Translation (American)

MG'

Mschinengewehr

Machine gun

Kw K

Kanipfwagenkanone

Tank cannon

20 mm 3? mm, etc~

Kaliberdurchmesser in mm

Caliber diameter in mm

Kal iberlaenge des Rohre s

Length of the barrel

Pak

Pa c era bwehrkaxsone

Antitank cannon

Flak

Flie gerabw eh rkan on e

Antiaircraft gun

Stu K

Stixrikanone

Assault cannon

Stu H

Sturmhaubitze

Assault howitzer

L 42, L60

etc,

A number behind "Kw K"° or "Pak" designates the type,

Kw K 42 or Pak 39,

such as

The number, however, does not indicate the year

of introduction or construction.

MS # p-059

f.

Caliber mm

Cali

ber length

Performance of Kw K and Pak

Muzzle velo-.

Armor-piercing capacity in mm with armor-piercing shell 39 at an impact angel of 600 and a range of

city

M/sec

100m

50Cm

100Cm

1500m

2000m

75

48

704

!99

91

82

67

63

75

70

925

138

129

111

99

88

88

56

773

120

110

110

91

84

88

71

1000

.222

185

165

148

132

228

215

202

190

178

18

592

250Cm

166

300Cm

155

14S # P#059

2,

TAILK STR1E1GTH

=Apiendix

1 shows tank strength on the following dates:

1 Septeber

1939

1 April 1940 1 September 1940

1 January 1941 After January, 1941,

strength is shown as of the first of every month

up to 1 February 1945, Strength in this case indicates the total strength in tanks of all units of the

Army

(Field and Replacement Army) and the Waffen-SS at

repair installations, schools, ordnance depots and the like4

Appendix 1 lists tanks according to type, which the author has classified in the following three groups: a, Tanks

A tank

is

b,

Assault guns and Jagdpanzses tank destroyers-/

c,

Pak on self-propelled mounts,

characterized by

a revolving turret;

it is the principal

weapon of the Armored Command, In assault guns and Jagdpaenzer the gun is not mounted in a turret, which makes the vehicle lower and less ponderous and saves material and work hours,

Assault guns and Jagdpenzers are principally 'employed as

1vS #

PO59 or antitank weapons

infantry stxpprort

in

conjunction

with other

arms

of the service, The Pak on a

self-.propelled

mount

to

It is open on top.

compensate

temporarily for

is

simply

an

antitank

lightly armored in front and.

gun mounted on a tank carriage and is on the sides.

(Pak/Sfl)

The Pak/Sfl is an emergency weapon

the lack of production

of assault

guns

and Jagdpanzers. Obsolete tank models, which can no longer be employed at the front, are

specifically

designated as

They were normally

in

the Replacement

of some of these

tanks which had not

inventories were

rebuilt

Army;

by occupation The

partisans,

carriages

been removed comletely from Army

PekfSf1 or Jagdpanzers.

sa

has not been possible,

It

Appendix 1.

the protection of troops against

and in

troops

used

such in

in

to break down the vehicles

Appendix 1,

according to theater or according to Field. and Replacement Army, It was possible

to give a

only for certain

In the Western Camaign of as part of

the strength, (second Pz,

*

the Field. Army

but only after

column) began on 10

Kpfw.1

"

"

field

but

1940 the'following tanks

(The figure in

1940,

1 April

May

&ay

The

brackets denotes

Western; Campaign

1940) 523

(1062)

II

955

(1079)

III

349

(329)*

The figure for ?z,Xpfw III participating in the exceeds the strength as of 1 April, is explained of this

theater

key-dates,

a. participated

limited breekdown according to

type

rolling

forces in

off

production

lines

time for the campaign

in

Western

Campaign, which by the fact that vehicles

April were

delivered

to

the

KS # p-059 Pz Kpfw

IV

278

(280)

a

"a

35 t

106

(143).

11

"

38 t

228

(238)

Pz Bef WLarmoaconmand car Total

b,

on 4

M

1943

135(2) (.3379 )

2574

on the Eastern

Front

inclusive of the Wfaffen-SS.

