moralidad vs sps pernes digest.pdf

[ G.R. No. 152809, August 03, 2006 ]

MERCEDES MORALIDAD, petitioner, VS. SPS. DIOSDADO PERNES AND ARLENE PERNES, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Davao City which is the subject of the controversy. The petitioner had worked in U.S.A. for years until retirement. Being single, she would usually stay in the house of her niece, respondent Arlene Pernes, at Mandug, Davao City during her vacation and that in 1986, when she received news from Arlene that Mandug was infested by NPA rebels and many women and children were victims of crossfire between government troops and the insurgents, she immediately sent money to buy a lot in Davao City proper where Arlene and her family could transfer and settle down. Petitioner wanted the property to be also available to any of her kins wishing to live and settle in Davao City and made known this intention in a document she executed on July 21, 1986. which reads: I, MERCEDES VIÑA MORALIDAD, of legal age, single, … hereby declare: 1. That it is my desire that Mr. and Mrs. Diosdado M. Pernes may build their house therein and stay as long as they like; 2. That anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned real property should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering with one another; 3. That anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof; 4. That anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the wishes of the undersigned may exercise the freedom to look for his own; 5. That any proceeds or income derived from the aforementioned properties shall be allotted to my nearest kins who have less in life in greater percentage and lesser percentage to those who are better of in standing. In her retirement, petitioner came back to the Philippines to stay with the respondents’ on the house they build on the subject property. In the course of time, their relations turned sour which resulted in violent confrontations and the filing of suits at the barangay lupon and to the Ombudsman for conduct unbecoming of public servants and at the MTCC, an ejectment suit for unlawful detainer. The MTCC rendered judgment for the petitioner directing the defendants to vacate the premises and to yield peaceful possession thereof to plaintiff. Respondent spouses appealed to the RTC where the decision of the MTCC was reversed, holding that respondents’ possession of the property in question was not by mere tolerance of the petitioner but rather by her express consent. It further ruled that Article 1678 of the Civil Code on reimbursement of improvements introduced is inapplicable since said provision contemplates of a lessor-lessee arrangement, which was not the factual milieu obtaining in the case. Instead, the RTC ruled that what governed the parties’ relationship are Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. Petitioner went to the CA wherein her petition was denied on the ground that it is still premature to apply Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code considering that the issue of whether respondents’ right to possess a portion of petitioner’s land had already expired or was already terminated was not yet resolved. The CA further ruled that what governs the rights of the parties is the law on usufruct but petitioner failed to establish that respondents’ right to possess had already ceased. ISSUES: What provisions of the Civil Code should govern the rights of the parties. Whether or not the respondents’ right to possess the land had been terminated. HELD:

Usufruct is defined under Article 562 of the Civil Code in the following wise: ART. 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides. Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to enjoy another’s property. It is also defined as the right to enjoy the property of another temporarily, including both the jus utendi and the jus fruendi, with the owner retaining the jus disponendi or the power to alienate the same. It is undisputed that petitioner, in a document, made known her intention to give respondents and her other kins the right to use and to enjoy the fruits of her property and the respondents were being given the right “to build their own house” on the property and to stay thereat “as long as they like.” Paragraph #5 of the same document earmarks “proceeds or income derived from the aforementioned properties” for the petitioner’s “nearest kins who have less in life in greater percentage and lesser percentage to those who are better of in standing.” The established facts undoubtedly gave respondents not only the right to use the property but also granted them, among the petitioner’s other kins, the right to enjoy the fruits thereof. There are other modes or instances whereby the usufruct shall be considered terminated or extinguished. For sure, the Civil Code enumerates such other modes of extinguishment:

ART. 603. Usufruct is extinguished: (1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears; (2) By expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the title creating the usufruct; (3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person; (4) By renunciation of the usufructuary; (5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct; (6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct; (7) By prescription. The document executed by the petitioner constitutes the title creating, and sets forth the conditions of the usufruct. Paragraph #3 thereof states “That anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to

stay therein and may avail the use thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof”. What may be inimical to the purpose constituting the usufruct may be gleaned from the preceding paragraph wherein petitioner made it abundantly clear “that anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned property should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering with one another.” That the maintenance of a peaceful and harmonious relations between and among kin constitutes an indispensable condition for the continuance of the usufruct is clearly deduced from the succeeding Paragraph #4 where petitioner stated “That anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the wishes of the undersigned may exercise the freedom to look for his own.” In fine, the occurrence of any of the following: the loss of the atmosphere of cooperation, the bickering or the cessation of harmonious relationship between/among kins constitutes a resolutory condition which, by express wish of the petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct. Thus, the Court rules that the continuing animosity between the petitioner and the Pernes family and the violence and humiliation she was made to endure, despite her advanced age and frail condition, are enough factual bases to consider the usufruct as having been terminated. The relationship between the petitioner and respondents respecting the property in question is one of owner and usufructuary. Accordingly, respondents’ claim for reimbursement of the improvements they introduced on the property during the effectivity of the usufruct should be governed by applicable statutory provisions and principles on usufruct. In this regard, we cite with approval what Justice Edgardo Paras wrote on the matter: If the builder is a usufructuary, his rights will be governed by Arts. 579 and 580. By express provision of law, respondents, as usufructuary, do not have the right to reimbursement for the improvements they may have introduced on the property. We quote Articles 579 and 580 of the Civil Code:

Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so without damage to the property Art. 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements he may have made on the property against any damage to the same.