(The

The following tanks were by the field forces,

employed

figuires in brackets denote strength of the respective types as of 1 Mae~ 1943) : Pz IKpfw

III

507

(1465)

f

IV

541

(1077)

VI

72

(165)

r Ha

In repair installations Total:o NIote:

162

(230

The difference between the figures in the second column and

those in brackets is accounted for by distribution over the remaining theaters, the Replacement Army, tank repair installations. in the Zone of Interior and the ordnance depots,

c,

The Ps

fw II

VI and assault guns employed on the

Eastern Front on 10 June 1943 by the field forces, inclusive of the Waffen-SS amounted to the following:

MS

#

p059

(The figure in brackets denotes total Army strength

as

of 1 June

1943),; Ready for employment In

repair

2569

installations

463

Total

3032 (5416)

Notes

The difference

distributed

as set

d, theaters total

is

A

between forth

the

figure

under b,

possible

for

Pz

Kpfw IV (

-I-~---

period and several (Figures denoting

Last

West -

-brackets was

brackets)

Italy

1 Feb

---

same

beginning of 1944.

the

are added in

-

in

above,

breakdown covering much the

Army strength

Pz Kpfw III action)

and that

'r

29 Feb -

-

-"-

23 Feb 44 1

-

-

~--

ZI Repair 29 Feb 44 -

I

Total Strength

I1

-

Mar44

-r

for

106

99

450

ready for

171

58?

405

290

128

418

(1339)

63

78

149'

(504)

(ready

655

( 888)

:1 1163 I(1824)

action) Pz Kpfw V (ready for act ion)

Pz Kpfw VI (ready action)

for

8

6

Pz Bef W (ready for action)

6

Assault guns

141

194

Total

(ready for action)

432

1233

In repair installJationsf

49

Gr~nd

totali

c-----

481

12333

-------

171

506

(466)

(~no

1519

-

1534

1232

3053

1232

115999

(80a)1

MS

#

p-059

The difference in

number of vehicles,

i.e.

the difference between

8031 and 5999 (2032 vehicles) applies to vehicles in use by occupation N5orway and in

troops in

activated units

in

the Balkans, including Crete and Rhodes, newly

the Zone of Interior,

ordnance depots and. the Replace-

ment Army.

The following survey shows the reinforcements,

e,

to month and type of tank, assigned to the tank forces in ing the six months preceding the Allied invasion.

according

the

'West dur-

The percentage of

allover tank strength represented by each month's reinforcement, indicated by figures in

Date

Pz III

j

Pz IV

is

brackets.

Pz

V

Pz VI

Stu Gesch

Total

Jgdpz (%)

(%)

(%)

1%)

31 Dec 43

145 (16)

316 (19)

157 (14)j

38 (10)

223 (10)

879 (14)

31 Jan 44

98 (11)

410 (24)

180 (15)'

64 (15)

171

(7)

1 923 (14)

29 Feb 44

99

587 (32)

290 (22)

63 (12)

194

(6)

99 (12)

52? (25)

323 (20)

45 (9)

211

(7)

114 (14)

674 (32)

514 (31)'101 (18)

219 (7)

1622 (19)

748 (32)

663 (35) 102 (16)

310

1862 (20)

31

Mar

44

30 Apr 44 10 Jun 44

39

(11)

(5)

(

(8)

1210 (16) 11205

(15)

MiS ; P059-1.

IT.

-15

Pz

Kpf'w

and

Stu Gesch with the field forces on the

eastern Front as of' 5 Januar 1945:

Stu Ge sch ?z units; brigades 0)

Pz Jaeger companies

Total F..stern Front

0))

Strength

(according to Appendix

ro

y4E

Pz Kpfw IV

596

596

(2259)

670

(1982)

(q

670 26

26

Pz Bef W, Flakpz

Stu Gesch

(428) (576)

641

902

949

1933

902

949

Jagdp z

} {

2492

( 6167)

3784

(11412)

*Already included in the figures directly above. 0) Stu Gesch Brigades ~[Sturmgeschxetz Brigaden -Assault gun brigades / are GHC, troops for the reinf'orcement of' infaentry divisions, 0)) Pz Jaeger companies are component parts of' infantry divisions,, N~oce: The great Russian offensive, which extended over the entire Eastern Front began on 15 January 1945,

1)

us # P-059

g,

Tank strength at

the

Wetern Front on 5 February 1945:

Strength

Pz Kpfw III and IV if

n

V

if

"r

VI

Readyr for action

Strength

ing

(accord-

to Appendix 1)

110

68

(2810)

219

.96

(1964)

61

26

(

404) 299)

Pz~efW

(228)

Flak tanks

Total number vehicles

390

190

(5705)

892

533

(6054)

Assault tank

32

15

( 188)

Jagdpz V

66

43

( 208)

Jagdpz VI

28

Stu

Gesch

anid

Jagclpz

IV

Total number of Jagdpz and Stu Ge sch

1Nashorn (?ako/SfJ. with 88 mm cannon)

1018

( 51))

I21 .612

(6501)

12

8

Total number of Pz Kpfw, Stu ~esh an. lashrn 120

10

( 141)

12277?)

MS # P-059

TANK LOSSES AND I fLACBMirT

3.

a,

In

principle the repairing of tanks was carried out as close

to the front as possible,

The repair services accompanied the troops

to the combat area, as far as enem~y fire

TLhe motor officers

permitted..

of the tank battalions accompanied the repair services to the combat area and directed their

employment there.

In

this

manner these officers

were able personally to survey losses and damages. Daiaged tanks which could not be repaired with the means available to the field

forces were collected by recovery vehicles and turned

over to the repair companies of the tank regiments or to other repair services.

In the evening,

battalions or regiments were informed as

to the number of tanks ready for action, the number in need of minor repairs,

the number in

need of major repairs and total

figures were reported through command channels at divisional headquarters

losses.

(adjutant

These

to Ia branch

and from there to Is. branch at corps headchannels (regimental

quarters, etc.), as well as through traffic

control

motor officer to divisional motor officer).

This short standardized

report was transmitted by telephone or radio, and from division to higher echelons usually by teletype.

These

daily reports were supplemented by a monthly report through

traffic control channels in which the daily reports were compiled and,

if

necessary, corrected and completed

by means of accurate and

detailed accounts covering damages and causes.

These reports were for-

warded through channels to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration

MS + p-O59

at the Army High Command, who in agencies in

turn,

submitted them to interested

the Army High Command for further evaluation~

Total losses are compiled in Appendix 2 and are broken

b0

down by month and according to tank types beginning with comprise all

These losses

whether they occurred in

by vehicles,

falling

ion or were the

losses

combat

at

regardless

1941, of

through enemy action, were occasioned

into enemy hands in

result

the front,.

May

damaged or undamaged condit

of "canibalization".

of damaged vehicles

to

make others fully serviceable,*

Temporary losses (damages) During the latter repaired the

by the field

tank regiment,

repaired

in

repair

are not considered in

part of, the War, forces,

while

and at

only about

shops in

Appendix 2.

95 percent of damages were

least

95 percent

5 percent

of these within

of the damages

the Zone of the Interior,.

In

this

were

connect-

ion see also the following;

Performance of the Tank Re air Services aa

At the front, ie,

the' tank repair shop companies of the

regiments, armies and army groups, exclusive of repair services in companies, etc~:

Reductions in number because of sales to foreign countries, transfers to agencies outside the Wehrmacht and total loss in the Replacement These are so small, however, that Army have not been considered. they would not have affected the statistics to an appreciable extent,

*1P -19"4

P-059

MS

Month

Pz

II-VI

Stu Gesch

Pak/ Sfl

Total

Motors

.200

1825

143

Oct 43

973

652

Nov

911

698

195

1804

216

Dec

1294

873

224

2391

2831

2190

1111

938

4239

228

Jan

*44

10259

Total

bb.

Zone of the Interior:

Oct 43

62

22

45

129

1Nov.

90

19

36

145

Dec

57

41

30

128

Jan 44

71

91

39

201

Total

C.

It was impossible

to prepare

603

a breakdown of losses

according to cause.

d~. Estimation

of tank losses and replacement

Up to the beginning of the 1941 Rissian campaign, the course of the War was rather abnormal on the German side because consumption of materie1 occurred almost exclusively during the short the campaigns (Poland~, Norway, made it. possible,

periods

France, Yugoslavia/Greece) lasted.

This

in spite of low -production, to increase the stocks of

war materiel whichi were very limited at the beginninz of the

War

during

v S # p-059

-20w

the long intervals between the campaigns, of 1941,

sufficient

forces

were at

so that,

hand for

in the summer

the difficult

task

ahead.,

For production data see Appendix 3, In

of Pz Xpfw and

of very low production

spite

been possible to increase

of

the tank divisions,

the

customary four,

it

had

the number of tank divisions from ten to

twenty during the period oaf twelve months beginning of

French campaign and the

Stu Gesch,

however,

between

the end of the Some

the Russian campaign,

had only two battalions instead

Su.bseqyuently,

of

they were to have been brought up

to full strength, the beginning of the Russian campaign

Aside from 4200 Pz Kpfw, at there was as a result of this

amounted to

Monthly production

able.

situation, practically no reserve avail.,

The Army High Command viewed this

increasing,

concern but had

been unable to

quirements for

the campaign

losses

from current

believed that operations

during

on a large

N~evertheless, the

It

hoped

especially

to

be able

since

scale were impossible

3800 Pz Kpfw were

expected to roll

from the beginning of the camipaign,

Mays, 1942, that

production,

with great

being aole to meet

could risk

against Russia.

was

it

reto

erroneously

in Russia

the winter.

Approximately lines

it

it

but

development

step up production,

Army High Command believed that

replenish

only 260 Pz Kpfw,

in

June,

off production

1940,

to the end of

i.e. prior to the beginning of furtner large operations in

year, At first

actual

production

came up to expectations,

Losses during

~jS P p-059

the summer of 1941,1900 tanks up to the end of October,

were

high

but could have been met by current production without difficulty if

two unexpected events had not

complicated the situation:

a.

The fighting continued unabated during the winter

b,

The superiority in

months,

which appeared in

armament of the Russian T 34 tanks,

ever-increasing numbers, neutralized the lightly

armed German tank models on the battleield, the latter

with the result that

had to be withdrawn and replaced by new models equipped

with better

cannon,

(Of. Appendix 1),

In preparation of the big summer offensive. of 1942, majority of our tank units from battle

in

was to participate,

spite of the fact

in

which the

tanks were withdrawn

that doing so involved great risks.

Thiese were completely re-equipped so that approximately 2500 Pz Kpfw could be conmmitted in

this

From the beginning

operation alone. of the campaign of 1941 up to the start

the summer offensive on 1 July 1942,

approximate losses of 3850 Pz Kpfww

were offset by the production of 4100 tanks.

However,

number of over 1000 tanks must be added to the losses, tanks were no longer fit

of

an additional since these

for service at the front,

The Stu Gesch and the PakfSf1 have so far not been taken into consideration. weapon, tests

still

The in

Stu Geech was at that time a

the development

at the front.

Its

stage,

comparatively new

and had to undergo extensive

production surpassed losses to a

considerable

extent so that the supply of 400 available at the beginning of the

-2 -22-

IVS f p-059

campaign increased to 780 by 1 July

1942.

These weapons did not

increase the fighting power of the tank divisions,

D~endices 5 and 6 show comparative production

infantry divisions. and loss figures,

The Pak/ Sf1 was introduced in the spring of 1942

the production in the Armored Command.

to fill

but that of the

This was a, temporary

emergency solution, designed to increase antitank fighting power at the front.

If these vehicles are included in the estimate, a more

as

favorable picture develops,

shown by the following statistics:

for action

remd 1Jul 41

lDec 4l

lkiar42

1 Jul42

1 Jan43

4278.

4084

2468

3471

4364

598

625

780

1155

306

1124

4557

6643

Pz Kpfw

416

Stu Gesch Pakf Sf1

--

3093

4682

4694

Total

The heavy destruaction of tank forces at Stalingrad introduced a new phase,9

Here,

as

well as

losses increased immensely.

during the ensuing retrograde. battles,

From

January

to the followings 2945

Pz

Kpfw,

461 Stu Gesch, 426 Pak/ Sfl1

to

April 1943 they amounted

MS # p-059

Kpfw

The strength of the Pz 2500 during this

ed to

that,

fact

would it

This,

this initiative,*

of the

the enemy now also

Only by conducting the War 1943 to

have been possible in

the German command,

regain

however, could not decide

do, mistake was soon followed by another.

The Stalingrad

following upon it

with the retreats

costly in chats

tank

4

new tank units

necessary

of a considerable

these

shown in

Appendix

attained,

very

2 ahd in the graphic

5,j

rehabilitation of units

increase in production,

impeded in

was

spite

The result was that the

and this It

consequently affected the fighting power of

was only in

the spring

of 1944,

available tanks again increased appreciably, in l4arch,

was again

July 1943,

tanks were distributed over an ever-increasing number of

units, units,

and

(Uitadele'"l),

Orel-Kursk

after

The un-

the fact that Hitler continuously ordered activation of

Due to

available

This is

losses,

in bend~es

tank

of 1943 at

summer offensive

successful

1944,

the tank

However, due to

so that,

Similar conditions prevailed

for exanple,

1944,, the number of available

wartime peak with 5800 vehicles, the overtaxing

the number of

that

as of January 1943, was again

strength

At the beginning of July,

tanks reached its

*

result

as a

had passed to

evident in the field of materiel,

on an economical basis

to

The

the initiative

Stalingrad defeat, became

period,

ready for action thus again decreas-

of tank forces

(Cf. Appendix 4),

which. had occurred earlier,

in other fields of materiel and personnel.

MS : p-059

the increase in

materiel was counterbalanced by a decrease in

train-

so that the fighting power of these forces was no

ed personnel,

longer commensurate with the number of tanks available. increase in losses was the result. during the battles after

by A

endice

certain extent by increased production; 3 and the graphic chart in Appendix 7.

-

Developments in the field more favorable,

The high losses in tanks suffered

the invasion of France and during the retreats

in Russia could be met to a as illustrated

A steady

of assault guns and Jagdpanzers were

due to the fact that their

requirements

and' labor were considerably lower than those for tanks,

in

materiel

so that

it

was easier to increase production, In conclusion, and judging by the course of events after 144,

it

may be regarded as an established fact that although tanks were subject to almost continuous commitment, forces could be maintained at a 10

15 'percent of its

however, posal

fixed level by monthly production of

over-all strength,

is that the tank forces have a

to take care of all

themselves. units

the strength of the German tank

A sufficient

A prerequisite for this,

repair service at their dis-

small and average repairs within the units supply of snare parts and interchangeable

must be made available to unit repair

Quick repair of damages sustained, able to work efficiently,

e,

installations

to insure

Unless repair installations are

the number of total losses quickly increases,

Tank production was guided through the following channels:

The Army General Staff,

on the -basis of strategic intentions

and

MMS #

p

25-

O59

organizational plans, filed a request with the General Army Office for the further development

of the tank arm,

For the purpose of establish-

ing a pattern, this request took into consideration a long period of time (several this In

reauest case it

years). in

detail

The

General Army Office in

and

forwarded it to the Army Ordnance Office,

turn worked out

should be impossible for these three offices of

Chief of the Army had to

the Commander in

a uniform conception,

Army High Command to attain

make

The Army Ordnance Office

the decision.

integrated the resulting plan into its

the

over-all armament plan, which

had to be approved by the Wehrmacht High Command,

Tnereafter

the

Ordnance Office had to insure that everything proceeded according to plan±, The already

output necessary

industrial

existed

or had

to

be created,

to attain

the goal

During the

either

course of the

War the authority of the agencies involved shifted as a result of the creation of a Miinistry for of Army Equipment, Chief of the

Army

Armaments

a.

and

With the dissolution of the post of Commander in and the assumption of its

fuanctions by the Chief

of the Wehrmacht High Comu and and Hitler himself since Hitler showed increased interest to armaments

in

-

particularly

all questions pertaining

authority shifted more and more to the Fuehrer.

For 1940, prior to the French campaign, quota for tanks

Office of Chief

and

the monithly production

assault guns was established at 600;

was to be attained in 1943,

goal

At the beginning of 1940) production

was still considerably below 200, campaign the figure wias 300.

this

At the beginning of the Russian

The increase in

tank divisions from ten

u26-

HIS #i p-059

to

twenty,

beginning with the autumn

of 1A940,

of the monthly production quota of 600 tanks. demand

to

raise

guns to 1250,

the

monthly production

led

to

a

revision

The result was a

quota of tanks and assault

This reqies ,in January,

1941,

fulfillment of which

was dependent on the building of new production centers, was opposed by the Minister of Armaments, Todt, as exaggerated and impossible obtained an order from the

The latter regarded the demands

to satisfy

by German industry,

Wehrmacht High Command,

prohibited. an increase over the old quota of 600, being, the Army High Command was' satisfied

Keitel,

He

which

For the time

with this

decision

and

oelieved that it would be able to conduct the campaign against Russia without

the

increase,

The considerations

which motivated this

attitude

have been mentioned above,

In January, the

Arnlrls

the Chief of the Ordnance Oftice again presented

1942,

requirements,

1250

tanks and assault

the Minister of Armaments.

In the meantime,

high losses in

past

tanks in

of tank divisions

tor

the

during

guns per

however,

the winter,

had been ordered by Hitler,

and bounds.

ments to Hitler, moment

The

who failed

inister

further

activation

to

of Armaments presented make

a

decision,

since

to

there had been activation of tank units

the SS had started and the demands for assault guns

by leaps

month,

had increased the recuire-

he was for

the

favorably impressed by events at the front and relied upon the

effect of the more This made him doubt

efficient antitank guns whose employment

wa s

imminent,

the future of the tank forces,

In response to renewed pressure by the Chief of the Ordnance

-27-

MS + P059

Office von Speer,

Minister of Armaments,

finally was compelled to make a

in

decision,

July 1942,

Hitler

He now exceeded the

origin-

el. demand. made by the Army and ordered a monthly production of 1450 tanks and assault guns,

steps which were immediately taken

The

to increase production and to fill the spring of 1943,

sults in A joences In

as shown in

meet

the reauested increases

to coordinate production

kinds,

graphic charts in

the

60

order to

necessary various

and 5

the new quota began to show re-

especially

as a

large

of a

great

number

in

production

many factories of plants

it

was of

shared in

the production of the following parts: Tank hulls.

Tracks and bogie wheels. Motors, Gears,

Turrets, Armament.

Optical instruments, Ammunition, etc, In

addition,

frequent changes in tank types,

which occurre.during of

the

the War, had to

Ordnance Office

and,

be considered,

armament, It

etc,,

was the mission

later, the Ministry of Armaments constantly

to coordinate production orders and the capacity of the manufacturing

plants

by allocating manpower,

etc,

The fact

that tnis was to a

great extent achieved in the face of great difficulties and in

spite

1s P-059

of the air war is shown in A nni Arnendi es 5

n

h

rpi

hrsi

and 6_,

The air attacks were successfully minimized by transferring proOduction centers to areas in less danger and particularly by de-

centralising prodtuction,

It was not until the end of 1944 that

the air war affected production.so severely that there was a cow~

siderable drop in production, sig. Burkhart MUZ " Ri HILLIBRI#

1)

*) a csaul t guns and Tank Ld for destroyirs readfo

Te&F

TYF

AAN

z

Fahrge8tell Carrisage

1.1

I

(F)

II

38(t)

35(t)

II/III

III

35(t) 38(t)

III

gun Tank

-Tank

Iv

guia Tank

Tank

* a ff

e

M.G.

Z=t

WepnMachine.

:

Coluan

gun colun

1.4.1940

I

A

t

1.2. J1.3. 11.41.

1.6.

1

11..

1.9.

1

1.10. 11] 1.11.

: ___ ___

1445

1223

10c2

1075

1.?. 1.3.

1

44.

J

1.5.

1.6. 31.7.

1.6. I

[.g. 11.10. 11.11, 11.1L. 1

5 cm~

1023

78

____

___

3 7

955

871

984 994

85

1019

____

___

143

7,.5

7,5

L 24

L 43

75mm

877 843

187:

1072 1067 9E5S 900

771

642

86

189 191,

896

717

1911

86

17LI

T ~0

708 693

1751

191 Ii

23e

it;" " 7.5

K . X.

L 70

9

10

528

1110 1200 1323 1440

476 459 499

1501

533. 488

1571 1646 1784

470

1.6. 1.7.

110.10.

2630 U

.

1077

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7399

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114

30

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11 11 1

g..

lo

261 284 299

34 9

1339 1617

499 556

5 6

1649

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12 31

2105 2067 34+ 216 0 94 179;1. 211 1729

22

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00

19-2 1964

41.

631 511 253 245 243

:_45

1 85

55

101 175

121 140 141 141

183 219

(*)

Without ohne Pz III ;.; ,iWth K,.KC. 37nm

R ear_

Im {Siheru

t bL

2738 2695

4"62

2468

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2718 2 946 3251 34,1

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3365

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508

50,

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541

147

573

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4u11

625 605 625

625

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5521

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605

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5433

625

625

623

-

3300 3093 3341

637

623 637

5087 5425

637

128

6 97

128 27C

5647

3711

697

6352

4218

306

6749

4557 4764

600

6964 7376 7426 784

112.4. 1222 1069

79 27 7929

6643

my

780 831 873 907

780

966

4364

43

161716

±61683 1818 16191 S187

193 .1945

3863

1911 2077

4 207 4 s16 4 823 5461 5307 5486

20-7

1±oo

6036 6284

5670

1696

5582

5206

1401 1573

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5396

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45%4 471 '~

12

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21415

204 2358 2071 2401 2071 2804

3026 204 2696 2655 228 2768 225 2859

1~I 22

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1?1 106 10VV

97 11.9 182 175

210 272 2%6

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2803 2814

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22

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21

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5463

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4085

4896 4828

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320 299

defLW

461 479

3904 4002

278 280 252 317 324

5119

256 228

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4539

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412 430 461 509 507

2271

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-7

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165

6o1 6 75 783 912

I260j _2h 91

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428 524

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335

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257 256 257

204

93

5264 5310

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255

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103

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3685

266

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260 286

24,"82 2457

W-9i

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on self-

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6

264

242 100

ready

4178 4317

661

2762

tanks

4467

2306

252

3195

307 289 278 273 26 9

9)'701.

y

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19

328 315

534

Stu. H. Stu. Jagd- Jagd-

for use tank tank gun 75.i:3~X i~4 L48

454 479 479

2944

1-16

2O0n

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III/

w. K.XW.K. 7,5 '7,

Pzspf.

;6w i -

2068

12;7

QlYuns

cmn3?min

530

2767

Antitwangun

hieeil

uln6

513 19W 893 16S6

zhe

215 ifourbarreled 243 ~~30 mm double-T-86 barrled 2441 232

499 485

or

-

Vier-

2cm

517

1479

3)34 950 730

2 cm

Zeilen

.

453

3)

e 1IPk/ 4=DaA-tI

9 t

--

III/ f rontfac- :III IV

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2o:.

1015

d

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TStu.c Stu. G.

Ider

d),etr

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;-L. U.

636 686 754 763 661 543 547

co

3,7

11

3

-

T

TOTAL

r

Summer~f

*)armored i

K. Flak

Kam. ~. , ,8 L 56 L 71 83mm 86mm

'U

X26 c#.ti' 520 570

522 521

692

u.48

L 70 75mm

9WUL

ain

y

Pz b Bef. Wten I -VI

IV

rn .-L.

329

491

907{ 97(' 11021f

7,9J

fTack

n

ecov

Recove

Flak

3 cia

201'

6o 708 701 092 692

Pak-

VI

Tsnk

front uie.

Destroyers

P--W-W-

Pz. 36(t)

75mm

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